Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules

Details

Serval ID
serval:BIB_12D5E8EA8B9D
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Title
Probabilistic assignments of identical indivisible objects and uniform probabilistic rules
Journal
Review of Economic Design
Author(s)
Ehlers L., Klaus B.
ISSN
1434-4742
Publication state
Published
Issued date
2003
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
8
Number
3
Pages
249-268
Language
english
Abstract
We consider a probabilistic approach to the problem of assigning k indivisible identical objects to a set of agents with single-peaked preferences. Using the ordinal extension of preferences we characterize the class of uniform probabilistic rules by Pareto efficiency, strategy-proofness, and no-envy. We also show that in this characterization no-envy cannot be replaced by anonymity. When agents are strictly risk averse von Neumann-Morgenstern utility maximizer, then we reduce the problem of assigning k identical objects to a problem of allocating the amount k of an infinitely divisible commodity.
Keywords
Probabilistic rules, Single-peaked preferences, Strategy-proofness, Uniform allocations
Create date
11/05/2010 14:26
Last modification date
20/08/2019 12:41
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