Positive Self-Image and Incentives in Organizations

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Ressource 1Télécharger: BIB_0DDE9451ACF7.P001.pdf (209.86 [Ko])
Etat: Serval
Version: de l'auteur
ID Serval
serval:BIB_0DDE9451ACF7
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Titre
Positive Self-Image and Incentives in Organizations
Périodique
The Economic Journal
Auteur(s)
Santos Pinto L.
ISSN
0013-0133
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
08/2008
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
118
Numéro
531
Pages
1315-1332
Langue
anglais
Résumé
This paper investigates the implications of workers' mistaken beliefs about their abilities on incentives in organisations. It shows that if effort is observable, then an agent's mistaken beliefs about his own ability are favourable to the principal. However, when effort is unobservable an agent's mistaken beliefs about his own ability can be either favourable or unfavourable to the principal. The article provides conditions under which an agent's overestimation about his own ability is favourable to the principal when effort is unobservable. The article shows that workers' mistaken beliefs about their co-workers' abilities make interdependent incentive schemes more attractive to firms than individualistic ones.
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Création de la notice
02/10/2008 14:32
Dernière modification de la notice
03/03/2018 13:41
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