Network fluctuations hinder cooperation in evolutionary games.

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_E58231E603C2
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Titre
Network fluctuations hinder cooperation in evolutionary games.
Périodique
PloS one
Auteur⸱e⸱s
Antonioni A., Tomassini M.
ISSN
1932-6203
ISSN-L
1932-6203
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2011
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
6
Numéro
10
Pages
e25555
Langue
anglais
Notes
Publication types: Journal Article ; Research Support, Non-U.S. Gov't
Publication Status: ppublish
Résumé
In this paper we study the influence of random network fluctuations on the behavior of evolutionary games on Barabási-Albert networks. This network class has been shown to promote cooperation on social dilemmas such as the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift games when the population network is fixed. Here we introduce exogenous random fluctuations of the network links through several noise models, and we investigate the evolutionary dynamics comparing them with the known static network case. The results we obtain show that even a moderate amount of random noise on the network links causes a significant loss of cooperation, to the point that cooperation vanishes altogether in the Prisoner's Dilemma when the noise rate is the same as the agents' strategy revision rate. The results appear to be robust since they are essentially the same whatever the type of the exogenous noise. Besides, it turns out that random network noise is more important than strategy noise in suppressing cooperation. Thus, even in the more favorable situation of accumulated payoff in which links have no cost, the mere presence of random external network fluctuations act as a powerful limitation to the attainment of high levels of cooperation.
Mots-clé
Biological Evolution, Models, Biological
Pubmed
Web of science
Open Access
Oui
Création de la notice
09/11/2011 17:20
Dernière modification de la notice
29/06/2024 9:30
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