A cognitive hierarchy model of behavior in the action commitment game

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ID Serval
serval:BIB_C953CEF4CD41
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Titre
A cognitive hierarchy model of behavior in the action commitment game
Périodique
International Journal of Game Theory
Auteur⸱e⸱s
Carvalho D., Santos-Pinto L.
ISSN
0020-7276
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
08/2014
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
43
Numéro
3
Pages
551-577
Langue
anglais
Résumé
We apply the cognitive hierarchy model of Camerer et al. (Q J Econ 119(3):861-898, 2004)-where players have different levels of reasoning-to Huck et al. (Games Econ Behav 38:240-264, 2002) discrete version of Hamilton and Slutsky (Games Econ Behav 2:29-46, 1990) action commitment game-a duopoly with endogenous timing of entry. We show that, for an empirically reasonable average number of thinking steps, the model rules out Stackelberg equilibria, generates Cournot outcomes including delay, and outcomes where the first mover commits to a quantity higher than Cournot but lower than Stackelberg leader. We show that a cognitive hierarchy model with quantal responses can explain the most important features of the experimental data on the action commitment game in (2002). In order to gauge the success of the model in fitting the data, we compare it to a noisy Nash model. We find that the cognitive hierarchy model with quantal responses fits the data better than the noisy Nash model.
Mots-clé
Action commitment game, Thinking steps, Cognitive hierarchy
Web of science
Création de la notice
10/02/2014 13:05
Dernière modification de la notice
09/09/2021 7:13
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