Manipulation via Endowments in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_C904DC248137
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Titre
Manipulation via Endowments in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods
Périodique
Social Choice and Welfare
Auteur(s)
Atlamaz M., Klaus B.
ISSN
0176-1714
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2007
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
28
Numéro
1
Pages
1-18
Langue
anglais
Résumé
We consider exchange markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods. We are interested in exchange rules that are efficient and immune to manipulations via endowments ( either with respect to hiding or destroying part of the endowment or transferring part of the endowment to another trader). We consider three manipulability axioms: hiding-proofness, destruction-proofness, and transfer-proofness. We prove that no rule satisfying efficiency and hiding-proofness ( which together imply individual rationality) exists. For two agents with separable and responsive preferences, we show that efficient, individually rational, and destruction- proof rules exist. However, for some profiles of separable preferences, no rule is efficient, individually rational, and destruction- proof. In the case of transfer-proofness the compatibility with efficiency and individual rationality for the two-agent case extends to the unrestricted domain. If there are more than two agents, for some profiles of separable preferences, no rule is efficient, individually rational, and transfer-proof.
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Création de la notice
13/04/2010 15:23
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 16:44
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