Manipulation via Endowments in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods

Details

Serval ID
serval:BIB_C904DC248137
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Title
Manipulation via Endowments in Exchange Markets with Indivisible Goods
Journal
Social Choice and Welfare
Author(s)
Atlamaz M., Klaus B.
ISSN
0176-1714
Publication state
Published
Issued date
2007
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
28
Number
1
Pages
1-18
Language
english
Abstract
We consider exchange markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods. We are interested in exchange rules that are efficient and immune to manipulations via endowments ( either with respect to hiding or destroying part of the endowment or transferring part of the endowment to another trader). We consider three manipulability axioms: hiding-proofness, destruction-proofness, and transfer-proofness. We prove that no rule satisfying efficiency and hiding-proofness ( which together imply individual rationality) exists. For two agents with separable and responsive preferences, we show that efficient, individually rational, and destruction- proof rules exist. However, for some profiles of separable preferences, no rule is efficient, individually rational, and destruction- proof. In the case of transfer-proofness the compatibility with efficiency and individual rationality for the two-agent case extends to the unrestricted domain. If there are more than two agents, for some profiles of separable preferences, no rule is efficient, individually rational, and transfer-proof.
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Create date
13/04/2010 15:23
Last modification date
20/08/2019 16:44
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