Cooperation on Social Networks and Its Robustness

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_C543CC52425F
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Titre
Cooperation on Social Networks and Its Robustness
Périodique
Advances in Complex Systems
Auteur(s)
A. Antonioni , M. Tomassini 
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
05/2012
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
15
Numéro
supp01
Pages
1250046
Langue
anglais
Résumé
In this work we have used computer models of social-like networks to show by extensive numerical simulations that cooperation in evolutionary games can emerge and be stable on this class of networks. The amounts of cooperation reached are at least as much as in scale-free networks but here the population model is more realistic. Cooperation is robust with respect to different strategy update rules, population dynamics, and payoff computation. Only when straight average payoff is used or there is high strategy or network noise does cooperation decrease in all games and disappear in the Prisoner's Dilemma.
Création de la notice
21/06/2012 16:23
Dernière modification de la notice
21/08/2019 6:15
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