Cooperation on Social Networks and Its Robustness

Details

Serval ID
serval:BIB_C543CC52425F
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Title
Cooperation on Social Networks and Its Robustness
Journal
Advances in Complex Systems
Author(s)
A. Antonioni , M. Tomassini 
Publication state
Published
Issued date
05/2012
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
15
Number
supp01
Pages
1250046
Language
english
Abstract
In this work we have used computer models of social-like networks to show by extensive numerical simulations that cooperation in evolutionary games can emerge and be stable on this class of networks. The amounts of cooperation reached are at least as much as in scale-free networks but here the population model is more realistic. Cooperation is robust with respect to different strategy update rules, population dynamics, and payoff computation. Only when straight average payoff is used or there is high strategy or network noise does cooperation decrease in all games and disappear in the Prisoner's Dilemma.
Create date
21/06/2012 15:23
Last modification date
21/08/2019 5:15
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