Electoral terms and terrorism

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_8CF4C4765AAA
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Titre
Electoral terms and terrorism
Périodique
Public Choice
Auteur(s)
Hodler R., Rohner D.
ISSN
0048-5829
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
01/2012
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
150
Numéro
1-2
Pages
181-193
Langue
anglais
Résumé
Many terror attacks occur at the beginning of electoral terms. We present a game theoretical model with incomplete information to account for this empirical pattern. Both terrorists and governments can be of weak or strong types. We find that the risk of terror attacks is highest at the beginning of electoral terms, because striking early allows the terrorists to collect valuable information about the government's type, and also because terrorists know that even initially weak governments sometimes retaliate to show toughness closer to an upcoming election. The model's predictions are consistent with anecdotal evidence.
Mots-clé
Terrorism, Tenure, Elections, Reputation
Web of science
Création de la notice
12/10/2012 15:41
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 15:51
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