Electoral terms and terrorism

Details

Serval ID
serval:BIB_8CF4C4765AAA
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Title
Electoral terms and terrorism
Journal
Public Choice
Author(s)
Hodler R., Rohner D.
ISSN
0048-5829
Publication state
Published
Issued date
01/2012
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
150
Number
1-2
Pages
181-193
Language
english
Abstract
Many terror attacks occur at the beginning of electoral terms. We present a game theoretical model with incomplete information to account for this empirical pattern. Both terrorists and governments can be of weak or strong types. We find that the risk of terror attacks is highest at the beginning of electoral terms, because striking early allows the terrorists to collect valuable information about the government's type, and also because terrorists know that even initially weak governments sometimes retaliate to show toughness closer to an upcoming election. The model's predictions are consistent with anecdotal evidence.
Keywords
Terrorism, Tenure, Elections, Reputation
Web of science
Create date
12/10/2012 14:41
Last modification date
20/08/2019 14:51
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