Inequality aversion and antisocial punishment

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ID Serval
serval:BIB_8C1D6336A013
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Titre
Inequality aversion and antisocial punishment
Périodique
Theory and Decision
Auteur(s)
Thöni C.
ISSN
0040-5833
1573-7187 (online)
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2014
Volume
76
Numéro
4
Pages
529-545
Langue
anglais
Notes
Thoni2014TD
Résumé
Antisocial punishment-punishment of pro-social cooperators-has shown to be detrimental for the efficiency of informal punishment mechanisms in public goods games. The motives behind antisocial punishment acts are not yet well understood. This article shows that inequality aversion predicts antisocial punishment in public goods games with punishment. The model by Fehr and Schmidt (Q J Econ 114(3): 817-868, 1999) allows to derive conditions under which antisocial punishment occurs. With data from three studies on public goods games with punishment I evaluate the predictions. A majority of the observed antisocial punishment acts are not compatible with inequality aversion. These results suggest that the desire to equalize payoffs is not a major determinant of antisocial punishment.
Mots-clé
Antisocial punishment, Inequality aversion, Public goods, Informal punishment, Experimental economics
Web of science
Création de la notice
08/09/2016 15:09
Dernière modification de la notice
09/09/2021 7:12
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