Inequality aversion and antisocial punishment

Details

Serval ID
serval:BIB_8C1D6336A013
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Title
Inequality aversion and antisocial punishment
Journal
Theory and Decision
Author(s)
Thöni C.
ISSN
0040-5833
1573-7187 (online)
Publication state
Published
Issued date
2014
Volume
76
Number
4
Pages
529-545
Language
english
Notes
Thoni2014TD
Abstract
Antisocial punishment-punishment of pro-social cooperators-has shown to be detrimental for the efficiency of informal punishment mechanisms in public goods games. The motives behind antisocial punishment acts are not yet well understood. This article shows that inequality aversion predicts antisocial punishment in public goods games with punishment. The model by Fehr and Schmidt (Q J Econ 114(3): 817-868, 1999) allows to derive conditions under which antisocial punishment occurs. With data from three studies on public goods games with punishment I evaluate the predictions. A majority of the observed antisocial punishment acts are not compatible with inequality aversion. These results suggest that the desire to equalize payoffs is not a major determinant of antisocial punishment.
Keywords
Antisocial punishment, Inequality aversion, Public goods, Informal punishment, Experimental economics
Web of science
Create date
08/09/2016 15:09
Last modification date
20/08/2019 15:50
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