How Does Corruption Affect the Adoption of Lobby Registers? A Comparative Analysis
Détails
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Accès restreint UNIL
Etat: Public
Version: de l'auteur⸱e
Licence: CC BY 4.0
ID Serval
serval:BIB_6FF34C40C250
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Titre
How Does Corruption Affect the Adoption of Lobby Registers? A Comparative Analysis
Périodique
Politics and Governance
ISSN
2183-2463
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
28/05/2020
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
8
Numéro
2
Pages
116-127
Langue
anglais
Résumé
Recent research has demonstrated that some governments in developed democracies followed the OECD and the EU recommendations to enhance transparency by adopting lobby registers, whereas other countries refrained from such measures. We contribute to the literature in demonstrating how corruption is linked to the adoption of lobbying regulations. Specifically, we argue that governments regulate lobbying when they face the combination of low to moderate levels of corruption and a relatively well-developed economy. To assess this argument empirically, we compare 42 developed countries between 2000 and 2015, using multivariate logistic regressions and two illustrative case studies. The statistical analysis supports our argument, even if we include a number of control variables, such as the presence of a second parliamentary chamber, the age of democracy, and a spatial lag. The case studies illustrate the link between anti-corruption agenda and the adoption of lobby registers.
Web of science
Open Access
Oui
Création de la notice
12/07/2020 10:21
Dernière modification de la notice
04/02/2022 7:34