How Does Corruption Affect the Adoption of Lobby Registers? A Comparative Analysis

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State: Public
Version: author
License: CC BY 4.0
Serval ID
serval:BIB_6FF34C40C250
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Title
How Does Corruption Affect the Adoption of Lobby Registers? A Comparative Analysis
Journal
Politics and Governance
Author(s)
De Francesco Fabrizio, Trein Philipp
ISSN
2183-2463
Publication state
Published
Issued date
28/05/2020
Volume
8
Number
2
Pages
116-127
Language
english
Abstract
Recent research has demonstrated that some governments in developed democracies followed the OECD and the EU recommendations to enhance transparency by adopting lobby registers, whereas other countries refrained from such measures. We contribute to the literature in demonstrating how corruption is linked to the adoption of lobbying regulations. Specifically, we argue that governments regulate lobbying when they face the combination of low to moderate levels of corruption and a relatively well-developed economy. To assess this argument empirically, we compare 42 developed countries between 2000 and 2015, using multivariate logistic regressions and two illustrative case studies. The statistical analysis supports our argument, even if we include a number of control variables, such as the presence of a second parliamentary chamber, the age of democracy, and a spatial lag. The case studies illustrate the link between anti-corruption agenda and the adoption of lobby registers.
Web of science
Open Access
Yes
Create date
12/07/2020 9:21
Last modification date
13/07/2020 5:21
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