The Sibling Negotiation Hypothesis

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Etat: Public
Version: de l'auteur⸱e
ID Serval
serval:BIB_5BD81E8D540C
Type
Partie de livre
Collection
Publications
Titre
The Sibling Negotiation Hypothesis
Titre du livre
The evolution of begging: competition, cooperation and communication
Auteur⸱e⸱s
Roulin A.
Editeur
Kluwer Academic Press
Lieu d'édition
Dordrecht
ISBN
1-4020-0571-7
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
2002
Editeur⸱rice scientifique
Wright J., Leonard M.L.
Pages
107-127
Langue
anglais
Résumé
I propose that when siblings strongly differ in need, in the absence of parents they signal to each other their willingness to compete for nondivisible food, provided upon the parent's return. A needy individual signals to its siblings that it will vigorously contest the impending food resources in order to deter siblings from competing when parents return to the nest, thus ensuring that it will be fed without having to beg too intensely. In contrast, since less needy siblings have little chance of being fed, they may expect little reward from investment in sibling competition. They should refrain from signalling to siblings, therefore indicating that they will retreat from sibling competition. This would allow them to avoid wasting energy in negotiation, competitive behaviour and begging. Sibling negotiation should allow nestlings to invest effort optimally in competitive begging when food resources are non-divisible.
Création de la notice
24/01/2008 17:42
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 14:14
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