The Sibling Negotiation Hypothesis

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State: Public
Version: author
Serval ID
serval:BIB_5BD81E8D540C
Type
A part of a book
Collection
Publications
Title
The Sibling Negotiation Hypothesis
Title of the book
The evolution of begging: competition, cooperation and communication
Author(s)
Roulin A.
Publisher
Kluwer Academic Press
Address of publication
Dordrecht
ISBN
1-4020-0571-7
Publication state
Published
Issued date
2002
Editor
Wright J., Leonard M.L.
Pages
107-127
Language
english
Abstract
I propose that when siblings strongly differ in need, in the absence of parents they signal to each other their willingness to compete for nondivisible food, provided upon the parent's return. A needy individual signals to its siblings that it will vigorously contest the impending food resources in order to deter siblings from competing when parents return to the nest, thus ensuring that it will be fed without having to beg too intensely. In contrast, since less needy siblings have little chance of being fed, they may expect little reward from investment in sibling competition. They should refrain from signalling to siblings, therefore indicating that they will retreat from sibling competition. This would allow them to avoid wasting energy in negotiation, competitive behaviour and begging. Sibling negotiation should allow nestlings to invest effort optimally in competitive begging when food resources are non-divisible.
Create date
24/01/2008 18:42
Last modification date
20/08/2019 15:14
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