Cartel Stability in Sealed Bid Second Price Auctions

Détails

ID Serval
serval:BIB_2AC0044A7460
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Titre
Cartel Stability in Sealed Bid Second Price Auctions
Périodique
Journal of Industrial Economics
Auteur⸱e⸱s
Von Ungern-Sternberg T.
ISSN
0022-1821
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
1988
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
36
Numéro
3
Pages
351-358
Langue
anglais
Résumé
One of the great advantages of sealed bid second price auctions is that they lead to very simple bidding strategies. This paper shows that they also suffer from a major inconvenience: They greatly facilitate collusion among the participants, even if the cartel's designated winner is not the one with the highest valuation.
Web of science
Création de la notice
19/11/2007 9:57
Dernière modification de la notice
20/08/2019 13:10
Données d'usage