Cartel Stability in Sealed Bid Second Price Auctions

Details

Serval ID
serval:BIB_2AC0044A7460
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Title
Cartel Stability in Sealed Bid Second Price Auctions
Journal
Journal of Industrial Economics
Author(s)
Von Ungern-Sternberg T.
ISSN
0022-1821
Publication state
Published
Issued date
1988
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
36
Number
3
Pages
351-358
Language
english
Abstract
One of the great advantages of sealed bid second price auctions is that they lead to very simple bidding strategies. This paper shows that they also suffer from a major inconvenience: They greatly facilitate collusion among the participants, even if the cartel's designated winner is not the one with the highest valuation.
Web of science
Create date
19/11/2007 10:57
Last modification date
20/08/2019 14:10
Usage data