A game without penalty: Purchasing a professional club, a rational crime?
Détails
Demande d'une copie Sous embargo indéterminé.
Accès restreint UNIL
Etat: Public
Version: Final published version
Licence: Non spécifiée
Accès restreint UNIL
Etat: Public
Version: Final published version
Licence: Non spécifiée
ID Serval
serval:BIB_0F802547CB5A
Type
Article: article d'un périodique ou d'un magazine.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Titre
A game without penalty: Purchasing a professional club, a rational crime?
Périodique
Quality in Sport
Statut éditorial
Publié
Date de publication
14/10/2020
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Langue
anglais
Résumé
This paper aims to advance a new strategic explanation for the detention of a professional football club based on criminal motivations. Despite recurring deficits, most of the French professional football teams have changed owner over the last years (22 of 40 since 2010). It is therefore difficult at first sight to understand why investors are attracted to this industry. Beyond the internal / external distinction, this article advances a new explanation based on economics of crime. Semi-structured interviews were performed and primary data was analyzed to explain that purchasing a professional football club for criminal ends would be rational. The removal of the Third Party Ownership may explain some of this phenomenon. Results also suggest that the football industry is a criminogenic market. From this, it was possible to derive consequences of the potential criminal behavior of the new investors and managerial recommendations to fight against this existing situation.
Mots-clé
Sport management, Strategy, Economics of crime, Agents
Création de la notice
06/10/2021 9:42
Dernière modification de la notice
23/02/2022 6:35