A game without penalty: Purchasing a professional club, a rational crime?

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Ressource 1Request a copy Under indefinite embargo.
UNIL restricted access
State: Public
Version: Final published version
License: Not specified
Serval ID
serval:BIB_0F802547CB5A
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Title
A game without penalty: Purchasing a professional club, a rational crime?
Journal
Quality in Sport
Author(s)
Carin Yann, Terrien Mickael
Publication state
Published
Issued date
14/10/2020
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Language
english
Abstract
This paper aims to advance a new strategic explanation for the detention of a professional football club based on criminal motivations. Despite recurring deficits, most of the French professional football teams have changed owner over the last years (22 of 40 since 2010). It is therefore difficult at first sight to understand why investors are attracted to this industry. Beyond the internal / external distinction, this article advances a new explanation based on economics of crime. Semi-structured interviews were performed and primary data was analyzed to explain that purchasing a professional football club for criminal ends would be rational. The removal of the Third Party Ownership may explain some of this phenomenon. Results also suggest that the football industry is a criminogenic market. From this, it was possible to derive consequences of the potential criminal behavior of the new investors and managerial recommendations to fight against this existing situation.
Keywords
Sport management, Strategy, Economics of crime, Agents
Create date
06/10/2021 10:42
Last modification date
23/02/2022 7:35
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