Competition among non-life insurers under solvency constraints: a game-theoretic approach
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Version: author
Serval ID
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Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Title
Competition among non-life insurers under solvency constraints: a game-theoretic approach
Journal
European Journal of Operational Research
ISSN
0377-2217
Publication state
Published
Issued date
12/2013
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
231
Number
3
Pages
702-711
Language
english
Abstract
We formulate a noncooperative game to model competition for policyholders among non-life insurance companies, taking into account market premium, solvency level, market share and underwriting results. We study Nash equilibria and Stackelberg equilibria for the premium levels, and give numerical illustrations.
Keywords
Non-life insurance, Market model, Game theory, Nash equilibrium, Stackelberg equilibrium
Web of science
Create date
20/06/2013 11:51
Last modification date
20/08/2019 17:26