Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets

Details

Serval ID
serval:BIB_F78B66E83226
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Title
Farsighted Stability for Roommate Markets
Journal
Journal of Public Economic Theory
Author(s)
Klaus B., Klijn F., Walzl M.
ISSN
1097-3923
Publication state
Published
Issued date
2011
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
13
Number
6
Pages
921-933
Language
english
Abstract
We study farsighted stability for roommate markets. We show that a matching for a roommate market indirectly dominates another matching if and only if no blocking pair of the former is matched in the latter (Proposition 1). Using this characterization of indirect dominance, we investigate von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable sets. We show that a singleton is von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable if and only if the matching is stable (Theorem 1). We also present a roommate market without a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set (Example 1) and a roommate market with a nonsingleton von Neumann-Morgenstern farsightedly stable set (Example 2).
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Create date
01/02/2011 10:12
Last modification date
03/03/2018 22:50
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