The Relation between Monotonicity and Strategy-Proofness

Details

Ressource 1Download: serval:BIB_CB4265647E40.P001 (346.37 [Ko])
State: Public
Version: author
License: Not specified
It was possible to publish this article open access thanks to a Swiss National Licence with the publisher.
Serval ID
serval:BIB_CB4265647E40
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Title
The Relation between Monotonicity and Strategy-Proofness
Journal
Social Choice and Welfare
Author(s)
Klaus B., Bochet O.
ISSN
0176-1714
Publication state
Published
Issued date
01/2013
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
40
Number
1
Pages
41-63
Language
english
Abstract
The Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem (J Econ Theory 14:412-418, 1977) establishes the equivalence between Maskin monotonicity and strategy-proofness, two cornerstone conditions for the decentralization of social choice rules. We consider a general model that covers public goods economies as in Muller-Satterthwaite (J Econ Theory 14:412-418, 1977) as well as private goods economies. For private goods economies, we use a weaker condition than Maskin monotonicity that we call unilateral monotonicity. We introduce two easy-to-check preference domain conditions which separately guarantee that (i) unilateral/Maskin monotonicity implies strategy-proofness (Theorem 1) and (ii) strategy-proofness implies unilateral/Maskin monotonicity (Theorem 2). We introduce and discuss various classical single-peaked preference domains and show which of the domain conditions they satisfy (see Propositions 1 and 2 and an overview in Table 1). As a by-product of our analysis, we obtain some extensions of the Muller-Satterthwaite Theorem as summarized in Theorem 3. We also discuss some new "Muller-Satterthwaite preference domains" (e.g., Proposition 3).
Web of science
Open Access
Yes
Create date
27/07/2011 14:04
Last modification date
25/09/2019 6:10
Usage data