Agency Conflicts around the World
Details
Serval ID
serval:BIB_69820D83F4A6
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Title
Agency Conflicts around the World
Journal
The Review of Financial Studies
ISSN
0893-9454
1465-7368
1465-7368
Publication state
Published
Issued date
01/11/2018
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
31
Number
11
Pages
4232-4287
Language
english
Abstract
We construct firm-level indexes for agency conflicts between controlling shareholders and outside investors by estimating a dynamic model of financing decisions. Our estimates for 12,652 firms from 14 countries show that agency conflicts are large and highly variable across firms and countries. Differences in agency conflicts are largely due to differences in firm-level governance, ownership concentration, and other firm characteristics. The origin of law is more relevant for curtailing governance excesses than for guarding the typical firm. Agency costs split about equally between wealth transfers and value losses from policy distortions. Recent governance reforms in Europe have significantly reduced agency costs.
Keywords
Economics and Econometrics, Accounting, Finance
Web of science
Create date
28/10/2016 17:31
Last modification date
30/05/2020 6:18