Performance pay and worker cooperation: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment

Details

Serval ID
serval:BIB_50439C0C3B12
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Title
Performance pay and worker cooperation: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment
Journal
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Author(s)
Burks S., Carpenter J., Goette L.
ISSN
0167-2681
Publication state
Published
Issued date
2009
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
70
Number
3
Pages
458 - 469
Language
english
Abstract
We report the results of an artefactual field experiment with bicycle messengers in Switzerland and the United States. Messenger work is individualized enough that firms can choose to condition pay on it, but significant externalities in messenger behavior nonetheless give their on-the-job interactions the character of a social dilemma. Second-mover behavior in our sequential prisoner's dilemma allows us to characterize the cooperativeness of our participants. Among messengers, we find that employees at firms that pay for performance are significantly less cooperative than those at firms that pay hourly wages or who are members of cooperatives. To examine whether the difference is the result of treatment or selection we exploit the fact that firm type is location-specific in Switzerland and that entering messengers must work in performance pay firms in the U.S.
Keywords
Field experiment, Social preferences, Compensation schemes, Sorting
Web of science
Create date
10/08/2009 12:52
Last modification date
20/08/2019 14:06
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