Human cooperation based on punishment reputation.

Details

Ressource 1Download: 23888865postscript.pdf (496.58 [Ko])
State: Public
Version: Author's accepted manuscript
Serval ID
serval:BIB_4CFB645F4F65
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Title
Human cooperation based on punishment reputation.
Journal
Evolution
Author(s)
dos Santos M., Rankin D.J., Wedekind C.
ISSN
1558-5646 (Electronic)
ISSN-L
0014-3820
Publication state
Published
Issued date
2013
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
67
Number
8
Pages
2446-2450
Language
english
Abstract
The threat of punishment usually promotes cooperation. However, punishing itself is costly, rare in nonhuman animals, and humans who punish often finish with low payoffs in economic experiments. The evolution of punishment has therefore been unclear. Recent theoretical developments suggest that punishment has evolved in the context of reputation games. We tested this idea in a simple helping game with observers and with punishment and punishment reputation (experimentally controlling for other possible reputational effects). We show that punishers fully compensate their costs as they receive help more often. The more likely defection is punished within a group, the higher the level of within-group cooperation. These beneficial effects perish if the punishment reputation is removed. We conclude that reputation is key to the evolution of punishment.
Keywords
Experimental game theory, indirect reciprocity, punishment
Pubmed
Web of science
Open Access
Yes
Create date
21/02/2013 9:05
Last modification date
20/08/2019 14:01
Usage data