Analyst forecasts, corporate governance and firm performance

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Serval ID
serval:BIB_43037
Type
PhD thesis: a PhD thesis.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Title
Analyst forecasts, corporate governance and firm performance
Author(s)
Kast M.
Director(s)
Von Thadden E.-L.
Institution details
Université de Lausanne, Faculté des hautes études commerciales
Address
Lausanne
Publication state
Accepted
Issued date
2004
Language
english
Notes
REROID:R003736801; 30 cm; 1 vol. (pagination multiple); Old school value: Université de Lausanne
Abstract
Abstract
Using a new data set of small public firms in Germany, this paper analyzes the incentive and entrenchment effects associated with managerial equity ownership. The relationship between firm value and insider ownership is found to be nonlinear: at low levels of ownership firm value is positively related to managerial holdings, whereas the relation is negative for higher levels of ownership. Disentangling cash flow and voting rights of managing directors, firm value increases with cash flow ownership of top management but decreases with control, in particular with management voting rights in excess of 25%. Outside blockholders do not appear to play a role in disciplining managements. Codetermination does not affect the value of small firms.
Keywords
corporate governance, ownership structure, managerial incentives
Create date
19/11/2007 10:23
Last modification date
29/05/2020 10:34
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