Lobbying, Counterlobbying, and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Rich and Poor Countries

Details

Serval ID
serval:BIB_2B90AD76B066
Type
Article: article from journal or magazin.
Collection
Publications
Institution
Title
Lobbying, Counterlobbying, and the Structure of Tariff Protection in Rich and Poor Countries
Journal
World Bank Economic Review
Author(s)
Cadot O., De Melo J., Olarreaga M.
ISSN
0258-6770
Publication state
Published
Issued date
2004
Peer-reviewed
Oui
Volume
18
Number
3
Pages
345-366
Language
english
Abstract
A political economy model of protection is used to determine endogenously the intersectoral patterns of protection. Three propositions are derived that are consistent with the stylized patterns of tariff protection in rich and poor countries: Nominal protection rates escalate with the degree of processing, protection is higher on average in poor countries, and rich countries protect agriculture relatively more than they protect manufacturing, whereas poor countries do the reverse. Numerical simulations for archetypal rich and poor economies confirm that the endogenously determined structure of protection is broadly consistent with observed patterns of protection. Copyright 2004, Oxford University Press.
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Create date
19/11/2007 9:57
Last modification date
20/08/2019 13:10
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