serval:BIB_A9C304DA0E44
Secure and Private Proofs for Location-Based Activity Summaries in Urban Areas
10.1145/2632048.2632064
Pham
A.
author
Huguenin
K.
author
Bilogrevic
I.
author
Hubaux
J.-P.
author
inproceedings
2014-09
ACM
Seattle, WA, United States
Proceedings of the 2014 ACM International Joint Conference on Pervasive and Ubiquitous Computing (UbiComp)
978-1-4503-2968-2
conference publication
751-762
Activity-based social networks, where people upload and share information about their location-based activities (e.g., the routes of their activities), are increasingly popular. Such systems, however, raise privacy and security issues: The service providers know the exact locations of their users; the users can report fake location information in order to, for example, unduly brag about their performance. In this paper, we propose a secure privacy-preserving system for reporting location-based activity summaries (e.g., the total distance covered and the elevation gain). Our solution is based on a combination of cryptographic techniques and geometric algorithms, and it relies on existing Wi-Fi access-point networks deployed in urban areas. We evaluate our solution by using real data sets from the FON community networks and from the Garmin Connect activity-based social network, and we show that it can achieve tight (up to a median accuracy of 76%) verifiable lower-bounds of the distance covered and of the elevation gain, while protecting the location privacy of the users with respect to both the social network operator and the access-point network operator(s).
Location privacy
Social networks
Location proofs
eng
60_published
University of Lausanne
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