

UNIVERSITÉ DE LAUSANNE
FACULTÉ DES SCIENCES SOCIALES
ET POLITIQUES
INSTITUT DE PSYCHOLOGIE

SESSION D'AUTOMNE 2023

PSYCHOLOGY OF POPULISM

—

**THE EFFECT OF INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POLITICAL EFFICACY
ON ANGER AND POPULIST ATTITUDES**

//

PSYCHOLOGIE DU POPULISME

—

**L'EFFET DE L'EFFICACITÉ POLITIQUE INTERNE ET EXTERNE
SUR LA COLÈRE ET LES ATTITUDES POPULISTES**

Mémoire/recherche de :

Maîtrise universitaire ès Sciences en Psychologie,

Orientation Psychologie sociale et interculturelle

Présenté par Guillaume Bornet

Directeur : Pr. Christian Staerklé

Experte : Anna Cortijos Bernabeu

Table of contents

Abstract	I
Résumé	II
Introduction	1
Populism	2
The people and the elite	4
Populism as a thin-centred ideology	6
Political efficacy	7
Political efficacy as a bidimensional construct	7
Political efficacy, system responsiveness, and populism	8
Measure and effects of internal and external political efficacy	10
Interaction between internal and external political efficacy	12
Political emotions and populism	14
Political efficacy, anger, and populism	17
Pilot study	19
Methods	19
Participants	19
Manipulations	19
Measures	22
Procedure	23
Analysis	24
Effect of political efficacy on political emotions	24
Effect of political efficacy condition on populist attitudes	26
Discussion	27
Implications for the main study	28
Main study	31

PSYCHOLOGY OF POPULISM

Methods	31
Participants	31
Manipulations	31
Measures	32
Procedure	35
Analysis	36
Effect of responsiveness and external political efficacy.....	36
Effects of internal and external political efficacy	40
Exploratory regressions – responsiveness vs. external political efficacy	43
Mediation of political efficacy's effect on populist attitudes.....	44
Discussion.....	45
Limitations.....	48
Implications for further studies.....	48
General discussion.....	49
References	51
Supplementary materials	56
Appendix 1 – Pilot study	56
Appendix 2 – Main study	61

Abstract

Background: Populism, from an ideational approach, is a set of ideas opposing people and elite in a moral, Manichean struggle. Research links populist attitudes to political anger. Feelings of political efficacy influence political attitudes, and external political efficacy, as it relates to the feeling of having means of influence, especially links with populist attitudes. Seeing the political system as opaque favours such attitudes. We aim to test if internal and external political efficacy influence populist attitudes, and if they do so through anger. The literature also suggests that internal and external political efficacy's effects could interact.

Methods: A pilot study manipulating internal and external political efficacy with a scenario was run. The main study manipulated system responsiveness and external political efficacy. Participants' internal political efficacy, anger, and populist attitudes were measured.

Results: In the pilot study, the manipulation worked for external, but not internal political efficacy. In the main study, external political efficacy had a main effect on anger and populist attitudes. Internal political efficacy had no significant association on its own. Their interaction was tendential. No significant mediation of anger was found in neither case.

Discussion: Internal and external political efficacy have tendential, but rarely significant effects on populist attitudes. Interaction is also tendentially found. External political efficacy and system responsiveness significantly influence negative-valence emotions. The perceived political situation affects perception of political events, though not as hypothesised. Further studies should focus on exploring these consequences on perception, and on finding improved ways of manipulating internal political efficacy to better test these interactions. Distinction between external political efficacy and system responsiveness is also central in manipulations.

Keywords: Populism, internal political efficacy, IPE, external political efficacy, EPE, responsiveness, political emotions, anger

Résumé

Contexte : Dans l'approche idéationnelle, le populisme est un ensemble d'idées opposant peuple et élites en une lutte morale manichéenne. La littérature lie les attitudes populistes à la colère. L'efficacité politique influence les attitudes politiques. L'efficacité politique externe, liée au sentiment qu'avoir de l'influence est possible, se lie en particulier au populisme : voir le système comme opaque le favorise. Notre étude teste si l'efficacité politique interne et externe influencent les attitudes populistes, et ce à travers la colère. La littérature suggère aussi qu'il peut y avoir interaction entre les effets de l'efficacité politique interne et externe.

Méthode : Une étude pilote manipulant l'efficacité politique interne et externe a été effectuée. L'étude principale manipule l'efficacité politique externe et la réactivité du système. Le sentiment d'efficacité politique interne, la colère, et les attitudes populistes sont mesurés.

Résultats : Le pilote montre que la manipulation fonctionne, pour l'efficacité politique externe, mais pas interne. Dans notre étude principale, l'efficacité politique externe a un effet principal sur la colère, et les attitudes populistes. L'efficacité politique interne ne s'associe significativement à aucune des deux. Efficacité politique interne et externe interagissent tendanciellement. La colère ne médie significativement l'effet d'aucune des deux.

Discussion : L'efficacité politique interne et externe ont des effets tendanciels, rarement significatifs, sur les attitudes populistes. Une interaction tendancielle existe. L'efficacité politique externe et la réactivité du système influencent significativement les émotions à valence négative. La perception de la situation politique influence donc la perception de faits politiques, mais pas de la manière que nous hypothétisons. Plus d'études sont nécessaires pour explorer ces conséquences sur la perception, et pour tester expérimentalement l'interaction entre efficacité politique interne et externe, ainsi que pour mieux manipuler l'efficacité

politique interne. La distinction entre efficacité politique externe et réactivité des autorités est importante dans les manipulations.

Mots-clés : Populisme, efficacité politique interne, EPI, efficacité politique externe, EPE, réactivité, émotions politiques, colère

Introduction

Populism is viewed by some as a symptom of, and answer to, failings of modern liberal democracies. It can be seen as an attempt to re-politicise and re-empower *the people* with a positive identity (Laclau, 2005; Mouffe, 2005), upon which the people's sovereignty can be rebuilt (Errejón & Mouffe, 2015). The generally moralistic and Manichean populist worldview (Mudde, 2004) tends to be simplistic, which reflects in simpler discourse (Bischof & Senninger, 2018). But the critiques it expresses must not be rejected on this basis alone (Canovan, 1999). Populist attitudes associate with feelings of anger (Rico et al., 2017), which can be too easily dismissed as well, as *the angry people* is an image that calls back to the cliché view of Le Bon's crowd psychology (1895). Further, populist attitudes are often linked to less socially powerful and politically influent, "low" people (Ostiguy, 2017, p. 73). Populism itself stresses this vertical differentiation between people and elite, actually (Brubaker, 2017). The simpler worldview can also be seen as appealing to those less confident in their political abilities.

In this study, we argue that a situation where citizens experience certain combinations of feelings of political efficacy favours populist attitudes. Populism's ideas do not simply reflect Le Bon's regressive *angry mob* mentality. Populist attitudes are, indeed, favoured by feelings of anger (Rico et al., 2017). Feelings of political efficacy are also strong predictors of populist attitudes (Spruyt et al., 2016). More precisely, feeling that means of political influence are not available to citizens (i.e., low external political efficacy) associates with more populist attitudes, as does feeling competent on political issues (i.e., high internal political efficacy) (Bene & Boda, 2023). In addition to that, people who feel competent in politics are more likely to report anger in threatening situations (Valentino et al., 2009). Feeling that influencing politics is not made possible should be one such situation. This suggests a

possible mediation of anger on the link between political efficacy and populist attitudes. Anger has already been shown to mediate the link between internal political efficacy and populist attitudes (Rico et al., 2020): those feeling more competent are more likely to feel they can identify the cause of the perceived problem (*people in charge*), and to feel that *the people*, themselves included, could handle power better on their own, without *the elites*. We aim to extend Rico and colleagues' idea of anger's mediating role to external political efficacy, and to take into account the potential interaction of both dimensions of political efficacy.

We test this empirically, by manipulating internal and external political efficacy through scenarios placing participants in fictitious situations. First, a pilot study is run to test the manipulations. We highlight the difficulty of manipulating internal political efficacy and, thus, resort to manipulating *external* political efficacy only, in the main study. The latter's results show that low external political efficacy seems to increase populist attitudes. Results for internal political efficacy are mixed, and anger's role is unclear.

Populism

Populism, as a concept, has been studied for over a century. However, it has long lacked a consensual definition. In their work, which is one of the first prominent ones on the subject, Ionescu and Gellner (1969) already began by admitting the difficulty of defining populism. A contributor to the book, Peter Worsley, quotes a definition by Edward Shils¹ proposing two main tenets of populism: "(a) the supremacy of the will of the people [...] (b) the desirability of a 'direct' relationship between people and leadership, unmediated by institutions" (Worsley, 1969, p.244). Although this shows early attempts existed, early works generally lacked interest for the ideas populism puts forward. The literature has long tended to focus on context-specific explanations of populist movements (Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018).

¹ No accurate citation is provided by Worsley in this chapter.

Other chapters in Ionescu and Gellner's book (1969) are examples of this, as the book's first half is dedicated to descriptions of specific cases of populist movements around the world.

More recently, Brubaker proposed an analysis of populism as a frame –or "repertoire"– for political discourse (Brubaker, 2017, p. 361). This perspective of populism as a collection of discourse elements also hints at its dimensional, rather than categorical nature (Brubaker, 2017). Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser echo this: "Populism in the ideational sense is better conceived as a continuous variable" (2018, p. 5). Populist elements can be found to different extents in various parties' programs or discourse. Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser also point out that populism is not just a set of discourse elements available to political actors –the *demand-side* must be considered, too: "populism at the level of individual citizens is a latent demand that must be activated through context and framing" (Hawkins & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018, p. 7). Voters hold beliefs, attitudes, and expectations, which political actors can try to make more salient through their discourse. Our study will focus on this *demand-side* of populism, as it centres on the ideas, on populist attitudes.

In this sense, Cas Mudde defined populism as:

An ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people. (Mudde, 2004, p. 543)

following which the so-called *ideational approach* developed (Hawkins et al., 2018). This approach considers populism as a set of ideas about the exaltation of popular sovereignty and the moralistic antagonism between *the people* and *the elite*.

The people and the elite

Beyond the complex matter of defining populism among scholars, uncertainty around its core concepts is of interest, too. For instance, Christa Deiwiks noted "people – whatever this term may refer to [...] and its 'other' – whatever this 'other' may be" (Deiwiks, 2009, p. 2), as she summarised definitions. This reflects less uncertainty in what populism *is*, than it does the general tendency to keep those terms vague.

Still, these terms *are* defined. Brubaker (2017) proposed two dimensions (also referred to as differentiations) for defining *the people* –which give clues as to the definition of the elite as well. The first, *vertical* dimension is obvious given the ideational definition of populism. It opposes "morally decent" people who lack power to "the rich, the powerful, institutionally empowered" elites who are "self-serving and often corrupt" (Brubaker, 2017, p. 363). The people's virtues separate them from *those on top*, the elite, but also from the *bottom* of the vertical dimension. The latter share the people's struggle and underprivileged state, but they lack its respectability and popular common sense. Brubaker's *horizontal* dimension opposes the "*inside* and *outside*" of the "bounded community" of the people (2017, p. 363). The source of opposition varies, especially depending on the left- or right-wing orientation of specific populist belief systems. In both cases, an outsider influence is seen as problematic. Populism with left-wing characteristics defines this "in economic or political terms". For right-wing populism, the people is defined more "culturally or ethnically" (2017, p. 363).

Defining *the people* and *the elite* in these ways influences political mobilisation in the targeted public. Thus, "distinction between populism as ideology and populism as movement is not as clear cut as it may seem, since there is considerable correlation between who the 'people' is and what its objectives are" (Deiwiks, 2009, p. 3). This question of "whether populism was primarily an ideology (or ideologies) or a movement (or movements) or both"

was already asked by Ionescu and Gellner (1969, p. 3). Consequently, populism seems to be an ideology especially linked to action.

Furthermore, this action seems directed *against* one specific thing: the elite. Ionescu and Gellner already noted that populism seemed exclusively constructed *against*, "*anti*" (1969, p. 4). This notion of populism as always oppositional is also echoed in later works. Discussing various forms of populism, Canovan remarked that it "can have different contents depending on the establishment it is mobilizing against." (1999, p. 4). This perspective suggests that populism is defined negatively. That is, it may seem that populism is not a thing itself, but could only be described as what it is not, and would lack actual characteristics of its own.

However, this criticism is unjustified, as populism is not purely defined negatively, by what it is not, or what it opposes. Its core notions of *people*, *elites*, or *volonté générale*, may be kept vague, but are still positively defined to an extent. We discussed above how people and elite are given characteristics of their own. The positive call to the *vox populi* as "an appeal to a recognised authority" is noted by Canovan (1999, p. 4), too. Mudde (2004) also rejects the idea that populism is constructed around *class* oppositions, showing that the *people* is an entity constructed in a specific way, with mythologised aspects.

Still, a study of elections around the world over a year empirically showed that populist candidates are indeed more negative in their messaging (Nai, 2018). It even seems a strong enough characteristic of populist discourse to cancel "one of the most powerful drivers of positive campaigns" (Nai, 2018, p. 235) –i.e., incumbent status, or running for re-election as opposed to doing so as a challenger. It also fully compensated right-wing candidates' (general) tendency to be more negative. That is, although right-wing orientation usually associates with negativity, "this difference ceases to exist once the populist nature of candidates is taken into account" (Nai, 2018, p. 239). Thus, negativity seems to be a characteristic of populist discourse itself, from the left to the right.

Populism as a thin-centred ideology

From a more *demand-side* perspective, populism as an ideology coexists quite easily with other ideologies. This extends for ideas on both sides of the political spectrum. Taking into account the vertical and horizontal dimensions (or differentiations) of populism, left-wing populism focuses primarily on Brubaker's vertical dimension, to underline the moral antagonism and power imbalance between the people and the elite, while right-wing populism also and *especially* relies on Brubaker's horizontal dimension, to separate the *true people* from "outsiders", often in a "defense of national identity" (Oesch, 2008, p. 369). The moral framing describing the *pure, honest, hardworking people* suggests an almost mythologised notion of people, and by opposition, also that of relevant outgroups. This is close to nationalism and may partly explain right-wing oriented branches of populism: "The step from 'the nation' to 'the people' is easily taken, and the distinction between the two is often far from clear" (Mudde, 2004, p. 549). This, however, is rarely observed in left-wing variants of populism.

Arguably, the main reason for populism's chameleonic nature can be found in Mudde's definition of, and Canovan's reference to, populism as a *thin-centred* ideology (Mudde, 2004; Canovan, 2002). This term was introduced by Freeden (1998), who used it to describe nationalism. He argued that some political thinking cannot fully be considered as an ideology. A *thin-centred* ideology is "one that arbitrarily severs itself from wider ideational contexts, by the deliberate removal and replacement of concepts" (Freeden, 1998, p. 750). Populism's focus on *people* and *elites*, as core concepts leads Mudde and Canovan to label populism as thin-centred. And it is indeed this thin-centredness that makes linking populism with various political ideologies simpler.

Political efficacy

If we understand populism as an ideology, the socio-psychological processes that could lead to its development are especially interesting. Some studies have investigated attitudinal correlates of populism, among them relative deprivation (Lüders et al., 2021), or uncertainty (Hogg, 2021). A construct that appears in theoretical explanations of populism, but whose relationship with populism has been less empirically investigated, is political efficacy. In this study, we focus on political efficacy because of its common ground with populism on the issue of political influence and decision-making. We view it as one of the starting points from which the populist ideology, as we have described it, can develop.

Political efficacy is part of one's beliefs on their relationship with politics. It can be defined, in broad terms, as "citizens' perceptions of powerfulness (or powerlessness) in the political realm" (Morrell, 2003, p. 589). It was conceptualised as a predictor of political participation. Campbell and colleagues tested this hypothesis, and found a positive link between political efficacy and political participation (1971)². They initially defined it as "the feeling that individual political action does have, or can have, an impact upon the political process [...]. It is the feeling that political and social change is possible, and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this change." (p.187).

Political efficacy as a bidimensional construct

Political efficacy is currently understood as a composite of at least two constructs. It is most commonly divided in two: *internal* and *external* political efficacy. The former can be classically defined as "the individual's belief that means of influence are available to him, his

² No test is provided in Campbell and colleagues' study, but a contingency table (political efficacy x political participation) is. We performed a chi-squared test with their figures. They are indeed not independent ($\chi^2(6) = 146.59, p < .001$). Using tests for ordinal variables also yielded medium (Goodman-Kruskal $\hat{\gamma} = .402$) to small (Kendall's $\hat{\tau}_b = .278$) effects.

evaluation of his own political abilities", while the latter is "the belief that the authorities or regime are responsive to influence attempts." (Craig, 1979, p. 227).

The United States' National Election Survey (NES) is the basis of early research into political efficacy (Campbell et al., 1971), but also of the distinction between its external and internal dimensions (Craig, 1979; Niemi et al., 1991). Balch (1974) was among the first to propose this distinction, towards which the field evolved. As Coleman and Davis (1976) argue, conceiving of political efficacy as relating to a person's perception of their interaction with the political system means it stands to reason that "there are really two attitude objects: oneself and the system." (p.189).

Internal and external political efficacy are conceived of as different, but still strongly linked. Indeed, believing the system to be irresponsive in general (having low *external* political efficacy) should rarely associate with believing that one can have influence themselves (having high *internal* political efficacy). A feeling of internal political efficacy should therefore develop if and only if one has a certain level of external political efficacy. Once this base level is reached, the two are more independent. In other words, external political efficacy is a foundation required for internal political efficacy to develop, though it doesn't necessarily cause it to develop (Craig & Maggionto, 1982).

Political efficacy, system responsiveness, and populism

Political efficacy and its internal and external dimensions also relate to neighbouring constructs, which was already recognised when political efficacy was first properly defined (Craig et al., 1990). As our study centres on the link between political efficacy and populism, an important related concept, which is nonetheless distinct from external political efficacy, is system responsiveness. Responsiveness is intended here as the degree to which the government, or politicians in general, do what citizens demand. This is (potentially)

independent from citizens' ability to influence decision-making. Alignment of a government's decisions with citizens' demands can happen even if said government leaves citizens no means of making their voices heard. In Craig and colleagues' study (1990), this was labelled *incumbent-based trust*. We use the term *responsiveness*, as it seems more transparent. This separation is especially important in the case of our study. The *responsiveness* of a political system, or lack thereof, can have effects that are similar, but different, to that of external political efficacy. Although we will also look at system responsiveness in our study, it is the latter whose effect on populist attitudes we primarily aim to investigate.

As we have seen, political efficacy corresponds to views on one's relationship with the political system. People who experience little external political efficacy and/or high internal political efficacy could have a strong desire for a political system that involves them, and *people like them*, more directly. In other words, this would seem to ask for *more democracy*. There, lies an important link with populism.

Since it ultimately seems to advocate for *power to the people*, researchers investigated the complex relationship between populism and democracy. Canovan (2002) argued that, by extending access to political power (theoretically) to all citizens, democracy paradoxically decreases transparency in politics. Decision-making, she describes, is distributed across a very varied group of people, which blurs the process. Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser also pointed to the lack of effort from parties in informing people on politics: "mainstream parties often devote little attention to explaining their decisions to the voting public, which then feels betrayed" (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser, 2018, p. 1679). Indeed, with the lack of transparency Canovan describes as inherent in the democratic system (2002), political parties could work to prevent disengagement. The lack of this kind of vulgarisation only worsens the situation.

Populist critiques of democracy cannot be rejected altogether based on their populist framing alone, and may point to actual shortcomings of current democracies (Canovan, 1999;

Rovira Kaltwasser, 2014) –especially liberal democracies. More recently, Hawkins and Rovira Kaltwasser (2018) pointed out the focus of liberal democracies on reaching agreement by compromise. This, they argue, projects an image of convergent political parties, which can be a strong enabler of populist discourse, as *the elites* appear a more unified group. Some authors argue that there is a crisis of representativity in democracies, too (Mair, 2009). This representation is subtly distinct from responsiveness, which does matter to feelings of external political efficacy, as we shall explain in more detail below.

Measure and effects of internal and external political efficacy

Recognising the distinction between internal and external political efficacy and other related constructs, some researchers revised the initial scales. First, Balch (1974) attempted to reorganise Campbell and colleagues' (1971) items into internal and external components. Variations were proposed to improve on the NES' scales (Craig & Maggiotto, 1982). Following the exploratory study that clarified the distinction between internal and external political efficacy, as well as from close theoretical concepts (Craig et al., 1990), the 1988 NES incorporated the items of the newly developed scales, which were further confirmed as pertinent in later studies (Niemi et al., 1991; Morrell, 2003, 2005).

Niemi and colleagues' (1991) scales indicate the core elements of both dimensions of political efficacy. First, external political efficacy is linked with an impression that people can influence the government. This corresponds directly to the external political efficacy definition we cited previously (Craig, 1979). Beyond having a say, there is also the feeling that politicians care about what people think. This second element is close to the first one, but more specific. Politicians prevent or allow influence, as they do or do not care about people's thoughts. In the first one, however, no single person does; the system at large does or does not allow for influence. The two other items tap into the government's representation. First, through the feeling that they take people's opinions into account, and second, through the

feeling that elections specifically make them pay attention. Altogether, two elements relate to the possibility of influence, and two are linked with representation. Of note, for our study linking political efficacy to populism, is the fact that all four items mention *the people*. The first two even specify "people like me" (Niemi et al., 1991, p. 1408). Thus, we argue that in situations where the political system does not allow for influence, people hold more populist attitudes. As explained, the perception that the political system is nebulous, non-transparent, can favour populism. Therefore, we present our first hypothesis:

H1: External political efficacy negatively associates with populist attitudes

Internal political efficacy contains, first, a feeling of understanding politics. This corresponds to the "own political abilities" in Craig's definition (1979, p. 227). Another aspect of this perceived ability is feeling "well-qualified to participate" (Niemi et al., 1991, p. 1408). So is the feeling that one could hold public office. These three represent degrees of involvement: the first only mentions understanding politics, which doesn't mean participation, necessarily. The second hints at a need for some *qualification*, and evokes participation explicitly. The third element directly speaks of involving oneself as a politician. The strong element of confidence in one's ability also reflects in the presence of a gender gap in internal political efficacy, which stems from a gendered difference in doubt in one's ability (Preece, 2016). Finally, internal political efficacy requires the feeling that political information is available. This corresponds to the base perception that fundamental means of influence are available to oneself specifically (Craig, 1979). These elements fit well with populist attitudes and their correlates. Someone who feels very able to understand, or participate in politics should be more likely to agree that people (like them) should hold the political power, not the elites (Rico et al., 2020). Therefore, we present our second hypothesis:

H2: Internal political efficacy positively associates with populist attitudes

However, to this day, there is still no total consensus in the use of scales for measuring internal or external political efficacy. Preece (2016), for instance, used a single item³ for internal political efficacy, which tapped into general interest in politics. Ardèvol-Abreu and colleagues (2020) used two items⁴ per dimension. They added an explicit mention of ability to influence the government for internal political efficacy, and the idea that voting is ineffective for external political efficacy. The scales included in the 7th round of the European Social Survey (ESS)⁵ also differed from Niemi and colleagues', although some are similar in wording (Bene, 2020). The external component added the explicit notion of having influence, while the internal one added the perception that participation is easy.

Interaction between internal and external political efficacy

Internal and external political efficacy are not completely independent from each other, even though they are distinct. As already presented, significant correlation has been found since their conceptualisation as separate components of political efficacy. Beyond the scope of computing correlations between Niemi and colleagues' (1991) –or other– subscales, hardly any research has been conducted on interaction effects. Craig and Maggiotto (1982), as we mentioned previously, hinted at an interplay. They noted that internal political efficacy's link to participation is weaker compared to external political efficacy. They implicitly suggested that the internal dimension may correlate with participation only because it does with the external dimension, but did not test for a potential interaction between the two.

³ "Generally speaking, how interested are you in what is going on in government and political affairs? Extremely interested, very interested, moderately interested, occasionally interested, or not interested at all?" (Preece, 2016, p. 204)

⁴ "No matter whom I vote for, it won't make a difference" (coded reversely) and "People like me don't have any say in what the government does" (coded reversely)" for EPE, and "I consider myself well qualified to participate in politics" and "People like me can influence the government" for IPE, respectively (Ardèvol-Abreu et al., 2020, p. 557)

⁵ "[external political efficacy]: (1) "How much would you say the political system in [country] allows people like you to have a say in what the government does?" (2) "How much would you say the political system in your country allows people like you to have an influence on politics?" (3) "How much would you say that politicians care what people like you think?"

[internal political efficacy]: (1) "How able do you think you are to take an active role in a group involved with political issues?" (2) "How confident are you in your own ability to participate in politics?" (3) "How easy do you personally find it to take part in politics?." (Bene, 2020, p. 11)

Pollock (1983), in turn, had found that the two dimensions interact to form a more complex relationship with political participation. However, he did not use Niemi and colleagues' more reliable scales (1991), as they did not exist yet. He showed that people low on both dimensions are significantly less engaged into politics, whereas those scoring high on both are generally more engaged.

More specifically –and of interest to our study– Pollock examined different modes of participation. He opposed conventional (campaigning, voting, contacting, and communal activity) to nonconformist modes (protest approval). Highly politically efficacious (on both dimensions) people participated more *conventionally*, not *unconventionally*. Instead, the high internal political efficacy–low external political efficacy configuration correlated most strongly to nonconformist participation. Finally, people in the low internal political efficacy–high external political efficacy case participated, but favoured conventional modes. This had already been hinted at by Balch's (1974) and Craig and Maggiotto's studies (1981, 1982). The latter had stated that "a belief in oneself as an effective political actor may be a necessary condition for the mobilisation of political discontent." (Craig & Maggiotto, 1982, p. 87).

More recent studies also hint at interaction between internal and external political efficacy. Feldman and colleagues' (2017) study of the effects of media messaging for climate change issues on activism is one such example. They showed that, when internal political efficacy was low, external political efficacy associated positively with activism⁶. High internal efficacy led to higher activism regardless of external political efficacy. This interaction provides potential explanations for variations in association between internal or external political efficacy and participation across studies. Feldman and colleagues find no main effect of external political efficacy on their dependent variable, climate change activism.

⁶ Here, internal and external political efficacy are both measured using items (though not the entire scales) from Niemi, and colleagues' (1991) study.

Failing to consider the possible interaction between the two components of political efficacy might be a reason for the absence (or weakness) of the links in other studies.

It is worth checking whether the participation Feldman and colleagues (2017) tap into is transferable to political action broadly. Comparing with Pollock's previously discussed study (1983) helps support generalisation. Though the wording "climate change activism" (Feldman et al., 2017, p. 1108) hints at unconventional modes of participation, the actual items tap into volunteering⁷ and contacting officials⁸. Those correspond to modes considered in Pollock's study – "campaigning" and "contacting" (1983, p. 404)– where they were among those categorised as *conventional*. The pattern is similar in both studies. Based upon the interaction of internal and external political efficacy, we formulate our third hypothesis as follows:

H3: Internal and external political efficacy effects on populist attitudes interact. When internal political efficacy is higher, the effect of external political efficacy on populist attitudes is stronger.

Political emotions and populism

Since populism relies on a moral framing of politics, and makes ample use of negativity, one proposed way to explain populist attitudes is through negative emotions. Populists are not only more negative in their messaging, but also use more appeals to emotions (Nai, 2018). However, an analysis limited to the valence of an object is not enough to understand its emotional aspects. As such, even if they are both *negative-valenced* emotions, anger and fear have very different appraisals. The cognitive consequences can therefore strongly differ, too.

⁷ "volunteered with or donated money to an organization working to reduce global warming" (Feldman et al., 2017, p. 1108)

⁸ "written letters, emailed, or phoned government officials about global warming." (Feldman et al., 2017, p. 1108)

Roseman's (1996, 2018), and Smith and Ellsworth's (1985) respective studies are classic examples of the cognitive appraisal approach of emotions, and showcase how anger and fear differ. Both classify anger as a negative-valence emotion related to high levels of certainty. Fear also falls under the broad negative-valence dimension, but strongly associates with uncertainty. As for the perceived source of the action, Roseman classifies fear as "circumstance-caused" and anger as "other-caused" (1996, p. 169, 2018, p. 144). Smith and Ellsworth categorise fear under "situational control", and anger under "human control" (1985, p.270 and 269 respectively). These models therefore oppose fear and anger in terms of both certainty about the situation and causal source of the situation.

This general distinction applies in a politicised setting as well (Petersen, 2010). Here, too, perceiving a clear cause of the threat, and the involvement of a specific group (or person) breaking a rule, are key to differentiating the two emotions. Petersen also argued that anger is particularly directed at *people*, rather than the inanimate. This is also of interest, as populists' negative messaging tends to target their opponent themselves, rather than their policies (Nai, 2018), further supporting the argument for a link between populism and anger. In sum, as it relates to populism, Rico and colleagues described the gist of the idea as follows:

People who feel angry are thus more likely to attribute blame to others and judge others' actions as being unfair, while people who feel afraid are more likely to perceive negative events as being unpredictable and determined by circumstances beyond anyone's control. [...] Therein lies the key to understanding [emotions'] role in the activation of populist attitudes. (Rico et al., 2017, p. 447)

In the case of populism, the opposition between the good and pure people and the self-serving, corrupt elite provides an obvious immediate culprit for any problem. Anger, being

specifically directed at people –whose conscious, intentional decisions allow them to be causes of perceived negative consequences– has a strong moral dimension (Petersen, 2010).

The populist framing of politics considers *elites* as bundled together in a single entity, and are explicitly designated as *those in charge*. As such, citizens angered by the political situation, who think that something or someone is the cause of said situation, can be attracted to populism. Indeed, the catch-all notion of *the elites* or *those in charge* necessarily includes anyone who could conceivably be that cause. Wagner's (2014) study of attitudes towards political parties showed that people's anger at a political actor was determined by their feeling that said actor, who should be accountable to them, had failed them. However, he also noted that anger only influenced voting behaviour for the leading party, holding government. Nevertheless, in a populist framing, all (non-populist) parties being considered as one entity, anger could still push towards populist actors. The political arena is reduced to a two-option choice (really, single-option, considering the valence of the framing). This may nudge towards a populist option even before being truly convinced by populist discourse. As Abramowitz and Webster showed, alignment with a party in a bipartisan system can result from negative partisanship feelings for the other party (2016). Populist framings can promote a negative perception of, and/or negative partisanship for, the whole block of non-populist parties. Further, more positive identification with populist discourse could then develop through increased engagement with the populist platform.

In terms of blame attribution, framing the whole *people* as experiencing the same negative consequences of the elite's actions also reinforces the perception of blame, (see Kelley's covariation model (1967)). Focusing on one's own misfortune could lead to thinking that it is circumstantial –i.e., *bad luck*, specific to one's situation. In contrast, considering that everyone experiences the same misfortune changes the perception. Perceived consistency makes blame more likely to be attributed to the subject –here, to the elites.

Crucially, the specific link between anger and populism holds regardless of respondents' change in position on the left-right axis (Rico et al., 2017). This supports the argument that the link with anger is a true characteristic of populism, not of some of its expressions. The authors are, however, careful to point out that their results did not allow them to verify the direction of a (supposed) causal link between populism and anger and restrict their conclusions to the association of the two. This leads us to our fourth hypothesis:

H4: Anger positively associates with populist attitudes

Political efficacy, anger, and populism

As mentioned previously, elements of internal and external political efficacy, as they are currently understood, correspond well to populist attitudes. Linking populism and political efficacy could be a path to better understand the thought processes behind populist attitudes.

This link was tested, and results showed that it is an interesting prospect for exploring the development of populism, as "it provides a compelling individual-level explanation for populism that works for different types of populism" (Rico et al., 2020, p. 798). The authors' position, which we share, is that the mindset of highly politically efficacious citizens closely matches with populist attitudes. Indeed, populism's focus on decision-making *by the people* seems to go hand in hand with the feeling that one is able to participate in politics. Confidence in one's ability can also be reasonably argued to associate with a greater tendency to criticise incumbent politicians. In this sense, Rico and colleagues argue, subjective –rather than objective– ability is of interest. Regardless of actual political knowledge, feeling knowledgeable and able to have political influence is what should empower them to criticise incumbent politicians. Feeling that the system does not allow for influence, in turn, is linked with more populist attitudes as well (Spruyt et al., 2016)

Valentino and colleagues (2009) showed that under conditions of perceived political threat, feelings of internal political efficacy have an effect on political emotions. The less efficacious tend to experience more fear in such scenarios, whereas more efficacious people experience more anger. Their study did not include tests of interactions with external political efficacy. However, we argue that situations of low external political efficacy are potentially perceived as more threatening –especially to someone who feels they are competent and should have political influence. The lack of available avenues of influence fuels discontent, which is a strong driver of populist attitudes (Spruyt et al., 2016). Wagner highlighted that it is "not whether individuals have actual control over the external actor, but whether they believe they should have such control" (2014, p. 689) that fuels people's anger at political actors who they feel has failed them. This element closely matches political efficacy and more specifically, *external* political efficacy. Thus, we formulate our fifth hypothesis as follows:

H5: Internal political efficacy, especially in low external political efficacy situations, positively associates with anger.

Rico and colleagues' (2020) results supported their hypothesis of a positive association between internal political efficacy and populist attitudes. Those whose feelings of internal political efficacy had been manipulated to be temporarily reduced expressed more populist attitudes. This was in fact also mediated by the intensity of their anger at the situation they were presented with. The focus on anger's mediating role in the relationship between political efficacy and populist attitudes reasonably follows from the specific appraisal characteristics of this emotion, which we detailed above. Based upon our reasoning for H4 and H5, as well as on the studies mentioned above, we propose our sixth and final hypothesis as follows:

H6: Anger mediates the association between internal and external political efficacy, and populist attitudes.

Pilot study

Methods

Participants

The survey-based experiment was created on the Qualtrics platform. Participants came from a convenience sample. The link was first shared with people in the authors' social circles via social media. It was then disseminated using a *snowballing* method: the "first circle" of participants was asked to share it in their social circles. There were three inclusion criteria for participating: (1) being at least 18 years old, (2) being a Swiss resident (not necessarily a Swiss national), and (3) being sufficiently fluent in French. The link was first sent on January 3rd, 2023, and the data was downloaded on February 14th, 2023. We analysed data gathered between January 3rd and February 3rd, 2023, representing a total of 149 attempts.

First, completion times were analysed. Participants who completed the questionnaire in less than 1/3 of the median completion time were removed ($n = 25$). Those who took more than half an hour were ignored in computing average completion time ($M = 659.5$ seconds, $SD = 329.2$). Finally, those for whom no experimental condition was recorded –having not completed the entire survey– were removed. The final 119 participants were 45.7 years old on average ($SD = 18.71$, $Mdn = 46$). 75 identified as women (60.5%), and 31 (25.0%) as men; 11 did not give any indication about their gender, and 2 "preferred not to say".

Manipulations

Internal political efficacy (IPE). We manipulated internal political efficacy using a multiple-choice questionnaire about political subjects. Participants were randomly assigned to either a *high-* or *low internal political efficacy* condition. The procedure was inspired by that of Ottati and colleagues (2015), and Rico and colleagues (2020). In the former, participants

were presented with a political knowledge test, in either a difficult or an easy variant. They then received false feedback on their relative performance (they saw their actual score but were randomly told it was above or below average). Rico and colleagues (2020) aimed to reduce feelings of internal political efficacy for half of their participants by presenting them with a difficult economics knowledge questionnaire. No feedback was provided, and the other half of the participants were not given any test in this study.

In the present study, participants were presented with a political knowledge questionnaire, followed by feedback on their performance. In the *high internal political efficacy* condition, they were presented with a set of "easier" questions and were told they had scored higher than average. In the *low internal political efficacy* condition, participants were presented with a set of "more difficult" questions and were told they had scored below average. The average score was indicated to be over 63% (5 out of 8 correct answers) in both conditions. The procedure was the same regardless of participants' actual score, which they did not see. We chose to present a questionnaire in both conditions, contrary to Rico and colleagues (2020), to increase comparability.

The aim of presenting feedback was to alter perceptions of internal political efficacy. Participants who had been asked easier questions and received positive feedback would experience increased feelings of internal political efficacy. Those receiving harder questions and negative feedback on their performance would experience decreased feelings of internal political efficacy. We added the comparative aspect, –i.e., telling them that they had performed above or below average– to further reinforce this effect. Moreover, we included such feedback with the aim of alleviating gender bias in the manipulation. Indeed, Preece (2016) showed that political knowledge questionnaires affect self-perception of political ability differently depending on participant's gender. She also showed, however, that this effect disappears when feedback is given.

In both conditions, the questionnaire consisted of eight questions. Seven out of eight questions in both conditions were sampled from so-called *naturalisation tests*⁹. These are part of the process of obtaining the Swiss citizenship and assess knowledge about Switzerland in a variety of subjects, including politics. The questions were sampled from sources showing examples of such tests (A-Vaud-Test, 2022; RTS, 2018). 14 questions were chosen from said sources, grouped into two sets of seven. The aim was to create a relatively difficult set, and a relatively easy one. Initially, 85 potentially relevant questions were identified. They were then categorised in terms of difficulty, based on authors' best judgement, which was cross-checked by colleagues in the lab. We aimed to create sets that were similar in content. 20 questions were chosen, 10 for each difficulty. Each set was then reduced from ten to seven questions. Finally, following a suggestion from a lab colleague, an 8th, more "problem-solving-focused" question was added to each condition, so that the questionnaire was not purely *knowledge-oriented*. This eighth question, which is the same for both sets, taps into the participant's understanding of the economic system and was not sampled from *naturalisation tests*.

External political efficacy (EPE). This manipulation was performed by presenting participants with a scenario in which authorities either fund or refuse funding to a citizen initiative. This was inspired by Hart and Feldman's (2016) manipulation of political efficacy, who used fictional press articles. Among other manipulations, the texts mentioned how easy or difficult it is for ordinary citizens to make their voice heard on climate change issues. These aimed to impact participants' feelings of external political efficacy. However, Hart and Feldman (2016) noted that only scenarios emphasizing the difficulty of having actual influence as an ordinary citizen (i.e. the *low external political efficacy* scenarios) were found to (negatively) affect participants' feeling of external political efficacy.

⁹ Some were adapted: questions about elected officials especially could be outdated. For one question, response options were presented as images instead of the original text, so that both conditions had a question with this mode of presentation.

In the present study, we created scenarios where a project for a civic centre is presented by a local association, as part of a broader initiative aimed at promoting civic empowerment. The association answers a call for projects issued by local authorities. Participants were randomly presented with a situation where authorities either allow or reject the project's funding (the *high* -and *low external political efficacy* condition, respectively). Compared to Hart and Feldman's (2016) more general and descriptive approach, our manipulation used a more concrete example, by involving the participant in an attempt to make a change. This was done with the aim of more firmly grounding the idea that citizens can have an impact on their community with the construction of the civic centre.

Measures

Emotions. Participants were asked to think of the situation they had been presented with, and of their ability and disposition to act in that situation. They then indicated how much they thought they would feel six emotions, using 6-point Likert scales ranging from *0 – Not at all* to *5 – Completely*. We included three emotions of negative valence (i.e. anger, fear, and sadness), and three of positive valence (i.e. happiness, pride, and hope). However, in the present study, we mainly focus on the negative-valence ones.

Populist attitudes. We used the six items from the Populist Representations Survey (Staerklé et al., In press). Each item asked the participant to rate their agreement or disagreement with a statement, on a 6-point Likert scale ranging from *0 – Completely disagree* to *5 – Completely agree*. The items are grouped into two subdimensions of populist attitudes: people sovereignty and anti-elitism. The former was measured with the following propositions: "*Members of Parliament should follow the people's will in all circumstances*"; "*The people, not politicians, should make the most important political decisions*"; "*I prefer being represented by an ordinary citizen rather than a professional politician*". This scale yielded a reasonable Cronbach's alpha ($\alpha = .734$). Anti-elitism was measured with the

following: "*Established politicians pretending they defend our interests only look out for themselves*"; "*National Council members quickly lose touch with ordinary citizens*"¹⁰; "*Politicians make decisions that are harmful to ordinary citizens*". This yielded a satisfying Cronbach's alpha ($\alpha = .797$).

Manipulation checks. For the external political efficacy manipulation, participants were asked to what degree they agreed that "*The story [they] read depicts a situation in which authorities invested in a project the citizens supported.*", on a 6-point Likert scale, ranging from 0 – *Completely disagree* to 5 – *Completely agree*. For internal political efficacy, they were asked to what degree they agreed that "*The results of the political knowledge test suggest [they] have a high level of ability in politics.*", on the same 6-point Likert scale.

Procedure

The complete materials of the survey are in the Appendix, under *Appendix 1 – Pilot study*. Participants were first presented with the study's informed consent. We explained that the survey was part of a Master's thesis in social sciences studying citizen participation in politics. A statement on confidentiality of the data collected was included. An introductory text was then shown, asking participants to picture themselves in a fictitious situation, in which, as described previously they were asked to imagine that they were a member of a local citizen association participating in a call for publicly funded projects with the aim to create a civic centre promoting citizen involvement in politics.

Next, participants were presented with a political knowledge test and were told it was a way to assess their personal ability to participate fully in the project, as it would involve interacting with the Swiss political system. Participants were randomly split in two groups – *high or low internal political efficacy*– and completed the corresponding version of the

¹⁰ Modified to mention the *National Council*, i.e., the Swiss national lower chamber, holding legislative power

questionnaire (i.e., the easier variant for the *high internal political efficacy* group; the more difficult variant for the *low internal political efficacy* group). After giving false feedback on their performance in the political knowledge test, attention was brought back to the scenario. Participants were randomly allocated again to two conditions, this time aimed to induce either high or low external political efficacy. They read the previously described text about the citizen association's project being either accepted or rejected by the authorities.

Following the second manipulation, all participants were presented with questions related to the dependent variables, and the manipulation checks. Finally, participants answered socio-demographic questions on their age and gender, after which they were presented with a specific debriefing depending on which combination of internal and external political efficacy condition they had randomly been allocated to. Importantly, participants were informed of why the survey included a political knowledge test, and of the fact that the feedback they received was unrelated to their actual performance. At the end of the debriefing, they were thanked for their participation.

Analysis

The analyses were conducted using R4.2.2 (R Core Team, 2022) and RStudio-2023.03.1 (R Studio, 2020). They were also conducted on SPSS 28 (IBM Corp., 2021), as a check. Both yielded the same results. As groups were unbalanced –they differed in size: 29, 33, 31, 26– and an interaction effect was expected, ANOVAs were run using type III sums of squares.

Effect of political efficacy on political emotions

External political efficacy had a significant main effect on anger ($F(1, 105) = 44.270$, $p < .001$), but internal political efficacy did not ($F(1, 105) = 1.285$, $p = .260$). There was a tendential, but non-significant interaction between internal and external political efficacy on

anger ($F(1,105) = 3.296, p = .072$). The same pattern emerged for fear, sadness, happiness, and hope. The interaction term was significant for no emotion, but a tendential interaction was observed for sadness, in addition to anger ($F(1,105) = 3.881, p = .051$ for sadness, all other $p_s \geq .206$).

Table 1: Fixed-Effects ANOVA results using anger as the criterion

Predictor	Sum of Squares	<i>df</i>	Mean Square	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	partial η^2	partial η^2 90% CI [LL, UL]
(Intercept)	360.04	1	360.04	261.388	.000		
IPE	1.77	1	1.77	1.285	.260	.01	[.00, .07]
EPE	60.98	1	60.98	44.270	.000	.30	[.18, .40]
IPE x EPE	4.54	1	4.54	3.296	.072	.03	[.00, .10]
Error	144.63	105	1.38				

Notes for tables 1 to 3. LL and UL represent the lower- and upper-limit of the partial η^2 confidence interval,. IPE represents the main effect of internal political efficacy; EPE represents the main effect of external political efficacy. IPEx EPE represents the interaction effect between internal and external political efficacy.


Table 2: Fixed-Effects ANOVA results using fear as the criterion

Predictor	Sum of Squares	<i>df</i>	Mean Square	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	partial η^2	partial η^2 90% CI [LL, UL]
(Intercept)	80.39	1	80.39	48.194	.000		
IPE	0.01	1	0.01	0.008	.931	.00	[.00, .01]
EPE	15.60	1	15.60	9.349	.003	.08	[.02, .17]
IPE x EPE	0.87	1	0.87	0.524	.471	.00	[.00, .05]
Error	173.48	104	1.67				

Table 3: Fixed-Effects ANOVA results using sadness as the criterion

Predictor	Sum of Squares	<i>df</i>	Mean Square	<i>F</i>	<i>p</i>	partial η^2	partial η^2 90% CI [LL, UL]
(Intercept)	322.67	1	322.67	208.814	.000		
IPE	3.31	1	3.31	2.142	.146	.02	[.00, .08]
EPE	44.93	1	44.93	29.077	.000	.22	[.11, .32]
IPE x EPE	6.00	1	6.00	3.881	.051	.04	[.00, .11]
Error	162.25	105	1.55				

Figure 1: Effect of internal and external political efficacy on negative-valence emotions



Note: Confidence intervals are calculated at the 95% confidence level.

Effect of political efficacy condition on populist attitudes

There was no main effect of internal ($F(1, 103) = 0.190, p = .664$) or external ($F(1, 103) = 2.004, p = .160$) political efficacy on anti-elitism. No interaction was found either ($F(1,103) = 0.319, p = .574$). The same pattern was found for people sovereignty.


Table 4: Fixed-Effects ANOVA results using anti-elitism as the criterion

Predictor	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	p	partial η^2	partial η^2 90% CI [LL, UL]
(Intercept)	206.08	1	206.08	283.521	.000		
IPE	0.14	1	0.14	0.190	.664	.00	[.00, .04]
EPE	1.46	1	1.46	2.004	.160	.02	[.00, .08]
IPE x EPE	0.23	1	0.23	0.319	.574	.00	[.00, .04]
Error	74.87	103	0.73				

Note for tables 4 and 5. LL and UL represent the lower- and upper-limit of the partial η^2 confidence interval. IPE represents the main effect of internal political efficacy; EPE represents the main effect of external political efficacy. IPExEPE represents the interaction effect between internal and external political efficacy.

Table 5: Fixed-Effects ANOVA results using people sovereignty as the criterion

Predictor	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	p	partial η^2	partial η^2 90% CI [LL, UL]
(Intercept)	311.67	1	311.67	287.87	.000		
IPE	0.23	1	0.23	0.215	.644	.00	[.00, .04]
EPE	0.05	1	0.05	0.044	.834	.00	[.00, .02]
IPE x EPE	0.28	1	0.28	0.262	.610	.00	[.00, .04]
Error	112.60	104	1.08				

Figure 2: Effect of internal and external political efficacy on populist attitudes

Note: Confidence intervals are calculated at the 95% confidence level.

Discussion

Political emotions. There was a significant main effect of external political efficacy, but not internal political efficacy, on all three negative emotions (anger, fear, and sadness)¹¹. This suggests that the political knowledge test may not have completely succeeded in affecting internal political efficacy. No significant interaction was found between internal and external political efficacy, for any emotion, although tendential effects were found for anger and sadness. This may indicate that the internal political efficacy manipulation was not completely unsuccessful, but rather too weak to yield significant results. As already discussed¹², either internal or external political efficacy may only produce significant interaction with the other construct, and no main effect on its own. This could explain the lack of significant main effect of internal political efficacy. Here, interaction effects were not

¹¹ Actually, internal political efficacy only had a statistically significant main effect on pride.

¹² See the discussion of Craig and Maggiotto (1982) and Feldman et al. (2017) in the introduction (under section *Interaction between internal and external political efficacy*, pages 12-14)

significant, though they were tendential. Further discussion on the manipulation of internal political efficacy is provided below.

[H5](#) is thus partly supported: we did find a main effect of external political efficacy, and a tendential interaction effect between internal and external political efficacy. This was, not limited to anger, however. External political efficacy affected all negative emotions, and a tendential interaction was observed for sadness. This could result from the situation being perceived as generally negative, and not especially linked with a systemic problem in the authorities' decision-making. In other words, the emphasis on the lack of influence the system allowed for might not have been sufficient. The perception of the political situation impacted how the situation was appraised emotionally, but in a way that differed from our hypotheses. The relationship between (external, especially) political efficacy and political emotions warrants further investigation, as it seems more complex than expected.

Populist attitudes. Neither internal nor external political efficacy had a main effect on populist attitudes, nor was there an interaction effect, for neither *anti-elitism*, nor *people sovereignty*. The lack of effect contradicts our hypothesised associations between political efficacy and populist attitudes ([H1](#), [H2](#), and [H3](#)). This could be the result of weakness in the manipulations, although we could alternatively imagine that populist attitudes are more stable than anticipated and, as such, difficult to alter) Mediation effects ([H6](#)) were not tested, as no direct main effect of internal or external political efficacy on populist attitudes was observed.

Implications for the main study

Changes in manipulations. In terms of political emotions, manipulating external political efficacy through the civic centre scenario yielded satisfying results. It seemed to impact respondents' external political efficacy. As it yielded significant variations at least on political emotions, we decided to keep this manipulation in the main study.

Internal political efficacy will be measured instead of manipulated, as almost none of the expected effects were observed. This may be imputed to the fact that internal political efficacy is, precisely, *internal*. Scenarios seemed effective at changing respondents' perception of the situation (i.e., as one where having influence is more or less difficult, due to the enablement or not of the project's implementation). However, meaningfully impacting their perception that *they* themselves are capable of effective political participation and thus influencing the political process may be more complex. Furthermore, the very *general knowledge-oriented* questionnaire could lead to the information given on one's ability being perceived as irrelevant to the specific scenario. A more *practical* manipulation could work better in that regard.

Power analysis. Power analysis was conducted using GPower 3.1 (Faul et al., 2007). It achieved a very high power ($(1 - \beta) \geq .901$) for the effect of external political efficacy on all negative emotions. Thus, type II error is of low probability. The tendential, non-significant interaction effect between internal and external political efficacy on anger would only achieve $(1 - \beta) = .483$. This could partly be attributed to the relatively low number of participants. Indeed, an effect of those sizes ($f_{Cohen} = 0.177$) only becomes detectable at sample sizes that are at least double the one we had in this pilot study. The apparent weakness of the internal political efficacy manipulation could also play a role here.

As a number of the expected effects were not observed in the pilot study, the sample size for the experimental study was calculated using only one result from the pilot study –the smallest in effect size. We calculated the required sample size using the same 2x2 design, and an estimated effect size of ($f_{Cohen} = 0.177^{13}$). Target power was set at $(1 - \beta) = .80$, which Cohen proposed based on the "relative seriousness" of type I and type II errors, "i.e., that

¹³ This is the effect size for the interaction effect of internal and external political efficacy on anger (see above). It represents a small target effect size as per Cohen's (1988) criterion, where $0.10 \leq f_{Cohen} < 0.25$ are characterized as small.

Type I errors are of the order of four times as serious as Type II errors" (1988, p. 56). With these parameters, GPower 3.1 calculates a $n = 253$ required sample size.

Main study

Methods

Participants

The survey-based experiment was created on the Qualtrics platform, as was the case for the pilot study. Participants were recruited through the Dynata platform. There were three inclusion criteria: (1) being 18 years old or older, (2) being a French resident (not necessarily a French national), and (3) being sufficiently fluent in French. Quotas were programmed for gender (allowing a maximum of 250 participants to be either male or female). The link was first sent on June 6th, 2023, and the data was downloaded on June 23rd, 2023. 368 attempts were recorded. *Empty* attempts (i.e., where the participant had not reached the manipulation, $n = 37$) were removed. Participants who had responded to the manipulation checks in a way that was strongly inconsistent with the scenario they had been presented with (i.e., they chose one of the two options most contrary to what was described) were removed. This left 234.

First, completions times were analysed. No participants completed the survey in less than 1/3 of the median completion time ($Mdn = 303.5$ seconds). Those who had taken less than two and a half minutes to answer were removed, as we considered it impossible to complete it this fast ($n = 14$). Those taking more than half an hour were recoded as missing values in computing average completion times ($M = 384.4$ seconds, $SD = 230.9$). The final sample consisted of 220 participants, who are 54.0 years old on average ($SD = 13.3$). 107 (48.6%) identified as women, 113 (51.4%) as men, and none as non-binary.

Manipulations

External political efficacy (EPE). External political efficacy was manipulated using a slightly different scenario to that of the pilot study. Participants read a scenario where a local

association they were asked to imagine being part of proposes the creation of a civic centre, in the context of a call for projects run by the municipality. The centre's aim is to promote civic empowerment. Participants were randomly presented with a situation where authorities either agreed or refused to meet with members of the associations to discuss the project. This aimed to increase the participant's feeling of external political efficacy (*high external political efficacy condition*), or to reduce it (*low external political efficacy condition*), respectively.

Responsiveness. In addition to manipulating whether the authorities agreed to involve the citizens' association in the process, a second manipulation was presented. The authorities either allocated the funds to the project or cancelled the call for projects. This was intended to manipulate the participants' feeling that the authorities are responsive (*high responsiveness condition*) or unresponsive (*low responsiveness condition*) to the citizens' wishes.

This modification was made because we felt there might have been confusion in the pilot study scenario between responsiveness –i.e., simply responding to people's wishes– and external political efficacy. Indeed, citizens' feelings of external political efficacy involve more than the alignment of the authorities' decisions with the people's wishes. Rather, it is linked with the opportunity for citizens to take part in the decision-making process in itself¹⁴.

Measures

Internal political efficacy (IPE). As the manipulation did not seem to work as intended in the pilot study, we changed the approach for the main study. Internal political efficacy was measured, instead of manipulated. We used four questions adapted from Niemi and colleagues' (1991) scale. On 6-point Likert scales, ranging from 0 – *Completely disagree* to 5 – *Completely agree*, participants rated their agreement or disagreement with the following:

¹⁴ This is explained in further detail in the sections *Political efficacy, responsiveness, and populism*, and *Internal vs. external political efficacy*, pages 8-11.

- (1) *I am confident in my own ability to participate in politics.*¹⁵
- (2) *I am perfectly able to understand and assess important political questions.*¹⁶
- (3) *I feel I could play an active role in a group dealing with political issues*¹⁷
- (4) *I think I am well-informed about politics and government.*¹⁸

Item 2 was modified to encompass a broader range of political questions than "political issues facing our country" (Niemi et al., 1991, p. 1408) –i.e., to be more general. As our scenario centres on a local scale, the original item's national perspective seemed less appropriate. Item 3 was modified, as item 2, to better correspond to the scenario, which asked to imagine oneself as a member of a local association working with local political institutions. Therefore, the notion of a "job in public office" (Niemi et al., 1991, p. 1408) was replaced with "a group dealing with political issues". Finally, item 4 was modified to tap into respondents' perception of their ability in absolute rather than relative terms. This avoids adding a dimension of social comparison that could add an overly complex layer to the statement. The four items were combined into an internal political efficacy measure ($M = 3.849$, $SD = 1.290$). Internal reliability was excellent (Cronbach's $\alpha = .910$).

Political emotions. Five of the six emotions tested in the pilot study were kept (i.e. anger, fear, sadness, happiness, and hope). Pride was not retained. A sixth emotion closely related to anger was added: frustration. As in the pilot study, political emotions were evaluated on 6-point Likert scales ranging from 0 – *Not at all* to 5 – *Completely*.

Populist attitudes. Populist attitudes consisted of the same subdimensions as in the pilot study –*people sovereignty* and *anti-elitism*–, each measured by three items (Staerklé et al., In

¹⁵ Adapted from SELFQUAL, "I consider myself to be well qualified to participate in politics" (1991, p. 1408)

¹⁶ from UNDERSTAND, "I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our country" (1991, p. 1408)

¹⁷ from PUBOFF, "I feel that I could do as good a job in public office as most other people." (1991, p. 1408)

¹⁸ from INFORMED, "I think that I am better informed about politics and government than most people." (1991, p. 1408)

press). However, the items themselves were slightly modified to suit changes in the data collection context (i.e., in France, not in Switzerland) and the scenario. They were made more situation-specific (i.e., with references to the situation presented in the scenario, and by swapping elements of national politics for more local ones). Participants indicated how much they agreed or disagreed with the given statements, on 6-point Likert scales ranging from 0 – *Completely disagree* to 5 – *Completely agree*.

People sovereignty included the following statements: "*Local authorities should follow the will of the community*"; "*The community, not the local authorities, should make the most important political decisions for the community (such as deciding on public funded projects)*"; "*In my municipality, I would rather be represented by an ordinary member of the community than by a professional politician*". This measure yielded a satisfying Cronbach's alpha ($\alpha = .804$).

Anti-elitism included the following statements: "*Established politicians who claim to defend our interests (such as willing to fund citizen projects) are only looking out for themselves*"; "*Local authorities very quickly lose contact with the members of their communities*"; "*Local authorities make decisions that harm ordinary members of the community*". This measure yielded a satisfying Cronbach's alpha ($\alpha = .835$).

Manipulation checks. A manipulation check was performed for each manipulation. First, for the system responsiveness manipulation, participants were asked to which extent they agreed that "*The story [they] read depicts a situation in which **authorities invested** in a project the citizens supported*", on a 6-point Likert scale, ranging from 0 – *Completely disagree* to 5 – *Completely agree*. For the external political efficacy manipulation, they were asked to which extent they agreed that "*In this story, the authorities **agreed to discuss** with teams representing the projects*", on the same scale.

Procedure

The complete materials of the survey are in the Appendix, under the title *Appendix 2 – Main study*. Participants were first presented with the survey's informed consent. The text explained that the survey was part of a Master's thesis in social sciences studying citizens' participation in politics. It was also stated that participants' data would be kept anonymous and treated confidentially. After agreeing to participate, participants answered socio-demographic questions relating to age (i.e., year of birth) and gender. Then, they were presented with the items measuring internal political efficacy¹⁹.

Following this, the introductory text asking respondents to picture themselves in a fictitious situation was shown. They were asked to imagine that they were a member of a citizen association in their city, which aimed to improve and promote civic empowerment. They were told that local authorities had issued a call for projects. Their association had submitted a project for the development of a civic centre which would host a series of activities surrounding political issues. They were also told that the authorities would pick the winning project based upon a group of experts' evaluation and that, following this, their association, asked the authorities for an opportunity to discuss the project with them.

Then, participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions. First, authorities either agreed to discuss the project (*high external political efficacy* condition) or refused to do so (*low external political efficacy* condition). Then, for all conditions, the experts evaluating the submitted projects declare the civic centre as the winning project. After that, the authorities either send the funds as intended (*high system responsiveness* condition), or cancel the call for projects and reallocate the funds (*low system responsiveness* condition).

¹⁹ Questions about relevance of political participation were also asked at this moment. As they are beyond the scope of the present study, these questions are not presented in further detail.

Following the manipulations, participants were presented with the questions relating to the dependent variables. First, they were asked to rate the fairness of the situation they had been presented with²⁰. Next, they were asked to report to what extent they would feel six discrete emotions in that situation. Finally, we presented participants with the items measuring populist attitudes, followed by the manipulation checks.

To end, participants were presented with a debriefing of the scenarios they had been asked to imagine. The text briefly explained our hypothesis about the effect that authorities' responsiveness and their willingness to listen to citizens' voices could have on their emotions and sociopolitical opinions. Participants were then thanked for their participation.

Analysis

As for the pilot study, the analyses were conducted using R 4.2.2 (R Core Team, 2022) software and RStudio-2023.03.1 (R Studio, 2020), with verification using SPSS 28 (IBM Corp., 2021). Both yielded the same results. As the data was unbalanced –condition groups differed in size: 70, 51, 48, and 51– and an interaction effect was expected, ANOVAs were run using type III sums of squares.

Effect of responsiveness and external political efficacy

Political emotions. Variances across the experimental conditions were homogenous, according to Levene's test (all $p_s > .255$), for all negative-valence emotions. Standard Fisher's ANOVAs were therefore used. Significant main effects of both responsiveness ($F(1, 216) = 46.007, p < .001$) and external political efficacy ($F(1, 216) = 16.187, p < .001$) were found for anger. No significant interaction effect was found ($F(1, 216) = 0.482,$

²⁰ These questions weren't presented (and answers will not be analysed) as they are beyond the scope of the present study.

$p = .488$). The same pattern emerged for frustration and sadness. All main effects of responsiveness and external political efficacy yielded $p_s < .001$, except for the main effect of external political efficacy on hope ($p = .004$) and sadness ($p = .029$). No significant main effect was found on fear (all $p_s \geq .408$). No significant interaction was found between responsiveness and external political efficacy for any emotion (all $p_s \geq .204$). Post-hoc tests using Tukey's correction showed that all four groups differed significantly (all $p_s \leq .044$). Anger was higher in both low responsiveness situations than in both high responsiveness situations. Within each case, it was higher in low external political efficacy situations (see Figure 3 below). For frustration, *low responsiveness-low²¹ external political efficacy vs low responsiveness-high external political efficacy* was the only non significant ($p = .144$) comparison; all others were significant ($p_s \leq .006$), and ordered in the same pattern as for anger (see Figure 3 below). For fear, no significant differences were found (all $p_s \geq .684$).

Table 6: Fixed-Effects ANOVA results using anger as the criterion

Predictor	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	p	partial η^2	partial η^2 90% CI [LL, UL]
(Intercept)	321.43	1	321.43	165.058	.000		
Resp	89.59	1	89.59	46.007	.000	.18	[.10, .25]
EPE	31.52	1	31.52	16.187	.000	.07	[.02, .13]
Resp x EPE	0.94	1	0.94	0.482	.488	.00	[.00, .02]
Error	420.63	216	1.95				

Note for tables 6 to 9. LL and UL represent the lower- and upper-limit of the partial η^2 confidence interval,. Resp represents the main effect of responsiveness; EPE represents the main effect of external political efficacy. Resp x EPE represents the interaction effect between responsiveness and external political efficacy.

Table 7: Fixed-Effects ANOVA results using frustration as the criterion

Predictor	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	p	partial η^2	partial η^2 90% CI [LL, UL]
(Intercept)	347.66	1	347.66	172.056	.000		
Resp	118.76	1	118.76	58.776	.000	.21	[.14, .29]
EPE	36.01	1	36.01	17.821	.000	.08	[.03, .14]
Resp x EPE	3.27	1	3.27	1.620	.204	.01	[.00, .04]
Error	436.45	216	2.02				

²¹ Underlined to emphasise where the conditions differ


Table 8: Fixed-Effects ANOVA results using fear as the criterion

Predictor	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	p	partial η^2	partial η^2 90% CI [LL, UL]
(Intercept)	356.63	1	356.63	174.732	.000		
Resp	0.07	1	0.07	0.033	.856	.00	[.00, .01]
EPE	1.40	1	1.40	0.687	.408	.00	[.00, .03]
Resp x EPE	1.77	1	1.77	0.866	.353	.00	[.00, .03]
Error	440.86	216	2.04				

Table 9: Fixed-Effects ANOVA results using sadness as the criterion

Predictor	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	p	partial η^2	partial η^2 90% CI [LL, UL]
(Intercept)	304.51	1	304.51	147.658	.000		
Resp	93.30	1	93.30	45.240	.000	.17	[.10, .25]
EPE	9.96	1	9.96	4.829	.029	.02	[.00, .06]
Resp x EPE	0.83	1	0.83	0.404	.526	.00	[.00, .02]
Error	445.46	216	2.06				

Figure 3: Effect of responsiveness and external political efficacy on emotions



Note: Confidence intervals are calculated at the 95% confidence level.

Populist attitudes. Variances across all four experimental conditions were homogenous, according to Levene's test ($p_s \geq .948$), for both dimensions of populist attitudes. Standard

Fisher's ANOVAs were therefore used. Responsiveness had a significant main effect on *people sovereignty* ($F(1, 216) = 13.884, p < .001$), but not *anti-elitism* ($F(1, 216) = 0.326, p = .569$). External political efficacy had no significant main effects on neither *people sovereignty* nor *anti-elitism*. There was no significant interaction between responsiveness and external political efficacy for neither *people sovereignty*, nor *anti-elitism*.

Post-hoc tests were run using Tukey's correction. For *people sovereignty*, low²² *responsiveness-high external political efficacy* vs high *responsiveness-high external political efficacy* ($t(216) = -0.725, p = .001$) and low *responsiveness-low external political efficacy* vs high *responsiveness-high external political efficacy* ($t(216) = -0.641, p = .005$) groups are the only ones that differed significantly (in all other cases, $.159 \leq p \leq .978$). No pair of groups differed significantly on *anti-elitism* (all $p_s \geq .868$).

Table 10: Fixed-Effects ANOVA results using people sovereignty as the criterion

Predictor	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	p	partial η^2	partial η^2 90% CI [LL, UL]
(Intercept)	1651.43	1	1651.43	1531.042	.000		
Resp	14.98	1	14.98	13.884	.000	.06	[.02, .12]
EPE	2.46	1	2.46	2.277	.133	.01	[.00, .04]
Resp x EPE	1.86	1	1.86	1.728	.190	.01	[.00, .04]
Error	232.98	216	1.08				


Note for tables 10 and 11. LL and UL represent the lower- and upper-limit of the partial η^2 confidence interval. Resp represents the main effect of responsiveness; EPE represents the main effect of external political efficacy. Resp x EPE represents the interaction effect between responsiveness and external political efficacy.

Table 11: Fixed-Effects ANOVA results using anti-elitism as the criterion

Predictor	Sum of Squares	df	Mean Square	F	p	partial η^2	partial η^2 90% CI [LL, UL]
(Intercept)	1285.71	1	1285.71	1170.724	.000		
Resp	0.36	1	0.36	0.326	.569	.00	[.00, .02]
EPE	0.01	1	0.01	0.009	.927	.00	[.00, .00]
Resp x EPE	0.00	1	0.00	0.004	.948	.00	[.00, 1.00]
Error	237.22	216	1.10				

²² Underlined to emphasise where the conditions differ

Figure 4: Effect of responsiveness and external political efficacy on populist attitudes



Note: Confidence intervals are calculated at the 95% confidence level.

Effects of internal and external political efficacy

Linear regressions models were used to test the relationship between external and internal political efficacy and dependent variables.

Political emotions. Neither internal nor external political efficacy, nor their interaction significantly associated with anger (all $p_s \geq .168$).²³

Since no significant interaction was found, we computed a regression on anger with a purely additive model –i.e., where internal and external political efficacy are predictors, but do not interact (Table 15). External political efficacy associated negatively significantly with anger ($\beta = -0.538, p < .001$), but internal political efficacy did not ($\beta = 0.106, p = .213$).

Table 12: Regression results using anger as the criterion

Predictor	<i>b</i>	<i>b</i>		<i>sr</i> ²	<i>sr</i> ²		Fit
		95% CI [LL, UL]			95% CI [LL, UL]		
(Intercept)	2.96**	[2.28, 3.64]					$R^2 = .108^{**}$ 95% CI [.03, .18]
EPE	0.17	[-0.51, 0.85]		.00	[-.01, .01]		
IPE	0.12	[-0.05, 0.29]		.01	[-.01, .03]		
EPE x IPE	0.10	[-0.07, 0.27]		.01	[-.01, .02]		

Note for tables 12 to 15. A significant *b*-weight indicates the semi-partial correlation is also significant. *b* represents unstandardized regression weights. *sr*² represents the semi-partial correlation squared. *LL* and *UL*

²³ The only emotion to which political efficacy significantly associated was hope. Internal political efficacy positively associated with hope ($\beta = 0.267, p < .001$).

indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively. *beta* indicates the standardized regression weights. IPE represents the effect of internal political efficacy; EPE represents the effect of external political efficacy. EPE x IPE represents the interaction effect between internal and external political efficacy. * indicates $p < .05$. ** indicates $p < .01$.

Table 13: Regression results using fear as the criterion

Predictor	<i>b</i>	<i>b</i> 95% CI [LL, UL]	<i>sr</i> ²	<i>sr</i> ² 95% CI [LL, UL]	Fit
(Intercept)	2.08**	[1.48, 2.69]			$R^2 = .001$ 95% CI [.00, .01]
EPE	0.01	[-0.60, 0.61]	.00	[-.00, .00]	
IPE	0.04	[-0.11, 0.19]	.00	[-.01, .01]	
EPE x IPE	-0.01	[-0.16, 0.14]	.00	[-.00, .00]	

Table 14: Regression results using anger as the criterion

Predictor	<i>b</i>	<i>b</i> 95% CI [LL, UL]	<i>beta</i>	<i>beta</i> 95% CI [LL, UL]	<i>sr</i> ²	<i>sr</i> ² 95% CI [LL, UL]	Fit
(Intercept)	3.00**	[2.32, 3.68]					$R^2 = .103^{**}$ 95% CI [.04, .18]
EPE	-0.54**	[0.32, 0.75]	0.32	[0.19, 0.44]	.10	[.02, .18]	
IPE	0.11	[-0.06, 0.27]	0.08	[-0.05, 0.21]	.01	[-.01, .03]	

Populist attitudes. Higher external political efficacy tendentially associated with less people sovereignty ($\beta = -0.392, p = .089$), but not significantly. Internal political efficacy did not significantly relate to people sovereignty, nor did it significantly interact with external political efficacy. However, simple slope analysis showed that internal political efficacy tendentially associated positively with people sovereignty when external political efficacy was high ($\beta = 0.162, p = .058$), and not when it was low ($\beta = -0.005, p = .942$).

External political efficacy ($\beta = -0.420, p = .061$) and its interaction with internal political efficacy ($\beta = 0.103, p = .064$) tendentially associated with anti-elitism. More external political efficacy related to less anti-elitism. Internal political efficacy had no significant link with anti-elitism ($\beta = -0.035, p = .526$). However, simple slope analysis showed that an increase in internal political efficacy was tendentially associated with a decrease in anti-elitism when external political efficacy was low ($\beta = -0.138, p = .060$), and not when it was high ($\beta = 0.068, p = .413$).

Considered together, populist beliefs significantly associated with external political efficacy ($\beta = -0.406, p = .048$) but not internal political efficacy ($\beta = 0.215, p = .670$). There was a tendential interaction between the two ($\beta = 0.093, p = .066$). Simple slope analysis showed that internal political efficacy significantly associated with populist beliefs in neither low nor high external political efficacy conditions ($p_s \geq .131$) (see Figure 5 below).

Table 15: Regression results using people sovereignty as the criterion

Predictor	<i>b</i>	<i>b</i> 95% CI [LL, UL]	<i>sr</i> ²	<i>sr</i> ² 95% CI [LL, UL]	Fit
(Intercept)	4.18**	[3.73, 4.63]			<i>R</i> ² = .022 95% CI [.00, .06]
EPE	-0.39	[-0.84, 0.06]	.01	[-.02, .04]	
IPE	0.08	[-0.03, 0.19]	.01	[-.02, .03]	
EPE x IPE	0.08	[-0.03, 0.20]	.01	[-.02, .04]	

Note for tables 16 to 18. A significant *b*-weight indicates the semi-partial correlation is also significant. *b* represents unstandardized regression weights. *sr*² represents the semi-partial correlation squared. *LL* and *UL* indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively. IPE represents the effect of internal political efficacy; EPE represents the effect of external political efficacy. EPE x IPE represents the interaction effect between internal and external political efficacy. * indicates $p < .05$. ** indicates $p < .01$.


Table 16: Regression results using anti-elitism as the criterion

Predictor	<i>b</i>	<i>b</i> 95% CI [LL, UL]	<i>sr</i> ²	<i>sr</i> ² 95% CI [LL, UL]	Fit
(Intercept)	4.37**	[3.93, 4.81]			<i>R</i> ² = .020 95% CI [.00, .06]
EPE	-0.42	[-0.86, 0.02]	.02	[-.02, .05]	
IPE	-0.04	[-0.14, 0.07]	.00	[-.01, .01]	
EPE x IPE	0.10	[-0.01, 0.21]	.02	[-.02, .05]	

Table 17: Regression results using populist beliefs as the criterion

Predictor	<i>b</i>	<i>b</i> 95% CI [LL, UL]	<i>sr</i> ²	<i>sr</i> ² 95% CI [LL, UL]	Fit
(Intercept)	4.27**	[3.87, 4.68]			<i>R</i> ² = .018 95% CI [.00, .06]
EPE	-0.41*	[-0.81, -0.00]	.02	[-.02, .05]	
IPE	0.02	[-0.08, 0.12]	.00	[-.01, .01]	
EPE x IPE	0.09	[-0.01, 0.19]	.02	[-.02, .05]	

Figure 5: Interaction effect between internal and external political efficacy on populist beliefs



Exploratory regressions – responsiveness vs. external political efficacy

Since manipulations did not seem to have fully worked –i.e., they had a significant effect on political emotions, but not on populist attitudes– we ran supplementary regressions. This was done with the exploratory aim of providing leads for explaining our results.

Analyses of internal and external political efficacy's effect on anger and populist beliefs were re-run using responsiveness instead of external political efficacy. We aimed to compare responsiveness to the latter. Responsiveness related to less populist beliefs ($\beta = -0.476$, $p = .023$), and tendentially affected anger ($\beta = 0.611$, $p = .061$). Internal political efficacy associated tendentially with neither ($p_s \geq .439$). No significant interaction effects between responsiveness and internal political efficacy were found ($p_s \geq .123$).

Table 18: Regression results using anger as the criterion

Predictor	<i>b</i>	<i>b</i> 95% CI [LL, UL]	<i>sr</i> ²	<i>sr</i> ² 95% CI [LL, UL]	Fit
(Intercept)	3.21**	[2.57, 3.85]			<i>R</i> ² = .261** 95% CI [.16, .34]
Resp	0.61	[-0.03, 1.25]	.01	[-.01, .04]	
IPE	0.06	[-0.10, 0.22]	.00	[-.01, .01]	
Resp x IPE	0.06	[-0.09, 0.22]	.00	[-.01, .01]	

Note for tables 19 and 20. A significant *b*-weight indicates the semi-partial correlation is also significant. *b*

represents unstandardized regression weights. sr^2 represents the semi-partial correlation squared. *LL* and *UL* indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively. Resp represents the effect of responsiveness; IPE represents the effect of internal political efficacy. Resp x IPE represents the interaction effect between responsiveness and internal political efficacy. * indicates $p < .05$. ** indicates $p < .01$.

Table 19: Regression results using populist beliefs as the criterion

Predictor	<i>b</i>	<i>b</i>		sr^2	sr^2		Fit
		95% CI [LL, UL]			95% CI [LL, UL]		
(Intercept)	4.18**	[3.77, 4.59]					$R^2 = .043^*$ 95% CI[.00,.10]
Resp	-0.48*	[-0.89, -0.07]		.02	[-.02, .06]		
IPE	0.04	[-0.06, 0.14]		.00	[-.01, .02]		
Resp x IPE	0.08	[-0.02, 0.18]		.01	[-.02, .04]		

Mediation of political efficacy's effect on populist attitudes

Anger significantly associated with anti-elitism ($\beta = 0.132, p = .001$), but not people sovereignty ($\beta = 0.007, p = .878$). On the whole, angrier participants held tendentially more populist attitudes ($\beta = 0.069, p = .068$). External political efficacy significantly associated with populist attitudes, and had a main effect on anger. Since internal political efficacy did not associate with populist beliefs, we tested for mediation effects by anger only in the relationship between external political efficacy and populist beliefs (H6).

Results are conflicting. Average causal mediated effect (ACME) was significant ($ACME = 0.047, p = .038$), but neither average direct effect ($ADE = -0.098, p = .130$) nor total effect ($TE = -0.052, p = .386$) were. Relationship between the variables seems more complicated than the previous results indicated, as the effects work in conflicting directions (ACME is surprisingly positive, while both ADE and TE are negative, as hypothesised, though not significant).

Table 21: Regression results using anti-elitism as the criterion

Predictor	<i>b</i>	<i>b</i>		<i>beta</i>	<i>beta</i>		sr^2	sr^2		Fit
		95% CI [LL, UL]			95% CI [LL, UL]			95% CI [LL, UL]		
(Intercept)	3.78**	[3.48, 4.08]								$R^2 = .046^{**}$ 95% CI[.01,.11]
anger	0.13**	[0.05, 0.21]		0.21	[0.08, 0.34]		.05	[.01, .11]		

Note for tables 21 to 23. A significant *b*-weight indicates the beta-weight and semi-partial correlation are also

significant. *b* represents unstandardized regression weights. *beta* indicates the standardized regression weights. *sr*² represents the semi-partial correlation squared. *r* represents the zero-order correlation. *LL* and *UL* indicate the lower and upper limits of a confidence interval, respectively.

* indicates $p < .05$. ** indicates $p < .01$.

Table 22: Regression results using people sovereignty as the criterion

Predictor	<i>b</i>	<i>b</i> 95% CI [LL, UL]	<i>beta</i>	<i>beta</i> 95% CI [LL, UL]	<i>sr</i> ²	<i>sr</i> ² 95% CI [LL, UL]	Fit
(Intercept)	4.46**	[4.14, 4.78]					$R^2 = .000$
anger	0.01	[-0.08, 0.09]	0.01	[-0.12, 0.14]	.00	[.00, .01]	95% CI[.00,.01]

Table 23: Regression results using populist beliefs as the criterion

Predictor	<i>b</i>	<i>b</i> 95% CI [LL, UL]	<i>beta</i>	<i>beta</i> 95% CI [LL, UL]	<i>sr</i> ²	<i>sr</i> ² 95% CI [LL, UL]	Fit
(Intercept)	4.12**	[3.84, 4.40]					$R^2 = .015$
anger	0.07	[-0.01, 0.14]	0.12	[-0.01, 0.26]	.02	[.00, .06]	95% CI[.00,.06]

Discussion

Political emotions. External political efficacy and responsiveness both had significant main effects on anger and frustration, but not fear. Anger was higher in high external political efficacy, and high responsiveness scenarios. This partly supports our hypothesis (H5). When considering internal and external political efficacy at the same time, neither associated with anger significantly. Internal and external political efficacy had no significant interaction on anger, either. Therefore, the effect of external political efficacy on anger disappearing when internal political efficacy was introduced did not result from interaction with internal political efficacy, here. This indicates that they share variance. A possible explanation is that the external political efficacy manipulation could have impacted participants' internal political efficacy. As we argued in presenting internal and external political efficacy, there is an argument that external political efficacy is required for internal political efficacy (Craig & Maggiotto, 1982). The external political efficacy manipulation in the scenario could have

temporarily modified respondents' level of internal political efficacy. This would result in shared variance, and reduce the chance for any of them to significantly associate with anger. This cannot be tested on our dataset, as participants answered the internal political efficacy items before the manipulations. At any rate, these results contradict our hypotheses (H5).

Populist attitudes. High external political efficacy associated with significantly less people sovereignty, and tendentially less anti-elitism. Thus, in general, it related to less populist attitudes, in support of our hypothesis (H1). Internal political efficacy significantly related to neither dimension of populism, nor with populist beliefs in general, contrary to our hypothesis (H2). Internal and external political efficacy tendentially interacted on populist attitudes, partly supporting H3. This pattern is somewhat expected, on the whole. As we highlighted, internal and external political efficacy have complex interaction patterns in the little literature we have on the subject. One can produce an effect while the other does not, and only the analysis of their interaction reveals that both have some form of influence.

Anger did positively associate with more populist attitudes, in support of our hypothesis (H4). As the (more extant) literature on this association describes, perceiving negative political consequences resulting from a clearly identifiable cause favours populist beliefs.

External political efficacy vs. responsiveness. Changes in the scenario introduced in the main study seemed to improve the accuracy of the manipulation. The interaction pattern between external political efficacy and internal political efficacy on populist attitudes matched our hypotheses more closely (H3). Responsiveness and internal political efficacy did not interact. Changing the scenario so that it manipulated external political efficacy, and not purely alignment with popular will (i.e., responsiveness), seems to have worked.

The lack of interaction between internal political efficacy and responsiveness on populist attitudes is more similar to what we found in the pilot study. The manipulation in our main study may have been more accurate at targeting respondents' external political efficacy.

Mediation. External political efficacy's main effect on anger and populist attitudes did not mean that the relationship was simple. Indeed, using anger as a mediator for external political efficacy's effect on populist attitudes, significant mediation was found, but the associations worked in different directions. As we explained, without mediation, external political efficacy had a significant negative effect on populist attitudes, as we hypothesised (H1). However, including anger as mediator resulted in a significant positive mediated effect, while the direct effect remained negative, but non-significant. Further examination of anger's role in the effect of external political efficacy on populist attitudes is needed. Results have already been obtained for internal political efficacy (Rico et al., 2020), but the picture would seem more complicated for external political efficacy.

Power analysis. We ran power analyses only on regression models with both internal and external political efficacy. As in the pilot study, we used GPower 3.1 (Faul et al., 2007).

For anger, as there were no significant effects in the model allowing for interaction, we ran the power analysis using the model without interaction. The effect of external political efficacy ($f_{Cohen}^2 = 0.107$) was small (defined as $0.02 \leq f_{Cohen}^2 < 0.15$) according to Cohen's (1988) criteria. This results in very low type II error probability ($(1 - \beta) = .998$)

For populist beliefs, both the effect of external political efficacy ($f_{Cohen}^2 = 0.003$), and the tendential interaction term with internal political efficacy ($f_{Cohen}^2 = 0.016$) were very small in terms of effect size ($f_{Cohen}^2 < .02$) according to Cohen (1988). This results in high risks of type II error ($(1 - \beta) = .120$ and $(1 - \beta) = .462$, respectively). Our reduced sample size, after cleaning the dataset, may have limited us in discovering these results. However,

GPower indicates that, to find an $f_{Cohen}^2 = 0.016$ effect while maintaining $(1 - \beta) \leq .80$, we would have needed a much bigger sample size still ($n = 495$).

Limitations

The scenario could lead to stronger feelings of internal political efficacy. The role in which the participant is pictured showed them as wanting to discuss the project with local authorities. This could interfere with their *normal*, baseline internal political efficacy, which we measured before the scenario was introduced. Thus, this could be another potential explanation for the lack of internal political efficacy effects in our results. Manipulating internal as well as external political efficacy would be preferable, but our pilot study showed that this was not easily and reliably done. Indeed, internal political efficacy may be too *internal* a feeling to be easily manipulated simply through a fictitious scenario.

Implications for further studies

Steps should be taken to ensure that manipulation of either internal or external political efficacy does not affect the other construct. This is especially the case if effects of both are studied. Indeed, external political efficacy can reasonably be considered a necessary condition for internal political efficacy, as is argued in the literature (e.g., Craig & Maggionto, 1982). . More effective manipulations of internal political efficacy should also be investigated

Although the mediating role of anger in internal political efficacy's effect on populist attitudes has already been studied (Rico et al., 2020), further investigation of anger's role in relation to external political efficacy's effect on populist attitudes is needed. External political efficacy does seem to present an association with anger, and the latter relates to populist attitudes, but there seemed to be more complex interplay than in the case of internal political efficacy.

General discussion

Across our pilot and main studies, external political efficacy seemed to influence anger. Situations where external political efficacy is presented as low lead to more anger. This suggests that people identify that there is a clear cause to the lack of influence, which directs them towards anger, not fear. Manipulations of external political efficacy through fictitious scenarios seem effective, as Feldman et al. noted (2017). The picture is not as clear for internal political efficacy. No significant association with anger was found, and interaction with external political efficacy was not significant either. Thus, our hypotheses on political efficacy's relationship with anger are not supported (although tendentially so in the pilot study) (H5). Further research into more effective and reliable means of manipulating internal political efficacy are needed.

Considered together, populist attitudes –i.e., anti-elitism and people sovereignty– were significantly affected by external political efficacy. The low external political efficacy situations led to more populist attitudes. Interaction with internal political efficacy was tendential, but the latter did not significantly associate with populist beliefs on its own. These results partly support our hypotheses: H1 is supported, and H3 tendentially so, while H2 is not. We argue that this shows the importance of considering an interaction between internal and external political attitudes. This result is one more example of how these two constructs need to be considered together, in order to understand their effects. Further studies are needed to investigate their effect on populist attitudes in more detail, as our manipulations seemed to present limitations.

Mediation analysis was only performed for external political efficacy because of the lack of significant effects in the case of internal political efficacy. The direct and indirect effects' directions are inconsistent –although only the indirect effect is significant. This indicates that

the relationship is more complex than we anticipated, or that the manipulations did not work as intended. Our hypotheses (H6) were not supported for the mediating role of anger, even though anger did significantly associate with populist attitudes, as expected (H4), as well as with external political efficacy (H5). Here, too, further research is needed to unpack the role of anger in the relationship between internal and external political efficacy. Our contradicting results may result from unpredicted interference of the manipulations on measured variables. The close and complex relationship between internal and external political efficacy must be considered with care when designing manipulations of these constructs. Investigations into the profiles of different combinations of high/low efficacy are needed, in the line of what Pollock (1983) had proposed. Bene and Boda's (2020) attempt to categorise the four combinations of internal and external political efficacy could be an example of a starting point.

Finally, attention must also be paid to the differing roles of system responsiveness and external political efficacy. We found that the two result in very different patterns when considered together with internal political efficacy. When manipulating external political efficacy through a fictitious scenario, steps should be taken to ensure that the wording targets the intended variable, not responsiveness.

References

- Abramowitz, A. I., & Webster, S. (2016). The Rise of Negative Partisanship and the Nationalization of U.S. Elections in the 21st Century. *Electoral Studies*, *41*, 12–22. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2015.11.001>
- Ardèvol-Abreu, A., Gil de Zúñiga, H., & Gámez, E. (2020). The influence of conspiracy beliefs on conventional and unconventional forms of political participation: The mediating role of political efficacy. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, *59*, 549–569.
- A-Vaud-Test. (2022). *Questionnaire-corrigé*. <https://prestations.vd.ch/pub/101112/#/>
- Balch, G. I. (1974). Multiple Indicators in Survey Research: The Concept ‘Sense of Political Efficacy’. *Political Methodology*, *1*(2), 1–43. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25791375>
- Bene, M. (2020). Does context matter? A cross-country investigation of the effects of the media context on external and internal political efficacy. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, *61*(4), 264–286. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0020715220930065>
- Bene, M., & Boda, Z. (2020). *Conceptualizing Democratic Efficacy*. <https://doi.org/10.17203/KDK419>
- Bene, M., & Boda, Z. (2023). A safety net against populism? An investigation of the interaction effect of political efficacy and democratic capacities on populist attitudes. *Political Research Exchange*, *5*(1), 2220385. <https://doi.org/10.1080/2474736X.2023.2220385>
- Bischof, D., & Senninger, R. (2018). Simple Politics for the People? Complexity in Campaign Messages and Political Knowledge. *European Journal of Political Research*, *57*, 473–495. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12235>
- Brubaker, R. (2017). Why Populism? *Theory and Society*, *46*, 357–385. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-017-9301-7>
- Campbell, A., Gurin, G., & Miller, W. E. (1971). *The Voter Decides*. Greenwood Press.
- Canovan, M. (1999). Trust the People! Populism and the Two Faces of Democracy. *Political Studies*, *47*(1), 2–16. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00184>
- Canovan, M. (2002). *Taking Politics to the People: Populism as the Ideology of Democracy* (Y. Mény & Y. Surel, Eds.; Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 25–44).
- Cohen, J. (1988). *Statistical Power Analysis for the Behavioral Sciences—Second Edition* (Second Edition). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers.
- Coleman, K. M., & Davis, C. L. (1976). The Structural Context of Politics and Dimensions of Regime Performance – Their Importance for the Comparative Study of Political

- Efficacy. *Comparative Political Studies*, 9(2), 189–206.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/001041407600900203>
- Craig, S. C. (1979). Efficacy, Trust, and Political Behavior: An Attempt to Resolve a Lingering Conceptual Dilemma. *American Politics Quarterly*, 7(2), 225–239.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/1532673X7900700207>
- Craig, S. C., & Maggiotto, M. A. (1981). Political Discontent and Political Action. *The Journal of Politics*, 43(2), 514–522. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2130380>
- Craig, S. C., & Maggiotto, M. A. (1982). Measuring Political Efficacy. *Political Methodology*, 8(3), 85–109. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25791157>
- Craig, S. C., Niemi, R. G., & Silver, G. E. (1990). Political efficacy and trust: A report on the NES pilot study items. *Political Behavior*, 12(3), 289–314.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00992337>
- Deiwiks, C. (2009). Populism. *Living Reviews in Democracy*, 1(1).
https://www.ethz.ch/content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/cis-dam/CIS_DAM_2015/WorkingPapers/Living_Reviews_Democracy/Deiwiks.PDF
- Errejón, I., & Mouffe, C. (2015). *Constructing the People: Hegemony and Radicalization of Democracy*.
- Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Lang, A.-G., & Buchner, A. (2007). G*Power 3: A flexible statistical power analysis program for the social, behavioral, and biomedical sciences. *Behavior Research Methods*, 39(2), 175–191. <https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03193146>
- Feldman, L., Hart, P. S., Leiserowitz, A., Maibach, E., & Roser-Renouf, C. (2017). Do Hostile Media Perceptions Lead to Action? The Role of Hostile Media Perceptions, Political Efficacy, and Ideology in Predicting Climate Change Activism. *Communication Research*, 44(8), 1099–1124.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0093650214565914>
- Freeden, M. (1998). Is Nationalism a Distinct Ideology? *Political Studies*, 46(4), 748–765.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.00165>
- Hart, P. S., & Feldman, L. (2016). The Influence of Climate Change Efficacy Messages and Efficacy Beliefs on Intended Political Participation. *PLOS ONE*, 11(8), e0157658.
<https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0157658>
- Hawkins, K. A., Carlin, R. E., Littvay, L., & Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2018). *The Ideational Approach to Populism—Concept, Theory, and Analysis* (1st Edition). Routledge.
- Hawkins, K. A., & Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2018). Introduction—The Ideational Approach. In K. A. Hawkins, R. E. Carlin, L. Littvay, & C. Rovira Kaltwasser (Eds.), *The Ideational Approach* (pp. 1–24). Routledge.

- Hogg, M. A. (2021). Uncertain Self in a Changing World: A Foundation for Radicalisation, Populism, and Autocratic Leadership. *European Review of Social Psychology*, 32(2), 235–268. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10463283.2020.1827628>
- IBM Corp. (2021). *IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows, version 18.0* (Version 28) [Computer software]. IBM Corp.
- Ionescu, G., & Gellner, E. (1969). *Populism—Its Meanings and National Characteristics*. The Garden City Press Limited.
- Kelley, H. H. (1967). Attribution Theory in Social Psychology. *Nebraska Symposium on Motivation*, 15, 192–238.
- Laclau, E. (2005). *On Populist Reason*. Verso.
- Le Bon, G. (1895). *Psychologie des foules*. Alcan.
- Lüders, A., Urbanska, K., Wollast, R., Nugier, A., & Guimond, S. (2021). Bottom-up Populism: How Relative Deprivation and Populist Attitudes Mobilize Leaderless Anti-Government Protest. *Journal of Social and Political Psychology*, 9(2), Article 2. <https://doi.org/10.5964/jspp.7349>
- Mair, P. (2009). Representative versus Responsible Government. *Cologne*.
- Morrell, M. E. (2003). Survey and Experimental Evidence for a Reliable and Valid Measure of Internal Political Efficacy. *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, 67(4), 589–602. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3521695>
- Morrell, M. E. (2005). Deliberation, Democratic Decision-Making and Internal Political Efficacy. *Political Behavior*, 27(1), 49–69. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-005-3076-7>
- Mouffe, C. (2005). *On the Political* (Routledge).
- Mudde, C. (2004). The Populist Zeitgeist. *Government and Opposition*, 39(4), 541–563. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1477-7053.2004.00135.x>
- Mudde, C., & Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2018). Studying Populism in Comparative Perspective: Reflections on the Contemporary and Future Research Agenda. *Comparative Political Studies*, 51(13), 1667–1693. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414018789490>
- Nai, A. (2018). Fear and Loathing in Populist Campaigns? Comparing the Communication Style of Populists and Non-Populists in Elections Worldwide. *Journal of Political Marketing*, 20(2), 219–250. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15377857.2018.1491439>
- Niemi, R. G., Craig, S. C., & Mattei, F. (1991). Measuring Internal Political Efficacy in the 1988 National Election Study. *American Political Science Review*, 85(4), 1407–1413. <https://doi.org/10.2307/1963953>
- Oesch, D. (2008). Explaining Workers' Support for Right-Wing Populist Parties in Western Europe: Evidence from Austria, Belgium, France, Norway, and Switzerland. *International Political Science Review*, 29(3), 349–373. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512107088390>

- Ostiguy, P. (2017). Populism—A Socio-Cultural Approach. In C. Rovira Kaltwasser, P. Taggart, P. Ochoa Espejo, & P. Ostiguy (Eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Populism* (Oxford University Press, pp. 73–97).
- Ottati, V., Price, E. D., Wilson, C., & Sumaktoyo, N. (2015). When self-perceptions of expertise increase closed-minded cognition: The earned dogmatism effect—ScienceDirect. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *61*, 131–138. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2015.08.003>
- Petersen, M. B. (2010). Distinct Emotions, Distinct Domains: Anger, Anxiety, and Perceptions of Intentionality. *The Journal of Politics*, *72*(2), 357–365. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S002238160999079X>
- Pollock, P. H. (1983). The Participatory Consequences of Internal and External Political Efficacy: A Research Note. *Western Political Quarterly*, *36*(3), 400–409. <https://doi.org/10.1177/106591298303600306>
- Preece, J. R. (2016). Mind the Gender Gap: An Experiment on the Influence of Self-Efficacy on Political Interest. *Politics & Gender*, *12*(1), 198–217. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S1743923X15000628>
- R Core Team. (2022). *R: A language and environment for statistical computing* (4.2.2) [Computer software]. R Foundation for Statistical Computing. <https://www.r-project.org/>
- R Studio. (2020). *RStudio: Integrated Development for R* (2023.03.1) [Computer software]. R Studio, PBC. <http://www.rstudio.com/>
- Rico, G., Guinjoan, M., & Anduiza, E. (2017). The Emotional Underpinnings of Populism: How Anger and Fear Affect Populist Attitudes. *Swiss Political Science Review*, *23*(4), 444–461. <https://doi.org/10.1111/spsr.12261>
- Rico, G., Guinjoan, M., & Anduiza, E. (2020). Empowered and Enraged: Political Efficacy, Anger and Support for Populism in Europe. *European Journal of Political Research*, *59*(4), 797–816. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12374>
- Roseman, I. J. (1996). Appraisal Determinants of Emotions: Constructing a More Accurate and Comprehensive Theory. *Cognition and Emotion*, *10*(3), 241–278. <https://doi.org/10.1080/026999396380240>
- Roseman, I. J. (2018). Functions of Anger in the Emotion System. In H. C. Lench (Ed.), *The Function of Emotions* (pp. 141–173). Springer, Cham.
- Rovira Kaltwasser, C. (2014). The Responses of Populism to Dahl's Democratic Dilemmas. *Political Studies*, *62*, 470–487. <https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9248.12038>
- RTS. (2018). Pourriez-vous devenir suisse? Faites le test des naturalisations. *Rts.Ch*. <https://www.rts.ch/info/suisse/9215027-pourriezvous-devenir-suisse-faites-le-test-des-naturalisations.html>

- Smith, C. A., & Ellsworth, P. C. (1985). Patterns of Cognitive Appraisal in Emotions. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 48(4), 813–838. <https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.48.4.813>
- Spruyt, B., Keppens, G., & Van Droogenbroeck, F. (2016). Who Supports Populism and What Attracts People to It? *Political Research Quarterly*, 69(2), 335–346. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912916639138>
- Staerklé, C., Cavallaro, M., & Cortijos-Bernabeu, A. (In press). The Inner Logic: An Intergroup Approach to the Populist Mentality in Europe. In G. Sensales (Ed.), *The Inner Logic: An Intergroup Approach to the Populist Mentality in Europe* (Palgrave Macmillan).
- Valentino, N. A., Gregorowicz, K., & Groenendyk, E. W. (2009). Efficacy, Emotions, and the Habit of Participation. *Political Behavior*, 31, 307–330. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-008-9076-7>
- Wagner, M. (2014). Fear and Anger in Great Britain: Blame Assignemnt and Emotional Reactions to the Financial Crisis. *Political Behavior*, 36, 683–703. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109-013-9241-5>
- Worsley, P. (1969). The Concept of Populism. In G. Ionescu & E. Gellner (Eds.), *Populism—Its Meanings and National Characteristics* (pp. 212–250). The Garden City Press Limited.

Supplementary materials

Appendix 1 – Pilot study

Bienvenue dans notre étude en sciences sociales, qui s'intéresse à l'avis des gens sur l'implication citoyenne en politique. Cette recherche est menée dans le cadre d'un mémoire de Master à l'Université de Lausanne.

Votre aide contribuera à une meilleure compréhension des opinions des gens concernant leur participation à la vie politique. Ce sont uniquement vos opinions et votre point de vue qui nous intéressent. Veuillez ainsi essayer de répondre à toutes les questions.

Pour participer à cette étude, il est nécessaire d'avoir au moins 18 ans, de résider en Suisse, et de maîtriser la langue française.

Toutes vos réponses sont anonymisées et seront utilisées exclusivement à des fins de recherche académique. Par conséquent, vos réponses ne nous permettront pas de vous identifier, et elles seront traitées de manière confidentielle par les membres de l'équipe de recherche.

En continuant, vous acceptez les conditions de récolte et de traitement des données.

– *Next page* –

Nous vous demandons de lire attentivement l'histoire suivante et d'essayer d'imaginer du mieux que vous pouvez la situation présentée:

– *Next page* –

Imaginez que vous faites partie d'une association citoyenne dans votre ville. Cette association vise à favoriser le développement de votre quartier, améliorer ses infrastructures et promouvoir la cohésion entre habitant·e·s. Vous avez participé dans ce but avec votre association à un appel à projets publics financé par la Direction générale de la cohésion sociale du Département de la santé et de l'action sociale.

Votre association a proposé de créer un centre civique qui serait connecté au réseau Européen "CitizenLab" (Laboratoire citoyen), qui a pour but de promouvoir une participation politique incluant plus les citoyen·ne·s. Dans le centre civique seront organisés une série de cours et d'ateliers visant à rapprocher les personnes et les familles de questions telles que la politique et l'économie, ainsi qu'une série de conférences sur des sujets d'actualité importants. Ce centre disposerait également d'une bibliothèque, de salles de travail et de sport, et de services de restauration.

Ce projet est en préparation depuis longtemps, il a été soigneusement réfléchi, et vous êtes

convaincu·e qu'il peut apporter de grandes améliorations à la qualité de vie des habitant·e·s de votre quartier et de votre ville.

Après des mois d'attente, vous avez enfin reçu la nouvelle que votre projet fait partie des projets sélectionnés cette année. On vous informe des procédures à suivre à ce stade pour accéder aux fonds. Le projet pourra démarrer dans les deux ou trois prochains mois.

– *Next page* –

Votre participation au développement de ce projet de la création d'un centre civique implique de nombreux contacts avec l'administration publique ainsi que des négociations avec les politicien·ne·s en charge du projet. C'est pourquoi il est nécessaire d'avoir de bonnes connaissances du système politique suisse.

Pour vous donner une idée du type de connaissances générales qu'il est nécessaire d'avoir, nous allons vous poser quelques questions sur la politique et la société suisses. Ces questions sont là pour vous aider à vous situer dans le contexte du projet. Veuillez répondre du mieux que vous pouvez.

– *Next page* –

[High internal political efficacy condition]

Dans quel texte de loi suisse se trouvent les droits fondamentaux ?

- Code pénal
- Constitution
- Code civil
- Règlement communal

– *Next page* –

Les femmes suisses ont obtenu le droit de vote au niveau fédéral dans ...

- Les années 1960
- Les années 1950
- Les années 1970
- Les années 1980

– *Next page* –

Combien de cantons et de demi-cantons y a-t-il en Suisse ?

- 20 cantons, 6 demi-cantons
- 26 cantons, 3 demi-cantons
- 16 cantons, 5 demi-cantons
- 13 cantons, 13 demi-cantons

– *Next page* –

Qui représente le pouvoir législatif au niveau fédéral ?

- Le Parlement fédéral

- b. Le Conseil d'État
- c. Le Grand Conseil
- d. La Croix-Rouge

– Next page –

Quelle chambre du Parlement fédéral représente le peuple ?

- a. Le Conseil national
- b. Le Conseil des États
- c. Le Conseil fédéral
- d. Le Grand Conseil

– Next page –

Qui présidait le Conseil fédéral en 2022 ?

- a. Guy Parmelin
- b. Simonetta Sommaruga
- c. Alain Berset
- d. Ignazio Cassis

– Next page –

Quel est le parti qui a le plus de sièges au Conseil national ?

- a. (1) [image]
- b. (2) [image]
- c. (3) [image]
- d. (4) [image]

– Next page –

En période d'inflation, comme celle dans laquelle nous nous trouvons aujourd'hui, quelle est la relation entre l'inflation et les salaires ?

- a. L'inflation est une hausse des prix, donc aussi du prix du travail. Les salaires augmentent automatiquement aussi.
- b. L'inflation cause de l'incertitude, donc les salaires baissent, parce que les entreprises craignent pour l'avenir.
- c. L'inflation fait que si le salaire n'est pas modifié, le pouvoir d'achat diminue.
- d. L'inflation est une notion de l'économie en général, et n'a aucune relation avec le salaire, qui concerne la relation entre employé-e et entreprise.

– Next page –

Merci d'avoir répondu à ces questions.

La moyenne de réponses correctes à cette enquête est de 63%. Votre score est supérieur à cette moyenne, car vous avez répondu correctement à plus de 63% des questions. On peut donc considérer que vous avez toutes les compétences politiques nécessaires pour dialoguer efficacement avec les institutions et les politicien-ne-s pour mettre en œuvre le projet.

[Low internal political efficacy condition]

La première Constitution fédérale date de ...

- a. 1291
- b. 1515
- c. 1848
- d. 1874

– Next page –

Le premier canton suisse à accorder le droit de vote aux femmes est le canton ...

- a. du Valais

- b. de Vaud
- c. de Bâle
- d. de Zurich

– Next page –

Lesquels de ces drapeaux suisses représentent deux demi-cantons ?

- a. (1) [image]
- b. (2) [image]
- c. (3) [image]
- d. (4) [image]

– Next page –

Quelle est la procédure d'élaboration d'une loi ?

- a. Avant-projet, traitement au Parlement, lancement d'un projet, votation populaire, application.
- b. Traitement au Parlement, avant-projet, lancement d'un projet, application, votation populaire.
- c. Lancement d'un projet, avant-projet, traitement au Parlement, votation populaire, application.
- d. Lancement d'un projet, votation populaire, traitement au Parlement, avant-projet, application.

– Next page –

Concernant le Conseil national, quelle affirmation est juste ?

- a. Le Conseil national représente le peuple.
- b. Au Conseil national, chaque canton a au moins deux sièges.
- c. Au Conseil national, les sièges sont répartis de manière égale entre les cantons.
- d. Le Conseil national est composé uniquement de représentant-e-s de tous les gouvernements cantonaux.

– Next page –

Quel conseiller fédéral est en charge des assurances sociales en 2023 ?

- a. Albert Rösti
- b. Guy Parmelin
- c. Ignazio Cassis
- d. Alain Berset

– Next page –

Associez le département fédéral DETEC à une tâche (une seule réponse correcte):

- a. Organisations internationales
- b. Sports et défense nationale
- c. Construction et entretien des routes
- d. Agriculture

– Next page –

En période d'inflation, comme celle dans laquelle nous nous trouvons aujourd'hui, quelle est la relation entre l'inflation et les salaires ?

- a. L'inflation est une hausse des prix, donc aussi du prix du travail. Les salaires augmentent automatiquement aussi.
- b. L'inflation cause de l'incertitude, donc les salaires baissent, parce que les entreprises craignent pour l'avenir.

- c. L'inflation fait que si le salaire n'est pas modifié, le pouvoir d'achat diminue.
- d. L'inflation est une notion de l'économie en général, et n'a aucune relation avec le salaire, qui concerne la relation entre employé·e et entreprise.

– *Next page* –

Merci d'avoir répondu à ces questions.

La moyenne de réponses correctes à cette enquête est de 63%. Votre score est inférieur à cette moyenne, car vous avez répondu correctement à moins de 63% des questions. On peut donc considérer que vous n'avez pas encore toutes les compétences politiques nécessaires pour dialoguer efficacement avec les institutions et les politicien·ne·s pour mettre en œuvre le projet.

[High external political efficacy condition]

Revenons maintenant à votre projet de centre civique.

Imaginez-vous que quelques semaines après que vous ayez reçu la bonne nouvelle de la sélection de votre projet, l'administration publique contacte votre association pour dire que les procédures de demande de financement se sont déroulées comme prévu. Le projet a obtenu les fonds nécessaires, et sa mise en œuvre peut donc commencer.

Cela représente un pas en avant pour la qualité de vie, l'autonomie, et le pouvoir d'action des habitant·e·s du quartier et de la ville.

[Low external political efficacy condition]

Revenons maintenant à votre projet de centre civique.

Imaginez-vous que quelques semaines après que vous ayez reçu la bonne nouvelle de la sélection de votre projet, l'administration publique contacte votre association pour dire que votre projet n'a pas obtenu les fonds nécessaires, et qu'il doit malheureusement être abandonné. Elle indique simplement que le budget devait être alloué à un autre projet, sans donner plus d'informations. Le projet ne peut donc pas être réalisé.

Cela représente un pas en arrière pour la qualité de vie, l'autonomie, et le pouvoir d'action des habitant·e·s du quartier et de la ville.

– *Next page* –

Réfléchissez à la situation que nous vous avons présentée quant au déroulement du projet d'association citoyenne pour le développement et la cohésion sociale. Pensez aussi à votre disposition et à votre capacité à réagir si cela vous arrivait. Si vous essayez de penser à des émotions précises...

... à quel point ressentiriez-vous de la colère dans cette situation ?

0 - Pas du tout → 5 – Tout à fait

– *Next page* –

... à quel point ressentiriez-vous de la joie dans cette situation ?

0 - Pas du tout → 5 – Tout à fait

– *Next page* –

... à quel point ressentiriez-vous de la peur dans cette situation ?

0 - Pas du tout → 5 – Tout à fait

– *Next page* –

... à quel point ressentiriez-vous de l'orgueil dans cette situation ?

0 - Pas du tout → 5 – Tout à fait

– *Next page* –

... à quel point ressentiriez-vous de la tristesse dans cette situation ?

0 - Pas du tout → 5 – Tout à fait

– *Next page* –

... à quel point ressentiriez-vous de l'espoir dans cette situation ?

0 - Pas du tout → 5 – Tout à fait

– *Next page* –

Nous allons maintenant vous poser quelques questions sur vos propres opinions socio-politiques. Dans quelle mesure êtes-vous d'accord (ou en désaccord) avec les affirmations suivantes ? Les membres du Parlement devraient suivre la volonté du peuple en toute circonstance.

Pas du tout d'accord

Pas d'accord

Plutôt pas d'accord

Plutôt d'accord

D'accord

Tout à fait d'accord

– *Next page* –

C'est le peuple, et non les politicien·ne·s, qui devrait prendre les décisions politiques les plus importantes.

Pas du tout d'accord

Pas d'accord

Plutôt pas d'accord

Plutôt d'accord

D'accord

Tout à fait d'accord

– *Next page* –

Je préfère être représenté·e par un·e citoyen·ne ordinaire que par un·e politicien·ne professionnel·le.

Pas du tout d'accord

Pas d'accord

Plutôt pas d'accord

Plutôt d'accord

D'accord

Tout à fait d'accord

– *Next page* –

Dans quelle mesure êtes-vous d'accord (ou en désaccord) avec les affirmations suivantes ?

Les politicien·ne·s établi·e·s qui prétendent défendre nos intérêts ne s'occupent que d'eux-/elles-mêmes.

Pas du tout d'accord

Pas d'accord

Plutôt pas d'accord

Plutôt d'accord

D'accord

Tout à fait d'accord

– *Next page* –

Les conseillers·ères nationaux·ales perdent très vite le contact avec les citoyen·ne·s ordinaires.

- Pas du tout d'accord
- Pas d'accord
- Plutôt pas d'accord
- Plutôt d'accord
- D'accord
- Tout à fait d'accord

– *Next page* –

Les politicien·ne·s prennent des décisions qui nuisent aux citoyen·ne·s ordinaires.

- Pas du tout d'accord
- Pas d'accord
- Plutôt pas d'accord
- Plutôt d'accord
- D'accord
- Tout à fait d'accord

– *Next page* –

Pour finir, dans quelle mesure êtes-vous d'accord (ou en désaccord) avec les affirmations suivantes ?

L'histoire que vous avez lue présente une situation où les autorités ont investi dans un projet que les habitant·e·s soutenaient.

- Pas du tout d'accord
- Pas d'accord
- Plutôt pas d'accord
- Plutôt d'accord
- D'accord
- Tout à fait d'accord

– *Next page* –

Les résultats du test de connaissances politiques suggèrent que vous avez un haut niveau de compétence en matière d'affaires politiques.

- Pas du tout d'accord
- Pas d'accord
- Plutôt pas d'accord
- Plutôt d'accord
- D'accord
- Tout à fait d'accord

– *Next page* –

Nous souhaitons vous poser encore deux brèves questions sur vous.

Nous vous rappelons que votre réponse est traitée de manière totalement anonyme.

Veuillez indiquer votre année de naissance (en 4 chiffres):

Vous vous identifiez comme:

- Un homme
- Une femme
- Autre _____
- Je préfère ne pas répondre

[Debriefing A – High internal political efficacy, high external political efficacy]

Vous avez terminé le questionnaire !

Nous vous remercions du temps que vous avez consacré à y répondre. Nous souhaitons maintenant vous donner quelques explications sur l'enquête.

Cette étude avait pour objectif de comprendre les effets du sentiment d'efficacité en politique sur les émotions et les attitudes politiques.

Le sentiment d'efficacité politique comprend, d'un côté, l'impression d'être compétent·e et bien informé·e sur les questions politiques, et de l'autre côté, l'impression de pouvoir avoir une influence sur les décisions politiques et que les autorités répondent lorsqu'elles sont sollicitées.

Pour évaluer l'effet de la compétence perçue sur les questions politiques, nous vous avons demandé de répondre à un test de connaissances politiques adapté des tests de naturalisation. Vous avez été aléatoirement mis·e dans le cas où vous deviez répondre à une série de questions plus ou moins simples.

Le retour qui vous a été donné indiquant que "Vos performances ont été supérieures à la moyenne" ne reflète pas nécessairement votre performance réelle (qui n'a pas été évaluée). Cela faisait partie de la mise en situation de l'étude pour induire un certain sentiment d'efficacité.

Pour évaluer l'effet de la perception que le système réagit aux demandes de citoyen·ne·s, nous vous avons présenté un texte dans lequel l'administration publique a permis le développement d'un projet d'une association.

Nous pensons que tant le test de connaissances politiques avec ses commentaires correspondants que le test que nous vous avons présenté ont pu orienter dans une certaine mesure vos réponses aux questions sur les émotions et attitudes politiques. C'est cette influence possible qui nous intéresse dans cette étude.

Nous vous remercions encore une fois pour votre précieuse participation et vous souhaitons une excellente journée.

Veuillez passer à la page suivante pour finir d'envoyer votre réponse.

[Debriefing B – High internal political efficacy, low external political efficacy]

Vous avez terminé le questionnaire !

Nous vous remercions du temps que vous avez consacré à y répondre. Nous souhaitons maintenant vous donner quelques explications sur l'enquête.

Cette étude avait pour objectif de comprendre les effets du sentiment d'efficacité en politique sur les émotions et les attitudes politiques.

Le sentiment d'efficacité politique comprend, d'un côté, l'impression d'être compétent·e et bien informé·e sur les questions politiques, et de l'autre côté, l'impression de pouvoir avoir une influence sur les décisions politiques et que les autorités répondent lorsqu'elles sont sollicitées.

Pour évaluer l'effet de la compétence perçue sur les questions politiques, nous vous avons demandé de répondre à un test de connaissances politiques adapté des tests de naturalisation. Vous avez été aléatoirement mis·e dans le cas où vous

deviez répondre à une série de questions plus ou moins simples.

Le retour qui vous a été donné indiquant que “Vos performances ont été supérieures à la moyenne” ne reflète pas nécessairement votre performance réelle (qui n’a pas été évaluée). Cela faisait partie de la mise en situation de l’étude pour induire un certain sentiment d’efficacité.

Pour évaluer l’effet de la perception que le système réagit aux demandes de citoyen·ne·s, nous vous avons présenté un texte dans lequel l’administration publique a empêché le développement d’un projet d’une association.

Nous pensons que tant le test de connaissances politiques avec ses commentaires correspondants que le test que nous vous avons présenté ont pu orienter dans une certaine mesure vos réponses aux questions sur les émotions et attitudes politiques. C’est cette influence possible qui nous intéresse dans cette étude.

Nous vous remercions encore une fois pour votre précieuse participation et vous souhaitons une excellente journée.

Veillez passer à la page suivante pour finir d’envoyer votre réponse.

[Debriefing C – Low internal political efficacy, high external political efficacy]

Vous avez terminé le questionnaire !

Nous vous remercions du temps que vous avez consacré à y répondre. Nous souhaitons maintenant vous donner quelques explications sur l’enquête.

Cette étude avait pour objectif de comprendre les effets du sentiment d’efficacité en politique sur les émotions et les attitudes politiques.

Le sentiment d’efficacité politique comprend, d’un côté, l’impression d’être compétent·e et bien informé·e sur les questions politiques, et de l’autre côté, l’impression de pouvoir avoir une influence sur les décisions politiques et que les autorités répondent lorsqu’elles sont sollicitées.

Pour évaluer l’effet de la compétence perçue sur les questions politiques, nous vous avons demandé de répondre à un test de connaissances politiques adapté des tests de naturalisation. Vous avez été aléatoirement mis·e dans le cas où vous deviez répondre à une série de questions plus ou moins difficiles.

Le retour qui vous a été donné indiquant que “Vos performances ont été inférieures à la moyenne” ne reflète pas nécessairement votre performance réelle (qui n’a pas été évaluée). Cela faisait partie de la mise en situation de l’étude pour induire un certain sentiment d’efficacité.

Pour évaluer l’effet de la perception que le système réagit aux demandes de citoyen·ne·s, nous vous avons présenté un texte dans lequel l’administration publique a permis le développement d’un projet d’une association.

Nous pensons que tant le test de connaissances politiques avec ses commentaires correspondants que le test que nous vous avons présenté ont pu orienter dans une certaine mesure vos réponses aux questions sur les émotions et attitudes politiques. C’est cette influence possible qui nous intéresse dans cette étude.

Nous vous remercions encore une fois pour votre précieuse participation et vous souhaitons une excellente journée.

Veillez passer à la page suivante pour finir d’envoyer votre réponse.

[Debriefing D – Low internal political efficacy, low external political efficacy]

Vous avez terminé le questionnaire !

Nous vous remercions du temps que vous avez consacré à y répondre. Nous souhaitons maintenant vous donner quelques explications sur l’enquête.

Cette étude avait pour objectif de comprendre les effets du sentiment d’efficacité en politique sur les émotions et les attitudes politiques.

Le sentiment d’efficacité politique comprend, d’un côté, l’impression d’être compétent·e et bien informé·e sur les questions politiques, et de l’autre côté, l’impression de pouvoir avoir une influence sur les décisions politiques et que les autorités répondent lorsqu’elles sont sollicitées.

Pour évaluer l’effet de la compétence perçue sur les questions politiques, nous vous avons demandé de répondre à un test de connaissances politiques adapté des tests de naturalisation. Vous avez été aléatoirement mis·e dans le cas où vous deviez répondre à une série de questions plus ou moins difficiles.

Le retour qui vous a été donné indiquant que “Vos performances ont été inférieures à la moyenne” ne reflète pas nécessairement votre performance réelle (qui n’a pas été évaluée). Cela faisait partie de la mise en situation de l’étude pour induire un certain sentiment d’efficacité.

Pour évaluer l’effet de la perception que le système réagit aux demandes de citoyen·ne·s, nous vous avons présenté un texte dans lequel l’administration publique a empêché le développement d’un projet d’une association.

Nous pensons que tant le test de connaissances politiques avec ses commentaires correspondants que le test que nous vous avons présenté ont pu orienter dans une certaine mesure vos réponses aux questions sur les émotions et attitudes politiques. C’est cette influence possible qui nous intéresse dans cette étude.

Nous vous remercions encore une fois pour votre précieuse participation et vous souhaitons une excellente journée.

Veillez passer à la page suivante pour finir d’envoyer votre réponse.

Appendix 2 – Main study

Bienvenue dans notre étude en sciences sociales, qui s'intéresse à l'avis des gens sur l'implication citoyenne en politique. Cette recherche est menée dans le cadre d'un mémoire de Master à l'Université de Lausanne, Suisse.

Votre aide contribuera à une meilleure compréhension des opinions des gens concernant leur participation à la vie politique. Ce sont uniquement vos opinions et votre point de vue qui nous intéressent. Veuillez ainsi essayer de répondre à toutes les questions.

Pour participer à cette étude, il est nécessaire d'avoir au moins 18 ans, de résider en France, et de maîtriser la langue française.

Toutes vos réponses sont anonymisées et seront utilisées exclusivement à des fins de recherche académique. Par conséquent, vos réponses ne nous permettront pas de vous identifier, et elles seront traitées de manière confidentielle par les membres de l'équipe de recherche.

En continuant, vous acceptez les conditions de récolte et de traitement des données.

– *Next page* –

Veuillez indiquer votre année de naissance (en 4 chiffres):

Vous vous identifiez comme:

Un homme

Une femme

Non-binaire

Je préfère ne pas répondre

– *Next page* –

Nous allons commencer par vous poser quelques questions sur vos opinions sociopolitiques.

Dans quelle mesure êtes-vous d'accord avec les affirmations suivantes ?

J'ai confiance en ma propre capacité à participer à la vie politique.

0 - Pas du tout d'accord → 5 - Tout à fait d'accord

– *Next page* –

Je suis parfaitement capable de comprendre et évaluer des questions importantes de politique.

0 - Pas du tout d'accord → 5 - Tout à fait d'accord

– *Next page* –

J'ai le sentiment que je serais capable de jouer un rôle actif dans un groupe traitant de questions de politique.

0 - Pas du tout d'accord → 5 - Tout à fait d'accord

– *Next page* –

Je pense que je suis bien informé·e sur les questions de politique et de gouvernement.

0 - Pas du tout d'accord → 5 - Tout à fait d'accord

– *Next page* –

Et si vous réfléchissez en termes d'importance...

À quel point est-ce important pour vous de participer à la vie politique ?

0 - Pas du tout d'accord → 5 - Tout à fait d'accord

– *Next page* –

Dans une démocratie, à quel point pensez-vous qu'il est important que les citoyen·ne·s participent au processus de prise de décision politique ?

0 - Pas du tout d'accord → 5 - Tout à fait d'accord

– *Next page* –

Maintenant, nous vous demandons de lire attentivement l'histoire suivante et d'essayer d'imaginer du mieux que vous pouvez la situation présentée.

Nous vous poserons ensuite des questions sur cette histoire.

– *Next page* –

Imaginez que vous faites partie d'une association citoyenne dans votre quartier. Cette association vise à favoriser le développement du quartier et à promouvoir l'autonomie civique (empowerment) et la cohésion parmi les habitant·e·s. Dans ce but, vous et votre association avez participé à un appel à projets financé par la municipalité.

Votre association a soumis une proposition de créer un centre civique qui vise à promouvoir plus d'implication et de participation des habitant·e·s dans les questions civiques et de politique. Le centre civique organiserait des ateliers pour sensibiliser les citoyen·ne·s aux questions pertinentes pour leur communauté, ainsi que des discussions informatives sur des événements actuels importants. L'idée est de rénover une maison ancienne, emblématique et chère au quartier, et de la convertir en centre civique. Le centre comprendrait également une bibliothèque, des salles de travail et de loisirs, ainsi que des services de restauration.

Le projet est en préparation depuis longtemps, et vous êtes convaincu·e qu'il peut grandement contribuer à améliorer la vie culturelle des habitant·e·s de votre quartier et de votre ville en général

– *Next page* –

À la soumission des projets, les autorités annoncent que le projet gagnant sera sélectionné en se basant sur une évaluation d'expert·e·s indépendant·e·s.

Parce que vous pensez qu'il serait désirable que les équipes des projets puissent rencontrer les

autorités locales en face-à-face pour expliquer l'importance des projets respectifs, vous demandez s'il serait possible d'organiser une rencontre. Vous voudriez avoir une chance de discuter de la grande pertinence sociale et civique de votre projet avec les autorités.

[High responsiveness, high external political efficacy condition]

Les autorités répondent positivement, et elles donnent un rendez-vous aux membres de chaque projet pour pouvoir discuter de ceux-ci.

– *Next page* –

Après des mois d'attente à la suite de ce rendez-vous, vous recevez enfin la nouvelle que votre projet de centre civique a obtenu la meilleure évaluation des expert·e·s. En conséquence, votre projet est déclaré gagnant, et vous êtes informé·e des étapes nécessaires pour accéder aux fonds alloués.

Quelques semaines plus tard, les autorités locales contactent votre association pour confirmer que la procédure de demande de fonds s'est déroulée comme prévu. Le projet a pu recevoir les fonds nécessaires, et la mise en place peut commencer.

[Low responsiveness, high external political efficacy condition]

Les autorités répondent négativement. Elles vous expliquent que ce n'est pas habituel de faire ainsi, et qu'elles ne voient pas l'intérêt de discuter des projets avec les équipes.

– *Next page* –

Après des mois d'attente, et malgré que les équipes des projets n'ont pas pu en discuter avec les autorités, vous recevez enfin la nouvelle que votre projet de centre civique a obtenu la meilleure évaluation des expert·e·s. En conséquence, votre projet est déclaré gagnant, et vous êtes informé·e des étapes nécessaires pour accéder aux fonds alloués.

Quelques semaines plus tard, les autorités locales contactent votre association pour confirmer que la procédure de demande de fonds s'est déroulée comme prévu. Le projet a pu recevoir les fonds nécessaires, et la mise en place peut commencer.

High responsiveness, low external political efficacy condition]

Les autorités répondent positivement, et elles donnent un rendez-vous aux membres de chaque projet pour pouvoir discuter de ceux-ci.

– *Next page* –

Après des mois d'attente à la suite de ce rendez-vous, vous recevez enfin la nouvelle que votre projet de centre civique a obtenu la meilleure évaluation des expert·e·s. Cela veut dire que votre projet devrait donc être le gagnant.

Toutefois, et malgré cela, les autorités locales contactent votre association quelques jours plus tard pour vous informer qu'elles ont décidé d'annuler l'appel à projets. Elles expliquent que le budget qui allait être alloué au projet gagnant a été redirigé pour

servir à un autre besoin urgent de la municipalité, sans donner de plus amples informations. Il n'y a plus de fonds pour votre projet de centre civique, et il ne sera donc pas construit.

[Low responsiveness, low external political efficacy condition]

Les autorités répondent négativement. Elles vous expliquent que ce n'est pas habituel de faire ainsi, et qu'elles ne voient pas l'intérêt de discuter des projets avec les équipes.

– *Next page* –

Après des mois d'attente, et malgré que les équipes des projets n'ont pas pu en discuter avec les autorités, vous recevez enfin la nouvelle que votre projet de centre civique a obtenu la meilleure évaluation des expert·e·s. Cela veut dire que votre projet devrait donc être le gagnant.

Toutefois, et malgré cela, les autorités locales contactent votre association quelques jours plus tard pour vous informer qu'elles ont décidé d'annuler l'appel à projets. Elles expliquent que le budget qui allait être alloué au projet gagnant a été redirigé pour servir à un autre besoin urgent de la municipalité, sans donner de plus amples informations. Il n'y a plus de fonds pour votre projet de centre civique, et il ne sera donc pas construit.

– *Next page* –

Si vous réfléchissez à la situation qui vous a été présentée vis-à-vis du développement du projet citoyen...

À quel point trouvez-vous que la décision des autorités a abouti à un résultat juste?

0 - Pas du tout → 5 - Tout à fait

– *Next page* –

À quel point trouvez-vous que la décision des autorités a été prise par un processus juste ?

0 - Pas du tout → 5 - Tout à fait

– *Next page* –

Réfléchissez encore à la situation que nous vous avons présentée. Essayez de penser aux émotions précises que vous pourriez ressentir dans cette situation.

Par rapport à la décision prise par les autorités, et la mesure dans laquelle on a permis aux citoyen·ne·s d'avoir leur mot à dire...

... à quel point ressentiriez-vous de la joie ?

0 - Pas du tout → 5 - Tout à fait

– *Next page* –

... à quel point ressentiriez-vous de la colère ?

0 - Pas du tout → 5 - Tout à fait

– *Next page* –

... à quel point ressentiriez-vous de la frustration ?

0 - Pas du tout → 5 - Tout à fait

– *Next page* –

... à quel point ressentiriez-vous de la tristesse ?

0 - Pas du tout → 5 - Tout à fait

– *Next page* –

... à quel point ressentiriez-vous de la peur ?

0 - Pas du tout → 5 - Tout à fait

– *Next page* –

... à quel point ressentiriez-vous de l'espoir ?

0 - Pas du tout → 5 - Tout à fait

– *Next page* –

Toujours en réfléchissant à la situation qui vous a été présentée, et en considérant la décision prise par les autorités ainsi que la mesure dans laquelle on a permis aux citoyen·ne·s d'avoir leur mot à dire...

... dans quelle mesure êtes-vous d'accord avec les affirmations suivantes ?

Les autorités locales devraient suivre la volonté des habitant·e·s.

0 - Pas du tout d'accord → 5 - Tout à fait d'accord

– *Next page* –

Ce sont les habitant·e·s, et non les autorités, qui devraient prendre les décisions politiques les plus importantes pour leur communauté (comme par exemple décider du financement public de projets).

0 - Pas du tout d'accord → 5 - Tout à fait d'accord

– *Next page* –

Dans ma commune, je préférerais être représenté·e par un·e citoyen·ne lambda que par un·e politicien·ne professionnel·le.

0 - Pas du tout d'accord → 5 - Tout à fait d'accord

– *Next page* –

Les politicien·ne·s établi·e·s qui prétendent défendre nos intérêts (comme par exemple en se disant favorables à financer des projets citoyens) ne se soucient que d'eux·elles-mêmes.

0 - Pas du tout d'accord → 5 - Tout à fait d'accord

– *Next page* –

Les autorités locales perdent très vite le contact avec les habitant·e·s de leurs communautés.

0 - Pas du tout d'accord → 5 - Tout à fait d'accord

– *Next page* –

Les autorités locales prennent des décisions qui nuisent aux habitant·e·s.

0 - Pas du tout d'accord → 5 - Tout à fait d'accord

– *Next page* –

Pour finir, dans quelle mesure êtes-vous d'accord avec les affirmations suivantes ?

L'histoire que vous avez lue présente une situation où les autorités ont investi dans un projet que les habitant·e·s soutenaient.

0 - Pas du tout d'accord → 5 - Tout à fait d'accord

– *Next page* –

Dans cette histoire, les autorités ont accepté de dialoguer avec les membres des équipes de projets citoyens.

0 - Pas du tout d'accord → 5 - Tout à fait d'accord

– *Next page* –

[Debriefing A – High responsiveness, high external political efficacy condition]

Vous avez terminé l'enquête !

Nous vous remercions du temps que vous avez consacré à y répondre. Nous souhaitons maintenant vous donner quelques explications sur notre étude avant que vous envoyiez votre réponse en passant à la page suivante.

Cette étude vise à comprendre dans quelle mesure a) la réponse institutionnelle dans la prise de décision politique, et b) la possibilité pour les citoyens d'avoir leur mot à dire dans ces décisions, ont un effet sur les émotions et les opinions des gens.

Pour évaluer l'effet de la réponse institutionnelle, nous vous avons présenté un texte dans lequel les autorités locales ont permis le développement du projet citoyen pour la construction du centre civique. Pour évaluer l'effet de pouvoir avoir un mot à dire sur la décision des institutions, nous avons indiqué que les autorités locales ont accepté de se réunir avec les membres des équipes de projet.

Nous pensons que tant votre perception de la réponse institutionnelle que le sentiment de pouvoir vous exprimer auprès des autorités ont pu influencer dans une certaine mesure vos réponses aux questions sur les émotions et les opinions sociopolitiques. C'est cette influence possible qui nous intéresse dans cette étude.

[Debriefing B – Low responsiveness, high external political efficacy condition]

Vous avez terminé l'enquête !

Nous vous remercions du temps que vous avez consacré à y répondre. Nous souhaitons maintenant vous donner quelques explications sur notre étude avant que vous envoyiez votre réponse en passant à la page suivante.

Cette étude vise à comprendre dans quelle mesure a) la réponse institutionnelle dans la prise de décision politique, et b) la possibilité (ou impossibilité, dans ce cas) pour les citoyens d'avoir leur mot à dire dans ces décisions, ont un effet sur les émotions et les opinions des gens.

Pour évaluer l'effet de la réponse institutionnelle, nous vous avons présenté un texte dans lequel les autorités locales ont permis le développement du projet citoyen pour la construction du centre civique. Pour évaluer l'effet de ne pas pouvoir avoir un mot à dire sur la décision des institutions, nous avons indiqué que les autorités locales n'ont pas accepté de se réunir avec les membres des équipes de projet.

Nous pensons que tant votre perception de la réponse institutionnelle que le sentiment de ne pas pouvoir vous exprimer auprès des autorités ont pu influencer dans une certaine mesure vos réponses aux questions sur les émotions et les opinions

sociopolitiques. C'est cette influence possible qui nous intéresse dans cette étude.

[Debriefing C – High responsiveness, low external political efficacy condition]

Vous avez terminé l'enquête !

Nous vous remercions du temps que vous avez consacré à y répondre. Nous souhaitons maintenant vous donner quelques explications sur notre étude avant que vous envoyiez votre réponse en passant à la page suivante.

Cette étude vise à comprendre dans quelle mesure a) la réponse institutionnelle dans la prise de décision politique, et b) la possibilité pour les citoyens d'avoir leur mot à dire dans ces décisions, ont un effet sur les émotions et les opinions des gens.

Pour évaluer l'effet de la réponse institutionnelle, nous vous avons présenté un texte dans lequel les autorités locales n'ont finalement pas permis le développement du projet citoyen pour la construction du centre civique. Pour évaluer l'effet de pouvoir néanmoins avoir un mot à dire sur la décision des institutions, nous avons indiqué que les autorités locales ont accepté de se réunir avec les membres des équipes de projet.

Nous pensons que tant votre perception de la réponse institutionnelle que le sentiment de pouvoir vous exprimer auprès des autorités ont pu influencer dans une certaine mesure vos réponses aux questions sur les émotions et les opinions sociopolitiques. C'est cette influence possible qui nous intéresse dans cette étude.

[Debriefing D – Low responsiveness, low external political efficacy condition]

Vous avez terminé l'enquête !

Nous vous remercions du temps que vous avez consacré à y répondre. Nous souhaitons maintenant vous donner quelques explications sur notre étude avant que vous envoyiez votre réponse en passant à la page suivante

Cette étude vise à comprendre dans quelle mesure a) la réponse institutionnelle dans la prise de décision politique, et b) la possibilité (ou impossibilité, dans ce cas) pour les citoyens d'avoir leur mot à dire dans ces décisions, ont un effet sur les émotions et les opinions des gens.

Pour évaluer l'effet de la réponse institutionnelle, nous vous avons présenté un texte dans lequel les autorités locales n'ont finalement pas permis le développement du projet citoyen pour la construction du centre civique. Pour évaluer l'effet de ne pas pouvoir avoir un mot à dire sur la décision des institutions, nous avons indiqué que les autorités locales n'ont pas accepté de se réunir avec les membres des équipes de projet.

Nous pensons que tant votre perception de la réponse institutionnelle que le sentiment de ne pas pouvoir vous exprimer auprès des autorités ont pu influencer dans une certaine mesure vos réponses aux questions sur les émotions et les opinions sociopolitiques. C'est cette influence possible qui nous intéresse dans cette étude.

– *Next page* –

Veillez cliquer sur la flèche pour terminer.