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Examining punishment at different explanatory levels

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ABSTRACT

Experimental studies on punishment have sometimes been overinterpreted not only for the reasons Guala lists but also because of a frequent conflation of proximate and ultimate explanatory levels that Guala’s review perpetuates. Moreover, for future analyses we may need a clearer classification of different kinds of punishment.

When explaining behavioral decisions, it is important to distinguish between different explanatory levels, especially between proximate (mechanistic) and ultimate (evolutionary) explanations (Tinbergen, 1963). Proximate explanations of a given behavior deal with questions about its ontogeny (e.g. how does the behavior change with age and experience) or about its causation, i.e. the physiological, molecular, and cognitive mechanisms underlying the behavior and the stimuli that elicit it. Ultimate explanations either deal with questions about the phylogeny of the behavior (e.g. how does it compare with similar behaviors in related species) or its adaptive value (e.g. what is its impact on the individual’s survival and life-time reproductive success).

The concept of weak reciprocity, as defined in Guala (2011), is an attempt to explain the adaptive value of cooperation and punishment because it concentrates on the fitness benefits one could get from cooperating, defecting, or punishing (Trivers, 1971; Alexander, 1974). This concept is restricted to one explanatory level only. In contrast, strong reciprocity mixes different explanatory levels: it uses proximate arguments to explain ultimate problems (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003, 2004; Fehr & Rockenbach, 2003; Gintis et al., 2003; Bowles & Gintis, 2004). Strong reciprocity is, for example, called a “… predisposition to reward others for cooperative, norm-abiding behaviours” and “… a propensity to impose sanctions on others for norm violations” (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003, p. 785). Such a definition clearly relates to the causal mechanisms of cooperation and punishment. But the concept is then frequently used as to answer ultimate (evolutionary) questions, for example in Bowles & Gintis (2004, p.17): “… cooperation is maintained because many humans have a predisposition to punish those who violate group-beneficial norms”. Such a mixing up of different explanatory levels can, from an evolutionary point of view, easily lead to overinterpretations of proximate patterns (Hagen & Hammerstein, 2006; Sigmund, 2007; West et al., 2007, in press; Rankin et al., 2009). For example, punishment that can be observed in anonymous one-shot interactions seems truly altruistic and was interpreted as such in Fehr & Gächter (2002). However, until very recently, humans lived in groups where anonymous one-shot interactions were probably very rare, i.e. such interactions are most probably not the context in which human punishment has
evolved. If studied within a more natural social context, human punishment may
ultimately be self-interested.

As discussed in Guala (2011), explaining punishment from an evolutionary point
of view requires determining the costs and benefits of punishment. In line with weak
reciprocity models, recent studies have shown that punishment can lead to long-term
net benefits and hence be evolutionarily stable when punitive actions contribute to a
punishment reputation (Hilbe & Sigmund, 2010; dos Santos et al., 2011). Under such
conditions, the immediate costs of punishment can be outweighed by the benefits a
punisher receives later because of his/her punishment reputation. Experimental studies
that ignore the possible effects of a punishment reputation can therefore easily produce
artifacts (Hagen & Hammerstein, 2006).

We also believe that the term “punishment” is currently used too broadly in the
literature on cooperation. If “punishment” is the subtraction of resources from free-
riders in order to reduce the frequency of further free-riding, there are at least three
different kinds of punishment that may need to be distinguished both for ultimate and
proximate analyses. Many of these analyses deal with what could be called “simple
costly punishment”, i.e. punishers pay a cost to induce a cost on the punished (Fehr &
Gächter, 2000; Rockenbach & Milinski, 2006; Dreber et al., 2008; Rand et al., 2009; Wu et
al., 2009). Another form of punishment could be called “punishment by taking
something away” (e.g. Cephu’s example in Guala, 2011). Here, the punisher takes
something from the punished in order to induce a cost to the punished. Regardless of
whether the punisher thereby experiences an immediate reduction of the own welfare
or not, “punishment by taking something away” and the upper “simple costly
punishment” are likely to differ in their cost-benefit ratios (relevant for ultimate
analyses) and may involve, for example, different kinds of emotions (relevant for
proximate analyses). A third category could be called “punishment by refusal”. The
punisher then punishes by refusing to cooperate with the punished in a repeated game
like, for example, an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (Fudenberg et al., 1994). The examples
of ostracism discussed in Guala relate to this kind of punishment. Such defection may
typically be a reaction to non-provoked defection and could be called “punishment” if it
reduces the income of the punished (i.e. his/her benefits from what would otherwise be
costly cooperative interactions) in order to possibly improve the punisher’s long-term benefits
from future cooperative interactions with a refined punished or with others. This third
kind of punishment could be immediately costly for the punisher, for example, if it
delays the resumption of beneficial mutual cooperation. Such immediate costs would
have to be compensated on the long run in order to maintain “punishment by refusal” as
an evolutionary successful behavioral strategy. However, a possible alternative function
of defection in response to defection may be to simply avoid the losses of anticipated
further defection (e.g. avoiding the sucker’s payoff in the Prisoner’s Dilemma). It is
probably not useful to call this later form of defection “punishment” if it usually does not
ultimately increase the level of cooperation within a group or directly with the defector
(from an ultimate point of view), or if it is just a precautionary measure to avoid further
losses (from a proximate point of view). Therefore, purely punitive actions may not
always be easy to identify. Multidisciplinary approaches that carefully exploit the
specific advantages of proximate and ultimate analyses are therefore often necessary to
better understand human behavior.


