
Johannes Bronkhorst
 Anthropole 4118
 Université de Lausanne
 CH-1015 Lausanne
 Johannes.Bronkhorst@unil.ch

Studies on Bharṭṛhari, 9: Bharṭṛhari and his Vedic tradition-

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In his preface to Masaaki Hattori's book *Dignāga on Perception* (Harvard University Press 1968; Editor's Foreword p. vi), Daniel H. H. Ingalls makes the following observation: "Indian philosophers [at least till some centuries after Dignāga's time] were banded together in small groups of teachers and pupils, following set rituals of worship and well-established regiments of exercise and meditation. Their writings are directed inward, are addressed to a narrow circle of colleagues and pupils, or, in rare cases of outward direction, are concerned with refuting the views of other tightly knit groups." This observation is no doubt incorrect in this extreme form, and I think Eli Franco is right in criticizing it in the following words (Franco, 1997: 37 n. 50): "This description (by Ingalls, J.B.) does not seem to be based on any external or internal evidence and goes quite contrary to the external evidence, such as the reports by the Chinese pilgrims, as well as the internal evidence which clearly shows that Indian philosophers were well informed about each other. This in turn presupposes, at least on a relative scale, a free circulation of manuscripts and access to well equipped libraries, which could only be found in larger monasteries or at kingly courts. It is only because Indian philosophers were well informed and openly engaging in a dialogue with rival philosophers, that Indological scholarship has been able to establish a quasi unshakable relative chronology for almost all Indian philosophers of the first millennium [sic] A.D., even though there are

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practically no [100] biographical data for any of them, nor, with very few exceptions, any external evidence for an absolute dating."

I repeat that I think Franco is right. Indeed, it would be impossible to understand the history of Indian philosophy without being aware of the constant interaction between the various schools. At the same time the possibility cannot beforehand be excluded that certain "philosophical" positions were cultivated in one rather than in another "religious" current. It seems certain that at least a number of philosophical traditions were held and preserved in family lineages that may have extended over several centuries. According to Gopikamohan Bhattacharya, the Mandara family of the Kāśyapagotra in Mithilā produced numerous great Naiyāyikas in the course of several centuries (among them Vaṭeśvara, Śivapati, and Yajñapati).¹ It is also remarkable that a number of thinker of the "old" Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika schools are known to have been Śaivas, or even more specifically Pāśupatas; this is true of Praśastapāda (probably), Uddyotakara, Bhāsarvajña, Vādi Vāgīśvara.² Of most other Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers we do not know the religious affiliation. But we may wonder: is it conceivable that this school, for at least a part of its existence, was limited to just one religious current? Even though no answer to this question may at this moment be possible, the question is intriguing.

On a higher level of generality, however, it is clear that different schools of thought are associated with different currents of religion. All forms of "Buddhist philosophy", for example, were elaborated and defended by Buddhists, normally by monks who followed one or another of the monastic disciplines (*vinaya*) of that religion. The Brahmanical philosophies were the property of Brahmins belonging to one or another of the Vedic schools. However, the moment we try to be more precise, the situation becomes obscure. The link between philosophical and disciplinary schools in Buddhism — and the difference between the two — is, to be sure, discussed in modern scholarly literature. The link between Brahmanical philosophies and religious currents within Brahmanism, including Vedic schools, on the other hand, remains unclear. There may be some exceptions — I mentioned the possible link between Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and the Pāśupata religion — but they are few in number.

One might think that a clear link between Vedic school and philosophy should be visible in the case of those Brahmanical philosophies which present themselves as Mīmāṃsā: examination of the Veda. The Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in particular has often been linked to the Śrauta Sūtras: many [101] topics dealt with in the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra have their counterpart in the Śrauta Sūtras, and occasionally the rules are identical. The Śrauta Sūtras belong to specific Vedic schools. Is there reason to believe that the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra and its commentaries, too, are linked to one particular Vedic school? I would not expect so.

¹ Bhattacharya, 1984: 15 sq.

² See Bronkhorst, 1996 (Praśastapāda); the final colophon of the Nyāyavārttika (Uddyotakara); Ingalls, 1962: 284; Sarma, 1934 (Bhāsarvajña); Raghavan, 1942 (Vādi Vāgīśvara).

Damodar Vishnu Garge (1952: 19-22) pointed out almost half a century ago that Śabara's Bhāṣya, though citing most often from Taittirīya texts, contains convincing indications that its author, Śabara, was himself a Maitrāyaṇīya.³ This suggests that, at any rate at the time of Śabara, Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā had lost any special link it may have had with the Taittirīyas, supposing that there ever was one. Madhav M. Deshpande, in a recent lecture, cites various passages which show that ritualists remained aware of the opposition between the own specific Śākhā and the Mīmāṃsā claim that all Śākhās teach one and the same ritual act. Regarding the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra, Asko Parpola (1981: 172) has argued that this text has directly grown out of discussions involving two opposing protagonists which were a regular institution of each Vedic school in the Sūtra period. In other words, the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra uses discussions that were current in various Vedic schools, but transcends any particular Vedic school.

Perhaps it is not surprising that a school of thought which deals with, which "examines", the whole Veda, not just the version accepted by this or that Vedic school, could not, or not for long, be confined to just one Vedic school. Seen in this way, Mīmāṃsā exceeds by its very nature the narrow confines of one Vedic school, even if most or all of its scholars must have belonged each of them to some such school.⁴

Similar reflections can be made with regard to Śārīraka-Mīmāṃsā, better known as Vedānta or, later, Uttara-Mīmāṃsā. In its classical form this school bases itself on a large number of Upaniṣads, belonging to different Vedic schools. The study of all those Upaniṣads necessarily goes beyond the territory of any single Vedic school. To this may be added that many of the classical authors of Vedānta, first among them Śāṅkara, may have been renouncers who had, along with much else, also renounced their affiliation to a particular Vedic school.

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Does this mean that our initial question is ill-posed? Do schools of thought by their very nature extend beyond the boundaries of one single Vedic school? Perhaps. Only future research may be able to answer these questions by collecting data from a variety of thinkers and schools. In this paper I wish to concentrate on one thinker and explore to what extent his thought may have been influenced, or even determined, by the Vedic school to which he belonged. This thinker is Bhartṛhari — a Brahmanical philosopher belonging to the fifth century of the common era, author of the Vākyapadīya and of a commentary, Ṭīkā, on the

³ Garge (1952: 13-14) presents elements from which he concludes that Jaimini was associated with the Sāmaveda. Parpola (1994: 304), however, points out: "Although Jaimini ... is associated with the Sāmaveda, it is true that the [Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra] actually has more to do with the Yajurveda than with the Sāmaveda."

⁴ Interestingly, Kumārila Bhaṭṭa pays homage, in the introductory stanza of his Śloka-vārttika, to "Him who wears the crescent moon" (*somārdhadhāriṇe*), i.e. to Śiva. The commentator Pārthasārathi Mīśra, perhaps embarrassed by this verse, points out that an interpretation of this term in sacrificial terms is also possible: *somasya ardhaṃ sthānaṃ grahacamasādi taddhāriṇe* "that which is equipped with vessels of Soma" (Ganganath Jha).

Mahābhāṣya, nowadays often referred to as Mahābhāṣya-dīpikā. The Vedic school to which he belonged is that of the Mānava-Maitrāyaṇīyas. Is it possible that this famous thinker may have borrowed, or rather inherited, some of his key ideas from this, his own, Vedic tradition?

This is indeed possible. The Vākyapadīya often invokes tradition, *āgama*. Vkp 1.30 states, for example:⁵ "Without tradition, logic cannot establish virtue (*dharma*); even the knowledge of seers derives from tradition." And Vkp 1.41:⁶ "He who bases himself on tradition ... is not hindered by logical arguments." It seems clear that tradition was very important for Bhartṛhari. It is even probable that he somehow considered the philosophy which he presented in the Vākyapadīya to be, at least in part, an expression of traditional points of view. But what exactly does he mean by tradition?

Unfortunately Bhartṛhari's explicit remarks on this matter do not help us much. Sometimes the grammatical tradition is clearly envisaged, like in Vkp 1.27:⁷ "Correct [words], which have been established on the basis of cultivated speakers [and] tradition (or: on the basis of tradition which comes from cultivated speakers), are a means to [realise] *dharma*. Incorrect [words] are opposite [in their effect], even though there is no difference in as far as the expression of meaning is concerned." Sometimes one has the impression that the Vaiśeṣika system of philosophy, or a related system, is referred to by the word *āgama*. An example is the following verse from the Vṛttisamuddeśa, which discusses the phrase *kṛṣṇās tilāḥ* 'black sesame seeds'; here an quality ('black'), a generic property (*tilatva*) and a substance ('sesame seed') are distinguished. The verse reads:⁸ "According [103] to the tradition coming from the ancients, three entities (*dravyātman*) are therefore separately present in the mind, as substrates and what inheres in them."

It would be useless to search for one single tradition that fits all the occurrences of the word *āgama* in the Vākyapadīya. Bhartṛhari recognised several traditions. But we must assume that he recognised the Mānava-Maitrāyaṇīya Vedic school as one of them. (Or perhaps better, if we take it that a Vedic school cannot be covered by the word *āgama*, we must assume that he recognized the Mānava-Maitrāyaṇīya Vedic school as a source of authority beside various traditions.)⁹ Bhartṛhari's Vedic quotations show that he belonged to this school.¹⁰ Moreover, he refers to the manuals of the Mānavas without specifying their

⁵ Vkp 1.30: *na cāgamād ṛte dharmas tarkeṇa vyavatiṣṭhate/ṛṣiṇām api yaj jñānam tad apy āgamapūrvakam//*

⁶ Vkp 1.41: *caitanyaṃ iva yaś cāyam avicchedena vartate/āgamas tam upāsīno hetuvādair na bādhyate//*

⁷ Vkp 1.27: *śiṣṭebhya āgamāt siddhāḥ sādhaso dharmasāadhanam/arthapratyāyanābhede viparītās tv asādhavaḥ//*

⁸ Vkp 3.14.20: *dravyātmanān trayas tasmād buddhau nānā vyavasthitāḥ/āśrayāśrayidharmenety ayaṃ pūrvabhya āgamaḥ//*

⁹ The Baudhāyana Dharmasūtra (1.1.1 ff.) states that each (*sākhā* of the) Veda teaches the *dharma*; *smṛti* (tradition) is the second (source of *dharma*), the traditional doctrine (*āgama*) of the *śiṣṭas* the third; see Gonda, 1980: 4. It is not impossible, however, that Bhartṛhari may have referred to the contents of the Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad as *āgama*; see below.

¹⁰ Rau, 1980; Bronkhorst, 1987.

name; he simply refers to their *prakaraṇas* ‘chapters’. In ritual details he appears to follow the teachings of that school.¹¹ We therefore get back to the question: is it conceivable that Bhartṛhari's philosophy, too, follows at least to some extent the Mānava-Maitrāyaṇīya school?

In order to investigate this question, we will have to compare Bhartṛhari's ideas with ideas current in the Mānava-Maitrāyaṇīya school. Bhartṛhari's ideas are to be found in the Vākyapadīya, and to a lesser extent in his commentary on the Mahābhāṣya. But how do we find out which ideas were current among the Mānava-Maitrāyaṇīyas? Which texts have to be taken into consideration here?

The first and main text that comes to mind is, of course, the Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad. In order to carry out a comparison between the Vākyapadīya and this Upaniṣad, I repeat here some important points of Bhartṛhari's philosophy as I have presented them in an earlier publication.¹² They concern the nature of Brahman — i.e. of the absolute — and its relationship with the phenomenal world.

(i) Bhartṛhari conceives of Brahman as being the totality of all that exists, including all that existed in the past and will exist in the future.

(ii) Brahman's relationship with the phenomenal world is essentially that of a division. The undivided whole is real, single and without modification; its division, i.e. the phenomenal world, is unreal, multiform and modified: "[Reality] does not exist and it exists; it is single and it is different; it is [104] joined and it is divided; it is modified and it is the opposite of that."¹³ Forms are only found in the phenomenal world: "It is because of time that actions are obtained through division, because of space that all forms [are obtained through division]. All divisions are based on [reality] which is without divisions."¹⁴ The absolute and the phenomenal world are therefore no more than two sides of the same entity. Bhartṛhari puts it as follows: "The tradition [that has come down to us] from the ancients teaches that there is no difference between reality and non-reality."¹⁵ This last quotation shows that Bhartṛhari linked this aspect of his doctrine in particular to tradition.

(iii) The shape of the unreal phenomenal world, i.e. of the division of undivided Brahman, is determined by language, more specifically by the divine language, Sanskrit; sometimes however it is rather the mind, or thought, which is presented as dividing, or even as creating, the phenomenal world.

(iv) The division of the absolute is accompanied, or even instigated, by certain ‘powers’ (*śakti*), among which time (*kāla*) and direction (*diś*) or space (*ākāśa*) play an important role.

¹¹ Bronkhorst, 1989.

¹² Bronkhorst, 1992.

¹³ Vkp 3.2.13: *tan nāsti vidyate tac ca tad ekaṃ tat pṛthak pṛthak/ samsṛṣṭaṃ ca vibhaktam ca vikṛtam tat tad anyathā//*

¹⁴ Vkp 3.7.153: *kālāt kriyā vibhajyanta ākāśāt sarvamūrtayah/ etāvāṃś caiva bhedo 'yam abhedopanibandhanaḥ//*

¹⁵ Vkp 3.2.7ab: *na tattvātattvayor bheda iti vṛddhebhya āgamaḥ//*

(v) Bhartṛhari's absolute is not identical with consciousness. Consciousness — or perhaps better: thought — only plays a role in the division of the world.

Are there statements in the Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad that correspond to these five points? That is to say, are there phrases or passages which may have convinced Bhartṛhari that his philosophy does not deviate from the Maitrāyaṇīya tradition? The Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad contains the following parallels to the points enumerated above:

(i) In connection with Bhartṛhari's view that Brahman is the totality of all that exists we can cite MaitUp 4.6, which states: *brahma khalv idam vāva sarvam* "this totality, indeed, is Brahman".¹⁶ A passage in MaitUp 6.6 speaks of Prajāpati's body "in [which] all this is contained, and which is contained in all this" (*etasām idam sarvam antarhitam asmimś ca sarvasminn eśāntarhiteti*).

(ii) The Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad does not speak of a division of Brahman, but it speaks of its two aspects in the following passage: "Brahman has two aspects, the one with form, the other one without form. [The aspect] with [105] form (*mūrta*) is unreal (*asatya*); [the aspect] without form (*amūrta*) is real (*satya*), it is the [real] Brahman."¹⁷

(iii) The role of language is mentioned in MaitUp 6.6: "This [world] was non-expressed. Prajāpati, who is the real, having practised *tapas*, expressed one after the other *bhūḥ*, *bhuvah*, *svah*. This [collection of syllables] is the most solid body of Prajāpati."¹⁸ Clearer is MaitUp 6.22-23, from which I choose the following extracts: "One must meditate on two Brahman, the word and the non-word. By the word the non-word is manifested. The word here is OM. ... For it is said: 'One must know the two Brahman: the *śabdabrahman* and the one that is supreme; he who is versed in *śabdabrahman* reaches the supreme Brahman.' ... The word is the syllable OM; its extreme is peaceful, without words, fearless, free from sorrow, blissful, satisfied, firm, immutable, immortal, unshakable, permanent."¹⁹

(iv) Bhartṛhari's "powers" find a parallel in MaitUp 6.15, which deals with time and its relationship to Brahman, and elaborates these notions in typically upaniṣadic fashion: "Brahman has two aspects, time and non-time. That which is anterior to the sun is non-time, without divisions; that which has the sun as antecedent is time, with divisions. The form of

¹⁶ For the meaning 'totality' of *sarva* see Gonda, 1955, esp. p. 63 [505] f.; 1982.

¹⁷ MaitUp 6.3: *dve vāva brahmaṇo rūpe mūrtaṃ cāmūrtaṃ ca/ atha yan mūrtaṃ tad asatyam/ yad amūrtaṃ tad satyaṃ tad brahma/*. The first half of this quotation ("Brahman has two aspects, the one with form, the other one without form") also occurs almost identically at BĀrUp 2.3.1. The remainder, which identifies *mūrta* with *asatya* and *amūrta* with *satya*, has no parallel in the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, nor anywhere else in Vedic literature. Closest comes MuṇUp 2.1.1-2, which identifies 'the person without form' (*amūrtaḥ puruṣaḥ*) with truth (*satyam*), without however mentioning *mūrta* and *asatya*.

¹⁸ MaitUp 6.6: *athāvyāhṛtaṃ vā idam āsīt/ sa satyaṃ prajāpatis tapas taptvānuvyāharad bhūr bhuvah svar iti/ eśaivāsya prajāpateḥ sthaviṣṭhā tanūḥ/*

¹⁹ MaitUp 6.22-23: *dve vāva brahmaṇī abhidhyeye śabdaś cāśabdaś ca/ atha śabdenaivāśabdāṃ āviṣkriyate/ atha tatrom iti śabdaḥ/ ... evaṃ hy āha: dve brahmaṇī veditavye śabdabrahma paraṃ ca yat/ śabdabrahmaṇī niṣṇātaḥ paraṃ brahmādhigacchati// ... yaḥ śabdaś tad om ity etad akṣaram/ yad asyāgraṃ tac chāntam aśabdāṃ abhayaṃ aśokam ānandaṃ tṛptaṃ sthiraṃ acalam amṛtam acyutaṃ dhruvam ...*

[time] with divisions is the year. From the year these creatures are born; once born with the year they grow in this world; in the year they are destroyed."²⁰ Also the remainder of MaitUp 6.15 as well as 6.16 deal with time. MaitUp 6.17 deals with the spatial aspects of the world: "Brahman was here alone at first, infinite to the East, infinite to the South, infinite to the West, infinite to the North, infinite upward and downward, in all directions infinite. ... [106] He is the *ākāśātman*. When all is destroyed, he awakes, alone. Out of this *ākāśa* he awakens this, [which is pure spirit]."²¹

(v) This last passage qualifies the world as *cetāmātram* 'pure spirit'. It is however to be noted that this expression qualifies the world that is awakened, not Brahman the awakener. Like Bhartṛhari, the Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad never identifies Brahman and consciousness, contrary to certain other Upaniṣads.

The parallels just indicated should not make us jump to the conclusion that Maitrāyaṇīya influence on Bhartṛhari has now been proved beyond doubt. In fact, the text here referred to as Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad is a composite work — variously known by the names Maitri (Maitrī), Maitrāyaṇa, and Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad — whose connection with the Maitrāyaṇīya school is subject to doubt. J.A.F. van Buitenen has been able to show (1962) that the present Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad is the result of combining two originally independent texts, an original Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad that did belong to the Vedic school of that name, and another text which he calls the Southern Maitrāyaṇī and which is "without apparent Vedic relationships" (p. 21); editorial changes were subsequently added to this combined text. van Buitenen says nothing about the date or dates when these changes took place, but it seems a priori most likely — in view both of his early date and his Vedic affiliation — that Bhartṛhari was acquainted with the original Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad, even though it cannot be completely excluded that he knew the inflated Upaniṣad, the one which we have now, and looked upon it as a Maitrāyaṇīya text.

The problem is that the first of the five points discussed above has only parallels in portions that do not belong to the original Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad. MaitUp 4.6, which identifies Brahman with the totality of what there is, is according to van Buitenen an editorial interpolation which was added after original Maitrāyaṇīya and Southern Maitrāyaṇī had been combined to make a new text. The portion of MaitUp 6.6 which expresses itself in a similar manner with regard to Prajāpati's body appears to be an editorial interpolation made under the influence of a passage in the Southern Maitrāyaṇī, and therefore once again posterior to

²⁰ MaitUp 6.15: *dve vāva brahmaṇo rūpe kālāś cākālāś ca/ atha yaḥ prāg ādityāt so 'kālo 'kalaḥ/ atha ya ādityādyah sa kālaḥ sakalaḥ/ sākālasya vā etad rūpaṃ yat saṃvatsaram/ saṃvatsarāt khalv evemāḥ prajāḥ prajāyante/ saṃvatsareṇeva vai jātā vivardhante/ saṃvatsare pratyastaṃ yanti/*

²¹ MaitUp 6.17: *brahma ha vā idam agra āsīd eko 'nantaḥ prāg ananto dakṣiṇato 'nantaḥ pratīcy ananta udīcy ananta ūrdhvaṃ cāvān ca sarvato 'nantaḥ/ .../ eṣa ākāśātmaiva/ eṣa kṛtsnakṣaya eko jāgarti iti/ etasmād ākāśād eṣa khalv idaṃ ... bodhayati/* For the interpretation of *ākāśātman*, cp. TaitUp 1.6: *ākāśasarīraṃ brahma.*

the combination of the two texts. Add to this that various other texts describe Brahman, sometimes Prajāpati, as the totality of all that exists; examples are ChānUp 3.14.1, BĀrUp 2.4.6, 2.5, 4.5.7, 5.3, MuṇUp 2.2.12, ŚPaBr 7.3.1.42, KauṣBr 6.15, 25.12, Bhag 11.40. [107]

Also the word *cetāmātram*, cited to illustrate point (v), is an interpolation according to van Buitenen (p. 48). The remaining points have each at least one relevant citation in the original Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad.

The only conclusion that can be drawn from the above is that the original Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad *may* have exerted a formative influence on Bhartṛhari's thought, but this is not certain.

There is another text that might conceivably preserve 'philosophical' or 'cosmological' ideas that were current in Bhartṛhari's Vedic school, and which therefore has to be taken into consideration here. In another publication I have drawn attention to the fact that Bhartṛhari, in his commentary on the Mahābhāṣya, simply uses the expression *prakaraṇa* 'chapter' where he refers to manuals of his own Vedic school, that of the Mānava-Maitrāyaṇīyas. On one occasion he uses this same expression while citing a verse that must have belonged to a work on Dharma. It can be concluded from this that Bhartṛhari knew a Mānava Dharmaśāstra.²² However, the verse he cites at this place does not occur in our Manusmṛti, so that it is clear that the Mānava Dharmaśāstra which Bhartṛhari knew was not identical with our Manusmṛti. It is however conceivable that the text he knew — which belonged to the Vedic school of the Mānava-Maitrāyaṇīyas — was the (or a) predecessor of our Manusmṛti which, as is well-known, is no longer the exclusive property of any one school.²³ Let us see whether Bhartṛhari shares ideas with the Manusmṛti.

The part of the Manusmṛti that might be of particular interest in this connection is its first book which, as Lingat (1967: 95) observed, is nothing but an introduction which contains nothing corresponding to it in the Dharmasūtras.²⁴ This introduction contains, among other things, a description of the creation of the world, and it is here that we might conceivably find traces of the 'cosmological' tradition of the Mānavas. A feature that strikes us immediately is that the eternal and non-manifested cause of the world is here characterized as *sadasadātmaka* 'being by nature real and unreal'.²⁵ (Śloka 12.118, too, characterizes 'the

²² Bronkhorst, 1985.

²³ Bühler's earlier attempts to show that the Manusmṛti must be the descendant of an earlier, now lost, Mānava Dharmasūtra, did not convince scholars; cp. Alsdorf, 1962: 22 (852) f.

²⁴ There is, on the other hand, much that corresponds to the contents of the first book of the Manusmṛti in the Purāṇas; see Jahn, 1904.

²⁵ Manu 1.11ab: *yat tat kāraṇam avyaktam nityam sadasadātmakam*. This line is "out of place here" and the result of a modernisation of the text, as Paul Hacker (1963: 79 (391)) rightly points out. As we are not in a position to determine the date of this modernisation, it cannot be excluded (but nor can it be proved) that this line belonged already to the Mānava precursor of the Manusmṛti. For similar passages in the Purāṇas, see Kirfel, 1927: 2 (Textgruppe I, verse 3), 7 (IIA, 1.4,5), 45 (IIB, 1.8).

all' as 'real and [108] unreal' (*sarvam ... sac cāśac ca*.) This characterization of reality occurs, as we have seen, in the Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad and in the Vākyapadīya, but also elsewhere (e.g. Bhag 11.37). The Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad and the Vākyapadīya assign form (*mūrti*) to the phenomenal world, conceiving ultimate reality as being without form. The Manusmṛti does not do so, at least not in the same explicit manner, but something similar may perhaps be found at Manusmṛti 1.55-56, which speaks of the creator who periodically loses his form and adopts another one: "Lodging in darkness, he remains there with the sensory powers for a long time and does not engage in his own innate activity; and then he moves out from that physical form. He becomes the size of an atomic particle and enters into the seed of what moves and of what is still; and when he has united [with that] he leaves his [former] physical form."²⁶

Beside this point, there are some other agreements between the Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad and the Manusmṛti, which we will now turn to.

MaitUp 1.2 announces in its final sentence a gāthā. Two then following passages are not in verse, but they resemble Manu 6.76-77, which is. MaitUp 1.3b-c reads:

bhagavann

asthicarmasnāyumajjāśukraśoṇitaśleśmāśrudūśikāviṇmūtravātapittakaphasamghāte

durgandhe niḥsāre 'smiñ śarīre kiṃ kāmopabhogaiḥ/

kāmakrodhalobhamohabhayaviśādersyeṣṭaviyogāniṣṭasamprayogakṣutpipāsājarāmṛty

urogaśokādyair abhigate 'smiñ charīre kiṃ kāmopabhogaiḥ/

"Sir, in this evil-smelling body, conglomeration of bones, skin, sinews, marrow, semen, blood, phlegm, tears, eye-secretion, feces, urine, wind, bile, and phlegm, devoid of all essence, how can one enjoy desires?

In this body, which is a prey to lust, wrath, greed, perplexity, fear, despair, envy, parting with the loved and meeting with the unloved, hunger, thirst, senility, death, sickness, and other sorrows, how can one enjoy desires?" (tr. van Buitenen, 1962: 124)

It is possible that the passage numbered MaitUp 1.3a in the edition by van Buitenen immediately preceded these two passages; it may also have been added later.²⁷ It reads:

śarīram idaṃ ... asthibhiḥ citaṃ māṃsenābhiliptaṃ carmaṇāvabaddhaṃ (or: °naddhaṃ) viṇmūtravātapittakaphamajjāmedovasābhir anyaiś ca malair bahubhiḥ paripūrṇam

"This body ... is piled up with bones, smeared over with flesh, bundled up with skin, and filled with feces, urine, wind, bile, phlegm, marrow, lymph, fat and with many other kinds of filth." (tr. van Buitenen, 1962: 123-124)

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Consider now the two verses from the Manusmṛti (6.76-77):²⁸

²⁶ Manu 1.55-56: *tamo 'yaṃ tu samāśritya ciraṃ tiṣṭhati sendriyaḥ/ na ca svaṃ kurute karma tadotkrāmati mūrtiḥ// yadānumātriko bhūtvā bijam sthāśnu carīṣṇu ca/ samāviśati saṃśṛṣṭas tadā mūrtiṃ vimuñcati//*. Tr. Doniger and Smith, 1991: 9.

²⁷ For a discussion see van Buitenen, 1962: 74 f.; and Horsch, 1966: 199-200.

*asthithūṇaṃ snāyuyutaṃ māṃsaṣoṇitalepanam/ carmāvanaddhaṃ durgandhi pūrṇaṃ
mūtrapuriṣayoḥ// jarāśokasamāviṣṭaṃ rogāyatanam āturam/ rajasvalam anityaṃ ca
bhūtāvāsam imam tyajet//*

"He should abandon this foul-smelling, tormented, impermanent dwelling-place of living beings, filled with urine and excrement, pervaded by old age and sorrow, infested by illness, and polluted by passion, with bones for beams, sinews for cords, flesh and blood for plaster, and skin for the roof."

It would be going too far to maintain that these two verses from the Manusmṛti originally occupied the place of the passages from the Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad considered above. The use of the word *gāthā* just before indicated nevertheless that a verse was found at that place at some time. The similarity between the verses and the passages is moreover undeniable. To explain this by assuming that a common tradition underlies both is not therefore altogether improbable.²⁹

Consider next the beginning of MaitUp 2.2:

*atha ya eṣocchvāsāvaṣṭambhanenordhvam utkrānto vyathamāno/vyayamāno
'vyathamānas/vyayamānas tamaḥ praṇudaty eṣa ātm[ā]*

"He, who with the reliance on the breath goes out upward, and is restless, yet, when not restless, dispelles the darkness, he is the self." (tr. van Buitenen, 1962: 125)

van Buitenen (1962: 125 n. 13) compares this passage with Manu 1.6 (*tataḥ svayaṃbhūr bhagavān avyakto vyañjayann idam/ mahābhūtādi vṛttaujāḥ prādur āsīt tamonudaḥ*) and asks the question whether *vyathamāna/vyayamāna* of the Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad replaces an original *vyañjyamāna*. This proposal rests on the unexpressed idea that a special link connects these two texts.

The similarities just considered between the Manusmṛti and the Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad have one fatal flaw. The Maitrāyaṇīya passages concerned do not belong to the original Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad as reconstituted by van Buitenen. They are part of what he calls the Southern Maitrāyaṇī. This means that we must either believe that the Southern Maitrāyaṇī and the original Maitrāyaṇīya were already combined before the time the original Mānava Dharmaśāstra was composed, or conclude that the features considered do not constitute evidence supporting the originally Maitrāyaṇīya nature of the Manusmṛti.

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²⁸ These same verses also occur Mhbh 12.316.42-43, with this difference, that verse 43d here reads: *bhūtāvāsam samutsṛja*. Horsch (1966: 198 f.) cites further parallels from the Pāli Buddhist canon and from the Māhābhārata.

²⁹ Horsch (1966: 202) suggests the following historical reconstruction: "1. Eine gāthā buddhistischen Inhalts über den zusammengesetzten, ekelerregenden Aspekt des Körpers. 2. Erweiterung durch eine zweite Strophe über das Wesen des Leidvollen, der buddhistischen Wahrheit vom Leiden entsprechend. Beide Punkte finden eine Parallele in den zwei Versen von MBh und Manu. 3. Verderbnis des Metrums durch Prosaeschiebe, die wahrscheinlich durch buddhistische Begriffsreihen ... inspiriert wurden. ..."

We fare slightly better when considering possible parallels between the Manusmṛti and the Vākyapadīya. Both texts deal with the central role which the Veda plays in the creation of the world. Vkp 1.10 calls the Veda ‘creator of the worlds’ (*vidhātus tasya lokānām*); Manu 1.21 explains that the names, activities and conditions of all things were made in accordance with the words of the Veda.³⁰ Another shared feature is their shared aversion of logical reasoning that is independent of tradition. This comes out clearly when we compare Manu 12.106 and Vkp 1.151ab. The Vākyapadīya has:

vedaśāstrāvirodhī ca tarkaś cakṣur apaśyatām/

"Logical reasoning, when not in contradiction with the Veda,³¹ is the eye of those who cannot see."

The same idea is expressed in Manu 12.106:

*ārṣaṃ dharmopadeśaṃ ca vedaśāstrāvirodhinā/ yas tarkeṇānusamdhatte sa dharmam
veda netaraḥ//*

"The man who uses reason which does not contradict the teachings of the Veda to investigate the sages' [Veda] and the instructions about duty (dharma) — he alone, and no one else, knows duty."

One could further compare Vkp 1.30, which reads: *na cāgamād ṛte dharmas tarkeṇa
vyavatiṣṭhate* "Without tradition, dharma is not determined by reasoning."³²

Do these parallels justify the conclusion that Bhartṛhari borrowed the notion of the Veda as creator of the world and his distrust with regard to logical reasoning from the Mānava-Maitrāyaṇīya tradition, the same tradition that also find expression in the verses of the Manusmṛti just cited? This is far from certain. Both the notion of the Veda as creator of the world and distrust of logical reasoning are too general to allow of any precise conclusions.³³ Moreover, the historical connection between the lost Mānava [111]

³⁰ Manu 1.21: *sarveṣāṃ tu sanāmāni karmāṇi ca pṛthak pṛthak/ vedaśabdebhya evādau pṛthak
saṃsthāś ca nirmame//*. Cp. Kūrmapurāna 1.7.64: *nāma rūpaṃ ca bhūtānām kṛtyānām ca
prapañcanam/ vedaśabdebhya evādau nirmame sa maheśvaraḥ//*

³¹ The word *śāstra* can refer to the Veda, as is clear from Vkp 1.43 ab, which juxtaposes the *akṛtaka
śāstra* and the *smṛti*.

³² Cp. further Manu 2.11: *yo 'vamanyeta te mūle hetuśāstrāśayād dvijaḥ/ sa sādhubhir bahiṣkāryo
nāstiko vedanindakaḥ//* "Any twice-born man who disregards these two roots (of religion [viz. śruti
and smṛti]) because he relies on the teachings of logic should be excommunicated by virtuous people
as an atheist and a reviler of the Veda"; and Manu 4.30: *pāṣaṇḍino vikarmasthān baiḍālavratikāñ
chathān/ haitukān bakavṛttimś ca vānmātrenāpi nārcayet//* "He should not give honour, even with
mere words, to heretics, people who persist in wrong action, people who act like cats, hypocrites,
logicians, and people who live like herons" Tr. Doniger & Smith, 1991: 77, modified.

³³ The notion of the creative power of the words of the Veda is fairly common. We find it, for
example, in the Anugītā, in a passage which Deussen (1906: p. 908 verse 9) translates in the
following manner: "Aus jenem [dem Erkennen, d.h. dem Ātman] ist hervorgegangen der Herr der
Rede [das ewige, welterschaffende Vedawort]; auf ihn [auf das Vedawort] blickt das Manas [der
Welterschaffende Wille] hin, und die Gestalt [der Aussendinge] entsteht; das Manas läuft hinter dem
Buchstaben [des Veda] her [d.h. die Dinge werden im Hinblick auf das ewige Vedawort geschaffen]." (Mhbh 14.21.4 reads, in the critical edition: *tato vācaspatir jajñe samānaḥ paryavekṣate/ rūpaṃ*

Dharmaśāstra and the surviving Manusmṛti is far from clear, and may indeed be non-existent. The claim has even been made that "the author of the Manu Smṛti ... was probably a follower of the Śāṅkhāyana Śākhā of the Ṛg Veda and not a follower of Maitrāyaṇīya Mānava Śākhā".³⁴

However, there is evidence to think that the Mānavas in particular had at some time a reputation for being distrustful of logical reasoning not agreeing with the Vedic tradition.³⁵ It occurs in a passage from the Arthaśāstra of Kauṭilya. The subject-matter is *ānvīkṣikī*, a term which has recently drawn the attention of scholars.³⁶ It refers to a rational methodology which is applicable in various domains, such as "science of the three Vedas" (*trayī*), the "science of material welfare" (i.e., trade and agriculture) (*vārttā*), and "science of government and politics" (*daṇḍanīti*). Following Halbfass, I will translate it "investigative science". The Arthaśāstra specifies that *ānvīkṣikī* is useful for people in that it investigates with reasons what is right and wrong in the field of Vedic knowledge, what is advantageous and disadvantageous in the science of material acquisitions, and appropriate or inappropriate in the science of government, and moreover, the strengths and weaknesses of these three sciences.³⁷ The paragraph concerned begins with the following observations:³⁸

Investigative science (*ānvīkṣikī*), the science of the three Vedas (*trayī*), the science of material welfare (*vārttā*) and the science of government and politics [112] (*daṇḍanīti*) are the sciences (*vidyā*). **According to the Mānavas**, [only] the science of the three Vedas, the science of material welfare and the science of government and politics are sciences, **given that investigative science is a special case of the science of the three Vedas.**

Read by itself, the remark to the extent that investigative science is a special case of Vedic science is obscure. Read in combination with the passages just considered of the Vākyapadīya and of the Manusmṛti it invites the following interpretation: investigative

bhavati vai vyaktam tad anudravate manaḥ/(Deussen must have read *taṃ manaḥ paryavekṣate* in pāda b)

³⁴ Smith (1989:198 n. 91) observes: "It is likely that the similarity between the classification system in the [Śāṅkhāyana Grhya Sūtra] and that in Manu is not just coincidental. Ram Gopal, in 'Manu's indebtedness to Śāṅkhāyana,' Poona Orientalist 27 (1962): 39-44, analyzes a number of parallel passages in the two texts and concludes that 'the author of the Manu Smṛti who drew upon the Śāṅkhāyana Grhya Sūtra ... was probably a follower of the Śāṅkhāyana Śākhā of the Ṛg Veda and not a follower of Maitrāyaṇīya Mānava Śākhā.' The question of Manu's Vedic affiliation, if any, remains controversial, however."

³⁵ Lindtner (1993: 207) observes: "The hostile attitude towards 'dry logicians' (*tārkika*) is by no means specific to Manu and the [Vākyapadīya]. According to Nāgārjuna, for instance, even the Buddha took exception to *tārkika*-s." In a footnote he refers to Lokātīstava 21, in his Nagarjuniana, p. 134. However, it is open to question whether this verse really expresses a hostile attitude towards logicians, and it certainly is not distrustful of logical reasoning not agreeing with the Vedic tradition.

³⁶ See Halbfass, 1988: 274 f.

³⁷ Arthaśāstra 1.2.11: *dharmādharmau trayyām arthānarthau vārttāyām nayāpanayau daṇḍanīyām balābale caitāsām hetubhir anvīkṣamāṇā lokasyopakaroti*. Halbfass, 1988: 275.

³⁸ Arthaśāstra 1.2.1-3: *ānvīkṣikī trayī vārttā daṇḍanītiś ceti vidyāḥ/ trayī vārttā daṇḍanītiś ceti mānavāḥ/ trayivīśeṣo hy ānvīkṣikīti/*

science has no place outside Vedic science, and should never be allowed to lead to conclusions that contradict the Veda.

What can we conclude from the preceding? Not very much, I fear. It seems possible, even likely, that Bhartṛhari looked upon his Vedic school, that of the Mānava-Maitrāyaṇīyas, as one of his sources of inspiration which he refers to as authoritative tradition, *āgama*. The specific texts belonging to that tradition which he used probably include the Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad. He also used other treatises of the Mānava school, among them probably a Mānava Dharmaśāstra. Whether he derived philosophical ideas from these treatises is not clear. The Manusmṛti — assuming that it is based on the Mānava Dharmaśāstra known to Bhartṛhari — does not provide much information that might support this.

The observation that Bhartṛhari probably used the Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad and drew inspiration from it, might of course be interpreted differently from the way suggested here. One might surmise that he considered himself a Vedāntin who, for that reason, looked upon all Upaniṣads as authoritative. The fact that Bhartṛhari uses somewhere in his Vākyapadīya the expression *trayyantavedin* (Vkp 3.3.72), which may mean *vedāntin*,³⁹ suggests that he may have known people who based their philosophical opinions on all, or at least a certain number of Upaniṣads, not just on the Upaniṣad belonging to their own school.

However, some factors go against such an assumption. To begin with, Bhartṛhari does not, as Ashok Aklujkar has rightly pointed out (1991: 4), turn to the Upaniṣads as *śruti* sources of philosophical views.⁴⁰ Indeed, he does not cite a single Upaniṣadic passage, neither in his Vākyapadīya nor in [113] his commentary on the Mahābhāṣya.⁴¹ What is more, Bhartṛhari is, beside with Vedānta, also acquainted with the school of (Pūrva-)Mīmāṃsā. However, for ritual details he does not draw on Mīmāṃsā but on the Mānava-Maitrāyaṇīya tradition, as pointed out above.⁴² Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta (also called Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā and Uttara-Mīmāṃsā respectively) resemble each other in that the former bases itself on the Vedic Brāhmaṇa texts of all schools, and the latter on the Upaniṣads belonging to all schools. Since Bhartṛhari attached apparently more importance to the ritual practices of his own school than to all the others, it seems likely that he also attached more importance to his "own" Upaniṣad than to the philosophical school which derived its knowledge from all

³⁹ For a discussion see Houben, 1995: 293 f.

⁴⁰ Aklujkar is furthermore of the opinion that Bhartṛhari's use of the expression *trayyanta* does not go against the conclusion that the Upaniṣads do not seem to enjoy in Bhartṛhari's thinking any special status as a body of literature particularly important for a philosopher, this because, in Aklujkar's opinion, this expression does not seem to refer to the Upaniṣads (at least not primarily or exclusively), but to a literature whose nucleus or definitive content could have been what we find in works like the Brahma-sūtras. However, Aklujkar bases this conclusion on the three occurrences of the expression *trayyanta* in the Vṛtti (on Vkp 1.10; 2.22; 2.233) which was probably not composed by Bhartṛhari himself; cp. Houben, 1998.

⁴¹ See Rau, 1980, esp. p. 178, for a list of Vedic passages cited in these two works.

⁴² Note 11, with reference to Bronkhorst, 1989.

Upaniṣads combined. The very fact that Bharṭṛhari writes explicitly as a Mānava-Maitrāyaṇīya — which reveals itself, not so much by his preference for Maitrāyaṇīya Vedic quotations, but above all by his habit to refer to Mānava-Maitrāyaṇīya texts (and only to those) without specification that he does so — further supports the view that the Mānava-Maitrāyaṇīya tradition was for him much more important than the other Upaniṣads.

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Abbreviations:

AAWL	Abhandlungen der Akademie der Wissenschaften und der Literatur, Mainz, Geistes- und Sozialwissenschaftliche Klasse
ABORI	Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona
ALB	The Brahmavidyā, Adyar Library Bulletin, Madras
AS	Asiatische Studien, Études Asiatiques, Bern
BĀrUp	Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad
Bhag	Bhagavadgīta
ChānUp	Chāndogya Upaniṣad
DRT	Disputationes Rheno-Trajectinae, The Hague
HOS	Harvard Oriental Series, Cambridge Mass.
IHQ	Indian Historical Quarterly, Calcutta
IL	Indian Linguistics, Calcutta, later Pune

Jg.	Jahrgang
JIP	Journal of Indian Philosophy, Dordrecht
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JOIB	Journal of the Oriental Institute, Baroda
KauṣBr	Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa
KISchr	Kleine Schriften (Glasenapp-Stiftung), Wiesbaden, Stuttgart
MaitUp	Maitrāyaṇīya Upaniṣad
Manu	Manusmṛti
Mhbh	Mahābhārata, crit. ed. V.S. Sukthankar et al., Poona 1933-41 (BORI)
MuṇUp	Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad
Nagarjuniana	Christian Lindtner, Nagarjuniana: Studies in the writings and philosophy of Nāgārjuna, Copenhagen 1982 (Indiske Studier 4)
ÖAW	Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Wien
ŚPaBr	Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa (Mādhyandina)
StII	Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik
TaitUp	Taittirīya Upaniṣad
Vkp	Bhartrhari, Vākyapadīya, ed. W. Rau, Wiesbaden 1977
VKSKS	Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Sprachen und Kulturen Südasiens, ÖAW, Wien
WZKS	Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens, Wien