"I know how to fit in": Social clear-sightedness and its impact on self-presentation in social situations

Rudmann Ocyna

UNIL | Université de Lausanne

FACULTÉ DES SCIENCES SOCIALES ET POLITIQUES

INSTITUT DE PSYCHOLOGIE

"I know how to fit in":
Social clear-sightedness and its impact on self-presentation in social situations

THÈSE DE DOCTORAT

présentée à la

Faculté des Sciences Sociales et Politiques
de l'Université de Lausanne

pour l'obtention du grade de

Docteure en Psychologie Sociale

par

Ocyna Rudmann

Directeur de thèse
Monsieur Benoît Dompnier Maître d'enseignement et de recherche

Jury

Professeur Fabrizio Butera
Professeure Franciska Krings
Professeur Olivier Desrichard

LAUSANNE
2023

UNIL | Université de Lausanne

FACULTÉ DES SCIENCES SOCIALES ET POLITIQUES

INSTITUT DE PSYCHOLOGIE

"I know how to fit in":
Social clear-sightedness and its impact on self-presentation in social situations

THÈSE DE DOCTORAT

présentée à la

Faculté des Sciences Sociales et Politiques
de l'Université de Lausanne

pour l'obtention du grade de

Docteure en Psychologie Sociale

par

Ocyna Rudmann

Directeur de thèse
Monsieur Benoît Dompnier Maître d'enseignement et de recherche

Jury

Professeur Fabrizio Butera
Professeure Franciska Krings
Professeur Olivier Desrichard

LAUSANNE
2023

UNIL | Université de Lausanne

Faculté des sciences sociales et politiques

IMPRIMATUR

Le Décanat de la Faculté des sciences sociales et politiques de l'Université de Lausanne, au nom du Conseil et sur proposition d'un jury formé des professeurs

- M. Benoît DOMPNIER, Maître d'Enseignement et de Recherche à l'Université de Lausanne, Directeur de thèse
- M. Fabrizio BUTERA, Professeur à l'Université de Lausanne
- Mme Franciska KRINGS, Professeure à la HEC de Lausanne
- M. Olivier DESRICHARD, Professeur associé à l'Université de Genève

autorise, sans se prononcer sur les opinions de la candidate, l'impression de la thèse de Madame Ocyna RUDMANN, intitulée :

« « I know how to fit in » : Social clear-sightedness and its impact on self-presentation in social situations. »

Nicky LE FEUVRE
Doyenne

Lausanne, le 1er décembre 2023

RÉSUMÉ

Cette thèse introduit le concept de *clairvoyance sociale* comme une connaissance dispositionnelle de la désirabilité sociale, opérationnalisée en un facteur latent supra-ordonné. Les individus haut en clairvoyance sociale utiliseraient cette connaissance pour identifier la désirabilité sociale de différents construits (ici, des dimensions de la personnalité) et falsifieraient leurs réponses auto-rapportées en conséquence à des fins de présentation de soi. De plus, le contexte (i.e., le type de situations et le niveau de pression évaluative) influencerait les traits identifiés et falsifiés par ces personnes, mettant ainsi en évidence la composante situationnelle du concept. À travers trois axes de recherche, cette thèse examine l'existence et l'influence de ce construit sur les questionnaires auto-rapportés de personnalité.

Dans le premier axe, deux études explorent ce nouveau construit théorique et méthodologique comme une approche innovante du *Socially Desirable Responding* (SDR) à travers une modélisation d'équations structurelles. Les résultats indiquent que le SDR est effectivement dépendant de la situation, plus prévalent dans les situations à enjeux élevés, et varie selon le niveau de clairvoyance sociale. Dans le second axe, trois études examinent cette composante situationnelle du SDR à partir de tâches de budgétisation. Les résultats montrent que les participants sont capables de distinguer les dimensions de personnalité les plus importantes de celles plus optionnelles à mettre en avant pour se faire apprécier dans différentes situations sociales (i.e., situations de devoir vs. de socialité). Le troisième axe s'appuie sur les deux précédents et examine si les individus clairvoyants élaborent des présentations de soi stratégiquement adaptées à la situation et à ses enjeux. Quatre études ont été menées et analysées par équations structurelles méta-analytiques (MASEM). Les résultats confirment d'abord que la clairvoyance sociale est une connaissance de la désirabilité sociale invariante à travers les situations. Ensuite, ils révèlent que les individus clairvoyants adaptent leurs descriptions, utilisant leur connaissance de la désirabilité sociale uniquement pour simuler leurs réponses sur les dimensions importantes et en contexte de pression évaluative forte.

En conclusion, cette thèse souligne le rôle essentiel de la clairvoyance sociale dans la mise en place de présentations de soi stratégiques, en particulier dans des situations à enjeux élevés.

ABSTRACT

This thesis introduces the psychological construct of *social clear-sightedness* as a dispositional knowledge of social desirability, operationalized as a supra-ordinate latent factor. It suggests that individuals high in social clear-sightedness would use this knowledge to identify the social desirability attached to various constructs (in this thesis, personality dimensions), and fake their self-reports accordingly to achieve self-presentational purposes. Additionally, the context (i.e., the type of situations and the level of evaluative pressure) was expected to influence which traits are identified and faked by those with high level of social clear-sightedness, thus highlighting the situational component of the construct. Through three research lines, the thesis examines the existence and influence of this construct on personality self-reports.

In the first research line, two studies explored this new theoretical and methodological construct as an innovative approach to Socially Desirable Responding (SDR) through structural equation modelling. Results indicate that SDR was indeed situation-dependent, more prevalent in high-stakes situations, and contingent on individuals' dispositional level of social clear-sightedness. In the second research line, three studies examined this situational component of SDR using budgeting tasks. Results showed that participants were able to distinguish between personality dimensions highly important to possess from optional ones in order to be appreciated in different social situations (duty vs. sociality situations). The third research line builds upon the previous two, examining whether clear-sighted individuals elaborate self-presentations strategically adapted to the situation and stakes at play. Four studies were conducted and analyzed using meta-analytic structural equation modelling (MASEM). Results first confirmed that social clear-sightedness was a cross-situationally stable knowledge of social desirability. Second, they revealed that clear-sighted individuals adapted their self-descriptions based on the type of social situation and evaluative pressure, using their knowledge of social desirability to fake their answers only on highly important dimensions and in contexts with high evaluative pressure.

In conclusion, this thesis underscores the pivotal role of social clear-sightedness in shaping strategic self-representations, particularly in high-stakes situations.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS — REMERCIEMENTS

Durant ces cinq années de doctorat et cette période finale de rédaction de thèse, j'ai eu l'immense chance et l'honneur d'être entourée de personnes formidables. Je souhaite ici leur exprimer mes profonds remerciements.

Tout d'abord, je tiens à remercier infiniment mon directeur de thèse, Dr. Benoît Dompnier. Ce fut le tout premier à me donner ma chance en m'acceptant tout d'abord comme mémorante, puis comme doctorante. Sans me connaître, il m'a donné plusieurs opportunités précieuses pour moi et engageante pour lui ; pour cette prise de risque initiale, un immense merci. Par la suite, tout au long de notre collaboration, je n'ai pu qu'apprécier ses nombreuses qualités, autant professionnelles qu'humaines. Grâce à sa disponibilité sans limite à la moindre de mes questions ou au moindre de mes doutes, son encadrement très stimulant intellectuellement tout en étant empli de bienveillance, ainsi que ses encouragements chaleureux et autonomisants, il m'a sans nul doute permis mieux que quiconque de mener à bien cette thèse. Je me sens extrêmement chanceuse d'avoir pu profiter et apprendre un peu de ses connaissances à mes yeux sans fin, autant sur le plan théorique que méthodologique. J'ai évolué professionnellement en apprenant la recherche à ses côtés, mais ai aussi—je l'espère—un peu aiguisé ma vision grâce à sa capacité à remettre les idées en question tout en les regardant sous les angles les plus variés possibles. Je pense avoir grandi durant ce parcours, et mon superviseur y est pour beaucoup. Je lui en suis plus que reconnaissante.

Ensuite, je souhaite remercier grandement les membres de mon jury de thèse : Pr. Olivier Desrichard, Pr. Franciska Krings, et Pr. Fabrizio Butera. Les échanges durant la soutenance privée avec chacune de ces personnes se sont révélés très stimulants, motivants, et essentiels pour l'amélioration de cette thèse. Je tiens également à relever la bienveillance et l'enthousiasme sans faille de ces membres du jury.

Je tiens à exprimer des remerciements tout particulièrement au Pr. Fabrizio Butera. En effet, en plus d'avoir accepté de faire partie de mon jury de thèse, il a également été fortement présent tout au long de mon parcours doctoral. Je le remercie vivement de m'avoir donné ma chance sur d'autres projets. Ces projets m'ont permis d'ouvrir ma vision de recherche, de varier mes intérêts, et m'ont énormément appris. Le côtoyer m'a également fait évoluer professionnellement et humainement, grâce à ses innombrables qualités de chercheur, de mentor, mais aussi grâce à son soutien plus que bienveillant.

J'aimerais à présent remercier Cinzia Zanetti et Vanessa Juarez. Leur présence tout au long de ce parcours, nos échanges sur nos expériences, et leur soutien sans faille ont été plus que précieux et ont grandement contribué à l'aboutissement de cette thèse, mais aussi simplement à ponctuer cette période de moments très agréables. Ce sont des amitiés qui naissent en vivant des choses similaires, et j'espère que ce partage continuera longtemps.

Je souhaite également remercier tous les membres du laboratoire UNILaPS. Premièrement, mes acolytes de bureau, Fantine Surret, Cinzia Zanetti et Robert Avery ; même si se retrouver les quatre en même temps dans notre antre était rare, cela a toujours été de formidables moments de rire et de partage. Une petite pensée pour notre porte toujours magnifiquement décorée à l'occasion du calendrier de l'Avant. Ensuite, tou·te·s les autres doctorant·e·s qui étaient dans le même « bateau » que moi durant ce parcours : Anna Cortijos Bernabeu, Karel Héritier, Anahita Mehrpour, et Jérôme Voumard ; sentir la présence d'un groupe bienveillant et joyeux lors d'une tâche aussi immense qu'un doctorat fut un ingrédient indispensable. Puis, les autres membres passés et présents de UNILaPS : Wojciech Swiatkowski, Laura Torres Vega, Jessica Gale, Marija Dangubic, Adar Hoffman, Rachel Fasel, Oriane Sarrasin, Eva Green, Christian Staerklé ; que ce soit lors des séminaires ou autres rencontres autant formelles que détendues, je me sens très chanceuse d'avoir pu discuter avec toutes ces personnes brillantes et d'avoir pu intégrer une équipe aussi

formidable. Merci aussi à Anatolia Batruch et Nicolas Sommet pour m'avoir permis d'ouvrir mes horizons de recherche en m'engageant sur d'autres thématiques, mais également pour leur compréhension et leur soutien pendant la rédaction de cette thèse. Finalement, un merci tout particulier à Marianna Schismenou, notre « maman » du laboratoire dont la bonne humeur et les compétences m'ont toujours beaucoup rassurée et permis d'avancer sans accros.

Je remercie également l'École Doctorale en Psychologie Sociale des Universités de Lausanne et Genève pour la bourse dont j'ai pu bénéficier au début de mon parcours doctoral et sans laquelle je n'aurais pas pu entamer ledit parcours, et également pour les nombreux modules méthodologiques et thématiques auxquels j'ai pu prendre part et desquels je suis ressortie très enrichie. Je remercie également les doctorant·e·s genevois avec qui les échanges lors de ces modules ont toujours été vivifiants et motivants.

Pour terminer, je tiens à remercier ma famille et mes ami·e·s pour leur soutien indéfectible pendant ce parcours. Sans leur présence, je n'y serais pas arrivée. Un merci du fond du cœur à mon cher papa, lui qui m'a donné le goût de la psychologie, de la réflexion sur l'humain. J'ai tant appris de lui, en apprends encore beaucoup, et espère avoir intégré au moins une once de sa bienveillance et de sa joie de vivre contagieuse. Merci d'être là. Finalement, un merci infini à Stefano, un pilier dans ma vie, un soutien sans borne. Dans les pires moments comme dans les meilleurs, il a été présent et soutenant du début à la fin, sans jamais faillir. Cette thèse n'aurait clairement pas pu aboutir sans sa présence à mes côtés. Je n'ai pas les mots pour exprimer à quel point je suis touchée par ce qu'il m'apporte.

Une pensée émue pour ma maman, sans qui je n'en serais pas là aujourd'hui.

Fribourg, novembre 2023

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 THEORETICAL PART

> When I consider others I can easily believe that their bodies express their personalities and that the two are inseparable. But it is impossible for me not to feel that my body is other than I, that I inhabit it like a house, and that my face is a mask which, with or without my consent, conceals my real nature from others. (…) The image of myself which I try to create in my own mind in order that I may love myself is very different from the image which I try to create in the minds of others in order that they may love me. (Auden, 1963, p. 104)

These words, also partly cited by Snyder (1987) in his famous book *Public appearances, private realities: the psychology of self-monitoring*, are poetically capturing one of the basic feature of human nature: we are unique beings with our own personality, but we are also social beings navigating through society and adapting how we present ourselves consequently. Each one of us is a person in his or her own right, but each one of us also needs to be liked by others to be a part of society. Indeed, relatedness (i.e., feeling connected to and supported by others) is depicted as a human basic psychological need (Ryan, 1995). Thus, trying to be appreciated by the people who matter to us is a natural human tendency we all have—although some more successfully than others.

The present dissertation proposes to precisely study this ability some people have to detect how they should present themselves if they want people around to like them. This will be done by proposing a new theoretical and methodological concept: *social clear-sightedness*. As such, this thesis stands at the crossroads of two major fields in psychology: personality psychology and social psychology. Initially separated, then in conflict, these two disciplines are now moving forward hand in hand, both beneficiating from insights of the other (Swann & Seyle, 2005). As Funder rightly suggested, “in the long run, a hybrid field of personality

and social psychology may be in the offing" (Funder, 2001, p. 215). This dissertation might be *right in the middle of it*.

From personality psychology, let us take the concepts of individual differences and dispositional traits. We are all different from one another, not only physically, but also intrinsically (McCrae & Costa, 2003). Some psychological characteristics are higher in some people, lower in others—like the ability to know how to present ourselves mentioned earlier. From social psychology, we are going to follow Pettigrew's recommendations to the letter: "the very title of the field implies that social psychologists specialize in placing psychological phenomena in their social contexts" (Pettigrew, 2018, p. 964). Hence, the impact of contextual features is going to be of great importance in our study of how people present themselves in everyday situations.

To put the present work even more in its context, it is essential to mention that it stems directly from a famous controversy that took place between social psychology and personality psychology during their conflictual phase: the person-situation debate (Kenrick & Funder, 1988). Although Mischel (1968) is generally identified as the first to have added fuel to the fire, this debate originated in the person-situation-behaviour triad (Funder, 2001). Whereas personality psychologists defended that behaviour derived from our personality—in other words, who we are defines what we do—, social psychologists, on their side, advocated that situation produces the behaviour—that is, where and with who we are defines what we do. Historically, the outcome of this debate was in favour of both positions, with personality *and* situation largely influencing behaviour (Fleeson, 2004; Funder, 2001). This is exactly where the present dissertation comes in.

The goal of the present thesis is indeed to study social clear-sightedness, a new psychological construct depicting the influence of the person—i.e., how high is people's ability to know how to be liked—and of the situation—i.e., how contextual features are

influencing the use of this knowledge—on behaviour—i.e., how people concretely use this knowledge to be liked. In other words, the purpose is to see how people identify how to behave in specific situations if they want to be appreciated. By looking at self-reported personality measures, the present work thus analyses the person-situation influences regarding self-presentation, and more specifically what is measured by personality self-reports when taking the situation into account: are these instruments really measuring the genuine personality of people? Or are they rather capturing situational constraints?

But how come that people would display different personality features in different situations? Self-reports in personality have in fact long been decried for their sensitivity to faking: if they want to, people can give a misrepresentation of themselves through their answers, thus preventing these measures from capturing their true personality (Holden & Book, 2011). Consequently, linking the concept of faking to the person-situation-behaviour triad, social clear-sightedness—and therefore the present thesis—sets out to study how specific situations give a sort of interpretation grid to people about what to do, i.e., about how to potentially fake their answers to a personality self-report to achieve their goal of being liked. But first, let's focus on a more in-depth theoretical examination of all the concepts involved in this process.

1.1 Personality and its Measure

1.1.1 Personality and Personality Psychology

What is personality? And does it exist? Do we have a stable personality, or does it vary according to the context? Those are some of the many questions that have been sources of debate for decades in personality psychology. The notion of personality itself was first introduced in America by James in 1895 in an encyclopaedia entry, but was already well-developed in the French psychology with authors like Charles Bonnet (1720-1793), Emile

Littré (1801-1881), Eugène Azam (1822-1899), Paul Janet (1823-1899), Théodule Ribot (1839-1916), Alfred Binet (1857-1911), and Pierre Janet (1859-1947) (Lombardo & Foschi, 2003). These authors together with the French psychological experimentalism largely influenced the development of personality psychology as we know it nowadays. The birth of personality psychology is generally thought to date back over 80 years with mainly Allport's (1937)—*Personality: A Psychological Interpretation*—, Stagner's (1937)—*Psychology of Personality*—and Murray's (1938)—*Exploration in Personality*—books. These books are linked with some shifts in psychology at that time, shifts that can be related to the French influence mentioned earlier: from a scientific psychology tending to identify general trends common to most people, the field started to view psychology with an individual perspective, with some psychologists even beginning to draw interest for nonpathological temperament or character—which were progressively called personality—and to study it empirically and in social contexts (Lombardo & Foschi, 2003).

Nowadays, the field of personality psychology studies different domains: how people differ from each other in terms of temperament or personality traits, what are their motivations for their behaviours, which skills or abilities they have, and their general life structure or narrative identity (i.e., their personal life story and life style) (McAdams & Pals, 2007; Roberts & Yoon, 2022). At first, clinical psychology largely influenced the field and extreme types of personality were seen as pathologies, but the emphasis was almost exclusively on biological antecedents of personality, and not at all on social and cultural influences (Cloninger, 2009). Thus, to understand people and their differences, the field now articulates findings coming from several psychological disciplines like clinical, developmental, social, cognitive and biological psychology (Funder, 2001). The main goals of the field are to understand how humans are similar in their personality as a species ("every person is like all other persons"), but also how some humans are more similar to certain

subgroups compared to other subgroups ("every person is like some other persons"), and evidently also how one human is different from everyone else ("every person is like no other person") (Kluckhohn & Murray, 1953; McAdams & Pals, 2006).

Today, personality is defined as follows in the APA Dictionary of Psychology (n.d.):

> The enduring configuration of characteristics and behaviour that comprises an individual's unique adjustment to life, including major traits, interests, drives, values, self-concept, abilities, and emotional patterns. Personality is generally viewed as a complex, dynamic integration or totality shaped by many forces, including hereditary and constitutional tendencies; physical maturation; early training; identification with significant individuals and groups; culturally conditioned values and roles; and critical experiences and relationships. Various theories explain the structure and development of personality in different ways, but all agree that personality helps determine behaviour.

Historically, different paradigms have been used to study personality (Cloninger, 2009; Funder, 2001; McCrae & Costa, 2003), such as: a psychoanalytic or psychodynamic paradigm focusing on defence mechanisms and unconscious motivations (with authors like Freud, Jung, Adler, Erikson, etc.); a behaviourist or learning paradigm centred exclusively on observable behaviours and rejecting subjective and unobservable aspects (with authors like Skinner, Staats, Dollard, Miller, etc.); a humanistic paradigm focusing on the individual and humankind, and how their perspective can be influenced by cultural aspects (with authors like Maslow, Rogers, Seligman, Csikszentmihalyi, etc.); a socio-cognitive paradigm especially studying the role of cognitive processes in shaping behaviour (with authors like Mischel, Bandura, Kelly, Beck, etc.); a biological paradigm relating for example brain regions, hormones, neurons, neurotransmitters, and genes to different aspects of personality (with authors like Buss, Eysenck, Gray, Cloninger, etc.); an evolutionary paradigm focusing on the

evolution as a cause of personality (with authors like Buss, Gigerenzer, Tooby, Cosmides, etc.); and a trait paradigm studying personality in terms of structured—and sometimes hierarchical—dimensions (with authors like Allport, Cattell, McCrae, Costa, etc.). Also, two main approaches to study personality have been used throughout history: an idiographic one focusing on the individual history, actions, thoughts, and emotions, and a nomothetic one focusing on comparing people and generalizing findings (Cloninger, 2009).

Of course, as nothing is really right or wrong, black or white (McGuire, 2004), it is quite straightforward to understand that all these paradigms and approaches have relevant and useful features that could largely benefit from being linked to each other, as complementary rather than opposite study angles. As an example of combining some of these paradigms, McAdams and Pals (2006) proposed that to fully understand the personality of the whole person, five principles should be kept in mind: 1) some personality features may come from evolution and human nature and thus be common to the whole species; 2) some personality features may be due to dispositional traits, i.e., individual variations along broad dimensions characterizing humans, thus creating some similarities among some people while digging differences with others; 3) some personality features may be more narrowed to become characteristic adaptations including, among others, “motives, goals, plans, strivings, strategies, values, virtues, schemas, self-images, mental representations of significant others, [and] developmental tasks”, that are more and more often incline to vary according to the environmental context (e.g., time, place, social role, culture, etc.); 4) personality also includes aspects even more personal, like life narratives, which refer to the coherent story people try to reconstruct about their life as a whole—past, present, and future—to give meaning, define their personal identity, and give themselves a sense of unity and purpose; 5) culture may impact personality at all the previous levels mentioned in this principle-list, with a more or less strong influence depending on the level (e.g., weak influence on aspects related to genes,

strong influence on aspects related to characteristic adaptations of life narratives). Summing up some of these principles, personality traits would give people their individuality, whereas characteristic adaptations would give them their motivation, and life narratives their meaning (McAdams & Olson, 2010). As it can thus be seen, personality can be studied at macro levels as well as at more magnifier-needing levels, all of them being informative and complementary.

1.1.2 Personality Traits and the Lexical Approach

For now, let us dive more deeply in the "traits" aspect of the field, as it is the most widely used conceptualisation of personality, even in everyday life (Funder, 1991). Personality is indeed usually conceptualised as being structured by dispositional traits, which are constructs approximating dimensions of personality that cannot be directly measured—like the height of a person—and on which each person can be more or less high (McAdams & Pals, 2007). Traits are different from mental abilities related to performance, and from beliefs or attitudes which are related to particular objects (Ashton, 2018b). As mentioned earlier as a contributor to the birth of personality psychology, Allport (1921; 1931, 1966) was among the firsts to wrote about personality traits from about a hundred years ago. More recently, McCrae and Costa (2003, p. 25) described personality traits as follow: "dimensions of individual differences in tendencies to show consistent patterns of thoughts, feelings, and actions". Thus, a trait is a cognitive, affective, and behavioural tendency of a person, averaged across situations (Fleeson & Jayawickreme, 2015). Traits are usually pictured as long-term characteristics, as opposed to personality states, which are more instantaneous expression of personality depending on the current mood of the person (Revelle, 2007). Their existence has been confirmed by long-lasting studies on their links with behaviours, but also by finding regular and persistent inter-judge agreements, as well as by noticing their stability across the lifespan (Funder, 1991).

How did researchers characterise personality? They started by a simple observation: people know they are different, want to talk about and describe each other, and thus invent words to describe people and their differences (Ashton, 2018c; McCrae & Costa, 2003). Consequently, through the ages, languages contain a bunch of terms to describe personalities (Ashton, 2018c). It is even argued that learning to use these words correctly would be important in the process of language acquisition (McCrae & Costa, 2003). Therefore, some researchers analysed the English language to find those terms and grouped them by traits. This approach is called the "lexical hypothesis" and was first proposed by Galton (1884). Later, Baumgarten (1933, as cited in Digman, 1990) began this process in the German language, and Allport and Odbert (1936) pursue Galton's work in the English language. These last researchers found a plethora (almost 18,000) of words used to describe personality. Reducing this number to a more apprehensible summary of describing "types" or basic elements became indispensable for the field of personality psychology, as "one sign of a mature science is the quality of its taxonomies" (Hough et al., 2015, p. 185). To do so, relying on the current language to derive scientific measures could seem trivial at first, but it is valuable for at least two reasons well-explained by Funder (1991). First, traits derived from the common language are intuitively meaningful, which mean that everyone can understand them, use them to describe themselves or others, and moreover see the social utility of each trait. Thus, studies relying on these traits might get patterns of results directly applicable and understandable through the society lens. When trying to understand individual differences across situations, relying on concepts familiar to these individuals and situations assure research of meaningful usefulness. Second, deriving personality traits from the common language assure the access to associations made by people's mind when thinking of words that they use in their daily life. More precisely, when thinking of a particular personality trait, people automatically associate it to behaviours and contexts they have currently experienced

to be linked to this trait. Even if they rely on lay processes, this is how they navigate in the social world in their daily life, thus it is plausible to assume that their associations are more or less true, as they have to be useful for the person to survive in society. Relying on this common language and its automatic associations is therefore a "logical starting point for research" to be effective (Funder, 1991, p. 36).

1.1.3 How many Personality Dimensions are they?

"How can you choose a set of personality traits that will represent the whole domain of personality as broadly as possible?" asked Ashton (2018c). Historically, factor analysis was seen as a promising method to answer this question by clarifying personality structure and finding its intrinsic trait hierarchy (Eriksen, 1957; Jensen, 1958; Markon, 2009). The first researcher to begin the reduction of the list of personality-describing words was Cattell (1943, 1945, 1947, 1956) who, based on 171 trait-words, first found 60 main clusters, then reduced them to 35, among which he found eleven or twelve factors before finding a 16-factor structure on which he worked later on, although hardly replicated by others (Digman, 1990). Based on Cattell's work, Fiske (1949) was the first one to find—although with little effect (Digman, 1990)—the famous number of five personality factors, which he called: social adaptability, emotional control, conformity, confident self-expression, and inquiring intellect. Tupes and Christal (1961, 1992) also significantly contributed to the establishment of this five-factor structure and were even declared the "true fathers" of this structure by Goldberg (1993, p. 27), but because they first published their findings "in an obscure Air Force technical report" (Digman, 1990, p. 419), their contribution remained largely unrecognized. Norman (1963) and Goldberg (1981, 1990) himself were major contributors of supporting evidences for the five factors of personality, which were also replicated by other researchers in English (e.g., Borgatta, 1964), but also in other languages and cultures (e.g., Bond, 1994; Digman, 1990; McCrae et al., 1998; McCrae & Costa, 1997).

It is important to note that the number of dimensions entailed by personality was not always found to be five. For example, these five factors have been combined to form four- (where the Extraversion and Openness dimensions combine into a Positive Emotionality one), three- (where, starting from the four-factor solution, Agreeableness and Conscientiousness also merge to become Disinhibition), two- (where Neuroticism and Disinhibition combine into an Alpha factor, whereas Positive Emotionality become a Beta factor), and even one-factor solution (Markon, 2009; Musek, 2007). Costa and McCrae (1976) themselves, although devoting their work to a five-factor solution, begun by finding a three-factor one, which is why they called their instruments the NEO (for Neuroticism, Extraversion, and Openness) Personality Inventory. However, these other solutions became less widespread as the five-factor one and encountered criticism (e.g., for the Big One, Davies et al., 2015). Parallelly, Zuckerman and colleagues (1988, 1993) also found three- (matching Eysenck model presented later in this section) and five- (the Alternative Five) factor solutions, but starting from other traits than the ones used by, for instance, Costa and McCrae (1976).

Moreover, as stated before, based on his own work on reducing the number of personality-describing factors, Cattell stuck to his 16-factor solution, giving birth with colleagues to the sixteen Personality Factor questionnaire (16PF, 185 items, Cattell & Mead, 2008). Eysenck and Eysenck, after thoroughly reviewing the literature, focused on a two dimensional solution displayed on a circumplex crossing an Extraversion-Introversion axis with a Stable-Unstable (corresponding to the Neuroticism dimension) one, leading to the Eysenck Personality Inventory (EPI, 57 items, 1971), and later to the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (EPQ) which includes a third personality dimension, Psychoticism (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975, as cited in Claridge, 1977). Cattell's and Eysenck's models were indeed viewed as very influential, and it is even said that their models "dominated the literature of personality structure" for a while (Digman, 1990, p. 419). On his side, Hogan (1982, as cited

in Hough et al., 2015) identified six factors, which lead to the Hogan Personality Inventory (HPI, 206 items, Hogan & Hogan, 2007). However, perhaps the second most famous organization of personality traits—after the five structure—is the HEXACO model and related personality inventory, also containing six factors: Honesty-Humility, Emotionality, eXtraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, and Openness to experience (Ashton & Lee, 2020; HEXACO-PI, 192 items, K. Lee & Ashton, 2004; Thalmayer & Saucier, 2014). Close relationships between dimensions of this last model and the Big Five model can easily be made, although "it is not merely the Big Five plus an honesty-humility factor" (Hough et al., 2015, p. 197).

These other personality structures notwithstanding, the five factors structure—called "The Big-Five" by Goldberg (1981, 1990)—has become over the years the most well-known and validated framework for assessing personality, recognized for its robustness, and garnering widespread consensus in the field of personality psychology. It is however important to bear in mind that, as stated by Funder (1991, p. 37), "this does not mean there are "only" five traits, but rather that five broad concepts can serve as convenient, if very general, summaries of a wide range of the trait domain". The Big Five is more to be seen as a way to order the chaos that had previously existed in personality organisation and measure (Funder, 2001). Thus, despite some oppositions (e.g., Block, 1995, 2001; McAdams, 1992), the Big Five has provided essential milestones to structure personality, deeply influenced how personality researchers think, and has generated numerous meta-analyses on its criterion-validity (Funder, 2001; Hough et al., 2015). Its ubiquity was even demonstrated by finding the Big Five dimensions in other personality structures (Digman, 1990) like the Eysenck Personality Inventory mentioned earlier (EPI, 1971; McCrae & Costa, 1985), but also the Jackson Personality Research Form (PRF; Jackson, 1974, as cited in Digman, 1990; Costa & McCrae, 1988a)—a measure of up to 20 dimensions of personality based on Murray's (1938)

theory (Tubré et al., 2020)—, and the California Q-Set (Block, 1961, as cited in Digman, 1990; McCrae et al., 1986)—an instrument whose items were devised by clinical psychologists and was thus first used to rate people by experts (McCrae et al., 1986).

1.1.4 The Big Five Dimensions and their Measurement

Across decades, researchers have developed a variety of instruments to assess those five factors. To develop them, they could rely on several strategies (Ashton, 2018b): an empirical strategy where one creates items based on own or theoretically-based thoughts, submit them to participants with other already validated measures of the same concept, and see which items most correlate with these other measures, without paying much attention to the content of the so-selected items; a factor-analytic strategy where a large amount of items are tested and then reduced through factor analysis, as in the lexical approach described earlier; and a rational strategy where the emphasis is on determining the relevance of each item with experts or large samples. Of course, a combination of two of these strategies can help yield better instruments, such as using a rational approach followed by a factor-analytic approach (Ashton, 2018b).

Here are some examples of instruments developed specifically to measure the Big Five. First, one of the most widely used instruments is the NEO-Personality Inventory Revised (NEO-PI-R) constructed by Costa and McCrae and entailing 240 items grouped into 30 scales measuring narrow traits (six per dimension), themselves grouped into the five factors (Costa & McCrae, 2008; Paulhus & Vazire, 2007). Its first version was presented in 1985 by the same authors and contained 180 items (Costa & McCrae, 2008). These authors also parallelly proposed a shorter version of their inventory, based on factor analyses: the NEO-Five Factor Inventory containing 60 items, i.e., 12 per dimension (NEO-FFI; Costa & McCrae, 1992). A few years later, based on psychometrical research conducted on this

instrument, McCrae and Costa introduced a revised version of this shorter inventory: the NEO-FFI-R (McCrae & Costa, 2004).

Another very widely used instrument is the 44-item Big Five Inventory proposed by John and colleagues (BFI; John et al., 1991; John & Srivastava, 1999; see also Benet-Martínez & John, 1998). Building from this instrument, Soto and John developed and validated a new version: the BFI-2, entailing 60 items grouped into 15 narrow traits (i.e., four items per narrow traits), themselves grouped into the five broad factors (i.e., three narrow traits per factor) (Soto & John, 2017b). Concerned by the length of their instrument as well as by practical considerations, Soto and John proposed two shorter versions of the BFI-2: the BFI-2-S containing 30 items (two per narrow traits, and thus six per dimension), and the BFI-2-XS containing three items per dimension, i.e., 15 items in total (Soto & John, 2017a).

Let us now dig a little deeper into the different dimensions of the Big Five personality structure these instruments are measuring. Nowadays, they are respectively called Extraversion, Agreeableness, Neuroticism (or Emotional Stability), Conscientiousness, and Openness to Experience (Costa & McCrae, 1992b; McCrae & Costa, 2003; Plaisant et al., 2010). Each of these dimensions are going to be detailed in the next paragraphs, along with what they are associated with and what they predict. These dimensions usually present a normal distribution in the population, with most people having middle scores on each, and lesser people scoring on both extremes, as is also the case for the distributions of height and weight, for example (Deary et al., 2010).

1.1.4.1 Extraversion

There was a general consensus on this first Big Five personality dimension, across time and across researchers (Digman, 1990). Extraversion describes people that are affectionate, joiners, talkative, active, fun-loving, and passionate. It is opposed to

Introversion, which depicts people that are more reserved, loners, quiet, passive, sober, and unfeeling. It reflects "a tendency to be outgoing and to take the lead in social situations versus a tendency to stay in the background socially and to be timid" (Deary et al., 2010, p. 57). Costa and McCrae (1995) proposed six lower-level facets—as for the other Big Five dimensions—of Extraversion: warmth, gregariousness, assertiveness, activity, excitement seeking, positive emotions. Between these facets and the broad Extraversion domain, DeYoung and colleagues (2007) proposed two aspects: enthusiasm and assertiveness. More recently, when proposing a new instrument to measure the Big Five, Soto and John (2017b) proposed only three Extraversion facets: sociability, assertiveness, energy level.

Extraversion was found to be positively and robustly associated with life outcomes such as subjective and existential well-being, gratitude, inspiration, resilience, peers' acceptance and friendship, dating variety, attractiveness, peer status, romantic satisfaction, social occupational interests, enterprising occupational interests, occupational satisfaction, occupational commitment, volunteerism, leadership, and negatively associated with depression (Soto, 2019). Regarding health, most common mental illnesses (e.g., depressive, anxiety, and substance use disorders) were found to be meta-analytically—although weakly—related to low extraversion (Kotov et al., 2010). Concerning well-being, Anglim and colleagues (2020) reported a mean meta-analytic correlation of .37 between Extraversion and well-being indicators such as satisfaction with life, positive affect, positive relations, environmental mastery, personal growth, purpose in life, and self-acceptance. Links of Extraversion with work-related outcomes have been largely studied. First, in a confirmatory meta-analysis—including 26 studies—of the relation between the Big Five and job performance, Hurtz and Donovan (2000) found that being extraverted had a positive influence on sales and managerial jobs, confirming the meta-analytical results of Barrick and Mount on 162 samples (1991). These two meta-analyses thus denoted the importance of being sociable,

gregarious, talkative, assertive, and active to perform in sales and managerial jobs. Secondly, when meta-analysing 222 correlations, Judge and colleagues (2002) found that Extraversion was the most consistent correlate of leadership across the Big Five.

Thirdly and perhaps most importantly, Wilmot and colleagues (2019) conducted a quantitative review of 97 meta-analytic reports on the link between Extraversion and 165 work variables. They found that being extraverted was an—although small—advantage in 90% of these variables. More precisely, the authors arrange their results into four main extraversion advantages. First, being extraverted seemed to give a motivational advantage at work, as it is related to a higher sensitivity and a stronger willingness to approach desired rewards at work, and as it elicits the activation of necessary behaviours to attain these goals. Second, being extraverted was found to give an emotional advantage at work, as it enables to experience higher levels of positive emotions. Third, being extraverted seemed to give an interpersonal advantage at work, as it is linked to more fluent nonverbal and verbal communication, more attention to others, better persuasion and leadership skills—thus corroborating findings from Judge and colleagues (2002) presented earlier—with the authors even pointing out that extraversion "predicts leadership emergence, behaviours, and effectiveness at some of the strongest magnitudes in the personality literature" (Wilmot et al., 2019, p. 1460). Fourth and finally, being extraverted was found to directly give a performance advantage at work, as it is related to proactivity—creativity, adaptation, instigating initiatives, and seizing opportunities—and receiving rewards—commendations, promotions, and salary. However, it is worth noting that this performance advantage for extraverted people was higher in jobs involving interpersonal skills, thus confirming results of Hurtz and Donovan (2000) and of Barrick and Mount (1991) presented earlier.

1.1.4.2 Agreeableness

Agreeableness produced a bit less agreement about its meaning, and has been thus also called Friendliness, Conformity, or Friendly Compliance (as opposed to Hostile Noncompliance) (Digman, 1990). More recently, Agreeableness is thought to describe soft-hearted, trusting, truthful, generous, altruist, sympathetic, acquiescent, lenient, honest, modest, and good-natured people (Tupes & Christal, 1992; Wilmot & Ones, 2022). On the other end of the Agreeableness continuum states Antagonism, describing ruthless, suspicious, sceptical, stingy, critical, hostile, condescending, manipulative, and irritable people. It depicts "a tendency to be trusting and deferential versus a tendency to be distrustful and independent" (Deary et al., 2010, p. 57). At the facet-level, Costa and McCrae (1995) proposed six Agreeableness dimensions—trust, straightforwardness, altruism, compliance, modesty, tender-mindedness—whereas Soto and John (2017b) advocated for three facets—compassion, respectfulness, trust. Although one structure entails twice the number of facets of the other, links between both propositions are easy to make, Costa and McCrae's six facets easily finding their place into Soto and John's three facets. Positing themselves between the facet-level and the domain-level, DeYoung and colleagues (2007) found Agreeableness to be split into two aspects: compassion (encompassing the altruism and tender-mindedness facets) and politeness (encompassing the straightforwardness, modesty and compliance facets)—the trust facet being a marker of Agreeableness in general rather than of one particular aspect.

Agreeableness was found to be positively and robustly related to life outcomes such as gratitude, forgiveness, enterprising occupational interests, volunteerism, leadership, and negatively related to personality disorders and criminal behaviours (Soto, 2019). The link of this dimension with job performance is not crystal-clear, as Barrick and Mount (1991) found that Agreeableness was not an important predictor of job performance when meta-analysing 162 samples, whereas Hurtz and Donovan (2000) found it to have a small but consistent

positive impact on performance in jobs requiring interpersonal interactions in a confirmatory meta-analysis of 26 studies. Parallelly, Agreeableness correlated positively and significantly with academic performance in a meta-analysis of 80 studies (Poropat, 2009). In another area, Agreeableness had a notable negative relation with substance use disorders and social phobia (Kotov et al., 2010). Regarding well-being, Anglim and colleagues (2020) reported a mean meta-analytic correlation of .25 between Agreeableness and well-being indicators, particularly positive relations and personal growth.

To have a better understanding of this dimension, Wilmot and Ones (2022) conducted a review of 142 meta-analyses (including more than 3,900 studies and more than 1.9 million participants) that have been done on Agreeableness and its links with 275 variables in total. Agreeableness had positive relationships with 93% of these variables (grand mean effect $\bar{\rho}_M$ = .16, *SD* = .13). In general, "Agreeableness is the personality trait primarily concerned with helping and building positive relationships with others" (Wilmot & Ones, 2022, p. 242), as is demonstrated by their results. The authors arranged their results in four general content domains. First, regarding individual variables, Agreeableness was found to be positively related to, for instance, psychological needs for relatedness, autonomy, competence, self-transcendence, happiness, quality of life, well-being, and sense of coherence. Second, regarding interpersonal variables, examples of positive links with Agreeableness include social support perceptions, perceptions of social job characteristics and forgivingness. Third, looking at examples of work or school variables positively linked to Agreeableness, adjustment to college, organizational commitment, work-life balance, and proficient performance on behavioural tendency can be mentioned. And fourth, considering antisocial variables, Agreeableness was found to be negatively related to psychopathy, Machiavellianism, narcissism, social dominance orientation, counterproductive work behaviour, antisocial behaviour, and aggression.

Based on these results, Wilmot and Ones (2022) proposed eight themes to describe the characteristic functioning of Agreeableness: agreeable people tend to be high on self-transcendence (i.e., wanting to grow as a person), contentment (i.e., accepting and adjusting to life), positive relational investment, good teamworking and work investment, social norm orientation and social integration, but lower on results emphasis. These themes give a comprehensive overview of how people being high on Agreeableness are and behave.

1.1.4.3 Neuroticism

Neuroticism, like Extraversion, was a consensual dimension across time and research (Digman, 1990). It depicts worrying, temperamental, self-pitying, self-conscious, emotional, and vulnerable people. It is opposed to Emotional Stability—a terminology also widely used—which stands for calm, even-tempered, self-satisfied, comfortable, unemotional, and hardy persons. It reflects "a tendency to feel anxiety and other negative emotions versus a tendency to be calm and emotionally stable" (Deary et al., 2010, p. 57). Costa and McCrae (1995) proposed a structure of Neuroticism in six facets: anxiety, angry hostility, depression, self-consciousness, impulsiveness, vulnerability. Although Soto and John (2017b) proposed only three facets—anxiety, depression, and emotional volatility—they are easily linkable with Costa and McCrae's six-facet version, and with DeYoung and colleagues' (2007) two-aspect (volatility and withdrawal) version.

Neuroticism was found to be negatively and robustly associated to life outcomes such as coping, subjective and existential well-being, family satisfaction, romantic satisfaction, occupational satisfaction, occupational commitment, intrinsic success, financial security, and positively associated to anxiety and depression (Soto, 2019). In Hurtz and Donovan's (2000) meta-analysis, it was found that Emotional Stability—reversed Neuroticism—had a rather small but consistent influence on job performance, showing the positive impact of being calm, secure, well-adjusted, and low in anxiety. In their meta-analysis of 851 effect sizes with

samples between 1,076 and 75,229, Kotov and colleagues (2010) found that all the mental disorders they examined (e.g., depressive, anxiety, and substance use disorders) were defined by high neuroticism, thus conferring to this dimension the position of the most powerful trait correlate of psychopathology. This important association has been later confirmed by Jeronimus and colleagues' (2016) meta-analysis of 59 longitudinal or prospective studies (443,313 participants). Focusing on the link between internet use and Neuroticism in a meta-analysis of 104 studies, Marciano and colleagues (2020) found almost no significant correlations of Neuroticism with non-addictive internet activities (exceptions: social media disclosure, expression of the real me, passive social media use, and frequency of online leisure activities and of social media use), whereas they found that Neuroticism significantly and positively correlated (medium size correlations) with all measures of problematic (i.e., addictive) internet activities, such as addictions to Internet, social media, Facebook, smartphone, and online gaming. In light of these results, the authors pointed out to the fact that as high Neuroticism tend to denote an already dysfunctional personality, it is hard to disentangle it from actual dysfunctional Internet use, as showed by the lack of link between Neuroticism and non-addictive measures. Thus, the strong relationships of Neuroticism with measures of addictive use of Internet could be linked to negative self-perceptions of neurotic people rather than to actual addictive behaviours (Anglim et al., 2020).

Regarding well-being, DeNeve and Cooper (1998), when meta-analysing the link between personality and subjective well-being among 148 studies with a total of 42,171 respondents, found that Neuroticism correlated strongly and negatively with general subjective well-being, encompassing life satisfaction, happiness, positive affect, and negative affect (negative correlation). However, these authors conducted their meta-analysis on measures developed before the Big Five and tried to recategorize them into the five famous dimensions, thus risking "approximation of how Big Five personality actually correlates with

well-being" (Anglim et al., 2020, p. 297). To overcome this shortcoming, Anglim and colleagues (2020) conducted their meta-analysis on several Big Five measures and largely including recent studies. They found a mean meta-analytic correlation of -.46 between Neuroticism and well-being indicators (satisfaction with life, positive affect, negative affect [positive correlation], positive relations, autonomy, environmental mastery, personal growth, purpose in life, and self-acceptance), thus conferring to this dimension the strongest correlate with well-being among the Big Five. At a lower level, five of the six Neuroticism facets also had strong—above .30—correlations with the nine well-being indicators (exception: impulsiveness had somewhat lower correlations with some of the well-being indicators).

1.1.4.4 Openness to Experience

Openness to experience has been the most difficult dimension to capture among the Big Five (Digman, 1990). Thus, a lot of debate throughout personality history occurred regarding, first, its existence, and second, its meaning (Connelly, Ones, & Chernyshenko, 2014). Due to this blurry delineating, Openness has also been called Intellect and Intelligence, or even Culture, depending on whether researchers included or not items measuring ability and intelligence (Connelly, Ones, & Chernyshenko, 2014). Besides intelligence- and culture-related traits, McCrae and Costa (1983a) also added to Openness a certain receptiveness to variety in novel experience. It describes imaginative, creative, original, variety-loving, curious, and liberal people. Its opposite is called Closedness and describes people that are down-to-hearth, uncreative, conventional, preferring routine, uncurious, and conservative. This dimension reflects "a tendency to be open to new ideas and feelings and to like reflection versus a tendency for shallowness and to be narrow in outlook" (Deary et al., 2010, p. 57).

At a lower level, Costa and McCrae (1995) proposed six facets for Openness, namely fantasy, aesthetics, feelings, actions, idea, and values. Focusing only on analysing Openness, Woo and colleagues (2014) broke it down also into six facets, but with different meanings and

labels than those proposed by Costa and McCrae (1995): intellectual efficiency, ingenuity, curiosity, aesthetics, tolerance, and depth. Moreover, Woo and colleagues (2014; 2014) as well as DeYoung and colleagues (2007) found that these six facets seemed to be encompassed by two intermediate-level factors or aspects: intellect and culture or openness, respectively, which directly connect to the debate concerning the very definition of Openness to experience. When compiling Openness taxonomies proposed in six studies and five personality inventories, Connelly and colleagues (2014, p. 3) clearly showed this "wide divergence in the number and conceptual alignment of the facet traits" of this dimension. Based on their own study (i.e., Connelly, Ones, Davies, et al., 2014) and on the integration of their review, the authors also proposed six facets: intellectual efficiency, nontraditionalism, curiosity, introspection/depth, aesthetics, openness to sensations (Connelly, Ones, & Chernyshenko, 2014). On their side, Soto and John (2017b) found three main facets to Openness, namely intellectual curiosity, aesthetic sensitivity, and creative imagination. More recently, Christensen and colleagues (2019), investigating four different Openness to Experience Inventories, identified ten facets—variety-seeking, aesthetic appreciation, intellectual curiosity, diversity, openness to emotions, fantasy, imaginative, self-assessed intelligence, intellectual interests, and nontraditionalism—that could be encompassed by three broader aspects, namely intellect, experiencing, and open-mindedness. A lack of unanimity concerning the number of aspects or facets and their meaning notwithstanding, a by-and-large overlap between the proposed structures attest a certain understanding of the Openness dimension of personality. All researchers define it in a similar manner, but different—although overlapping—internal hierarchy are perceived.

Openness was found to be positively and robustly related to life outcomes such as inspiration, investigative and artistic occupational interests, and negatively related to right-wing authoritarianism and conservatism (Soto, 2019). It is among the most important

personality traits to study creativity and innovation, and has been found to be strongly related to intelligence and general cognitive ability (Connelly, Ones, & Chernyshenko, 2014; DeYoung et al., 2014). When looking at educational outcomes, its intellectual curiosity and need for cognition facets were found to predict academic success (Connelly, Ones, & Chernyshenko, 2014), and the broad Openness dimension was positively correlated to academic performance in an 80-study meta-analysis (Poropat, 2009). Openness was also the strongest predictor of SAT (Scholastic Assessment Test) verbal scores in four independent USA samples and across 4 different personality inventories (Noftle & Robins, 2007), and was meta-analytically strongly and positively related to learning goal orientation (Payne et al., 2007) and study attitudes (Credé & Kuncel, 2008). Regarding work, Openness has a tendency to positively affect performance in jobs involving customer services (Hurtz & Donovan, 2000). On a more political side, analysing four waves of the European Social Survey, Roets and colleagues (2014) found a positive robust relationship between Openness to Experience and left-wing political orientation in Western Europe, and a significant positive relationships with activism. This confirms conclusions of Connelly and colleagues (2014), who stated that "Openness plays a critical role in shaping political attitudes". On another subject, Openness was negatively—but only moderately—associated to agoraphobia and dysthymic disorder (Kotov et al., 2010), although this personality dimension generally does not have strong links with personality disorders, as shown by meta-analyses (Connelly, Ones, & Chernyshenko, 2014). Regarding well-being, Anglim and colleagues (2020) found a mean meta-analytic correlation of .19 between Openness and well-being indicators, particularly personal growth. These authors thus concluded that Openness was a "modest but nevertheless meaningful predictor of well-being" (Anglim et al., 2020, p. 305).

1.1.4.5 Conscientiousness

Conscientiousness, like Agreeableness, has been a bit more difficult to capture, and has thus been also called Will to Achieve or just Will (Digman, 1990). It represents people that are conscientious, hardworking, well-organized, punctual, ambitious, and persevering. Its opposite is called Undirectedness and states for people that are more negligent, lazy, disorganized, late, aimless, and quitting. Deary and colleagues (2010, p. 57) defined high level of conscientiousness as "a tendency to be organized and to follow rules" as opposed to "a tendency to be somewhat careless and disorganized and not to plan ahead". On their side, Jackson and colleagues defined conscientious individuals as people who "are clean and tidy, work hard, follow the rules of society and social decorum, think before acting, are organized (…) tend to write down important dates, comb their hair, polish their shoes, stand up straight, and scrub floors", whereas people on the other side of the Conscientiousness spectrum would "exceed their credit limit, watch more television, cancel plans, curse, oversleep, and break promises" (Jackson et al., 2010, p. 9). Through research and time, Conscientiousness has been split down into different facet structures: competence, order, dutifulness, achievement striving, self-discipline, and deliberation (Costa & McCrae, 1995); achievement, dependability, order, and cautiousness (Dudley et al., 2006); self-control, industriousness, responsibility, and orderliness (Eisenberg et al., 2014), followed by conventionality, formalness, and punctuality (Roberts et al., 2014); and organization, productiveness, and responsibility (Soto & John, 2017b). Between these narrower traits and the broad Conscientiousness domain, DeYoung and colleagues (2007) posited two aspects: industriousness and orderliness.

Over the years, this trait has attracted a great deal of attention due to its numerous positive consequences. One of the domains where Conscientiousness is among the most striking predictors is health outcomes (Chapman et al., 2007; Goodwin & Friedman, 2006;

Hampson, 2012; Hill et al., 2014; Roberts et al., 2005). For example, out of the Big Five, Conscientiousness was the only personality dimension to predict global health of 10-year-old children 40 years later (Hampson et al., 2013). In a meta-analysis of 194 studies, Bogg and Roberts (2004) showed that Conscientiousness was systematically negatively relate to risky health-related behaviours whereas it was also systematically positively related to beneficial health-related behaviours. Besides physical health, Conscientiousness also relates to mental health: in Kotov and colleagues' (2010) meta-analysis, it has been found that mental disorders were defined by low Conscientiousness, thus conferring to this dimension the second position—after neuroticism—in the most powerful traits correlate of psychopathology. Conscientiousness was also found to be associated with reduction in risk of Alzheimer disease and cognitive impairment (Wilson et al., 2007) as well as of major depression (Kendler & Myers, 2010). Considering subjective and psychological well-being, Anglim and colleagues (2020) reported a mean meta-analytic correlation of .36 between Conscientiousness and well-being indicators such as positive affect, positive relations, autonomy, environmental mastery, personal growth, purpose in life, and self-acceptance. A logic consequence of these findings is that Conscientiousness predicts longevity, which has been demonstrated first by Friedman and colleagues (1993) in a study of 1,178 individuals from their childhood to their late adult life (more than 70 years later), and then by Kern and Friedman's (2008) meta-analysis of 20 independent samples from multiple countries.

Another well-known beneficial impact of Conscientiousness concerns performance (Hurtz & Donovan, 2000). Beginning with school years, out of the Big Five, Conscientiousness was found to be the strongest predictor of grades in high school and college in four independent samples (Noftle & Robins, 2007), and the strongest predictor of academic performance in a meta-analysis involving 80 research reports (Poropat, 2009). Continuing with performance at work, in their confirmatory meta-analysis, Hurtz and

Donovan (2000) showed that Conscientiousness predicted task performance, job dedication, and interpersonal facilitation—three dimensions of job performance. In a meta-analysis of 162 samples with a total of 23,994 participants, Barrick and Mount (1991) found that Conscientiousness consistently and largely predicted all job performance criteria (job proficiency, training proficiency, personnel data) included in the samples for all occupational groups included (professionals, police, managers, sales, and skilled/semi-skilled). In a second-order meta-analysis summarizing 15 prior meta-analyses, Barrick and colleagues (2001) found that Conscientiousness was positively associated with and the highest—across Big Five traits—valid predictor of work-, teamwork-, and training-performance across all jobs analysed. Conscientiousness was also found to predict performance in pair with cognitive ability, accounting together for 26% of the variance in performance (Cortina et al., 2000). Neuroticism and Conscientiousness were also found to be the strongest and most consistent correlates of performance motivation in a meta-analysis including 150 correlations from 65 studies (Judge & Ilies, 2002). Apart from performance, Conscientiousness was the second strongest and most consistent correlates (.28) of leadership in a meta-analysis of 222 correlations from 73 samples (Judge et al., 2002), and is also of good influence on objective—money earned and saved—and subjective—life satisfaction and emotion valence—success (Barrick et al., 2001; Duckworth et al., 2012).

Considering all these benefits in many areas of life of being somewhat conscientious, it is “common for people to want to understand how to foster conscientiousness”, according to Robert and colleagues (2017, p. 199). When thinking of intervention programs aimed at fostering Conscientiousness, these authors stated that these programs should focus on motivating people to behave conscientiously, instead of trying directly to change the whole personality (Roberts et al., 2017). According to their sociogenomic model of personality traits (Roberts & Jackson, 2008), this type of intervention corresponds to changing the personality

states—"moment-to-moment fluctuations in functioning" (Roberts et al., 2014, p. 2)—until they become automatic, i.e., until they become personality traits. Roberts and colleagues (2014) also proposed that identifying Conscientiousness as a state rather than as a trait can help delineating the contexts in which Conscientiousness could be expressed. Thus, Conscientiousness is more "afforded the opportunity to be expressed" (Roberts et al., 2014, p. 4) in certain specific situations. This may also be the case for the other four Big Five traits to a certain extent, but as Conscientiousness has been remarkably linked to an immense amount of positive life outcomes, the link between its expression and contextual features should be clearer and possibly stronger. Consequently, when measuring high level of Conscientiousness in a specific context, we could deduce the nature of this specific context.

1.1.5 Methodological and Conceptual Challenges of the Big Five

Obviously, such a widespread perspective on personality has not made its way without some criticism. One of these criticisms concerns the method-bound aspect of the Big Five (Hough et al., 2015): as the dimensions were identified through factor analysis, they may largely depend on the variables used and analysed rather than on an implicit "true" personality structure, thus maybe missing other dimensions that would have been found with other variables. Funder (2001) warned that even if other personality variables can be described using the Big Five, this does not mean that these personality variables can be *derived from* the Big Five. Hough and colleagues (2015) gave examples of some dimensions—varying in breadth and how they are related to the Big Five—that may be missed by the Big Five: honesty, interpersonal (e.g., consideration, altruism, and sensuality) and intrapersonal (e.g., self-regulation, egotism, and heroism) aspects, values, self-evaluation, interests (e.g., artistic, enterprising, and social), and others (e.g., fashionableness, humorousness, and masculinity-femininity). The interpretation of factor analyses has also been criticised for its subjectiveness (Ashton, 2018c; Digman, 1990). For instance, with the same five-factor structure, Peabody

(1984) and Peabody & Golberg (1989) proposed to disentangle the evaluative aspect of the dimensions from their respective descriptive aspects, and thus arrived to a general Evaluative dimension along with two descriptive ones, Tight vs. Lose and Assertive vs. Unassertive. It is worth mentioning the also influential three-level Guilford system, in which the author, using factor analyses, yelled a presentation of 13 first-order factors among which 12 were nested into four second-order factors (Social Activity, Introversion-Extraversion, Emotional Stability, and Paranoid disposition), among which two (Emotional Stability and Paranoid disposition) were represented by a third-order factor, Emotional Health (Digman, 1990; Guilford, 1975). Thus, depending on the number of factors expected, and on the interpretation given to each factorial option, the resulting models can be very different[1].

[1] Considering these variables that could be missed by the Big Five, it is worth mentioning negative aspects of human character, namely the dark side of personality. These negative—or dark—personality traits are usually described as encompassing Narcissism, Machiavellianism, Psychopathy, and occasionally also Sadism (Furnham et al., 2013). Across studies, they have been sometimes structured as the Dark Core (altogether; Bertl et al., 2017; Moshagen et al., 2018), the Malicious Two or the Dark Dyad (Machiavellianism and Psychopathy only; Egan et al., 2014; Rauthmann & Kolar, 2012, 2013), and the Dark Tetrad (Chabrol et al., 2009). However, the structure that has been and still is more generally and widely used is the Dark Triad (without the Sadism dimension) introduced by Paulhus and Williams (2002). Since then, a noteworthy interest has grown for this taxonomy of dark personality traits (for reviews, see Furnham et al., 2013; LeBreton et al., 2018; Muris et al., 2017). Each of these three dark dimensions of personality can be assessed separately by different instruments developed in personality or clinical psychology, but as interest in this triad grew, specialised instruments were soon developed to assess the three of them together (e.g., the Dirty Dozen: Jonason & Webster, 2010; the SD3: D. N. Jones & Paulhus, 2014). Despite the nowadays popularity of the Dark Triad and its measurement instruments, its distinctiveness from the Big Five still has to be assured (Jonason et al., 2013). This step could consequently help understand if the Big Five is missing something that the Dark Triad does measure. Regarding this last point, Muris and colleagues' (2017) meta-analysis showed that the Dark Triad was principally related to

Another criticism against the Big Five structure of personality concerns the importance of narrower traits. The Big Five personality dimensions are considered as broad traits, but they can be broken down into narrower traits: facets. Each Big Five dimension can thus be viewed as a supra latent variable which entails its own facet structure, as depicted in the description of the Big Five dimensions proposed earlier in the present thesis. For example, Costa and McCrae (1995) proposed *exactly* six facets in each Big Five dimension, whereas Saucier and Ostendorf (1999) found three to four facets per dimension, for a total of 18 facets that replicated across German and English. Soto and John (2009), on their side, arrived to a total of 15 facets. DeYoung and colleagues (2007) posit themselves right between domains (i.e., broad traits) and facets by proposing two *aspects* in each of the five factor encompassing the facets, thus adding a third hierarchical level to the structure of traits. Alternatively, narrower latent variables can be found outside the Big Five structure, i.e., not encompassed by the Big Five or straddling two or more Big Five dimensions. After considering such trait-structures, the question arising is: at which level should personality measures be aggregated? As stated by Markon (2009, p. 822), it "may depend on the particular question at hand".

For researchers according to whom the emphasis is on the broad traits, narrower traits could be useful to predict single behaviours, but it is not possible with them to "generat[e] statements about individual differences that have real explanatory power" (Funder, 1991, p. 31). Indeed, the narrower the trait, the less stable the trait across diverse situations (Asendorpf, 2009). However, other researchers stress the importance of the facet-level by stating that focusing on broad factors can "obscure important relationships" (Hough et al., 2015, p. 148). For this side of the debate, the major disadvantages of big structures of traits

---

Agreeableness in the Big Five, but also largely to the Honesty-Humility dimension of the HEXACO, thus maybe hinting that aspects of this personality dimension might be missing from the Big Five ones.

entail the fact that they rely on factor analyses rather than on person-centred approaches, and hinder the creation of new compounds of facets correlating across big traits to correspond to particular situations (Hough et al., 2015). The Big Five structure encompassing facets hierarchically below broader traits is thus seen as disconnected from reality (Hough et al., 2015): how is it, for instance, that exactly the same number of facets can be implemented in each broader trait? Hough and colleagues do not deny the milestone these kind of personality structures have been, but rather invite researchers to take a step forward by considering them now more as "security blanket" (2015, p. 185) than as golden standards, with the aim of creating significant advancements in the field of personality psychology. To support their point, the authors listed a certain number of studies demonstrating higher criterion-related validity for facets than for broad traits of personality (e.g., Ashton, 1998; Ashton et al., 1995; Hough, 1992; Jenkins & Griffith, 2004; Kwong & Cheung, 2003; Mershon & Gorsuch, 1988; Paunonen et al., 1999, 2003; Paunonen & Ashton, 2001; Tett et al., 2003).

In this sense, not fixing the number of dimensions, facets or even items of a personality inventory, thus letting open the discovery and evolution of new personality proxies, seems as a promising pathway, already opened by Goldberg and his colleagues (2006) with the International Personality Item Pool inventory (IPIP). This freely online available inventory initially contained 1,252 items and currently contains 3,320 items. The goals of this inventory were to easily give access to personality items to all researchers, but also to ease collaboration in studying personality and/or discovering new personality dimensions and items.

A final—non-exhaustive—consideration on the criticisms regarding the Big Five structure and other models of personality involving factors is that the correlations between these factors are often not modelled. However, even if some famous authors like McCrae and Costa (2003) argued that their five factors were independent, it is not hard to picture that

some personality dimensions might be more related or closer than others, or even overlapping (Roberts & Yoon, 2022). Indeed, some studies did find such correlations—at the factor- or facet-levels—which undermine the assumption of orthogonality between the five factors (e.g., Condon & Mroczek, 2016; Duckworth et al., 2012). In an influential papier, Digman (1997) modelled the correlations between the Big Five and found two higher order factors, the Factor Alpha—later named *Stability* (DeYoung, 2006)—representing the shared variance between Emotional Stability, Agreeableness, and Conscientiousness, and the Factor Beta—later named *Plasticity* (DeYoung, 2006)—which represent the shared variance of Extraversion and Openness. It is even argued that, supposedly due to their social desirability, all five factors are positively correlated (Funder, 2001). Additionally, beside correlations between factors, taking into account correlations between items can help give birth to other organizations or structures of traits (Condon & Mroczek, 2016).

To take this relational aspect into consideration, some researchers imagined circumplex models of personality. In these models, personality dimensions are displayed on a circle, generally two by two, thus forming two broad axes on which one can be more or less high (Hough et al., 2015). Consequently, personality variables that are physically close in the circle tend to correlate more and positively, whereas variables that are far apart tend to be less or even negatively correlated (Browne, 1992). We can mention here three models of such personality circumplex: the Leary's Interpersonal Circle organizing interpersonal behaviours on a circle with a Love-Hate axis crossing a Power axis (Leary, 1957); the one proposed in the Eysenck Personality Inventory (EPI, Eysenck & Eysenck, 1971) described earlier in this thesis; and the Abridged Five Dimension Circumplex Model (AB5C; Hofstee et al., 1992). The shortcoming of such models is that they can entail only two personality dimensions at a time. To overcome this two-dimensional aspect, Hough and colleagues (2015) proposed the *nomological-web clustering approach* were the number of dimensions is not restricted. A

construct of interest is placed at the centre of the cluster, and n-dimensions can be drawn from this construct, with their distance to the construct representing the strength of their correlation with the construct. Also taking into consideration the previous limitation of Big Five structures, this nomological-web clustering approach is thought to be open and "continuously revised and refined as more knowledge is gained and new criteria for clustering are added" (Hough et al., 2015, p. 200).

These limitations notwithstanding, the Big Five is still the most widespread method of assessing personality, as demonstrated by the many self-assessment personality instruments that exist (cf. the above non-exhaustive list). But why is it so? More than one reason may explain this multiplicity. Personality—through the Big Five—has been shown to be a powerful predictor of important educational, work, and life outcomes (Hough et al., 2015; Kuncel et al., 2010). In a meta-analysis on prospective longitudinal studies, Roberts and colleagues (2007) even found that, regarding life outcomes such as mortality, divorce, and work success, personality had a predictive validity as influential as cognitive abilities, and even better than socio-economic status. In their literature review, Ozer and Benet-Martínez (2006) even concluded that "personality effects are ubiquitous, influencing each of us all the time" (p.416). This review demonstrated that personality predicted three types of consequential outcomes (Ozer & Benet-Martínez, 2006). First, individual outcomes such as happiness and subjective well-being (e.g., Benet-Martínez & Karakitapoglu-Aygün, 2003; Diener et al., 1999; Kwan et al., 1997; R. M. Ryan & Deci, 2001; Schimmack et al., 2002), physical health and longevity (e.g., Danner et al., 2001; Miller et al., 1996), psychopathology (e.g., Trull & Sher, 1994), and identity (e.g., Helson & Srivastava, 2001; Ryder et al., 2000). Second, interpersonal outcomes such as peer, family and romantic relationships (e.g., Anderson et al., 2001; Donnellan et al., 2005; Jensen-Campbell et al., 2002; Karney & Bradbury, 1995; Newcomb et al., 1993). And third, social and institutional outcomes such as

occupational choice and performance (e.g., Goldberg et al., 1998; Judge et al., 1999; Larson et al., 2002; Roberts et al., 2003), political attitudes and values (e.g., Heaven & Bucci, 2001; Hiel & Mervielde, 2004; Van Hiel et al., 2004), community involvement (e.g., Carlo et al., 2005), and criminality (e.g., Krueger et al., 2001).

To give more concrete examples, in a second-order meta-analysis summarizing 15 prior meta-analytic studies, Barrick and colleagues (2001) demonstrated that the Big Five traits were generally related to work performance and success. On his side, Paunonen (2003) found, when using three different measures of the Big Five for replicated predictions in two independent samples, that personality was a determinant in some complex behaviours, such as alcohol or tobacco consumption, honesty, grade point average, and dating variety. As another example, in a meta-analysis of 334,567 correlations (462 studies) examining the link between Big Five (NEO-PI-R, IPIP-NEO, Big Five Aspect Scales) and HEXACO-PI-R personality domains and dimensions of subjective and psychological well-being, Anglim and colleagues (2020) showed that personality had a strong relationship of $r = .28$ on average with well-being. Additionally, with the Life Outcomes of Personality Replication (LOOPR) Project, Soto (2019) tested the replicability of 78 published associations between personality traits and life outcomes and was able to replicate 87% of them (some of which are presented in the above sections 1.1.4.1 to 1.1.4.5 describing the Big Five dimensions), thus attesting of the influential and stable impact of personality on our everyday life. It is therefore valuable and important to have instruments to measure it.

1.2 Change and Variability in Personality and its Measurement

1.2.1 The Big Five Dimensions: Innate or Learned? Stable or Changing?

But where does personality come from? We can trace down attempts at explaining personality origins to the famous nature-nurture debate. Does personality and its traits derive

from innate components like genes or brain structure, or does it ensue from environmental presses, as might socialization, culture, and life events be? As already depicted in the present thesis when defining personality psychology and personality, nature *and* nurture are to be considered when describing personality. However, this has been acknowledged with time and was not always as obvious in the personality psychology field.

A first line of attack on this question was to understand if personality was genetically predetermined, or totally environmentally shaped. A good way to distinguish between the influence of genes and the influence of the environment is to study twins. However, findings with this type of population regarding personality are mixed. For instance, when reviewing previous longitudinal findings on twins in the literature, Plomin and Nesselroade (1990) found that the influence of genetic on personality change was stronger in childhood, while it was increasingly weaker as people evolved in adulthood. When studying twins reared apart, Bouchard and colleagues (1990), on their side, found heritability quotients around 50% for personality variables, thus demonstrating that first, twins reared apart did not differ more one from another than twins reared together, and that a great amount of personality variability was consequently due to genes. Focusing on adulthood, McGue and colleagues (1993) studied the differences between monozygotic and dizygotic twin pairs (127 pairs in total) at 20 and then 30 years old, and found that personality stability was mainly due to genetic factors, whereas personality change was mainly influenced by environmental factors. Thus, notwithstanding these mixed effects, research on twins seem to definitely show heritability *and* contextual influence in personality and its stability.

After advocating and proving that both sides were right, “the question [was] no longer whether genes or environment matter but how much genes and environment matter” (Anusic & Schimmack, 2016, p. 766). In other words, the challenge shifted to understand how much personality changes versus how much it stays stable. Thus, the second line of attack, which

quickly became a debate on its own, was to disentangle stability from change in personality. Is personality stable throughout the lifespan? Does it evolve or change? And if so, are these variations genetically or contextually driven, and to what extend? As we are going to see in the next paragraphs, for one side of the debate—strongly represented by Costa and McCrae—personality is mainly stable after a certain age (often fixed to 30 years old). For the other side of this debate, personality continues to develop across life and even in later age (e.g., Helson et al., 2002). Changing aspects were mainly studied regarding age evolution, and situational influences.

To quantify the amount of change in personality, studies relied mainly on two approaches: mean-level change, and individual differences in change (Specht et al., 2014). Mean-level change refers to increase or decrease over time on a specific personality dimension among a specific cohort, thus representing average differences in personality across age. Individual differences in change, on their side, are usually estimated with correlations in trait scores over time, i.e., the rank-order stability or change in personality, which represent the position someone occupies on a specific personality dimension within a specific cohort (e.g., someone being the third most extraverted in a cohort at a first measurement becomes the fifth most extraverted at the last measurement). These individual differences in change can also be latently modelled to picture differences in personality change trajectories (Specht et al., 2014).

Specht and colleagues (2014) reviewed several perspectives in the literature on change in personality, and posit that these perspectives can be viewed as representing a continuum of influences: at one extreme are personality changes influenced mainly by biology, whereas at the other end of the continuum lie changes influenced mainly by environment. The two perspectives staying at the far more extremes of this proposed continuum are going to be

detailed next as examples[2]. All perspectives acknowledge the influence of both biological and environmental factors, but they differ in the degree of influence they grant each of these factors. Specht and colleagues (2014, p. 220) also pointed out that "none of these perspectives is comprehensive but each offers explanations for specific aspects of personality development in detail", emphasizing the complementarity of these conceptualisations.

On one extreme of this continuum stands the Five-Factor Model (FFM) of personality famously proposed by McCrae and Costa (2003), who devoted a significant part of their research effort to personality and its development. The FFM is described by its authors themselves as bringing "order and understanding to the endless list of specific traits" (McCrae & Costa, 2003, p. 21), and to encompass personality traits that are *normal* as well as pathological. However, it cannot be reduced to only the Big Five personality dimensions structure, as it is more "an attempt at creating a complete catalogue of human variation"

[2] The other perspectives on change in personality listed by Specht and colleagues (2014) include: the theory of genotype → environment effects (Scarr & McCartney, 1983), which posits that an individual's genotype influences the development of personality directly and via its impact on environment, without denying the direct impact of environment itself, but only after it has been selected due to genetic influences; the dynamic equilibrium model (Ormel et al., 2012), which proposes genetically influenced personality trait "set-points" around which a person can temporarily evolve due to circumstances but to which one often returns, except when experiences are so strong that they even move these set points; the paradoxical theory of personality coherence (Caspi & Moffitt, 1993), which differentiates new situations that are unpredictable and thus tend to activate pre-existing individual differences (i.e., stability), from new situations that clearly discourage past behaviours while giving unambiguous hints on what is expected and thus tend to provoke changes in personality (e.g., social role expectations); and finally the neo-socioanalytic theory (Roberts & Wood, 2006), which delineates some principles on personality changes, such as the fact that personality is influenced by the environment across life, the fact that investment in social roles greatly influence personality development, and the fact that maintaining an identity and social roles result in more personality consistency with age.

(Roberts & Yoon, 2022, p. 494), which includes traits, but also attitudes, roles, identities, self-concept, and moral development (McCrae & Costa, 2003). In this model, McCrae and Costa (2003) differentiate between, on one side, basic tendencies—influenced only by biological factors—like the Big Five personality dimensions and their facets, but also cognitive abilities, sexual orientation, learning processes, and perception, and on the other side, characteristic adaptations—influenced by basic tendencies and the environment—which are concrete acquired structures and learned skills like habits, attitudes, beliefs, interests, and roles. For these authors, behaviours result from an interaction between characteristic adaptations—which themselves derive from biological factors—and the environment (McCrae & Costa, 2003). Due to the biological determination of basic tendencies, personality dimensions are viewed as generally stable across cultures, contexts, and ages, as the FFM "does not admit of any influence of the environment on personality traits" (McCrae & Costa, 2003, p. 193). For example, when studying if personality was stable in time, Costa and McCrae (1988b) showed correlations ranging between .82 and .83 with a six-year longitudinal study on adults, denoting very small changes in personality traits in individual, and even less changes when considering the group as a whole and their rank-order in personality traits. One of their main findings is that personality tend to crystalize around age 30, when changes become "the exception rather than the rule" (McCrae & Costa, 2003, p. 11), and paralleling other human characteristics: "By age 20 the vast majority of men and women have reached their full height, and—although they may settle a bit over the years—the tall remain tall, the short, short" (McCrae & Costa, 2003, p. 3). With other colleagues, they for instance found that intra-individual stability in personality increased up to 30 years old and then plateaued in a cohort of 684 participants between 17 and 76 years old measured twice (Terracciano et al., 2010). According to their model, the development of personality mainly depends on biological maturation rather than on life experiences, as if it was following a pre-determined

sequences of developmental steps (Specht et al., 2014). This remarkable stability seem to be also partly due, for McCrae and Costa (2003), to social pressure and need for identity. They also found that 50% of the variance in personality traits come from genes, and that the remaining 50% would not be attributable to the environment, but rather considered as mere measurement error (McCrae & Costa, 2003).

On the other extreme of the perspectives reviewed by Specht and colleagues (2014) is the theory of self-regulated personality change proposed by Denissen and colleagues (2013). In their conception, these authors present personality as a regulatory system which grows from a simple physiological reactivity to the environment at young age to a more complex regulation to attain specific reference values. These reference values can be, among others, personal goals, desired end state, social norms, but also physiologically based preferences. According to this vision, behaviours are seen as functional reactions to environmental features to achieve the aforementioned reference values, and thus "behaviours that are typically associated with traits (e.g., talking to strangers for extraversion) are performed because they are strategic means to desired end states" (Denissen et al., 2013, p. 255). In other words, people might perform certain behaviours corresponding to personality dimensions in order to achieve specific goals. In this perspective, personality stability or change is due to stability or change in reference values. For example, according to the authors, reference values become increasingly responsible and socially desirable with age, explaining the mean-level increase in personality dimensions such as Agreeableness, Conscientiousness and Emotional Stability. With this explanation, changes of some personality traits but not others and changes for some individuals and not others could come from the desirability of these traits and the self-regulatory resources of these individuals. On one side, when engaging in certain social roles corresponding to their reference value, people might adapt themselves (change) by enhancing the socially desirable—for these roles—aspects of personality, and then keep this personality

aspects constant (stability) to perform uniformly good in these roles. On the other side, changes in personality in an undesirable way might come from a degradation of self-regulatory capacities, or from reference values undesirable for society in general but valued in a particular group (Specht et al., 2014).

Notwithstanding the relevance of these theoretical perspectives, what do the empirical results actually tell us about stability and change in personality? In 2006, Roberts and colleagues published a meta-analysis of 92 longitudinal studies with a total of 50,120 participants comprising 1,682 estimates of change (Roberts et al., 2006a). They focused on mean-level changes in the Big Five dimensions (with Extraversion divided into social vitality and social dominance) and found distinct developmental patterns of stability and change for each personality trait. In brief, they found that social dominance, Conscientiousness and Emotional Stability tended to increase during young adulthood (i.e., from 20 to 40 years old), that social vitality and Openness tended to increase during adolescence and to decrease during older age, and that Agreeableness tended to increase significantly only during old age (Roberts et al., 2006a). The authors concluded that, as the six traits they examined demonstrated changes after 30 years old and as four of the six changed significantly in middle and old adulthood, personality seemed to still change after 30 years old, which contradicts the stability plateau of personality advocated by McCrae and Costa (2003). They also found that longer studies as well as studies having younger participants tended to demonstrate more changes in personality estimates. Costa and McCrae (2006) directly responded to this meta-analysis by stating that they never denied—and even also acknowledged in their studies—modest changes in personality after the age 30 (e.g., “we cannot claim that there are no changes (…) there is a certain degree of instability in the course of normal aging”, McCrae & Costa, 2003, p. 112). In turn, Roberts and colleagues (2006b) answered back by pointing out to the fact that Costa and McCrae tended to minimize the changes in personality to emphasize

its stability, and to not acknowledge the fact that these changes could be environmentally driven rather than only biologically or genetically induced. In fact, for Roberts and colleagues (2006a), their results about increases in Conscientiousness, Agreeableness and Emotional Stability could be explained by a conformation to social roles, whereas Costa and McCrae (2006) see these results as coming from biological maturation. Roberts and colleagues also noted that the same results can be interpreted differently, referring to changes of one standard deviation in personality during the life span, which were considered as small by Costa and McCrae, but as impressive by Roberts and colleagues themselves.

Beside this very specific quarrel, numerous other studies were conducted on the subject, once again with mixed results. For instance, when studying transition to early adolescence, a period one would thought to be marked by tremendous fluctuation in personality, Göllner and colleagues (2017) found only modest changes—"if at all" (p.383)—across the Big Five traits. On their side, McAdams and Olson (2010), in their literature review, although finding that personality development in adulthood tends to attain a certain plateau, also pointed out to a deterioration in old age, as much in personality traits as in characteristic adaptations—due to loss in coping ability—and life narratives. Similar results were found in Lucas and Donnellan (2011)'s longitudinal four-year study of more than 20,000 participants. They obtained a relatively stable personality in young adulthood peaking later but decreasing among the oldest old. Results also revealed differential patterns of mean-level change depending on the personality dimensions, with Extraversion and Openness declining across ages, Agreeableness increasing, Conscientiousness increasing and then decreasing in older life, and Neuroticism experiencing little variation in its stability across life. In this study, although personality stability seemed to increase less strongly after the age of 30, the peak of stability occurred between 60 and 70 years old.

In a longitudinal four-year study involving almost 15,000 adult participants, Specht and colleagues (2011) obtained mitigating results regarding stability and change of personality. On one hand, they found differential rank-order evolution depending on the personality dimensions, with Emotional Stability, Extraversion, Openness and Agreeableness increasingly stable until 40 to 60 years old where they reached a plateau before becoming more and more changeable in old age, and Conscientiousness increasing in stability throughout life without decrease. They also concluded that personality could change in response to environment and social demands, and not only due to biological maturation. But on the other hand, the effect of major life events—e.g., marriage, childbirth, widowhood—on personality stability was generally not significant. However, other findings leaned more towards large influences of life events (transition from school to adult life, Bleidorn, 2012; short- and long-term sojourning, Zimmermann & Neyer, 2013), social roles (Caspi & Moffitt, 1993; Roberts & Wood, 2006), and culture (McAdams & Pals, 2006; Roberts & Wood, 2006) on personality changes.

In a noteworthy meta-analysis of 62 independent effect sizes including more than 100,000 participants of all ages, Vukasović and Bratko (2015) investigated heritability in personality. Their findings revealed that 40% of individual differences in personality were genetically influenced, whereas 60% came from environmental influences, thus giving both influences a large credit. Notably, several meta-analyses on longitudinal studies of traits have been conducted specifically to disentangle the stability versus change parts of personality. In her meta-analysis of 206 uncorrected rank-order stability coefficients of self-reported personality measures or personality ratings by spouses, peers, or trained raters, Ardelt (2000) found that personality seemed to change over the life course, particularly when the retest interval was large, and if participants were young or more than 50 years old at the first time point, thus going against the assumption that personality stabilizes after age 30. For this

author, the remarkable stability of personality found by Costa and McCrae could have two main explanations: first, Costa and McCrae tended to use the Baltimore Longitudinal Study of Aging (BLSA), which could have intrinsically attracted participants who are naturally more stable than others. In fact, as also pointed out by Roberts and colleagues (2006a), these data were collected mostly on people over 40 years old. Second, their own instrument, i.e., the NEO personality inventory, tend to lead to higher stability coefficients than other instruments. Bazana and Stelmack (2004) also conducted a meta-analysis of 81 longitudinal studies including 95 cohorts on the stability of personality across the life span and found a mean trait stability of .54. Like Ardelt (2000), they found lower stability with longer intervals than with shorter ones, and when participants were young at the first measurement. However, unlike Ardelt, they found more stability when participants were old.

In a meta-analysis of 152 longitudinal studies comprising 3,217 test-retest correlation coefficients and 55,180 participants, Roberts and DelVecchio (2000) focused on rank-order consistency of personality. They found that this consistency increased linearly with age: it was at its lowest during childhood (.31), increased during college years (.54) and even more at 30 years old (.64), and stabilized between 50 and 70 years old (.74). Thus, these authors concluded that, even if personality seems to stabilize with age, there does not seem to have a specific life point where it stops all changes, letting space for dynamic changes across the life span. But on the other side, in a meta-analysis of 47 studies including 30,990 participants, Ferguson (2010) found a corrected stability coefficient for personality of .79. As Costa and McCrae, this author found that personality was relatively changing during young years but quickly stabilizing in early adulthood, with a peak in stability around 30 years old. Ferguson viewed these results as supporting a more biological essentialist perspective, with personality being mainly stable over time, with relatively small changes. He also did not find more personality changes in people attending therapy. Elaborating from the difference between

traits and states (presented in the 1.1.2 section of the present thesis) that they renamed stable factors (i.e., stable causes of individual differences, like genes or stable aspects of the environment) versus changing factors (i.e., influences that can change over time, like individual life events), Anusic and Schimmack (2016) proposed a Meta-Analytic Stability and Change (MASC) model to help synthesize these longitudinal results. Analysing 243 retest correlations of 179 studies, these authors found a reliability estimate of .72 for personality traits. Moreover, stable factors accounted for 83% of the variance in personality traits, whereas changing factors accounted for only 17% of it. Although small, this influence of changing factors refutes the hypothesis that personality might crystalized after age 30, and advocate for small changes due to changing circumstances.

More recently, taking advantage of the numerous longitudinal studies conducted on personality stability and change since 2005, Bleidorn and colleagues (2022) proposed a meta-analysis on rank-order stability in 189 studies comprising 178,503 participants, and on mean-level change in 276 studies comprising 242,542 participants. First, their results showed that rank-order stability of personality was moderate to high across the lifespan. However, rank-order stability tended to increase significantly during young ages and yielded a plateau in young adulthood. Moreover, this rank-order stability was not found to increase after 25 years old. Second, results also revealed mean-level changes in personality, with some traits showing increases (e.g., emotional stability), and others showing decreases (e.g., extraversion) over time, although cumulative mean-level trait changes were somewhat smaller than those found in previous meta-analyses. Overall, emotional stability and conscientiousness were the most stable traits across the life span. In sum, this meta-analysis suggests that personality is relatively stable, but also changing, mainly during young age and adulthood where development and maturation are at work. The authors also highlight the importance of the person-environment interaction in explaining both stability and changes in personality.

Based on all these longitudinal studies, Roberts and Yoon (2022) concluded that personality dimensions seemed to have moderate to high rank-order consistency over four- to ten-year periods, but also that this rank-order consistency tended to increase with age, being at its highest after 25 years old, and decreasing in old age. The conclusion seems to be that "personality characteristics are neither fixed nor rapidly changing from moment to moment" (Anusic & Schimmack, 2016, p. 766), proving right both sides of the debate and mimicking the nature-nurture debate explored earlier: personality does somehow stabilize after a certain age, but it does also continue to change, even in old age. In their literature review, Caspi and Roberts (2001) observed that even if personality traits do not fix at a certain point in life, personality consistency still increases and becomes more prominent than changes with age. In another review, McAdams and Olson (2010) sum up this increasing consistency by noticing that with age, people usually become more comfortable with themselves—i.e., less incline to perform different personality aspects they do not have just for the sake of pleasing—, less moody—i.e., less subject to short and great variations—, more responsible and long-term oriented and thus more stable, with a decrease of risk-taking and sudden impulses. Taken together, all these findings about personality stability and change, although not always consistent, tend to point out at least at one observation: there seems to be enough continuity in personality to attest to its existence and importantly, "personality is consistent, changing, apparently responsive to experience, and a profoundly important foundation for understanding human nature" (Roberts & Yoon, 2022, p. 499). This human nature seems consequently to lie on neither extreme, whether referring to nature-nurture or stability-change debates.

1.2.2 Personality Dimensions across Situations: The Person-Situation Debate

Paralleling the investigations on personality changes across the lifespan, researchers also looked into the large variability of personality—and its related behaviours—across situations, so far as to question the mere existence of personality traits. These inputs mainly

came from the field of social psychology, that can be described as focusing on three main topics: intra- and inter-group processes; attitudes, opinions, and beliefs; and social and self-perception, including how individuals make assessments about themselves and others (Ross et al., 2010). Thus, in this field, social contexts (which can relate to groups, cultures, or any other forms of social environments) are considered to play a key role in human behaviour and cognition (Funder, 2001). This cross-situation variability led to a very famous debate in the field: the person-situation debate. Let us now take a look at the origins of this debate.

In two influential books—*A Dynamic Theory of Personality* (Lewin, 1935), which is a collection of relevant papers, and *Principles of topological psychology* (Lewin, 1936)—, Kurt Lewin, considered as one of the most influencing researchers in social psychology, and particularly regarding group dynamics and occupational psychology (Ross et al., 2010), formulated a particular view on behaviour as largely influenced by the surrounding psychological situation, which includes individual and environmental characteristics. Influenced by the Gestalt theory and by theoretical physics, Lewin summed this interactionist view on behaviour in the famous equation $B = f(P, E)$, where behaviour is in fact a function of the interaction between the person and the environment. Thus, personality (i.e., the person in the equation) and situations (i.e., the environment in the equation) are viewed as interdependent, a vision that contradicts views positing that behaviours depend entirely on intrinsic influences, i.e., the person and their psychological functioning.

Pushing the importance of the situational influence even further, the cataclysm in personality psychology came some years later, with Walter Mischel's (1968) *Personality and Assessment* book. For Mischel, psychologists were wrongly using "personality" and "behaviour" interchangeably, because while he considered behaviours as observable, he depicted personality as "an abstraction or hypothetical construction from or about behaviour" (Mischel, 1968, p. 4). Thus, he conceived personality traits as simply a pale summary of

observable and potentially stable individual differences in behaviours, with no "concrete real existence (…) within persons" (Mischel, 1968, p. 5). When reviewing results in the field, Mischel found that situations were way more influential than personality traits in predicting behaviours, thus rendering superfluous and even useless—as not explaining enough—the concept of trait. The only usefulness of the concept of traits considered by Mischel is its informative potential about constructs and stereotypes people have about themselves or others (McAdams & Pals, 2006; Mischel, 1968). Coming from social behaviour theory, Mischel viewed behaviours as depending on the conditions surrounding it. Thus, stability in behaviours comes from stability in these environmental conditions, and parallelly, changes in behaviours are induced by changes in the contextual conditions. The author nonetheless pointed out that the person influence is not to be denied, as "persons are the source from which human responses are evoked" (Mischel, 1968, p. 296), but what is evoking and potentially changing these responses are in fact situational characteristics.

Classically, correlations around .30 were found between traits and behaviours in the field of personality psychology; these results were seen as proof in favour of the trait conception, and the variance not explained by traits was considered as measurement error (Roberts, Kuncel, Shiner, et al., 2007). However, Mischel took such results—known as the "personality coefficient" (Back et al., 2009)—as indication of the low predictive validity of traits, as a .30 correlation was in fact accounting "for less than 10 percent of the relevant variance" (Mischel, 1968, p. 38), and he considered what was portrayed as error as critical situational determinants of behaviour. Based on the findings he reviewed, this previously conceived "error" was in fact considered by Mischel as reflecting "the empirically unjustified assumptions of trait (…) and not merely the limitations of measurements" (Mischel, 1968, p. 148). At that time, behaviourism was highly influencing social psychology with studies demonstrating the remarkable impact of the situation on behaviours (Digman, 1990). Thus,

the classical behaviourist perspective of stimuli leading to responses became, after influential work such as those by Mischel, situations leading to complex social behaviours (Ross et al., 2010). The resulting situationist perspective in social psychology consequently considered that "stable personality traits or dispositions matter less than lay observers assume, or at least that they can be outweighed by particular features or manipulations of the immediate situation at hand" (Ross et al., 2010, p. 5). Although going with the rise of social psychology and having positive influences on the scientific advances on the subject, this perspectives seriously damaged for several years the neighbouring discipline, personality psychology, even provoking a decrease of the number of studies, graduate programs, and dissertations dedicated to it (Cloninger, 2009; Swann & Seyle, 2005).

On the other side of this person-situation debate stood researchers such as, once again, McCrae and Costa. They presented themselves as personality psychologists and strong advocates of the trait concept, which sees personality as intrinsic to the person and almost not influenced at all by the environment, and as developmentalists for whom personality unfolds in natural, predetermine stages. They posit themselves as opposed to a social learning approach which seem, to their eyes, to reduce personality to just "the sum total of all behaviours", which they considered as "an incredibly naïve attempt to (…) reducing personality to observable facts" (McCrae & Costa, 2003, p. 208). This social learning approach and environmentalist position conceptualized personality as largely influenced by the environment, and more precisely influenced by an internalized reinforcement system which allow people to know what behaviours they should perform in which situations (e.g., being organized at work) (McCrae & Costa, 2003). For McCrae and Costa, behaviour and personality are not synonymous, and thus the latter cannot be reduced to the former. Behaviours are seen as responses to situational demands and constraints, whereas personality

has a history and represents consistent patterns over time and across situations (McCrae & Costa, 2003).

To sum up, for the situation side of the debate, the immediate situation is the cause of behaviours and produces very different behaviours from the same person in different contexts; for the person side of the debate, however, behaviours are largely determined by personality traits, thus making people act very similarly from situations to situations (Fleeson, 2004). As previously noted when reviewing the stability vs. change debate, McCrae and Costa's perspective with extreme biological predetermination in not tenable: the "pure trait" position is not supported by many evidences (Kenrick & Funder, 1988). What about the situationist position incarnated by Mischel? This perspective could also not be considered as totally true. First, Mischel seemed to have confused behaviours with inter-individual differences in behaviours (Asendorpf, 2009). Even if great variability in behaviours were found across situations, the rank-order of individual differences remained; thus, someone could be more or less conscientious as a function of the situation, but this person might almost always be more conscientious than another particular person, regardless of the situation (Ashton, 2018b). Second, as the previous review of stability and change in personality showed, there is still some signs of long-term continuity of personality, as well as increasing levels of personality consistency with age, thus advocating in favour of the existence of personality. Third, as showed when reviewing personality dimensions one by one, but also the Big Five as a whole, personality and its traits do have a great predictive validity in very important life domains, thus once again pointing to their existence.

Finally, although great situational variability has to be acknowledged, "situational variables usually failed to account for more than 15% of criterion variance" p.421 (Digman, 1990), which puts the—too big—importance attached to situations into perspective. Indeed, the fact that personality variables correlated with behaviours at .30 did not mean that

situational aspects accounted for the total of what is left (Swann & Seyle, 2005). Besides, when trying to study, in the same way as personality-behaviours correlations were computed, correlations between some of the most prominent situational factors of the time in social psychology—i.e., incentive for advocacy, hurry, number of onlookers, victim's isolation, and proximity of authority—and behaviours like attitude report, bystander intervention, and obedience, Funder & Ozer (1983) found an average correlation around .40. Interestingly, this result was not dramatically different from correlations with personality variables, given that these situational effects were surely overestimation, as they were opposing extreme situations two by two. Mischel himself revised his position on this aspect a few years after his influential book (Mischel, 1973, 1984).

Consequently, Mischel's position was refuted by important discoveries in personality psychology demonstrating that personality does indeed matter (Swann & Seyle, 2005). When analysing the person-situation debate, the studies and results it generated over the years, Kenrick and Funder (1988) posited that all these efforts have made it possible to prove that: personality traits are not just "in the eye of the beholder" (p.25), that they are neither a semantic illusion nor artifacts, that they are not produced solely by situational consistencies, and that the relationship between traits and behaviours is important. However, this in no way detracts from the great influence this perspective has had on the field. It pushes personality psychology to its limits to let it rise stronger from the ashes: "After surviving a near-death experience in the 1970s, personality psychology has made a strong comeback" (McAdams & Pals, 2006, p. 204). This comeback came hand in hand with social psychology instead of against it, and even with some mutual influences (Swann & Seyle, 2005).

Theoretical and empirical models were therefore needed to reconcile person *and* situation contribution to behaviour. A number of researchers have set themselves this task, including William Fleeson, who produced many studies on the subject. For example, Fleeson

& Gallagher (2009) carried out a meta-analysis on fifteen "experience-sampling" studies (i.e., measuring participants' experiences and behaviours in real time and situations, multiple times per day for several days) conducted in Fleeson's lab between 1997 and 2004, including more than 20,000 reports of trait manifestation in behaviour. Their results showed that Big Five personality traits measured with self-reports before the experiment were strong predictors (correlations ranging from .42 to .56) of individual differences in the traits participants actually manifested in the behaviours they reported during the experiment (i.e., Big Five states), thus demonstrating the importance and usefulness of personality traits in social behaviour. But the most relevant proposition of Fleeson regarding person, situation, and behaviour is depicted in the next paragraphs.

Across three studies focusing on the Big Five during everyday life across two to three weeks, Fleeson (2001) found support for a density distribution conception of personality. This conception starts from the observation in these studies that within-person variability in Big-Five related behaviours was so high that a typical person would daily show nearly all levels of all five personality dimensions, and that this typical person would differ from themselves as much as they differ from others. Thus, ignoring this remarkable variability would be misleading, according to Fleeson (2001). The author therefore proposed, instead of measuring personality traits at one time-point and trying to find individual differences based on this measure, to look at the density distribution of Big-Five related behaviours across a short period of time. What he found is that reliable and stable individual differences could be noticed in characteristics of these behavioural distributions (central tendencies like the mean, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis of the distribution, but also its size, shape, and location), as well as in the amount of variability in these distributions. Another interesting finding of these studies is that within-person variation in the daily display of Big Five related behaviours also depends on how sensitive the individual is to situational cues, such that the

higher the sensitivity, the higher the variation, which can in turn be informative on individual differences on this within-person variation.

Mixing the experience-sampling method with the density distribution model, Fleeson and Law (2015) conducted a lab study including 97 participants (i.e., targets) and 183 observers, allowing not to rely exclusively on self-reports. Each target attended 20 1-hour-long lab sessions (to maintain standardised conditions for all participants) over a period of 10 to 20 weeks, where they experimented diverse situations as close as possible to real life (e.g., playing board games, telling embarrassing stories, analysing a painting, studying, panning a party, collaborating on a study project), in the same order, thus ensuring that differences found between participants would not be attributable to the situations. Observers rated participants' behaviour in all these situations. Results showed that most of the variability in trait-related behaviours was within-person, thus supporting the density distributions model in several ways: first, individual differences in trait levels and in the frequency of behaviours were linked; second, the density distributions of behaviours were found to be stable across time; third, the density distributions of behaviours were associated to self-reported *and* observer ratings of trait levels; and fourth, the density distributions could be used to predict behaviours in other situations.

Important conclusions are to be remembered from Fleeson's studies (Fleeson, 2001; Fleeson & Gallagher, 2009; Fleeson & Law, 2015). First, stability and variability of behaviours can totally coexist in the individual: a person can daily vary in behavioural expressions linked with the Big Five, but this person would still display individual characteristics different from other persons on the distribution of these personality related behaviours (Fleeson, 2001). Moreover, the consistency in individual differences in behaviours is attributable to personality, and not simply to situational stability, and the behavioural variability in one person is real and not just an illusion (Fleeson & Law, 2015). These

findings consequently imply that the concept of personality trait is not threaten by variations in personality expression, but that it has to accommodate large within-person variability (Fleeson & Law, 2015). Thus, personality traits are still useful to describe and understand individual differences in everyday behaviours (Fleeson, 2004; Fleeson & Law, 2015). Additionally, a large part of this within-person variation can be attributed to two sources: to the situation, as people react and thus adapt themselves quite flexibly to situational cues, and to the interactions between the person and the situation, as people do not all react and adapt themselves in the same way to the same situations. Other sources of variation in which level of a personality trait one would display in a particular situation could for instance imply the pursuit of personal goals (Fleeson, 2001).

Mimicking the process of the stability-change debate, the attention shifted from *situation vs person* to *how much of the situation* and *how much of the person*. Trying to predict behaviours by using only personality traits was depicted as possibly misleading, as one behaviour could be related to more than one personality trait (Funder, 1991). Moreover, for Funder (1991), traits are more than just a sum of behavioural patterns, stressing the impact of the immediate situation as well as of other individual characteristics. But trying to predict behaviours with only contextual information is also not viable, as explained earlier. Thus, researchers began to evaluate the level and the way of influence of both the person and the situation. Sarason and colleagues (1975), when meta-analysing 102 studies, found that the effects of situation and personality on social behaviour were very similar in size, with a median correlation of .21 for situations and of .17 for personality. On their side, Richard and colleagues (2003) reviewed 474 effects in social psychology and revealed again that both influences were similar in magnitude, with a mean correlation of .22 across 17,631 estimates for situations, and of .19 across 16,282 estimates for personality.

Very recently, Irwing and colleagues (2023) proposed an Adaptive Personality Regulation (APR) index, which matches how personality is expressed with situational demands. In their view, people can have the ability—or the propensity—to express their personality in a way that matches what is required in the situation at hand. The proposed index should measure what is situationally required in terms of personality expression, and if these requirements are fulfilled by people in the situation. Their goal was to observe individuals in situations and to measure if their behaviours—i.e., how they expressed their personality—matched what is generally expected in such situations. Across two studies, Irwing and colleagues (2023) showed that individuals indeed shifted how they expressed their personality according to what was required in the situation they were in, and that this shift in personality expression is an ability some people have and can carry from situations to situations. Although very promising, the author's proposition requires a lot of resources, including experts to rate the observable behaviours, access to real situations, and access to the people in these real situations. Moreover, knowing which personality dimensions—and what levels of these dimensions—are required in different situations is not a subject very developed yet (Irwing et al., 2023).

Thus, as stated by Roberts and Yoon (2022), the variability across moment-to-moment situations does not question the existence of personality, as absolute cross-situational stability was not part of the definition of personality in personality psychology. When taking as example the Extraversion trait, "one cannot be extraverted when alone", as stated by Roberts (2009, p. 5). Consequently, to acknowledge this social psychological influence, some authors posit that the definition of personality traits has to entail this cross-situational variance component—depicting a "person-situation" interaction—because no one acts exactly the same across all situations (Funder, 1991; Roberts, 2009). Therefore, authors suggested to add this inconsistency aspect of personality to the definition of traits by describing them as

"relatively enduring patterns of thoughts, feelings, and behaviours that reflect the tendency to respond in certain ways under certain circumstance" (Roberts, 2009, p. 7). Personality traits are thus more viewed as reflecting patterns of behaviours *and* a psychological structure, becoming "something both about how the person behaves (or would behave) in certain kinds of situations and about the functioning of his or her mind" (Funder, 1991, p. 32). Additionally, the influence between person and situation is not depicted as one-way and onefold, but rather as a complex interaction (Asendorpf, 2009; Ashton, 2018b; Funder, 1991): first, people's personality make them actively select the situations they involve themselves into; second, people, their personality and ensuing behaviours can change the features of the situation they are in; and third, the situation can in turn affect personality and the related behaviours through long time exposure.

At the beginning of the millennial, the person-situation debate was considered by Funder (2001, p. 200) "about 98% over", but it elicited important empirical recognitions, as well as revealed some "bald spots" in the study of personality. As depicted by Funder (2001), the empirical advances encompass the acknowledgement of large correlations (.40 or bigger, approaching some of the most important effects in social psychology) between behaviours of people in one situation and their behaviour in another situation, and the orthogonality (i.e., absence of reciprocal influence) between behavioural consistency and change. This later aspect was retrieved from the observation that, although mean-levels of behaviours (i.e., averaged across all people present) can be radically changed by small modifications of the characteristics of the situation people are in, the individual differences between these people are still going to show consistency across situations (Funder & Colvin, 1991). Thus, opposing effects of the situation to effects of the person may in reality be "a false dichotomy" (Funder, 2001, p. 200). Both effects are indeed influencing behaviours in their own way and in interaction with each other, and the effects of personality traits and of situations have been

found to be equally strong (Funder & Ozer, 1983; Sarason et al., 1975). In other words, it turns out that both sides of the debate were kind of right: when looking at momentary behaviours, traits are less useful than situational aspects, but when looking at trends of behaviours over time, traits regain their predicting power about individual differences (Fleeson, 2004). The research community nowadays do more or less agree that person *and* situation are important when trying to understand people's behaviour: there are dispositional *and* situational influences and both with important outcomes (Roberts, Kuncel, Shiner, et al., 2007). As the nature vs. nurture debate described earlier also taught us, once again, human nature is not in the extremes, and a more moderate position is the correct one: "the truth finally appears to lie not in the vivid black or white of either extreme, but somewhere in the less striking grey area" (about the person-situation debate, Kenrick & Funder, 1988, p. 31).

On the bald spot side, the person-situation debate revealed some imbalance in the person-situation-behaviour personality triad (Funder, 2001). As presented from the beginning of the present thesis, a large amount of research has been dedicated to individual characteristic of personality—i.e., the person angle of the triad. Parallelly, behaviourism but also the person-situation debate itself led to more attention on behaviours, and more precisely on methods to measure observable ones (Baumeister et al., 2007; Botwin & Buss, 1989; Digman, 1990; Kenrick & Funder, 1988). However, a much lesser attention has been drawn on situations (Funder, 2001; Rauthmann et al., 2014; Wagerman & Funder, 2009). Why is this important to note? Because in this personality triad, "knowledge about any two of these should lead to an understanding of the third" (Funder, 2001, p. 210). Thus, persons and behaviours could be more fully understood if situations were also thoroughly described (Wagerman & Funder, 2009). We could know more about a type of behaviour by knowing which types of people tend to perpetrate it in which types of situations. Also, we could try to predict personality traits of people when analysing what they did in which situations. And

finally, we could categorize situations by knowing the personality traits and behaviours of people evolving in it.

1.2.3 Describing Situations

Although less attention has been given to the situation side of the triad, some attempts are worth mentioning to fully understand the evolution of the concept. Mirroring the development of personality inventories, three main methodologies to develop instruments measuring situations were used (Rauthmann et al., 2014; Wagerman & Funder, 2009): the now well-known lexical approach, but also generation by researchers themselves, or by daily diary filled by laypeople. Over the years, more than twenty taxonomies of situations were created (for reviews, see Ten Berge & De Raad, 1999; Yang et al., 2009), among which Krause's taxonomy of seven classes of social situations (e.g., joint working, fighting, and playing; Krause, 1970), Moos' taxonomy of the psychosocial characteristics of the environment in three dimensions (relationship, personal development, and system maintenance and change; Moos, 1973), and Van Heck's taxonomy of 10 dimensions of situations (e.g., interpersonal conflict, intimacy and interpersonal relations, and travelling; Van Heck, 1989), to name a few. However, none of these taxonomies were widely accepted and used after their birth (Rauthmann et al., 2014; Ten Berge & De Raad, 1999; Yang et al., 2009).

Another attempt at categorizing situations is the Riverside Situational Q-Sort (Sherman et al., 2010, 2012, 2013), which was considered at that time “the only available measure that samples characteristics of situations in a fairly comprehensive way” (Rauthmann et al., 2014, p. 5). In this instrument, participants have to sort descriptive items into a forced distribution (Wagerman & Funder, 2009). With this so-called “Q-technique”, if the instrument is made of 81 items for example, participants have to use a 9-point scale ranging from “highly uncharacteristic of the situation” to “highly characteristic of the situation” by putting a pre-

determined number of items on each degree of this scale, so that almost half of the items—i.e., 43 items—are in the middle levels—4, 5, and 6—and less and less are in both extreme levels, thus resembling a normal distribution. This technique forces participants to compare each item to the others to place it on the scale in function of their representativeness of the situation at hand, thus avoiding absolute ratings. The few items put at the extremes have consequently been carefully selected and are thus supposed to be highly relevant for the situation. Together with the California Adult Q-Sort (CAQ; Block, 1961/1978) measuring personality, and the Riverside Behavioral Q-sort (RBQ; Funder, Furr, & Colvin, 2000) describing social behaviours, the RSQ was designed to assess the full person-situation-behaviour triad (Rauthmann et al., 2014). The original RSQ comprised 100 items, one for each CAQ item, and was then reduced to 89 items, which is still a long instrument.

More recently, Rauthmann and colleagues (2014) published another taxonomy of situations based on the RSQ: the Situational Eight DIAMONDS RSQ-8, which can be used with the Q-technique or with a Likert scale. In their conception, people are forming impression on situations in a similar way as when they form impression about people, and this to adapt their behaviour and navigate smoothly through the social world. Thus, the authors described the process through which people perceive situations, which helped them characterise the eight situational dimensions they found. Across six studies, they construed and validated these dimensions: Duty, Intellect, Adversity, Mating, Positivity, Negativity, Deception, Sociality (i.e., DIAMONDS anagram). In Study 1, they reduced the 89 items of the RSQ to the eight dimensions comprising a total of 32 items (i.e., four items per dimension), giving birth to the psychometrically sounded RSQ-8. Study 2 showed that the situations described by the instrument reflected shared social realities, as people inside as well as outside these situations generally agreed on their descriptions, with levels of internal-external agreement “at least comparable to what is typically found in perceptions of

personality traits" (Rauthmann et al., 2014, p. 13). Studies 3 and 4 were designed to identify the concrete situational cues as well as the affordances (i.e., what does the situation demand, call for, require, or elicit) of each situational dimension, whereas studies 5 and 6 were conducted to attest of the association of the situational dimensions with behaviours as well as to demonstrate that the eight dimensions had "incremental, dominant, and unique predictive abilities over and above both Big Five personality traits as well as Van Heck's situation dimensions as the competing scales" (Rauthmann et al., 2014, p. 25).[3]

[3] Another—more recent—situational framework is worth-mentioning here: the CAPTION taxonomy of psychological situations (Parrigon et al., 2017). Using the lexical approach, the authors identified 851 adjectives representing situational characteristics and a subset of 535 nonredundant adjectives. Then, across four studies using different analytical methods—qualitative dimensional exploration of the adjectives, factor analyses of ratings of naturally occurring situations, and lexical-vector representations from neural-network-based models—the authors revealed a 7-dimensional structure of situation perception: Complexity, Adversity, Positive valence, Typicality, Importance, humOr, and Negative valence (forming the CAPTION anagram). The authors subsequently developed, across two studies, a 70-item scale named CAPTIONS—and a 28-item short version of it named CAPTIONS-SF—measuring the CAPTION dimensions, and found support regarding their model's ability to predict important psychological outcomes (i.e., personality-relevant behaviours, affect, intrinsic motivation, and need satisfaction). Interestingly, Parrigon and colleagues (2017) found strong correlations between their CAPTION dimensions and Rauthmann and colleagues' (2014) DIAMONDS dimensions, due to their strong degree of conceptual overlap (e.g., the Duty dimension of the DIAMONDS strongly correlated with the Importance dimension of the CAPTION). However, whereas the DIAMONDS model focused on personality-relevant situations—i.e., identifying "situations in which certain personality traits are expected to be behaviourally manifested over others" (Parrigon et al., 2017, p. 645)—, the CAPTION model is thought to be broader and more general by also capturing perceived situational features less personality-relevant. As the focus of the present thesis was on personality dimensions perceived as socially desirable according to the situation, the DIAMONDS taxonomy was favoured over the CAPTION taxonomy.

The Duty situational dimension (item e.g., “A job needs to be done”) is perceived by people as related to career, work or studying, involving duties, tasks, solving problems, and making decisions. It is particularly related to the Conscientiousness personality dimension, to achievement, and asks for displaying ambition and trying to control situation. It is viewed a bit negatively due to the obligation of doing something. The Intellect dimension (item e.g., “situation affords an opportunity to demonstrate intellectual capacity”) is perceived as intellectually engaging, cognitively demanding, containing deep reflection, and particularly related to the Openness personality dimension. It involves communicating, social recognition, exhibiting interest, and expressing ideas. The Adversity dimension (item e.g., “being blamed for something”) is perceived as threatening, containing problems, conflicts, competitions, and where blaming, criticizing, and victimizing can occur. It can involve blaming others, trying to undermine, exhibiting an awkward interpersonal style, or expressing criticism, and is related to power and aggression. The Mating dimension (item e.g., “potential romantic partners are present”) is perceived as leading to sex, love, and/or romance, where sexual interest is expressed, and physical contact is made. It involves liking others and smiling frequently. The pOsitivity dimension (item e.g., “situation is potentially enjoyable”) is perceived as pleasant, fun, playful, simple, and clear, involving friends, behaving in cheerful manner, and laughing frequently. The Negativity dimension (item e.g., “situation is potentially anxiety-inducing”) is perceived as unpleasant, provoking negative feelings, and can involve acting irritated, and exhibiting physical signs of tension or anxiety. The Deception dimension (item e.g., “it is possible to deceive someone”) is perceived as containing mistrust, deception, lying, betrayal, hostility, and is particularly related to the Dark Triad of personality (cf. footnote 1). It involves blaming others, behaving in competitive manner, trying to sabotage, expressing hostility, and acting irritated. And finally, the Sociality dimension (item e.g., “social interaction is possible”) is perceived as containing socializing, communicating, pleasant

interaction, interpersonal warmth, and is particularly related to the Extraversion and Agreeableness personality dimensions. It involves friends, exhibiting social skills, liking others, seeming or being likeable, and being talkative.

After its creation, the RSQ-8 was for instance used by Sherman and colleagues (2015), who conducted an experience-sampling study to assess the simultaneous effects of personality traits (HEXACO model) and situational characteristics on the expression of behaviours. Their results showed that personality and situation were independent predictors of behaviours, thus highlighting the importance of both factors, and that the DIAMONDS dimensions of situation are a useful tool. In fact, the RSQ-8 is "recognized as [one] of the most useful situation taxonomies to date" (Parrigon et al., 2017, p. 657). Such findings highlighted how intricate is the relationship between personality, behaviour, and situations. On this matter, Kurt Lewin (1936) seemed to be right when depicting behaviours as resulting from an interaction of the person and the environment. The importance and impact of personality was stressed in section 1.1 of this thesis, whereas the importance and impact of situations has just been emphasized in the current section. It is now clear that to understand one of the three part of the personality triad, the other two are necessary. As it has been noted that personality can remain consistent despite varying behavioural manifestations across situations, development of tools like the RSQ-8 is fundamental to fully understand human nature in context. In other words, while personality remains a fundamental concept, it is crucial to measure and understand situations to grasp the full spectrum of human behaviour.

1.3 About the Fakability of Personality Measures

Since the beginning of the present literature review, one assumption has not been challenged yet: the fact that measures of personality traits are really measuring personality traits, or in other words, that people are always reporting their true personality when asked.

However, several factors can actually "interfere" in this process, like biases during the completion of personality self-reports, or intentional attempts at distorting one's answers to these self-reports for certain reasons, or even some individual characteristics or abilities people may have. All these factors can impact the measure of personality traits and cause some kind of variability in the assessments. This variation may be greater or lesser depending on the situation in which the measure is made, which is why it is important to bear in mind the impact of situational characteristics as described above. Let us review, in the next sections, some of these impactful factors.

1.3.1 Self-Reports and Biases

Self-reports are the "most commonly used mode of assessment [in personality psychology] —by far" (Paulhus & Vazire, 2007, p. 224), and are considered as "probably the best way to measure personality" (McCrae & Costa, 2003, p. 40). Their most known form consists of asking people direct questions about themselves (e.g., their personality) and their actions, thoughts, and feelings in various situations (Ashton, 2018a; Paulhus & Vazire, 2007)[4]. When answering self-reports, people are believed to "implicitly compar[e] themselves to others they know (or imagine) in order to come up with an accurate response" (McAdams & Pals, 2007, p. 8). Self-reports present many advantages. First, they are practical to use, can be easily interpreted, and are efficient, yet inexpensive (McAdams & Pals, 2007). Second, they give access to a multiplicity of information that would not be directly accessible otherwise, as people have full access to their own thoughts, feelings and behaviours, and can

[4] Two other forms of self-reports can be used: open-ended self-descriptions where respondents can freely write about their personality, and indirect self-reports where the actual goal of the measure—what it is supposed to measure—is made as hidden as possible, or even by making respondents believe that the self-report is about something else (Paulhus & Vazire, 2007).

thus report them more accurately that anyone else (Baumeister et al., 2007; Cloninger, 2009; McAdams & Pals, 2007). Moreover, these measures have been proven to partly provide valid information regarding the concepts they are supposed to measure (Holden & Passey, 2010; Roberts, Kuncel, Shiner, et al., 2007). However, despite the positive aspects just mentioned, right from the beginning of their use and as early as in the 30s (e.g., Bernreuter, 1933), criticism arose regarding the validity of self-reported methods (Funder, 2001; Lewis, 2001; Morgeson et al., 2007; Paulhus & Vazire, 2007).

First, self-reports are subject to common method biases, which can cause systematic measurement error (i.e., the instrument is mistakenly measuring something other than just what it is supposed to measure) potentially leading to false conclusions (Podsakoff et al., 2003). According to Podsakoff and colleagues' (2003) review on the subject, common method biases can come from four main sources. A first source is having the same respondent for different variables (i.e., common rater), as it can make salient some response biases, which have a detrimental impact on self-reports (Paulhus & Vazire, 2007). As stated by Paulhus (1991, p. 17), "people's reports of their own traits, attitudes, and behaviour may involve systematic biases that obscure measurement of content variables". A response bias is defined as "a systematic tendency to respond to a range of questionnaire items on some basis other than the specific item content (i.e., what the items were designed to measure)" (Paulhus, 1991, p. 17). In other words, biases in self-reported questionnaires alter individual responses and thus impact the concept the questionnaire is trying to assess. If these response biases are consistent across time and context (i.e., the same individual has a tendency to display such biases), they are called response styles (Paulhus, 1991; Paulhus & Vazire, 2007). They can include the fact that people might try to be consistent in their answers (i.e., consistency bias), that they may have implicit theories about the items, that they may try to give a positive image of themselves through their answers (i.e., social desirability, see section 1.3.2 of this

thesis), that they can be prone to agree with the items more often than to disagree or conversely (i.e., acquiescence or reactance responding), but also extreme responding when selecting more extreme points on the scale to answer (Paulhus, 1991; Paulhus & Vazire, 2007; Podsakoff et al., 2003).

A second source of common method biases is the subjective interpretation of items (i.e., item characteristics), as some of them can be viewed for example as more socially desirable than others, or too complex or ambiguous (Podsakoff et al., 2003). A third source of biases is that items can detrimentally influence each other (i.e., item context), as for instance with anchoring, recency, and priming effects (i.e., when items' order of presentation causes the answers to some of them to influence the answers of the others, depending on their position in the instrument), or fatigue and careless responding deriving from too long instruments (Paulhus & Vazire, 2007; Podsakoff et al., 2003). And a fourth source of biases is the specificity of the context of measurement itself (i.e., measurement context), as time and location, but also time pressure for example, which all can cause response sets, i.e., biases specifically due to the situation of completion (Paulhus, 1991; Paulhus & Vazire, 2007; Podsakoff et al., 2003). Thus, relying solely on self-reports might trigger these biases, which in turn can raise issues relating to common method variance, as it could inflate associations between constructs just because they were measured with the same instrument, e.g., a self-report (Paulhus & Vazire, 2007). Thus, it has often been warned that "self-report measures of personality should not be taken at face value", and that different methods should be used to assess the same construct (Cloninger, 2009, p. 16). However, some posited that self-reports are rather impressively valid measures of personality on their own, given their approximation status of unobservable variables (Roberts et al., 2014).

Some other criticisms against self-reports stem directly from the person-situation debate depicted earlier. As emphasised by Baumeister and colleagues (2007), social and

personality psychology turned their back on direct observations of behaviours in favour of self-reports and questionnaires, a damaging undertaking in fields where social behaviour is central. Whereas personality psychology had already a long history of self-reports and questionnaires to measure traits, social psychology was more incline to observe behaviours and its situational influences. But self-reports gain more weight with the rise of cognitive psychology, and both personality and social psychology were majorly using this method when Baumeister and colleagues (2007) reviewed important issues in highly impacting journals. This tendency seemed to increase in the following years, as more statistical power was required from researchers to avoid false positives, which meant larger sample sizes demanding more resources, resources that were in turn "taken" from the methods used, thus leading to even more self-reports in social psychology (e.g., 68% in 2018 versus 38.8% in 2011 published studies using only self-reports; Sassenberg & Ditrich, 2019). Baumeister and colleagues thus advocated for a return of more direct behavioural observations in both fields, because "it cannot be blithely assumed that responding to questionnaires is enough to tell us all we need to know about actual life" (Baumeister et al., 2007, p. 400). However, they also recognize that these observations are sometimes unethical, unfeasible, and time and money consuming. Besides these direct behavioural observations, personality and social psychologists were also encouraged to rely more on other sources of information to overcome the common method biases mentioned above, such as life-outcome data (e.g., health outcomes, job performance, criminal record), peers' or informant reports (i.e., asking acquaintances of the person being evaluated about this person's characteristics), interviews, and diary of daily experience as proposed in the experience-sampling method presented earlier in section 1.2.2 (Funder, 1991, 2001; Roberts et al., 2014). However, some of these methods, such as informant reports or diaries, require a lot of resources (e.g., time, money, or more research fellows) not always available when conducting studies (Vazire, 2006).

Informant or observers reports can also be impacted by biases and do not give access to thoughts, feelings, and processes (Ashton, 2018a). On their side, interviews are not as straightforward as self-reports to analyse, and life-outcome data do not directly reveal behaviours and processes essential in social and personality psychology.

Other criticisms concern the subjective aspect of self-reports. One of the assumptions on which self-reports is based is that people possess an accurate knowledge about their own behaviours, thoughts, and feelings (Ashton, 2018a). However, it is widely recognised that self-reports have a subjective component: as people's memory and insight are not infallible, their recollection through self-reports cannot always be considered as genuine and direct, and how people understand themselves can be error-prone (Baumeister et al., 2007; Cloninger, 2009; Funder, 1991). As Fiske (2014, p. 4) pointed out, "as observers of self and other, people are both biased (e.g., prefer to accentuate the positive) and prone to random error (e.g., variable over time, place, modality)". Empirical evidences also supported these concerns, as those of Gosling and colleagues (1998), who conducted a study to see how accurate were people's self-reports of their personality-related behaviours by comparing them to observers' reports. Their findings demonstrated great variability of agreement between observers' and participants' own reports across behaviours. This variation could first be attributed to participants' memory inaccuracy, whereas observers could rely on videotapes. Second, the variation in agreement could come from a self-enhancement bias leading participants to over-report desirable behaviours and under-report undesirable ones. Results of Gosling and colleagues (1998) indeed showed that self-reports were generally positively distorted. Thus, the authors concluded that self-reported act frequencies may not be reliable indicators of actual behaviours and advocated for a more frequent use of observers' reports, which can also overcome some common method biases deriving from having solely one type of rater.

1.3.2 Socially Desirable Responding

A famous response bias mentioned earlier in this dissertation deserves more attention: socially desirable responding (SDR). SDR was defined as "the tendency of individuals to give answers that make them look good" (Paulhus, 1991, p. 17), "to present themselves favourably with respect to current social norms and standards" (Zerbe & Paulhus, 1987, p. 250), "regardless of their true feelings about an issue or topic" (Podsakoff et al., 2003, p. 881). In other words, when responding to a self-report of personality in a socially desirable way, people are trying to give a positive image of themselves in the context at hand. SDR is the most frequently studied response bias, and its issue has begun to be raised more than 80 years ago (Paulhus, 1991).

SDR is traditionally depicted as having two components: self-deception and impression management (Paulhus, 1984, 1991; Paulhus & Vazire, 2007)[5]. Whereas the latter reached a fair consensus, the real meaning of the first one has sometimes been the subject of debate (Burns & Christiansen, 2006). On the one hand, the self-deception—also named alpha—component is an unconscious tendency to SDR by which people actually believe the positive self-description they are conveying with their answers (i.e., self-favouring bias)

[5] Impression management was also sometimes named other-deception, but both labels refer to the same construct: "several subsequent researchers have made similar distinctions [self-deception vs. impression management] but have applied different labels to the constructs" (Paulhus, 1984, p. 599). Paulhus (1984) also empirically demonstrated the overlapping of both labels through factor analysis: the Self-Deception Questionnaire (Sackeim & Gur, 1978, as cited in Paulhus, 1984) strongly loaded on the alpha or self-deception factor, whereas the Other-Deception Questionnaire (Sackeim & Gur, 1978, as cited in Paulhus, 1984) strongly loaded on the gamma or impression management factor. Thus, for this author, both labels can be used interchangeably.

(Paulhus, 1984; Paulhus & Vazire, 2007; Zerbe & Paulhus, 1987). This self-deceptive positivity is linked to optimism, self-esteem, and adjustment (Paulhus, 1991). Thus, self-deception is less susceptible to vary across situations, less susceptible to be influenced by anonymity or privacy of the self-reported questionnaire, seems to correspond to a response style, and is "inextricably linked to content variance" (Paulhus, 1991), making it impossible to be controlled for (Burns & Christiansen, 2006; Paulhus, 1984; Paulhus & Vazire, 2007; Zerbe & Paulhus, 1987). The impression management—also called the gamma—component, on the other hand, is a conscious tendency to SDR where the faking of the self-description is conscious and thought to give a precise image of oneself in a specific social interaction (Gilibert & Cambon, 2003; Paulhus, 1984; Uziel, 2010). Therefore, this component is pictured as sensitive to situational characteristics, as respondents might try to consciously distort their answers according to what they perceived to be socially desirable in the context at hand. Thus, for instance, assuring respondents that the questionnaire at hand is anonym may reduce this tendency to impression management (Paulhus, 1984; Zerbe & Paulhus, 1987). Due to its conscious and situation-dependent aspects, the impression management component of SDR was more conceptualised as a response set and became the "target to be shot" in self-reports of personality, more than its unconscious self-deception counterpart (Burns & Christiansen, 2006; Edwards, 1957; Paulhus, 1984, 1991).

To avoid the impact of SDR on self-reports, a couple of strategies have been developed. One of them included trying to reduce the potential perceived stakes of the self-report by, for example, reassuring respondents about the complete anonymity of their answers, or by emphasising that there are no right or wrong answers, or simply by providing a non-stressing environment during the self-report completion (Paulhus, 1991; Paulhus & Vazire, 2007). However, although these strategies might be relevant in laboratory contexts, none of them are truly applicable in more ecological situations such as job interviews, as

answers cannot be anonymous, and as the type of answers given are used for the selection process leading to a hiring decision. Thus, other techniques needed to be considered. One of them involves creating inventories with neutral items in terms of social desirability, but again, such an undertaking might be tricky or even impossible in some contexts, as neutrality is hard to defined and may depend on situations, and as item formulation might become quite obscure during the operation, thus threatening the validity of the measure itself (Edwards, 1957). Another technique consists in using forced-choice inventories, where items are presented in pair thought to be equivalent in social desirability value, forcing participants to choose only one item in the pair each time (Edwards, 1957). Hence, respondents cannot choose the most socially desirable item, as the items forming the pair are supposed to be equally desirable. However, this method did not gain much success and was recently found to be considerably less reliable than other methods for controlling SDR (Kreitchmann et al., 2019). Yet another technique is to use indirect self-reports meant to contain more obscure questions formulations (Paulhus & Vazire, 2007). The rationale behind this is that the "right" answer in the context at hand might be fairly easy to spot if the question is too obvious and straightforward. Therefore, the meaning of the items could be hidden, or at least made less obvious. Although promising, this technique may not be as efficient as thought, for two main reasons. On one hand, respondents' capacity to understand the meaning of the item should not be underestimated, whether it is obvious or not. On the other hand, the more the items are reformulated indirectly, the higher the risk of denaturing the instrument, ending with an invalid measure, i.e., not capturing what it was supposed to capture (Paulhus & Vazire, 2007).

Another technique developed to control for SDR is by using social desirability (SD) scales. These instruments are thought to be used with self-reports—and are even sometimes directly included in personality measures—to capture SDR during statistical procedures, thus helping to disentangle social desirability from the actual concept measured (Paulhus, 1991;

Paulhus & Vazire, 2007). The goal of such scales is to assess to what extend respondents are prone to SDR. Thus, their score on the scale can be used as a control variable when computing their personality scores or can even be ruled out by factor analysis procedures. As stated by Ashton, such SD scales are "useful for researchers who want to make sure that other personality scales—each of them meant to measure a different personality trait—are not simply measuring the tendency to respond desirably" (2018b, p. 55). This way of dealing with SDR was—and probably still is—the most frequently used. In the early 2000s, more than 80% of personality inventories commercialized included such a scale, showing their widespread (Burns & Christiansen, 2006). Several scales of this type have thus been developed over the years; actually, more than a dozen SD scales had already been created before 1970 (Wiggins, 1968). Examples of SD scales directly integrated to personality measures are the two instruments specially designed for the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI): the L Scale, measuring mainly impression management—i.e., the conscious aspect of SDR—and the K Scale, a more subtle version supposedly capturing self-deception (Meehl & Hathaway, 1946). Other examples of such integrated scales include the desirability scale of the Jackson's (1984, as cited in Holden & Passey, 2010) personality research form (PRF), and the validity index of the Holden psychological screening inventory (HPSI; Holden, 1996, as cited in Holden & Passey, 2010). Examples of SD scales standing on their own are: the Edwards Social Desirability Scale, mainly used to measure self-deception (Edwards, 1957); the "Good Impression" Scale proposed by Gough (1952) and thought to assess impression management among adolescents; and the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR) developed by Paulhus (1991) to asses both dimensions of SDR—self-deception and impression management— by separated subscales in the same instrument. However, the most widely used of these scales is the Marlowe-Crowne social desirability Scale (MCS, Crowne & Marlowe, 1960). This scale was elaborated to measure "individuals'

tendency to overreport infrequent socially desirable behaviours and underreport frequent undesirable behaviours" (Smeding et al., 2017, p. 156). Thus, people displaying high scores on the socially approved behaviours and low scores on the socially disapproved behaviours are identified as potential generators of SDR (Uziel, 2010). In other words, respondents producing SDR are saying, through their answers, that they often or even always have positive behaviours that are actually quite rare in the normal population (e.g., 'I always try to practice what I preach'; Crowne & Marlowe, 1960), and that they rarely or even never have negative behaviours that are in facts very common in the normal population (e.g., 'I like to gossip at times'; Crowne & Marlowe, 1960).

However, the impact of SDR on the validity of self-reported personality questionnaires has been the subject of debate (Burns & Christiansen, 2011; Holden & Passey, 2010; Uziel, 2010). On one side, some researchers argued that SDR was not a real threat (e.g., Kurtz et al., 2008; Piedmont et al., 2000). Focusing specifically on SD scales, their efficiency in improving the accuracy of self-reports could often not be proven (e.g., McCrae & Costa, 1983b; Piedmont et al., 2000). And even when results seem to indicate, by means of social desirability scales, that applicants distorted their answers on a personality inventory, Barrick and Mount (1996) and Hough and colleagues (1990) found that these distortions did not attenuate the predictive validity of personality constructs. Moreover, SDR was found to be unrelated to the criterion validity of the NEO PI-R in low-stakes testing conditions (Holden & Passey, 2010). In their meta-analysis, Ones and colleagues (1996) found that social desirability is not a predictor, suppressor, nor mediator between personality assessment and job performance. These findings were confirmed by Paunonen and LeBel (2012) by using Monte Carlo methods. Together, these studies added weight to considering social desirability as a "red herring" and to the resulting possibility of safely using personality instruments in personnel selection.

On the other side, other researchers still warned against the deleterious impact of SDR (e.g., Ganster et al., 1983; Holden, 2007). For instance, simply ignoring SDR has been found to be detrimental for the validity of personality measures, compared to trying to control for it in different ways (Kreitchmann et al., 2019). To have an idea of the impact of social desirability on personality measurement, Edwards (1957) asked people to evaluate the social desirability of personality statements. People had to rate or place each statement on a continuum (i.e., social desirability scale) ranging from highly undesirable to highly desirable. Hence, each statement was associated with its average ratings, resulting in a social desirability value. What was found across multiple studies is that the higher the social desirability value of a statement, the higher the proportion of people endorsing it when measuring their personality, thus revealing a linear association between the probability of endorsement and the social desirability value of a statement. This association was still found when participants were assured that their answers were anonymous, and also when using inventories measured with the Q-technique.

Apart from the debate regarding the potential impact of SDR, its very nature has also long been discussed: is it a bias or dispositional characteristic? Stated differently, these considerations are mirroring the person-situation debate: does SDR reflect individual differences—i.e., being more or less well-adjusted to society and able to spot what is suitable in any situation—or does it reflect situational impacts—e.g., constraints, pressure and stakes involved in the context of completion? On the person side, it is totally imaginable that respondents detected as potential producers of SDR are actually telling the truth about themselves and their real personality. For Edwards (1957, p. 86), when someone endorse a personality item, “we have no way of knowing, for example, whether the statement is, in fact, descriptive of the subject or whether he simply says that it is because he regards it as a socially desirable characteristic”. In other words, a high score on a social desirability scale

could indicate genuine personality feature, as well as an engagement in distortion (Burns & Christiansen, 2006). The main issue when using SD scales is thus the risk to over evacuate actual personality features of respondents. The bottom line of these considerations is that "desirability scales are not usually able to distinguish people who are trying to "look good" from people who really do have desirable characteristics" (Ashton, 2018b, p. 56). For instance, Bensch, Paulhus and colleagues (2019) found that scales measuring SDR were statistically not distinct from personality measures (and crystallized intelligence).

Some hints about these aspects where already given in the distinction between response sets and response styles depicted when presenting self-reports (cf. section 1.3.1), and more recently when decomposing SDR into self-deception and impression management: when SDR is stable across time and situations, it is considered more as a response style than as a response set, thus denoting a sort of personal characteristic of the respondent (Paulhus, 1991; Paulhus & Vazire, 2007). As stated by Verardi and colleagues, "social desirability (…) might be linked to a personality trait rather than to a response bias" (2010, p. 30). For example, when meta-analysing the literature on social desirability, Ones and colleagues (1996) found that scores on social desirability scales were mainly related to Emotional Stability ($r = .37$) and Conscientiousness ($r = .20$). A dispositional component linked to a personality trait named "need for approval" seemed indeed to be included in SDR (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960; Edwards, 1957; Zerbe & Paulhus, 1987). Consequently, SDR can be conceived both as a bias and as an individual difference variable, and both of these conceptualisations are in fact probably related, as high level of SDR as individual difference variable would certainly lead to more SDR as a bias, and conversely (Burns & Christiansen, 2006). Thus, instruments like the MCS were progressively used to measure both the bias and the dispositional variable (Paulhus, 1991; Paulhus & Vazire, 2007). However, the nature of the potential personality trait (or aggregation of traits) represented by high scores on SD

scales was not clear, and the fact that these scales were used to measure both a bias and a possible individual variable created confusion (Burns & Christiansen, 2006).

On the situation side of this SDR-related debate, an aspect that has been repeatedly found to influence the extent to which SDR detrimentally impact self-reports is the stakes of the situation, as more SDR tend to be produced in high-stake contexts. For instance, the more formal and evaluative the referent—i.e., the person to whom one would like to give a positive image (e.g., teachers or employers)—the more SDR is expected (Gilibert & Cambon, 2003). Consistently, SDR is more likely to be used by job applicants, as the referent is highly evaluative and the stakes of the situation involves the possibility to get a job (Paulhus & Vazire, 2007). Thus, the higher the evaluative pressure of the questionnaire context, the higher the probability of provoking socially desirable answers in self-reports. Is the resolution of the SDR-debate the same as the solution of the person-situation debate, i.e., that SDR is induced by both person *and* situation characteristics? Let us consider another point of view on social desirability in self-reports to gain more insight.

1.3.3 Faking

Another concept whose impact on personality self-reports is feared is faking. In fact, another assumption on which self-reports are based (apart from assuming that people know themselves, cf. section 1.3.1) is that people are willing to report their behaviours, thoughts, and feelings (Ashton, 2018a). However, this is not always the case, as they might intentionally try to distort their answers, which corresponds to the very definition of faking. Holden and Book (2011, p. 2) defined it as an "intentional misrepresentation in self-report" which is conscious, with some degree of deception, and oriented toward others. According to Edwards (1957), faking is a conscious distortion of scores in terms of response tendencies. Griffith and Peterson (2011, p. 291) defined applicant-faking behaviour in the context of self-report personality assessments as "a volitional attempt at increasing one's score on a

personality assessment in order to obtain a desired outcome". In other words, faking is thus depicted as a conscious and volitional attempt to modify answers to a self-report to convey a particular image of the self, negative or positive, to achieve personal goals. Whereas the utility of faking good is quite straightforward—e.g., increases the chances of being hired after a job interview—, the strategy behind faking bad might not come to mind as quickly. It can nevertheless be highly useful when not wanting to be enrolled in the army for example, or when applying for job interviews just to get unemployment compensation (Edwards, 1957). However, faking bad is indeed not as prevalent as faking good (Edwards, 1957).

There are obvious similarities between SDR and the concept of faking. For instance, the conscious aspect of faking resembles the description of the conscious component of SDR, i.e., impression management. Indeed for Edwards (1957), faking good on a personality inventory without special instructions to do so can be considered as the equivalent of SDR. Thus, a lot of SD scales developed to measure SDR were used to measure faking behaviour, particularly in organizational contexts (Griffith & Peterson, 2011). However, "the use of social desirability (SD) measures to examine the issue of applicant faking has a long but rather unproductive history" (Griffith & Peterson, 2008, p. 308). Indeed, SD scales were often found to be ineffective in correcting scores for faking behaviour (Ellingson et al., 1999; Schmitt & Oswald, 2006). Additionally, the association between scores on SD scales and actual faking behaviour has been found to be rather small, as attested by the estimation made by Tett and Christiansen (2007) when reviewing the literature: applicant faking seemed to explain no more than 10% of the variance in social desirability scores, thus giving SD scales little credit at spotting faking. This lack of relationship between measures of social desirability and actual faking behaviour was even found in field settings (Peterson et al., 2011). Thus, correcting personality inventory scores based on social desirability scores to control for faking is questionable (Burns & Christiansen, 2006). Moreover, as the same

technique was used to study SDR and faking, the doubts concerning the impact of SDR on self-reports rubbed off on faking, leading to the belief that faking, too, could just be a "red herring" (Griffith & Peterson, 2008, p. 311).

Thus, theoretically distinguishing the two concepts appeared necessary. Faking, unlike SDR, became over time more related to organizational fields, which attempted to differentiate the two concepts as follows: "[faking] corresponds to a job- or organization- specific response distortion strategy (…) social desirability involves voluntary response distortion as well as involuntary self-deception" (Roulin et al., 2016, p. 146). On one hand, as reviewed in the previous section, definition and measurement of SDR remains quite blurry: SD scales can be used to detect response sets as suggested by the impression management component of SDR impacted by situational characteristics, thus leading to score corrections or even applicants' removal based on SD scales scores; but SD scales can also be used to measure the self-deception response style as an individual difference variable not impacted by situational features (Griffith & Peterson, 2008). On the other hand, benefiting from its prominence in organizational fields, the definition of faking became much clearer: it refers to "an applicant's deliberate alteration of responses on a measure of personality, under motivated conditions, in order to present a more favourable impression to a prospective employer" (Griffith & Peterson, 2008, p. 309), and can be operationalized as the amount of change in a self-report measure of a same person between high-stakes (e.g., applying for a job) and low-stakes conditions; the greater the change, the higher the faking behaviour in high-stakes contexts (Griffith & Peterson, 2008).

Faking is known to produce a systematic measurement error, which could lead to potential misleading conclusions (Podsakoff et al., 2003), and is therefore seen as one of the key problems endangering the reliability of self-report personality tests (Podsakoff et al.,

2003)[6]. It has for example been found to reduce criterion validity and mean performance (e.g., Griffith et al., 2007; R. Mueller-Hanson et al., 2003). Thus, faking has been identified as impacting self-reports in general, but as previously noted with SDR, particularly in high-stake contexts (Stark et al., 2001; White et al., 2008). In fact, big rates of faking have been found in job interview settings (e.g., Rosse et al., 1998): 15% to 40% (Arthur et al., 2010) or even 30% to 50% (Griffith et al., 2007), to the extent that faking significantly influence which person is hired (Rosse et al., 1998). In their meta-analysis of 33 studies, Birkeland and colleagues (2006) demonstrated that applicants scored significantly higher than non-applicants on personality measures, and that applicants enhanced their scores on personality dimensions depending on the job concerned. Thus, the stakes of the situation (i.e., applying for a job or not) but also simply the type of context (i.e., differences between jobs features) are influencing the faking behaviour. Consequently, the person-situation interaction seems ones again to play its cards. The definition of faking hence evolved to include dispositional as well as, importantly, situational features. Thus, Ziegler and colleagues (2011, p. 8) stated that "faking occurs when [it] is activated by situational demands and person characteristics to

[6] As for SDR, a bunch of techniques were developed to detect faking. Here are some examples: response latencies, as faking tend to increase response time (Holden, 1995; Holden et al., 1992; Holden & Hibbs, 1995; Holden & Lambert, 2015); the study of response patterns, as fakers tend to display a drifting towards more positive or negative extreme responding (Holden et al., 2017); the use of idiosyncratic item-response pattern, which is very similar to the previous techniques but does not focus only on extreme responding (Kuncel & Borneman, 2007); the analysis of item-level covariance as faking tends to increase correlations between measures (Christiansen et al., 2017); and more recently, more inter-item standard deviation (ISD) was found to be indicating more faking (Holden & Marjanovic, 2021; Marjanovic et al., 2015; Marjanovic & Holden, 2019). To reduce faking and its impact, the same strategies as for SDR have usually been used (e.g., ensuring anonymity, exhortations to frankness, use of forced-choice inventories, etc.; Stark et al., 2011).

produce systematic differences in test scores that are not due to the attribute of interest". In the same volume, McCann and colleagues (2011) proposed four main characteristics of faking: (1) it is a behaviour, (2) requiring motivation and goal orientation, (3) which produces response distortion (4) according to the interaction between individual traits and the situation at hand. Faking as an individual variable encompassing an interaction between person and situation was also suggested by Ellingson (2011). For this author, "people fake only when they need to fake", and this need to fake is viewed to be depending on individual capacity to fake (i.e., related to the person side), the believed necessity of faking in the situation at hand (e.g., to get the job), and the perceived value of the opportunity to fake in the situation at hand (i.e., if faking is achievable), the latter two being perceptions of the situation. Consequently, it appears that "the situation as well as the trait focused matter, even for dishonest behaviour" (Bensch, Maass, et al., 2019, p. 542).

Consequently, having whole conceptualisations of faking based on its impact and on the definitional features exposed in the previous paragraph is a promising research path to improve the measurement of personality. Thus, several models of faking encompassing dispositional, motivational and situational components were proposed over the years, some of which will be presented here. Levashina and Campion (2006) proposed a theoretical model of faking likelihood in the employment interview based on a literature review. This model conceives faking as a positive distortion towards desirable features for the job at hand, and depending on candidates' capacity to fake (i.e., dispositional aspects involving skills, abilities, and knowledge), willingness to fake (i.e., motivational aspects involving dispositional and situational features), and opportunity to fake (i.e., situational aspects involving the structure and purpose of the interview and the constructs assessed). On their side, McFarland and Ryan (2000, 2006) proposed a model of applicant faking integrating the theory of planned behaviour and individual differences in faking. According to this model, individual variables

such as attitude and subjective norm towards faking but also perceived behavioural control are influencing the intention to fake, an influence itself impacted by situational features. The intention to fake then lead to faking behaviour, but this relation is impacted by applicants' ability to fake.

Goffin and Boyd (2009) suggested that more attention should be paid to the psychological processes underlying faking in order to optimise the use of personality self-reports for personnel selection, and thus proposed a model of the faking process along with a faking decision tree. In their model, faking is determined by the motivation to fake. This motivation is in turn determined by individual variables (i.e., personality and moral), contextual features (i.e., perception of need for and consequences of faking), but also by the perceived ability to fake, which again is determined by individual variables (i.e., personality, skills and experiences) and contextual features (i.e., perceived opportunity to fake and requirements of the situation). Trying to implement a model of faking as complete as possible, Tett and Simonet (2011) constructed a multisaturation theoretical model of motivated distortion where performing faking is described as deriving from an interaction between opportunity, ability, and motivation to fake. Thus, effects from the person (i.e., traits and motivation), and from the situation (i.e., context and motivation) are considered, as well as how they influence and are influenced by impression management and self-deception, also invoking the trait activation theory. In the same effort to incorporate as many factors as possible that have been shown in the literature to have an impact on faking, while remaining parsimonious, Ellingson & McFarland (2011) proposed a conceptual framework to explain faking behaviour on personality self-reports. In their conception, faking behaviour is determined by the motivation to fake, but this link is moderated by the objective capacity to fake. The motivation to fake is conceptualised in the VIE framework: it is viewed as determined by Valence (i.e., the perceived positive aspects that getting the job would

produce), Instrumentality (i.e., the perceived necessity of faking in the situation at hand), and Expectancy factors (i.e., the perceived ability to fake).

As has been mentioned on several occasions, the interaction between person and situation is highly relevant in faking and consequently in the models produced to represent it. But what these models also seem to imply is that faking—just like SDR—can be viewed as an individual difference variable capturing the ability to fake. Pauls and Crost (2005) looked into this possibility and found that the amount of faking produced was associated with measures of general intelligence and more relevantly to the ability to spot what is expected in a precise situation and to fake accordingly, thus demonstrating that faking might be more than just a bias, i.e., an individual difference variable on its own. Two other models based on this individual difference aspect are worth mentioning for the progress of the current dissertation and are thus going to be reviewed in more details.

First, a recent model of faking was proposed by Ziegler and colleagues (2015). Advanced statistical computations were already proven useful in the study of faking, such as structural equation modelling which elicited modelling faking as representing individual differences between honest and faked scores, stressing the potential effect of faking on construct validity (Ziegler & Buehner, 2009). The model proposed included even more advanced statistical features—deriving from structural equation modelling—leading to theoretical consequences for the concept of faking. By combining factor mixture modelling with a latent change score model, these authors proposed a new modelling technique allowing to determine the change between honest condition and high-stakes condition as a function of time. Student participants answered a personality inventory (here, the NEO-FFI) twice six weeks apart, first as honestly as possible, and second in a high-stake condition operationalized through the opportunity to apply for an organization, thus keeping only those students who showed real interest to apply and believed in the veracity of the process. Because of the

relevance of this dimension in organizational fields (cf. section 1.1.4.5 of the present thesis), Conscientiousness was the only personality trait included in the analyses. The results revealed that participants actually differed in the change between both conditions. Thus, faking could be viewed as "the interindividually differing quantitative difference between honest and faked scores" (Ziegler et al., 2015, p. 696). Altogether, these findings could advocate for a conceptualisation of faking as an interindividual difference variable, where how one interprets situational demands is interacting with one's personality traits. The authors hence insisted on the situational aspect of faking and even recommended the use of measures of perception of situations, as the one proposed by Rauthmann and colleagues (2014) presented previously in the present dissertation, to better understand this impact.

Bensch and colleagues (2019) used the previously presented model (Ziegler et al., 2015), but without the factor mixture model part, as it did not yield relevant results. The authors also focused on how faking is influenced by the situation and the person. However, their goal was to extend the findings to all five factors of the Big Five, as only Conscientiousness was investigated in the paper proposing the model. To this end, they used the NEO-PI-R on a two-group design: an experimental group completing the personality inventory first under honest instructions (cf. section 1.3.4 for details regarding this procedure), and one week later under fake good or fake bad instructions on a between-subjects repartition aiming at applying to an internship; a control group completing the personality inventory both times under honest instructions. The authors then constructed a latent change score variable measuring the differences between both groups. Their results first revealed that all domains of the Big Five were faked, thus showing that previous findings on Conscientiousness can be extended to the five traits. Second, results showed that the faking behaviour differed across the five personality dimensions and according to situational demands (i.e., faking good vs. faking bad), thus attesting to the situationally relevant aspect of

faking. Altogether, these findings pointed out to the fact that when faking, it not only matters whether one aims to appear better or worse; it also seems to matter which construct an item reflects. In other words, faking is not a homogenous common process across all domains nor across all conditions, but it rather occurs only when the item is perceived as relevant to attain their goal. Consequently, the authors stressed the necessity to account for situational demands and person characteristics (i.e., person-situation interaction) when studying faking.

In recent years, Roulin and colleagues (2016) proposed a dynamic model of faking in the field of job application theoretically close to the previously presented model but encompassing different features. In this model, faking is considered as a dynamic process depending on several aspects. First, faking depends on how able the applicant is to fake, which is depicted as deriving from individual difference variables, such as interpersonal and social skills, but also faking skills developed through experiences, the ability to detect what is expected in a specific situation (e.g., the organizations' selection criteria), the capacity to fake accordingly, as well as personal attitudes towards competition. Second, faking depends on how motivated the applicant is to fake, which can be largely influenced by how competitive the situation is perceived to be (i.e., the higher the competition between applicants to get the job, the higher the applicants' motivation to show off in their best light), and on how favourable is to them the ratio opportunity vs. risks to fake; is faking easy to achieve in the current situation? Is there a high probability of being caught? Are the risks of being spotted higher than the potential gains if succeeding? Whereas as the first element influencing faking is more linked to the person per se, the motivational aspect and its competitive as well as risk-related components are more depending on the organization people are applying to, i.e., the situational presses precisely at hand in the context of application for a determine organization. Here again, a clear association with the lessons learned from the person-situation debate can be made. When considering faking in organizational psychology, individual differences as

well as contextual characteristics have to be accounted for in order to clearly understand the process at play.

Roulin and colleagues (2016) therefore insisted on the dynamic aspect of faking in their model, as applicants can adapt themselves and their faking to the specific recruiting situation, but this recruiting situation can also be adapted by organizations in response to faking in order to avoid it, e.g., by reducing the perception of competition in their recruitment process, as well as by increasing faking detection devices to increase the probability of spotting dishonest applicants. Of course, the process can go on round again, with people adapting their faking in consequences of previous experiences they had, and organizations adapting their recruitment in consequences of how previous sessions went. Thus, this dynamic process of personnel selection is a negotiation between applicants and organizations to evaluate potential mutual fit; organizations have to be sure that the people they are hiring are honestly depicting themselves, so as to assure an optimal fit with organizational expectations in the future professional collaboration. Relying only on one fakable personality self-report can therefore be quite risky and even detrimental for the organization in question, as it may lead to decreased job performance related to the hiring of people not really suited to the positions they occupy.

Even more recently, Roulin and Krings (2020) published a 6-study research paper testing some of the assumptions of their previously proposed dynamic model of faking. Focusing precisely on this negotiation around the potential fit of an applicant with the organization (i.e., P-O fit, short for person-organization fit), the authors wanted to evaluate the adaptative nature of faking to organizational selection criteria. More precisely, the studies assessed how the level of competitiveness and of innovativeness promoted by a specific hiring organization impacted applicants' self-reports of personality (here, through an HEXACO instrument) when asked to picture themselves as applying for a job in this

organization. Their results demonstrated that, even when taking self-selection processes into account (i.e., applicants could naturally select organizations to which they could fit), participants faked their self-reports of personality according to the description of the fictional organization that was given to them. More precisely, they lessened their scores on Honesty-Humility and Agreeableness when the organization was pictured as more competitive (while decreasing them the organization was less competitive or when no information was given) and boosted their scores on Openness to Experience when the organization was high in innovativeness. Moreover, this adaptational faking was found to be transiting through the perception of an ideal profile for each organizational selection criteria. Altogether, these findings showed the adaptive and strategic aspects of faking: participants faked only on the personality traits they perceived as picturing the ideal profile desired by the organization and its related internal culture.

1.3.4 Self-Presentation: From a Theoretical Perspective to a Methodological Approach

SDR and faking impact on personality self-reports have been reviewed, and their potential standing as individual variable was proposed. All these conceptualisations are in fact embedded in the self-presentation perspective. This perspective “assumes that an individual's actions are guided by attempts to create impressions that will gain social approval and avoid social disapproval” (Jellison & Green, 1981, p. 643). Self-presentation thus encompasses a heavy strategical component—which could be more or less conscious—used to control the image one is conveying to others during social interactions (Gilibert & Cambon, 2003). In fact, people are usually quite good at knowing “what behaviours will create which impressions” (Snyder, 1987, p. 10) on others. Thus, in everyday life, self-presentation can be mobilised by people to please others and can be involved in many types of social behaviours (e.g., giving and receiving help, conformity, reactance, and aggressive behaviour; Baumeister, 1982). As a consequence of self-presentation strategies, “individuals would be driven by a

need for recognition and the desire to be appreciated which would incite them to present themselves in a socially acceptable way" (Gilibert & Cambon, 2003, p. 39), which in turn has been found to impact response to evaluations and self-reports (Baumeister, 1982; Funder, 1991).

This notion of self-presentation is in fact an interesting point of view over the concept of personality itself. The origin of the word "personality" comes indeed from the history of theatre, where actors used to wear masks—called *persona* at that time—specifically linked to characters, all precisely defined in terms of behaviours and attitudes (Goffman, 1956; Snyder, 1987). From depicting the mask itself, *persona* came to describe the character it represented, and later simply the actor him or herself (Snyder, 1987). Thus, personality historically already entailed a part of self-presentation. This link between humans' social interactions and theatre was even taken further, with the dramaturgical metaphor (Buss & Briggs, 1984). This metaphor was originally proposed by a sociologist, Goffman (1956), in his influential book *The presentation of self in everyday life*. Depicted as a "role theorist", Goffman published 11 books in 25 years about public behaviours and social roles performed by people, but relying mainly on his own observations on everyday life rather than on experiments and surveys (Snyder, 1987).

Hence, taking a sociological perspective to study social life, Goffman proposed this dramaturgical metaphor in which social interactions are conceived as theatrical performances. In this perspective, people are like performers or characters controlling how they are presenting themselves and their behaviours in situations to give a certain impression to others present, i.e., the audience. In short, they are like actors on stage, and each interaction is like a play, or a performance given on one occasion to influence people present. Hence, an "ordinary social intercourse is itself put together as a scene is put together, by the exchange of dramatically inflated actions, counteractions, and terminating replies" (Goffman, 1959, p. 63).

The goal for performers is thus to express themselves through these exchanges as to give a specific impression which will achieve a desired response in the audience. Thus, each performer can have different parts to play, one for each situation involving a specific audience. As stated by Goffman, “sometimes he [the individual] will intentionally and consciously express himself in a particular way, but chiefly because the tradition of his group or social status require this kind of expression" (Goffman, 1956, p. 3). In other words, the motivation people have to control their self-presentation to achieve a certain goal is also dependent of situational features, i.e., what the context requires and asks for. Here, the importance of the situation is thus once again enhanced: “the performer who is to be dramaturgically prudent will have to adapt his performance to the information conditions under which it must staged” (Goffman, 1956, p. 142). People have therefore to be aware of what the situation is asking for to adapt their play in accordance. As depicted previously for SDR and faking, Goffman posited that more self-presentation can also occur in high-stake situations: “it is apparent that care will be great in situations where important consequences for the performer will occur as a result of his conduct” (Goffman, 1956, p. 144). As an example, the author takes the job interview as being a context clearly involving high stakes, as its outcome can have major life consequences solely based on the here-and-now performance of the job applicant. It is an evidently motivated situation where the applicant has to take particular care of his or her impression, not only just to be appreciated, but more importantly to be hired. On the other hand, “when there is little chance of being seen, opportunities for relaxation can be taken” (Goffman, 1956, p. 139). Thus, when no one is watching, people can relax their control of the impression they want to give, and just be their true selves.

The parallel between the social situations depicted by Goffman and the completion of personality self-reports is straightforward. First, Goffman pointed out to the fact that

performers can have a tendency to "offer their observers an impression that is idealized in several different ways. (…) incorporat[ing] and exemplify[ing] the officially accredited values of the society" (Goffman, 1956, p. 23). Stated differently, people have a tendency to self-enhancement, to give a more positive image of themselves than is actually the case, but particularly in adequation with what the context they are in—e.g., society—is holding as socially desirable. These considerations can be applied as they stand to self-reports. Second, when playing onstage, actors and actresses are supposed to pretend to be their character in a way that allows the audience to really believe they are those fictional personas. They have to play them and make them as believable as possible. The same occurs when completing self-reported questionnaires: people able to fake can choose a certain role they want to play in order to make the audience of the context believe they *are* their role, i.e., what they are trying to portray through their answers. Of course, Goffman did not pretend that life is exactly identical to theatre; this analogy merely served rhetorical purposes. Moreover, as he wisely put it, the metaphor has its limits, as actions on stage do not have the real consequences and implications of actions in real life. However, it is worth citing his words one again: "All the world is not, of course, a stage, but the crucial ways in which it isn't are not easy to specify" (Goffman, 1959, p. 63). Hence, the actor might also be quite hard to disentangle from the true person, especially when trying to figure it out through self-reported personality questionnaires.

The dramaturgical metaphor and the self-presentation perspective can be paralleled with some considerations about faking proposed by Paulhus (1993) in his controlled self-presentation model. In this view, faking is depicted as demanding a certain control *of* one's own mind to not betray one's role, and a control *by* one's mind to maintain the consistency of the role through behaviours and sayings. These perspectives are close to two concepts embedded in the self-presentation perspective: impression management and self-monitoring.

The connexion between self-presentation and impression management was even directly made by Goffman himself, as his view on self-presentation involves a degree of control—i.e., management—of the impression one is trying to make on others (Goffman, 1956). The concept of impression management was used in the study of faking (e.g., R. A. Mueller-Hanson et al., 2006) and has also been suspected of being an individual difference variable (Gilibert & Cambon, 2003).

Another concept related to self-presentation and impression management is self-monitoring. This concept was first proposed by Snyder (1974) and extensively presented in his famous book *Public appearances, private realities: the psychology of self-monitoring* (Snyder, 1987). It directly derives from the dramaturgical metaphor of Goffman (1956) in line with self-presentation strategies. Snyder started from the question of whether people in general would differ in their ability and motivation to control their self-presentation through behaviours. Thus, self-monitoring is an individual difference variable on which people can be more or less high, and which is largely influencing how they generally approach life and how they specifically behave in social situations. On one side, people high in self-monitoring are trying to adapt (i.e., monitor) themselves the best they can to the current circumstances to be "the right person in the right place at the right time" (Snyder, 1987, p. 4), being thus highly sensitive to situational cues to *tune* themselves to them, even if it makes them behave in way that do not match their inner self. High self-monitors are therefore very flexible and can easily adapt themselves, as if they were continually asking themselves "Who does this situation want me to be and how can I be that person?" (Snyder, 1987, p. 46). They can be thought as actors having "a large repertoire of roles, willing and able to work from a wide range of scripts" (Snyder, 1987, p. 186). On the other side, people low in self-monitoring are less sensitive to situational presses and are more driven by a will to stay authentic, true to themselves, regardless of the situation, as to answer the question "Who am I and how can I be

me in this situation?" (Snyder, 1987, p. 46). To further the dramaturgical metaphor, they would represent actors who always play the same role, and moreover a role that is quite similar to their own true personality. Thus, self-monitoring is an individual difference variable entailing a motivational aspect, as high self-monitors are intrinsically motivated to adapt their self-presentations, whereas low self-monitors are not. Linking his concept to the person-situation debate, Snyder proposed that low self-monitors were more on the person side, i.e., their true personality would influence their behaviours, whereas high self-monitors would more stand on the situation side, as contextual presses would highly impact their behaviours. However, some doubts emerged later concerning these assumptions, as they did not seem to be proven by empirical data (Gangestad & Snyder, 2000), and as "no psychological characteristic has been shown to moderate the stability of personality traits" (McCrae & Costa, 2003, p. 130). Nonetheless, self-monitoring appears to be an individual difference variable interesting in itself since it was shown to predict many work-related outcomes such as job performance, job involvement or leadership (Day et al., 2002).

Apart from a perspective to investigate human behaviours in social interactions, self-presentation has also been implemented as a methodological paradigm to investigate socially desirable beliefs, preferences, or attitudes (Gilibert & Cambon, 2003). This paradigm generally consists of asking participants to answer a questionnaire under different instructions: standard instructions asking them to simply answer the questionnaire—as honestly as possible (Edwards, 1957)—and assuring them that there are no right or wrong answers; self-enhancement or "fake good" instructions where they have to answer with the aim to generate a positive image of themselves; and self-depreciation or "fake bad" instructions where the goal is to generate a negative image of oneself through the answers (Gilibert & Cambon, 2003). The rationale behind this paradigm is that it helps spot which items or groups of items are perceived as socially desirable, as they will be the target of

enhanced scores between standard and fake good instructions. The reverse is true for socially undesirable (or counter-normative) items with fake bad instructions. For example, Jellison and Green (1981) found that participants gave more internal responses to the Rotter (1966)'s locus of control scale when they had to give a positive image of themselves, and more external answers when having to give a negative image, which supported the theoretical definition of to the norm of internality as the social valorisation of internal attributions in the explanation of everyday events (Beauvois & Dubois, 1988).

Whereas a majority of studies using the self-presentation paradigm at its birth were computing the instructions across between-subjects designs, using within-subjects designs was not found to reduce the magnitude of the findings elicited (Jouffre et al., 2001; e.g., Py & Somat, 1991). Regarding the order of presentation of the instruction types, whereas standard instructions are always presented first to avoid contamination by other instruction types (Havan & Kohút, 2023), fake good and fake bad instructions seem to be usable in both order without effect on the results (Jouffre et al., 2001; Somat & Vazel, 1999). Another important feature of this paradigm is the incarnation of the evaluative pressure under faking instructions by a potential evaluator or referent (Gilibert & Cambon, 2003), that is the target to whom one tries to give a good or bad image of themselves through their answers. For instance, teachers might be mentioned as the target of the self-presentation when studying students, or a CEO when studying job applicants. As for previously presented concepts, here again, high-stakes contexts may even accentuate the score differences between instructions: the more formal the potential referent, the higher the enhancement under fake good instructions (Gilibert & Cambon, 2003).

Using the self-presentation paradigm by contrasting answers under standard instructions with answers under fake good instructions was quite informative about self-reports in general, as it happened that no significant difference was found between the scores

obtained under these two types of instructions (Gilibert & Cambon, 2003). Thus, such findings highlighted the fact that respondents might try to give a positive image of themselves even under standard instructions, which could be explained by several considerations: respondents may be deceiving themselves in the standard instructions, or they may be trying to hide their faking in the fake good instructions, or the evaluative pressure felt even under standard instructions might still be high (Gilibert & Cambon, 2003). Thus, dispositional, motivational, and situational influences seem to be in interaction when using this paradigm, as typically conceptualized in faking research (see section 1.3.3 of the present thesis).

Due to its convenience but also its interesting features regarding high-stakes and targets, the self-presentation paradigm has often been used to study SDR and faking (Edwards, 1957; e.g., Holden & Evoy, 2005; McFarland & Ryan, 2000; for a meta-analysis, see Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999). Paul and Crost (2005), when using this paradigm to study the ability to fake, even stated that personality scores under faking instructions were in fact not measuring personality anymore, but the ability to fake proportionally to situational pressure. Thus, personality measurements under such instructions would have a different meaning compared to honest or standard instructions. However, some criticism arose regarding the very meaning of the results obtained with this paradigm when studying SDR and faking. Meehl and Hathaway (1946) indeed pointed out to the fact that the mean-score changes found between standard and fake good instructions could simply indicate that more faking occurred under fake good instructions, but that this did not mean that no faking at all was done under standard instructions. Moreover, detecting that someone is able to fake when asked to do so with the self-presentation paradigm does not mean that this person would actually produce faked answers in a real-world settings, such as during personnel selection processes (McCrae & Costa, 1983b; Ones & Viswesvaran, 1998). Finally, the self-presentation paradigm, as used as a mean to assess the level of social desirability of

psychological concepts, focuses on mean comparison across conditions and thus does not allow considering individual variability (i.e., deviations from the means) in the perception of such social desirability. Thus, although promising in the study of SDR and faking, the self-presentation paradigm as typically used in this literature is limited to investigate the complex interaction of individual and situational variabilities that shape self-presentation strategies in social contexts.

1.3.5 Normative Clear-Sightedness

After reviewing that faking—and/or SDR—can produce detrimental variability in self-reports of personality when people are trying to achieve self-presentational goals, one question remain: how do these respondents know which items they should enhance to achieve a desired self-presentation purpose in a particular situation? A clue to answer is given by Beauvois and Dubois, who used the self-presentation paradigm to study and detect social norms: “People use self-presentation strategies to enhance their self-image, and in doing so, they rely on norms” (2001, p. 490). This section is going to explore this proposition. As reviewed in the previous sections about social desirability, faking, and self-presentation, some people may have more knowledge about what they should display in a particular situation to obtain what they would like to obtain. Jellison and Green (1981) referred to such a knowledge when studying the fundamental error of attribution (tendency to overestimate the importance of dispositional over environmental factors). The authors experimentally showed that, when asking to give a positive image of themselves, subjects gave significantly more internal responses than subjects who were asked to give a negative image of themselves. Thus, behind the fundamental error of attribution lies a social norm in favour of internality, and people can have a certain knowledge of this valorisation of internality, and could use this knowledge in self-presentation goals to monitor their behaviour (Jellison & Green, 1981).

Based on these findings and going one step further, Py & Somat (1991) built on this hypothesis that a sort of knowledge of social norms existed, but added the idea of dispositional variable, as presented by Snyder by suggesting that this knowledge differed among people. Py and Somat (1991) thus proposed a new concept: normative clear-sightedness. They defined it as a "knowledge—vs non-knowledge—, on the one hand, of the normative or counter-normative character of a type of social behaviours, or a type of judgements, and on the other hand, of the conformity or non-conformity of a behaviour regarding what is being expected by an individual having a certain status" (personal translation, Py & Somat, 1991, p. 172). Normative clear-sightedness can thus be viewed as a social competence and a dispositional knowledge about the social functioning, the drivers of social behaviours, and what is normative or counter-normative in a specific situation (Jouffre et al., 2001; Py & Ginet, 2003). It is a social knowledge of what is socially valued or useful and is thus associated with certain types of explanations and responses (Py & Somat, 1991), and "affects the way individual apprehends certain social situations" (Py & Ginet, 2003, p. 170). Stated in a simpler way, "normative clear-sightedness can (…) be seen as a social skill that allows people to favourably influence how other people judge them" (Bressoux & Pansu, 2007, p. 170).

Although the goal of this line of research was initially to show that normative clear-sightedness could be applied to any social norm, it was very often measured on young populations—children or adolescents (Py & Ginet, 2003)—and first and mostly in relation to the norm of internality (J.-L. Beauvois & Dubois, 1988; Dubois & Beauvois, 2008; Pansu et al., 2008), which describes that attributing behaviours, outcomes, or failures to oneself is more positively viewed as trying to blame an external source (e.g., "I failed the exam because I did not study enough" vs. "I failed the exam because the teacher did not explain the theory well in class"). Thus, normative clear-sighted people are expected to be quite aware of the

valorisation of this norm of internality and should therefore display it more often than less- or non-clearsighted people. This should even more be the case in situation with a certain evaluative pressure and with power relationships (Py & Ginet, 2003; Py & Somat, 1991)—e.g., when students are evaluated by their teachers—, leading to a circle: the more the person in power reinforces the expression of normative behaviours through evaluative function, the more people hierarchically below them will try to display these normative behaviours.

To measure normative clear-sightedness, researchers relied on the self-presentation paradigm. They asked respondents to answer an internality questionnaire under honest, positive, and negative self-presentation instructions. More precisely, people had to answer the questionnaire three times: a first time depicting their honest feeling about their personality regarding internality, a second time explicitly trying to give a good—pro-normative—image of themselves through their answers, and a third time explicitly trying to give a bad—counter-normative—image of themselves. Their normative clear-sightedness score was then computed by subtracting their answers under negative instructions to their answers under positive instructions. The higher the difference—big emphasis on internality under normative instructions and big emphasis on externality under counter-normative instructions—, the more clear-sighted the person (Channouf et al., 1995; Py & Somat, 1991; Tarquinio & Somat, 2001). Extending this methodology, normative clear-sightedness was also studied in pairs with norms, and thus subjects were selected on their scores on these norms and on their clear-sightedness on these norms by fixing an a priori deviation about the mean, allowing to keep only “the most “typed” subjects on the (…) variables which were of interest” (Py & Ginet, 2003; Somat & Vazel, 1999, p. 698).

Over the years, some studies have been made on this concept, but not a plethora[7]. As stated earlier, most of these studies have been conducted on the clear-sightedness of the internality norm. It has been found that normative clear-sightedness about internality plays a role in the reduction of cognitive dissonance by inhibiting the intervention of internality on rationalization processes (Channouf et al., 1993): when asked to write an essay against their own opinion and attitude, clear-sighted 10-to-11-year-old children changed less their attitude directly after the writing than non-clear-sighted children. The rationale behind these results is that, on one hand, internal children justify the arguments they wrote against their own opinion by attributing these arguments to themselves and, consequently, change their attitude after writing them. On the other hand, clear-sighted children know power relationships and thus know that they wrote this text against their opinion because the experimenter asked them to do so. They therefore do not need to change their own attitude after the writing. However,

[7] For the sake of approximating exhaustivity, it is worth mentioning that a doctoral dissertation (Desponds, 2011) has been written on normative clear-sightedness and its link with social utility versus social desirability (Beauvois, 2003), which correspond to the two fundamental dimensions of social judgement (Abele et al., 2021). It posits that some norms—internality and self-sufficiency—elicit a positive evaluation in terms of social utility, whereas other norms—like individualism—elicit positive evaluations in terms of social desirability. This thesis thus proposes two complementary concepts, social utility clear-sightedness and social desirability clear-sightedness, which both help attain a positive social evaluation more efficiently than normative clear-sightedness of internality or other norms. An interesting proposition in this dissertation is the contextual aspect described as having an important impact, along with clear-sightedness, on the positive social evaluation obtained. A second doctoral thesis has been made on the subject, comparing normative clear-sightedness to the need for cognition regarding causal attribution (Ginet, 2000), and a third one exploring the links between normative clear-sightedness of internality and explanatory production activity in 9- to 14-year-old children (Jouffre, 2003). As these documents were not freely available, no further description of their content can be made.

these effects were found directly after writing the counter-attitudinal essay but did not last longer.

On their side, Tarquinio & Somat (2001) showed that normative clear-sightedness about internality allowed students to be aware of the arbitrariness of social reinforcements distribution and thus to distancing themselves from its influence on their identity, i.e. their academic self-schema. Students achieving badly at school but being clear-sighted actually had a self-image as good as students achieving well but without being clear-sighted, and a better self-image than students achieving badly without being clear-sighted. Clearsighted good students had the best academic self-image among all students. Thus, the authors concluded that normative clear-sightedness prevent students from having a bad academic self-identity construction due to their low achievement.

A few years later, Bigot and colleagues (2004, p. 342) pointed out that "normative clear-sightedness scores varied considerably across school grades", that is across contexts. As expected by the authors, normative clear-sightedness—about the norm of internality—generally increased with age, but a decrease during a specific transition of the French school system—moving from elementary to middle school—indicated that students might need an adaptation time to a new context and its rules before expressing clear-sightedness again. These authors also showed that the expression of normative clear-sightedness was not equal across all school graders involved in their study. In fact, younger pupils were mostly clear-sighted about positive events, whereas older ones were clear-sighted for both positive and negative events. Thus, normative clear-sightedness seems not only to increase but also to mean something different with age. Its expression also seems to be linked to the familiarity of the context.

But is normative clear-sightedness really conscious? In their review on the normative clear-sightedness concept, Py and Ginet (2003) seemed to consider its possible conscious

component: clear-sighted people would be more prone to reflexive causal inferences activities and would be moved by a general need of understanding their environment and behaviours. They depicted normative clear-sightedness as a variable related to self-monitoring and the need for cognition. Guingouain (2001) conducted a study to see if normative clear-sightedness—about internality—could be viewed as a metacognition, i.e., a knowledge about a knowledge, beliefs about cognitive activities, a conscious and voluntary auto-evaluation of the quality of our processes. In other words, the author's question was: do normative clear-sighted people know they are clearsighted and do they consciously mobilize this knowledge? To reach an answer, Guingouain compared the classical measure of normative clear-sightedness with a new way of measuring it as a metacognition: the abnormativity paradigm. The hypothesis was that clear-sighted people—students in this case—should be able to reproduce a normative error: reproduce the answering type of a questionnaire filled with external answers by a—fictive—person instructed to answer in an internal way, and the reverse with a questionnaire filled with internal answers by a person instructed to fill it with external ones. To summarize the results, adult—and not children—students obtaining higher scores on normative clear-sightedness were more able, first, to understand the error made by the fictive person in the internality questionnaire, and second, to reproduce it. Guingouain thus concluded that normative clear-sightedness was a metacognition and could be effectively measured with the abnormativity paradigm. However, this paradigm was never used again in the published literature.

This conscious aspect of normative clear-sightedness also questioned Pasquier and Valéau (2006). In contrast to Guingouain, they found evidence that this process might be unconscious. Thus, they proposed to rename it "reactivity to normative-counter-normative induction" as the main generators of it, according to them, are the instructions used to measure it: people would simply submit to these instructions. In their results, the level of

reactivity—or of normative clear-sightedness—depended on people's adhesion to the internality norm and on their general intelligence. Reactivity would thus be a spontaneous, almost automatic, unconscious—or at least poorly conscious—reaction to normative instructions. However, it must be pointed out that their study, containing a wide range of variables, only involved a hundred participants and was not replicated to our knowledge, although the authors argued again in favour of this terminology in the discussion of a following paper treated later in the present thesis (Pasquier & Valéau, 2015).

Rare are the attempts to generalize normative clear-sightedness to norms other than internality, but two other concepts were investigated: the norm of individualism and the norm of consistency (Py & Ginet, 2003). After showing that both concepts had all the required characteristics to be called norms in Western liberal societies, Somat and Vazel (1999) and Jouffre and colleagues (2001) tried to highlight a link between clear-sightedness of the internality norm on one side, and clear-sightedness of individualism and consistency norms on the other side, respectively. However, both studies failed to find correlations between the clear-sightednesses, challenging the generalization of normative clear-sightedness. Regarding individualism, the authors still found that the most clear-sighted people about internality had the highest scores on individualism, and the most clear-sighted people about individualism had higher scores on internality than others. They thus concluded that "a certain type of individual, more than others, is conscious of the value associated with a certain type of event" (Somat & Vazel, 1999, p. 703), but this attempt to support the generalization of the normative clear-sightedness based on a lack of direct correlation seems meandering.

Regarding consistency, to justify this lack of link, Jouffre and colleagues (2001) pointed to the fact that normative clear-sightedness is expected to be a knowledge about social judgement while the consistency norm is more obviously about behaviour even though it has an attitudinal part. However, Jouffre (2007) made another study about clear-sightedness of

internality and consistency: comparing French and Lithuanian 9-13-year-old pupils, even if internality clear-sightedness was stronger among Lithuanian pupils and consistency tended to be more pronounced in France, stronger internality clear-sightedness was generally associated to stronger consistency clear-sightedness. In sum, some promising results like the latter notwithstanding, the generalizability of normative clear-sightedness appears to be challenging and not straightforward.

Another facet of the experimental studying of normative clear-sightedness includes field application and implementation trials. Beauvois and Dubois (2001) started with a normative clear-sightedness training proposition—using social skill transmission strategies—to help unemployed people succeed in job interviews. They focused on three norms: internality, self-sufficiency, and individualism. Their goal was not to make people more internal, self-sufficient, and individualist, but rather to help them be aware that these norms are valued and can thus be used in self-presentation strategies to gain social approval in job interviews. The authors did not see their training proposition as an encouragement to fake during job interview, but rather as an attempt to assure equal opportunities by helping people acquiring values often leading to more success, in the same vein as are trainings on effective cover letters and curriculum vitae (Beauvois & Dubois, 2001).

Férec and colleagues (2011) proposed a similar application focusing on the internality norm to help people out of unemployment. The aim was to teach them how to identify the social value of internal statements and how to adopt effective self-presentation strategies. They found that their training had some beneficial effects: subjects found it useful and reusable, made significant learnings that were still there after one month, and were able to generalize these learnings. They displayed more internal explanations and were more clear-sighted after the training; they did not perceive themselves as more competent than before, but as more able to self-present in a favourable way during evaluative situations. However,

their insertion rate in the job market remained the same as for people who did not do the training. Auzoult (2006) also proposed an implementation of normative clear-sightedness related to job but at an earlier stage: teenagers' orientation choices. By working on teenagers' knowledge of themselves, the author found increases in the normative clear-sightedness of the internality norm scores.

Valéau and Pasquier's (2004) findings went in the same way as they saw self-presentation strategies by the mean of normative clear-sightedness in personality questionnaires for job interview not as faking but as a demonstration of social competences valued in the job market. They actually showed a strong link between normative clear-sightedness—of internality—and a successful job training. Thus, rather than being seen as opportunistic or even manipulative, clear-sighted people could just be well-adapted adults displaying social competences needed for any jobs. A few years later, the same authors (Pasquier & Valéau, 2015) extended their work on the subject. Seeing normative clear-sightedness about internality as a socialisation skill required for a good job insertion—clear-sighted people would be able to do a work in line with the company's expectations—they wanted to document the differences between four types of people: internal clear-sighted, external clear-sighted, internal non-clear-sighted, and external non-clear-sighted. They found that internal clear-sighted and external non-clear-sighted were the most extreme groups, the former being perfectly in tune with and aware of the norm, allowing them to use it, and the latter living outside the norm without any motivation to be socially desirable. The two remaining more moderate groups were internal non-clear-sighted—applying the internality norm without being aware of it—and external clear-sighted—aware of the norm without wanting to apply it. The authors also found a link between general intelligence and normative clear-sightedness—as in one of their previous studies (Pasquier & Valeau, 2006)—and that this clear-sightedness reinforced the beneficial effects of norm adhesion on self-esteem.

Besides adding to the relevance of normative clear-sightedness as a social competence for work-related contexts, these findings emphasized the dispositional aspect of the concept: not everyone has the same level of clear-sightedness, and it can be expressed in different ways. In parallel, the debate concerning the conscious aspect of normative clear-sightedness remained unsolved as the latter study showed both conscious *and* unconscious sides.

Although the concept of normative clear-sightedness seemed promising and useful, it included some obstacles that prevent it from becoming a wide used concept. First, normative clear-sightedness was theorized as a "knowledge [which] is independent of the degree of normative adhesion or of the effective conformity" (personal translation, Py & Somat, 1991, p. 172). In other words, knowing what is normatively suitable to behaviourally display in a social situation does not mean agreeing that it actually *is* a good thing that this type of behaviours is socially praised; knowing the norm is independent of using the norm on a daily basis (Channouf et al., 1995). But this orthogonality between clear-sightedness and normativity itself was actually not found in a lot of studies (Bressoux & Pansu, 2007; Dompnier et al., 2006, 2007; Jouffre et al., 2001, 2001; Pasquier & Valeau, 2006; Pasquier & Valéau, 2015), or only partially found in sample subgroups (Bigot et al., 2004; Somat & Vazel, 1999), or simply not reported (Auzoult, 2006; Beauvois & Dubois, 2001; Channouf et al., 1993; Férec et al., 2011; Guingouain, 2001; Tarquinio & Somat, 2001; Valeau & Pasquier, 2004). Even the instigators of the concept and its definition found a .26 correlation between normative clear-sightedness and internality, and stated that "there is a slight correspondence between the distribution of internality scores and the distribution of normative clear-sightedness scores" (personal translation, Py & Somat, 1991, p. 184). Altogether, this lack of confirmation is damaging for the initial definition of the concept and asks for a better and more accurate conceptualisation.

A second obstacle regarding normative clear-sightedness is the fact itself that the concept relied on norms, as stated by Py and Somat (1991, p. 172): “The “clear-sightedness vs non-clear-sightedness” variable must be crossed with a variable describing a normative or conformist functioning”, i.e. a norm. A norm is a “judgement shared by a group of people concerning the value of certain events (…), the acquisition of this judgement is subject to a process of social influence” (personal translation, Py & Somat, 1991, p. 172) and “is independent of all truth criteria” (Somat & Vazel, 1999, p. 692). Social norms are shared ways of thinking and acting, are particularly relevant in evaluation of behaviours, and are internalized through socialization processes (Pasquier & Valéau, 2015). Our social world is full of such norms, but to use them, researchers have first to spot them, prove their existence, find where they come from, what is their usefulness, how they work, etc. All these steps are necessary to attest that it is relevant to study this norm and thus to pretend that some people might be more or less clear-sighted about it. We can see some hint of this process in the small literature about normative clear-sightedness: a vast majority of the studies were performed on the norm of internality as its existence is well-established and as it was the first norm used to study normative clear-sightedness. The only studies that tried to extend the concept to other norms had to pick very carefully the norm they wanted to study, provide a background to it, and even sometimes linked it to the study of the norm of internality to validate their findings (Jouffre, 2007; Jouffre et al., 2001; Somat & Vazel, 1999). Thus, even if the concept of social norm is a huge pertinent milestone in this field, it might hinder the study of clear-sightedness.

Another obstacle embedded in the concept of normative clear-sightedness is its operationalisation itself: “We should probably also turn our attention again to the way in which this variable is measured, as the method has not changed since 1991” stated Py and Ginet (2003), making salient the possible obsolescence of this measure. In fact, computing a difference score between the positive and the negative self-presentation instructions implies

that both scores are comparable, i.e., that 1 point down the negative instruction is equivalent to 1 point up the positive instruction. Stated differently, this difference score—or composite indicator—is expected to be "more heuristic than each one of the scores [normative vs. counter-normative instructions] that enters into its calculation" (Bressoux & Pansu, 2007, p. 170). Actually, Bressoux and Pansu (2007), with regard to internality and teachers' judgement on their students, showed that this is not the case: the two types of instructions were not symmetrically related to teachers' judgement. Even more, they demonstrated that the negative instruction score was not necessary to obtain a reliable score of normative clear-sightedness, and that the positive instruction was actually a better measure of it. Thus, for these authors, "normative clear-sightedness would not be the expression of a difference between two supposedly symmetrically opposed situations, but the ability to present oneself as internal in situations where it is important to look good (pro-normative situations)" (Bressoux & Pansu, 2007, pp. 175–176).

All these shortcomings taken together hindered not only the generalization of normative clear-sightedness, but also its use as a predictor, which is however a valuable and important step when trying to study a concept. To our knowledge, only two studies—made by the same team of researchers—tried to use the concept as a predictor (Dompnier et al., 2006, 2007): they did two real-world students-teachers studies on the link—highlighted by path analyses—between the norm of internality and teacher's judgement about their students. In their first study, they showed that normative clear-sightedness of students could predict their internality score with honest instruction, which in turn predicted—along with achievement and class average in French—student's internality score perceived by their teacher, which finally predicted teacher's judgement. In their second study, they added student's utility score perceived by their teacher as a mediator between student's internality score perceived by their teacher and teacher's judgement. Thus, Dompnier and colleagues demonstrated that "pupils'

normative clear-sightedness could have an indirect effect on a teacher's judgments through its effect on pupils' spontaneous expression of internality" (2007, p. 344).

To sum up, normative clear-sightedness was prominently studied with regard to internality and by using the self-presentation paradigm, but as promising and relevant as this concept sounded, it remained blurred and hampered by its own theoretical and methodological limitations. Is it conscious or unconscious? Does it apply equally to all types of norms? How to accurately measure it? Does it predict meaningful outcomes? Can it be learned and if so, does it have practical and measurable positive impacts? Originally proposed in 1991 by Py and Somat, normative clear-sightedness was mostly studied between that date and 2007, with only two exception after 2010 (Férec et al., 2011; Pasquier & Valéau, 2015), leaving all these questions mainly unanswered. Thus, the concept seems to have run out of steam and to have stopped, to our knowledge, attracting research attention nowadays. However, the present thesis aims at reviving this concept from the ashes by renewing it and giving it another angle of meaning. The goal is not to study normative clear-sightedness as such though, but to build on its theoretical and methodological reflexions that were promising research avenues to conceptualise a more mature and advanced construct: social clear-sightedness.

1.4 Theoretical Model: Social Clear-Sightedness

Social clear-sightedness is an old and new concept at the same time. It is kind of old because it takes its roots in—and is directly inspired by—the concept of normative clear-sightedness proposed by Py and Somat (1991). Theoretically and conceptually, normative and social clear-sightedness are very similar: both are social competences allowing some people—the clear-sighted ones—to identify what would be socially desirable in a specific context to give a positive image of themselves. The only difference is that social clear-

sightedness does not rely on social norms—or more accurately, not directly. As the focus of the present thesis is on self-reported personality questionnaires, the use of normative clear-sightedness would have implied defining a norm for each personality dimension. Focusing on proving norms existence, their antecedents and consequences was not relevant, as our interest was not specifically on the norms at hand, but rather on what people do with the personality dimensions in the exact moment of questionnaire completion. Moreover, as personality dimensions used in the present thesis (i.e., the Big Five) are positively defined, they tend all to be socially desirable (Bäckström & Björklund, 2013; Digman, 1997; Funder, 2001), and could thus all be normative in any contexts (e.g., Gangloff, 2003). However, the model proposed here aimed precisely at highlighting possible variations in what is seen as important according to the situation.

Our postulate is that, when putting respondent in a particular situation—e.g., with a certain evaluative pressure—they are going to tell, through their answers, what are the possible social expectations—including norms—at hand, that is, what is socially valued and identified as important to be viewed positively. As Goffman rightly stated, "when an individual appears before others, he wittingly and unwittingly projects a definition of the situation" (1956, p. 155). In other words, when put in a specific situation, people are automatically defining it and what they perceive it requires. Thus, defining each norm, their origins and impact is not needed, as the interest is more on what people think these norms are, and how they are going to behave in particular situations, with or without evaluative pressure. Stated differently, there is no need to define what is expected in each situation, as people themselves will reveal it. If a majority of people answering individually agreed on some items to be socially desirable, it can be concluded that those are the items important in the situation at hand. Thus, any construct can be used to study social clear-sightedness—and consequently social desirability—as it has been freed from its link to social norms.

Practically, normative and social clear-sightedness are not operationalized in the same way. Thus, the novelty does not rely on the theory but rather on a more well-suited statistical operationalisation of the concept (i.e., structural equation modelling). The methodology behind normative clear-sightedness and why it is not convincing on some aspects has already been discussed. To study social clear-sightedness, the self-presentation paradigm is also used, but differently. First, people answer the items under honest instructions. Second, they answer them again, but under positive self-presentation instructions, i.e., to give a positive image of themselves in the situation at hand. Then, through a structural equation modelling procedure, scores obtained under positive self-presentation instruction are used to build social clear-sightedness, as the answers people gave under such instructions provide information about which items or dimensions are socially desirable in the situation—i.e., people show their own knowledge about social desirability. Social clear-sightedness can then be used to predict scores under honest instructions: this step is crucial in the process of understanding the concept.

Indeed, if a link exists between social clear-sightedness and some responses under honest instructions, our conceptualization assumes that clear-sighted people already boosted their answers even when they had the instruction to answer honestly. Of course, the link between social clear-sightedness and those type of responses is not totally explaining these responses; thus, what is remaining can be attributed, among others, to the true personality of the person. Thus, our operationalisation of social clear-sightedness allows to: 1) identify what is viewed as socially desirable in specific situations; 2) construct a latent variable representing social clear-sightedness and helping to spot clear-sighted people; 3) spot if clear-sighted people used their general dispositional knowledge of what is socially desirable—i.e., social clear-sightedness—already in the honest instruction to give a good image of themselves; and 4) disentangle which part of people's honest answers is attributable to their social clear-

sightedness and thus which part could more certainly be produced by their true personality. The latter point reveals that the conceptualization proposed here does not rely on the assumption of orthogonality initially postulated by Py and Somat (1991) between clear-sightedness and normativity. Rather, a link between people's answers under honest instructions and social clear-sightedness is expected (Dompnier et al., 2006, 2007). Table 1 presents definitional components that clarify the similarities and differences between social clear-sightedness and other psychological constructs, such as the previously discussed normative clear-sightedness.

Table 1

Comparing and differentiating social clear-sightedness from similar psychological constructs

Definitional components	SDR (IM or other-deception)	Self-monitoring	Normative clear-sightedness	Social clear-sightedness
Individual difference variable	Yes if dispositional trait No if methodological bias	Yes	Yes	Yes
Knowledge of social expectancies	Yes	Yes for high self-monitors ? for low self-monitors	Yes	Yes
Social competence (situationally motivated use of knowledge of social expectancies)	Yes if dispositional trait No if methodological bias	Yes	Yes	Yes
Orthogonality knowledge — adhesion	No if dispositional trait Yes if methodological bias	No	Yes	No
Reference to norms	implicit	implicit	explicit	implicit
Measurement method	scales	scales	self-presentation paradigm	self-presentation paradigm
Statistical approach	score on scales	score on scales	difference scores	SEM
Performative measure	No	No	Yes	Yes

Note. SDR = Socially Desirable Responding, IM = Impression Management, SEM = Structural Equation Modelling.

Apart from normative clear-sightedness, as depicted in Table 1, social clear-sightedness could seem very similar to the concept of self-monitoring presented earlier (Snyder, 1987). Both are individual difference variables representing a motivated ability to self-present in a socially desirable way according to the situation. However, here are a few aspects on which the two constructs differ. First, self-monitoring does not elicit the distinction between the knowledge of social expectancies and the potential social competence coming from it. In the construct of social clear-sightedness, the knowledge of what is socially desirable is constructed based on the answers participants provide under self-presentational instructions. This knowledge is distinct from its situationally motivated use, i.e., the potential social competence component of social clear-sightedness enabling people to act according to their knowledge. As such, the knowledge component of social clear-sightedness is always present in its construction, whereas the social competence component is a context-dependent potential: if the situation includes sufficient motivational aspects (e.g., evaluative pressure), then the knowledge can turn into a competence which is an appropriate use of the knowledge according to the situational demands. It is important to mention, though, that “thinking is for doing” as stated by Fiske (1992). Consequently, even if the knowledge component of social clear-sightedness and its social competence component are distinct, they go hand in hand, as the knowledge of social expectancies (i.e., thinking) serves the situationally motivated use (i.e., for doing) one does of this knowledge: "People's interpersonal thinking is embedded in a practical context, which implies that it is best understood—and its accuracy best evaluated—by its observable and desired consequences for social behaviour" (Fiske, 1992, p. 878).

However, in the construct of self-monitoring, these two components are not distinguishable; in his book, Snyder stated that “The question really is: Within the general population, do people differ meaningfully in whether they can and do exercise intentional control over their self-presentations, expressive behaviours, and nonverbal displays of

affects?" (1987, p. 12). In this conceptualisation, "can" involves the knowledge component, whereas "do exercise" depicts the competence component (as defined in the present thesis as the situationally motivated use of the knowledge). Consequently, if people have a high score on the self-monitoring scale, it can be inferred that these persons know social expectancies and could potentially have the competence to use this knowledge to modify their behaviours. However, when people are depicted as low self-monitors by the instrument, does it mean that these persons do not know social expectancies, or that they know them but do not want to act according to them? In Snyder's book, low self-monitors are described as having a strong inclination towards authenticity, which could be in favour of an unused knowledge of social expectancies (i.e., *I clearly know what is expected here, but I deliberately choose to stay true to myself*). However, when looking at the items of the self-monitoring measurement instrument (Snyder, 1974), the statements tend to lean more towards a lack of knowledge (e.g., "I find it hard to imitate the behaviour of other people", "I have trouble changing my behaviour to suit different people and different situations"). Thus, social clear-sightedness can be used to overcome the confusion between knowledge and competence in the self-monitoring construct.

A second difference between self-monitoring and social clear-sightedness that is worth mentioning is that self-monitoring is mainly captured through scores on a self-reported scale, whereas social clear-sightedness uses structural equation modelling and the self-presentation paradigm to reach several goals: evaluating participants' knowledge of social desirability through a performative measure, i.e., being able to show the maximum extent of one's knowledge; quantifying the potential situationally motivated use participants made of their knowledge, thus providing information regarding their related social competence. Thus, social clear-sightedness gives a grasp on the knowledge component, but also on its tangible impact on honest responses to a personality self-report. Third and finally, the older concept on which

social clear-sightedness is based, namely normative clear-sightedness, was not found to be related to measures of self-monitoring (e.g., r = 0.03 in a sample of 211 participants in Py & Somat, 1996, as cited in Py & Ginet, 2003). These discrepancies notwithstanding, it is worth mentioning two interesting similarities between the two concepts. On the one hand, people low on social clear-sightedness, similarly to low self-monitors, are more likely to provide genuine answers to personality self-reports and thus to enable these measures to capture what they are supposed to capture instead of socially desirable answers. On the other hand, both variables have a motivational aspect guided by the social contexts they are in: high self-monitors can be motivated to adapt to any given situation in order to look good, and highly socially clear-sighted people can be motivated by situational characteristics to use their knowledge of what is socially desirable. In sum, both constructs are at the cross-roads of personality psychology and social psychology, but with different angles.

Defined as previously, social clear-sightedness could not be more attached to personality psychology. As stated when defining personality psychology, this field analyses different domains: personality traits, motives, abilities, and narrative identity (Roberts & Yoon, 2022). Social clear-sightedness can be analysed from at least three of these angles. First, as an individual difference variable, it can be viewed as a personality trait on which people can be placed on a continuum ranging from high to low. As any other dispositional trait, social clear-sightedness is a long-term characteristic depicting patterns of thoughts and actions (McCrae & Costa, 2003; Revelle, 2007): more socially clear-sighted people would tend to adapt their behaviours and actions to specific situations, even maybe with a thinking process behind it, whereas less socially clear-sighted people would not know how to adapt their actions to the context at hand. But social clear-sightedness could also be scrutinised through a motivational angle: this general knowledge allows for a motivational use of SDR according to the context. In other words, depending on the situation they are in, people could

be motivated to answer in a socially desirable way to be appreciated, and would thus use their social clear-sightedness. Of course, individual differences in this motivation to produce SDR exist: as studied through the concept of self-monitoring, some people are more prone to wanting to adapt and be liked, whereas others are more likely to seek how to be themselves in all circumstances (Snyder, 1987). However, even when motivated to produce SDR, people might not be able to do it, which leads to the third angle of analysis: skills and abilities. More precisely, social skills are defined as capacities that "a person is capable of doing when the situation calls for it" (Roberts & Yoon, 2022, p. 493). Thus, social clear-sightedness can be considered as a social skill some people have, like a tool they can use when faced with a situation that motivates them to use it. In sum, in contexts with more evaluative pressure, people that are socially clear-sighted (i.e., personality trait) could want to be liked (i.e., motivational aspect) and could thus try to use their knowledge to produce SDR (i.e., if they have the ability to do it). These considerations can be linked to theoretical aspects proposed by Funder (1991): he stated that personality traits influence the perception of situations through different mechanisms, which can be motivational, related to capacities and tendencies, and related to learning. Thus, when considering social clear-sightedness as a personality trait, the motivational and ability-related aspects developed before can indeed have an influence on how the situation is perceived, as more or less evaluative, for example. Consequently, social clear-sightedness seems like a promising concept that can be studied at different level and through different angles to help the understanding of personality.

But social clear-sightedness is also heavily anchored in the person-situation debate tracks and lessons. As the "social" aspect of its denomination points out, social clear-sightedness in linked to social situations: socially clear-sighted people know which personality dimensions they should present themselves with to be liked, and these relevant personality dimensions can be different from situations to situations, thus leading clear-

sighted people to self-present in different ways according to these situations. As reviewed earlier, personality was found to display great within-person variability between situations (e.g., Fleeson, 2001). Social clear-sightedness would be thus partly explaining this variation by self-presentational strategies mobilised to answer to situational characteristics. Hence, the kind of situation as well as the stakes at hand in it are all characteristics that are influencing how and how strongly socially clear-sighted people are going to use their dispositional knowledge of what is socially desirable. Moreover, the whole person-situation-behaviour triad is playing in this new concept: the person aspect is entailed in the dispositional part on which people can be more or less clear-sighted; the situation aspect has just been described, i.e., the variation in the mobilisation of this dispositional knowledge according to the context; and the behaviour aspect is represented by the potential boosting of some types of items under honest instruction, which is a faking behaviour that the study of social clear-sightedness allow to spot and to link with the general knowledge of what is socially desirable.

Thus, the link with SDR (see Table 1), faking and self-presentation is also quite straightforward, as social clear-sightedness represents a knowledge of social desirability—and potentially, of how to produce SDR—which can be mobilised to fake on personality measures to achieve self-presentational goals depending on the situational affordances. An obvious comparison can be done with the dynamic model of faking presented earlier (Roulin et al., 2016; Roulin & Krings, 2020). Although this model was specifically focusing on organizational contexts with job applicants, the conception of faking it depicts entails similar conceptual features to those of social clear-sightedness. On one hand, both conceptualisations describe an adaptative and strategic faking produced to fit what is socially desirable in the situation at hand (i.e., the organization criteria for the dynamic model, any contextual affordance for social clear-sightedness). On the other hand, the person-situation components that social clear-sightedness proposes to encompass were already mentioned in the dynamic

model of faking, where individual differences in the ability and motivation to fake were crossed with contextual characteristics embodied by the organizational culture and the faking opportunities. Concretely, the dynamic model of faking was studied in relation to competitiveness and innovativeness of organizational cultures, but "other dimensions may trigger a specific, yet different, pattern of faking" (Roulin & Krings, 2020, p. 143), which is exactly what is expected with social clear-sightedness: situational affordances would trigger socially clear-sighted people to use their knowledge in a way specific to each situation, and thus to produce a "pattern of faking" directly related to the context at hand. On a more methodological side, the two conceptions differ in that the dynamic model of faking, to this date, is not modelled through structural equation modelling, but with ANOVAs and correlations.

Hints of the existence of social clear-sightedness were also already found in a line of research mainly related to achievement goals but also to personality and leading to the present thesis (Butera et al., 2024). First, observing that some students, even when reporting a high desire to learn—i.e., high mastery goals—, were not succeeding in their exams, Dompnier and colleagues (2009) hypothesised that displaying a high desire to learn through self-report would be related to actual achievement in exams only if students were reporting a desire to learn because they consider it as useful, but not if they were reporting it because it makes them look good and be liked by teachers, i.e., for self-presentational purposes. Using real social psychology class grades of university students and a self-presentation paradigm where students were asked to report their learning goals first honestly, then to be liked by teachers and to succeed at school (the order of presentation of these last two conditions being counterbalanced across students), the authors confirmed their hypotheses, thus showing that self-reports (here of learning goals) could be used to appear as socially desirable, and not only to genuinely report one's level on the construct being assessed. Consequently, this study

revealed that students knew what would be important to report, through the self-report, if they wanted to be liked by teachers. They consequently "faked" their answers to present themselves as socially desirable in the situation at hand, i.e., at school with teachers, thus reducing the predictive link between their self-reported mastery goals and their grades. These findings were later replicated with high-school students and by using actual reading comprehension competences instead of grades (Smeding et al., 2015). Using exactly the same methodological paradigm but with performance-approach goals (i.e., desire to outperform others) instead of mastery goals, Dompnier and colleagues (2013) obtained the same results, thus confirming them as well as extending them to a neighbouring construct.

Second, extending this line of research one step further, Smeding and colleagues conducted two studies to test "the moderating role of individual differences in perceived social desirability of the Openness to Experience dimension for test-retest reliability and predictive validity of a typical Openness measure" (Smeding et al., 2017, p. 155). More specifically, again using the self-presentation paradigm, but this time with a personality construct, the authors found that the less desirable a university student considered Openness to Experience (i.e., as indicated by the level of Openness reported under instructions to fake good), the less deleterious the impact on the test-retest reliability of this personality dimension (i.e., Openness self-reports under honest instructions once month apart), but only when anonymity was overtly guaranteed (vs. when students were told that their answers were not anonymous, i.e., visibility condition), and the less deleterious the impact on the predictive validity of a cultural knowledge test (i.e., a behavioural, performance-based criteria). Altogether, Smeding and colleagues' findings indicate that the knowledge of what is socially desirable could be an individual difference variable, as some students reported high levels of Openness when asked to fake good, whereas others did not. Additionally, these results demonstrated the potential concrete impact—here, a moderating role—of this knowledge on

the test-retest reliability and predictive validity of a self-reported personality measure. It also pointed out to the potential importance of situational features (i.e., anonymity vs. visibility of the self-reported answers) in this process. Consequently, honest answers to self-reports of personality when anonymity is guaranteed could be measuring what they are supposed to measure only when people do not know how socially desirable personality dimensions are in the context at hand. If they know the contextual social desirability of these dimensions, their answers, even under honest instructions, cannot be taken as genuine measures of personality, as they are potentially also measuring how socially desirable one perceived these dimensions.

Third and finally, the last step of this research line to date was recently provided by Smeding and colleagues (2022). These authors replicated the methodology of the previous studies but added a multilevel aspect to investigate mastery goals among primary school students, and provide more insight regarding the importance of the context. More specifically, their results revealed that the moderation produced by social desirability on the link between self-reported mastery goals and a performance (here, number of errors in a French dictation) was mainly accounted for at the class level. In other words, some primary school students showed that they were able to identify what was socially desirable in the specific context of their class, and to fake reporting these socially desirable attributes to serve self-presentation purposes, i.e., being appreciated by their teacher. As in the primary schools studied, each class was fairly stable through the year in its composition, and more importantly, had one main referent teacher, these results meant that the contextual features, mostly produced by the teacher, played a quite important role in what students hold as important to display to be liked. By doing so, they were adjusting to a specific normative context, i.e., the class and its teacher, showing the context-dependent aspect of social desirability. Implications of such findings are important for school achievement: endorsing mastery goals can be beneficial for school performance, but only if students perceive low class-level of mastery goals social

desirability. If the perceived class-level of social desirability is high, the reported level of mastery goals may not indicate true endorsement, but rather an understanding of the normative class-climate.

As stated earlier, the present thesis follows directly on from this line of research. The goal is here to demonstrate that the level of perceived social desirability of some constructs reported by participants is in fact the result of a dispositional knowledge of social desirability: social clear-sightedness. Socially clear-sighted people can identify what is socially desirable thanks to their knowledge, and then potentially use this knowledge to actually fake their self-reported answers in a self-presentational purpose. Importantly, this knowledge encompasses a situational aspect, as clear-sighted people are supposed to identify the constructs specifically desirable in the context they are in, and thus fake according to the situational features. In summary, social clear-sightedness is a supra-ordinate latent psychological construct which represents a dispositional general knowledge of what is socially desirable in a given social context. In the case of the research lines presented in this thesis, the focus is particularly on studying social clear-sightedness and its impact on self-reported personality questionnaire when varying the context of answer and the evaluative pressure at hand. Which are the personality dimensions identified as socially desirable in which contexts? Do clear-sighted people already display these dimensions under honest instructions? This research thus not only investigates the existence of social clear-sightedness, but also the behavioural impact it could have. In brief, the aim is to show that people not only know well what they should put forward in specific situations, but also that they potentially do use this knowledge to actually modify their answer even when they are asked to be honest.

2 EMPIRICAL PART

In total, the empirical part of this thesis presents nine studies encompassing 2,205 participants. These studies share common ground in their use of the Big Five personality inventory and self-presentation. This empirical part is divided into three research lines:

The first research line (two studies) is the beating heart of the present thesis: defining and testing the construct of social clear-sightedness through structural equation modelling. This part aims to empirically demonstrate the dispositional variable of social clear-sightedness and its features, such as the context-dependent use of SDR, as well as the impact of situational characteristics like evaluative pressure.

The second research line (three studies) focuses on how individuals perceive the personality dimensions of the Big Five as more or less socially desirable depending on the context. In other words, this second part examines the trade-offs people make when rank-ordering the five personality dimensions to be liked in specific situations. Rather than concentrating on individual differences, this research line emphasizes general tendencies in the perceived importance in social desirability of each personality dimension. This step is essential for later formulating grounded hypotheses about social clear-sightedness and its consequences on self-reported personality questionnaires. It allows the testing of postulates regarding the perceived ranked importance of the social desirability of personality dimensions: whereas some traits might be considered necessary to possess (or claim to possess), others may only be seen as "luxurious" (see section 2.3 for an explanation of this term) to be appreciated depending on the social situation at hand.

The third and final research line of this thesis (four studies) is the convergence of the previous two paths. It first aims to confirm the social clear-sightedness model as presented in the first research line. Second, it seeks to study meta-analytically the contextual variations in

the use of social clear-sightedness according to the situational characteristics identified in the second research line.

2.1 Some Considerations about Structural Equation Modelling and Meta-Analyses

> While we focus on whether we can trust *p*-values, we should also be teaching, using, and advocating the new tools that allow us to meet belatedly the original thrust of social psychology. To name a few such methods, structural equation modelling, moderator and mediator analyses, meta-analysis, and especially multilevel analyses. (Pettigrew, 2018, p. 965)

Through these words, Pettigrew (2018) emphasized the necessity of using new statistical tools to accompany the 'emergence of contextual social psychology'. As already stated on numerous occasions, contextual or situational aspects are highly influential in social psychology and consequently significant in the present thesis. In order to take this situational influence fully into account, structural equation modelling (SEM), meta-analyses, and moderator analyses will be used in the first and the third research lines, which are presented next. To wholly understand the relevance of these methods for the present thesis, some of their specific characteristics will be reviewed in this section.

SEM allows to test multivariate hypotheses about the relationships between variables (Hoyle, 2007). It distinguishes between observed variables, also known as indicators, and latent variables, or factors, which are not directly observable but are 'indicated' by the observable variables (Kline, 2015). In the present dissertation, social clear-sightedness is considered a latent factor, constructed from measures of personality under social desirability instructions, i.e., observed variables. Thus, the relationships—and variations of those relationships—between social clear-sightedness as a latent factor and multiple observed

variables (such as, in this thesis, personality dimensions and a social desirability scale as indicators) are examined. Unlike latent variables, these indicators are directly measured, and their loadings—i.e., the parameters representing the regression of each indicator on the latent variable—indicate how strongly they are predicted by the latent factor, thereby suggesting its existence and structure (Hoyle, 2007). Generally, a minimum of three to five indicators is necessary for a latent construct to be assessed using SEM (Hoyle, 2007; Kline, 2015).

One of the initial steps in SEM is to specify a model for hypothesis testing, a step that is essential since, as Kline stated, "the quality of the outputs of SEM depend on the validity of the researcher's ideas" (2015, p. 10). This model specification should be strongly rooted in theoretical foundations and previous empirical findings. In this step, when using confirmatory factor analysis (CFA), the researcher has to specify the exact number of latent factors included in the model and clarify how these factors relate to, and thus causes, the indicators (Kline, 2015). The latent variable is expected to generate observable associations between the indicators, resulting in common variance among them caused by the latent variable (Kline, 2015). However, the indicators are also expected to have their own uniquenesses, that is, a proportion of variance that does not come from the latent factor (Hoyle, 2007). A subsequent step involves estimating the model fit, that is, assessing how well the model constructed with SEM explains the data collected and is thus a valid representation of the observed relationships (Hoyle, 2007; Kline, 2015). If the model fit is satisfactory, the parameter estimates obtained with it can be interpreted to check the hypotheses. However, as stated by Kline, "SEM is more useful for rejecting a false model than for somehow 'confirming' whether a given model is actually true, especially without replication" (2015, p. 465). Therefore, to add weight to the validity of a model, an important step in SEM involves replicating results across various studies, samples, and contexts. This replication is also essential to preclude a model from being overly specific to only one data set (Hoyle, 2007).

An important and useful features of SEM is measurement invariance, which addresses "whether a set of indicators measures the same constructs with equal precision over different samples" (Kline, 2015, p. 394), or in other words, assesses the degree of invariance of a model over groups, situations, and time (Hoyle, 2007). The absence of measurement invariance thus suggests that findings drawn from the model may have been influenced by factors such as time, situations, or group membership (Kline, 2015). To evaluate this invariance, constraints can be placed on specific parameters within the model. These parameters can be free (indicating they can differ in each sample), fixed (set to equal a constant), or constrained (set to be equal across samples) (Kline, 2015). In the absence of any constraints, i.e., when all parameters are free, the model is independently tested in each sample, referred to as "configural invariance" (Kline, 2015). Conversely, when constraints are specified, 'cross-group equality constraints' force the model to maintain equal estimates for certain parameters across studies, allowing the model's fit to reveal whether this equality is supported by the data (Kline, 2015). Generally, the more constraints are applied to a model, the simpler it becomes. Therefore, models displaying the greatest invariance, if they fit the data well, are the ones typically retained in SEM (Kline, 2015).

Apart from SEM, other advanced statistical techniques are increasingly seen as essential to enhance the accuracy of findings in various fields. As noted by Roberts and colleagues, "the preponderance of underpowered studies in personality psychology alone is sufficient justification for combining the results from several commensurable studies with meta-analytic methods" (2007, p. 653). Therefore, the use of meta-analysis is more than desirable in social and personality psychology. This need has led to the development of methods combining meta-analysis and SEM, one of which is particularly suitable for the present thesis: parameter-based meta-analytic structural equation modelling (MASEM; Cheung & Cheung, 2016; Jak & Cheung, 2020). MASEM allows to measure how some

parameter estimates vary across studies, identifying study-specific effects and characteristics at play that predict these variations (Cheung & Cheung, 2016). More precisely, it measures the study-level heterogeneity—i.e., between-study variance—of the parameter estimates across studies, such as "how consistently an item or a subscale is a strong indicator of a factor in a factor model" (Cheung & Cheung, 2016, p. 145). In the context of social clear-sightedness, the goal is to determine how personality dimensions remain strong indicators of social clear-sightedness across different studies featuring varying contexts. Concretely, with MASEM, a structural model is first fitted in each study, and second the parameter estimates are meta-analytically combined as effect sizes (Jak & Cheung, 2020).

In this approach, it is first assumed that the model built with SEM remains valid across all studies (i.e., the model adequately fits the data in all studies), but that some parameter estimates and their sampling variances (e.g., factor loadings and their standard errors) may, on their side, vary across studies (Cheung & Cheung, 2016). Second, to account for the variation found, specific characteristics of the studies can be included as moderator variables on which model parameters are regressed (Jak & Cheung, 2020), thus integrating another method advocated by Pettigrew (2018). This approach consequently incorporates random-effects, as parameters are allowed to vary from study to study to form a 'super distribution' of effect sizes (i.e., each study may display its own effect size), and the inclusion of moderators elevates it to the status of mixed-effects multivariate meta-analysis (Cheung & Cheung, 2016; Jak & Cheung, 2020). In this approach, the parameter estimates are thus considered as the variables, whereas the studies are viewed as the subjects (Jak & Cheung, 2020), offering insights into how and in which circumstances each variable characterises the subjects.

To sum up, as rightly written by Kline, "the technique of SEM is about testing theories, not just models" (2015, p. 466). In the present thesis, this technique will be used to

specify a model, which is only a mean to test a broader theory regarding the existence of social clear-sightedness. In a complementary way, MASEM is a powerful and innovative method, the advantages of which are well-described by Jak and Cheung: “MASEM is a multivariate technique that evaluates complete theoretical models, accounts for sampling covariance between effect sizes, provides the researcher measures of overall fit of a hypothesized model, and provides parameter estimates from SEMs with confidence intervals and standard errors” (2020, p. 431). MASEM will thus allow to further evaluate the theoretical model of social clear-sightedness, as well as extend the understanding of its application and influence in different studies, that is, different contexts. Both these methods, along with moderator analysis embedded in the meta-analytical part, will constitute the backbone of the first and third research lines of this thesis.

2.2 Social Clear-Sightedness: A New Theoretical and Methodological Approach to Study Socially Desirable Responding in Personality Measurement[8]

2.2.1 Abstract

Socially desirable responding (SDR) is assumed to affect the validity of self-reported measures, especially in highly evaluative contexts. Notwithstanding the wealth of research devoted to this phenomenon, its operationalization is still under debate. We propose a novel theoretical and methodological approach that considers SDR as the consequence of a latent psychological construct—*social clear-sightedness*—that corresponds to individuals' ability to identify social expectations in a social context. Within this framework, SDR is conceptualized as the context-dependent manifestation of the latent psychological construct of social clear-sightedness. This novel approach led to the development of a new model, which allowed making specific predictions that were empirically tested in two original experimental studies through a structural modelling approach on Swiss university students. In Study 1 (N = 317), the theoretical model of social clear-sightedness is tested using structural equation analyses, and good fit of the model allows us to further investigate the construct. In Study 2 (N = 348), the context-dependent aspect of social clear-sightedness is tested by empirically manipulating the evaluative situation. Results indicate that SDR is indeed a context-dependent phenomenon, whose probability of occurrence increases in higher stakes situations, but conditionally to individuals' dispositional level of social clear-sightedness. This research thus

[8] Rudmann, O., Meier, E., Smeding, A., Butera, F., and Dompnier B. (submitted). Social clear-sightedness: A new theoretical and methodological approach to study socially desirable responding in personality measurement. Instructions and material of the studies are presented in section 5.1 of the Appendices.

extends existing work on SDR and goes one step further by proposing a new theoretical approach to understand it, as well as a new method to measure its potential impact without relying on self-reports. A new practical usefulness of social desirability scales is discussed.

Keywords: evaluative pressure, personality measurement, social clear-sightedness, socially desirable responding, structural equation modelling

Social Clear-sightedness: A New Theoretical and Methodological Approach to Study Socially Desirable Responding in Personality Measurement

Introspection-based, self-reported data probably reflect the most commonly used method in psychological assessment. Self-report data are widely used across many fields of research to obtain information on demographic variables, personality traits, values, beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors (Chan, 2009; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2007; Sassenberg & Ditrich, 2019; Schwarz, 1999). By the 1990s, the use of measures based on self-reports such as personality inventories has also gained popularity to explain such phenomena as academic success (Mammadov, 2022; Poropat, 2009; Ziegler et al., 2010) and organizational behavior (He et al., 2019; Kiefer & Benit, 2016; Morgeson et al., 2007; Rothstein & Goffin, 2006). Despite the now widespread use of a wide array of personality inventories based on self-reported data (Kiefer & Benit, 2016; Morgeson et al., 2007; Poropat, 2009; Rothstein & Goffin, 2006; Ziegler et al., 2010), scepticism subsists in the field concerning their actual link with relevant behavior (Baumeister et al., 2007) and more generally their validity (Burns & Christiansen, 2006).

Response biases such as consistency seeking, acquiescence, central tendencies, extreme responding, self-enhancement, random responding, socially desirable responding (SDR) or faking are sources of systematic measurement errors, unique to self-report measures, that often raise concern regarding these measures' validity (Chan, 2009; Helmes et al., 2015; Kreitchmann et al., 2019; Paulhus, 1991; Paunonen & LeBel, 2012; Ziegler & Buehner, 2009). Among these systematic measurement-related threats, SDR— defined as the "tendency for an individual to present him or herself, in test-taking situations, in a way that makes the person look positive with regard to culturally derived norms and standards" (Ganster et al., 1983, p. 322)—is a recurrent problem that has not received a definitive

solution yet (Burns & Christiansen, 2011; Campbell, 1960; Griffith & Peterson, 2006; Holden & Passey, 2010; Kiefer & Benit, 2016; Meehl & Hathaway, 1946).

The aim of this paper is to propose a new approach to SDR that is both theoretical and methodological. From a theoretical point of view, SDR is defined as the contextually motivated manifestation of a general latent psychological factor—*social clear-sightedness*—that can impact individuals' answers to personality inventories, especially in highly evaluative test-taking situations (e.g., recruitment, asymmetrical power situations). Moreover, from a methodological point of view, such a conceptualization allows to propose an operational model that predicts variabilities of SDR that could be detected through cross-situational variations of the links between social clear-sightedness and spontaneous self-descriptions. As illustrated in Figure 1, social clear-sightedness represents a latent psychological construct, which indicates the level of knowledge of socially desirable responses for a given construct (solid arrows). Depending on this level of knowledge for a given construct, context-dependent variability in responses can be observed, with high-stakes situations particularly likely to trigger the motivation to use this knowledge if it is available (dotted arrows) in order to achieve strategic self-presentation goals. The proposed approach aims at contributing to the ongoing debates about SDR by integrating, in a single theoretical conceptualization, SDR's contextual and dispositional components.

Figure 1

Social clear-sightedness and its impact on knowledge of social desirability and self-descriptions



Note. Solid arrows represent stable cross-situational relationships whereas dotted arrows represent variable cross-situational relationships. Cross-situational relationships between social clear-sightedness and self-descriptions could vary as a function of the evaluative pressure, so that these relationship in highly evaluative contexts should be higher on the same construct compared to less evaluative ones.

2.2.2 Socially Desirable Responding: An Old Question Without a Definitive Answer

The puzzle of response bias in self-report measures (e.g., Paulhus & Vazire, 2007) appears to be almost as old as the field of psychological measurement itself (e.g., Campbell, 1960; Cronbach, 1946; Humm & Humm, 1944; Kelly et al., 1936; Meehl & Hathaway, 1946). Among the various methodological biases that can alter the validity of psychological measurement (see Podsakoff et al., 2003), SDR is considered as one of the main objections against the use of self-reports (Chan, 2009; Paulhus & Vazire, 2007) and has generated a tremendous amount of research since the middle of the last century (see, for reviews, Ones & Viswesvaran, 1998; Paulhus, 2002; Uziel, 2010). However, despite the impressive number of studies conducted on SDR, its operationalization, as well as its potential consequences on construct validity, are still under debate, especially in personality psychology (Griffith & Peterson, 2011; Lanz et al., 2022; Paunonen & LeBel, 2012; Uziel, 2010).

2.2.3 Dimensions of Socially Desirable Responding

Even if early works defined SDR as a unidimensional concept (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960; Edwards, 1957), such a conceptualization has been challenged by more recent research. For instance, Paulhus (1991) suggested a two-factor model of SDR that distinguishes self-deception (unconscious and self-directed) from impression management (conscious and other-directed). Over the years, the latter has often been considered as a tendency to display faking behavior, a response set "aimed at providing a portrayal of the self that helps a person to achieve personal goals", activated by the interaction between individual characteristics and situational demands (Ziegler et al., 2011, p. 8). In other words, contextual demand differs across situations (e.g., importance of the outcome) and interacts with individual characteristics (e.g., personality) resulting in lower scale validity through irrelevant variance due to faking (Ziegler et al., 2011).

Indeed, beyond individual characteristics that predispose an individual to adopt self-presentation strategies to a higher or lower degree, asking people to describe themselves—as in personality inventories—may be perceived as an invitation to provide socially desirable self-descriptions, which should vary depending on the situation's stakes (Dilchert et al., 2006; Rees & Metcalfe, 2003; Tett et al., 2006; Tett & Simonet, 2011). Therefore, information obtained with self-report methodologies, particularly in evaluative contexts that involve power asymmetry between respondents and evaluators (e.g., job applicants and recruiters, employees and employers, students and teachers), could be affected by "systematic sources of variation other than the attribute of interest" (Ziegler et al., 2011, p. 7).

2.2.4 Most Prominent Methodological Approaches to Detect Socially Desirable Responding

Many different methodologies have been developed over the years to investigate SDR and its potential impact on the validity of self-reported measures (Burns & Christiansen, 2011; Chan, 2009; P. Lee et al., 2017; McLarnon et al., 2019; Vésteinsdóttir et al., 2022; Ziegler et al., 2015). One of the most prominent methodological approaches (at least from a historical point of view) is the use of social desirability scales (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960; Edwards, 1957; Stöber, 2001). Such scales were developed to measure individuals' tendency to provide a desirable self-description and to screen individuals who are more prone to do so. Despite their widespread use, these methodological tools have a "long but rather unproductive history" (Griffith & Peterson, 2008, p. 308). Beyond the fact that they are susceptible to strategic responding too (Griffith & Peterson, 2008; Pauls & Crost, 2004; Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999), controlling for the covariances between social desirability scales and personality measures has not been shown to increase the criterion-related validity of the latter (Christiansen et al., 1994; Hough, 1998; Kurtz et al., 2008; Ones et al., 1996).

Moreover, there is evidence that such scales also capture true variance on personality dimensions. Indeed, the meta-analysis of Ones et al. (1996) highlighted that social desirability scales correlate with Emotional stability and Conscientiousness. Consistent with these findings, Smith and Ellingson (2002)'s study, which compared groups that vary in their motivation to fake (job applicants versus students), indicated that social desirability scales measure important individual differences in subscales of Conscientiousness and Agreeability. As Goffin and Christiansen (2003, p. 340) pointed out, "it is difficult to know whether applicants with high scores on social desirability scales have engaged in distortion or whether they legitimately have favourable trait elevations".

Beyond social desirability scales, another widely used methodology to investigate SDR consists in explicitly asking individuals to distort their self-descriptions to reach some specific self-presentation goals (e.g., Paulhus et al., 1995). This methodology, sometimes labelled the self-presentation paradigm (Gilibert & Cambon, 2003) or the induced faking paradigm (Birkeland et al., 2006), has been employed so far to assess the degree to which individuals are able to alter their answers when instructed to do so. In such paradigms, using a within- or between-participants design, respondents are traditionally invited to answer a given scale—for instance a personality inventory—under a "respond honestly" and a "motivated" condition such as fake good (e.g., answer in such a way as to increase chances of being hired) or fake bad (e.g., answer in such a way as to diminish chances of being hired) instructions (McFarland & Ryan, 2000; Paulhus et al., 1995). Based on a comparison between mean scores obtained under honest and faking instructions, results consistently highlighted that respondents were able to alter their responses when instructed to do so (for a meta-analysis, see Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999).

Even if this methodology is informative regarding individuals' ability to modify their responses in order to convey a specific self-image (Jellison & Green, 1981; D. B. Smith &

Ellingson, 2002), it provides no insight on its actual impact on scores obtained under honest instructions and by extension on the validity of self-reported answers in real testing settings (Ziegler et al., 2011). In other words, the fact that people can alter their answers in the direction valued by social norms and standards when instructed to do so does not provide information about the degree to which they actually alter their genuine answers in real testing settings (Chan, 2009; D. B. Smith & Robie, 2004). To partly address this issue, other studies have investigated mean scores differences on personality measures in real-life job interviews by comparing applicants and job incumbents, for whom the motivation to fake is assumed to vary naturally (Birkeland et al., 2006). Despite smaller effect sizes compared to induced faking studies, results highlighted that job applicants score higher than job incumbents on the same measures, suggesting that SDR occurs in real testing settings. However, the correlational nature of these studies prevents from drawing any definite conclusion about the role played by SDR in real-life highly evaluative contexts.

Taken together, these studies reveal that no clear conclusion can currently be drawn regarding the role played by SDR on the validity of self-reported measures. Indeed, whereas some authors consider this phenomenon as a methodological myth without reality (Chan, 2009; J. Hogan et al., 2007; Paunonen & LeBel, 2012), others consider that SDR occurs depending on assessment situations (Birkeland et al., 2006; Donovan et al., 2003). In this paper, given previous evidence suggesting that SDR may occur and depend on contextual variations, we concur with the latter position. We propose a new framework that originates in recent work investigating SDR through the use of the self-presentation paradigm, which addresses limitations identified in previous research.

2.2.5 Socially Desirable Responding as a Form of Social Communication

In recent years, research has investigated the conscious and other-directed component of SDR by measuring the extent to which individuals are able to alter their self-descriptions

on demand and how this ability alters the validity of attitudinal and motivational measures (Dompnier et al., 2009, 2013; Smeding et al., 2015, 2017, 2022). According to this perspective on self-report measurement, the ability to modify self-descriptions on demand reflects the level of knowledge of what is socially desirable or undesirable in a specific social context. This knowledge of social desirability is conceptualized as an individual difference variable that can be assessed through individuals' answers to self-report measures under self-presentation instructions: The higher their score on a given construct when asked to respond to be appreciated by a specific target in a specific context, the more individuals know that this construct is socially desirable. Moreover, according to the socioanalytic view of SDR (Johnson & Hogan, 2006), answering a questionnaire is a form of social interaction in which respondents portray themselves. In order to convey the requested self-presentation (i.e., answers under specific self-presentation instructions), individuals need to have some knowledge of what is desirable in a given situation (Johnson & Hogan, 2006; Malham & Saucier, 2016). This principle relies on the idea that, just like actors, individuals need to know how to fake (e.g., mimic) when addressing a given audience in a given context (Goffman, 1956). In other words, some individuals have a clearer knowledge than others of the social desirability attached to a psychological construct in a given social context.

The above considerations led us to adopt a different perspective on the meaning and interpretation of individual answers on self-reported measures. Indeed, considering knowledge of social desirability as an individual difference variable allows to differentiate individuals who can alter their answers to be appreciated by a given target (high level of knowledge of social desirability) from those who cannot, or can to a lesser extent (low knowledge of social desirability). Consequently, the level of validity of individuals' self-reported descriptions—assessed under honest or no specific instructions—is assumed to depend on conditional values of their knowledge of social desirability. The rationale behind

this perspective is that knowing what is socially desirable in a given social context would potentially change the very meaning of individuals' answers to the measurement tool (Dompnier et al., 2013). In other words, although knowledge about social desirability could be considered as a social competence to identify relevant criteria in a given situation (Johnson & Hogan, 2006), the higher the knowledge of social desirability, the more answers assessed under honest instructions are likely to be contaminated by SDR, thus affecting the construct validity of self-report measures. Conversely, the lower the individuals' knowledge of social desirability, the less likely they are to alter their answers to convey a positive image of themselves and the higher the measures' construct validity (given high correspondence between genuine self-perceptions and self-descriptions). A same observed score on a given self-report scale could therefore have a different meaning depending on whether the individual has high or low knowledge of the targeted construct's social desirability.

Such a change in the meaning of individuals' self-reported answers is illustrated empirically by the fact that knowledge of social desirability was identified as a robust moderator of the construct validity of several psychological constructs. For instance, in the educational domain, research showed that the more students perceived achievement goals (Elliot, 2005) as socially desirable, the weaker the link between their reported level of achievement goal endorsement and a relevant behavioral criteria (i.e., academic achievement; Dompnier et al., 2009, 2013; Smeding et al., 2015, 2022). In the same vein, it was observed in the domain of personality assessment (Smeding et al., 2017) that the more students perceived Openness to Experience—one of the Big Five personality dimensions (McCrae & John, 1992)—as socially desirable, the lower the test-retest reliability (Study 1) and the predictive validity (Study 2) of their self-descriptions obtained under honest instructions. Altogether, these studies revealed that assessing individuals' knowledge of social desirability enables to quantify the extent to which individuals are likely to adapt their answers to be socially

desirable, and to identify individuals who report more genuine self-descriptions, less contaminated by social desirability concerns.

Yet, even if individual differences in knowledge of social desirability, when serving as moderators, improve measures' validity, little is known about when (in which situations) and how it compromises self-descriptions' validity. To answer these questions, we developed a theoretical model that assumes the existence of a latent psychological construct underlying the SDR phenomenon: Social clear-sightedness. In the following section, we present this model, which integrates both dispositional and situational determinants of SDR within the same theoretical framework.

2.2.6 Social Clear-Sightedness: A New Psychological Construct in SDR Research

Assuming that SDR is the consequence of a latent psychological construct is a core assumption in research devoted to this phenomenon. For instance, social desirability scales (e.g., Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) or impression management scales (e.g., Paulhus, 1991) were used over the years to capture such a construct, mainly to control for its impact on the validity of other self-reported personality measures (Podsakoff et al., 2003). This assumption is also present in other research domains investigating self-presentation strategies. For instance, Malham and Saucier (2016, p. 476) indicated that SDR could be, in part, linked to the concept of cultural normativity insofar that it could represent "knowledge of groups norms and even congruence with these norms". It follows that people could be differentiated on their knowledge of norms in a given culture. Similarly, other research on social judgment norms (Dubois, 2003) showed that people could be differentiated on their knowledge of the normativity of judgments and attitudes. Labelled normative clear-sightedness (Py & Ginet, 2003; Somat & Vazel, 1999), this individual difference variable enables to identify individuals who know how to appear as normative in a given social context and those who do not. Assessed through variations of answers provided by the same individuals under

normative (e.g., to appear as a good person) and counter-normative (e.g., to appear as a bad person) self-presentation instructions (Gilibert & Cambon, 2003), normative clear-sightedness was shown to predict self-descriptions on normativity measures: The more clearsighted the individuals, the higher their spontaneous adherence to normative beliefs (e.g., Dompnier et al., 2006).

In the present research, we build on these conceptualizations and adopt the assumption that SDR is the consequence of a latent psychological construct. However, rather than defining SDR as a general tendency to alter self-reported answers toward socially desirable positions, we conceptualize it as the manifestation of a situationally motivated use of a general knowledge about social desirability. This general knowledge, that we label social clear-sightedness, corresponds to the individuals' ability to identify social expectations in a specific social context. Figure 1 presents the theoretical model underlying this reasoning. The proposed model assumes that social clear-sightedness is a causal antecedent of the knowledge of socially desirable attributes related to a particular psychological construct. This knowledge of desirable attributes related to different constructs can be gauged by individuals' answers provided under social desirability instructions (i.e., solid arrows in Figure 1). In other words, social clear-sightedness, as a general dispositional knowledge, encompasses a high number of constructs and can be mobilized by individuals to provide socially desirable answers to various measurement tools. As a matter of fact, social clear-sightedness would be superordinate to many lower-order knowledge on specific constructs' social desirability.

The theoretical model also has several implications on how SDR would be detected in individuals' self-descriptions assessed via their answers provided under honest instructions. As stated above, the model assumes that SDR is the manifestation of a situationally motivated use of social clear-sightedness, as illustrated by the links connecting the latent psychological construct to self-descriptions (i.e., dotted arrows in Figure 1). Furthermore, since past

research showed that the occurrence of SDR increases with situational evaluative pressure (Booth-Kewley et al., 1992; Ellingson et al., 2007; Hu & Connelly, 2021; Novo et al., 2022; Paulhus, 1991), the model hypothesizes that social clear-sightedness could influence self-descriptions and distort them towards socially desirable positions, especially in highly evaluative contexts. Such context-dependent influence would impact self-descriptions' validity as a function of the level of evaluative pressure: Whereas individuals would be less motivated to use their general knowledge of social desirability to provide positive self-descriptions in low evaluative contexts (e.g., online anonymous surveys), they would be more tempted to mobilize it in highly evaluative situations (e.g., job interviews, face-to-face hierarchical interactions). In other words, the model predicts situational variabilities of SDR that could be detected through cross-situational variations of the links between social clear-sightedness and self-descriptions.

To sum up, the proposed model integrates both a dispositional component—social clear-sightedness—that corresponds to a stable general knowledge of social desirability, and a motivational component—evaluative pressure—that corresponds to a situationally induced incentive to use social clear-sightedness in order to communicate a socially desirable self-description to a given audience.

2.2.7 Hypotheses and Overview

The proposed model relies on several assumptions and allows making hypotheses that will be empirically tested. First, it assumes that social clear-sightedness is a causal antecedent of specific knowledge of social desirability associated with different psychological constructs. Thus, we hypothesize that a unique latent factor should strongly predict individuals' answers to different measurement tools obtained under social desirability instructions (H1). Second, since the model assumes that social clear-sightedness reflects a general knowledge of social desirability, we hypothesize that social clear-sightedness should predict individuals' answers

to measurement tools assumed to capture socially desirable responding, such as social desirability scales (H2). Third, the model assumes that social clear-sightedness is mobilized when individuals resort to socially desirable self-presentation strategies. We then hypothesize that social clear-sightedness should predict self-descriptions under honest instructions, indicating that spontaneous socially desirable responding contaminated these measures (H3). Fourth, due to the dispositional nature of social clear-sightedness, the model assumes stable cross-situational relationships between this higher order construct and lower order knowledge of social desirability. Consequently, we hypothesize that the relationships between social clear-sightedness and answers under social desirability instructions should be invariant across contexts that vary in terms of evaluative pressure (H4). Finally, the model assumes variable cross-situational relationships between social clear-sightedness and self-descriptions due to a contextually motivated use of this higher order knowledge to produce socially desirable responding. Therefore, we hypothesize that the links between social clear-sightedness and self-descriptions under honest instructions should be stronger in highly evaluative contexts compared to less evaluative ones (H5).

To test the proposed model, we conducted two studies. Study 1 aimed at testing the theoretical model and its structural validity, especially the assumed links between social clear-sightedness and knowledge of social desirability in various constructs, and between social clear-sightedness and honest self-descriptions (H1, H2, H3). This study was conducted in a low evaluative pressure context (i.e., an anonymous web survey), where the individuals' motivation to use SDR was reduced in order to obtain baseline parameter estimates of these relationships. Study 2 was conducted to replicate Study 1's findings but also to test the dispositional (H4) and situational (H5) components of the model by comparing the parameter estimates obtained in contexts with low and high evaluative pressure (i.e., an anonymous web survey vs. a non-anonymous web survey) from a within-person perspective. In both studies,

materials were based on two measurement tools: a social desirability scale (Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability scale; Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) assessing the tendency to search for social approval, and a personality inventory (Study 1: Big Five Inventory, John et al., 1991; Study 2: Big Five Inventory 2, Soto & John, 2017) measuring the five personality dimensions of Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism/Stability (McCrae & John, 1992). Participants answered twice to all items, first under honest instructions (see McFarland & Ryan, 2000) and then under social desirability instructions (see Dompnier et al., 2009; Smeding et al., 2017). Data collected in both studies were analyzed using structural equation modelling, since the model under investigation corresponds to a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) in which knowledge of social desirability of specific constructs (i.e., the five dimensions of personality and the tendency to search for social approval) —measured with social desirability instructions—are assumed to be indicators of the latent factor of social clear-sightedness.

2.2.8 Study 1

2.2.8.1 Method

Participants

Three hundred and seventeen students of a French-speaking Swiss university (216 women; *M*age = 22.44, *SD* = 3.17; 24 respondents did not report their age) participated in this study on a voluntary basis. Students were enrolled in various departments (mainly in Social Sciences, Psychology, Law, and Geography departments), and all participants whose responses were complete were retained for the structural equation modelling analysis.

Procedure

Participants were recruited on their university campus and, after agreeing to participate in the study, received an email with a valid token that allowed them to respond anonymously to the questionnaires through an online procedure. This study was described as being conducted by a university professor interested in studying university students' personality, and especially the characteristics of sympathetic students who have what it takes to be appreciated. This cover story was used to increase the overall credibility of the study and to provide students information about the professor's expectancies in terms of self-presentation strategies. In the first phase, participants were asked to fill in a questionnaire under honest instructions (i.e., "It is important that you answer as honestly as possible"; see McFarland & Ryan, 2000). This questionnaire included two measurement tools: A social desirability scale and a personality inventory (see below).

In the second phase, respondents were asked to complete the same questionnaire under social desirability instructions, that is to answer the items in order to be appreciated by their teachers (i.e., "Now imagine that the same questions as before were asked to you by your teachers and that you have to convince them that you are a sympathetic student. Try to put yourself in this role to answer the questions. In other words, what we are asking you here is to try to show that you are a student who has everything it takes to be appreciated by others, in this case, your teachers.").

Participants always answered the questionnaire first under honest instructions, and then under social desirability instructions. Order of presentation of instructions was fixed to obtain uncontaminated measures under honest instructions (see Dompnier et al., 2009; Ellingson et al., 1999; Smeding et al., 2017).

Material

Social desirability scale. The short form of the French version of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Verardi et al., 2010) was used to assess participants' tendency to adopt socially desirable behaviors. This scale consists of 13 items reflecting highly socially desirable behaviors with very low probability of occurrence (e.g., "I have never deliberately said something that could hurt someone") or undesirable behaviors with very high probability of occurrence (e.g., "It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged"). Participants indicate for each item whether it is true or false for them. Respondents' scores were calculated by summing the number of socially desirable behaviors chosen as true plus the number of socially undesirable behaviors chosen as false. This score thus ranged from 0 to 13.

Personality inventory. The 45-item French version of the Big Five Inventory (BFI-Fr, Plaisant et al., 2010) was used to assess personality dimensions. Respondents were asked to indicate how much they agree with the statement (i.e., "I see myself as someone who…") on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*) for each item of the Big Five model of personality: Openness (10 items; e.g., "Is original, comes up with new ideas"), Conscientiousness (9 items; e.g., "Does a thorough job"), Extraversion (8 items; e.g., "Is talkative"), Agreeableness (10 items; e.g., "Is helpful and unselfish with others"), and Neuroticism (8 items; e.g., "Is depressed, blue"). For each dimension, a mean score was calculated by averaging participants' responses on the relevant items.

2.2.8.2 Model Specification

Based on the theoretical model (see Figure 1), social clear-sightedness was conceived as a latent psychological factor that would explain individual variabilities in lower order knowledge of social desirability, operationalized in the present study by the social desirability scale and the Big Five Inventory measured with social desirability instructions (H_1). A CFA

model was thus built, in which participants' answers to these measurement tools under social desirability instructions served as indicators of the latent factor. Moreover, as typical in CFA models (Kline, 2015), it was assumed that correlations between indicators would be equal to zero, over and above the influence of the latent factor. Accordingly, correlations between residual errors of knowledge of social desirability were fixed to zero (Kline, 2015). In addition, since social clear-sightedness is assumed to predict socially desirable responding as measured by social desirability scales (H_2), the CFA model included a link between the latent factor and the social desirability scale answered under honest instructions. Furthermore, the theoretical model also assumes that social clear-sightedness could possibly impact the participants' self-descriptions (H_3). The CFA model thus included links between the latent factor and self-descriptions under honest instructions.

Finally, two other specifications were added to the CFA model. First, since research showed that personality dimensions empirically correlate to some extent (Anusic et al., 2009; Van der Linden et al., 2010), correlations between residual errors of self-descriptions under honest instructions were freely estimated. Second, correlated uniquenesses were added between variables measured using the same items with honest and social desirability instructions (i.e., every correlation between residual variances of a given construct being measured with honest and social desirability instructions) to consider common method variance (Kline, 2015).[9]

2.2.8.3 Results

Means, standard deviations, correlations and reliability coefficients for all variables are presented in Table S1. The theoretical model was tested on the data using MLR

[9] For a visual representation of the structure of the model, see Figure 4 in Appendix 5.1.1.3

estimation. Goodness of fit was assessed using the comparative fit index (CFI), the standardized root mean square residual (SRMR) and the root mean square of approximation (RMSEA). According to standards in structural equation modelling (Kline, 2015), adequate fit was defined by CFI > .90, SRMR < .08, and RMSEA < .08. Standardized parameters (factor loadings and correlations) for the CFA model are presented in Table 2.

Table 2

Factor loadings and correlations for the CFA Model (Study 1).

Variables	SC	C (H)	E (H)	A (H)	O (H)	N (H)	SDS (H)
C (SD)	.89***	*.23***					
E (SD)	.41***		*.23****				
A (SD)	.76***			*.31****			
O (SD)	.66***				*.31****		
N (SD)	-.78***					*.42****	
SDS (SD)	.71***						*.11*[t]
C (H)	.19**						
E (H)	.06	*.08*					
A (H)	.23***	*.19****	*.05*				
O (H)	-.09	*.06*	*.21****	*-.03*			
N (H)	-.06	*-.11**	*-.25****	*-.17****	*-.07*		
SDS (H)	.15**	*.27****	*.01*	*.41****	*.08*	*-.31****	

Note. *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, [t] $p < .10$. H = Honest instructions, SD = Social desirability instructions, SC = Social clear-sightedness, C = Conscientiousness, E = Extraversion, A = Agreeableness, O = Openness, N = Neuroticism, SDS = Social desirability scale. Correlations freely estimated between observed variables are presented in italics.

Results indicated that the specified model had a satisfying fit on the data: $\chi^2(33) = 49.62$, $p = .03$, CFI = .98, SRMR = .03, RMSEA = .04. Looking at the model's parameter estimates (Table 2), results highlighted, as expected by H_1, that the latent factor strongly predicted all knowledge on constructs' social desirability. Factor loadings for all dimensions measured with social desirability instructions were strong and positive, except for Neuroticism that held a strong negative relationship with the latent factor. Furthermore, the fact that the model obtained a satisfying fit on the data revealed that all residual correlations between variables measured with social desirability instructions could be considered as equivalent to zero. Second, as expected by H_2, the model solution showed that the latent factor significantly predicted self-descriptions on the social desirability scale ($\lambda = .15$). The higher the participants' score on the latent factor, the more they choose socially desirable answers with honest instructions. Third, as expected by H_3, results also revealed that the latent factor predicted honest self-descriptions on personality dimensions such as Conscientiousness ($\lambda = .19$), and Agreeableness ($\lambda = .23$), but to a much lower extend than those observed under social desirability instructions. Nonetheless, such results indicate that social clear-sightedness could have contaminated participants' self-descriptions with honest instructions on these two personality dimensions.

2.2.8.4 Discussion

The aim of Study 1 was to test a theoretical model assuming that a latent psychological construct—social clear-sightedness—reflects some general knowledge of social desirability that impacts lower order knowledge on specific constructs as well as self-descriptions on these constructs. Results obtained in the present study clearly supported the proposed model and its first three hypotheses.

First, in line with H_1, a unique latent factor emerged that predicted all psychological constructs measured with social desirability instructions (i.e., the social desirability scale as

well as all the Big Five personality dimensions measured by the BFI-Fr). Furthermore, it appeared that the model's solution differentiated personality dimensions as a function of their valence in terms of social desirability. Indeed, in order to present themselves as sympathetic students who have what it takes to be appreciated in the eyes of their university teachers (i.e., as required by social desirability instructions), participants with a higher score on the latent factor showed a higher score on the social desirability scale, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Openness, but a lower score on Neuroticism. In this respect, Neuroticism measured with social desirability instructions appeared to be a reverse indicator of the latent factor due to its social undesirability. Taken as a whole, these results are consistent with the assumption that the latent factor that was estimated corresponds to what could be expected from a social clear-sightedness construct.

In addition, and in line with H_2, results highlighted that the latent factor was related to self-descriptions on the social desirability scale measured with honest instructions, indicating that the latent variable predicted the extent to which individuals spontaneously chose socially desirable answers. This result provided supplementary empirical evidence in favor of the assumption that social clear-sightedness can be viewed as a higher order psychological construct on which SDR is based.

Finally, as assumed by H_3, the model solution revealed that some personality dimensions measured with honest instructions were related to the latent variable, namely Conscientiousness and Agreeableness. An explanation for these links in line with the theoretical model is that self-descriptions on these dimensions were contaminated by social desirability concerns, despite the low level of evaluative pressure involved in the situation at hand (i.e., an online anonymous study).

Altogether, Study 1's findings confirmed the structural validity of the proposed theoretical model and thus the possible existence of social clear-sightedness as a general

higher order knowledge of social desirability. However, this study remains limited with regards to the model's assumptions. Indeed, Study 1 does not allow excluding an alternative interpretation for the links observed between social clear-sightedness and self-descriptions on personality dimensions. In fact, due to the correlational nature of the data, an alternative explanation could be that clearsighted individuals (i.e., with higher scores on the latent factor) were genuinely more conscientious and agreeable than non-clearsighted ones.

One way to overcome this limitation would be to test whether the links between social clear-sightedness and the constructs measured with honest instructions would change as a function of situational stakes. If factor loadings linking social clear-sightedness to self-descriptions indeed reflect a strategic use of social clear-sightedness, one could expect these factor loadings to vary across contexts that differ in terms of evaluative pressure. In fact, the theoretical model predicts that the relationships between social clear-sightedness and self-descriptions with honest instructions should increase as a function of the degree of situational evaluative pressure. One could therefore expect that boosting participants' motivation to self-present by increasing situational evaluative pressure would strengthen these links.

Study 2 was conducted to overcome Study 1's limitations. Participants answered the items with honest and social desirability instructions in two different contexts: First in a context with low evaluative pressure and one month later in a context with high evaluative pressure. In line with the theoretical model (see Figure 1), we predicted that the links between social clear-sightedness and specific knowledge of social desirability should be invariant across contexts due to the dispositional nature of social clear-sightedness (H_4), whereas the relationships between self-descriptions with honest instructions and social clear-sightedness should be stronger in a context with high evaluative pressure compared to one with low evaluative pressure (H_5).

2.2.9 Study 2

2.2.9.1 Method

Participants

Three hundred and forty-eight first-year psychology students of a French-speaking Swiss university (281 women; *M*age = 20.63, *SD* = 3.80; 7 participants did not report their age, 2 reported their gender as non-binary, and 4 did not report their gender at all) participated in this study. Participants were enrolled in exchange of credits for course requirement.

Material and Procedure

As in Study 1, participants were informed that a university teacher interested in studying students' personality, and especially the characteristics of sympathetic students who have what it takes to be appreciated, conducted this research. However, in the present study, they answered the items first in an "anonymity" condition similar to the one used in Study 1, and then one month later in a "visibility" condition (for a similar procedure see Smeding et al., 2017, Study 1). In the "anonymity" condition (i.e., low evaluative pressure), participants were informed that their answers would be totally anonymous and that they would receive confidential, automatically computed feedback on their personality profile to help them know themselves better. In the "visibility" condition (i.e., high evaluative pressure), participants were informed that their answers would not be anonymous and that they would receive non-confidential, automatically computed feedback on their personality profile to help the professor who conducted the study to know them better. Participation was anonymous in both conditions since no personally identifiable information was collected from participants. Participants' answers in the two conditions were paired using an anonymized coding system.

Finally, materials used in both conditions was similar to Study 1 with the sole difference that items used to assess the Big Five personality dimensions were extracted from a

more recent version of the BFI, namely the BFI-2 (Soto & John, 2017b), assessing the same personality dimensions: Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, Extraversion, and Stability (reversed Neuroticism). The original 60 items were first translated in French using a translation-back translation procedure. Two French speaking researchers translated the scale in French. Then, an English-speaking researcher translated the French items back to English. No major differences were spotted, but small discrepancies were discussed and resolved between the three researchers. To reduce completion time, 15 of them (three per dimension) as well as three items among the 13 items of the reduced Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability scale were selected[10]. For each of the Big Five dimensions, a mean score was calculated by averaging participants' responses on the relevant three items. For the social desirability scale, the number of socially desirable answers were added up (score from 0 to 3).

To sum up, participants answered a total of 18 items (three per construct) in the "anonymity" condition, first with honest instructions and then with social desirability instructions. One month later, they answered the same 18 items with the same instructions but this time in the "visibility" condition[11]. At the end of the study, participants were fully debriefed.

---

[10] Items selection was based on a previous study conducted on 390 Swiss French speaking first year psychology students. Participants answered the BFI-2 (60 items) and the reduced version of the Marlowe-Crowne social desirability scale (13 items) with honest instructions. For each of the five dimensions of the BFI-2, the positive item obtaining the highest factor loading in each subdimension (three per personality dimension) was selected to stick to the BFI-2 structure, thus resulting in three items retained per dimension. For the Marlowe-Crowne social desirability scale, the three positive items obtaining the highest factor loadings were selected and retained. These items and the selection procedure are detailed in section 5.1.1.2 of the Appendices.

[11] Participants also answered eight items extracted from the RSQ-8 (Rauthmann et al., 2014; for more details see Appendix 5.1.2.3). After participating in the study, participants completed a budgeting task using the same 18

2.2.9.2 Model Specification

A CFA model similar to the one used in Study 1 was tested simultaneously in both within-participant conditions. Consequently, two social clear-sightedness latent variables were estimated, one in the "anonymity" condition and the other in the "visibility" condition. In addition, since items assessing the Big Five personality dimensions and social desirability were completed four times (i.e., with two types of instructions in each of the two within-participant conditions), six latent variables were added to control for common method variance. For each scale used, a latent variable predicted self-descriptions with honest and social desirability instructions in both conditions. For example, one of these six latent variables included participants' answers to items measuring extraversion four times: with honest and socially desirable instructions, in both the visibility and the anonymity conditions. Therefore, the links between these latent control variables and their respective indicators (i.e., self-descriptions with honest and social desirability instructions) were assumed to be invariant across the two within-participant conditions (i.e., cross-situational stability).

Finally, to test the dispositional and situational components of the theoretical model (see Figure 1), within-participant measurement invariance was tested using invariance constraints on specific parameters between the two conditions (Byrne et al., 1989; Kline, 2015; Vandenberg & Lance, 2000). In line with H_4, measurement invariance should be observed when tested on the links between social clear-sightedness and self-descriptions with social desirability instructions (i.e., cross-situational stability). On the contrary, and in line with H_5, measurement invariance should not be observed when tested on the links between

---

items extracted from the French versions of the BFI-2 and of the Marlowe-Crowne social desirability scale. These data were used in Study 2 of the second research line (i.e., Duty condition, see section 2.3.7 and Appendix 5.2.2).

social clear-sightedness and self-descriptions with honest instructions (i.e., cross-situational variability). Indeed, the theoretical model predicted these links to be stronger in the "visibility" condition than in the "anonymity" condition due to strategic SDR.

To sum up, the model tested included eight latent variables that predicted the participants' answers under honest and social desirability instructions assessed in the anonymity and in the visibility conditions. Two latent variables corresponded to social clear-sightedness estimated in each of the two within-participant conditions. The six others were control latent variables and corresponded to the five subscales of the BFI-2 and to the social desirability scale. Finally, correlations between all latent variables were freely estimated.[12]

2.2.9.3 Results

Means, standard deviations and correlations for all measured variables in both within-participant conditions are presented in Table S2, whereas correlations and reliability coefficients of the eight latent variables are presented in Table 3. Among the 348 participants, 47 did not participate to the second part of the study (i.e., the "visibility" condition). Since participation (vs non-participation) to the second part was unrelated to observed variables measured in the first part ($-.09 < rs < .07$, $ps > .05$), missing values were considered as missing completely at random (MCAR) and imputed using the robust two-step approach (Savalei & Falk, 2014).

[12] For a visual representation of the structure of the model, see Figure 5 in Appendix 5.1.2.4

Table 3

Correlations between the latent variables and their respective reliability estimates (Study 2).

Variables	C	E	A	O	S	SDS	SC_A	SC_V
Conscientiousness	.70							
Extraversion	.27***	.76						
Agreeableness	.28***	.31***	.75					
Openness	.00	.14*	.26***	.83				
Stability	.27***	.54***	.26***	.11*	.70			
SDS	.22**	.05	.56***	.16**	.27***	.67		
SC_A	-.23**	-.22**	-.11	.03	-.19**	-.23**	.71	
SC_V	-.28***	-.22**	-.10	-.03	-.30***	-.34***	.57***	.70

Note. *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, $^t p < .10$. C = Conscientiousness, E = Extraversion, A = Agreeableness, O = Openness, S = Stability, SDS = Social desirability scale, SC_A = Social clear-sightedness in the "anonymity" condition, SC_V = Social clear-sightedness in the "visibility" condition. Reliability estimates (Cronbach's α) for each latent factor are presented on the diagonal.

Four incremental models were tested on the data using MLR estimation and compared using the MLR correction for χ^2 difference test of nested models ($\Delta\chi^2$). Model 1 (i.e., configural invariance) tested the structural part of the model in both within-participant conditions without invariance constraints on parameter estimates. Model 2 (i.e., metric invariance of latent control variables) included invariance constraints on the links between the six latent control variables and their respective indicators across the two within-participant conditions. Model 3 (i.e., metric invariance of social clear-sightedness) included invariance constraints of the links between social clear-sightedness and self-descriptions with social desirability instructions across the two conditions. Finally, Model 4 (i.e., full metric

invariance) added invariance constraints on the links between social clear-sightedness and self-descriptions with honest instructions across the two conditions.

First, Model 1, which served as a baseline model, showed an acceptable fit with the data: $\chi^2(200) = 477.70$, $p < .001$, CFI = .93, SRMR = .04, RMSEA = .06. This indicates configural invariance for the model's structure across the two conditions. Second, model comparison showed that Model 2 ($\chi^2(212) = 491.56$, $p < .001$, CFI = .93, SRMR = .04, RMSEA = .06) did not differ significantly from Model 1, $\Delta\chi^2(12) = 13.42$, $p = .34$, which indicates that the factor structure of latent control variables was invariant across the "anonymity" and the "visibility" conditions. More importantly, model comparison also showed that Model 3 ($\chi^2(218) = 501.80$, $p < .001$, CFI = .93, SRMR = .05, RMSEA = .06) did not differ significantly from Model 2, $\Delta\chi^2(6) = 9.86$, $p = .13$. Thus, as predicted by H_4, the links between social clear-sightedness and its indicators (i.e., self-descriptions with social desirability instructions) were invariant across conditions. Finally, Model 4 ($\chi^2(224) = 513.17$, $p < .001$, CFI = .93, SRMR = .05, RMSEA = .06) marginally differed from Model 3, $\Delta\chi^2(6) = 11.12$, $p = .08$. In line with H_5, this last result suggests that full metric invariance could not be retained and that some variabilities were detected in the links between social clear-sightedness and self-descriptions with honest instructions across conditions. Based on fit measures and model comparison, Model 3 was retained as the best representation of the data. Parameter estimates for this model are presented in Table 4.

Table 4

Factor loadings for Model 3 (Study 2).

Conditions	Variables	SC_A	SC_V	C	E	A	O	S	SDS
Anonymity	C (SD)	.77***		.37***					
	E (SD)	.67***			.47***				
	A (SD)	.59***				.51***			
	O (SD)	.48***					.50***		
	S (SD)	.89***						.37***	
	SDS (SD)	.63***							.43***
	C (H)	.12*		.92***					
	E (H)	.07^t			.92***				
	A (H)	.07				.83***			
	O (H)	.03					.91***		
	S (H)	.09^t						.91***	
	SDS (H)	.14*							.81***
Visibility	C (SD)		.80***	.38***					
	E (SD)		.69***		.48***				
	A (SD)		.53***			.46***			
	O (SD)		.48***				.50***		
	S (SD)		.91***					.38***	
	SDS (SD)		.59***						.40***
	C (H)		.20***	.94***					
	E (H)		.09*		.93***				
	A (H)		.13*			.79***			
	O (H)		.05				.92***		
	S (H)		.18***					.95***	
	SDS (H)		.21**						.84***

Note. *** $p < .001$, ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$, ^{t} $p < .10$. H = Honest instructions, SD = Social desirability instructions, SC_A = Social clear-sightedness in the "anonymity" condition, SC_V = Social clear-sightedness in the "visibility" condition, C = Conscientiousness, E = Extraversion, A = Agreeableness, O = Openness, S = Stability, SDS = Social desirability scale.

Overall, results obtained on factor loadings confirmed Study 1's findings. First, knowledge on each constructs' social desirability was strongly related to social clear-sightedness in the "anonymity" conditions ($.48 < \lambda s < .89$) and in the "visibility" condition ($.48 < \lambda s < .91$). Moreover, social clear-sightedness appeared to be quite stable across situations, as shown by the strong positive correlation between the two latent variables that were modelled in each condition ($r = .57$, see Table 3). Second, the model solution indicated that social clear-sightedness predicted self-descriptions on social desirability items in the "anonymity" condition ($\lambda = .14$) and in the "visibility" condition ($\lambda = .21$). Finally, social clear-sightedness predicted self-descriptions with honest instructions on some constructs, especially in the "visibility" condition (Agreeableness: $\lambda = .12$) or in both conditions (e.g., Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Stability). However, as indicated by the fit comparison between Model 4 and Model 3, some of these links could not be considered as equivalent across conditions. To identify these links, measurement invariance was tested for each self-description with honest instructions in six alternative versions of Model 3 that included an invariance constraint on one dimension at a time. Comparisons between these models and Model 3 revealed that two links were not equivalent across conditions: Social clear-sightedness more strongly predicted Conscientiousness and Stability in the "visibility" condition ($\lambda = .20$ and $\lambda = .16$) than in the "anonymity" condition ($\lambda = .12$ and $\lambda = .09$), $\Delta\chi^2(1) = 3.87$, $p < .05$ and $\Delta\chi^2(1) = 7.13$, $p < .01$ respectively.

2.2.9.4 Discussion

Study 2 was conducted to test the impact of a situationally induced motivation to produce SDR on the links between social clear-sightedness and knowledge of social desirability (i.e., answers with social desirability instructions) and self-descriptions (i.e., answers with honest instructions). Whereas the links between social clear-sightedness and knowledge of constructs' social desirability were expected to be invariant across contexts

(H_4), the links between social clear-sightedness and self-descriptions were expected to be stronger with higher evaluative pressure compared to contexts with low evaluative pressure (H_5).

Results obtained through cross-situational modelling first replicated Study 1's findings with a different material (i.e., items extracted from the BFI2). In both conditions, social clear-sightedness was strongly and positively related to knowledge of social desirability for each construct. Study 2's results also extended those of Study 1 by showing that the links between social clear-sightedness and knowledge on all constructs' social desirability were invariant across conditions. In this respect, knowledge on these constructs' social desirability, assessed with social desirability instructions, appeared to be a robust indicator of social clear-sightedness whatever the level of evaluative pressure in which participants were placed. Such results are thus in line with the assumption that social clear-sightedness is a stable dispositional psychological construct that does not depend on situational characteristics, as predicted by H_4.

Second, these results also replicated most of Study 1's findings about the links between social clear-sightedness and self-descriptions. In both conditions, social clear-sightedness predicted participants' honest answers on items extracted from a social desirability scale. However, measurement invariance testing revealed that some of the links between social clear-sightedness and self-descriptions with honest instructions varied across conditions. Indeed, in line with H_5, the links connecting social clear-sightedness to Conscientiousness and Stability were stronger in the "visibility" condition than in the "anonymity" condition. Since such variations could hardly be explained by changes in the participants' actual personality characteristics over a one-month period, this result indicates that self-descriptions on these two dimensions were more contaminated by SDR in the former situation than in the latter.

2.2.10 General Discussion

For the last decades, SDR has been the crux of an active debate in the fields of methodology and personality psychology about its actual impact on the validity of psychological measurement (Chan, 2009; Griffith & Peterson, 2011; Lanz et al., 2022; Paunonen & LeBel, 2012; Uziel, 2010). The aim of the present research is to participate in this debate and to propose a new theoretical and methodological framework to investigate SDR. Indeed, in line with recent research that conceives SDR as the result of the interaction between individual characteristics and situational demands (Ziegler et al., 2011), the current framework conceptualizes it as the manifestation of a situationally motivated use of a superordinate disposition—social clear-sightedness—that reflects the level to which individuals are aware of social expectations in a given social context. As a higher order latent factor, social clear-sightedness was assumed to organize knowledge on the social desirability of many more specific lower-order psychological constructs. Within this framework, SDR was conceived as the strategic use of such a general knowledge, especially in situations with high personal stakes. To test the proposed model (Figure 1), two studies were conducted in situations implying different levels of evaluative pressure (Study 1: Low evaluative pressure; Study 2: Low and high evaluative pressure). Taken as a whole, results obtained using structural equation modelling supported the main hypotheses underlying the theoretical model.

Central to this model was the hypothesis that social clear-sightedness would organize individuals' responses to various measurement tools answered with social desirability instructions, whatever the particular content of the psychological constructs assessed by these tools (H_1). Results obtained in both studies confirmed unambiguously this hypothesis. As indicated by the satisfactory fit obtained by the CFA models and by the strong factor loadings observed, the latent factor appeared to correspond to the expected characteristics of social

clear-sightedness. Furthermore, Study 1 showed that it was differentially related to constructs that varied in terms of social desirability (i.e., positive relationships with socially desirable constructs such as Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion and Agreeableness, and a negative link with a socially undesirable one, namely Neuroticism). Another central hypothesis of the model was that social clear-sightedness should predict individuals' answers to measurement tools specifically designed to capture SDR, such as social desirability scales (H_2). Both studies confirmed this hypothesis by showing that social clear-sightedness was consistently related to the participants' honest answers on social desirability scales. Finally, following H_4, invariance tests conducted in Study 2 showed that the relationships between social clear-sightedness and each specific knowledge on constructs' social desirability did not depend on the type of contexts (i.e., low vs. high evaluative pressure) in which they were estimated, thus corroborating the dispositional component of social clear-sightedness.

In addition to providing empirical evidence supporting the existence of social clear-sightedness as a general knowledge of social desirability, results obtained were also in line with the proposed definition of SDR as the situationally motivated use of this superordinate knowledge. As presented above, the theoretical model predicted that social clear-sightedness would be associated with self-descriptions with honest instructions (H_3). Such relationships, which were assumed to reveal SDR on specific dimensions, were observed in both studies. Conducted in an anonymous test-taking situation, Study 1 showed that social clear-sightedness was positively associated with some personality constructs measured with honest instructions (i.e., Agreeableness and Conscientiousness). Going one step further, Study 2 showed that at least some of these links (i.e., Conscientiousness and Stability), were stronger in the "visibility" condition than in the "anonymity" condition. Such results are in line with the theoretical model since it posits that SDR should be stronger in highly evaluative contexts compared to lowly evaluative ones (H_5). Given that in Study 2 the same participants were

involved in both conditions, this difference could not be explained by actual personality differences between the two situations. This variability rather indicates that the more clearsighted the participants, the more they described themselves as having higher levels of these dimensions in the "visibility" condition compared to what they declared in the "anonymity" condition one month earlier. Accordingly, one can conclude that these dimensions measured with honest instructions were more biased by SDR in the former condition than in the latter and that this contamination increased with the participants' level of social clear-sightedness.

2.2.10.1 Theoretical and Methodological Contributions to SDR Research

Overall, the present findings have far-reaching consequences for SDR research. At the theoretical level, they first confirmed that SDR is a context-dependent phenomenon whose probability of occurrence increases with evaluative pressure (Booth-Kewley et al., 1992; Ellingson et al., 2007; Hu & Connelly, 2021; Novo et al., 2022; Paulhus, 1991). Second, they revealed that SDR could be viewed as the consequence of an individual characteristic reflecting individuals' understanding of socially situated self-presentation constraints, as captured by the social clear-sightedness concept. Third, they contribute to understand why knowledge of social desirability was observed to be a moderator of the predictive validity of psychological constructs (Dompnier et al., 2009; Smeding et al., 2017). As stated above, in highly evaluative contexts, the higher the individuals' level of social clear-sightedness, the higher the probability for SDR to alter their self-descriptions given its motivational component. As a result, self-description's validity tends to decrease due to a loss of valid information that increases with social clear-sightedness (for a similar argument, see Konstabel et al., 2006). Such a loss would result in a moderation effect on the self-descriptions—outcomes links. Given that social clear-sightedness was shown in Studies 1 and 2 to be strongly related to the specific knowledge on constructs' social desirability, it seems

reasonable to assume that this dispositional variable has the potential to be a general moderator of many psychological constructs' validity.

At the methodological level, the approach developed here also provides innovative ways to study SDR from a behavioral perspective. Within this framework, social clear-sightedness is estimated through individuals' behavioral responses to several distinct psychological measurement tools under specific self-presentation instructions. Contrary to other more classical approaches investigating SDR (e.g., social desirability scales), its assessment does not rely on self-descriptions with honest instructions but on choices operated to reach the goal provided by social desirability instructions. Using this type of instructions has the consequence of modifying the nature of the measure provided by the psychological tools used, which no longer reflects self-descriptions but corresponds to the evaluation of social skills that allows individuals to respond to the demand made by the instructions (i.e., to answer in order to be appreciated by a specific target). Even if social desirability instructions have been used extensively in the past for mean scores comparison with other types of instructions (Birkeland et al., 2006; Paulhus et al., 1995; Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999), they also provide relevant information in terms of interindividual variance. The present approach uses this variability to capture individual differences in knowledge of social desirability and by extension individual differences in social clear-sightedness.

2.2.10.2 Limitations and Future Research Directions

In addition to its contribution to the SDR literature, the present research is limited on several aspects that offer avenues for future research on the social clear-sightedness concept. First, the impact of SDR — as measured by the links between social clear-sightedness and self-descriptions with honest instructions — was relatively modest in both studies ($\lambda s < .23$). Yet rather than suggesting that SDR is a marginal phenomenon in test-taking situations, we think that such a reduced impact could be explained by the type of sample investigated in both

studies, namely university students. Indeed, research already showed that compared to other populations (e.g., employees), university students were less prone to spontaneously engage in SDR (Akbulut et al., 2017). Although focusing on student samples enabled us to conduct a proof of concept for the social clear-sightedness construct, a first research direction would be to investigate other types of participant samples in more ecological situation, such as job applicants (Hu & Connelly, 2021), in which stronger effect sizes could be expected.

Second, in contexts with low evaluative pressure (Study 1 and Study 2's "anonymity" condition), social clear-sightedness was positively related to self-descriptions with honest instructions on some dimensions (e.g., Conscientiousness). Indeed, these relationships could reveal some interesting information about the links between social clear-sightedness and private self-descriptions. Although the present research does not provide any conclusive empirical evidence on this issue, these links could indicate that clearsighted individuals spontaneously adopted more SDR in private contexts than non-clearsighted ones. This possibility is in line with the two-factor model of SDR (Paulhus, 1984, 1991, 2002) which distinguishes self-deception and impression management: Whereas impression management is other-directed and conscious, self-deception is self-directed and unconscious. Based on this distinction, one could assume that clearsighted individuals were more prone to use self-deception on these dimensions than non-clearsighted individuals. A second research direction would be to investigate this hypothesis by empirically assessing the relationship between social clear-sightedness and self-deception behaviors (Schwardmann & van der Weele, 2019; M. K. Smith et al., 2017).

Finally, a third research direction concerns the fact that only some constructs measured with honest instructions were contaminated by SDR in a highly evaluative context. Even if the proposed theoretical model (see Figure 1) does not predict on which personality construct SDR should occur, this result may provide interesting insights into how social clear-

sightedness enables individuals who possess it to self-present themselves strategically. Indeed, as shown in both studies, clearsighted individuals had a clear knowledge about the level of social desirability attached to the six investigated psychological constructs. However, when placed in a visibility context, they chose to increase their score under honest instructions on only some dimensions but not on the others, adopting a more “methodical style of responding" (D. B. Smith & Ellingson, 2002, p. 216). Such result suggests that clearsighted individuals would be able to differentiate dimensions that are highly important for the audience from those that are less central. Indeed, in both studies, the audience was operationalized as a university teacher interested in identifying the psychological proprieties of sympathetic students who have what it takes to be appreciated. This situation, which implies a work relationship between a supervisor (i.e., the teacher) and a subordinate (i.e., the student participant), may have increased the relevance of these dimensions as the most important dimensions for self-presentation. For instance, research already showed that Conscientiousness is one of the best predictors of academic achievement (Fonteyne et al., 2017; Kuncel et al., 2004) and is of special importance in educational situations that imply work relationships (Rauthmann et al., 2014). Thus, clearsighted individuals in both studies may have identified Conscientiousness as the most important characteristic to possess in the eyes of the audience and thus chose to simulate on this dimension and not on the others. Indeed, increasing their self-description on all dimensions could increase the probability of being easily detected by the audience as a faker. By choosing to engage in intentional misrepresentation on some—but highly relevant—dimensions, clearsighted individuals adopt an efficient strategy containing only minor risks of being detected. Future research should therefore investigate to what extent social clear-sightedness enables individuals to implement such kind of elaborated self-presentation strategies, for instance by varying the targeted audience (Goffman, 1956).

2.2.10.3 Practical Implications

The present research has important implications for personality assessment in personnel selection where self-report measures are used extensively (Lievens & Sackett, 2017; A. M. Ryan & Ployhart, 2014). Due to the high stakes involved in such situations, clear-sighted individuals may give more socially desirable answers, and social desirability scales may not be sufficient to control for this deleterious impact (Griffith & Peterson, 2008). Clear-sighted applicants may spot which characteristics are specifically desirable for the job and those which are not, and consequently deliberately alter their scores on these dimensions. This was actually studied by Roulin and colleagues (Roulin et al., 2016; Roulin & Krings, 2020). First, they proposed a dynamic model of applicant faking, where faking—on personality measures—was presented as an adaptive ability strategically used and a dynamic process depending on applicants' motivation and capacity to fake, both influenced by individual differences as well as by the measures to counter faking taken by the organization they wanted to apply to (Roulin et al., 2016). Obvious parallels can be made between these authors' view of faking and the concept of clear-sightedness presented here: both are depicted as depending on people's ability to spot what is socially desirable, and on people's motivation to use this ability. Social clear-sightedness stays however on the individual difference side, whereas Roulin and colleagues' model includes organizational aspects. Second, applying their model and based on the observation that organizations attach great importance to person-organization fit, the authors posited that applicants would try to "look like a better fit for the organization" (Roulin & Krings, 2020, p. 130). In fact, in their 6-study research, they found that participants faked their level of competitiveness and innovativeness—and not the other personality dimensions—to match the levels of the organization they were supposed to be applying to. This behavior, as depicted by the authors, can have negative consequences for real-life organizations, as they might hire applicants that actually do not totally fit with their

culture, which can in turn alter job performance, thus stressing the importance of taking faking into account. The present research go one step further by shifting the attention from SDR—or faking—to what produces it, namely social clear-sightedness. In high-stake situations with high evaluative pressure like personnel selection, recruiters might be more advanced in their search of the best candidate if they try to measure candidates' level of social clear-sightedness in general, instead of their level of SDR in the personality self-report.

Mirroring this shift of attention, the practical use of social desirability scales could move from trying to quantify SDR to assess the knowledge each candidate has of what is socially desirable (i.e., their level of social clear-sightedness). Stated differently, social desirability scales could be used as performative measures of social clear-sightedness: under social desirability instructions, these scales can indeed inform on the maximal level of socially desirable answers one can give in a specific situation, i.e., how social clear-sighted one can be. In the two studies reported here, social desirability scales answered under social desirability instructions appeared to be quite good indicators of social clear-sightedness ($.59 < \lambda s < .71$). Asking candidates to answer a desirability scale with specific self-presentation instructions could thus be an easy-to-use method to assess their level of social clear-sightedness. For those who score high, cautious should be taken when interpreting their self-reported answers on other tools as they could have identified socially desirable responses in all questionnaires they answered. Despite the lack of evidence concerning the practicality of social desirability scales to rule out SDR, the present research may be a first step regarding their usefulness — when combined with self-presentation strategies — to measure social clear-sightedness.

2.2.11 Conclusion

The present research provides some useful food for thought for the study of individual differences in social skills and self-presentation ability (Bolino et al., 2016). Indeed, many

different psychological constructs were developed over the years to assess these individual variabilities, such as the need for approval (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960), self-monitoring (Gangestad & Snyder, 2000), political skill (Brouer et al., 2015), or Machiavellianism (Paulhus & Williams, 2002). However, most of these concepts are assessed through self-report scales (for a review, Bolino et al., 2016). Given that any self-report scale can be potentially contaminated by SDR, including social desirability scales (Griffith & Peterson, 2008), the methodology used here to assess social clear-sightedness appears to be of particular interest to study self-presentation mechanisms over and above the influence of SDR on the measurement of these individual differences. In this respect, social clear-sightedness appears as a complementary conceptual tool that can participate in enlightening the "black box" underlying SDR in test-taking situations.

2.3 On the Necessities and Luxuries of Personality Dimensions: Strategic Self-presentation Depends on What is Desirable in a Situation[13]

2.3.1 Abstract

In personality assessment, self-reported inventories have been shown to be sensitive to Socially Desirable Responding: when answering such inventories, individuals may try to convey a good image of themselves. In a given situation, they may seek to distinguish personality dimensions that are highly important to claim to possess (i.e., necessities) from those that are optional (i.e., luxuries). The present research aims to investigate this necessity/luxury distinction as a function of what is socially desirable in specific situations. Three studies were conducted in which participants answered a personality inventory using a budgeting task (Li et al., 2002) with the goal to be appreciated by others. A pilot study (N = 66) showed the relevance of this task for disentangling necessities from luxuries in self-presentation. Study 1 (N = 126) showed that 1) Conscientiousness was perceived as a necessity in a duty situation (i.e., a work relationship with a hierarchical superior) compared to a sociality situation (i.e., an informal relationship with friends), 2) Extraversion and Agreeableness were perceived as necessities in a sociality situation compared to a duty situation. Study 2 replicated these findings using a different material and among a larger sample (N = 465). Overall, these studies indicate that self-presentation strategies are highly determined by situationally dependent perceptions, as personality dimensions can be claimed

[13] Rudmann, O., Meier, E., Smeding, A., Butera, F., and Dompnier B. (in preparation). On the necessities and luxuries of personality dimensions: strategic self-presentation depends on what is desirable in a situation. Instructions and material of the studies are presented in section 5.2 of the Appendices.

as necessities or luxuries to be liked depending on the situation. Thus, this research enables to identify the most effective self-presentation strategies and the dimensions the most likely to be faked in a given context.

Keywords: Self-presentation; socially desirable responding; budgeting task; personality measurement; social situations

On the Necessities and Luxuries of Personality Dimensions: Strategic Self-presentation Depends What is Desirable in a Situation

Many—if not all—everyday social interactions are guided by social principles and norms that encourage individuals to adapt their behaviours and communications to the audience with whom they interact to gain social approval (Butera et al., in press; Goffman, 1956). This is even more true in evaluative situations in which individuals seek to be appreciated by key others (Paulhus, 1991). Not limited to face-to-face interactions, the motivation to gain social approval can also be observed when people describe themselves in personality inventories. A long tradition of research in the fields of psychometry and personality measurement has already demonstrated the sensitivity of such tools to, among other biases, Socially Desirable Responding (SDR; Paulhus, 1991). SDR is the tendency to respond in a way that gives a positive self-image, which is a form of self-presentation. However, depending on social situations, not all personality dimensions may be equally important to possess—or claim to possess—and individuals may strategically identify those that are most important to highlight in order to achieve their goal of being appreciated in the evaluative situation.

The aim of the present research is to identify specific personality dimensions perceived as more important than others to fulfil self-presentation goals in different social situations. In other words, whereas some personality dimensions would be of primary concern for self-presentation in some situations, others would be only secondary in those same situations. Being able to distinguish between essential and optional characteristics is indeed fundamental to identifying the most effective self-presentation strategies as well as the dimensions the most likely to be faked in a given context. To do so, we used a specific paradigm—named the budgeting task (Li et al., 2002)—designed to untangle necessities (i.e.,

primary importance) from luxuries (i.e., secondary importance) in the self-assignment of personality dimensions.

2.3.2 Self-Presentation and Personality Measurement

Since the middle of the twentieth century (e.g., Campbell, 1960), a tremendous amount of research has been devoted to understand how SDR and self-presentation strategies impact personality measurement. The origin of this research interest is certainly to be found in the massive use in this field of self-reported questionnaires to access individual differences in personality (Paulhus & Vazire, 2007). Indeed, as humans—and especially psychologists—are eager to understand what makes them different from each other, plethora of such measures were developed since the early development of personality psychology (e.g., NEO-PI and NEO-PI-R, Costa & McCrae, 2008; BFI and BFI-2, Soto & John, 2017b). Various self-report personality questionnaires have been designed to measure the five fundamental dimensions of personality (McCrae & John, 1992): Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, Openness to Experience and Neuroticism/Emotional Stability.

Paralleling this growing interest in personality measurement, awareness of the impact of self-presentation on these self-report measures started to rise (Funder, 1991). Indeed, when focusing on personality, it is quite easy to imagine that the way people describe themselves will considerably impact the way others see their personality characteristics (e.g., Barrick et al., 2009). As self-report personality inventories can often be read by external targets, people could use their answers on such tools as an instrument of self-presentation (e.g., Niessen et al., 2017). In line with this reasoning, Goffman (1959) developed the idea that in face-to-face interactions people can be considered as theatre actors and actresses, and social interactions as representations. As accessing directly to what others think is not possible *per se* (i.e., the "black box" metaphor), people have to rely on external cues to form an impression of others, such as how they present themselves (e.g., physical appearance, behaviour) (on impression

formation, see Asch, 1946; or more recently Prager et al., 2018). Consequently, as Goffman (1959) highlighted, everyone has to master staging processes to have a good role playing, that can change from a situation to another. Thus, should the stage be a self-report personality inventory, people could perform in a socially desirable way with the objective of being liked by the audience.

Acting in self-reports to present a socially desirable self is also in line with Socially Desirable Responding (SDR), one of the most frequently studied bias among other methodological issues in personality measurement (Cronbach, 1946; Griffith & Peterson, 2011; Uziel, 2010). SDR can be defined as "the tendency of individuals to give answers that make them look good" (Paulhus, 1991, p. 17) "(…) with respect to current social norms and standards" (Zerbe & Paulhus, 1987, p. 250), and "regardless of their true feelings about an issue or topic" (Podsakoff et al., 2003, p. 881). Thus, when completing a self-report personality questionnaire, SDR could actively lead people to exert a faking behaviour (Edwards, 1957). Indeed, research already showed that such a conscious alteration of answers was easy to produce, especially on personality inventories assessing the Big Five dimensions, which all appeared to be equally fakeable (Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999).

But faking in a socially desirable way not only depends on the individuals' willingness to adapt their answers toward socially desirable positions. It also depends on the knowledge individuals possess about what is desirable in a given situation and the target to which the communication is addressed (Roulin & Krings, 2020). Just like actors need to know how to adapt their play according to the audience in front of them (Goffman, 1959), individuals should adapt their self-presentation to their audience as function of the role they have to play. In other words, what is socially desirable and what is not depends on the target of the communication and on the social context in which the interaction occurs (e.g., different job contexts, Birkeland et al., 2006). Thus, it should vary from one social interaction to another.

For instance, people may want to emphasize different personality characteristics when they are trying to be appreciated by a friend at a party than by their supervisor at work. In line with this idea, Fleeson (2001) found within-person variation in personality self-description on the Big Five across time—but also between situations (Fleeson, 2007). Although such variability of self-descriptions may be challenging from a pure personality perspective, it makes sense from a self-presentation view of self-report measures: When people adapt the description of their personality according to the context, part of these modifications could be due to SDR.

To detect biases such as SDR and to limit their impact on psychological assessment, researchers made several recommendations to be applied during the completion of self-reported measures: full anonymity, encouraging frankness and objectivity, assuring respondents that there were no right or wrong answers (Meehl & Hathaway, 1946; Podsakoff et al., 2003; Smeding et al., 2017). Yet all these incentives were criticized for their limited efficiency. Parallelly, special instruments exclusively dedicated to the measurement of SDR were developed and most of the time used as control variables (Lanz et al., 2022; Uziel, 2010). For instance, one of the most widely used is the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960), which is composed of two types of items: infrequent but socially approved behaviours (e.g., “I always try to practice what I preach”) and frequent but socially disapproved behaviours (e.g., “I like to gossip at times”) (Uziel, 2010). Thus, people having a high score on socially approved behaviours and having a low score on socially disapproved behaviours are identified as potential generators of social desirability bias (Uziel, 2010). But again, doubts about this type of tools emerged, notably about their ability to detect faking strategies (Chan, 2009) or dishonest responses (Holtrop et al., 2020). Moreover, such scales could assess actual personality characteristics to the same extent than response sets and biases (de Vries et al., 2014; Lanz et al., 2022; Ones et al., 1996; Uziel, 2010).

Another way to highlight SDR is the so-called self-presentation paradigm. In this procedure, respondents answer a given questionnaire with different instructions: A standard instruction, under which respondents answer frankly and honestly, and then an instruction to fake good—self-enhancement or normative instruction—, under which respondents answer the questionnaire in order to be perceived positively (Gilibert & Cambon, 2003; Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999). This procedure was frequently used to spot faking respondents (Edwards, 1957; for a meta-analysis, see Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999)—i.e., people having the lowest differences between their scores under standard and self-enhancement instructions. Indeed, people high on SDR are likely to fake their answers already under standard instructions. Therefore, their scores under faking and standard instructions should be quite similar (Edwards, 1957). Consequently, people low on SDR would have the biggest differences between the two instruction types. Relying on this difference score to infer SDR and study faking has already provided relevant results (Py & Somat, 1991; Rudmann et al., submitted; Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999). Additionally, self-enhancement instructions are also useful to simply identify what people perceive as socially desirable, irrespective of their actual faking behaviour. However, knowing what is perceived as socially desirable or not does not inform about a possible ranking people make to order personality dimensions in terms of importance in order to generate a positive image of themselves in a given situation.

2.3.3 Necessities and Luxuries: A New Look at Self-Presentation Strategies

Beyond individual differences in knowledge of social desirability, it is not unreasonable to assume that personality dimensions can be ranked in terms of self-presentation importance in each situation from the audience perspective. Indeed, what is considered as socially desirable in a given situation for a given target audience may be less desirable in another situation for another target. Effective self-presentation strategies may therefore involve using SDR on those dimensions that are most relevant from the perspective

of the audience in the situation. However, the question remains of how these socially desirable situation-dependent rankings can be empirically identified. A body of research has been developed to distinguish between preferences that individuals consider essential from those that are considered optional.

Li et al. (2002) introduced a methodology to study preferences and priorities based on the observation that when assessing preferences, rating different options one by one might not reveal trade-offs made in real life. These authors pointed out that if characteristics are presented one by one, and therefore judged separately, people can rate the importance of each characteristic assuming "acceptable levels on other desirable traits" (Li et al., 2002, p. 948). By assuming so, they could possibly rate optional items as important. Thus, to assess the importance given to different characteristics in a non-independent way, Li et al. (2002) created a "budgeting task". In this task, participants have to allocate imaginary limited budgets to different characteristics, as if they had to "purchase" those characteristics. The rationale is that, when having a restricted budget, people will first "buy" essential items in sufficient quantity to satisfy basic needs—i.e., necessities—just as in real life (e.g., water, food). However, when having an extended budget, people tend to allocate more of their budget to luxuries, as they can easily afford for sufficient quantities of primary necessities (Li et al., 2002). The amount of money allocated to necessities could be very similar in a low or in a high budget, but the proportion of the budget assigned to necessities decreases as the budget grows. In contrast, the proportion of luxuries tends to grow with budget size.

This budgeting task, which reveals the trade-offs people make between necessities and luxuries, has been used in research mainly on relationship choices and mate preferences (Choy et al., 2023; Csajbók & Berkics, 2022; Edlund & Sagarin, 2010; Jonason et al., 2011, 2012, 2017; Langley & Shiota, 2023; Li, 2007; Li et al., 2002, 2011; Li & Kenrick, 2006; Lu, 2023; Park & MacDonald, 2023; Thomas et al., 2019; Wang, 2021; K. E. G. Williams et al.,

2022; M. Williams & Sulikowski, 2020; Yong et al., 2022), but also on social perception (Patel et al., 2023), in educational psychology (Bonney & Pettit, 2019; Goldman et al., 2017; Knoster et al., 2020; Senko et al., 2012; Winstone et al., 2016), and in organizational psychology (Wee et al., 2014). Yet, if it is conceivable for some socially desirable dimensions to be more important than others in the eyes of certain targets, this procedure could contribute significantly to SDR research by enabling the distinction between the necessary statements and the luxurious ones to be appreciated by a given audience. In other words, one could expect some socially desirable dimensions to be perceived as necessities to be appreciated by some targets whereas others to be still socially desirable but perceived as non-necessary—i.e., as luxuries. Moreover, it is also possible that some socially desirable propositions that are perceived as necessary to be appreciated are only so in some contexts and for some audiences.

Although the present research is the first to propose to disentangle necessary characteristics from luxurious ones in SDR research, the rationale behind this distinction is indirectly supported by empirical evidence showing that the importance of possessing certain personality characteristics—or claiming to possess them—varied as function of audiences and contexts. For instance, in the motivation domain, Dompnier et al (2008) showed that a fictitious student whose achievement goals were to be better than others (i.e., pursuing performance-approach goals) was perceived differently depending on the social position university students had to adopt to judge him. While the target was judged negatively in terms of warmth when participants responded as university students, this fictitious student was judged positively in terms of competence when participants responded from the point of view of their teachers. In the recruitment domain, Roulin and Krings (2020) also observed that applicants adapted their answers to personality inventories to the culture of the organization they were applying to in order to increase their personal fit with the job. Whereas they portrayed themselves as being less agreeable and honest when they applied to companies with

competitive cultures, they described themselves as more open-minded and extraverted when the job was offered by companies with innovative cultures. In the same vein, Irwing and colleagues (2023) recently proposed an adaptive personality regulation (APR) index to measure "the ability or propensity to express personality to meet situational requirements" (p.2). These authors showed that behavioural expressions of personality did vary according to situational requirements: in their first study, participants indeed exhibited more extraversion in a networking condition than in a working condition. Finally, Rauthmann et al. (2014) argued that social situations provide affordances for the expression of personality traits as function of what they "demand, call for, require, or elicit" (p.691). These authors identified eight dimensions of situation characteristics which could allow people to form impression about a situation, namely the Situational Eight Diamonds: Duty, Intellect, Adversity, Mating, pOsitivity, Negativity, Deception, and Sociality. They also observed that some of these situation characteristics elicited the expression of some specific personality dimensions. For instance, Conscientiousness, which is a highly expected and rewarded personality characteristic in educational and work contexts (e.g., Donahue & Harary, 1998), appeared to be highly required in social situations in which duties must be fulfilled, namely "duty" situations. However, in social situations that involve informal and enjoyable interactions with friends, namely "sociality" situations, it was the Extraversion and Agreeableness personality dimensions that were highly called for.

Altogether, these lines of research support the possibility of situational variability in the importance of possessing—or claiming to possess—some personality characteristics to be appreciated by others. In this respect, the distinction between necessities and luxuries seems particularly promising to detect such a change according to audiences and contexts. In other words, one could expect the "necessity" versus "luxury" status of personality dimensions for self-presentation to vary according to the requirements imposed by the test-taking situation.

2.3.4 Research Overview and Hypotheses

The present research aimed at investigating the general hypothesis that personality dimensions could be perceived as necessary or luxurious to put forward in self-presentation as function of the type of audience or social situations. If the relevance of such a distinction proves to be empirically supported, it would make it possible to identify the most effective self-presentation strategies depending on the social situations in which respondents answer personality inventories. In addition, this would enable identifying which of the various personality dimensions are most likely to be faked by respondents given their high effectiveness in conveying a positive self-image in the eyes of a specific audience in a given situation.

More particularly, we expected some personality dimensions to be perceived as necessities to possess to be appreciated in some contexts but not in others. We based our rationale on the eight-dimensional taxonomy of social situations proposed by Rauthman et al. (2014). However, for parsimony reasons, we choose to focus in the present research exclusively on two of these dimensions, namely Duty and Sociality, due to their clear affordances of specific personality dimensions: Conscientiousness for Duty and Extraversion and Agreeableness for Sociality (see Rauthmann et al., 2014, Table 6, p.694). We thus expected Conscientiousness (H1) to be more perceived as a necessity to be appreciated in "Duty" situations (i.e., situations in which work has to be done for hierarchical superiors), than in "Sociality" situations (i.e., situations that involve informal social interactions with friends). On the contrary, we expected Extraversion (H2) and Agreeableness (H3) to be more perceived as necessities to be appreciated in "Sociality" situations than in "Duty" situations.

To reach our research goal, we conducted a pilot study and two main studies. The pilot study aimed at investigating the relevance of the budgeting task for disentangling necessities and luxuries in self-presentation strategies (i.e., answering the budgeting task to be

appreciated by hierarchical superiors vs. to describe their ideal self). Studies 1 and 2 tested specifically H1 to H3 by asking participants to complete a budgeting task to be appreciated in a given social situation (i.e., to be appreciated by a hierarchical superior in a duty situation vs. to be appreciated by friends in a sociality situation). In all studies, participants were university students. Thus, hierarchical superiors were defined as their university professors, and friends as their fellow students.

2.3.5 Pilot Study: Exploring Necessities and Luxuries in Self-Presentation

2.3.5.1 Method

Participants

Sixty-six students involved in a Swiss university filled the study in after being recruited by giving their mailing address to receive the study link. This sample involved 52 women (79%) and 13 men (20%)—one participant did not report his/her gender—and the mean age was 22.34 (SD = 8.87), with the youngest participants being 18 and the oldest being 63. A sensitivity analysis indicated that the sample enabled to detect a moderate to high effect size of d = .70 with a power level of .80.

Material and Procedure

All participants completed an online budgeting task (Li et al., 2002) in which they had to distribute several budgets among items extracted from the French version of the Big Five Inventory (BFI-Fr, 45 items; Plaisant et al., 2010) and the French version of the reduced Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability scale (13 items; Verardi et al., 2010). This last tool was included to allow participants to select items clearly identifiable as socially desirable. Due to the comparative nature of the budgeting task itself, using all the 58 items included in these two tools was not possible. Thus, to assess the six constructs (i.e., Extraversion,

Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Stability, Openness, and SDR), three items per dimension were selected for a total of 18 items. These 18 items were selected based on a previous study (see Rudmann et al., submitted) conducted on 358 university Swiss students who answered the BFI-Fr and the Marlowe-Crowne scale in their complete versions. Items selection was based on factor analyses conducted on the participants' answers. For each of the six constructs under study, the three best items—i.e., those that obtained the higher factor loadings on their relevant factor—were selected and included in the budgeting task.

As typical in the budgeting task paradigm (e.g., Li et al., 2002), participants filled in three times the selected 18 items: using a low budget (36 Swiss Francs—CHF; ratio of 2 CHF per item), a medium budget (72 CHF; ratio of 4 CHF per item) and a high budget (108 CHF; ratio of 6 CHF per item). Participants could allocate a maximum of 10 CHF to each item. This methodology enables to assess the trade-offs made by participants when choosing between the selected 18 items. The goal was to measure variations in the purchase of valued features according to budgetary constraints. In this task, participants spent imaginary limited funds of money (i.e., budgets) to items, as if they had to "purchase" them. This principle assumes that, when having a low budget, people tend to assure first essential items and cannot afford luxuries. However, when having an extended budget, people spend more money on luxuries, as they can easily afford primary necessities. Thus, purchasing choices would reveal the "necessary" vs. "luxurious" nature of the valued features: necessities are more chosen when having less money (i.e., low budget), and luxuries are more chosen when having more money. Thus, the characteristics chosen in the low budgets (i.e., in the first 36 CHF) were seen as necessities, whereas characteristics chosen once those necessities were secured were seen as luxuries. To identify these luxuries, an incremental budget was calculated by subtracting the money allocated to each item in the medium budget to the money allocated in the high budget, thus representing the last 36 CHF.

Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions that differed as a function of the target of the communication. About half of participants ($N = 30$) were placed in a control condition where they had to complete the budgeting task to describe the ideal person they wanted to be ("Ideal self" condition). The participants' ideal self was retained as the target of the control condition given that what could be perceived as socially desirable for the self could differ strongly for each participant. The remaining participants ($N = 36$) were placed in an experimental condition where they had to complete the budgeting task to appear as a nice student in the eyes of their university professors ("Professors" condition). In this last condition, participants were explicitly instructed to provide answers to the budgeting task to be appreciated by their hierarchical superiors. Finally, participants answered demographic questions (e.g., age gender).

2.3.5.2 Results

Sums for each personality dimension for each budget in each condition were first computed. Incremental budgets (i.e., money spent in the high budget minus money spent in the medium budget) were calculated for each dimension in each condition. For each dimension, a difference score between the low budget (i.e., the first 36 CHF) and the incremental budget (i.e., the last 36 CHF) was then computed, and a one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare these difference scores between the two conditions. Then, a one-sample t-test was conducted to compare each difference score mean to zero: Whereas a positive difference score indicated that a given personality dimension was perceived as a necessity, a negative difference revealed that this dimension was perceived as a luxury. Means, standard deviations and difference scores for each dimension as function of the two experimental conditions are presented in Table 5.

Table 5

Means and difference scores between Low and Incremental Budgets for each dimension in each condition (Pilot study).

	"Professors" condition ($N = 36$)			"Ideal self" condition ($N = 30$)		
	LB	IB	DS	LB	IB	DS
Conscientiousness	11.53	5.06	6.47***	7	6.5	.5
Extraversion	4.78	5.28	-.5	6.93	5.07	1.87*
Agreeableness	4.53	5.61	-1.08	6.33	6.43	-.1
Openness to experience	5	6.58	-1.58^{t}	6.77	6.27	.5
Stability	3.58	6.31	-2.72**	3.63	5.6	-1.97*
Social desirability	6.58	7.17	-.58	5.33	6.13	-.8

Note. ^{t} $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$. A significant test indicates that the reported value is different from zero. LB = Low budget (i.e., the first 36 CHF), IB = Incremental budget (i.e., the last 36 CHF), DS = Difference score (i.e., the higher this score, the higher the dimension was perceived as a necessity; the lower this score, the higher the dimension was perceived as a luxury).

First, Conscientiousness obtained a more positive difference score in the "Professors" condition than in the "Ideal self" condition, $F(1, 64) = 14.66$, $p < .001$, $d = .96$. As shown in Table 5, Conscientiousness was significantly perceived as a necessity in the "Professors" condition, $t(35) = 5.65$, $p < .001$, $d = .94$, but neither a necessity nor a luxury in the "Ideal self" condition, , $t(29) = .49$, $p = .63$.

Extraversion obtained a more positive difference score in the "Ideal self" condition than in the "Professors" condition, $F(1, 64) = 6.17$, $p < .05$, $d = .62$. Indeed, in the "Ideal self" condition, Extraversion was significantly perceived as a necessity, $t(29) = 2.18$, $p < .05$, $d = .81$, but neither a necessity nor a luxury in the "Professors" condition, $t(35) = -1.00$, $p = .32$.

Openness to experience obtained a marginally more positive difference score in the "Professors" condition than in the "Ideal self" condition, $F(1, 64) = 2.95$, $p = .09$, $d = .43$. This dimension marginally appeared to be a luxury in the "Professors" condition, $t(35) = -1.75$, $p = .08$, $d = .59$, but neither a necessity nor a luxury in the "Ideal self" condition, $t(29) = .65$, $p = .52$.

Stability showed no significant variation in difference scores between the two conditions, $F(1, 64) = 0.37$, $p = .54$. Indeed, Stability was significantly perceived as a luxury both in the "Ideal self" condition, $t(29) = -2.18$, $p < .05$, $d = .59$, and in the "Professors" condition, $t(35) = -3.23$, $p < .01$, $d = .85$.

Finally, both Agreeableness and Social Desirability difference scores did not vary as function of the experimental conditions, $F(1, 64) = .49$, $p = .49$, and $F(1, 64) = .05$, $p = .82$ respectively. In addition, these two dimensions were identified neither as necessities nor as luxuries in the "Professors" condition, $t(35) = -1.11$, $p = .28$ and $t(35) = -.87$, $p = .39$ respectively, and in the "Ideal self" condition, $t(29) = -.10$, $p = .92$ and $t(29) = -1.27$, $p = .21$ respectively.

2.3.5.3 Discussion

The aim of this pilot study was to test the relevance of using the "budgeting task" paradigm (Li et al., 2002) to investigate self-presentation choices on the Big Five personality dimensions. As a starting point, we proposed that the Big Five personality dimensions could differ in terms of their necessity or luxury status to be perceived as socially desirable, and that this status could depend on the target of the self-presentation. Results obtained clearly supported this conceptualization. First, Conscientiousness was identified as the only necessary personality characteristic to possess to be appreciated in the "Professors" (experimental) condition. Second, other dimensions appeared to be perceived either as a necessity or a luxury, depending on the experimental conditions: Extraversion was the only one to be perceived as necessary to be appreciated in the "Ideal self" (control) condition, Openness to experience was perceived as a luxury only in the "Professors" condition, and Stability was perceived as a luxury characteristic to possess in both conditions. Finally, some dimensions (i.e., Agreeableness and SDR) appeared to be perceived neither as necessities nor luxuries, at least in the two contexts that were manipulated in this study. Such a lack of effect could be explained, at the very least, by the relatively low power of the pilot study, which only allowed the detection of relatively strong effects (d = .70). Studies 1 and 2 were thus conducted on larger samples of participants to overcome this potential limit of the pilot study.

To sum up, results obtained thus supported the relevance of the budgeting task to identify among the various personality dimensions those that are perceived as necessities to claim to possess to be appreciated by a specific audience. In other words, even if all the Big Five personality dimensions may be socially desirable (Bäckström & Björklund, 2013; Digman, 1997; Funder, 2001), some characteristics could be more important than others in some contexts compared to others. This pilot study thus provides preliminary evidence that the distinction between necessities and luxuries can be a helpful conceptual tool to understand

the motivational processes underlying SDR. In this respect, being able to distinguish those characteristics that are perceived as necessities from those that are identified as luxuries using the budgeting paradigm offers a new avenue for research on self-presentation and the social desirability attached to personality characteristics.

Study 1 was conducted to test the hypotheses that the necessity versus luxury status of personality dimensions would depend on social situations by manipulating the test-taking context in which self-presentation choices had to be made. As a reminder, we expected Conscientiousness to be perceived more as a necessity in evaluative work-like (Duty) situations involving university professors compared to more friendly and social (Sociality) situations involving friends. Second, we expected Extraversion (H2) and Agreeableness (H3) to be perceived more as necessities in Sociality situations than in Duty situations.

2.3.6 Study 1: Hypothesis Testing

2.3.6.1 Method

Participants

One hundred and twenty-six Swiss university students were recruited by giving their mailing address to receive the questionnaire link. This sample involved 81 women (64%) and 44 men (35%)—one participant did not report his/her gender—and the mean-age was 22.59 years old (SD = 3.68), with the youngest participant being 18 and the oldest being 45. A sensitivity analysis revealed that the sample enabled to detect a moderate effect size of d = .50 with a power level of .80.

Material and Procedure

The same material as in the pilot study (i.e., 15 items of the BFI-Fr and three items of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale short form C) was used in this study.

Furthermore, as in the pilot study, participants received an e-mail with a link leading to the questionnaire and were randomly assigned to two experimental conditions corresponding to two distinct social situations: A "Duty" condition ($N = 63$) and a "Sociality" condition ($N = 63$). These situations were created based on Rauthmann et al. (2014)'s taxonomy of situational characteristics. In the "Duty" condition, participants were provided a description of a social situation in which a university student was about to interact with one of his/her university professors to discuss about a working paper. In the "Sociality" condition, participants were provided a description of a social situation in which a university student was about to interact with friends in a bar to discuss about a trip they planned for the next holidays. In both conditions and as in the pilot study, participants had to allocate three different amounts of money (low budget: 36CHF; medium budget: 72CHF; high budget: 108CHF) across the 18 items (score from 0 to 10 for each item) in order to buy the characteristics that the student should have to be appreciated by his/her teacher ("Duty" condition) or his/her friends ("Sociality" condition). Finally, participants had to provide answers to demographic questions.

2.3.6.2 Results

As in the pilot study, sums for each personality dimension for each budget in each condition were first computed and incremental budgets (i.e., high budget minus medium budget) as well as difference scores (i.e., low budget minus incremental budget) were calculated. For each dimension, a one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare difference scores between the two experimental conditions and a one-sample t-test was conducted to compare each difference score mean to zero to conclude on the necessity/luxury status of each dimension across conditions. Means and difference scores for each dimension are presented in Table 6.

Table 6

Means and difference scores between Low and Incremental Budgets for each dimension in each condition (Study 1).

	"Duty" condition ($N = 63$)			"Sociality" condition ($N = 63$)		
	LB	IB	DS	LB	IB	DS
Conscientiousness	10.98	5.98	5***	4.76	5.3	-0.54
Extraversion	4.13	4.97	-.84	6.57	5	1.57*
Agreeableness	4.03	6.25	-2.22***	7.35	6.1	1.25*
Openness to experience	5.16	6.54	-1.38*	4.41	7.25	-2.84***
Stability	3.86	5.97	-2.11***	4.63	5.65	-1.02*
Social desirability	7.84	6.29	1.56*	8.27	6.7	1.57*

Note. ^{t} $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$. A significant test indicates that the reported value is different from zero. LB = Low budget (i.e., the first 36 CHF), IB = Incremental budget (i.e., the last 36 CHF), DS = Difference score (i.e., the higher this score, the higher the dimension was perceived as a necessity; the lower this score, the higher the dimension was perceived as a luxury).

First and as expected by H1, Conscientiousness obtained a more positive difference score in the "Duty" condition than in the "Sociality" condition, $F(1, 124) = 30.8$, $p < .001$, $d = 1$. As shown in Table 6, Conscientiousness was significantly perceived as a necessity in the "Duty" condition, $t(62) = 6.05$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.54$, but neither as a necessity nor as a luxury in the "Sociality" condition, $t(62) = -.97$, $p = .34$.

Second, and as expected by H2, Extraversion obtained a more positive difference score in the "Sociality" condition than in the "Duty" condition, $F(1, 124) = 8.78$, $p < .01$, $d = .53$. Indeed, in the "Sociality" condition, Extraversion was significantly perceived as a necessity, $t(62) = 2.52$, $p < .05$, $d = .64$, but neither as a necessity nor as a luxury in the "Duty" condition, $t(62) = -1.61$, $p = .11$.

Third, and as expected by H3, Agreeableness obtained a more positive difference score in the "Sociality" condition than in the "Duty" condition, $F(1, 124) = 21.1$, $p < .001$, $d = .83$. Agreeableness was significantly perceived as a necessity in the "Sociality" condition, $t(62) = 2.14$, $p < .05$, $d = .54$, but was perceived as a luxury in the "Duty" condition, $t(62) = -4.63$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.18$.

Fourth, Openness to experience obtained a marginally more negative difference score in the "Sociality" condition than in the "Duty" condition, $F(1, 124) = 2.96$, $p = .09$, $d = .31$. However, this dimension appeared to be a luxury in the "Sociality" condition, $t(62) = -4.68$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.19$, as well as in the "Duty" condition, $t(62) = -2.33$, $p < .05$, $d = .59$.

Fifth, Stability showed no significant variation in difference scores between the two conditions, $F(1, 124) = 2.42$, $p = .12$, but was significantly perceived as a luxury in the "Sociality" condition, $t(62) = -2.04$, $p < .05$, $d = .52$ and in the "Duty" condition, $t(62) = -4.24$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.08$.

Finally, Social desirability did not vary across conditions, $F(1, 124) = .01$, $p = .99$, but was perceived as a necessity in the "Duty" condition, $t(62) = 2.07$, $p < .05$, $d = .53$ and in the "Sociality" condition, $t(62) = 2.44$, $p < .05$, $d = .62$.

2.3.6.3 Discussion

Study 1 was conducted to provide a direct test of the three proposed hypotheses about the necessity vs. luxury status of some personality dimensions as function of social situations. Results obtained clearly support all the proposed hypotheses. In line with H1, results showed that Conscientiousness was more perceived by participants as a necessity in the Duty situation than in the Sociality situation. In line with H2 and H3 respectively, Extraversion and Agreeableness were both more seen as necessities in the Sociality situation than in the Duty situation. Study 1 thus confirmed that the necessity/luxury status of personality dimensions in self-presentation depends on the characteristics of the situation in which self-presentation occurs. In this regard, Study 1's findings illustrate the usefulness of the theoretical classification of situations proposed by Rauthmann et al. (2014) in investigating the impact of social contexts on the relative importance of the Big Five personality dimensions in self-presentation.

Yet, despite its merits, Study 1 remained limited by the fact that the items used in the budgeting task to capture the dimensions under investigation were extracted from a particular personality inventory, namely the BFI-Fr (Plaisant et al., 2010). One may wonder if results can be replicated using items assessing the same dimensions but extracted from a different measurement tool. Study 2 was thus conducted to replicate Study 1's findings with a different measure of the Big Five personality dimensions. All hypotheses were the same as in Study 1.

2.3.7 Study 2: Robustness Check

2.3.7.1 Method

Participants

Four hundred and fifty-six first-year psychology Swiss students were recruited in exchange for course credits. This sample involved 375 women (82%) and 76 men (13%)—five participants did not report their gender—and the mean-age was 20.67 years old (*SD* = 3.40), with the youngest participant being 18 and the oldest being 44. A sensitivity analysis revealed that the sample enabled to detect a low effect size of $d = .26$ with a power level of .80.

Material and Procedure

The material used in this study differed to some extent from Study 1. First, items were selected from the BFI-2 (Soto & John, 2017b) rather than being extracted from the BFI-Fr (Plaisant et al., 2010). The 60 items from the BFI-2 were adapted in French using a back translation procedure (Rudmann et al., submitted): they were first translated in French by a native French speaker fluent in English and then back translated in English by a native English speaker fluent in French. The back translated version of the BFI-2 was compared to the original version and the few differences observed were reconciled through discussion between the two translators. To create a material adapted for the budgeting task, three positively worded items for each personality dimension were selected based on factor loadings. Finally, the same three items extracted from the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale used in the pilot study and in Study 1 were added to the 15 selected items of the BFI-2. The total number of items proposed to the participants was identical to Study 1 (i.e., 18 items; three per dimension).

Second, the budgeting task was modified to vary the amount of money that participants could allocate for each item. Indeed, based on the original budgeting task developed by Li et al. (2002), participants of the pilot study and of Study 1 could allocate a maximum amount of 10 CHF per item. Although limiting the maximum level of resource that can be spent per characteristic is mandatory in the budgeting task to mimic the satisfaction of needs, the level of this limitation could possibly impact the resource distribution across items. To diminish this constraint, the scale for each item was expanded from 0 to 12 CHF to enable participants to "buy" at their maximum value (12 CHF) all the three items of one dimension with the low budget (36 CHF), two dimensions with the medium budget (72 CHF) and three dimensions with the high budget (108 CHF).

As in Study 1, all participants received an e-mail with a link leading to the questionnaire and were assigned to one of the two experimental conditions used in Study 1: one with a Duty situation and one with a Sociality situation. Hence, 301 of the participants were assigned to the Duty Condition, and 155 to the Sociality Condition. Yet, participants were part of two cohorts and thus were not randomly distributed between conditions. The first cohort ($N = 301$)[14] completed the questionnaire in the "Duty" condition in Fall 2020 and the second cohort ($N = 155$) completed the questionnaire in the "Sociality" condition in Fall 2021. Participants of both cohorts had to complete the budgeting task and finally answer the same demographic questions as in Study 1.

2.3.7.2 Results

Collected data were analysed through the same procedure used in previous studies. Sums for each personality dimension for each budget in each condition were first computed

[14] In the Duty Condition, the participants were the same as in Study 2 of the first research line (see footnote 9).

and incremental budgets (i.e., high budget minus medium budget) as well as difference scores (i.e., low budget minus incremental budget) were calculated. One-way ANOVAs contrasting the two conditions as predictors and one-sample t-tests were conducted on each personality dimension. Means and difference scores for each dimension are presented in Table 7.

Table 7

Means and difference scores between Low and Incremental Budgets for each dimension in each condition (Study 2).

	"Duty" condition (N = 301)			"Sociality" condition (N = 155)		
	LB	IB	DS	LB	IB	DS
Conscientiousness	9.56	6.96	2.6***	3.98	4.9	-0.92**
Extraversion	5.92	5.91	.01	8.41	6.19	2.22***
Agreeableness	4.72	5.42	-0.7***	8.95	6.74	2.21***
Openness to experience	4.18	5.05	-0.86***	2.84	5.58	-2.74***
Stability	5.68	6.27	-0.58*	4.99	5.62	-0.63*
Social desirability	5.93	6.4	-0.47^{t}	6.83	6.97	-0.14

Note. ^{t} $p < .10$. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$. A significant test indicates that the reported value is different from zero. LB = Low budget (i.e., the first 36 CHF), IB = Incremental budget (i.e., the last 36 CHF), DS = Difference score (i.e., the higher this score, the higher the dimension was perceived as a necessity; the lower this score, the higher the dimension was perceived as a luxury).

First, in line with H1 and replicating Study 1's results, Conscientiousness obtained a more positive difference score in the "Duty" condition than in the "Sociality" condition, $F(1, 454) = 65.01$, $p < .001$, $d = .76$. As shown in Table 7, Conscientiousness was significantly perceived as a necessity in the "Duty" condition, $t(300) = 9.35$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.08$, but as a luxury in the "Sociality" condition, , $t(154) = -3.29$, $p < .01$, $d = .53$.

Second, in line with H2 and also replicating Study 1's results, Extraversion obtained a more positive difference score in the "Sociality" condition than in the "Duty" condition, $F(1, 454) = 29.27$, $p < .001$, $d = .51$. Indeed, in the "Sociality" condition, Extraversion was significantly perceived as a necessity, $t(154) = 6.03$, $p < .001$, $d = .97$, but neither as a necessity nor as a luxury in the "Duty" condition, $t(300) = .03$, $p = .98$.

Third, in line with H3 and with Study 1's results, Agreeableness obtained a more positive difference score in the "Sociality" condition than in the "Duty" condition, $F(1, 454) = 54.22$, $p < .001$, $d = .69$. Agreeableness was significantly perceived as a necessity in the "Sociality" condition, $t(154) = 5.66$, $p < .001$, $d = .91$, but was perceived as a luxury in the "Duty" condition, $t(300) = -3.49$, $p < .001$, $d = .40$.

Fourth, in line with Study 1's results, Openness to experience obtained a more negative difference score in the "Sociality" condition than in the "Duty" condition, $F(1, 454) = 20.78$, $p < .001$, $d = .31$. This dimension appeared to be a luxury in the "Sociality" condition, $t(154) = -8.07$, $p < .001$, $d = 1.30$, as well as in the "Duty" condition, $t(300) = -3.62$, $p < .001$, $d = .42$.

Fifth, in line with Study 1's results, Stability showed no significant variation in difference scores between the two conditions, $F(1, 454) = .016$, $p = .90$, but was significantly perceived as a luxury in the "Sociality" condition, $t(154) = -2.05$, $p < .05$, $d = .33$ and in the "Duty" condition, $t(300) = -2.38$, $p < .05$, $d = .27$.

Finally but contrary to Study 1's results and, although Social Desirability did not significantly vary across conditions, $F(1, 454) = .52$, $p = .47$, it was marginally perceived as a luxury in the "Duty" condition, $t(300) = -1.73$, $p = .08$, $d = .20$ and neither a necessity nor a luxury in the "Sociality" condition, $t(154) = -.37$, $p = .72$.

2.3.7.3 Discussion

Study 2 was conducted to replicate Study 1's findings with a different material (items extracted from the BFI-2 with a range from 0 to 12). Results obtained clearly replicated these findings among an independent participant sample. As observed in Study 1, Conscientiousness was perceived unambiguously as a necessity for positive self-presentation in the "Duty" condition but as a luxury in the "Sociality" condition[15]. Conversely, Extraversion and Agreeableness were perceived as necessities for positive self-presentation only in the "Sociality" condition, although the latter was perceived as a luxury in the "Duty" condition. Finally, Study 2's findings replicated those of Study 1 on Openness to experience and Stability, which were perceived as luxuries in both situations. However, and contrary to what was observed in Study 1, items extracted from the social desirability scale were not perceived as necessary for positive self-presentation. This inconsistency will be discussed later with regard to the specific features of the budgeting task. Nonetheless, taken as a whole, results obtained in Study 2 replicated those of Study 1 for most of the Big Five personality dimensions, although these dimensions were assessed with items extracted from a different personality inventory.

---

[15] The fact that Conscientiousness was significantly perceived as a luxury in the "Sociality" condition (which was not the case in Study 1) could be explained by the higher power level of Study 2 ($N = 456$) compared to Study 1 ($N = 126$).

2.3.8 General discussion

The aim of this research was to investigate the distinction between necessities and luxuries in self-presentation strategies in order to identify the dimensions with the highest probability to be faked and to determine the most efficient self-presentation strategy in a given social situation. The three studies demonstrated that such a distinction is particularly relevant when it comes to measuring personality dimensions with self-reported measures. As a first step, we conducted a preliminary study to evaluate the applicability of the budgeting task to choices in self-presentation strategies. This pilot study showed compelling results indicating that such task could be used to differentiate between necessities and luxuries to reach self-presentational goals. More particularly, it was observed that personality dimensions may or may not be necessary characteristics to highlight to gain social approval from a given target of the communication: Whereas Conscientiousness was perceived as a necessity when the target was hierarchical superiors, Extraversion was perceived as a necessity when it was about portraying the ideal self.

In a second step, we conducted two studies to test specific hypotheses regarding the impact of social situations on the necessity versus luxury status of personality dimensions based on the framework proposed by Rauthmann et al. (2014) about situational characteristics. Results obtained in Study 1 and replicated in Study 2 showed, as predicted by H1, that Conscientiousness was perceived more as a necessity in Duty situations than in Sociality situations. Results also showed, as predicted by H2 and H3 respectively, that Extraversion and Agreeableness were more perceived as necessities in Sociality situations than in Duty situations. Moreover, the high degree of replication between these two studies should be considered even more compelling given the task participants were asked to perform. Remember that, when they completed the budgeting task and allocated the amount of money available in the three budgets (low: 36 CHF, moderate: 72 CHF, high: 108 CHF),

participants were unaware of the various computations that would be operated on their allocation choices. Such lack of awareness thus prevents any interpretation of results based on strategical responding from the participants during the task or demand characteristics (Orne, 1962). Instead, it reinforces the idea that the observed variations in the necessity or luxury status of personality dimensions for self-presentation reflected participants' perceptions about the relative importance of these dimensions to be appreciated in the targeted social situations.

Beyond empirically demonstrating that the distinction between necessities and luxuries is relevant to study strategic self-presentation, the present research also has important theoretical implications for research on SDR, and more generally faking behaviors, in test-taking situations. Over the years, many research efforts have been devoted to understanding the psychological dynamics behind such behaviors in assessment situations (e.g., recruitment, clinical assessment). However, past research has often overlooked the role played by social contexts and respondent goals in the implementation of elaborate response strategies. In line with recent work conducted on recruitment contexts (Roulin & Krings, 2020), the present research highlights that respondents in general and applicants in particular could develop highly sophisticated self-presentation strategies depending on the social situation in which they answer a personality inventory. Indeed, rather than faking on all socially desirable dimensions at hand, they might choose to fake their answers on those that truly matter, that is on necessary dimensions. Using such strategies could be highly socially adapted by limiting faking behaviors to only a reduced number of (relevant) items of a personality inventory, hence decreasing the probability of being detected as a faker.

Due to their relative complexity, such strategy could be hard to detect by classical psychometric methods used to spot deception, such as social desirability scales. These scales could be ineffective due to the use of socially desirable—but unnecessary—items in the specific test-taking situation. As an illustration, we observed that the Social desirability

dimension, which was assessed with items extracted from one of the most standard social desirability scale (i.e., the Marlowe-Crowne scale; Crowne & Marlowe, 1960), did not show stable estimates of its necessity or luxury status across studies. For instance, this dimension appeared to be a necessity in the "Duty" and the "Sociality" conditions in Study 1 but not in Study 2. Although puzzling at first glance, such a lack of robustness could reflect a more general flaw of social desirability scales to assess elaborate strategic response style (for a review see Lanz et al., 2022; Uziel, 2010), as they contain very generic socially desirable items whose relevance may vary depending on the presence of other more crucial items to gaining social approval in a given social situation. Given that the budgeting task requires to allocate limited sums of money among the proposed items, it is possible that the change in material—coupled with the modification of the rating scale—operated between Studies 1 and 2 altered the relative importance of social desirability items compared with those of the other items used to measure the Big Five dimensions. This possibility highlights one of the particularities of the budgeting task, and consequently of the status of necessity or luxury attributed in this task to the characteristics studied: The necessity or luxury status of a given characteristic is not absolute but is relative to the other options available (Li et al., 2002).

Despite the contribution of the present studies to the literature on self-presentation in personality inventories, they remain limited on several aspects. Firstly, although two measurement tools were used to assess personality (i.e., BFI-Fr, BFI2), results may not be generalizable to other measurement instruments that are not based on a five-dimensional conception of personality, such as the HEXACO model (K. Lee & Ashton, 2004). This limitation is especially relevant as the necessity or luxury status of personality dimensions may be dependent on the type of items included in the chosen measurement tool. Future research should thus confirm the present findings by using more diverse personality inventories. Secondly, the studies carried out focused on two social situations (i.e., Duty and

Sociality) due to the clear affordances of personality traits they offer (Rauthmann et al., 2014). However, future research should investigate other types of situations included in the so-called Situational Eight Diamonds (Rauthmann et al., 2014) to test the generalizability of the present findings to other affordances between personality dimensions and social situations. Thirdly, studies are limited regarding the population they focused on, namely university students. Although this population allowed us to test the usefulness of necessity/luxury distinction in strategic self-presentation, it nevertheless presents specific characteristics that may not be generalizable to other populations (Arnett, 2008; Sears, 1986). Future research will need to study more representative populations, especially those for whom the use of self-presentation strategies may present a much higher stake (e.g., applicants in recruitment contexts; Griffith & Peterson, 2011; Roulin & Krings, 2020).

In conclusion, the present research opens new perspectives on how to conceptualize the strategic choices that individuals may make when faced with personality measurement tools. Taking this distinction into account allows for a better reflection of the complexity of self-presentation strategies issued in specific social contexts. In this respect, considering the distinction between necessities and luxuries enables a greater degree of specificity in strategic self-presentation and offers a better understanding of who says what to whom and when.

2.4 How to Catch Social Chameleons in the Act? A Meta-analytical Perspective on Social Clear-sightedness in Social Situations[16]

2.4.1 Abstract

Socially Desirable Responding (SDR) detrimentally affects the validity of personality self-reports, particularly in high-stake situations. However, the precise nature and operationalisation of SDR remain ambiguous, navigating between situational and dispositional considerations. The construct of social clear-sightedness (SC) aims at integrating these considerations. SC represents a stable dispositional knowledge of social desirability, which enables to produce SDR according to the situation and stakes at hand. The present research aimed to examine whether clear-sighted individuals elaborate self-presentations which are strategically adapted to the situation and stakes involved. Using Big Five personality inventories and the self-presentation paradigm, four studies (N_{tot} = 1,193) were conducted. These studies experimentally manipulated the type of social situations (work- or friend-related) and evaluative pressure (high or low) and were meta-analysed using parameter-based MASEM. Meta-analytical results first confirmed that SC was a cross-situationally stable knowledge of social desirability. Second, they revealed that clear-sighted individuals adapted their self-descriptions based on the type of social situation at hand, and especially under high evaluative pressure. In other words, they used their knowledge of social desirability only when necessary and only on the personality dimensions socially desirable in

[16] Rudmann, O., Meier, E., Smeding, A., Butera, F., and Dompnier B. (in preparation). How to catch social chameleons in the act? A meta-analytical perspective on social clear-sightedness in social situations. Instructions and material of the studies are presented in section 5.3 of the Appendices.

the situation (i.e., Conscientiousness in work-related situations and Extraversion in friend-related situations). In sum, the present research not only provides support to and a better understanding of SC by delineating the conditions of its potential use in self-presentation strategies, but also stresses the detrimental impact its use can have on personality measurement.

Keywords: personality measurement, social clear-sightedness, socially desirable responding, structural equation modelling

How to Catch Social Chameleons in the Act? A Meta-analytical Perspective on Social Clear-sightedness in Social Situations

Non-cognitive measures based on self-reports are routinely used in psychology to assess individuals' personality characteristics (Chan, 2009; Paulhus & Vazire, 2007; Sassenberg & Ditrich, 2019; Schwarz, 1999). Various measurement tools were developed to capture such individual differences (McCrae & John, 1992; Soto & John, 2017b). Yet, despite the huge amount of research effort devoted to ensure their validity, these personality inventories were shown to be sensitive to several response biases, among which Socially Desirable Responding (SDR; Paulhus, 2002). SDR—the tendency to answer self-reports to convey a positive image of oneself—negatively impacts the validity of self-reported measures, and more so in high-stake situations (Dilchert et al., 2006; Tett & Simonet, 2011; Ziegler et al., 2011): The higher the evaluative pressure in the situation at hand—e.g., applying for a job—the more likely individuals are to try providing answers that portray them in a positive light.

Over the years, research has continuously questioned the very nature of SDR (Griffith & Peterson, 2011; Lanz et al., 2022; Paunonen & LeBel, 2012; Uziel, 2010): Is SDR to be considered a context-specific phenomenon (i.e., a situated response set) or a stable personality tendency (i.e., a psychological disposition)? Although various proposals have been made to address this question (e.g., Bensch, Maass, et al., 2019; Ellingson & McFarland, 2011; Goffin & Boyd, 2009; Levashina & Campion, 2006; McFarland & Ryan, 2006; Roulin et al., 2016; Tett & Simonet, 2011; Ziegler et al., 2015), no definitive answer has been provided to date. In this debate, a new approach to SDR has recently been developed to articulate these situational and dispositional perspectives within the same theoretical model (Rudmann et al., submitted). This model assumes that SDR should be conceived as the situationally motived manifestation of a dispositional characteristic that would reflect the individuals' general knowledge of social

desirability. Named *social clear-sightedness*, this construct aims at differentiating individuals in the degree to which they know how to identify socially desirable answers in a given social situation. Those high in social clear-sightedness should be able to use this knowledge at will if their goal is to be appreciated by others in the given situation. The aim of the present research is to extend this theoretical framework by investigating when and how clear-sighted individuals use this knowledge to reach self-presentational goals.

2.4.2 SDR as the Motivated Use of "Social Clear-sightedness"

SDR has been defined as "the tendency for an individual to present him or herself, in test-taking situations, in a way that makes the person look positive with regard to culturally derived norms and standards" (Ganster et al., 1983, p. 322), "regardless of their true feelings about an issue or topic" (Podsakoff et al., 2003, p. 881). SDR has been spotted to produce systematic measurement errors in self-reports (Burns & Christiansen, 2011; Meehl & Hathaway, 1946; Podsakoff et al., 2003), particularly in high-stake situations (Booth-Kewley et al., 1992; Ellingson et al., 2007; Hu & Connelly, 2021; Novo et al., 2022; Paulhus, 1991). However, research—especially in personality psychology—has not yet reached a definitive consensus on how to operationalize and measure SDR, as well as how to quantify its genuine impact on self-reports (Griffith & Peterson, 2011; Lanz et al., 2022; Paunonen & LeBel, 2012; Uziel, 2010). Over the years, many methodologies were developed to investigate SDR, unfortunately with rather limited success. One of the most emblematic methods is the use of social desirability scales (see for reviews Lanz et al., 2022; Uziel, 2010), which were designed to directly assess SDR. However, such scales were shown to have many shortcomings, among which their own susceptibility to SDR (Griffith & Peterson, 2008; Pauls & Crost, 2004; Viswesvaran & Ones, 1999), their failure to increase the predictive validity of the self-report measures (Christiansen et al., 1994; Hough, 1998; Kurtz et al., 2008; Ones et al., 1996; Piedmont et al., 2000), and their inability to disentangle individuals who possess to higher

extent an actual socially desirable personality characteristic from those who adopt a strategic response style (Bensch, Maass, et al., 2019; de Vries et al., 2014; Goffin & Christiansen, 2003; Lanz et al., 2022; Ones et al., 1996; D. B. Smith & Ellingson, 2002).

To go beyond these limitations, Rudmann et al. (submitted) recently proposed a new theoretical and methodological approach to SDR based on a psychological construct named "social clear-sightedness" (SC). SC is defined as the "ability to identify social expectations in a specific social context" (Rudmann et al., submitted, p.131 of the present thesis, section 2.2.6). SC is assumed to reflect individuals' general knowledge of the social desirability of (personality) dimensions in a given social situation. This knowledge is assessed by asking individuals to answer several self-report measures of relevant psychological constructs (e.g., the Big Five personality dimensions) with the aim of being appreciated by a meaningful evaluative audience (e.g., university teachers when the participants are university students), that is answering the tools with social desirability instructions (Dompnier et al., 2009; Smeding et al., 2017, 2022). Accordingly, the more individuals are able to provide socially desirable answers (or to avoid providing socially undesirable answers for socially undesirable constructs), the higher their level of SC. In this sense, SC is a performative measure of the knowledge of social desirability that is built on the individuals' ability to respond appropriately to a self-presentation task. SDR is thus neither considered as a response set nor as a personality trait but as a situated and motivated use of SC (Rudmann et al., submitted).

In line with this conceptualization, Rudmann et al. (submitted) first showed, using confirmatory factor analyses, that participants' answers with social desirability instructions to a personality inventory assessing the Big Five personality dimensions (McCrae & John, 1992) were organized by a single latent factor corresponding to the theoretical definition of social clear-sightedness as a generalized knowledge of social desirability. Furthermore, the relationships between this latent factor and participants' answers with social desirability

instructions were shown to be stable across contexts that varied in terms of evaluative pressure (i.e., visible or anonymous contexts). Finally, the latent factor was more related to self-description with honest instructions on some personality dimensions, such as Conscientiousness when participants were induced to believe that a hierarchical superior would have access to their answers (i.e., a "visibility" condition) than when the anonymity of their answers was guaranteed (i.e., a "anonymity" condition). In other words, the more individuals were clear-sighted, the more they altered their answers under honest instructions to gain social approval when they were in a situation with a high level of evaluative pressure. However, these individuals did not alter their "honest" answers as much when there was less evaluative pressure.

Yet, while Rudmann et al. (submitted) provided preliminary support for the construct of social clear-sightedness, some questions remain unanswered. Indeed, while it appeared that clear-sighted individuals used their general knowledge of social desirability to strategically alter the way in which they described themselves with honest instructions, they did not operate these modifications on all characteristics, but only on some of them. For instance, when university students were asked by a university professor who claimed to have access to their responses to answer honestly to a personality inventory, participants higher in SC increased their score especially on Conscientiousness. To explain such results, Rudmann et al. (submitted) proposed that clear-sighted individuals might not only use appropriately their knowledge of social desirability but may be able to differentiate dimensions regarding their respective efficiency for gaining approval from a given audience in a specific situation. Indeed, such situationally-dependent aspect of response distortion mirrored results obtained by Bensch and colleagues (2019) who showed that faking differed across personality dimensions and according to situation demands, thus showing that faking occurred predominantly on items perceived as relevant in the situation.

Stated otherwise, social clear-sightedness would enable adopting highly elaborate self-presentation strategies designed to maximize the desired impact on the targets of the communication and, at the same time, minimize the risk of being detected as a faker. Both these goals would be reached by altering answers only on the most relevant dimensions. But how can these relevant dimensions be identified since they can change from one situation to another? Recent research conducted on the impact of social contexts on self-presentation strategies provides some answers to this question.

2.4.3 Necessities and Luxuries in Self-Presentation

When it comes to self-presentation strategies, considering social contexts in which they are deployed is of the utmost importance (Goffman, 1959; Snyder, 1987). Like actors adapting their behavior to the role they are performing in a play, individuals who manage their impression seek to align the image they wish to convey to others with certain norms and standards relevant in these contexts (Goffman, 1959). In this respect, research already showed that SDR varies cross-situationally (Bensch, Maass, et al., 2019; Hu & Connelly, 2021), and the way in which people describe their personality changes as function of social contexts. For instance, a high level of Conscientiousness is more often reported in work-related contexts and also more expected in recruitment contexts (Donahue & Harary, 1998; Grover & Furnham, 2021; Robinson, 2009). In such contexts, Conscientiousness appears to be a highly important personality dimension to possess—or to claim to possess—to be positively evaluated by hierarchical superiors or recruiters. In the same vein, applicants were shown to adapt their self-descriptions on personality inventory to increase their fit with the organizations' cultural values where they applied for a job (Roulin & Krings, 2020). It thus appears that possessing some personality characteristics may be strongly expected in some social contexts, and that individuals who wish to be appreciated in these contexts may be tempted to focus their self-presentation strategy on these characteristics as a priority.

However, one remaining difficulty is to differentiate between characteristics that are important in a particular context and those that are not or less important. One way to deal with this issue could be to consider the characteristics of the social contexts themselves, since they can provide information about the social expectations these contexts may generate. In this respect, research conducted by Rauthmann et al. (2014) is of special interest. Indeed, these researchers showed that social situations could be characterized by eight dimensions, labelled as the Situational Eight DIAMONDS: Duty, Intellect, Adversity, Mating, pOsitivity, Negativity, Deception, and Sociality. Furthermore, each of these dimensions was related to specific situational expectancies and personality affordances. For instance, social situations strongly characterized by the Duty dimension are work- or study-related, involving colleagues or hierarchical relationships, at workplace or university, and require people involved in them to possess personality traits related to work performance, such as Conscientiousness (Rauthmann et al., 2014). As another example, social situations strongly characterized by the Sociality dimension imply more informal settings like communicating or eating, with friends, family members, or spouses, in places such as bars, cafés, or restaurants, and require personality characteristics relevant in social interactions, such as Extraversion and Agreeableness (Rauthmann et al., 2014).

Although not designed initially to provide insights on self-presentation strategies and SDR, Rauthmann et al. (2014)'s dimensional characterization of social situations was recently used as a theoretical basis to study self-presentation choices. In particular, Rudmann et al. (in preparation) investigated two specific types of situations—Duty and Sociality—with the goal to identify which personality dimensions were seen as more socially desirable to possess in each of them using a budgeting task (Li et al., 2002). Already applied to different research questions (e.g., Choy et al., 2023; Edlund & Sagarin, 2010; Patel et al., 2023), the budgeting task helps to unveil the trade-offs people have to make when disentangling necessary

characteristics (i.e., those that people pursue in priority) from luxurious ones (i.e., those that people pursue when their essential needs are already satisfied). To do so, individuals are asked in this task to "buy" psychological characteristics with more or less restricted budgets (i.e., within-participants small, medium, and large budgets). In other words, characteristics that are selected with a restricted budget are perceived by individuals as being necessary, whereas characteristics that are selected only with the remaining money of a larger budget are considered as being luxurious.

Using this methodology, Rudmann et al. (in preparation) showed that Conscientiousness was consistently the only personality dimension that was "bought" with a small budget when participants had to portray a fictitious person who had all the qualities to be appreciated in a Duty situation (i.e., a work relationship with a hierarchical superior). On the other hand, they observed that Extraversion and Agreeableness were the only two personality dimensions that participants bought with a small budget when they had to describe a fictitious person who had all the qualities to be appreciated in a Sociality situation (i.e., a conversation with friends in a bar). Stated differently, whereas Conscientiousness was perceived as a necessary personality characteristic to possess to be appreciated in a Duty situation, this was not the case in a Sociality situation, where the perceived necessary characteristics to possess to be liked were Extraversion and Agreeableness. To sum up, these results revealed that possessing some specific personality dimensions is of special importance to be appreciated by others, but this importance can dramatically vary as function of the social situations in which individuals are embedded. As far as self-presentation strategies are concerned, being able to disentangle necessary socially desirable characteristics from luxurious ones would be a highly useful ability. Moreover, faking specifically on necessary characteristics could have a high level of efficiency to be appreciated by the audience involved in these situations and to reduce risks of being detected as a faker.

2.4.4 Hypotheses and Research Overview

Building on the research program presented above (Rudmann et al., submitted, in preparation), the present research was conducted to investigate the possibility that clear-sighted individuals would be able to engage in elaborate self-presentation strategies, that is to alter their answers with honest instructions to a personality inventory only on necessary dimensions. Such strategic alteration would appear to a higher extent in situations where evaluative pressure is high rather than low, that is when individuals high in SC think that their answers with honest instructions would be visible—vs. anonymous—to a meaningful audience.

More particularly, we expected the relationships between SC and self-descriptions with honest instructions to vary as function of the characteristics of the situation (Duty vs. Sociality) and of their level of evaluative pressure (high: visibility vs. low: anonymity). Based on research showing that the necessary or luxurious status of personality dimensions varies across situations (Rudmann et al., in preparation), we expected the relationship between SC and Conscientiousness (H1) to be higher in a highly evaluative (visible) duty situation compared to other types of social situations, replicating previous findings (Rudmann et al., submitted). In addition, we also expected the relationships between SC and Extraversion (H2) and Agreeableness (H3) to be higher in a highly evaluative (visible) sociality situation compared to other types of social situations.

To test these hypotheses, we conducted four studies experimentally manipulating the type of social situations (Duty vs. Sociality) as well as their level of evaluative pressure (high: visibility vs. low: anonymity), and in which participants were asked to describe themselves on personality inventories. Finally, rather than being analysed separately by studies, collected data were meta-analysed and hypotheses tested using parameter-based meta-analytic structural equation modelling (MASEM; see Cheung & Cheung, 2016; Jak & Cheung, 2020).

2.4.5 Meta-Analytical Study

2.4.5.1 Method

Samples and Procedure

The overall data set contained 1,193 participants, including 820 women and 276 men (97 participants reported their gender as "other" or did not report it at all). The total mean age was 22.65 (SD_{age} = 3.77). All participants were Swiss students recruited in the same university on a voluntary basis, either on the general campus, or in an introductory course on methods in psychology in exchange for credits. After agreeing to participate in the study, they received an email with a valid token that allowed them to respond anonymously to an online questionnaire. Participants were then randomly assigned to the experimental conditions detailed below. After an introductory page on the online questionnaire, all participants were asked to answer twice two other measurement tools (see their description below): the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale, and a Big Five Personality Inventory. The first time, participants were asked to answer these two scales under honest instructions (i.e., "*It is important that you answer as honestly as possible"*; see McFarland & Ryan, 2000). The second time, they were asked to answer these items under social desirability instructions, that is to answer in order to be appreciated by the target of the questionnaire (i.e., a teacher or a master's degree student, depending on the condition). Participants always answered the questionnaire in the same order: first under honest instructions, and then under social desirability instructions. This ensured to obtain uncontaminated measures under honest instructions (see Dompnier et al., 2009; Ellingson et al., 1999; Smeding et al., 2017). At the end of each questionnaire, participants received automatically computed feedback on their personality—based on their answers on the personality questionnaire under honest instructions—and were fully debriefed.

Conditions. In total, four types of experimental conditions were used across the four studies, each study comprising a combination of two condition types: "Duty with low evaluative pressure", "Duty with high evaluative pressure", "Sociality with low evaluative pressure", and "Sociality with high evaluative pressure" (see Table 8 for the distribution of participants in conditions across the four studies). The distinction between Duty and Sociality conditions was inspired by Rauthmann et al. (2014) and based on Rudmann et al. (in preparation). In all conditions, participants read a cover story on the first page of the online questionnaire. This cover story was used to increase the overall credibility of the study and to provide students information about the situational expectancies in terms of self-presentation strategies. In the two Duty conditions, this cover story informed participants that a university teacher interested in studying students' personality, and especially the characteristics of sympathetic students who have what it takes to be appreciated, conducted this research. In the two Sociality conditions, in contrast, the cover story indicated that a master's degree student conducted this survey for a new university association whose aim was to promote friendship. Thus, the master's degree student was supposedly interested in studying students' personality, and especially the characteristics of students that have what it takes to be liked by their peers.

In the two conditions implying high evaluative pressure, the e-mail received by participants was already manipulated, in that it was personally addressed to participants (i.e., "Dear *First name Last name*, …"). Once on the online questionnaire, participants read the cover story in which some details were added to increase the evaluative pressure: they were informed that their answers would not be anonymous and that they would receive non-confidential automatically computed feedback on their personality profile to help the person—teacher or master's degree student, depending on the condition—who conducted the study to know them better. Actually, participation was anonymous in all conditions since no personally identifiable information was collected from participants. In the two conditions

implying low evaluative pressure, on the contrary, the e-mail was not nominative, and participants were told in the cover story text that answering the questionnaire would help them know themselves better and that their answers would be totally anonymous. Overall, the research was performed in accordance with the ethical standards of the Declaration of Helsinki.

Table 8

Distribution of participants in conditions across the four studies involved in the meta-analysis

Study	Condition n°	Sample		Condition type
		N	% of females	
1	1	143	60.84	Duty with low EP
	2	147	72.79	Duty with high EP
2	3	198	79.29	Duty with low EP
	4	198	76.77	Duty with high EP
3	5	107	61.68	Duty with high EP
	6	103	63.11	Sociality with high EP
4	7	144	67.36	Sociality with low EP
	8	153	58.17	Sociality with high EP

Note. EP = Evaluative Pressure. Low evaluative pressure corresponds to anonymity conditions, whereas high evaluative pressure corresponds to visibility conditions.

Material

Social desirability scale. As in Rudmann et al. (submitted), the material included a social desirability scale to assess the participants' spontaneous tendency to provide socially desirable answers under honest instructions. In addition, when answered under social desirability instructions, the social desirability scale was used as a proxy of SC since it captured the participants knowledge of social desirability of items designed to be highly

saturated by social desirability. The short form of the French version of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Verardi et al., 2010) was used to assess participants' tendency to adopt socially desirable behaviours. This scale consists of 13 items reflecting two types of behaviours: highly socially desirable but unlikely (e.g., "I have never deliberately said something that could hurt someone"), or socially undesirable but likely (e.g., "It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged"). Participants indicated for each item whether it was true or false for them. Their scores were calculated by summing the number of socially desirable behaviours chosen as true plus the number of socially undesirable behaviours chosen as false. Scores thus ranged from 0 to 13. This 13-item scale was used twice in all four studies, first under honest instruction, and second under social desirability instruction.

Personality inventories. For Study 1, the French version of the Big Five Inventory (45-item BFI-Fr; Plaisant et al., 2010) was used to assess personality dimensions. Respondents were asked to indicate how much they agreed with the statement (i.e., "I see myself as someone who…") on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*) for each item of the Big Five model of personality: Openness (10 items; e.g., "Is original, comes up with new ideas"), Conscientiousness (9 items; e.g., "Does a thorough job"), Extraversion (8 items; e.g., "Is talkative"), Agreeableness (10 items; e.g., "Is helpful and unselfish with others"), and Neuroticism (8 items; e.g., "Is depressed, blue"). For Study 2, 3, and 4, a more recent version of the BFI, namely the BFI-2 (Soto & John, 2017b) was used. Since no French translation of this tool already existed at that time, items were retrieved from Rudmann et al. (submitted), who used a back translation method. This instrument contains 60 statements with which participants had to indicate how much they agreed on the same scale as in the BFI-Fr. The BFI-2 entails 12 items per dimension: Openness (e.g., "Is curious about many different things"), Conscientiousness (e.g., "Is systematic, likes to keep things in

order"), Extraversion (e.g., "Is outgoing, sociable"), Agreeableness (e.g., "Is compassionate, has a soft heart"), and Neuroticism (e.g., "Is moody, has up and down mood swings"). This 45- or 60-item Big Five Inventory was used twice in each study, first under honest instruction, and second under social desirability instruction.

2.4.5.2 Analytic Strategy

Collected data were analysed using a parameter-based MASEM (Cheung & Cheung, 2016; Jak & Cheung, 2020) following a three-step procedure. First, confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) were performed in each condition of each study to assess social clear-sightedness as a latent construct and its relationships with all observed variables. Second, based on the factor loadings obtained in the first step, a meta-analytic analysis was carried out for each variable (12 in total, including the five personality dimensions and the social desirability scale under honest and social desirability instructions). Third, based on I^2 indices, meta-analytic analyses showing significant variability were run again with the addition of a moderator opposing conditions with high evaluative pressure (i.e., "Duty with high evaluative pressure" or "Sociality with high evaluative pressure") to the remaining three conditions (see Figures 2 and 3).

For the first step, based on the theoretical model proposed in Rudmann et al. (submitted), SC was conceived in each condition of each study as a unique latent psychological factor that would explain individual variabilities in lower order knowledge of social desirability, operationalized by the participants' answers to the social desirability scale and the personality inventory completed with social desirability instructions. A CFA model was thus built in each condition separately (i.e., eight models in total, see Table 9), in which participants' answers to these measurement tools under social desirability instructions served as indicators of the latent factor (i.e., SC). Moreover, as typical in CFA models (Kline, 2015), it was assumed that correlations between indicators would be equal to zero, over and above

the influence of the latent factor. Accordingly, correlations between residual errors of knowledge of social desirability were fixed to zero (Kline, 2015). In addition, the theoretical model assumes that SC could possibly impact the participants' self-descriptions, revealing the degree to which their general knowledge of social desirability influenced the way they portrayed themselves on the measurement tools. The CFA model thus included links between the latent factor and self-descriptions under honest instructions[17]. A maximum likelihood estimator (MLM) was used in each model, and all variables—including the latent factor—were standardized within each condition. The model was tested with the Lavaan package (Rosseel, 2012) developed for the R software (R Core Team, 2022). Goodness of fit was assessed using the comparative fit index (CFI), the standardised root mean square residual (SRMR) and the root mean square of approximation (RMSEA). According to standards in structural equation modelling (Kline, 2015), adequate fit was defined by CFI > 0.90, SRMR < .08, and RMSEA < 0.08.

For the second meta-analytic step, factor loadings and standard errors of all variables retrieved from the eight CFA models were submitted to a linear model meta-analysis, using the random-effects model approach (Hedges & Vevea, 1998). These meta-analyses were performed using R (R Core Team, 2022) with the *metafor* package (Viechtbauer, 2010). A

[17] Two other specifications were added to the CFA model. First, since research showed that personality dimensions empirically correlate to some extent (Anusic et al., 2009; Van der Linden et al., 2010), correlations between residual errors of self-descriptions under honest instructions were freely estimated. Second, correlated uniquenesses were added between variables measured using the same items with honest and social desirability instructions (i.e., every correlation between residual variances of a given construct being measured with honest and social desirability instructions) to consider shared method variance (Kline, 2015). For a visual representation of the structure of the model, see Figure 4 in Appendix 5.1.1.3.

maximum likelihood estimator (ML) was used in each meta-analysis, as well as the Knapp-Hartung method (knha; Knapp & Hartung, 2003) recommended when the number of studies included in a meta-analysis is low (only 8—conditions—in the present research).

For the third and last step, a moderator was included in the previous meta-analyses when the presence of heterogeneity enabled it. As the Cochran's Q-statistic is not a reliable index of heterogeneity when a few effect sizes (only 8 per variable in the present case) are included in analyses, we relied on the Higgin's & Thompson's I^2 (Higgins et al., 2003; Higgins & Thompson, 2002). When this I^2 was different from 0, the meta-analysis was again conducted, but by adding a moderator. The moderator was coded using contrasts: 0.5 for the high evaluative pressure condition of interest (Duty for Conscientiousness, Sociality for Agreeableness and Extraversion), and -0.5 for the three remaining conditions (See Figures 2 and 3).

2.4.5.3 Results

Correlations, reliability coefficients, means and standard deviations for all measured variables are presented for each study in Tables S4 to S7. For the first step of the analyses, factor loadings of each indicator on the latent factor, their standard errors, and models fit indices are visible in Table 9. Overall, the SEM model calculated with a CFA analysis yielded good to acceptable model fit indices in each condition.

Table 9

Beta, SE, and model fit indices for each Structural Equation Model tested for each condition

	Study 1				Study 2				Study 3				Study 4			
	1. Duty with low EP		2. Duty with high EP		3. Duty with low EP		4. Duty with high EP		5. Duty with high EP		6. Sociality with high EP		7. Sociality with low EP		8. Sociality with high EP	
Variables	B	SE B	B	SE B	B	SE B	B	SE B	B	SE B	B	SE B	B	SE B	B	SE B
C (SD)	0.85	0.10	0.89	0.12	0.85	0.08	0.89	0.11	0.82	0.11	0.66	0.09	0.79	0.07	0.72	0.08
A (SD)	0.63	0.09	0.69	0.11	0.78	0.10	0.84	0.11	0.73	0.09	0.72	0.10	0.84	0.08	0.69	0.11
N (SD)	-0.75	0.11	-0.77	0.09	-0.83	0.07	-0.84	0.08	-0.79	0.13	-0.80	0.10	-0.90	0.08	-0.81	0.10
O (SD)	0.49	0.11	0.63	0.08	0.66	0.08	0.64	0.12	0.51	0.12	0.44	0.10	0.50	0.10	0.44	0.12
E (SD)	0.54	0.13	0.34	0.11	0.49	0.09	0.67	0.10	0.59	0.18	0.53	0.09	0.53	0.10	0.71	0.09
SDS (SD)	0.74	0.10	0.74	0.12	0.85	0.09	0.81	0.09	0.70	0.11	0.64	0.12	0.76	0.11	0.73	0.10
C (H)	0.17	0.10	0.40	0.09	0.10	0.07	0.22	0.10	0.24	0.10	-0.04	0.10	0.08	0.09	0.12	0.09
A (H)	0.08	0.09	0.17	0.10	0.16	0.08	0.25	0.08	0.26	0.10	-0.03	0.12	0.25	0.09	0.13	0.10
N (H)	0.09	0.09	0.02	0.08	-0.08	0.07	-0.06	0.09	0.09	0.13	-0.00	0.12	-0.04	0.09	-0.19	0.10
O (H)	-0.04	0.09	0.16	0.11	0.07	0.07	0.17	0.09	0.04	0.09	0.01	0.10	-0.03	0.10	0.11	0.08
E (H)	0.15	0.10	-0.01	0.08	-0.04	0.07	0.07	0.09	0.18	0.15	0.24	0.10	-0.04	0.10	0.14	0.09
SDS (H)	0.11	0.09	0.06	0.08	0.13	0.07	0.20	0.07	0.07	0.10	0.02	0.13	0.06	0.09	0.20	0.10
Model fit indices																
$\chi 2$ (33)	48.47		56.04		77.09		55.45		41.05		62.38		88.42		49.79	
CFI	.97		.95		.95		.97		.98		.91		.91		.97	
RMSEA	.06		.07		.09		.07		.05		.10		.12		.06	
SRMR	.05		.05		.04		.05		.06		.08		.08		.06	
N used in the model	143		147		196		194		90		95		120		127	

Note. EP = Evaluative Pressure, SD = Social desirability instructions, H = Honest instructions, C = Conscientiousness, E = Extraversion, A = Agreeableness, O = Openness, N = Neuroticism, SDS = Social desirability scale. CFI = comparative fit index; RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation; SRMR = standardized root mean squared residual

In each condition, models' parameter estimates indicated that the latent factor—social clear-sightedness—predicted knowledge of constructs' social desirability (i.e., measures with social desirability instructions), with factor loadings for dimensions measured with social desirability instructions ranging from 0.342 to 0.896. The latent factor predicted honest self-descriptions on some personality dimensions in each condition—although to a much lower extent than self-descriptions under social desirability instructions—, indicating that social clear-sightedness could have contaminated participants' answers under honest instructions on some personality dimensions in some conditions. Thus, the second analytic step of the present research could be conducted.

As can be seen in Table 10, some tests of heterogeneity indicated variability in the estimated factor loadings (i.e., $I^2 \neq 0$). This was particularly the case for Conscientiousness under honest instructions, Q(7) = 14.25, $p < .05$, $I^2 = 43.95\%$. Other dimensions under honest instructions showed potential indication of variability, namely Extraversion (Q(7) = 9.19, $p = .24$, $I^2 = 15.12\%$), and Agreeableness (Q(7) = 7.11, $p = .42$, $I^2 = 0.08\%$)[18].

[18] Unexpectedly, Table 10 also indicated that the link between SC and Extraversion measured under social desirability instructions could vary across conditions, (Q(7) = 8.70, $p = .28$, $I^2 = 13.94\%$). However, contrary to what was observed for Extraversion measured with honest instructions, an exploratory moderation analysis indicated that this relationship was not significantly moderated by the contrast opposing the "Sociality with high evaluative pressure" condition to all the other conditions, $\beta = 0.10$, $t(6) = 1.14$, $p = .299$, 95% CI = [-0.11, 0.31].

Table 10

Random-effects model meta-analyses of factor loadings and se of each variable across all conditions

Variables	λ	95% *CI*	*t* (7)	T^2	I^2	*Q* (7)
C (SD)	.79***	[0.72, 0.86]	28.09***	0	0	5.56
A (SD)	.74***	[0.68, 0.81]	26.46***	0	0	4.63
N (SD)	-.82***	[-0.86, -0.78]	-50.17***	0	0	1.81
O (SD)	.55***	[0.47, 0.63]	17.06***	0	0	5.75
E (SD)	.55***	[0.45, 0.65]	13.38***	0.002	13.94	8.70
SDS (SD)	.76***	[0.70, 0.81]	32.42***	0	0	2.77
C (H)	.16*	[0.05, 0.27]	3.47*	0.01	43.95	14.25*
A (H)	.17**	[0.10, 0.25]	5.34**	0	0.08	7.11
N (H)	-.03	[-0.10, 0.04]	-1.01	0	0	6.20
O (H)	.06*	[0.0003, 0.13]	2.38*	0	0	5.11
E (H)	.07	[-0.02, 0.16]	1.80	0.002	15.12	9.19
SDS (H)	.12**	[0.06, 0.17]	5.11**	0	0	4.02

Note. SD = Social desirability instructions, H = Honest instructions, C = Conscientiousness, E = Extraversion, A = Agreeableness, O = Openness, N = Neuroticism, SDS = Social desirability scale. 95% *CI* = lower and upper limits of 95% confidence interval; *t*-test for significance of β; T^2 = between-studies variance; I^2 = percentage of the total variability reflecting real differences in ß*i*; *Q* = homogeneity estimate. *** $p < .0001$, ** $p < .001$, * $p < .05$

For the third analytical step, we first tested whether the conditions in which participants were placed—Duty or Sociality with low or high evaluative pressure—could account for the heterogeneity of the Conscientiousness dimension under honest instructions. As can be seen in Figure 2 and as predicted by H1, the analysis indicated that "Duty with high evaluative pressure" vs. all the other conditions was a statistically significant moderator of the relationship between social clear-sightedness and Conscientiousness under honest instructions, $\beta = 0.21$, $t(6) = 3.46$, $p < .05$, 95% CI = [0.06, 0.35]. A similar moderator test was conducted to account for the heterogeneity of the Extraversion dimension under honest

instructions. As can be seen in Figure 3 and as predicted by H2, the analysis indicated that "Sociality with high evaluative pressure" vs. all the other conditions was a marginally significant moderator of the link between social clear-sightedness and Extraversion under honest instructions, $\beta = 0.16$, $t(6) = 2.26$, $p = .065$, 95% CI = [-0.01, 0.32]. Finally, the analysis revealed that "Sociality with high evaluative pressure" vs. all the other conditions was not a significant moderator of the link between social clear-sightedness and Agreeableness under honest instructions, $\beta = -0.13$, $t(6) = -1.77$, $p = .128$, 95% CI = [-0.31, 0.05], thus indicating that H3 was not supported by the data.

Figure 2

Forest plot of the meta-analysis with moderator on the link of Conscientiousness under honest instructions with social clear-sightedness



Note. EP = Evaluative Pressure.

Figure 3

Forest plot of the meta-analysis with moderator on the link of Extraversion under honest instructions with social clear-sightedness



Note. EP = Evaluative Pressure.

2.4.6 Discussion

The goal of this research was to participate in the development of a new approach to SDR through the construct of SC. More precisely, this research aimed at investigating the general hypothesis that being high on SC could enable individuals to implement elaborate self-presentation strategies that take account of the specificity of the social situations in which they are involved. More specifically, we proposed that clear-sighted individuals should be

able not only to know the social desirability associated with different constructs, but also to alter their self-presentation only on constructs that would be necessary to possess to be appreciated in a given social situation. In this respect, we formulated three specific hypotheses about the personality dimensions that clear-sighted individuals should preferentially target in the self-presentation strategy according to the type of social situation: Conscientiousness in Duty situations (H1) and Extraversion and Agreeableness in Sociality situations (H2 and H3 respectively). To test these hypotheses, we conducted four studies in which participants were placed in different social situations (Duty vs. Sociality) that varied in terms of level of evaluative pressure (high vs low), and data collected were meta-analyzed using parameter-based MASEM (Jak & Cheung, 2020).

Overall, meta-analytical results confirmed that clear-sighted individuals were able to implement elaborate self-presentation strategies that were adapted to the specificities of the test-taking situations. First, they confirmed that SC could be empirically described as a supra-ordinate dimension of general knowledge of social desirability based on more specific knowledge, replicating Rudmann et al. (submitted)'s findings. Indeed, as shown by the CFA models tested in each of the conditions of the four studies (see Table 9), it appeared that a single-factor solution could account for the moderate to strong correlations (see Tables S4 to S7) observed between specific pieces of knowledge of social desirability (i.e., measures with social desirability instructions). Moreover, this unidimensional structure was shown to be invariant between conditions, given the low level of variability across conditions of the relationships between the latent factor and specific knowledge social desirability (see Table 10).

Meta-analytical results also highlighted that SC was positively related to several self-descriptions under honest instructions (e.g., Conscientiousness, Agreeableness, the Social Desirability Scale, and Openness to Experience). These results, which also replicated those of

Rudmann et al. (submitted), confirmed that SC could enable clear-sighted individuals to spontaneously modify their responses to personality inventories even when explicitly instructed to answer honestly. More importantly, meta-analytic moderation analyses revealed that some of the relationships between SC and honest self-descriptions varied according to the social situations in which participants were randomly placed. First, supporting H1, the relationship between SC and Conscientiousness was more positive when participants were assigned to a situation with high evaluative pressure involving a working relationship with the target of the communication (i.e., a Duty situation with visibility) compared with the other social situations manipulated. Second, the relationship between SC and Extraversion was more positive when participants were assigned to a high-evaluative-pressure situation involving a social relationship with the target of the communication (i.e., a Sociality situation with visibility) compared with the other experimental conditions. Although this moderation was only marginally significant, it was in line with H2. Finally, contrary to H3, the potential variability in the relationship between SC and Agreeableness did not appear to be explained by variation in social situations. Agreeableness thus appeared to be invariantly positively related to SC across all experimental conditions. Such a result could indicate the presence of a genuine link between SC and Agreeableness, which would not be surprising given that both concepts could be considered as markers of social adaptiveness.

At the theoretical level, the present research has several implications for the emerging literature on SC as a promising concept for better understanding SDR in personality measurement. On the one hand, studies conducted largely replicated results obtained by previous research on SC (Rudmann et al., submitted), both in terms of the definition of SC as a supra-ordinate knowledge of social desirability, and of its use for strategic self-presentation purposes. On the other hand, they extend previous research by showing that SC is not only a variable of general knowledge of social desirability, but also incorporates the ability to use

this knowledge appropriately according to the requirements of social situations. As shown by meta-analytic moderation analyses, individuals higher in SC increased their self-reported level of Conscientiousness in Duty-type situations and their self-reported level of Extraversion in Sociality-type situations, but only when these situations were high in evaluative pressure (i.e., situations involving visibility of self-reported answers). Such results revealed that clear-sighted individuals were not only able to identify the level of social desirability of personality dimensions, but also to use this knowledge strategically to alter their self-descriptions only on necessary dimensions to gain social approval when the situation requires it. By misrepresenting themselves only on necessary personality characteristics but not on luxurious ones (Rudmann et al., in preparation), clear-sighted individuals would maximize the impact of their self-presentation strategy with "only minor risk of being detected" (Rudmann et al., submitted, p.156 of the present thesis).

By providing a better understanding of the consequences of SC on self-presentation strategies, the present research also has practical implications for personality measurement and recruitment. Identifying clear-sighted people indeed appears to be a key factor in ensuring the quality of personality measurements conducted in high-stakes situations, such as recruitment interviews or clinical assessments. Since SC can be considered as a performative measure of the level of knowledge that individuals possess about social desirability, it could be used to identify individuals' knowledge of social desirability as well as their ability to behave like "social chameleons". Thus, due to their ability not only to detect the level of social desirability associated with psychological constructs but also to modify their responses only on those that are most essential in the test situations, undetected clear-sighted individuals are susceptible to compromise the validity of the measurement tools, particularly on the dimensions that are most important in the eyes of evaluators. Furthermore, while the identification of clear-sighted people can be useful for maintaining the efficiency of

personality measures in high-stakes situations, assessing SC enables to measure a general social skill related to social adaptability, which can be required for functions or jobs in organizations, such as leadership positions (Day et al., 2002).

However, despite encouraging results supporting the SC concept, the present research is also limited on several aspects. First, though the hypotheses regarding Conscientiousness (H1) and Extraversion (H2) were supported by the data, this was not the case for Agreeableness (H3). Indeed, SC appeared to be positively associated with the latter dimension to the same extent in all experimental conditions. As already mentioned by Rudmann et al. (submitted), this result could indicate that SC and Agreeableness have a genuine positive relationship. Future research should thus investigate the actual psychological characteristics and demographic properties of clear-sighted individuals to provide a better understanding of the correlates and antecedents of SC. Another limitation of the present studies is that participant samples were composed exclusively of university students, which may limit the generalizability of the results obtained (Sears, 1986). Future research should thus investigate other populations in more ecological contexts, such as real job applicants, to increase the external validity of the conclusions drawn. Finally, the studies conducted were limited to manipulating exclusively two types of social situations—Duty and Sociality—among the eight configurations identified by Rauthmann et al. (2014). While this experimental choice was motivated by the clarity of the predictions that could be made regarding the necessities and luxuries of personality dimensions (Rudmann et al., in preparation), future research will need to examine other types of situations to test their impact on the self-presentation strategies of clear-sighted individuals[19].

[19] For example, Negativity-type situations were shown to afford fear, displeasure, tension, the obtention of negative reinforcement, and Neuroticism as a personality dimension (Rauthmann et al., 2014). With the present

2.4.7 Conclusion

The current research reveals that certain individuals can be aptly described as "socially clear-sighted". These individuals, similar to "social chameleons", not only possess an acute knowledge of social desirability when presenting themselves, but also use this knowledge strategically by adapting their self-presentation to the type of social situation and stakes at play. Furthermore, by boosting their self-presentation only on the most relevant and necessary aspects in the situation at hand, they manage to minimize the risk of being caught faking. SC can therefore be characterized as a form of social skill or ability used in self-presentation, integrating—and thus reconciling—both the dispositional and situational facets of SDR in personality measurement. SC indeed represents the dispositional and stable knowledge of social desirability, which enables the production of situated and context-specific SDR, depending on the stakes motivating it. Thus, despite the perceived utility of high SC in conveying a portrayal of the self-aligned with societal expectations, this portrayal does not necessarily correspond, trait for trait, to an individual's genuine personal characteristics. The use of SC can consequently be detrimental for measurement tools, particularly in high-stakes contexts such as job interviews or psychological assessments, as it may guide to misleading hiring or treatment decisions. Therefore, the identification of SC—along with its antecedents and consequences—is of great importance to ensure that its implications are appropriately acknowledged and considered across all situations.

---

theoretical model in mind, one could predict that clear-sighted people could strategically increase their self-report score on Neuroticism, as this dimension could become a necessity to be appreciated in this type of social situation.

3 GENERAL DISCUSSION

This dissertation introduces the psychological construct of social clear-sightedness. The objective was to show that this construct represents a dispositional knowledge of social desirability, operationalized as a supra-ordinate latent psychological factor. This knowledge was expected to cause perception of some constructs (in the present thesis, personality dimensions) as socially desirable. Furthermore, as a form of social competence, it was expected that individuals would use it to fake their self-reports (of personality) accordingly, thereby serving self-presentational purposes. An additional objective was to highlight the situational component of social clear-sightedness. It was hypothesized that the constructs identified as socially desirable and consequently faked by those high in social clear-sightedness would vary according to contextual features, such as the type of social situation at hand, or the level of evaluative pressure involved. This thesis therefore sought to demonstrate the existence of social clear-sightedness and its behavioural impact on personality self-reports. It aimed to show that individuals can have a certain knowledge of what is socially desirable in a particular context and subsequently use this knowledge to strategically fake their answers with a self-presentational intent.

In this last chapter of general discussion of the present thesis, findings will first be summarized and integrated all together to give a broad overview of the research conducted. Based on these findings, a complete model will then be proposed by building on the present thesis and a previous broad research line to further the interpretation of social clear-sightedness. Limitation of this thesis will next be highlighted along four main paths (i.e., general, cultural, perspectivist, and qualitative), with the aim of pointing to potential relevant future research avenues. Subsequently, general implications and contributions of this thesis

will be delineated in response to the theoretical part of this thesis, and concluding remarks will be attempted.

3.1 Integrative Summary of the Findings

Across three research lines encompassing nine studies, the social clear-sightedness construct was tested, validated, and further examined. As each of the three research lines presented in this thesis already includes a detailed summary of its own results, those results will be summarized here collectively, with the aim of integrating them into a cohesive whole.

In the first research line encompassing two studies, the theoretical model of social clear-sightedness was empirically tested. Using SEM (Kline, 2015), social clear-sightedness was modelized as a higher-order latent factor. In line with expectations, the analyses from both studies revealed a well-fitting model with a unique latent factor strongly predicting the level of lower-order knowledge of the social desirability of personality dimensions. In other words, this latent factor representing social clear-sightedness highly predicted participants' scores when answering a personality inventory aiming at being liked. More specifically, the factor loadings of each personality dimension measured with social desirability instructions were strong and invariant across conditions (i.e., low or high evaluative pressure), thus denoting the stable and dispositional aspect of social clear-sightedness. Therefore, answering in a socially desirable way to a personality inventory shows the individual level of knowledge of each personality dimension's social desirability, and this knowledge is encompassed by social clear-sightedness.

Furthermore, the social clear-sightedness latent factor also predicted scores on some personality dimensions under honest instructions, but this prediction varied across conditions. More specifically, in the first study characterised by low evaluative pressure, social clear-sightedness predicted scores on Conscientiousness and Agreeableness even under honest

instructions, although less than with social desirability instructions. In the second study, it predicted scores on Conscientiousness and Stability under honest instructions, but to a larger extent under high evaluative pressure (i.e., "visibility" condition) than under low evaluative pressure (i.e., "anonymity" condition). Together, these findings indicate the possible impact of the latent construct of social clear-sightedness on some honest personality self-descriptions depending on the situation, thus denoting the situationally motivated—or context-dependent—use of social clear-sightedness: this general knowledge, if possessed to a sufficient level, is more used in high-stakes situations.

The results from the second and third research lines are presented together, capitalizing on the first research line findings. Indeed, in the first research line, the situationally dependent aspect of social clear-sightedness was uncovered, which highly needed further examination. To do so, the first essential step was to discern which personality aspects are more socially desirable in various contexts. This would subsequently enable hypotheses regarding which dimensions social clear-sightedness would predict in different situations. Thus, a budgeting task (Li et al., 2002) was used in a pilot study and two subsequent studies in the second research line, to understand the motivational process underlying SDR. The goal was to identify the personality dimensions perceived as necessary to attain a positive self-presentation in a work-related (i.e., Duty) situation with hierarchical interactions versus a more casual (i.e., Sociality) situation with friends (Rauthmann et al., 2014). The findings indicated that conscientiousness was identified as necessary in Duty situations, while Extraversion and Agreeableness were perceived as necessities in Sociality situations.

Consequently, the third research line sought to integrate and extend the findings from the first two research lines. First, the structural model of social clear-sightedness was once again confirmed across four studies, validating the construct as a unidimensional supra-

ordinate dimension of general knowledge of social desirability that is cross-situationally invariant. Second, the use of MASEM (Cheung & Cheung, 2016; Jak & Cheung, 2020) revealed cross-condition variability in the factor loadings of some honest personality self-descriptions on the social clear-sightedness latent factor across the four studies. Third, characteristics of these conditions (i.e., Duty vs. Sociality situations, and low vs. high evaluative pressure) were computed as potential moderators of the relationship between some honest personality self-descriptions and social clear-sightedness. Almost completely in line with hypotheses based on the second line's findings, the latent construct more strongly predicted Conscientiousness in Duty situations with high evaluative pressure and Extraversion (though not Agreeableness) in Sociality situations with high evaluative pressure, compared to all other situations. This suggests that individuals high in social clear-sightedness used this general knowledge for self-presentation purposes—even when asked to be honest—according to the type of situation and the stakes at hand. In other words, they adapted their answers only when necessary and only on necessary socially desirable dimensions in the given context.

In sum, findings robustly attest to the existence of social clear-sightedness as a superordinate dispositional variable. This variable reflects individuals' level on a general knowledge encompassing lower-order knowledge of social desirability of specific psychological constructs. This general knowledge is then strategically used by manifesting SDR in self-descriptions on these specific constructs according to the type of situation, and this manifestation is motivated by the stakes of the situation. Individuals high in social clear-sightedness are therefore able to engage in elaborate self-presentations strategically adapted to the characteristic of the situation. Stated differently, they not only know the degree of social desirability of each personality dimension in specific social situations, but they are also able to strategically alter their self-presentation only on these dimensions to give a positive image of themselves.

The operationalisation of this variable includes, on one hand, the measurement of individuals' knowledge of social desirability in a performative way (see Dong et al., 2023 for a similar performative variable, i.e., 'performative wisdom'), and on the other hand, the potential transformation of this knowledge into a social competence defined here as a situationally motivated use of the knowledge. Social clear-sightedness is therefore not merely a supra-ordinate knowledge, but also a type of social competence that enables the identification of socially desirable elements and the capacity to answer to self-reports accordingly. Comparable to other performative variables, social clear-sightedness is: 'state-like', reflecting the invariant and dispositional component of the knowledge; 'scenario-specific' and 'context-dependent', denoting the situational variability of the use of this knowledge (Dong et al., 2023). The performative aspect of this variable captures the "maximal, rather than typical" level of social clear-sightedness one can exhibit, as individuals are expected to "give their best effort" to successfully execute their 'potential' for social clear-sightedness (Dong et al., 2023, p. 6). Such "maximal performance is episodic and is typically elicited when individuals know that their performance will be evaluated and so exert their full effort" (Dong et al., 2023, p. 27). In other words, individuals high in social clear-sightedness will perform under self-presentation instructions by showing their knowledge of the upper limit of social desirability of each personality dimensions in the situation at hand. Then, under honest instructions, this knowledge can become a social competence especially under high evaluative pressure (i.e., motivation), where participants will answer in a socially desirable way, and even more so on necessary constructs.

On another note, in section 2.1 of the present thesis, a particular emphasis was placed on the usefulness of measurement invariance in SEM, which was then extensively put into practice in the second study of the first research line. In this study, two conditions varying in evaluative pressure (low in the "anonymity" condition versus high in the "visibility"

condition) were implemented in a within-subjects design, that is, with the same participants undergoing both conditions one month apart. This design allowed to test the structural model and especially to 'play' with invariance constraints between the two conditions, assessing the model's stability across time and situations (Hoyle, 2007; Kline, 2015). Thus, different versions of the model, each with varying invariance constraints, were tested on the data: 1) a baseline model with configural invariance where all parameters were free across conditions, designed to simply test the model's structure within each condition; 2) a model implementing metric invariance for the latent control variables, which was specified by putting cross-condition invariance constraints on the links between the latent factors of each personality dimensions and the social desirability scale with their respective indicators; 3) a model, building on the second, which added a cross-condition metric invariance on the links between social clear-sightedness and self-descriptions with social desirability instructions; and 4) a model expanded on the third by implementing full metric invariance, that is, adding cross-condition invariance constraints on the links between social clear-sightedness and self-descriptions with honest instructions.

As stated in section 2.1 and in accordance with Kline's (2015) recommendations, when comparing models, the one fitting the data while incorporating the greatest invariance should be retained. In the analyses of this second study of the first research line, the third model was proved superior. This indicated that: the model's structure was fitting the data well in both conditions; each personality dimension and the social desirability scale were linked to their respective indicators in the same way in both conditions; and self-descriptions with social desirability instructions were predicted by social clear-sightedness in the same manner in both conditions, thus attesting of the stability of the knowledge represented by the social clear-sightedness construct. However, full metric invariance as implemented by the fourth model could not be kept. As this step was tested by adding invariance constraints on the links

between social clear-sightedness and self-descriptions with honest instructions, it meant that the data could not support these equalities, thus pointing to variability in these links (Kline, 2015). To identify which specific links were varying, the third model was compared to six versions of itself, with each version specifying an invariance constraint on only *one* of the links between social clear-sightedness and honest self-descriptions. This revealed that the links between social clear-sightedness and both Conscientiousness and Stability exhibited variance across conditions. Specifically, these links were stronger in the condition involving high—vs low—evaluative pressure.

Beyond the aforementioned critical finding, this study yielded two other significant insights. First, correlations between the latent factors corresponding to each personality dimension and the social desirability scale on one side, and the social clear-sightedness latent variables on the other side, appeared to be of moderate size at best ($-.30 < r\text{s} < .03$, see Table 3, section 2.2.8.3). It can consequently be inferred that social clear-sightedness is distinct from the Big Five dimensions, which is pivotal in giving credibility to the existence of this construct, underscoring discriminant validity. A second notable insight of this study relates to its within-subjects design. Given that the social clear-sightedness latent variables measured in each condition were highly correlated ($r = .57$, see Table 3, section 2.2.8.3), it suggests that participants high in social clear-sightedness in one condition were also high in the other, at least in this study. While this finding undoubtedly requires further replication across various conditions, it offers a first hint towards the fact that social clear-sightedness elicits knowing how to appear socially desirable in many situations, and not only one type of situations (e.g., work-related or casual situations). This inference can also be drawn from studies of the third research line, though with a bit less certainty. Since participants were randomly assigned to all conditions in a between-subjects design, it is reasonable to assume that they were rendered

equivalent, and therefore that results could possibly have been similar with a within-subjects design.

Replication, a fundamental tenet of SEM (Hoyle, 2007; Kline, 2015), was also an inherent feature of the present thesis. In fact, the statistical structural model representing social clear-sightedness was not only tested but also successfully replicated across the six studies of this thesis that tested the social clear-sightedness concept. Thus, all these studies point to same conclusion: social clear-sightedness is present and holds as a latent variable in several contexts and even over time, as hinted by the second study of the first research line. In recent times, psychology faced a significant replication crisis revealing that "many—if not the majority of—published findings (…) are indeed not replicable" (Świątkowski & Dompnier, 2017, p. 111). Taking this history into account, the consistent replication of findings in this thesis is particularly noteworthy. Furthermore, as Świątkowski and Dompnier (2017) underscored the importance of situating research within its social context when addressing the ramifications of this crisis, the fact that all nine studies of the present thesis are grounded in defined social contexts—characterized by varying evaluative pressure and type of situations, such as Duty versus Sociality—add even more strength to the consistent replications of the social clear-sightedness model[20].

To further bolster these conclusions, a meta-analytical approach through MASEM (Cheung & Cheung, 2016; Jak & Cheung, 2020) was used on the four studies of the third research line. The first study of the first research line could also have been integrated into this meta-analysis, given its analogous design and corroborative findings to the four studies

[20] A similar observation can be made for the second line of research, given the very high consistency of results obtained between studies regarding perceptions of necessities and luxuries of personality dimensions as function of social situations (Duty or Sociality situations).

included, which would have added even more strength to the meta-analytical findings. Nonetheless, to assure independence of the research lines and to respect the chronological unfolding of the discoveries made throughout this thesis (i.e., the first research line revealed that social situations were important in the conceptualisation of social clear-sightedness, the second research line demonstrated it, and the third research line capitalized on it), it was left out. Hence, through the use of MASEM, the structural model of social clear-sightedness was once again found to be fitting and thus valid in all four studies included in the meta-analysis, again stressing the robust replication of the findings. Additionally, MASEM and moderator analyses allowed to understand the cross-study parameter variation already found in the second study of the first research line. Specifically, the link between social clear-sightedness and self-descriptions under honest instructions was the strongest under high evaluative pressure and for necessary personality dimensions in the social context at hand. Consequently, across the three research lines, the robustness of social clear-sightedness was attested through systematic replications. Furthermore, its impact and use were studied according to specific features of social situations, thus highly contextualising the findings. Such thorough contextualisation is crucial for contemporary social psychology if it is to avoid replication pitfalls that detrimentally impacted the field earlier (Świątkowski & Dompnier, 2017).

3.2 A Model Proposition

Furthering the attempt of integrating all these results into a cohesive whole, a model depicted in Figure 4 will now be proposed, emerging by putting together the findings of the three research lines as well as by extending their possible impact. This model is presented first as a way of further theoretically interpreting the empirical results obtained, and second as an avenue for future research. In this thesis, using SEM allowed to construct the social clear-sightedness latent variable, and using MASEM allowed to demonstrate the reproducibility of the proposed model, as well as its variability across studies, both statistical approaches

leading to conclude that the results are robust. Consequently, it does not seem unreasonable to think that this model could be applied to other constructs than personality dimensions.

Figure 4

Impact of Social Clear-Sightedness on Self-Reported Constructs and their Construct Validity



The first part of the proposed model directly derives from the findings of this thesis and is represented by its "dispositional component". As a supra-ordinate latent variable constructed with SEM, social clear-sightedness was found to predict positively and robustly the perception of social desirability of some personality dimensions, perception measured by individuals' answers to a personality self-report with social desirability instructions. The model proposed in this section extends these findings by suggesting that other self-reported constructs (than personality dimensions) measured with social desirability instructions could be predicted by social clear-sightedness. In other words, individuals high in social clear-sightedness would show that they know which constructs (personality dimensions in this thesis) are socially desirable. The SEM analyses also revealed that this perception of social desirability then predicted some of the self-reported personality dimensions, as measured by

the links between the social clear-sightedness latent factor and personality self-report with honest instructions. Once again, the proposed model postulates that other self-reported psychological constructs measured with honest instructions could be linked to social clear-sightedness.

The second part of the model also directly draws on the present findings and concerns its "situational component". Indeed, the constructs that would be predicted by social clear-sightedness under honest instructions would depend on specific conditions: in the particular situation at hand, the construct in question has to be necessary to possess to be liked, and the evaluative pressure has to be high. Stated differently, if the context in which individuals answer a self-report involves high evaluative pressure, the more socially desirable a construct is perceived—thanks to high social clear-sightedness—for the context, the more individuals will enhance their scores on this specific construct.

Finally, the third part of the proposed model derives from a broad research line described at the end of section 1.4 of the present dissertation and showing that the construct validity of self-reported psychological constructs (e.g., achievement goals, personality dimensions) was impacted by knowledge of social desirability measured with social desirability instructions (for a recent review, Butera et al., 2024). So far, this broad research line showed first that self-reported endorsement of mastery goals among university students was positively related to success at exams, but only among students who perceived these goals as being lowly socially desirable (Dompnier et al., 2009). The same conclusions were made among high-school students with reading comprehension competences instead of grades (Smeding et al., 2015), among primary school students and their performance in a French dictation (Smeding et al., 2022), and among university students with performance-approach goals instead of mastery goals (Dompnier et al., 2013). Similar results were also obtained for personality dimensions such as Openness to experience. In particular, the link between self-

reported Openness to Experience and an external measure of Openness (i.e., a cultural knowledge test) was found to be moderated by individual differences in perceived social desirability of this specific personality dimension (Smeding et al., 2017). Together, these studies showed that the perceived social desirability of psychological constructs is a robust moderator of the link between self-reports of these constructs and external criteria (grades or specific competences).

Consequently, based on all these findings, the proposed model presents social clear-sightedness as a possible general moderator of construct validity. Social clear-sightedness positively predicts the perception of social desirability of a particular construct. Furthermore, the higher this perception of social desirability, the stronger the self-enhancement in self-reports of this construct, but only if the construct is necessary in the situation to appear as socially desirable, and if the situation involves high evaluative pressure. Moreover, the stronger the self-enhancement in self-reports of this construct (due to its necessity and to high evaluative pressure), the lower the link between these self-reports and external criteria. In this model, the impact of SDR on self-reported constructs is envisioned to be most pronounced for individuals high on social clear-sightedness, especially when these constructs are necessary to be appreciated in the test-taking context, and when the evaluative pressure is high. In this particular case, SDR would lead to a reduction of the construct validity for individuals high in social clear-sightedness due to the addition of variance unrelated to the construct itself but dependent upon a self-presentation strategy. Consequently, the relationship between a self-reported construct and an external criterion should be attenuated (i.e., negatively moderated) by social clear-sightedness. Future studies could thus try to further test this model as a whole, as it is of particular interest for the study of construct validity and the impact of social desirability.

Apart from a performance measure, the external criterion could also be implemented as a behavioural measure, thus encompassing the whole person-situation-behaviour triad depicted in section 1.2.2 of this thesis (Funder, 2001). As also mentioned in section 1.2.2, the famous personality coefficient is generally found to be around .30 between personality and behaviours (Back et al., 2009). Based on the findings of the present thesis and on the model just proposed, one could imagine that this coefficient could increase thanks to taking dispositional (social clear-sightedness) and situational (type of social situation and evaluative pressure) components of the model into account. The perfect situation to obtain a genuine link between personality and behaviour would thus be among individuals low in social clear-sightedness who answer anonymously a measurement tool assessing a construct not perceived as a necessity in the test-taking situation. In this particular case, what individuals are reporting could be trusted with more certainty, possibly resulting in an increase of the link between self-reported answers and the external criterion if both variables are genuinely related.

3.3 Limitations and Future Research

> Personality psychologists may be cautioned, therefore, to be particularly cautious about generalizing results from research settings to other places and times. The meanings of our theoretical constructs should not be assumed to be universal, unless considerable observation in diverse contexts provides an empirical basis for such an assumption. (Cloninger, 2009, p. 20)

In this part, limitations of the present thesis and its three research lines will be discussed in a way that can essentially widen the understanding of the findings and open many relevant paths for future studies. The aim is to situate this research in its context—implying limiting features—, as recommended by Cloninger in the above quotation, to better

grip the potential it has raised to further our understanding of social clear-sightedness and its related impact with regard to personality and social psychology.

3.3.1 General Considerations

A first limitation that is worth mentioning is that all the studies included in this thesis relied on university students as participants, as they were easily accessible. As such, our samples were clearly of convenience, which may imply that they were not representative of the whole population (Roberts, Kuncel, Shiner, et al., 2007). When conducting studies on such samples, as is often the case in psychology, Roberts and colleagues warned that "the results for SES and cognitive abilities are generalizable, whereas it is more difficult to generalize findings from personality research" (2007, p. 337), which is our specific case. Moreover, we used online questionnaires exclusively, another feature that could be detrimental for the representativeness of our findings (Hough et al., 1990). However, both these limitations may also be considered as strengths of our model. First, Paulhus and Vazire (2007) stated that research on student samples are generally less concerned by SDR bias as they tend to involve "low-demand conditions", that is, context of research with low stakes. Second, the same considerations were formulated about "computerized assessments [which tend to] show lower SDR than face-to-face interviews" (Paulhus, 1991, p. 19).

As one of the main objectives of this thesis was to study the motivational and situational use of SDR deriving from social clear-sightedness, particularly in high-stakes contexts, designing studies with such low-stakes-inducing features may be viewed as "shooting ourselves in the foot". However, despite these discouraging aspects, our studies robustly and consistently demonstrated more use of SDR when the experimental induction involved high evaluative pressure. Thus, we may have put ourselves in one of the worst case possible to find the effect we were looking for, but still found it. It is therefore possible that studies designed with more pressure-inducing components might find even stronger effects.

As a case in point, a sample of job applicants during job interviews may certainly demonstrate higher use of social clear-sightedness than students picturing an interaction with a professor. Future research could consequently try to access samples relevant to the experimental situations presented, and these situations could even be more related to real-life ones, such as job interviews.

Another limitation of the studies presented in this thesis may be that only one out of nine presents a within-subjects design. However, this study (the second of the first research line) was highly relevant to demonstrate the distinctiveness of social clear-sightedness from the Big Five personality dimensions, and to attest that people high in social clear-sightedness in one situation are also high in social clear-sightedness in other situations. Although these aspects are also presupposed in the other studies with between-subjects designs, which were also useful in demonstrating the inter-individual variability in social clear-sightedness, they can only be demonstrated with confidence by using within-subjects design. As replication is essential to strengthen results obtained, future studies could benefit from focusing on within-subjects designs, also to further confirm the stability of social clear-sightedness over time and across situations, as well as its homogeneity. Moreover, the usefulness of within-subjects designs was also emphasized to help understand underlying mechanisms of faking behaviour, as these designs "would help to further understand the situational, motivational, dispositional, and cognitive antecedents that lead to faking and moreover to differences in faking behaviour" (Ziegler et al., 2015, p. 698). As all these elements are highly embedded in our conceptualisation of social clear-sightedness, these designs could definitely benefit the comprehension of this construct.

A potential other limitation of this thesis may directly rely in the operationalisation of social clear-sightedness through structural equation modelling. Kline himself warned researchers against reification, which he defined as "the belief that a factor must correspond

to a real thing" (Kline, 2015, p. 300). To better understand this consideration, he gave the example of the g factor of cognitive ability. Although this factor is largely found and consequently used in research, it does not mean that this g factor of intelligence "actually corresponds to any particular genetic or neurological substrate". As such, this factor can only be described as a statistical abstraction, and may in real life encompass several dimensions, such as artistic or social competences, for example. The same reasoning could thus be applied to social clear-sightedness. Across this thesis, we studied and built this psychological construct through SEM and MASEM, without measuring external components to the statistical construct itself. We therefore cannot affirm that social clear-sightedness does exist as such in individuals' head, which would be a reification of a statistical abstraction. Rather, social clear-sightedness could also be represented by more than one real-life aspect. Some hints of these dimensions were already mentioned throughout this thesis, such as the ability to detect what is consensually socially desirable in a particular context, or the ability to produce faking responses to a self-reported questionnaire to serve self-presentational strategies, or even the motivation one may have—or not—to try to produce such a faking behaviour. In sum, individual differences in several dispositional characteristics might be encompassed by the construct of social clear-sightedness.

This reification-related limitation leads directly to the challenge of empirically distinguishing social clear-sightedness from other psychological constructs, as the ones presented in Table 1. Although the introduction of this thesis made a theoretical attempt to differentiate these constructs based on their definitions, empirical evidence is required to establish social clear-sightedness as distinct from social desirability—and its related scales—and self-monitoring. As such, the present thesis does not provide empirical differentiation, thus failing to exclude possible conceptual overlap among these constructs. Despite this, the method used to capture social clear-sightedness and the statistical strategy implemented do

distinguish it from other constructs in terms of measurement, even if the underlying conceptual idea may be similar. However, this would not be the first time, in the history of social psychology, that there is a debate over whether two constructs are truly distinct or merely overlapping. For example, the correspondence bias—i.e., the tendency to perceive others' behaviours as a direct reflection of their inner qualities, thus ignoring situational causes—and the fundamental error of attribution—i.e., the tendency to ignore or underestimate the influence of situations on others' behaviours—are nowadays still not clearly defined as different concepts or interchangeable terminologies (Gilbert & Malone, 1995; Jones, 1979; Ross, 1977). Similarly, social clear-sightedness would benefit from studies aiming at comparing it with other psychological constructs, to determine whether it is a unique construct or an "old wine in a new bottle", that is, a construct already conceptualised but operationalised differently. Nonetheless, even if the latter turns out to be true, social clear-sightedness would still be an advance in operationalisation, offering new research opportunities through a more practical method assessment.

A final general potential limitation in this thesis may be related to social value theory. This theory derives from the fact that everyone needs to know, when meeting someone else, if this other person is nice or dangerous, and then if this other person can really put into effect their nice or dangerous behaviour (S. T. Fiske et al., 2007). Thus, these two aspects fulfil evolutionary necessities, which are first being accepted by others, and second showing competences (Ybarra et al., 2008). These two characteristics constitute the two fundamental dimensions of social judgment—warmth and competence—which are used to form impression and perception of others, but also of the self (Abele et al., 2008). The warmth dimension is related to friendliness, helpfulness, sincerity, trustworthiness and morality, whereas the competence dimension is related to ability, intelligence, skill, creativity and efficacy (S. T. Fiske et al., 2007). Across the years, these two dimensions have received

different names (e.g., morality and competence, Wojciszke, 2005; communion and agency, Ybarra et al., 2008) among which social desirability and social utility (Dubois & Beauvois, 2005). Throughout this thesis, the notion of social desirability, even if defined through a slightly different perspective, has been made familiar. However, social clear-sightedness might benefit from the decomposition of the social desirability we presented into these two fundamental dimensions. On the one hand, social desirability corresponds to the degree to which an individual manages to be liked by others by presenting what these others like—in other words, they likeableness or capacity to trigger positive affects in others (Beauvois & Dubois, 2009; Dompnier et al., 2013; Dubois & Beauvois, 2005). As such, this dimension may thus be more in adequation with our operationalisation of Sociality situations and their casual, social features. On the other hand, social utility refers to "the individuals' capacity to satisfy the functional requirements of a given social environment and corresponds to the degree to which they can succeed in this environment" (Dompnier et al., 2013, p. 589). Thus, this dimension may correspond more closely to Duty situations and their work-related aspects. In other words, the meaning of "being liked" could change as a function of the type of situation, and social clear-sightedness may be helpful in identifying this meaning. In Sociality situations, giving a positive image may mean trying to appear socially desirable, whereas in Duty situations, it may mean trying to appear as socially useful. Consequently, using the distinction between these two subtypes of social desirability in future studies may further our understanding of the scope of social clear-sightedness (Desponds, 2011).

3.3.2 Cultural Considerations

In an attempt to precisely recognize the context-dependent features—and consequently, the potential lack of universality—of the findings of this thesis regarding social clear-sightedness (Świątkowski & Dompnier, 2017), a look on cultural aspects is now going to be taken in the present section. Historically, social psychology has sometimes been accused

of parochialism (Ross et al., 2010) and thus criticized for its lack of consideration of the cultural roots of the basic social psychological phenomena its studies, despite the critical influence culture seems to have on them, and despite the fact that such aspects may question the cross-cultural generalization of such phenomena (Pettigrew, 2018). These cultural considerations may therefore be directly applied to the present thesis, and more particularly to social clear-sightedness. Are our findings generalizable across cultures? Does social clear-sightedness exist in other cultures that the Western one in which our research is embedded? Would participants from different cultural backgrounds interpret our operationalisation of social situations as we expect? Even the perception people have of self-reports may vary outside the "European heritage" and thus result in different meaning and usage made of them, because the "reference group" to which people are comparing themselves when answering this type of instruments may be totally different from culture to culture (Paulhus & Vazire, 2007).

Culture may be defined as a collection of "shared elements that provide the standards for perceiving, believing, evaluating, communicating, and acting among those who share a language, a historic period, and a geographic location" (Triandis, 1996, p. 408) and is "a key determinant of what it means to be a person" (Benet-Martínez, 2007, p. 170). In the case of this thesis, participants were students from the university of Lausanne in Switzerland at the beginning of the 21st century. Thus, different cultural influences may have impacted the way they answered our questionnaires: the geographic location (i.e., Lausanne, in Switzerland, in Europe, and thus in Western societies), the historic period (i.e., from 2019 to 2022, which encompasses the covid crisis, for example), but also the social role of these participants, as students tend to be more similar between cultures than with other groups of the same culture (Benet-Martínez, 2007). All this cultural anchoring may have influence, in one way or

another, the findings of our studies. The characteristics we found of the very construct of social clear-sightedness may also be deeply rooted in culture.

Regarding personality, the Big Five dimensions were often robustly found and confirmed across many different cultures and languages, even non-Western (e.g., De Raad et al., 2010; Deary et al., 2010; McCrae, 2001; McCrae et al., 2005; Rolland, 2002; van Aarde et al., 2017). However, two limitations of this apparent generalizability of personality structure are worth mentioning. First, "although all facets, traits, and compounds may exist across cultures or languages, they should not be expected to be present in the same amounts everywhere" (Hough et al., 2015, p. 186). Stated differently, even if one particular personality structure as the Big Five seems to hold in other cultural contexts, this does not mean that the repartition of this structure is equal in every culture studied. Second, the Big Five structure has been historically discovered in North America and through the analysis of the English language, and such a structure should thus not be "the only standard to try to fit to other languages and cultures" (Hough et al., 2015, p. 189). Alternatively, attention should be put on personality-descriptive aspects that may be shared by all cultures (i.e., emic), and on those that may be different in each culture (i.e., etic) (Funder, 2001). Culture and personality are indeed depicted as mutually influencing one another (Benet-Martínez, 2007). Thus, simply translating personality inventories to other languages is largely not enough to capture this interaction, but a plethora of inventories, each one developed specifically for one culture, might obviously be detrimental for cross-cultural comparisons (Benet-Martínez, 2007). To overcome these limitations, the combined emic-etic approach was proposed, through which instruments of different cultures are compared, thus reaching more representative inventories (Benet-Martínez, 2007).

These cultural considerations just mentioned for the Big Five could also be applied to social clear-sightedness as a whole. The way we conceptualized this construct and its

consequences is dependent of the cultural context we are in. Thus, the fact that high social clear-sightedness might provoke more SDR on the Conscientiousness personality dimensions in Duty situations with high evaluative pressure, and on Extraversion in Sociality situations with high evaluative pressure, is the result of cultural influences. It is totally imaginable that these two types of social situations might ask for other personality dimensions than the ones obtained in this thesis. In fact, "people's behaviour differs from culture to culture, not because the people are differently endowed by nature, but because the rules for social interaction are different in their proximal social environments" (R. Hogan & Bond, 2009, p. 584). Stated differently, as the norms of social interactions may be different in each culture, social clear-sightedness would thus point to different necessary psychological constructs in each social situation of each culture. What is considered as socially desirable in one culture may indeed be totally different from what is perceived as desirable in another one. And even further, we could also imagine that the situational eight DIAMONDS and its related RSQ8 instrument of situations' taxonomy may have been developed through an emic approach. Thus, both this instrument measuring situations and the construct of social clear-sightedness may benefit from combined emic-etic approach to better understand how they can be operationalized in other cultures. Consequently, our findings about the precise predictions that can be made from social clear-sightedness on specific personality dimensions might not necessarily replicable across cultures. However, this would not mean that social clear-sightedness does not exist in other cultures. As people coming from different cultures are still effectively communicating in everyday life, this means that common grounds of adaptation exist across cultures (R. Hogan & Bond, 2009). Rather, such lack of replication would highlight that social clear-sightedness characteristics and the predictions it implies might be different according to the cultural context.

Cultures may vary along several dimensions such as power distance (i.e., acceptance of economic and social inequality), individualism vs. collectivism (i.e., the degree of integration of individuals into groups), uncertainty avoidance (i.e., experiencing discomfort in ambiguous situations), and masculinity vs. femininity (i.e., the distribution of emotional roles) (Draguns, 2009; Hofstede & McCrae, 2004). Hereafter will be given some examples on how these cultural dimensions may influence social clear-sightedness. In cultures with high power distance, social clear-sightedness might be used to appear as more conform and obedient in Duty situations involving hierarchical interactions with high stakes. In a collectivist culture, social clear-sightedness could be used to give a self-effacing of the self in Sociality situations involving groups of friends, whereas giving a more self-enhancing image of the self might be more socially desirable in an individualistic culture. In a culture low in uncertainty avoidance, appearing as socially desirable in a Sociality situation involving friends might be accomplished by using social clear-sightedness in order to appear somewhat careless about not knowing what the group is up to. And finally, feminine cultures might trigger the use of social clear-sightedness to produce a more tender-minded self-presentation in various social situations, whereas masculine cultures might trigger a more tough-minded self-presentation. Putting ourselves on the other side of the line for a second, having information on the personality characteristics that are relevant in any culture according to these dimensions could help migrants, sojourners and visitors train their “cultural” social clear-sightedness when visiting another culture, and thus foster an easier adaptation and integration (cf. section 3.4 below for other potential programs of fostering social clear-sightedness) (Draguns, 2009). To give a more concrete example, Agreeableness was recently found to be higher among individuals in cultures low in individualistic and masculine dimensions (Wilmot & Ones, 2022). Consequently, in these particular cultures, social clear-sightedness could produce more strategical self-presentation involving Agreeableness.

To sum up this section, culture may have several impacts at different levels on the concepts studied in this thesis. From the personality structure that may vary, to the socially desirable aspects each culture may trigger, future research may make very interesting discoveries by trying to replicate our methodologies in other cultures, or by trying to construct culturally dependent ways of conducting such research to uncover the specificities of social clear-sightedness in other contexts.

3.3.3 Perspectivist Considerations

In this section, the goal is to look at the hypotheses and results of the present thesis through the lens of McGuire's perspectivism, as recommended by Świątkowski & Dompnier when drawing the consequences of the replication crisis in social psychology (2017). Based on the reading of some of McGuire's work (McGuire, 1989, 1997, 2004) and on his famous heuristics, social clear-sightedness, its hypotheses and implications will be reviewed to try to give insights for future studies, but also to have a more critical point of view on our own work. As stated by Fiske (2014), "researchers may pit two theories against each other, sometimes supporting one to the exclusion of the other, but more often determining the conditions under which each is true". Perspectivism will thus be used to even further contextualising our model of social clear-sightedness.

In the third research line of this thesis, the meta-analysis of four studies revealed that social clear-sightedness was effectively stable across contexts, and that Conscientiousness was indeed constantly predicted by social clear-sightedness in honest answers in Duty contexts involving high stakes. For Sociality contexts with high stakes, the link hypothesised between social clear-sightedness and Extraversion and/or Agreeableness was not as clear and stable. Using some McGuire's heuristics to make sense of these odd findings, the definition of what is a "Sociality" situation seemed a focal point. In our studies, this type of situations was operationalised as a virtual social interaction between participants and other students, whereas

Duty situations implied a similar social interaction with a university professor. First, our Sociality situation seemed to include some Duty features: As University and students were taken as a context, work-related appraisal could have been activated, even when talking about "friends". Indeed, friends at university are often working together to study or to hand in group assignments. Second, even if our Sociality situation was not impacted by its Duty aspects, a prototypical casual, friendly context is harder to find than a prototypical work context. For some people, being with friends could mean going to a bar by night and drink alcohol with a huge group of people, whereas for other people, it could mean going for a walk with their dearest friend. As one can easily guess, the affordances of the two situations just mentioned can be very different. In a bar with a lot of people, Extraversion and Agreeableness could in fact be the two most socially desirable personality dimensions of the Big Five. But during a virtual online interaction as the one we implemented in our studies, they could be less necessary, reducing their relevance for self-presentation purposes in such contexts.

But what can influence people's view of a Sociality situation? Maybe one hint of explanation could be the continuum between introversion and extraversion: more extraverted people could be more used to bar-friends-noise contexts, whereas more introverted people could picture more directly one-to-one encounters. Thus, the operationalisation in the present thesis of a Sociality situation is in line with the fact that extraversion tend to be more valued in our western, individualistic society (e.g., Friedman et al., 1988). However, extraverted people are a subset of the population (Blevins et al., 2022) and introverted people—even if not declaring it loudly—may have their own vision of Sociality situations, which could have influenced the results obtained in our studies. Of course, "there must be something about the situation that is influential across both the shy and extraverted person", as stated by Wagerman and Funder (2009, p. 35), to elicit the study of situations. However, these authors also acknowledge that a more subjective, constructivist, and thus narrower approach to

situation (i.e., how each type of personality might perceive each type of situation) could enlighten some aspects of the person-situation relation. Thus, our operationalisation of a Sociality situation could be improved, modified, and even more: various types of operationalisations might be tested to see if differences between introverts and extraverts—and also people being in the middle of the continuum—actually exist. A first interesting step could be to run a qualitative study asking people to describe how they picture themselves when asking to think about a social situation and to link their answers to a personality test about extraversion.

Mirroring this exploration of the Sociality situation meaning, another interesting path of reflection could be the meaning of the Duty situation. As our population, across all studies, was made of university students, it is not surprising that their own definition of Duty seemed to be consensual. But what if we take one step back to see other types of Duty contexts? Is Conscientiousness always the first and most important feature to display to be liked in work-related situations? We may consider, for instance, artists and their work. As stated in section 1.1.4.4 of this thesis, Openness was indeed found to be related to inspiration and artistic occupational interests (Soto, 2019), and presented as highly relevant in creativity and innovation (Connelly, Ones, & Chernyshenko, 2014; DeYoung et al., 2014). Thus, in such artistic contexts, Openness may be a very highly valued or even necessary dimension to possess, and perhaps more than Conscientiousness. That being said, Openness might also be a very relevant characteristic to display to work in scientific research, an eventuality that McGuire would surely not deny when taking into consideration his emphasis on creativity to generate new research lines. Another example would be jobs involving communication skills or services, like in the social sector, or sales, or even hotels, restaurants, and bars. In all these work contexts just mentioned, Agreeableness appears as the first quality to display, as people working there are directly communicating with other people or customers. In fact, as depicted

in section 1.1.4.2 of this thesis, Agreeableness was found to positively influence performance in jobs requiring interpersonal interactions (Hurtz & Donovan, 2000), and is considered as highly relevant when helping and building positive relationships with others (Wilmot & Ones, 2022). What we could conclude from these thoughts is that Conscientiousness might be needed in every jobs—and maybe this could be true across cultures—but might not be the most necessary dimension to display in some specific work contexts. Each sector may have its own highly socially desirable feature for the perfect employee.

Another angle of approach to creatively generate new insights on our research is considering social clear-sightedness alone: What are its implications? Is it really a general knowledge thus applicable to a large range of variables and contexts? In other words, is a clearsighted person clearsighted in all situations? Maybe some people are, and taking this hypothesis to an extreme, people like that might exist because there may be some worldwide norms about prototypical situations true in any cultures or contexts. If this was true, clear-sighted people could help others to become like them, and programs of social clear-sightedness could be set up to teach people how to be socially desirable in any contexts anywhere. Some similar programs were already tested for unemployed people regarding normative clear-sightedness to help them succeed in job interviews (Beauvois & Dubois, 2001; Férec et al., 2011). Taking the reflection to the other extreme, it is also totally imaginable that some other people could be very clear-sighted in a particular situation, but not really in other types of situations. For example, someone might be very suitable and likable for their job position but might be totally confused about how to be socially desirable in casual, friendly contexts. Even more precisely, if an accountant changed career after thirty years of work, it could be hard for them to understand how to show their best side for a position in, say, socio-cultural animation. Also, intuitively, affordances should differ between cultures: a worker who has everything it takes to please in Costa Rica might have some

troubles understanding how to adapt to a Mongolian work context. Similarly, neuroatypical people could feel like they are permanently in a different culture as they try to fit in with what is socially expected from them to be desirable.

However, if people low on social clear-sightedness exist, maybe it is for a reason. When trying to put attention to the opposite pole of the problem, people lacking social clear-sightedness might not always be "weaker". Social clear-sightedness could be viewed as a type of intelligence or comprehension, and therefore clear-sighted people might be supposed to understand better how the social world works. Thus, social clear-sightedness may be socially desirable in itself: being clear-sighted is good and useful. But maybe being low on social clear-sightedness could be a strength in some contexts. Coming back to the artistic community, the pursuit of authenticity is extremely valued, like are individualising and standing out. People in art must cultivate their differences and avoid being too much like everyone else. Thus, not being sensitive to what one should show in a work context or a social one could help keeping one's ground, staying oneself. In this perspective, a parallel with low self-monitors (Snyder, 1987) seems obvious: whereas authenticity is sought by low self-monitors, people low in social clear-sightedness might be authentic in spite of themselves.

In sum, we may have caught "some aspects of the truth" (McGuire, 1989, p. 216) with our research on social clear-sightedness, but of course the representation we now have of it is imperfect. McGuire's contexts argument is highly relevant in this case: we tested two types of situations—Duty and Sociality—but other types might also be tested. In fact, Rauthmann and colleagues (2014) proposed eight different types of situations (Duty, Intellect, Adversity, Mating, pOsitivity, Negativity, Deception, Sociality). Moreover, we tested only one operationalisation of our two contexts, and with only one population, namely students. Thus, future studies might vary the population, but also the culture, and of course the operationalisation of the contexts. Is Conscientiousness always outstandingly desirable at

work? In addition, studying with more scrutiny what people envision when talking about casual, friendly situations is a very promising path, and so is the link of these results with some personality characteristics like introversion. In a more critical point of view, we studied social clear-sightedness as a general knowledge of what is socially desirable, but social clear-sightedness in itself certainly *is* socially desirable. Further explorations about this fact could help understand more accurately our social world by, for example, trying to disentangle contexts where social clear-sightedness might not be totally socially desirable, or even contexts where it might be an advantage not to have it. To conclude, perspectivism helped understand how this research program is embedded in an extremely precise context and consequently how results obtained might be totally different if we had changed some aspects, or even without changing anything but simply running them in a different social environment.

3.3.4 Qualitative Considerations

The present section aims at questioning the epistemological point of view of our research by reviewing considerations from qualitative approaches. Confining a research line to a specific epistemological view is necessary to actually *do* research in a concrete and reasonable way, but it is also important to explicitly state in which epistemological tradition our research is situated. In this section, we will therefore locate the epistemological approach of our research and then push away the—limiting—border delineated by it to explore other paths. As stated by Parker (2004, p. 97): “Now it is necessary to find a way to open up new ways of thinking about the domain of the ‘psychological’—perhaps by refocusing on such things as ‘experience’, ‘subjectivity’ or ‘interaction’”. Some new ways are going to be explored here and ultimately, some avenues for qualitative studies to complete our subject are going to be proposed.

Throughout our research lines, our posture and paradigm—i.e., belief system or worldview to do science—have mainly been post-positivist (Guba & Lincoln, 1994): based on

theories and previous findings, we formulated a priori hypotheses we planned to verify or falsify, tested them multiple times with the aim of replicating and thus confirming our findings, minimizing as much as possible our impact on the measures, and controlling as far as we could the experiment settings. In other words, our path was more verifying and refuting (i.e., post-positivist) than discovering (i.e., constructivist) (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Qualitative research, which tend to be embedded in a constructivist paradigm, is defined as situated, integrating the subjectivity of both the observer (i.e., the researcher) and the observed (e.g., participants), focusing on interpretations, representations and meanings people give to their perceived world (Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). It is important to say that both paradigms are valid and that verifying and refuting is an important part of science making. However, by changing the paradigm and doing science in a more discovery-prone way, constructivism is as valuable as other widespread paradigms in advancing science (Flick et al., 2004).

Some aspects of our paradigm are now going to be explored. First, even from the perspectivist point of view examined in the previous section, we know that our results are true only in a specific context, embedded in a culture and an era. We cannot say that our findings are generalizable world-wide, as it would be a compositional fallacy as depicted by Pettigrew (2018). Second, as we had precise quantitative approaches based on previous findings, the variables we included in our research were preselected and the—possibly great—impact of other potential variables was thus not allowed to emerge (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). Third, our posture regarding the study of social clear-sightedness was as objective as possible but obviously, our own conceptions of it influenced our research and methodological approach. In a more constructivist paradigm, objectivity is viewed as a construction (Parker, 2004). Thus, interrogating social clear-sightedness from a more subjective point of view might widen our comprehension of it, and it would be interesting to see how far lay conceptions are from our

own. In some ways, we already included some aspects of a subjective knowledge as described by Flick (1992): instead of finding and relying on social norms (i.e., as it was the case with normative clear-sightedness), we let participants tell us which personality dimensions were socially desirable in both contexts we presented them. We thus relied on the consensus of their subjective knowledge on social desirability in two types of social situations. However, as we stayed away from our participants (they answered online surveys), meeting them and having conversations with and among them might provide new perspectives on our research line.

In light of these considerations, four—non-exhaustive—main avenues including qualitative considerations are going to be proposed. What might first come to mind are direct observational methods (Adler & Adler, 1994): if clear-sighted people are changing their presentation according to the context they are in, observers should be able to spot these changes. With the line of research presented in this thesis, we have demonstrated that people know which personality dimensions are more socially desirable depending on the situation, and that they were able to boost these dimensions when answering to an online personality questionnaire. But is this boosting also visible when observing actual behaviours? In other words, by observing people acting in different situations, is it possible to see how social clear-sightedness look like? When describing personality psychology of situations, Wagerman and Funder (2009, p. 38) stated that "future research should also include direct observations of behaviour in experimental situations designed to accentuate selected situational dimensions". To answer this call and the other questions raised previously, we could implement a study mirroring what we proposed in our research: participants could be invited to experiment two different social situations, one involving a fake job interview, and a second involving a fake social gathering with games. Half of them would begin by the fake job interview, whereas the other half would begin by the social game. Situations would be video-taped, and independent

coders would watch and code the situations, by focusing on how each participant monitor they behaviour to match and be liked in the situation (thus slightly mirroring the procedure used by Irwing et al., 2023 for their APR model). This study could help demonstrate how people actually enact social clear-sightedness and thus expand our knowledge about this concept.

A second research avenue could clarify how the Sociality situation we implemented in our studies is actually perceived, as our results concerning this type of situation remained a bit blurry. We defined Sociality situations (Rauthmann et al., 2014) as contexts where participants are with university friends and trying to be liked by these friends. However, this is our specific conceptualisation of Sociality based on the context (i.e., university) we had. As our meta-analytic results suggest less stable personality dimensions viewed as socially desirable for this situation than for the Duty one, we can infer that participants had their own and diverse conceptualisations of this specific context. Thus, individual interviews on this topic could enlighten the signification people gave to this context, how they differ from our conceptions, and can ultimately help us reframe our operationalisation of this kind of situations. Instead of using Rauthmann's taxonomy, we could ask people to describe the different types of social situations they faced the day before and how their behaviour changed accordingly. We would thus focus on how each person construct their reality in terms of social situations. On a methodological point of view, thematical analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) across individual interviews could be performed to see if there are a consensus on the existence of certain situations, and what kind of behaviours were involved in each of these situations, based on the average behavioural description made by people. Alternatively or additionally, a more quantitative approach to qualitative data could be used, with Reinert's (1999) descending hierarchical classification method named *Alceste* and implemented in the IRaMuTeQ software: we could compare the classes of words used in each situation described

by participants with the aim of fully understanding how each social situation is understood and perceived, allowing us to better frame our future operationalisation of situations, bearing in mind that they would be culturally and temporally pinned.

A third research avenue could focus on social clear-sightedness itself and how it is lived and subjectively perceived by people. Using again individual interviews, we could this time focus only on people who are looking for or who just found a job—i.e., people who recently went through a job interview as applicant. With this population, we could be precisely in the context we wanted to study with our Duty situations, see how applicants gave sense to what happened during a job interview, and how they perceived the event in terms of presentational strategies about their personality. Research questions we could try to answer are: when freely describing their last job interview, do people spontaneously talk about how they present themselves? How do they talk about self-presentation? How do they call and describe it? Based on what they say, do they seem to consciously try to monitor their self-presentation, or does it seem like they are not really aware of such processes? Do they describe themselves as good or bad at making a good impression during a job interview, compared to how they think other people do? How do they picture the impact of such presentational strategies on the goal of the organization to find the perfect match for the position they are offering (which clearly reminds the impact of faking on P-O fit demonstrated by Roulin & Krings, 2020)? As what is said is inseparable from the context in which it has been said (Poupart, 1993), answering these questions could help us contextualise our findings—thus tending towards a more contextual social psychology (Pettigrew, 2018)—by investigating how people construct the reality of self-presentation nowadays in job interview situations. We would interrogate the social reality of job interviews by allowing the research to follow participants' conceptions and perceptions, thus perhaps letting new insights emerge (Poupart, 1993).

A fourth and final research avenue could investigate how self-presentation strategies are subjectively conceived interactively using focus groups, which are defined as "a research technique that collects data through group interaction on a topic determined by the researcher" (Morgan, 1996, p. 130). Participants—students—would first be invited to pass our survey: answering a personality questionnaire first under honest instructions, and then under fake-good instructions. Half of the groups—at least two—would be asked to fake good in a Duty situation, whereas the other half—at least two groups—would be asked to fake good in a Sociality situation. After the survey completion, participants would be asked to discuss about how and why they responded in the way they did, and what were their reactions to the fake-good instructions. The goal of such a study would be to understand more deeply how people construct meaning around self-presentation strategies and to answer questions such as: how do a group of people spontaneously interpret what they were asked to do? How is trying to give a good image of oneself perceived in a group? Do people overtly admit their effort to be liked in general? Are there positive versus negative perceptions of trying to be liked, or is it generally neutrally viewed? How do a group of people consider the impact such presentational strategies could have in daily life? Thus, this approach could for example give some hints on the potential social desirability of social clear-sightedness itself, as already mentioned in the perspectivist considerations. Using focus groups here could elicit the emergence of axes we did not think about as the social interaction tend to favour the production of broader range of answers (Caillaud et al., 2022).

Additionally, in individual interviews or even in focus groups, we could also, at the end, present the findings of our research line in an attempt to use respondent validation (Barbour, 2001; Parker, 2004): this would be a way to see how quantitative results are perceived by those actually living the situations presented. Do our results make sense for people? Do our results help them understand something? Or, on the other side, are our results

too far away from the social reality? This would enable us to take a reflexive point of view on our findings. Of course, all the study propositions overviewed previously are not mutually exclusive. On the contrary, following a triangulation approach (Flick, 1992, 2017) might even combine two or more of these study propositions to increase the breadth of comprehension of social clear-sightedness and adding knowledge about it: it would elicit a fuller picture and deeper understanding of the concept. Moreover, results obtained by triangulation of these qualitative studies might be integrated with our quantitative data already collected in order to give more solid foundations to our social psychological theory building about social clear-sightedness (Fine & Elsbach, 2000). Finally, it is crucial to remember that—quantitative or qualitative—results are attached to their context, and that they might change and evolve, for instance, with time (Parker, 2004). It would thus be fascinating to redo these studies in, say, a decade or two, to see how the findings and consequently the social realities attached to them will transform. The non-replication of results should not simply be considered as a failure, but more as a hint of the change occurring in society (Pettigrew, 2018; Power et al., 2023).

3.4 Implications and Contributions

Specific implications of the present thesis along with its contributions to the literature reviewed in the theoretical part are now going to be explored. First, it is important to highlight that, even if the Big Five personality dimensions and inventories measuring them could be considered as method-bound (due to their construction through CFA), subjective, or too broad (see section 1.1.5 for details concerning these limiting aspects of the Big Five), all our studies still obtained robust, stable, and replicated results. In our studies, these instruments were reliable and useful, and as good psychometrics such as reliability and validity are indeed essential in SEM (Kline, 2015), our research advocate in favour of the qualitative properties of Big Five instruments. However, these measures were highly contextualized in our studies, and as the importance of such contextualization has been highlighted throughout this thesis, it

may have helped reach reliable results. In consequence, this thesis demonstrated that personality inventories such as the Big Five can be highly useful and lead to robust findings if rightly contextualized. Moreover, social clear-sightedness might help to explain the non-independence of the Big Five dimensions sometimes found in research (e.g., Condon & Mroczek, 2016; Duckworth et al., 2012). As all five factors may be positively correlated due to their social desirability (Funder, 2001), the knowledge of what is socially desirable in any situations would thus possibly strengthen these associations. And finally, this thesis could also advocate in favour of the existence of personality, as each personality dimension still had its uniqueness even after ruling out the impact of social clear-sightedness and social desirability.

As a second aspect of implications and contributions, let us simply have a look at the direct consequences of social clear-sightedness itself: what are the practical benefits of being high on social clear-sightedness? When considering the knowledge and social competence components of social clear-sightedness, being socially clear-sighted may help people understand the interactions they are experiencing, and more broadly, the society they are living in. However, it is yet to discover if this knowledge is culturally bounded or totally generalizable. On one side, people could in fact have an excellent knowledge of what is socially desirable in their own culture—which can be conceptualised, as previously mentioned in the Cultural Considerations section, at the level of the profession (i.e., the culture of students, the culture of traders, etc.), as well as at the level of a locality, a country, or even Western versus Eastern cultures—and thus be high in clear-sightedness in this particular culture. On the other side, being high in clear-sightedness may reflect a very broad general knowledge allowing people to understand the world's societies as a whole.

Consequently, being socially clear-sighted may not have the same implications depending on the level of abstraction of the construct. If it is culturally bounded, then people

might lose their advantage when moving from one cultural context to another. If it is general, socially clear-sighted people may be advantaged in the human functioning in general. When thinking about a concrete example, as social clear-sightedness was studied in this thesis with regard to personality dimensions, if the construct is generalizable at least to the functioning of a particular society, socially clear-sighted people might be more able to spot what they should answer to personality self-reports used as personnel selection tools. Consequently, being high in social clear-sightedness may help being hired for a job. However, if the construct is bounded to one particular professional context, a socially clear-sighted person in one specific job could for instance encounter troubles when trying to change career.

Future studies could focus on investigating the antecedents of social clear-sightedness to further enable prediction about its implications. For example, is social clear-sightedness related to social class? Different scenarios could be imagined: as a knowledge of social expectancies, being high in social clear-sightedness could inferred understanding how the world of powerful people works, i.e., the world of high social classes. Consequently, people high in social clear-sightedness could either come from high social classes—i.e., they have been educated to understand how it works and have thus a great knowledge of social expectancies—or either from low social classes—i.e., as societies might be more ruled by high social classes, they may have had to adapt to it their whole life and thus developed an acute understanding and knowledge of social expectancies. Social clear-sightedness may also have other antecedents than social class, as for instance age and personality itself. Is social clear-sightedness something that people can learn or something they intrinsically are? Mirroring the nature-nurture debate regarding personality, both aspects might be true: people could have predispositions to being socially clear-sighted, but a learning curve throughout life may still be possible.

Let us consider now a third view on implications and contributions. As reviewed in sections 1.1.4.1 to 1.1.4.5 of this thesis, all five personality dimensions have their own powerful implications, and each predicts a great number of positive outcomes. It would therefore not be surprising that people would try to pretend to be high on these personality dimensions to access their positive consequences. Put the other way around, general programs to help some types of population reach higher levels of these dimensions could also be pictured. In the context of their sociogenomic model, Roberts and colleagues (2017) proposed intervention programs aiming at fostering Conscientiousness by teaching people to behave more conscientiously in order to change their personality state until it becomes automatic and thus a permanent trait. According to these authors, this could be the first step for people to actually *be* more conscientious and thus benefit from its positive impacts. Similar beneficial potential in intervention programs has also been proposed for normative clear-sightedness, as described in section 1.3.5 of this thesis. Beauvois and Dubois (2001), but also Férec and colleagues (2011), came up with normative clear-sightedness training propositions to help unemployed people succeed in job interviews by enabling them to be aware of the norms valued in such contexts. These trainings were seen as a step to assure equal opportunities to people with regard to the job market, and some preliminary beneficial effects were found (Férec et al., 2011). On a similar note, Auzoult (2006) proposed a comparable program to foster normative clear-sightedness in teenagers facing orientation choices.

Considering all these intervention programs fostering personality dimensions or normative clear-sightedness, such programs could clearly also be pictured for social clear-sightedness. As it has been described as a sort of social competence enabling people to spot what would be socially desirable in a given context if they want to be liked, numerous benefits from trying to foster social clear-sightedness can be thought of. As for normative clear-sightedness, fostering social clear-sightedness could help unemployed people to be more

successful during job interviews, by accentuating their conscientious side to match expectations of such a Duty situation, or by enhancing their self-presentation on whatever psychological constructs they identified as necessary to increase their P-O fit (Roulin & Krings, 2020). As a concrete example, Gioaba and Krings (2017) proposed that training older job applicants to use impression management specifically to target age-related stereotypes at hiring would help them get out of unemployment. Even if their findings revealed that this procedure did not totally overcome these age-related stereotypes, they still found some beneficial effects of fostering impression management, which could consequently possibly be paralleled with social clear-sightedness. Helping older job applicants to be more socially clear-sighted about what could be socially undesirable about their age could enable them to strategically present themselves specifically to counter these stereotypes. A final aspect on which fostering social clear-sightedness might be beneficial concerns social classes. When experiencing social class mobility, that is, when coming from a different social class as the one in which one is evolving (through studying or working, for example), people might experience a sort of cultural mismatch and struggle to adapt themselves, thus resulting in negative impacts on their general well-being and performance (e.g., Stephens et al., 2012). Fostering social clear-sightedness in socially mobile individuals could therefore help them develop a better understanding of the rules and habits current in their new social environment, as well as directly facilitate their integration and general fulfilment.

A fourth angle on implications and contributions concerns the social psychological side of this thesis, as social clear-sightedness can be linked to different aspects or concepts presented in the theoretical part. For instance, the great within-person variability of personality found between situations (e.g., Fleeson, 2001) could find a path of explanation in social clear-sightedness, as self-presentational strategies allowed by this construct would be used in self-reported personality inventories according to the social situation at hand. Thus,

the same person, if high in social clear-sightedness, would modify their self-reported personality as a function of situational features. This conceptualization is also in line with the density distribution conception of personality (Fleeson, 2001; Fleeson & Law, 2015) which reconcile the existence of both stability and variability of behaviours in one individual. As demonstrated in this thesis, social clear-sightedness in a stable dispositional variable across time and situations, which produce variability in self-reported psychological constructs, thus entailing both stable and variable components. Another example of implication regarding the social psychological side of this thesis is the connexion that could be made with the theory of self-regulated personality change (Denissen et al., 2013). The regulatory system pictured in personality could be attributed to social clear-sightedness, as this construct is proposed to "regulate" the behavioural expression of personality according to the situation. Moreover, the reference values which are targeted in Denissen and colleagues' model by the regulation of personality expression could easily be linked to the necessities identified by social clear-sightedness to be liked in particular contexts. The authors themselves stated that these reference values might sometimes correspond to social norms, which is also the case of the necessary constructs in our model. Thus, as personality stability and change in Denissen and colleagues' model is thought as being due to stability and change in reference values, the parallel with our conceptualisation is straightforward: stability or change in self-reported personality is tightly linked to stability or change in the constructs identified thanks to social clear-sightedness as necessary to be liked in a specific context.

A final obvious link that can be made between this thesis findings and its social psychological aspect concerns the person-situation-behaviour triad. This thesis and the construct of social clear-sightedness definitely abound in the sense of an equal and detrimental importance of the three elements of this triad. The famous $B = f(P, E)$ formula proposed by Lewin (1936) is also highly relevant in the matter. In the case of social clear-

sightedness, the behavioural response given to a self-report is the result of the interaction between dispositional characteristics such as the level of social clear-sightedness (encompassing, among other, the ability to fake), and environmental features such as the type of social situation and the evaluative pressure involved. Going one step further by capitalizing on the model proposed in section 3.2 of the present discussion, the behaviour-part of the formula could even be represented by an external criterion. Thus, a behavioural measure would be predicted by self-reports of this behaviour, which in turn are a result of the interaction described previously.

A fifth implication and contribution of the present thesis to the literature is directly related to normative clear-sightedness. As such, the social clear-sightedness construct presented here was a way of reviving normative clear-sightedness by capitalizing on its theoretical and methodological reflexions and extending it outside its norm-related boundaries. Theoretically and statistically, normative clear-sightedness was conceptualized as orthogonal to the adhesion of norms (cf. section 1.3.5), that is, being high on normative clear-sightedness was expected to be fully independent of the degree of adhesion to norms. Additionally, normative clear-sightedness was only used to study social norms. In our conceptualisation of social clear-sightedness, we first rejected the orthogonality postulate and thus proposed that being high on social clear-sightedness would predict self-reports of other psychological constructs in some particular contexts (such as the level of Conscientiousness in Duty situations with high evaluative pressure). We hence proposed that social clear-sightedness, as a reformulation of normative clear-sightedness, could be used to study faking behaviour (and thus not only norms), i.e., the concrete impact of social clear-sightedness on the measure of personality in specific contexts.

On a sixth and more methodological note about implications and contributions, this thesis demonstrated the usefulness and relevant of several tools. First, SEM and MASEM

were particularly essential to construct, validate, and further examine our proposed psychological construct of social clear-sightedness. Second, even if self-reports were highly criticized for their sensitivity to biases and subjectivity (see section 1.3.1 of this thesis), they have proved particularly effective in all our studies to access the subjective perceptions of participants and to allow inferences on them. The same remarks as for Big Five inventories can be made though: the context in which this type of measures is used has to be taken into account to ensure valid access to the concepts one is to capture. When this situational impact is considered, self-reports can even serve as behavioural measures: a response behaviour is a type of behaviour or performance, especially when it is produced according to specific instructions relating to particular situations. Third, these specific instructions were also a methodological tool used successfully in this thesis: the self-presentation paradigm, operationalized through various types of instructions (honest vs. faking good in the present case) is highly relevant in the study of social clear-sightedness. In addition, when combining self-reports and instructions to fake good, the very meaning of the concept supposedly measured by the self-reports change. In our research, self-reported questionnaires were originally designed to measure the Big Five personality dimensions. However, when answered under social desirability instructions, these self-reports were in practice measuring the knowledge of social desirability participants had in the context at hand. In other words, through their answers under these instructions, participants did not reveal their own personality, but rather the most highly socially desirable personality they could imagine when thinking of the experimental situation they had to imagine. Fourth and finally, in line with the major emphasis put on social situations throughout this thesis, the situation eight DIAMONDS were successfully used in the majority of our studies, therefore advocating for their relevant, usefulness, and validity.

Let us make a final comment on the implications and contributions of the present thesis. The findings obtained, when stated in common words, can seem trivial or even obvious. As raised by Ross and colleagues, some findings in social psychology can be perceived as being "Nothing more than proving things "we knew all along"" (2010, p. 18). Thus, showing that some people may be quite good at identifying how they have to behave to be liked in a particular context is "no great shakes". However, being able to bring such real-life issues under research to study them systematically is of great importance (Ross et al., 2010). Moreover, good theories and research are the one that are the simplest (i.e., Ockham's razor) while still being highly comprehensive, that is, explaining the largest number of phenomena possible (Cloninger, 2009). Thus, even if social clear-sightedness might first seem quite obvious, it was still necessary to operationalise it in the simplest way possible to account for a wide range of observable phenomena. As such, the simplest structural model of social clear-sightedness was kept (cf. statistical considerations in section 2.1), and very accurate advanced predictions about observations were still made (i.e., which personality dimensions would be more faked in which context), thus attesting to the theoretical validity of the construct (Cloninger, 2009). Additionally, scientifically studying such conception as social clear-sightedness is essential to verify how far or close are lay conceptions from reality. Indeed, "all human beings are, in a sense, already *intuitive psychologists*" (Ross et al., 2010, p. 8), a conception termed as "naïve realism". This terminology refers to the fact that people, in general, tend to consider their own subjective experiences as representative of the objective reality. In other words, people have lay theories they believe to be true about everyday life, and these theories help them give meaning to their everyday social interactions and experiences. However, the genuine link between these naïve theories and the objective reality is not always studied, despite its obvious significance in the comprehension of human

behaviours and interactions. Testing such lay theories—such as, maybe, the ones resembling the construct of social clear-sightedness—is therefore essential in social psychology.

However, naïve realism and its subsequent lay theories might also be wrong. As a case in point, "lay dispositionism" may particularly lead lay people to misleading conclusions in the social clear-sightedness conceptualization. Lay dispositionism refers to "the tendency of social actors and observers to attribute actions and outcomes to the attributes of the actor (…) rather than the field of forces influencing the relevant actor or entity" (Ross et al., 2010, p. 22). Stated differently, it depicted the tendency people have to think that someone else's behaviour is directly attributable to this person, without considering any situational features that may have impacted the expression of the behaviour in question. Expressed more simply, it means that we all generally tend to be more in favour of nature rather than nurture, of person rather than situation. This is because in our everyday life, our experiences generally confirm the predictions we make about other people's behaviours, and as naïve realism postulates, we then tend to hold these experiences as real objective theories about our social world. Consequently, we generally fail to "realize the extent to which the same person (…) may behave very differently when the balance of the relevant situational forces and constraints (…) changes" (Ross et al., 2010, p. 25). Yet, the whole point of the present thesis was to highlight how influential are nurture, environment, and situations. In the particular case of social clear-sightedness, even if it seem obvious at first glance that we might know how to behave in a likable way, it is thus not so obvious, when on the other side of the mirror, to totally grasp the fact that the behaviours people are displaying in front of us might not reflect their true personality or inherent nature, but rather a strategical attempt at gaining our favour (e.g., being hired during a job interview). "Person and situation are inevitably confounded in the real world" (Ross et al., 2010, p. 24), and disentangling the effects of the former from the effects of the later might be particularly tricky for lay perceptions, therefore

asking for thorough scientific studies of such phenomena to fully understand what might be "really"—or at least more objectively—happening in which situations.

3.5 Conclusions

To conclude this thesis, putting aside the scientific aspect for a second to consequently dive a bit more into naïve realism, we all feel, obviously, that we manage more or less who we are as a function of who we have in front of us, or of what kind of situation we are in. Rare are those who can pretend behaving exactly the same when spending a recreative evening with some dear friends in a bar, or when having the biggest meeting of the year first thing in the morning on Monday. Thus, we are overall aware that our personality can express itself differently—and consequently be viewed differently by others too—in the various domains of our lives. Does that mean that our personality is thus only a vanishing cloud untouchable that takes the shape of the box we put it into? This thesis demonstrated that this is not the case, as noticeable levels on personality dimensions were still found, and as individual differences in social clear-sightedness were also revealed.

Going back to the dramaturgical metaphor proposed by Goffman (Goffman, 1956, 1959)—according to which people tend to control their self-presentation in social interactions like actors on stage—and to the very origin of the word "personality" (Goffman, 1956; Snyder, 1987)—i.e., *persona*, which historically corresponded to masks worn by actors on stage to portray specific characters and their particular behaviours—, social clear-sightedness could be pictured as the panoply of social masks a person possesses. Thus, people high on social clear-sightedness may have a wide range of effective masks representing characters particularly suitable for several situations. These people could then decide to put on the specific mask they perceived as useful in the context they are in, but only if putting this mask seems necessary or even expected to achieve certain presentational goals such as being liked.

As we all are social beings with basic psychological needs such as relatedness (R. M. Ryan, 1995), we may all have some masks to help us adapting ourselves and "fit" everyday life situations. However, we may not all be equal in our ability to successfully present ourselves favourably according to the context or, furthering our metaphor, we may not all have the same number of perfectly fitting masks for each social situation we face.

In sum, this thesis particularly stressed its position at the intersection of personality and social psychology by acknowledging dispositional and situational influences, although particularly emphasizing the importance of the context. More precisely, we demonstrated that the impact of social desirability does exist, but that not *all* personality dimensions are necessary to be appreciated in *all* social situations. Additionally, the psychological construct of social clear-sightedness was proposed as distinguishing people on their knowledge of this social desirability. Thus, individuals high in social clear-sightedness could be able to use complex self-presentational strategies when high evaluative pressure is involved, by producing SDR only on the necessary dimensions to be liked by the audience in the situation at hand. To use Fiske's (2014) formulation "scratch an itch with a brick", this thesis scratched the itch of the gap in the literature about the conditional impact of SDR on self-reported measures by putting a new brick to the wall: social clear-sightedness, its theoretical conception and practical implementation. In doing so, the goal was to "both resolving discrepancies and filling the gaps" in the literature, theoretically as well as empirically, as social and personality psychology are pictured as not separating theory from research (Fiske, 2014, p. 4). In this thesis, our theoretical conceptualisations about social clear-sightedness have been thoroughly put to the empirical test of science, and the robustness of the findings obtained point to the relevance of this new psychological construct: "ideas are easy; evidence is harder, so it is more precious" (Fiske, 2014, p. 3).

4 REFERENCES

Abele, A. E., Cuddy, A. J. C., Judd, C. M., & Yzerbyt, V. Y. (2008). Fundamental dimensions of social judgment. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *38*(7), 1063–1065. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.574

Abele, A. E., Ellemers, N., Fiske, S. T., Koch, A., & Yzerbyt, V. (2021). Navigating the social world: Toward an integrated framework for evaluating self, individuals, and groups. *Psychological Review*, *128*(2), 290–314. https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000262

Adler, P. A., & Adler, P. (1994). Observational techniques. In *Handbook of qualitative research* (pp. 377–392). Sage Publications, Inc.

Akbulut, Y., Dönmez, O., & Dursun, Ö. Ö. (2017). Cyberloafing and social desirability bias among students and employees. *Computers in Human Behavior*, *72*, 87–95. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chb.2017.02.043

Allport, F. H., & Allport, G. W. (1921). Personality traits: Their classification and measurement. *The Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology*, *16*(1), 6–40. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0069790

Allport, G. W. (1931). What is a trait of personality? *The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, *25*(4), 368–372. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0075406

Allport, G. W. (1937). *Personality: A psychological interpretation* (pp. xiv, 588). Holt.

Allport, G. W. (1966). Traits revisited. *American Psychologist*, *21*(1), 1–10. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0023295

Allport, G. W., & Odbert, H. S. (1936). Trait-names: A psycho-lexical study. *Psychological Monographs*, *47*(1), i–171. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0093360

Anderson, C., John, O. P., Keltner, D., & Kring, A. M. (2001). Who attains social status? Effects of personality and physical attractiveness in social groups. *Journal of Personality*

and Social Psychology, *81*(1), 116–132. https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.81.1.116

Anglim, J., Horwood, S., Smillie, L. D., Marrero, R. J., & Wood, J. K. (2020). Predicting psychological and subjective well-being from personality: A meta-analysis. *Psychological Bulletin*, *146*(4), 279–323. https://doi.org/10.1037/bul0000226

Anusic, I., & Schimmack, U. (2016). Stability and change of personality traits, self-esteem, and well-being: Introducing the meta-analytic stability and change model of retest correlations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *110*(5), 766–781. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000066

Anusic, I., Schimmack, U., Pinkus, R. T., & Lockwood, P. (2009). The nature and structure of correlations among Big Five ratings: The halo-alpha-beta model. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *97*(6), 1142–1156. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0017159

APA Dictionary of Psychology. (n.d.). Retrieved 13 February 2023, from https://dictionary.apa.org/

Ardelt, M. (2000). Still stable after all these years? Personality stability theory revisited. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, *63*(4), 392–405. https://doi.org/10.2307/2695848

Arnett, J. J. (2008). The neglected 95%: Why American psychology needs to become less American. *The American Psychologist*, *63*(7), 602–614. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.63.7.602

Arthur, W., Glaze, R. M., Villado, A. J., & Taylor, J. E. (2010). The magnitude and extent of cheating and response distortion effects on unproctored Internet-based tests of cognitive ability and personality. *International Journal of Selection and Assessment*, *18*(1), 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2389.2010.00476.x

Asch, S. E. (1946). Forming impressions of personality. *The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, *41*(3), 258–290. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0055756

Asendorpf, J. B. (2009). Personality: Traits and situations. In *The Cambridge handbook of*

personality psychology (pp. 43–53). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511596544.006

Ashton, M. C. (1998). Personality and job performance: The importance of narrow traits. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, *19*(3), 289–303.

Ashton, M. C. (2018a). Chapter 1—Basic Concepts in Psychological Measurement. In M. C. Ashton (Ed.), *Individual Differences and Personality (Third Edition)* (pp. 1–28). Academic Press. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-809845-5.00001-9

Ashton, M. C. (2018b). Chapter 2—Personality Traits and the Inventories That Measure Them. In M. C. Ashton (Ed.), *Individual Differences and Personality (Third Edition)* (pp. 29–58). Academic Press. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-809845-5.00002-0

Ashton, M. C. (2018c). Chapter 3 - Personality Structure: Classifying Traits. In M. C. Ashton (Ed.), *Individual Differences and Personality (Third Edition)* (pp. 59–83). Academic Press. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-809845-5.00003-2

Ashton, M. C., Jackson, D. N., Paunonen, S. V., Helmes, E., & Rothstein, M. G. (1995). The criterion validity of broad factor scales versus specific facet scales. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *29*(4), 432–442. https://doi.org/10.1006/jrpe.1995.1025

Ashton, M. C., & Lee, K. (2020). Objections to the HEXACO model of personality structure—And why those objections fail. *European Journal of Personality*, *34*(4), 492–510. https://doi.org/10.1002/per.2242

Auden, W. H. (1963). *The dyer's hand: And other essays*. Faber and Faber.

Auzoult, L. (2006). Diffusion d'une clairvoyance normative en internalité par un travail éducatif en orientation sur la connaissance de soi. *Pratiques Psychologiques*, *12*(3), 317–330. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.prps.2006.06.002

Back, M. D., Schmukle, S. C., & Egloff, B. (2009). Predicting actual behavior from the explicit and implicit self-concept of personality. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*,

97(3), 533–548. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0016229

Bäckström, M., & Björklund, F. (2013). Social desirability in personality inventories: Symptoms, diagnosis and prescribed cure. *Scandinavian Journal of Psychology*, *54*(2), 152–159. https://doi.org/10.1111/sjop.12015

Barbour, R. S. (2001). Checklists for improving rigour in qualitative research: A case of the tail wagging the dog? *BMJ*, *322*(7294), 1115–1117. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.322.7294.1115

Barrick, M. R., & Mount, M. K. (1991). The Big Five personality dimensions and job performance: A meta-analysis. *Personnel Psychology*, *44*(1), 1–26. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1744-6570.1991.tb00688.x

Barrick, M. R., & Mount, M. K. (1996). Effects of impression management and self-deception on the predictive validity of personality constructs. *The Journal of Applied Psychology*, *81*(3), 261–272. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.81.3.261

Barrick, M. R., Mount, M. K., & Judge, T. A. (2001). Personality and performance at the beginning of the new millennium: What do we know and where do we go next? *International Journal of Selection and Assessment*, *9*(1 & 2), 9–30. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2389.00160

Barrick, M. R., Shaffer, J. A., & DeGrassi, S. W. (2009). What you see may not be what you get: Relationships among self-presentation tactics and ratings of interview and job performance. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *94*(6), 1394–1411. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0016532

Baumeister, R. F. (1982). A self-presentational view of social phenomena. *Psychological Bulletin*, *91*(1), 3–26. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.91.1.3

Baumeister, R. F., Vohs, K. D., & Funder, D. C. (2007). Psychology as the science of self-reports and finger movements: Whatever happened to actual behavior? *Perspectives on*

Psychological Science, *2*(4), 396–403. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6916.2007.00051.x

Bazana, P. G., & Stelmack, R. M. (2004). Stability of personality across the life span: A meta-analysis. In *On the psychobiology of personality: Essays in honor of Marvin Zuckerman* (pp. 113–144). Elsevier Science. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-008044209-9/50009-9

Beauvois, J., & Dubois, N. (2001). Normativity and self-presentation: Theoretical bases of self-presentation training for evaluation situations. *Journal of Managerial Psychology*, *16*(7), 490–508. https://doi.org/10.1108/EUM0000000006164

Beauvois, J.-L. (2003). Judgment norms, social utility, and individualism. In N. Dubois (Ed.), *A Sociocognitive Approach to Social Norms*. Routledge.

Beauvois, J.-L., & Dubois, N. (1988). The norm of internality in the explanation of psychological events. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *18*, 299–316. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2420180402

Beauvois, J.-L., & Dubois, N. (2009). Lay psychology and the social value of persons: Social value of persons. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, *3*(6), 1082–1095. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9004.2009.00225.x

Benet-Martínez, V. (2007). Cross-cultural personality research: Conceptual and methodological issues. In R. W. Robins, R. C. Fraley, & R. F. Krueger (Eds.), *Handbook of research methods in personality psychology* (pp. 170–189). The Guilford Press.

Benet-Martínez, V., & John, O. P. (1998). Los Cinco Grandes across cultures and ethnic groups: Multitrait-multimethod analyses of the Big Five in Spanish and English. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *75*(3), 729–750.

Benet-Martínez, V., & Karakitapoglu-Aygün, Z. (2003). The interplay of cultural syndromes and personality in predicting life satisfaction: Comparing Asian- and European-Americans. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, *34*(1), 38–60.

https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022102239154

Bensch, D., Maass, U., Greiff, S., Horstmann, K. T., & Ziegler, M. (2019). The nature of faking: A homogeneous and predictable construct? *Psychological Assessment*, *31*(4), 532–544. https://doi.org/10.1037/pas0000619

Bensch, D., Paulhus, D. L., Stankov, L., & Ziegler, M. (2019). Teasing apart overclaiming, overconfidence, and socially desirable responding. *Assessment*, *26*(3), 351–363. https://doi.org/10.1177/1073191117700268

Bernreuter, R. G. (1933). Validity of the personality inventory. *Personnel Journal*, *11*, 383–386.

Bertl, B., Pietschnig, J., Tran, U. S., Stieger, S., & Voracek, M. (2017). More or less than the sum of its parts? Mapping the Dark Triad of personality onto a single Dark Core. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *114*, 140–144.

Bigot, J., Pichot, N., & Testé, B. (2004). Is there a drop in normative clearsightedness in sixth grade? Study of internality and normative clearsightedness in fourth to seventh graders. *European Journal of Psychology of Education*, *19*(4), 335–347. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03173214

Birkeland, S. A., Manson, T. M., Kisamore, J. L., Brannick, M. T., & Smith, M. A. (2006). A meta-analytic investigation of job applicant faking on personality measures. *International Journal of Selection and Assessment*, *14*(4), 317–335. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2389.2006.00354.x

Bleidorn, W. (2012). Hitting the road to adulthood: Short-term personality development during a major life transition. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *38*(12), 1594–1608. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167212456707

Bleidorn, W., Schwaba, T., Zheng, A., Hopwood, C. J., Sosa, S. S., Roberts, B. W., & Briley, D. A. (2022). Personality stability and change: A meta-analysis of longitudinal studies.

Psychological Bulletin, *148*(7–8), 588–619. https://doi.org/10.1037/bul0000365

Blevins, D. P., Stackhouse, M. R. D., & Dionne, S. D. (2022). Righting the balance: Understanding introverts (and extraverts) in the workplace. *International Journal of Management Reviews*, *24*(1), 78–98. https://doi.org/10.1111/ijmr.12268

Block, J. (1995). A contrarian view of the five-factor approach to personality description. *Psychological Bulletin*, *117*(2), 187–215. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.117.2.187

Block, J. (2001). Millennial contrarianism: The Five-Factor Approach to personality description 5 years later. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *35*(1), 98–107. https://doi.org/10.1006/jrpe.2000.2293

Bogg, T., & Roberts, B. W. (2004). Conscientiousness and health-related behaviors: A meta-analysis of the leading behavioral contributors to mortality. *Psychological Bulletin*, *130*(6), 887–919. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.130.6.887

Bolino, M., Long, D., & Turnley, W. (2016). Impression management in organizations: Critical questions, answers, and areas for future research. *Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior*, *3*(1), 377–406. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-orgpsych-041015-062337

Bond, M. H. (1994). Trait theory and cross-cultural studies of person perception. *Psychological Inquiry*, *5*(2), 114–117.

Bonney, A., & Pettit, S. (2019). Which types of feedback do CBT students in training value most? *The Cognitive Behaviour Therapist*, *12*, e45. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1754470X19000321

Booth-Kewley, S., Edwards, J. E., & Rosenfeld, P. (1992). Impression management, social desirability, and computer administration of attitude questionnaires: Does the computer make a difference? *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *77*(4), 562–566. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.77.4.562

Borgatta, E. F. (1964). The structure of personality characteristics. *Behavioral Science*, *9*(1), 8–17. https://doi.org/10.1002/bs.3830090103

Botwin, M. D., & Buss, D. M. (1989). Struc-ture of act report data: Is the five factor model of personality recaptured? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *56*(6), 988–1001.

Bouchard, T. J., Lykken, D. T., McGue, M., Segal, N. L., & Tellegen, A. (1990). Sources of human psychological differences: The Minnesota study of twins reared apart. *Science*, *250*(4978), 223–228. https://doi.org/10.1126/science.2218526

Braun, V., & Clarke, V. (2006). Using thematic analysis in psychology. *Qualitative Research in Psychology*, *3*(2), 77–101. https://doi.org/10.1191/1478088706qp063oa

Bressoux, P., & Pansu, P. (2007). A methodological shortnote on measuring and assessing the effects of normative clearsightedness about internality. *European Journal of Psychology of Education*, *22*(2), 169–178.

Brouer, R. L., Badaway, R. L., Gallagher, V. C., & Haber, J. A. (2015). Political skill dimensionality and impression management choice and effective use. *Journal of Business and Psychology*, *30*(2), 217–233. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10869-014-9344-y

Browne, M. W. (1992). Circumplex models for correlation matrices. *Psychometrika*, *57*(4), 469–497. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02294416

Burns, G. N., & Christiansen, N. D. (2006). Sensitive or sensless: On the use of social desirability measures in selection and assessment. In R. L. Griffith & M. H. Peterson (Eds.), *A closer examination of applicant faking behavior* (pp. 115–150). Information Age Publishing.

Burns, G. N., & Christiansen, N. D. (2011). Methods of measuring faking behavior. *Human Performance*, *24*(4), 358–372. https://doi.org/10.1080/08959285.2011.597473

Buss, A. H., & Briggs, S. R. (1984). Drama and the self in social interaction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *47*(6), 1310–1324. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-

3514.47.6.1310

Butera, F., Dompnier, B., & Darnon, C. (2024). Achievement Goals: A Social Influence Cycle. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *75*(1), null. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-013123-102139

Butera, F., Dompnier, B., & Darnon, C. (in press). Achievement goals: A social influence cycle. *Annual Review of Psychology*.

Byrne, B. M., Shavelson, R. J., & Muthén, B. (1989). Testing for the equivalence of factor covariance and mean structures: The issue of partial measurement invariance. *Psychological Bulletin*, *105*(3), 456–466. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.105.3.456

Caillaud, S., Kalampalikis, N., & Doumergue, M. (2022). Designing Focus Groups. In U. Flick (Ed.), *The SAGE Handbook of Qualitative Research Design* (pp. 684–699). SAGE Publications.

Campbell, D. T. (1960). Recommendations for APA test standards regarding construct, trait, or discriminant validity. *American Psychologist*, *15*(8), 546–553. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0048255

Carlo, G., Okun, M. A., Knight, G. P., & de Guzman, M. R. T. (2005). The interplay of traits and motives on volunteering: Agreeableness, extraversion and prosocial value motivation. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *38*(6), 1293–1305. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2004.08.012

Caspi, A., & Moffitt, T. E. (1993). When do individual differences matter? A paradoxical theory of personality coherence. *Psychological Inquiry*, *4*(4), 247–271. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327965pli0404_1

Caspi, A., & Roberts, B. W. (2001). Personality development across the life course: The argument for change and continuity. *Psychological Inquiry*, *12*(2), 49–66. https://doi.org/10.1207/S15327965PLI1202_01

Cattell, H. E. P., & Mead, A. D. (2008). The Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire (16PF). In *The SAGE Handbook of Personality Theory and Assessment: Volume 2—Personality Measurement and Testing* (pp. 135–159). SAGE Publications Ltd. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781849200479

Cattell, R. B. (1943). The description of personality: Basic traits resolved into clusters. *The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, *38*(4), 476–506. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0054116

Cattell, R. B. (1945). The description of personality: Principles and findings in a factor analysis. *The American Journal of Psychology*, *58*(1), 69. https://doi.org/10.2307/1417576

Cattell, R. B. (1947). Confirmation and clarification of primary personality factors. *Psychometrika*, *12*(3), 197–220. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02289253

Cattell, R. B. (1956). Validation and intensification of the Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire. *Journal of Clinical Psychology*, *12*, 205–214. https://doi.org/10.1002/1097-4679(195607)12:3<205::AID-JCLP2270120302>3.0.CO;2-0

Chabrol, H., Van Leeuwen, N., Rodgers, R., & Séjourné, N. (2009). Contributions of psychopathic, narcissistic, Machiavellian, and sadistic personality traits to juvenile delinquency. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *47*(7), 734–739. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2009.06.020

Chan, D. (2009). So why ask me? Are self-report data really that bad? In C. E. Lance & R. J. Vandenberg (Eds.), *Statistical and methodological myths and urban legends: Doctrine, verity and fable in the organizational and social sciences* (pp. 309–336). Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group.

Channouf, A., Le Manio, P. Y., Py, J., & Somat, A. (1993). Internality, normative clearsightedness and temporal persistence of the effects of dissonance. *Revue*

Internationale de Psychologie Sociale, *6*, 69–81.

Channouf, A., Py, J., & Somat, A. (1995). Internalité, clairvoyance normative et pratiques pédagogiques. *Les Cahiers Internationaux de Psychologie Sociale*, *26*, 72–87.

Chapman, B. P., Lyness, J. M., & Duberstein, P. (2007). Personality and medical illness burden among older adults in primary care. *Psychosomatic Medicine*, *69*(3), 10.1097/PSY.0b013e3180313975. https://doi.org/10.1097/PSY.0b013e3180313975

Cheung, M. W.-L., & Cheung, S. F. (2016). Random-effects models for meta-analytic structural equation modeling: Review, issues, and illustrations. *Research Synthesis Methods*, *7*(2), 140–155. https://doi.org/10.1002/jrsm.1166

Choy, B. K. C., Li, N. P., & Tan, K. (2023). The long and short of mistress relationships: Sex-differentiated mate preferences reflect a compromise of mating ideals. *Journal of Personality*, *91*(2), 383–399. https://doi.org/10.1111/jopy.12734

Christensen, A. P., Cotter, K. N., & Silvia, P. J. (2019). Reopening Openness to Experience: A network analysis of four Openness to Experience inventories. *Journal of Personality Assessment*, *101*(6), 574–588. https://doi.org/10.1080/00223891.2018.1467428

Christiansen, N. D., Goffin, R. D., Johnston, N. G., & Rothstein, M. G. (1994). Correcting the 16PF for faking: Effects on criterion-related validity and individual hiring decisions. *Personnel Psychology*, *47*(4), 847–860. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1744-6570.1994.tb01581.x

Christiansen, N. D., Robie, C., Burns, G. N., & Speer, A. B. (2017). Using item-level covariance to detect response distortion on personality measures. *Human Performance*, *30*(2–3), 116–134. https://doi.org/10.1080/08959285.2017.1319366

Claridge, G. (1977). Manual of the Eysenck personality questionnaire (junior and adult): H. J. Eysenck and Sybil Eysenck Hodder and Stoughton (1975). *Behaviour Research and Therapy*, *15*(4), 369–370. https://doi.org/10.1016/0005-7967(77)90069-9

Cloninger, S. (2009). Conceptual issues in personality theory. In G. Matthews & P. J. Corr (Eds.), *The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology* (pp. 3–26). Cambridge University Press. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-handbook-of-personality-psychology/conceptual-issues-in-personality-theory/6661CB57C3C4E8C3FFD3B4767AC3272D

Condon, D. M., & Mroczek, D. K. (2016). Time to move beyond the Big Five? *European Journal of Personality*, *30*(4), 311–312.

Connelly, B. S., Ones, D. S., & Chernyshenko, O. S. (2014). Introducing the special section on Openness to Experience: Review of Openness taxonomies, measurement, and nomological net. *Journal of Personality Assessment*, *96*(1), 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1080/00223891.2013.830620

Connelly, B. S., Ones, D. S., Davies, S. E., & Birkland, A. (2014). Opening up Openness: A theoretical sort following critical incidents methodology and a meta-analytic investigation of the trait family measures. *Journal of Personality Assessment*, *96*(1), 17–28. https://doi.org/10.1080/00223891.2013.809355

Cortina, J. M., Goldstein, N. B., Payne, S. C., Davison, H. kristl, & Gilliland, S. W. (2000). The incremental validity of interview scores over and above cognitive ability and conscientiousness scores. *Personnel Psychology*, *53*(2), 325–351. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1744-6570.2000.tb00204.x

Costa Jr., P. T., & McCrae, R. R. (2006). Age changes in personality and their origins: Comment on Roberts, Walton, and Viechtbauer (2006). *Psychological Bulletin*, *132*(1), 26–28. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.132.1.26

Costa, P. T., Jr., & McCrae, R. R. (1976). Age differences in personality structure: A cluster analytic approach. *Journal of Gerontology*, *31*(5), 564–570. https://doi.org/10.1093/geronj/31.5.564

Costa, P. T., & McCrae, R. R. (1988a). From catalog to classification: Murray's needs and the five-factor model. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *55*(2), 258–265. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.55.2.258

Costa, P. T., & McCrae, R. R. (1988b). Personality in adulthood: A six-year longitudinal study of self-reports and spouse ratings on the NEO Personality Inventory. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *54*(5), 853–863. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.54.5.853

Costa, P. T., & McCrae, R. R. (1992). *Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO PI-R) and NEO Five-Factor Inventory (NEO-FFI): Professional manual*. Psychological Assessment Resources.

Costa, P. T., & McCrae, R. R. (1995). Domains and facets: Hierarchical personality assessment using the Revised NEO Personality Inventory. *Journal of Personality Assessment*, *64*(1), 21–50. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327752jpa6401_2

Costa, P. T., & McCrae, R. R. (2008). The Revised NEO Personality Inventory (NEO-PI-R). In *The SAGE Handbook of Personality Theory and Assessment: Volume 2—Personality Measurement and Testing* (pp. 179–198). SAGE Publications Ltd. https://doi.org/10.4135/9781849200479.n9

Credé, M., & Kuncel, N. R. (2008). Study habits, skills, and attitudes: The third pillar supporting collegiate academic performance. *Perspectives on Psychological Science: A Journal of the Association for Psychological Science*, *3*(6), 425–453. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6924.2008.00089.x

Cronbach, L. J. (1946). Response sets and test validity. *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, *6*(4), 475–494. https://doi.org/10.1177/001316444600600405

Crowne, D. P., & Marlowe, D. (1960). A new scale of social desirability independent of psychopathology. *Journal of Consulting Psychology*, *24*(4), 349–354.

https://doi.org/10.1037/h0047358

Csajbók, Z., & Berkics, M. (2022). Seven deadly sins of potential romantic partners: The dealbreakers of mate choice. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *186*, 111334. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2021.111334

Danner, D. D., Snowdon, D. A., & Friesen, W. V. (2001). Positive emotions in early life and longevity: Findings from the nun study. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *80*(5), 804–813.

Davies, S. E., Connelly, B. S., Ones, D. S., & Birkland, A. S. (2015). The General Factor of Personality: The "Big One," a self-evaluative trait, or a methodological gnat that won't go away? *Personality and Individual Differences*, *81*, 13–22. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2015.01.006

Day, D. V., Shleicher, D. J., Unckless, A. L., & Hiller, N. J. (2002). Self-monitoring personality at work: A meta-analytic investigation of construct validity. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *87*(2), 390–401. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.87.2.390

De Raad, B., Barelds, D. P. H., Levert, E., Ostendorf, F., Mlacić, B., Di Blas, L., Hrebícková, M., Szirmák, Z., Szarota, P., Perugini, M., Church, A. T., & Katigbak, M. S. (2010). Only three factors of personality description are fully replicable across languages: A comparison of 14 trait taxonomies. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *98*(1), 160–173. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0017184

de Vries, R. E., Zettler, I., & Hilbig, B. E. (2014). Rethinking trait conceptions of social desirability scales: Impression management as an expression of Honesty-Humility. *Assessment*, *21*(3), 286–299. https://doi.org/10.1177/1073191113504619

Deary, I. J., Weiss, A., & Batty, G. D. (2010). Intelligence and personality as predictors of illness and death: How researchers in differential psychology and chronic disease epidemiology are collaborating to understand and address health inequalities.

Psychological Science in the Public Interest, *11*(2), 53–79. https://doi.org/10.1177/1529100610387081

DeNeve, K. M., & Cooper, H. (1998). The happy personality: A meta-analysis of 137 personality traits and subjective well-being. *Psychological Bulletin*, *124*(2), 197–229. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.124.2.197

Denissen, J. J. A., van Aken, M. A. G., Penke, L., & Wood, D. (2013). Self-regulation underlies temperament and personality: An integrative developmental framework. *Child Development Perspectives*, *7*(4), 255–260. https://doi.org/10.1111/cdep.12050

Denzin, N., & Lincoln, Y. (2000). Introduction. The discipline and practice of qualitative research. In *Handbook of qualitative research* (pp. 1–28). SAGE Publications.

Desponds, F. (2011). *Clairvoyance de l'utilité et de la désirabilité sociales dans les situations d'évaluation*. University of Lausanne.

DeYoung, C. G. (2006). Higher-order factors of the Big Five in a multi-informant sample. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *91*(6), 1138–1151. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.91.6.1138

DeYoung, C. G., Quilty, L. C., & Peterson, J. B. (2007). Between facets and domains: 10 aspects of the Big Five. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *93*, 880–896. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.93.5.880

DeYoung, C. G., Quilty, L. C., Peterson, J. B., & Gray, J. R. (2014). Openness to Experience, Intellect, and Cognitive Ability. *Journal of Personality Assessment*, *96*(1), 46–52. https://doi.org/10.1080/00223891.2013.806327

Diener, E., Suh, E. M., Lucas, R. E., & Smith, H. L. (1999). Subjective well-being: Three decades of progress. *Psychological Bulletin*, *125*(2), 276–302. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.125.2.276

Digman, J. M. (1990). Personality structure: Emergence of the Five-Factor Model. *Annual*

Review of Psychology, *41*(1), 417–440. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.ps.41.020190.002221

Digman, J. M. (1997). Higher-order factors of the Big Five. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *73*(6), 1246–1256. https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.73.6.1246

Dilchert, S., Ones, D. S., Viswesvaran, C., & Deller, J. (2006). Response distortion in personality measurement: Born to deceive, yet capable of providing valid self-assessments? *Psychology Science*, *48*(3), 209–225.

Dompnier, B., Darnon, C., & Butera, F. (2009). Faking the desire to learn: A clarification of the link between mastery goals and academic achievement. *Psychological Science*, *20*(8), 939–943. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02384.x

Dompnier, B., Darnon, C., & Butera, F. (2013). When performance-approach goals predict academic achievement and when they do not: A social value approach. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, *52*(3), 587–596. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjso.12025

Dompnier, B., Darnon, C., Delmas, F., & Butera, F. (2008). Achievement goals and social judgment: The performance-approach goals paradox. *Revue internationale de psychologie sociale*, *21*(1–2), 247–271.

Dompnier, B., Pansu, P., & Bressoux, P. (2006). An integrative model of scholastic judgments: Pupils' characteristics, class context, halo effect and internal attributions. *European Journal of Psychology of Education*, *21*(2), 119–133. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03173572

Dompnier, B., Pansu, P., & Bressoux, P. (2007). Social utility, social desirability and scholastic judgments: Toward a personological model of academic evaluation. *European Journal of Psychology of Education*, *22*(3), 333–350. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03173431

Donahue, E. M., & Harary, K. (1998). The patterned inconsistency of traits: Mapping the differential effects of social roles on self-perceptions of the Big Five. *Personality and*

Social Psychology Bulletin, *24*(6), 610–619. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167298246005

Dong, M., Weststrate, N. M., & Fournier, M. A. (2023). Thirty years of psychological wisdom research: What we know about the correlates of an ancient concept. *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, *18*(4), 778–811. https://doi.org/10.1177/17456916221114096

Donnellan, M. B., Larsen-Rife, D., & Conger, R. D. (2005). Personality, family history, and competence in early adult romantic relationships. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *88*(3), 562–576. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.88.3.562

Donovan, J. J., Dwight, S. A., & Hurtz, G. M. (2003). An assessment of the prevalence, severity, and verifiability of entry-level applicant faking using the randomized response technique. *Human Performance*, *16*(1), 81–106. https://doi.org/10.1207/S15327043HUP1601_4

Draguns, J. G. (2009). Personality in cross-cultural perspective. In G. Matthews & P. J. Corr (Eds.), *The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology* (pp. 556–576). Cambridge University Press. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-handbook-of-personality-psychology/personality-in-crosscultural-perspective/F0B4A5678502C73845395601763968C9

Dubois, N. (2003). *A sociocognitive approach to social norms*. Routledge.

Dubois, N., & Beauvois, J.-L. (2005). Normativeness and individualism. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *35*(1), 123–146. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.236

Dubois, N., & Beauvois, J.-L. (2008). The social value of internal explanations and the norm of internality. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, *2*(4), 1737–1752. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9004.2008.00126.x

Duckworth, A. L., Weir, D., Tsukayama, E., & Kwok, D. (2012). Who does well in life? Conscientious adults excel in both objective and subjective success. *Frontiers in Psychology*, *3*, 356. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2012.00356

Dudley, N. M., Orvis, K. A., Lebiecki, J. E., & Cortina, J. M. (2006). A meta-analytic investigation of conscientiousness in the prediction of job performance: Examining the intercorrelations and the incremental validity of narrow traits. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *91*, 40–57. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.91.1.40

Edlund, J. E., & Sagarin, B. J. (2010). Mate value and mate preferences: An investigation into decisions made with and without constraints. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *49*(8), 835–839. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2010.07.004

Edwards, A. L. (1957). *The social desirability variable in personality assessment and research.* Dryden Press.

Egan, V., Chan, S., & Shorter, G. W. (2014). The Dark Triad, happiness and subjective well-being. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *67*, 17–22. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2014.01.004

Eisenberg, N., Duckworth, A. L., Spinrad, T. L., & Valiente, C. (2014). Conscientiousness: Origins in childhood? *Developmental Psychology*, *50*(5), 1331–1349. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0030977

Ellingson, J. E. (2011). People fake only when they need to fake. In M. Ziegler, C. MacCann, & R. Roberts (Eds.), *New Perspectives on Faking in Personality Assessment* (p. 0). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195387476.003.0014

Ellingson, J. E., & McFarland, L. A. (2011). Understanding faking behavior through the lens of motivation: An application of VIE theory. *Human Performance*, *24*(4), 322–337. https://doi.org/10.1080/08959285.2011.597477

Ellingson, J. E., Sackett, P. R., & Connelly, B. S. (2007). Personality assessment across selection and development contexts: Insights into response distortion. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *92*(2), 386–395. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.92.2.386

Ellingson, J. E., Sackett, P. R., & Hough, L. M. (1999). Social desirability corrections in

personality measurement: Issues of applicant comparison and construct validity. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *84*(2), 155–166. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.84.2.155

Elliot, A. J. (2005). A conceptual history of the achievement goal construct. In A. J. Elliot & C. S. Dweck (Eds.), *Handbook of competence and motivation* (pp. 52–72). Guilford Publications.

Eriksen, C. W. (1957). Personality. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *8*(1), 185–210. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.ps.08.020157.001153

Eysenck, H. J., & Eysenck, S. B. G. (1971). *Eysenck personality inventory* (4. impr). University of London Press LTD.

Férec, N., Pansu, P., Py, J., & Somat, A. (2011). Évaluation d'un programme de formation à la clairvoyance normative pour demandeurs d'emploi. *L'Orientation scolaire et professionnelle*, *40/3*. https://doi.org/10.4000/osp.3515

Ferguson, C. J. (2010). A meta-analysis of normal and disordered personality across the life span. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *98*(4), 659–667. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0018770

Fine, G. A., & Elsbach, K. D. (2000). Ethnography and experiment in social psychological theory building: Tactics for integrating qualitative field data with quantitative lab data. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology*, *36*(1), 51–76. https://doi.org/10.1006/jesp.1999.1394

Fiske, D. W. (1949). Consistency of the factorial structures of personality ratings from different sources. *The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, *44*(3), 329–344. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0057198

Fiske, S. T. (1992). Thinking is for doing: Portraits of social cognition from Daguerreotype to laserphoto. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *63*(6), 877–889. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.63.6.877

Fiske, S. T. (2014). Scratch an itch with a brick: Why we do research. In C. M. Judd & H. T. Reis (Eds.), *Handbook of Research Methods in Social and Personality Psychology* (2nd ed., pp. 1–8). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511996481.003

Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J. C., & Glick, P. (2007). Universal dimensions of social cognition: Warmth and competence. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences*, *11*(2), 77–83. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2006.11.005

Fleeson, W. (2001). Toward a structure- and process-integrated view of personality: Traits as density distributions of states. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *80*(6), 1011–1027. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.80.6.1011

Fleeson, W. (2004). Moving personality beyond the person-situation debate: The challenge and the opportunity of within-person variability. *Current Directions in Psychological Science*, *13*(2), 83–87. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0963-7214.2004.00280.x

Fleeson, W. (2007). Situation-based contingencies underlying trait-content manifestation in behavior. *Journal of Personality*, *75*(4), 825–862. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.2007.00458.x

Fleeson, W., & Gallagher, M. P. (2009). The implications of Big-Five standing for the distribution of trait manifestation in behavior: Fifteen experience-sampling studies and a meta-analysis. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *97*(6), 1097–1114. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0016786

Fleeson, W., & Jayawickreme, E. (2015). Whole Trait Theory. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *56*, 82–92. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2014.10.009

Fleeson, W., & Law, M. K. (2015). Trait enactments as density distributions: The role of actors, situations, and observers in explaining stability and variability. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *109*(6), 1090–1104. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0039517

Flick, U. (1992). Triangulation revisited: Strategy of validation or alternative? *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour*, *22*(2), 175–197. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5914.1992.tb00215.x

Flick, U. (2017). Mantras and myths: The disenchantment of mixed-methods research and revisiting triangulation as a perspective. *Qualitative Inquiry*, *23*(1), 46–57. https://doi.org/10.1177/1077800416655827

Flick, U., von Kardoff, E., & Steinke, I. (2004). What is qualitative research? An introduction to the field. In U. Flick, E. von Kardoff, & I. Steinke (Eds.), *A companion to qualitative research* (pp. 3–11). SAGE Publications.

Fonteyne, L., Duyck, W., & De Fruyt, F. (2017). Program-specific prediction of academic achievement on the basis of cognitive and non-cognitive factors. *Learning and Individual Differences*, *56*, 34–48. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lindif.2017.05.003

Friedman, H. S., Riggio, R. E., & Casella, D. F. (1988). Nonverbal skill, personal charisma, and initial attraction. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *14*(1), 203–211. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167288141020

Friedman, H. S., Tucker, J. S., Tomlinson-Keasey, C., Schwartz, J. E., Wingard, D. L., & Criqui, M. H. (1993). Does childhood personality predict longevity? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *65*(1), 176–185. https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.65.1.176

Funder, D. C. (1991). Global traits: A neo-Allportian approach to personality. *Psychological Science*, *2*(1), 31–39. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.1991.tb00093.x

Funder, D. C. (2001). Personality. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *52*, 197–221. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.52.1.197

Funder, D. C., & Colvin, C. R. (1991). Explorations in behavioral consistency: Properties of persons, situations, and behaviors. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *60*(5),

773–794. https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.60.5.773

Funder, D. C., & Ozer, D. J. (1983). Behavior as a function of the situation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *44*(1), 107–112. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.44.1.107

Furnham, A., Richards, S. C., & Paulhus, D. L. (2013). The Dark Triad of personality: A 10 year review. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, *7*(3), 199–216. https://doi.org/10.1111/spc3.12018

Galton, F. (1884). Measurement of character. *Fortnightly Review*, *36*, 179–185.

Gangestad, S. W., & Snyder, M. (2000). Self-monitoring: Appraisal and reappraisal. *Psychological Bulletin*, *126*(4), 530–555. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.126.4.530

Gangloff, B. (2003). D'une nature personnologique à une nature normative des 5 facteurs du Big Five. *Cahiers de psychologie politique*, *4*. https://hal.parisnanterre.fr/hal-01661822

Ganster, D. C., Hennessey, H. W., & Luthans, F. (1983). Social desirability response effects: Three alternative models. *Academy of Management Journal*, *26*(2), 321–331. https://doi.org/10.5465/255979

Gawronski, B., & Bodenhausen, G. V. (2007). What do we know about implicit attitude measures and what do we have to learn? In B. Wittenbrink & N. Schwarz (Eds.), *Implicit measures of attitudes* (pp. 265–286). The Guilford Press.

Gilbert, D. T., & Malone, P. S. (1995). The correspondence bias. *Psychological Bulletin*, *117*(1), 21–38. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.117.1.21

Gilibert, D., & Cambon, L. (2003). Paradigms of the sociocognitive approach. In N. Dubois (Ed.), *A sociocognitive approach to social norms* (pp. 38–69). Routledge.

Ginet, A.-M. (2000). *Clairvoyance normative et besoin de cognition dans les processus d'attribution et de rationalisation* [These de doctorat, Clermont-Ferrand 2]. https://www.theses.fr/2000CLF20002

Gioaba, I., & Krings, F. (2017). Impression management in the job interview: An effective way of mitigating discrimination against older applicants? *Frontiers in Psychology*, *8*(770), 1–12. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00770

Goffin, R. D., & Boyd, A. C. (2009). Faking and personality assessment in personnel selection: Advancing models of faking. *Canadian Psychology / Psychologie Canadienne*, *50*(3), 151–160. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0015946

Goffin, R. D., & Christiansen, N. D. (2003). Correcting personality tests for faking: A review of popular personality tests and an initial survey of researchers. *International Journal of Selection and Assessment*, *11*(4), 340–344. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0965-075X.2003.00256.x

Goffman, E. (1956). *The presentation of self in everyday life*. University of Edinburgh.

Goffman, E. (1959). *The presentation of self in everyday life*. Doubleday.

Goldberg, L. R. (1981). Language and individual differences: The search for universals in personality lexicons. In L. Wheeler (Ed.), *Review of personality and social psychology* (Vol. 2, pp. 141–165). SAGE.

Goldberg, L. R. (1990). An alternative 'description of personality': The Big-Five factor structure. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *59*(6), 1216–1229. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.59.6.1216

Goldberg, L. R. (1993). The structure of phenotypic personality traits. *American Psychologist*, *48*(1), 26–34. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.48.1.26

Goldberg, L. R., Johnson, J. A., Eber, H. W., Hogan, R., Ashton, M. C., Cloninger, C. R., & Gough, H. G. (2006). The international personality item pool and the future of public-domain personality measures. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *40*(1), 84–96. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2005.08.007

Goldberg, L. R., Sweeney, D., Merenda, P. F., & Hughes, J. E. (1998). Demographic variables

and personality: The effects of gender, age, education, and ethnic/racial status on self-descriptions of personality attributes. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *24*(3), 393–403. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0191-8869(97)00110-4

Goldman, Z. W., Cranmer, G. A., Sollitto, M., Labelle, S., & Lancaster, A. L. (2017). What do college students want? A prioritization of instructional behaviors and characteristics. *Communication Education*, *66*(3), 280–298. https://doi.org/10.1080/03634523.2016.1265135

Göllner, R., Roberts, B. W., Damian, R. I., Lüdtke, O., Jonkmann, K., & Trautwein, U. (2017). Whose "storm and stress" is it? Parent and child reports of personality development in the transition to early adolescence. *Journal of Personality*, *85*(3), 376–387. https://doi.org/10.1111/jopy.12246

Goodwin, R. D., & Friedman, H. S. (2006). Health status and the five-factor personality traits in a nationally representative sample. *Journal of Health Psychology*, *11*(5), 643–654. https://doi.org/10.1177/1359105306066610

Gosling, S. D., John, O. P., Craik, K. H., & Robins, R. W. (1998). Do people know how they behave? Self-reported act frequencies compared with on-line codings by observers. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *74*(5), 1337–1349. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.74.5.1337

Gough, H. G. (1952). On making a good impression. *The Journal of Educational Research*, *46*(1), 33–42.

Griffith, R. L., Chmielowski, T., & Yoshita, Y. (2007). Do applicants fake? An examination of the frequency of applicant faking behavior. *Personnel Review*, *36*(3), 341–355. https://doi.org/10.1108/00483480710731310

Griffith, R. L., & Peterson, M. H. (2006). *A closer examination of applicant faking behavior*. Information Age Publish.

Griffith, R. L., & Peterson, M. H. (2008). The failure of social desirability measures to capture applicant faking behavior. *Industrial and Organizational Psychology*, *1*(3), 308–311. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1754-9434.2008.00053.x

Griffith, R. L., & Peterson, M. H. (2011). One piece at a time: The puzzle of applicant faking and a call for theory. *Human Performance*, *24*(4), 291–301. https://doi.org/10.1080/08959285.2011.597474

Grover, S., & Furnham, A. (2021). Personality at home vs. work: Does framing for work increase predictive validity of the Dark Triad on work outcomes? *Personality and Individual Differences*, *169*, 109848. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2020.109848

Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1994). Competing paradigms in qualitative research. In *Handbook of qualitative research* (pp. 105–117). Sage Publications, Inc.

Guilford, J. P. (1975). Factors and factors of personality. *Psychological Bulletin*, *82*(5), 802–814. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0077101

Guingouain, G. (2001). La clairvoyance normative métacognition sociale? Une perspective métacognitive de l'étude de la clairvoyance normative. *L'Orientation scolaire et professionnelle*, *30/3*, 1–16. https://doi.org/10.4000/osp.5116

Hampson, S. E. (2012). Personality processes: Mechanisms by which personality traits "get outside the skin". *Annual Review of Psychology*, *63*, 315–339. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-120710-100419

Hampson, S. E., Edmonds, G. W., Goldberg, L. R., Dubanoski, J. P., & Hillier, T. A. (2013). Childhood conscientiousness relates to objectively measured adult physical health four decades later. *Health Psychology: Official Journal of the Division of Health Psychology, American Psychological Association*, *32*(8), 925–928. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0031655

Havan, P., & Kohút, M. (2023). Details matter: The effect of different instructions and their order on the bias of measured personality traits by social desirability. *Studia*

Psychologica, *65*(2), 154–164. https://doi.org/10.31577/sp.2023.02.872

He, Y., Donnellan, M. B., & Mendoza, A. M. (2019). Five-factor personality domains and job performance: A second order meta-analysis. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *82*, 103848. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2019.103848

Heaven, P. C. L., & Bucci, S. (2001). Right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation and personality: An analysis using the IPIP measure. *European Journal of Personality*, *15*(1), 49–56. https://doi.org/10.1002/per.389

Hedges, L. V., & Vevea, J. L. (1998). Fixed- and random-effects models in meta-analysis. *Psychological Methods*, *3*(4), 486–504. https://doi.org/10.1037/1082-989X.3.4.486

Helmes, E., Holden, R. R., & Ziegler, M. (2015). Response bias, malingering, and impression management. In G. J. Boyle, D. H. Saklofske, & G. Matthews (Eds.), *Measures of Personality and Social Psychological Constructs* (pp. 16–43). Academic Press. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-386915-9.00002-4

Helson, R., Jones, C., & Kwan, V. S. Y. (2002). Personality change over 40 years of adulthood: Hierarchical linear modeling analyses of two longitudinal samples. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *83*(3), 752–766. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.83.3.752

Helson, R., & Srivastava, S. (2001). Three paths of adult development: Conservers, seekers, and achievers. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *80*(6), 995–1010. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.80.6.995

Hiel, A. V., & Mervielde, I. (2004). Openness to experience and boundaries in the mind: Relationships with cultural and economic conservative beliefs. *Journal of Personality*, *72*(4), 659–686. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0022-3506.2004.00276.x

Higgins, J. P. T., & Thompson, S. G. (2002). Quantifying heterogeneity in a meta-analysis. *Statistics in Medicine*, *21*(11), 1539–1558. https://doi.org/10.1002/sim.1186

Higgins, J. P. T., Thompson, S. G., Deeks, J. J., & Altman, D. G. (2003). Measuring

inconsistency in meta-analyses. *BMJ: British Medical Journal*, *327*(7414), 557–560. https://doi.org/10.1136/bmj.327.7414.557

Hill, P. L., Nickel, L. B., & Roberts, B. W. (2014). Are you in a healthy relationship? Linking conscientiousness to health via implementing and immunizing behaviors. *Journal of Personality*, *82*(6), 485–492. https://doi.org/10.1111/jopy.12051

Hofstede, G., & McCrae, R. R. (2004). Personality and culture revisited: Linking traits and dimensions of culture. *Cross-Cultural Research: The Journal of Comparative Social Science*, *38*(1), 52–88. https://doi.org/10.1177/1069397103259443

Hofstee, W. K., de Raad, B., & Goldberg, L. R. (1992). Integration of the big five and circumplex approaches to trait structure. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *63*(1), 146–163. https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.63.1.146

Hogan, J., Barrett, P., & Hogan, R. (2007). Personality measurement, faking, and employment selection. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *92*(5), 1270–1285. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.92.5.1270

Hogan, R., & Bond, M. H. (2009). Culture and personality. In *The Cambridge handbook of personality psychology* (pp. 577–588). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511596544.036

Hogan, R., & Hogan, J. (2007). *Hogan Personality Inventory Manual, third edition*. Hogan Assessment Systems.

Holden, R. R. (1995). Response latency detection of fakers on personnel tests. *Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science / Revue Canadienne Des Sciences Du Comportement*, *27*(3), 343–355. https://doi.org/10.1037/0008-400X.27.3.343

Holden, R. R. (2007). Socially desirable responding does moderate personality scale validity both in experimental and in nonexperimental contexts. *Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science*, *39*(3), 184–201. https://doi.org/10.1037/cjbs2007015

Holden, R. R., & Book, A. S. (2011). Faking Does Distort Self-Report Personality Assessment. In M. Ziegler, C. MacCann, & R. Roberts (Eds.), *New Perspectives on Faking in Personality Assessment* (pp. 71–84). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195387476.003.0026

Holden, R. R., & Evoy, R. A. (2005). Personality inventory faking: A four-dimensional simulation of dissimulation. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *39*(7), 1307–1318. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2005.06.007

Holden, R. R., & Hibbs, N. (1995). Incremental validity of response latencies for detecting fakers on a personality test. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *29*(3), 362–372. https://doi.org/10.1006/jrpe.1995.1021

Holden, R. R., Kroner, D. G., Fekken, G. C., & Popham, S. M. (1992). A model of personality test item response dissimulation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *63*(2), 272–279. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.63.2.272

Holden, R. R., & Lambert, C. E. (2015). Response latencies are alive and well for identifying fakers on a self-report personality inventory: A reconsideration of van Hooft and Born (2012). *Behavior Research Methods*, *47*(4), 1436–1442. https://doi.org/10.3758/s13428-014-0524-5

Holden, R. R., Lambert, C. E., D'Agata, M. T., & Book, A. S. (2017). Response patterns for the identification of fakers: Detecting drifting dissimulators. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *108*, 195–199. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2016.12.029

Holden, R. R., & Marjanovic, Z. (2021). Faking on a self-report personality inventory: Indiscriminate, discriminate, or hyper-discriminate responding? *Personality and Individual Differences*, *169*, 109768. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2019.109768

Holden, R. R., & Passey, J. (2010). Socially desirable responding in personality assessment: Not necessarily faking and not necessarily substance. *Personality and Individual*

Differences, *49*(5), 446–450. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2010.04.015

Holtrop, D., Hughes, A. W., Dunlop, P. D., Chan, J., & Steedman, G. (2020). Do social desirability scales measure dishonesty?: A think-aloud study. *European Journal of Psychological Assessment*, 1–9. https://doi.org/10.1027/1015-5759/a000607

Hough, L. M. (1992). The 'Big Five' personality variables–construct confusion: Description versus prediction. *Human Performance*, *5*(1–2), 139–155. https://doi.org/10.1080/08959285.1992.9667929

Hough, L. M. (1998). Effects of intentional distortion in personality measurement and evaluation of suggested palliatives. *Human Performance*, *11*(2–3), 209–244. https://doi.org/10.1080/08959285.1998.9668032

Hough, L. M., Eaton, N. K., Dunnette, M. D., Kamp, J. D., & McCloy, R. A. (1990). Criterion-related validities of personality constructs and the effect of response distortion on those validities. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *75*(5), 581–595. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.75.5.581

Hough, L. M., Oswald, F. L., & Ock, J. (2015). Beyond the Big Five: New directions for personality research and practice in organizations. *Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior*, *2*(1), 183–209. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-orgpsych-032414-111441

Hoyle, R. H. (2007). Applications of structural equation modeling in personality research. In *Handbook of research methods in personality psychology* (pp. 444–460). The Guilford Press.

Hu, J., & Connelly, B. S. (2021). Faking by actual applicants on personality tests: A meta-analysis of within-subjects studies. *International Journal of Selection and Assessment*, *29*(3–4), 412–426. https://doi.org/10.1111/ijsa.12338

Humm, D. G., & Humm, K. A. (1944). Validity of the Humm-Wadsworth Temperament Scale:

With consideration of the effects of subjects' response-bias. *The Journal of Psychology*, *18*(1), 55–64. https://doi.org/10.1080/00223980.1944.9917207

Hurtz, G. M., & Donovan, J. J. (2000). Personality and job performance: The Big Five revisited. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *85*(6), 869–879. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.85.6.869

Irwing, P., Cook, C., & Hughes, D. J. (2023). Toward an index of Adaptive Personality Regulation. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672231177567

Jackson, J. J., Wood, D., Bogg, T., Walton, K. E., Harms, P. D., & Roberts, B. W. (2010). What do conscientious people do? Development and validation of the Behavioral Indicators of Conscientiousness (BIC). *Journal of Research in Personality*, *44*(4), 501–511. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2010.06.005

Jak, S., & Cheung, M. W.-L. (2020). Meta-analytic structural equation modeling with moderating effects on SEM parameters. *Psychological Methods*, *25*(4), 430–455. https://doi.org/10.1037/met0000245

Jellison, J. M., & Green, J. (1981). A self-presentation approach to the fundamental attribution error: The norm of internality. *Journal of Personality and Social Psvchology*, *40*(4), 643–649. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.40.4.643

Jenkins, M., & Griffith, R. (2004). Using personality constructs to predict performance: Narrow or broad bandwidth. *Journal of Business and Psychology*, *19*(2), 255–269.

Jensen, A. R. (1958). Personality. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *9*(1), 295–322. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.ps.09.020158.001455

Jensen-Campbell, L. A., Adams, R., Perry, D. G., Workman, K. A., Furdella, J. Q., & Egan, S. K. (2002). Agreeableness, Extraversion, and peer relations in early adolescence: Winning friends and deflecting aggression. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *36*(3), 224–251.

https://doi.org/10.1006/jrpe.2002.2348

Jeronimus, B. F., Kotov, R., Riese, H., & Ormel, J. (2016). Neuroticism's prospective association with mental disorders halves after adjustment for baseline symptoms and psychiatric history, but the adjusted association hardly decays with time: A meta-analysis on 59 longitudinal/prospective studies with 443 313 participants. *Psychological Medicine*, *46*(14), 2883–2906. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291716001653

John, O. P., Donahue, E. M., & Kentle, R. L. (1991). *The Big Five Inventory—Versions 4a and 54*. University of California, Berkeley, Institute of Personality and Social Research.

John, O. P., & Srivastava, S. (1999). The Big Five Trait taxonomy: History, measurement, and theoretical perspectives. In *Handbook of personality: Theory and research, 2nd ed* (pp. 102–138). Guilford Press.

Johnson, J. A., & Hogan, R. (2006). A socioanalytic view of faking. In R. L. Griffith & M. H. Peterson (Eds.), *A closer examination of applicant faking behavior* (pp. 209–231). Information Age.

Jonason, P. K., Kaufman, S. B., Webster, G. D., & Geher, G. (2013). What lies beneath the Dark Triad Dirty Dozen: Varied relations with the Big Five. *Individual Differences Research*, *11*(2), 81–90.

Jonason, P. K., Luevano, V. X., & Adams, H. M. (2012). How the Dark Triad traits predict relationship choices. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *53*(3), 180–184. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2012.03.007

Jonason, P. K., Nolland, M., & Tyler, M. D. (2017). Incorporating geographic distance into mate preference research: Necessities and luxuries, 2.0. *Personal Relationships*, *24*(3), 585–597. https://doi.org/10.1111/pere.12199

Jonason, P. K., Valentine, K. A., Li, N. P., & Harbeson, C. L. (2011). Mate-selection and the Dark Triad: Facilitating a short-term mating strategy and creating a volatile environment.

Personality and Individual Differences, *51*(6), 759–763. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2011.06.025

Jonason, P. K., & Webster, G. D. (2010). The dirty dozen: A concise measure of the dark triad. *Psychological Assessment*, *22*(2), 420–432. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0019265

Jones, D. N., & Paulhus, D. L. (2014). Introducing the Short Dark Triad (SD3): A brief measure of dark personality traits. *Assessment*, *21*(1), 28–41. https://doi.org/10.1177/1073191113514105

Jones, E. E. (1979). The rocky road from acts to dispositions. *American Psychologist*, *34*(2), 107–117. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.34.2.107

Jouffre, S. (2003). *L'expression et la clairvoyance de la norme d'internalité: Outils de mesure, production d'explications causales et niveau de scolarisation* [These de doctorat, Paris 8]. https://www.theses.fr/2003PA082246

Jouffre, S. (2007). Expression et clairvoyance des normes d'internalité et de consistance: Étude comparative entre élèves français et lituaniens. *Revue Internationale de Psychologie Sociale*, *20*(3), 5–33.

Jouffre, S., Py, J., & Somat, A. (2001). Norme d'internalité, norme de consistance et clairvoyance normative. *Revue Internationale de Psychologie Sociale*, *14*(2), 121–164.

Judge, T. A., Bono, J. E., Ilies, R., & Gerhardt, M. W. (2002). Personality and leadership: A qualitative and quantitative review. *The Journal of Applied Psychology*, *87*(4), 765–780. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.87.4.765

Judge, T. A., Higgins, C. A., Thoresen, C. J., & Barrick, M. R. (1999). The Big Five personality traits, general mental ability, and career success across the life span. *Personnel Psychology*, *52*(3), 621–652. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1744-6570.1999.tb00174.x

Judge, T. A., & Ilies, R. (2002). Relationship of personality to performance motivation: A meta-analytic review. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *87*(4), 797–807.

https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.87.4.797

Karney, B. R., & Bradbury, T. N. (1995). The longitudinal course of marital quality and stability: A review of theory, method, and research. *Psychological Bulletin*, *118*(1), 3–34. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.118.1.3

Kelly, E. L., Miles, C. C., & Terman, L. M. (1936). Ability to influence one's score on a typical pencil-and-paper test of personality. *Character & Personality; A Quarterly for Psychodiagnostic & Allied Studies*, *4*, 206–215. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.1936.tb02123.x

Kendler, K. S., & Myers, J. (2010). The genetic and environmental relationship between major depression and the five-factor model of personality. *Psychological Medicine*, *40*(5), 801–806. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0033291709991140

Kenrick, D. T., & Funder, D. C. (1988). Profiting from controversy: Lessons from the person-situation debate. *American Psychologist*, *43*(1), 23–34. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.43.1.23

Kern, M. L., & Friedman, H. S. (2008). Do conscientious individuals live longer? A quantitative review. *Health Psychology: Official Journal of the Division of Health Psychology, American Psychological Association*, *27*(5), 505–512. https://doi.org/10.1037/0278-6133.27.5.505

Kiefer, C., & Benit, N. (2016). What is applicant faking behavior? A review on the current state of theory and modeling techniques. *Journal of European Psychology Students*, *7*(1), 9–19. https://doi.org/10.5334/jeps.345

Kline, R. B. (2015). *Principles and practice of structural equation modeling*. Guilford Publications.

Kluckhohn, C., & Murray, H. A. (1953). Personality formation: The determinants. In C. Kluckhohn, H. A. Murray, & D. M. Schneider (Eds.), *Personality in Nature, Society, and*

Culture (2nd ed.) (pp. 53–69). Alfred A. Knopf.

Knapp, G., & Hartung, J. (2003). Improved tests for a random effects meta-regression with a single covariate. *Statistics in Medicine*, *22*(17), 2693–2710. https://doi.org/10.1002/sim.1482

Knoster, K., Goodboy, A., Martin, M., & Thomay, A. (2020). What matters most? A prioritization of medical students' preferences for effective teaching. *Communication Education*, 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/03634523.2020.1841254

Konstabel, K., Aavik, T., & Allik, J. (2006). Social desirability and consensual validity of personality traits. *European Journal of Personality*, *20*(7), 549–566. https://doi.org/10.1002/per.593

Kotov, R., Gamez, W., Schmidt, F., & Watson, D. (2010). Linking 'big' personality traits to anxiety, depressive, and substance use disorders: A meta-analysis. *Psychological Bulletin*, *136*(5), 768–821. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0020327

Krause, M. S. (1970). Use of social situations for research purposes. *American Psychologist*, *25*(8), 748–753.

Kreitchmann, R. S., Abad, F. J., Ponsoda, V., Nieto, M. D., & Morillo, D. (2019). Controlling for response biases in self-report scales: Forced-choice vs. psychometric modeling of likert items. *Frontiers in Psychology*, *10*(2309), 1–12. https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2019.02309

Krueger, R. F., Hicks, B. M., & McGue, M. (2001). Altruism and antisocial behavior: Independent tendencies, unique personality correlates, distinct etiologies. *Psychological Science*, *12*(5), 397–402. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-9280.00373

Kuncel, N. R., & Borneman, M. J. (2007). Toward a new method of detecting deliberately faked personality tests: The use of idiosyncratic item responses. *International Journal of Selection and Assessment*, *15*(2), 220–231. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-

2389.2007.00383.x

Kuncel, N. R., Hezlett, S. A., & Ones, D. S. (2004). Academic performance, career potential, creativity, and job performance: Can one construct predict them all? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *86*(1), 148–161. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.86.1.148

Kuncel, N. R., Ones, D. S., & Sackett, P. R. (2010). Individual differences as predictors of work, educational, and broad life outcomes. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *49*(4), 331–336. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2010.03.042

Kurtz, J. E., Tarquini, S. J., & Iobst, E. A. (2008). Socially desirable responding in personality assessment: Still more substance than style. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *45*(1), 22–27. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2008.02.012

Kwan, V. S., Bond, M. H., & Singelis, T. M. (1997). Pancultural explanations for life satisfaction: Adding relationship harmony to self-esteem. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *73*(5), 1038–1051. https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.73.5.1038

Kwong, J. Y. Y., & Cheung, F. M. (2003). Prediction of performance facets using specific personality traits in the Chinese context. *Journal of Vocational Behavior*, *63*(1), 99–110. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0001-8791(02)00021-0

Langley, E. B., & Shiota, M. N. (2023). Funny date, creative mate? Unpacking the effect of humor on romantic attraction. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 01461672231202288. https://doi.org/10.1177/01461672231202288

Lanz, L., Thielmann, I., & Gerpott, F. H. (2022). Are social desirability scales desirable? A meta-analytic test of the validity of social desirability scales in the context of prosocial behavior. *Journal of Personality*, *90*(2), 203–221. https://doi.org/10.1111/jopy.12662

Larson, L. M., Rottinghaus, P. J., & Borgen, F. H. (2002). Meta-analyses of Big Six interests and Big Five personality factors. *Journal of Vocational Behavior*, *61*(2), 217–239.

https://doi.org/10.1006/jvbe.2001.1854

Leary, T. (1957). *Interpersonal diagnosis of personality; a functional theory and methodology for personality evaluation* (pp. xv, 518). Ronald Press.

LeBreton, J. M., Shiverdecker, L. K., & Grimaldi, E. M. (2018). The Dark Triad and workplace behavior. *Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior*, *5*(1), 387–414. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-orgpsych-032117-104451

Lee, K., & Ashton, M. C. (2004). Psychometric properties of the HEXACO personality inventory. *Multivariate Behavioral Research*, *39*(2), 329–358. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327906mbr3902_8

Lee, P., Mahoney, K. T., & Lee, S. (2017). An application of the exploratory structural equation modeling framework to the study of personality faking. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *119*, 220–226. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2017.07.029

Levashina, J., & Campion, M. A. (2006). A model of faking likelihood in the employment interview. *International Journal of Selection and Assessment*, *14*(4), 299–316. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2389.2006.00353.x

Lewin, K. (1935). *A Dynamic Theory of Personality—Selected Papers*. McGraw-Hill.

Lewin, K. (1936). *Principles of topological psychology* (pp. xv, 238). McGraw-Hill. https://doi.org/10.1037/10019-000

Lewis, M. (2001). Issues in the study of personality development. *Psychological Inquiry*, *12*(2), 67–83. https://doi.org/10.1207/S15327965PLI1202_02

Li, N. P. (2007). Mate preference necessities in long- and short-term mating: People prioritize in themselves what their mates prioritize in them. *Acta Psychologica Sinica*, *39*(3), 528–535.

Li, N. P., Bailey, J. M., Kenrick, D. T., & Linsenmeier, J. A. W. (2002). The necessities and luxuries of mate preferences: Testing the tradeoffs. *Journal of Personality and Social*

Psychology, *82*(6), 947–955. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.82.6.947

Li, N. P., & Kenrick, D. T. (2006). Sex similarities and differences in preferences for short-term mates: What, whether, and why. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *90*(3), 468–489. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.90.3.468

Li, N. P., Valentine, K. A., & Patel, L. (2011). Mate preferences in the US and Singapore: A cross-cultural test of the mate preference priority model. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *50*(2), 291–294. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2010.10.005

Lievens, F., & Sackett, P. R. (2017). The effects of predictor method factors on selection outcomes: A modular approach to personnel selection procedures. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *102*(1), 43–66. https://doi.org/10.1037/apl0000160

Lombardo, G. P., & Foschi, R. (2003). The concept of personality in 19th-century French and 20th-century American psychology. *History of Psychology*, *6*(2), 123–142. https://doi.org/10.1037/1093-4510.6.2.123

Lu, Y. (2023). The criteria of Chinese and South Koreans' mate selection: A comparative study of long-term and short-term mate selection preferences in the cross-cultural perspective. *Heliyon*, *9*(2), e13329. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.heliyon.2023.e13329

Lucas, R. E., & Donnellan, M. B. (2011). Personality development across the life span: Longitudinal analyses with a national sample from Germany. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *101*(4), 847–861. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0024298

Malham, P. B., & Saucier, G. (2016). The conceptual link between social desirability and cultural normativity. *International Journal of Psychology*, *51*(6), 474–480. https://doi.org/10.1002/ijop.12261

Mammadov, S. (2022). Big Five personality traits and academic performance: A meta-analysis. *Journal of Personality*, *90*(2), 222–255. https://doi.org/10.1111/jopy.12663

Marciano, L., Camerini, A.-L., & Schulz, P. J. (2020). Neuroticism in the digital age: A meta-

analysis. *Computers in Human Behavior Reports*, *2*, 100026. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.chbr.2020.100026

Marjanovic, Z., & Holden, R. R. (2019). Differentiating conscientious from indiscriminate responders in existing NEO-Five Factor Inventory-3 data. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *81*, 127–137. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2019.05.009

Marjanovic, Z., Holden, R., Struthers, W., Cribbie, R., & Greenglass, E. (2015). The inter-item standard deviation (ISD): An index that discriminates between conscientious and random responders. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *84*, 79–83. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2014.08.021

Markon, K. E. (2009). Hierarchies in the structure of personality traits. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, *3*(5), 812–826. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9004.2009.00213.x

McAdams, D. P. (1992). The Five-Factor Model in personality: A critical appraisal. *Journal of Personality*, *60*(2), 329–361. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.1992.tb00976.x

McAdams, D. P., & Olson, B. D. (2010). Personality development: Continuity and change over the life course. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *61*(1), 517–542. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.093008.100507

McAdams, D. P., & Pals, J. L. (2006). A new Big Five: Fundamental principles for an integrative science of personality. *American Psychologist*, *61*(3), 204–217. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.61.3.204

McAdams, D. P., & Pals, J. L. (2007). The role of theory in personality research. In *Handbook of research methods in personality psychology* (pp. 3–20). The Guilford Press.

McCann, C., Ziegler, M., Roberts, R. D., Ziegler, M., McCann, C., & Roberts, R. (Eds.). (2011). Faking in personality assessment: Reflections and recommendations. In *New Perspectives on Faking in Personality Assessment* (p. 0). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195387476.003.0087

McCrae, R. R. (2001). Trait psychology and culture: Exploring intercultural comparisons. *Journal of Personality*, *69*(6), 819–846. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-6494.696166

McCrae, R. R., Costa Jr, P. T., & Busch, C. M. (1986). Evaluating comprehensiveness in personality systems: The California Q-Set and the five-factor model. *Journal of Personality*, *54*(2), 430–446. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.1986.tb00403.x

McCrae, R. R., Costa Jr., P. T., Del Pilar, G. H., Rolland, J.-P., & Parker, W. D. (1998). Cross-cultural assessment of the five-factor model: The Revised NEO Personality Inventory. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, *29*(1), 171–188. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022198291009

McCrae, R. R., & Costa, P. T. (1983a). Joint factors in self-reports and ratings: Neuroticism, extraversion and openness to experience. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *4*(3), 245–255. https://doi.org/10.1016/0191-8869(83)90146-0

McCrae, R. R., & Costa, P. T. (1983b). Social desirability scales: More substance than style. *Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology*, *51*(6), 882–888. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-006X.51.6.882

McCrae, R. R., & Costa, P. T. (1985). Comparison of EPI and psychoticism scales with measures of the five-factor model of personality. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *6*(5), 587–597. https://doi.org/10.1016/0191-8869(85)90008-X

McCrae, R. R., & Costa, P. T. (1997). Personality trait structure as a human universal. *The American Psychologist*, *52*(5), 509–516. https://doi.org/10.1037//0003-066x.52.5.509

McCrae, R. R., & Costa, P. T. (2003). *Personality in adulthood: A five-factor theory perspective*. Guilford Press.

McCrae, R. R., & Costa, P. T. (2004). A contemplated revision of the NEO Five-Factor Inventory. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *36*(3), 587–596. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0191-8869(03)00118-1

McCrae, R. R., & John, O. P. (1992). An introduction to the five-factor model and its applications. *Journal of Personality*, *60*(2), 175–215. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.1992.tb00970.x

McCrae, R. R., Terracciano, A., & Personality Profiles of Cultures Project. (2005). Universal features of personality traits from the observer's perspective: Data from 50 cultures. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *88*(3), 547–561. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.88.3.547

McFarland, L. A., & Ryan, A. M. (2000). Variance in faking across noncognitive measures. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *85*(5), 812–821. https://doi.org/10.1037//0021-9010.85.5.812

McFarland, L. A., & Ryan, A. M. (2006). Toward an integrated model of applicant faking behavior. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, *36*(4), 979–1016. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0021-9029.2006.00052.x

McGue, M., Bacon, S., & Lykken, D. T. (1993). Personality stability and change in early adulthood: A behavioral genetic analysis. *Developmental Psychology*, *29*(1), 96–109. https://doi.org/10.1037/0012-1649.29.1.96

McGuire, W. J. (1989). A perspectivist approach to the strategic planning of programmatic scientific research. In B. Gholson, Jr. Shadish William R., R. A. Neimeyer, & A. C. Houts (Eds.), *Psychology of Science: Contributions to Metascience* (pp. 214–245). Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139173667.012

McGuire, W. J. (1997). Creative hypothesis generating in psychology: Some useful heuristics. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *48*(1), 1–30. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.48.1.1

McGuire, W. J. (2004). A perspectivist approach to theory construction. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, *8*(2), 173–182. https://doi.org/10.1207/s15327957pspr0802_11

McLarnon, M. J. W., DeLongchamp, A. C., & Schneider, T. J. (2019). Faking it! Individual

differences in types and degrees of faking behavior. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *138*, 88–95. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2018.09.024

Meehl, P. E., & Hathaway, S. R. (1946). The K factor as a suppressor variable in the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *30*(5), 525–564. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0053634

Mershon, B., & Gorsuch, R. L. (1988). Number of factors in the personality sphere: Does increase in factors increase predictability of real-life criteria? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *55*(4), 675–680. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.55.4.675

Miller, T. Q., Smith, T. W., Turner, C. W., Guijarro, M. L., & Hallet, A. J. (1996). A meta-analytic review of research on hostility and physical health. *Psychological Bulletin*, *119*(2), 322–348. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.119.2.322

Mischel, W. (1968). *Personality and assessment* (pp. xii, 365). John Wiley & Sons Inc.

Mischel, W. (1973). Toward a cognitive social learning reconceptualization of personality. *Psychological Review*, *80*(4), 252–283. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0035002

Mischel, W. (1984). Convergences and challenges in the search for consistency. *American Psychologist*, *39*(4), 351–364. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.39.4.351

Moos, R. H. (1973). Conceptualizations of human environments. *American Psychologist*, *28*(8), 652–665. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0035722

Morgan, D. L. (1996). Focus Groups. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *22*(1), 129–152. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.soc.22.1.129

Morgeson, F. P., Campion, M. A., Dipboye, R. L., Hollenbeck, J. R., Murphy, K., & Schmitt, N. (2007). Reconsidering the use of personality tests in personnel selection contexts. *Personnel Psychology*, *60*(3), 683–729. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1744-6570.2007.00089.x

Moshagen, M., Hilbig, B. E., & Zettler, I. (2018). The dark core of personality. *Psychological*

Review, *125*(5), 656–688. https://doi.org/10.1037/rev0000111

Mueller-Hanson, R. A., Heggestad, E. D., & Thornton III, G. C. (2006). Individual differences in impression management: An exploration of the psychological processes underlying faking. *Psychology Science*, *48*(3), 288–312.

Mueller-Hanson, R., Heggestad, E. D., & Thornton III, G. C. (2003). Faking and selection: Considering the use of personality from select-in and select-out perspectives. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *88*(2), 348–355. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.88.2.348

Muris, P., Merckelbach, H., Otgaar, H., & Meijer, E. (2017). The malevolent side of human nature: A meta-analysis and critical review of the literature on the Dark Triad (Narcissism, Machiavellianism, and Psychopathy). *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, *12*(2), 183–204. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691616666070

Murray, H. A. (1938). *Explorations in personality*. Oxford Univ. Press.

Musek, J. (2007). A general factor of personality: Evidence for the Big One in the five-factor model. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *41*(6), 1213–1233. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2007.02.003

Newcomb, A. F., Bukowski, W. M., & Pattee, L. (1993). Children's peer relations: A meta-analytic review of popular, rejected, neglected, controversial, and average sociometric status. *Psychological Bulletin*, *113*(1), 99–128. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.113.1.99

Niessen, A. S. M., Meijer, R. R., & Tendeiro, J. N. (2017). Measuring non-cognitive predictors in high-stakes contexts: The effect of self-presentation on self-report instruments used in admission to higher education. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *106*, 183–189. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2016.11.014

Noftle, E. E., & Robins, R. W. (2007). Personality predictors of academic outcomes: Big five correlates of GPA and SAT scores. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *93*(1),

116–130. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.93.1.116

Norman, W. T. (1963). Toward an adequate taxonomy of personality attributes: Replicated factor structure in peer nomination personality ratings. *The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, *66*(6), 574–583. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0040291

Novo, R., Gonzalez, B., & Roberto, M. (2022). Beyond personality: Underreporting in high-stakes assessment contexts. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *184*(111190), 1–8. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2021.111190

Ones, D. S., & Viswesvaran, C. (1998). The effects of social desirability and faking on personality and integrity assessment for personnel selection. *Human Performance*, *11*(2–3), 245–269. https://doi.org/10.1080/08959285.1998.9668033

Ones, D. S., Viswesvaran, C., & Reiss, A. D. (1996). Role of social desirability in personality testing for personnel selection: The red herring. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *81*(6), 660–679. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.81.6.660

Ormel, J., Riese, H., & Rosmalen, J. G. M. (2012). Interpreting neuroticism scores across the adult life course: Immutable or experience-dependent set points of negative affect? *Clinical Psychology Review*, *32*(1), 71–79. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cpr.2011.10.004

Orne, M. T. (1962). On the social psychology of the psychological experiment: With particular reference to demand characteristics and their implications. *American Psychologist*, *17*(11), 776–783. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0043424

Ozer, D. J., & Benet-Martínez, V. (2006). Personality and the prediction of consequential outcomes. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *57*(1), 401–421. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.57.102904.190127

Pansu, P., Dubois, N., & Dompnier, B. (2008). Internality-norm theory in educational contexts. *European Journal of Psychology of Education*, *23*(4), 385–397. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03172748

Park, Y., & MacDonald, G. (2023). Necessities and luxuries in satisfying single lives. *Journal of Social and Personal Relationships*, *40*(3), 937–954. https://doi.org/10.1177/02654075221122887

Parker, I. (2004). Criteria for qualitative research in psychology. *Qualitative Research in Psychology*, *1*(2), 95–106. https://doi.org/10.1191/1478088704qp010oa

Parrigon, S., Woo, S. E., Tay, L., & Wang, T. (2017). CAPTION-ing the situation: A lexically-derived taxonomy of psychological situation characteristics. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *112*(4), 642–681. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000111

Pasquier, D., & Valeau, P. (2006). Le paradigme de Jellison et Green: De la clairvoyance à la réactivité normative. *Psychologie du Travail et des Organisations*, *12*(1), 1–19. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pto.2005.09.002

Pasquier, D., & Valéau, P. (2015). Adhésion à la norme d'internalité et clairvoyance normative: Un passage par les contingences de la socialisation. *Psychologie du Travail et des Organisations*, *21*(3), 260–285. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1420-2530(16)30010-3

Patel, D., Krems, J. A., Stout, M. E., Byrd-Craven, J., & Hawkins, M. A. W. (2023). Parents of children with high weight are viewed as responsible for child weight and thus stigmatized. *Psychological Science*, *34*(1), 35–46. https://doi.org/10.1177/09567976221124951

Paulhus, D. L. (1984). Two-component models of socially desirable responding. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *46*(3), 598–609. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.46.3.598

Paulhus, D. L. (1991). Measurement and control of response bias. In J. P. Robinson, P. R. Shaver, & L. S. Wrightsman (Eds.), *Measures of personality and social psychological attitudes* (pp. 17–59). Academic Press. https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-590241-0.50006-X

Paulhus, D. L. (1993). Bypassing the will: The automatization of affirmations. In D. M. Wegner

& J. W. Pennebaker (Eds.), *Handbook of mental control* (pp. 573–587). Prentice-Hall, Inc.

Paulhus, D. L. (2002). Socially desirable responding: The evolution of a construct. In H. I. Braun, D. N. Jackson, & D. E. Wiley (Eds.), *The role of constructs in psychological and educational measurement* (pp. 46–69). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Paulhus, D. L., Bruce, M. N., & Trapnell, P. D. (1995). Effects of self-presentation strategies on personality profiles and their structure. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *21*(2), 100–108. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167295212001

Paulhus, D. L., & Vazire, S. (2007). The self-report method. In R. W. Robins, R. C. Fraley, & R. F. Krueger (Eds.), *Handbook of research methods in personality psychology* (pp. 224–239). The Guilford Press.

Paulhus, D. L., & Williams, K. M. (2002). The dark triad of personality: Narcissism, machiavellianism, and psychopathy. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *36*(6), 556–563. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0092-6566(02)00505-6

Pauls, C. A., & Crost, N. W. (2004). Effects of faking on self-deception and impression management scales. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *37*(6), 1137–1151. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2003.11.018

Pauls, C. A., & Crost, N. W. (2005). Cognitive ability and self-reported efficacy of self-presentation predict faking on personality measures. *Journal of Individual Differences*, *26*(4), 194–206. https://doi.org/10.1027/1614-0001.26.4.194

Paunonen, S. V. (2003). Big Five factors of personality and replicated predictions of behavior. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *84*(2), 411–424. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.84.2.411

Paunonen, S. V., & Ashton, M. C. (2001). Big five factors and facets and the prediction of behavior. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *81*(3), 524–539.

Paunonen, S. V., Haddock, G., Forsterling, F., & Keinonen, M. (2003). Broad versus narrow personality measures and the prediction of behaviour across cultures. *European Journal of Personality*, *17*(6), 413–433. https://doi.org/10.1002/per.496

Paunonen, S. V., & LeBel, E. P. (2012). Socially desirable responding and its elusive effects on the validity of personality assessments. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *103*(1), 158–175. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0028165

Paunonen, S. V., Rothstein, M. G., & Jackson, D. N. (1999). Narrow reasoning about the use of broad personality measures for personnel selection. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, *20*(3), 389–405.

Payne, S. C., Youngcourt, S. S., & Beaubien, J. M. (2007). A meta-analytic examination of the goal orientation nomological net. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *92*(1), 128–150. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.92.1.128

Peabody, D. (1984). Personality dimensions through trait inferences. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *46*(2), 384–403. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.46.2.384

Peabody, D., & Goldberg, L. R. (1989). Some determinants of factor structures from personality-trait descriptors. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *57*(3), 552–567. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.57.3.552

Peterson, M. H., Griffith, R. L., Isaacson, J. A., O'Connell, M. S., & Mangos, P. M. (2011). Applicant faking, social desirability, and the prediction of counterproductive work behaviors. *Human Performance*, *24*(3), 270–290. https://doi.org/10.1080/08959285.2011.580808

Pettigrew, T. F. (2018). The emergence of contextual social psychology. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *44*(7), 963–971. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167218756033

Piedmont, R. L., McCrae, R. R., Riemann, R., & Angleitner, A. (2000). On the invalidity of validity scales: Evidence from self-reports and observer ratings in volunteer samples.

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, *78*(3), 582–593. https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.78.3.582

Plaisant, O., Courtois, R., Réveillère, C., Mendelsohn, G. A., & John, O. P. (2010). Validation par analyse factorielle du Big Five Inventory français (BFI-Fr). Analyse convergente avec le NEO-PI-R. *Annales Médico-psychologiques, revue psychiatrique*, *168*(2), 97–106. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amp.2009.09.003

Plomin, R., & Nesselroade, J. R. (1990). Behavioral genetics and personality change. *Journal of Personality*, *58*(1), 191–220. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.1990.tb00913.x

Podsakoff, P. M., MacKenzie, S. B., Lee, J.-Y., & Podsakoff, N. P. (2003). Common method biases in behavioral research: A critical review of the literature and recommended remedies. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *88*(5), 879–903. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.88.5.879

Poropat, A. E. (2009). A meta-analysis of the five-factor model of personality and academic performance. *Psychological Bulletin*, *135*(2), 322–338. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0014996

Poupart, J. (1993). Discours et débats autour de la scientificité des entretiens de recherche. *Sociologie et sociétés*, *25*(2), 93–110. https://doi.org/10.7202/001573ar

Power, S. A., Zittoun, T., Akkerman, S., Wagoner, B., Cabra, M., Cornish, F., Hawlina, H., Heasman, B., Mahendran, K., Psaltis, C., Rajala, A., Veale, A., & Gillespie, A. (2023). Social Psychology of and for World-Making. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, *00*(0), 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1177/10888683221145756

Prager, J., Krueger, J. I., & Fiedler, K. (2018). Towards a deeper understanding of impression formation—New insights gained from a cognitive-ecological perspective. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *115*(3), 379–397. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspa0000123

Py, J., & Ginet, A. (2003). Knowledge of general social norms: Normative clearsightedness. In

N. Dubois (Ed.), *A sociocognitive approach to social norms* (pp. 170–182). Routledge.

Py, J., & Somat, A. (1991). Normativité, conformité et clairvoyance: Leurs effets sur le jugement évaluatif dans un contexte scolaire. *Perspectives Cognitives et Conduites Sociales*, *3*, 167–193. https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.1.4673.8964

R Core Team. (2022). *R: A language and environment for statistical computing* [Computer software]. R Foundation for Statistical Computing. https://www.r-project.org/

Rauthmann, J. F., Gallardo-Pujol, D., Guillaume, E. M., Todd, E., Nave, C. S., Sherman, R. A., Ziegler, M., Jones, A. B., & Funder, D. C. (2014). The Situational Eight DIAMONDS: A taxonomy of major dimensions of situation characteristics. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *107*(4), 677–718. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0037250

Rauthmann, J. F., & Kolar, G. P. (2012). How "dark" are the Dark Triad traits? Examining the perceived darkness of narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *53*(7), 884–889. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2012.06.020

Rauthmann, J. F., & Kolar, G. P. (2013). The perceived attractiveness and traits of the Dark Triad: Narcissists are perceived as hot, Machiavellians and psychopaths not. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *54*(5), 582–586. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2012.11.005

Rees, C. J., & Metcalfe, B. (2003). The faking of personality questionnaire results: Who's kidding whom? *Journal of Managerial Psychology*, *18*(2), 156–165. https://doi.org/10.1108/02683940310465045

Reinert, M. (1999). Quelques interrogations à propos de l' 'objet' d'une analyse de discours de type statistique et de la réponse 'Alceste'. *Langage & société*, *90*(1), 57–70. https://doi.org/10.3406/lsoc.1999.2897

Revelle, W. (2007). Experimental approaches to the study of personality. In *Handbook of research methods in personality psychology* (pp. 37–61). The Guilford Press.

Richard, F. D., Bond, C. F., & Stokes-Zoota, J. J. (2003). One hundred years of social

psychology quantitatively described. *Review of General Psychology*, *7*(4), 331–363. https://doi.org/10.1037/1089-2680.7.4.331

Roberts, B. W. (2009). Back to the future: Personality and assessment and personality development. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *43*(2), 137–145. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2008.12.015

Roberts, B. W., Caspi, A., & Moffitt, T. E. (2003). Work experiences and personality development in young adulthood. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *84*(3), 582–593. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.84.3.582

Roberts, B. W., & DelVecchio, W. F. (2000). The rank-order consistency of personality traits from childhood to old age: A quantitative review of longitudinal studies. *Psychological Bulletin*, *126*(1), 3–25. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.126.1.3

Roberts, B. W., Hill, P. L., & Davis, J. P. (2017). How to change conscientiousness: The sociogenomic trait intervention model. *Personality Disorders*, *8*(3), 199–205. https://doi.org/10.1037/per0000242

Roberts, B. W., & Jackson, J. J. (2008). Sociogenomic personality psychology. *Journal of Personality*, *76*(6), 1523–1544. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.2008.00530.x

Roberts, B. W., Kuncel, N. R., Shiner, R., Caspi, A., & Goldberg, L. R. (2007). The power of personality: The comparative validity of personality traits, socioeconomic status, and cognitive ability for predicting important life outcomes. *Perspectives on Psychological Science: A Journal of the Association for Psychological Science*, *2*(4), 313–345. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1745-6916.2007.00047.x

Roberts, B. W., Kuncel, N. R., Viechtbauer, W., & Bogg, T. (2007). Meta-analysis in personality psychology: A primer. In *Handbook of research methods in personality psychology* (pp. 652–672). The Guilford Press.

Roberts, B. W., Lejuez, C., Krueger, R. F., Richards, J. M., & Hill, P. L. (2014). What is

conscientiousness and how can it be assessed? *Developmental Psychology*, *50*(5), 1315–1330. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0031109

Roberts, B. W., Walton, K. E., & Bogg, T. (2005). Conscientiousness and health across the life course. *Review of General Psychology*, *9*(2), 156–168. https://doi.org/10.1037/1089-2680.9.2.156

Roberts, B. W., Walton, K. E., & Viechtbauer, W. (2006a). Patterns of mean-level change in personality traits across the life course: A meta-analysis of longitudinal studies. *Psychological Bulletin*, *132*(1), 1–25. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.132.1.1

Roberts, B. W., Walton, K. E., & Viechtbauer, W. (2006b). Personality traits change in adulthood: Reply to Costa and McCrae (2006). *Psychological Bulletin*, *132*(1), 29–32. https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.132.1.29

Roberts, B. W., & Wood, D. (2006). Personality development in the context of the neo-socioanalytic model of personality. In T. D. Little & D. K. Mroczek (Eds.), *Handbook of Personality Development* (pp. 11–39). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers.

Roberts, B. W., & Yoon, H. J. (2022). Personality Psychology. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *73*, 489–516. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-020821-

Robinson, O. C. (2009). On the social malleability of traits. *Journal of Individual Differences*, *30*(4), 201–208. https://doi.org/10.1027/1614-0001.30.4.201

Roets, A., Cornelis, I., & Van Hiel, A. (2014). Openness as a predictor of political orientation and conventional and unconventional political activism in Western and Eastern Europe. *Journal of Personality Assessment*, *96*(1), 53–63. https://doi.org/10.1080/00223891.2013.809354

Rolland, J.-P. (2002). The Cross-Cultural Generalizability of the Five-Factor Model of Personality. In R. R. McCrae & J. Allik (Eds.), *The Five-Factor Model of Personality Across Cultures* (pp. 7–28). Springer US. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4615-0763-5_2

Ross, L. (1977). The intuitive psychologist and his shortcomings: Distortions in the attribution process. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* (Vol. 10, pp. 173–220). Academic Press. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0065-2601(08)60357-3

Ross, L., Lepper, M., & Ward, A. (2010). History of Social Psychology: Insights, Challenges, and Contributions to Theory and Application. In *Handbook of Social Psychology*. John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. https://doi.org/10.1002/9780470561119.socpsy001001

Rosse, J. G., Stecher, M. D., Miller, J. L., & Levin, R. A. (1998). The impact of response distortion on preemployment personality testing and hiring decisions. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *83*(4), 634–644. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.83.4.634

Rosseel, Y. (2012). Lavaan: An R package for structural equation modeling. *Journal of Statistical Software*, *48*(2), 1–36. https://doi.org/10.18637/jss.v048.i02

Rothstein, M. G., & Goffin, R. D. (2006). The use of personality measures in personnel selection: What does current research support? *Human Resource Management Review*, *16*(2), 155–180. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.hrmr.2006.03.004

Rotter, J. B. (1966). Generalized expectancies for internal versus external control of reinforcement. *Psychological Monographs: General and Applied*, *80*(1), 1–28. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0092976

Roulin, N., & Krings, F. (2020). Faking to fit in: Applicants' response strategies to match organizational culture. *The Journal of Applied Psychology*, *105*(2), 130–145. https://doi.org/10.1037/apl0000431

Roulin, N., Krings, F., & Binggeli, S. (2016). A dynamic model of applicant faking. *Organizational Psychology Review*, *6*(2), 145–170. https://doi.org/10.1177/2041386615580875

Rudmann, O., Meier, E., Smeding, A., Butera, F., & Dompnier, B. (in preparation). *On the necessities and luxuries of self-assigned personality dimensions: Strategic self-*

presentation depends on the situation.

Rudmann, O., Meier, E., Smeding, A., Butera, F., & Dompnier, B. (submitted). *Social clear-sightedness: A new theoretical and methodological approach to study socially desirable responding in personality measurement*.

Ryan, A. M., & Ployhart, R. E. (2014). A century of selection. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *65*(1), 693–717. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-psych-010213-115134

Ryan, R. M. (1995). Psychological needs and the facilitation of integrative processes. *Journal of Personality*, *63*(3), 397–427.

Ryan, R. M., & Deci, E. L. (2001). On happiness and human potentials: A review of research on hedonic and eudaimonic well-being. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *52*, 141–166. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.psych.52.1.141

Ryder, A. G., Alden, L. E., & Paulhus, D. L. (2000). Is acculturation unidimensional or bidimensional? A head-to-head comparison in the prediction of personality, self-identity, and adjustment. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *79*(1), 49–65. https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.79.1.49

Sarason, I. G., Smith, R. E., & Diener, E. (1975). Personality research: Components of variance attributable to the person and the situation. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *32*(2), 199–204. https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.32.2.199

Sassenberg, K., & Ditrich, L. (2019). Research in social psychology changed between 2011 and 2016: Larger sample sizes, more self-report measures, and more online studies. *Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science*, *2*(2), 107–114. https://doi.org/10.1177/2515245919838781

Saucier, G., & Ostendorf, F. (1999). Hierarchical subcomponents of the Big Five personality factors: A cross-language replication. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *76*(4), 613–627. https://doi.org/10.1037//0022-3514.76.4.613

Savalei, V., & Falk, C. F. (2014). Robust two-stage approach outperforms robust full information maximum likelihood with incomplete nonnormal data. *Structural Equation Modeling: A Multidisciplinary Journal*, *21*(2), 280–302. https://doi.org/10.1080/10705511.2014.882692

Scarr, S., & McCartney, K. (1983). How people make their own environments: A theory of genotype → environment effects. *Child Development*, *54*(2), 424–435. https://doi.org/10.2307/1129703

Schimmack, U., Radhakrishnan, P., Oishi, S., Dzokoto, V., & Ahadi, S. (2002). Culture, personality, and subjective well-being: Integrating process models of life satisfaction. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *82*(4), 582–593. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.82.4.582

Schmitt, N., & Oswald, F. L. (2006). The impact of corrections for faking on the validity of noncognitive measures in selection settings. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *91*(3), 613–621. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.91.3.613

Schwardmann, P., & van der Weele, J. (2019). Deception and self-deception. *Nature Human Behaviour*, *3*(10), Article 10. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41562-019-0666-7

Schwarz, N. (1999). Self-reports: How the questions shape the answers. *American Psychologist*, *54*(2), 93–105. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.54.2.93

Sears, D. O. (1986). College sophomores in the laboratory: Influences of a narrow data base on social psychology's view of human nature. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *51*(3), 515–530. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.51.3.515

Senko, C., Belmonte, K., & Yakhkind, A. (2012). How students achievement goals shape their beliefs about effective teaching: A 'build-a-professor' study. *British Journal of Educational Psychology*, *82*, 420–435. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8279.2011.02036.x

Sherman, R. A., Nave, C. S., & Funder, D. C. (2010). Situational similarity and personality predict behavioral consistency. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *99*(2), 330–343. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0019796

Sherman, R. A., Nave, C. S., & Funder, D. C. (2012). Properties of persons and situations related to overall and distinctive personality-behavior congruence. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *46*(1), 87–101. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2011.12.006

Sherman, R. A., Nave, C. S., & Funder, D. C. (2013). Situational construal is related to personality and gender. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *47*(1), 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2012.10.008

Sherman, R. A., Rauthmann, J. F., Brown, N. A., Serfass, D. G., & Jones, A. B. (2015). The independent effects of personality and situations on real-time expressions of behavior and emotion. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *109*(5), 872–888. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000036

Smeding, A., Dompnier, B., & Darnon, C. (2017). Individual differences in perceived social desirability of openness to experience: A new framework for social desirability responding in personality research. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *113*, 155–160. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2017.03.028

Smeding, A., Dompnier, B., Meier, E., Darnon, C., Baumberger, B., & Butera, F. (2015). The motivation to learn as a self-presentation tool among Swiss high school students: The moderating role of mastery goals' perceived social value on learning. *Learning and Individual Differences*, *43*, 204–210. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.lindif.2015.08.036

Smeding, A., Dompnier, B., Meier, E., Darnon, C., & Butera, F. (2022). A multilevel account of social value-related reasons behind mastery goals. *British Journal of Educational Psychology*, *92*(2), 394–408. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjep.12453

Smith, D. B., & Ellingson, J. E. (2002). Substance versus style: A new look at social desirability

in motivating contexts. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *87*(2), 211–219. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.87.2.211

Smith, D. B., & Robie, C. (2004). The implications of impression management for personality research in organizations. In B. Schneider & D. B. Smith (Eds.), *Personality and organizations* (pp. 111–138). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates Publishers.

Smith, M. K., Trivers, R., & von Hippel, W. (2017). Self-deception facilitates interpersonal persuasion. *Journal of Economic Psychology*, *63*, 93–101. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2017.02.012

Snyder, M. (1974). Self-monitoring of expressive behavior. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *30*(4), 526–537. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0037039

Snyder, M. (1987). *Public appearances, private realities: The psychology of self-monitoring*. W.H. Freeman.

Somat, A., & Vazel, M.-A. (1999). Normative clearsightedness: A general knowledge of social valuation. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *29*(5–6), 691–705. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0992(199908/09)29:5/6<691::AID-EJSP957>3.0.CO;2-I

Soto, C. J. (2019). How replicable are links between personality traits and consequential life outcomes? The life outcomes of personality replication project. *Psychological Science*, *30*(5), 711–727. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797619831612

Soto, C. J., & John, O. P. (2009). Using the California Psychological Inventory to assess the Big Five personality domains: A hierarchical approach. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *43*(1), 25–38. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2008.10.005

Soto, C. J., & John, O. P. (2017a). Short and extra-short forms of the Big Five Inventory–2: The BFI-2-S and BFI-2-XS. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *68*, 69–81. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2017.02.004

Soto, C. J., & John, O. P. (2017b). The next Big Five Inventory (BFI-2): Developing and assessing a hierarchical model with 15 facets to enhance bandwidth, fidelity, and predictive power. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *113*(1), 117–143. https://doi.org/10.1037/pspp0000096

Specht, J., Bleidorn, W., Denissen, J. J. A., Hennecke, M., Hutteman, R., Kandler, C., Luhmann, M., Orth, U., Reitz, A. K., & Zimmermann, J. (2014). What drives adult personality development? A comparison of theoretical perspectives and empirical evidence. *European Journal of Personality*, *28*(3), 216–230. https://doi.org/10.1002/per.1966

Specht, J., Egloff, B., & Schmukle, S. C. (2011). Stability and change of personality across the life course: The impact of age and major life events on mean-level and rank-order stability of the Big Five. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *101*(4), 862–882. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0024950

Stagner, R. (1937). *Psychology of personality* (p. 465). McGraw-Hill.

Stark, S., Chernyshenko, O. S., Chan, K.-Y., Lee, W. C., & Drasgow, F. (2001). Effects of the testing situation on item responding: Cause for concern. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *86*(5), 943–953. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-9010.86.5.943

Stark, S., Chernyshenko, O. S., & Drasgow, F. (2011). Constructing fake-resistant personality tests using Item Response Theory: High-stakes personality testing with multidimensional pairwise preferences. In M. Ziegler, C. MacCann, & R. Roberts (Eds.), *New Perspectives on Faking in Personality Assessment* (p. 0). Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195387476.003.0061

Stephens, N. M., Fryberg, S. A., Markus, H. R., Johnson, C. S., & Covarrubias, R. (2012). Unseen disadvantage: How American universities' focus on independence undermines the academic performance of first-generation college students. *Journal of Personality and*

Social Psychology, *102*(6), 1178–1197. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0027143

Stöber, J. (2001). The Social Desirability Scale-17 (SDS-17): Convergent validity, discriminant validity, and relationship with age. *European Journal of Psychological Assessment*, *17*(3), 222–232. https://doi.org/10.1027/1015-5759.17.3.222

Swann, W. B., & Seyle, C. (2005). Personality psychology's comeback and its emerging symbiosis with social psychology. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *31*(2), 155–165. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167204271591

Świątkowski, W., & Dompnier, B. (2017). Replicability crisis in social psychology: Looking at the past to find new pathways for the future. *International Review of Social Psychology*, *30*(1), Article 1. https://doi.org/10.5334/irsp.66

Tarquinio, C., & Somat, A. (2001). Scholastic achievement, academic self-schemata, and normative clearsightedness. *European Journal of Psychology of Education*, *16*(1), 117–129. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03172997

Ten Berge, M. A., & De Raad, B. (1999). Taxonomies of situations from a trait psychological perspective. A review. *European Journal of Personality*, *13*(5), 337–360. https://doi.org/10.1002/(SICI)1099-0984(199909/10)13:5<337::AID-PER363>3.0.CO;2-F

Terracciano, A., McCrae, R. R., & Costa, P. T. (2010). Intra-individual change in personality stability and age. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *44*(1), 31–37. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2009.09.006

Tett, R. P., Anderson, M. G., Ho, C.-L., Yang, T. S., Huang, L., & Hanvongse, A. (2006). Seven nested questions about faking on personality tests: An overview and interactionist model of item-level response distortion. In R. L. Griffith & M. H. Peterson (Eds.), *A closer examination of applicant faking behavior* (pp. 43–83). Information Age Publish.

Tett, R. P., & Christiansen, N. D. (2007). Personality tests at the crossroads: A response to

Morgeson, Campion, Dipboye, Hollenbeck, Murphy, and Schmitt (2007). *Personnel Psychology*, *60*(4), 967–993. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1744-6570.2007.00098.x

Tett, R. P., & Simonet, D. V. (2011). Faking in personality assessment: A "multisaturation" perspective on faking as performance. *Human Performance*, *24*(4), 302–321. https://doi.org/10.1080/08959285.2011.597472

Tett, R. P., Steele, J. R., & Beauregard, R. S. (2003). Broad and narrow measures on both sides of the personality-job performance relationship. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, *24*(3), 335–356. https://doi.org/10.1002/job.191

Thalmayer, A. G., & Saucier, G. (2014). The questionnaire Big Six in 26 nations: Developing cross-culturally applicable Big Six, Big Five and Big Two inventories. *European Journal of Personality*, *28*(5), 482–496. https://doi.org/10.1002/per.1969

Thomas, A. G., Jonason, P. K., Blackburn, J. D., Kennair, L. E. O., Lowe, R., Malouff, J., Stewart, S., Sulikowski, D., & Li, N. P. (2019). Mate preference priorities in the East and West: A cross-cultural test of the mate preference priority model. *Journal of Personality*, *88*, 606–620. https://doi.org/10.1111/jopy.12514

Triandis, H. C. (1996). The psychological measurement of cultural syndromes. *American Psychologist*, *51*(4), 407–415. https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.51.4.407

Trull, T. J., & Sher, K. J. (1994). Relationship between the five-factor model of personality and Axis I disorders in a nonclinical sample. *Journal of Abnormal Psychology*, *103*(2), 350–360. https://doi.org/10.1037/0021-843X.103.2.350

Tubré, T., Miotke, A., & Sawdy, M. (2020). Personality Research Form (PRF). In V. Zeigler-Hill & T. K. Shackelford (Eds.), *Encyclopedia of Personality and Individual Differences* (pp. 3849–3850). Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-24612-3_926

Tupes, E. C., & Christal, R. E. (1961). *Recurrent personality factors based on trait ratings*

(USAF Tech.Rep. 61–97). https://www.bibsonomy.org/bibtex/1087186482417b0509eeee918b300a51c/veronicasu

Tupes, E. C., & Christal, R. E. (1992). Recurrent personality factors based on trait ratings. *Journal of Personality*, *60*(2), 225–251. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6494.1992.tb00973.x

Uziel, L. (2010). Rethinking social desirability scales: From impression management to interpersonally oriented self-control. *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, *5*(3), 243–262. https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691610369465

Valeau, P., & Pasquier, D. (2004). La manipulation des questionnaires de personnalité par le répondant: De la tricherie aux compétences professionnelles. *Psychologie du Travail et des Organisations*, *9*(3–4), 191–214.

van Aarde, N., Meiring, D., & Wiernik, B. M. (2017). The validity of the Big Five personality traits for job performance: Meta-analyses of South African studies. *International Journal of Selection and Assessment*, *25*(3), 223–239. https://doi.org/10.1111/ijsa.12175

Van der Linden, D., te Nijenhuis, J., & Bakker, A. B. (2010). The general factor of personality: A meta-analysis of Big Five intercorrelations and a criterion-related validity study. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *44*(3), 315–327. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2010.03.003

Van Heck, G. L. (1989). Situation concepts: Definitions and classification. In P. J. Hettema (Ed.), *Personality and environment: Assessment of human adaptation* (pp. 53–69). John Wiley & Sons.

Van Hiel, A., Mervielde, I., & De Fruyt, F. (2004). The relationship between maladaptive personality and right wing ideology. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *36*(2), 405–417. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0191-8869(03)00105-3

Vandenberg, R. J., & Lance, C. E. (2000). A review and synthesis of the measurement

invariance literature: Suggestions, practices, and recommendations for organizational research. *Organizational Research Methods*, *3*(1), 4–70. https://doi.org/10.1177/109442810031002

Vazire, S. (2006). Informant reports: A cheap, fast, and easy method for personality assessment. *Journal of Research in Personality*, *40*(5), 472–481. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2005.03.003

Verardi, S., Dahourou, D., Ah-Kion, J., Bhowon, U., Tseung, C. N., Amoussou-Yeye, D., Adjahouisso, M., Bouatta, C., Dougoumalé Cissé, D., Mbodji, M., Barry, O., Minga, D. M., Ondongo, F., Tsokini, D., Rigozzi, C., Meyer de Stadelhofen, F., & Rossier, J. (2010). Psychometric properties of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale in eight African countries and Switzerland. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, *41*(1), 19–34. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022022109348918

Vésteinsdóttir, V., Asgeirsdottir, R. L., Omarsdottir, H. R., & Thorsdottir, F. (2022). Convergent validity of methods for assessing socially desirable responding in personality items. *Nordic Psychology*, *0*(0), 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1080/19012276.2022.2054465

Viechtbauer, W. (2010). Conducting meta-analyses in R with the metafor package. *Journal of Statistical Software*, *36*(3), 1–48. https://doi.org/10.18637/jss.v036.i03

Viswesvaran, C., & Ones, D. S. (1999). Meta-analyses of fakability estimates: Implications for personality measurement. *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, *59*(2), 197–210. https://doi.org/10.1177/00131649921969802

Vukasović, T., & Bratko, D. (2015). Heritability of personality: A meta-analysis of behavior genetic studies. *Psychological Bulletin*, *141*(4), 769–785. https://doi.org/10.1037/bul0000017

Wagerman, S. A., & Funder, D. C. (2009). Personality psychology of situations. In G. Matthews & P. J. Corr (Eds.), *The Cambridge Handbook of Personality Psychology* (pp. 27–42).

Cambridge University Press. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-handbook-of-personality-psychology/personality-psychology-of-situations/DA36ED9485B46D0A8011FA57D68453C7

Wang, I. M. (2021). *How ecological conditions impact sociality*. University of Michigan.

Wee, S., Jonason, P. K., & Li, N. P. (2014). Cultural differences in prioritizing applicant attributes when assessing employment suitability. *European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology*, *23*(6), 946–956. https://doi.org/10.1080/1359432X.2013.820377

White, L. A., Young, M. C., Hunter, A. E., & Rumsey, M. G. (2008). Lessons learned in transitioning personality measures from research to operational settings. *Industrial and Organizational Psychology*, *1*(3), 291–295. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1754-9434.2008.00049.x

Wiggins, J. S. (1968). Personality structure. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *19*(1), 293–350. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.ps.19.020168.001453

Williams, K. E. G., Krems, J. A., Ayers, J. D., & Rankin, A. M. (2022). Sex differences in friendship preferences. *Evolution and Human Behavior*, *43*(1), 44–52. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2021.09.003

Williams, M., & Sulikowski, D. (2020). Implicit and explicit compromises in long-term partner choice. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *166*, 110226. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2020.110226

Wilmot, M. P., & Ones, D. S. (2022). Agreeableness and Its consequences: A quantitative review of meta-analytic findings. *Personality and Social Psychology Review: An Official Journal of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc*, *26*(3), 242–280. https://doi.org/10.1177/10888683211073007

Wilmot, M. P., Wanberg, C. R., Kammeyer-Mueller, J. D., & Ones, D. S. (2019). Extraversion

advantages at work: A quantitative review and synthesis of the meta-analytic evidence. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *104*(12), 1447–1470. https://doi.org/10.1037/apl0000415

Wilson, R. S., Schneider, J. A., Arnold, S. E., Bienias, J. L., & Bennett, D. A. (2007). Conscientiousness and the incidence of Alzheimer disease and mild cognitive impairment. *Archives of General Psychiatry*, *64*(10), 1204–1212. https://doi.org/10.1001/archpsyc.64.10.1204

Winstone, N. E., Nash, R. A., Rowntree, J., & Menezes, R. (2016). What do students want most from written feedback information? Distinguishing necessities from luxuries using a budgeting methodology. *Assessment & Evaluation in Higher Education*, *41*(8), 1237–1253. https://doi.org/10.1080/02602938.2015.1075956

Wojciszke, B. (2005). Morality and competence in person- and self-perception. *European Review of Social Psychology*, *16*(1), 155–188. https://doi.org/10.1080/10463280500229619

Woo, S. E., Chernyshenko, O. S., Longley, A., Zhang, Z.-X., Chiu, C.-Y., & Stark, S. E. (2014). Openness to Experience: Its lower level structure, measurement, and cross-cultural equivalence. *Journal of Personality Assessment*, *96*(1), 29–45. https://doi.org/10.1080/00223891.2013.806328

Woo, S. E., Chernyshenko, O. S., Stark, S. E., & Conz, G. (2014). Validity of six Openness facets in predicting work behaviors: A meta-analysis. *Journal of Personality Assessment*, *96*(1), 76–86. https://doi.org/10.1080/00223891.2013.806329

Yang, Y., Read, S. J., & Miller, L. C. (2009). The concept of situations. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, *3*(6), 1018–1037. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1751-9004.2009.00236.x

Ybarra, O., Chan, E., Park, H., Burnstein, E., Monin, B., & Stanik, C. (2008). Life's recurring challenges and the fundamental dimensions: An integration and its implications for

cultural differences and similarities. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, *38*(7), 1083–1092. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.559

Yong, J. C., Tan, Y. W., Li, N. P., & Meltzer, A. L. (2022). Looks and status are still essential: Testing the mate preference priority model with the profile-based experimental paradigm. *Journal of Personality*, 1–25. https://doi.org/10.1111/jopy.12699

Zerbe, W. J., & Paulhus, D. L. (1987). Socially Desirable Responding in organizational behavior: A reconception. *Academy of Management Review*, *12*(2), 250–264.

Ziegler, M., & Buehner, M. (2009). Modeling Socially Desirable Responding and its effects. *Educational and Psychological Measurement*, *69*(4), 548–565. https://doi.org/10.1177/0013164408324469

Ziegler, M., Danay, E., Schölmerich, F., & Bühner, M. (2010). Predicting academic success with the Big 5 rated from different points of view: Self-rated, other rated and faked. *European Journal of Personality*, *24*(4), 341–355. https://doi.org/10.1002/per.753

Ziegler, M., Maass, U., Griffith, R., & Gammon, A. (2015). What is the nature of faking? Modeling distinct response patterns and quantitative differences in faking at the same time. *Organizational Research Methods*, *18*(4), 679–703. https://doi.org/10.1177/1094428115574518

Ziegler, M., MacCann, C., & Roberts, R. D. (2011). Faking: Knowns, unknowns, and points of contention. In M. Ziegler, C. MacCann, & R. D. Roberts (Eds.), *New perspectives on faking in personality assessment* (pp. 3–16). Oxford University Press.

Zimmermann, J., & Neyer, F. J. (2013). Do we become a different person when hitting the road? Personality development of sojourners. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *105*(3), 515–530. https://doi.org/10.1037/a0033019

Zuckerman, M., Kuhlman, D. M., & Camac, C. (1988). What lies beyond E and N? Factor analyses of scales believed to measure basic dimensions of personality. *Journal of*

Personality and Social Psychology, *54*(1), 96–107. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.54.1.96

Zuckerman, M., Kuhlman, D. M., Joireman, J., Teta, P., & Kraft, M. (1993). A comparison of three structural models for personality: The Big Three, the Big Five, and the Alternative Five. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *65*(4), 757–768. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.65.4.757

5 APPENDIX

5.1 Appendices of the First Research Line

5.1.1 Study 1

5.1.1.1 Experimental Induction for Study 1: Instructions

Honest Instructions

"Vous allez trouver un certain nombre de qualificatifs qui peuvent ou non s'appliquer à vous. Par exemple, acceptez-vous d'être quelqu'un qui aime passer du temps avec les autres ? Choisissez pour chaque affirmation le chiffre indiquant combien vous désapprouvez ou approuvez l'affirmation. Il est important que vous répondiez le plus honnêtement possible."

Social Desirability Instructions

"Parfois, on répond aux questionnaires en essayant de donner une certaine image de soi-même. Imaginez maintenant que les mêmes questions qu'avant vous soient posées par vos enseignants et que vous deviez les convaincre que vous êtes un(e) étudiant(e) sympathique. Essayez de vous mettre dans ce rôle là pour répondre aux questions. En d'autres termes, ce qu'on vous demande ici c'est d'essayer de montrer que vous êtes un(e) étudiant(e) qui a tout ce qu'il faut pour se faire apprécier d'autrui, en l'occurrence vos enseignants."

5.1.1.2 Material for Study 1

The Big Five Inventory (BFI)

The 45-item French version of the Big Five Inventory (BFI-Fr, Plaisant et al., 2010) was used. Respondents were asked to indicate how much they agree with the statement (i.e.,

"I see myself as someone who…") on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*) for each item of the Big Five model of personality: Openness (10 items; e.g., "Is original, comes up with new ideas"), Conscientiousness (9 items; e.g., "Does a thorough job"), Extraversion (8 items; e.g., "Is talkative"), Agreeableness (10 items; e.g., "Is helpful and unselfish with others"), and Neuroticism (8 items; e.g., "Is depressed, blue").

The Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale

The short form of the French version of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Verardi et al., 2010) was used. This scale consists of 13 items reflecting highly socially desirable behaviors with very low probability of occurrence (e.g., "I have never deliberately said something that could hurt someone") or undesirable behaviors with very high probability of occurrence (e.g., "It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged"). Participants indicate for each item whether it is true or false for them.

5.1.1.3 Visual representation of the structure of the model tested in Study 1

Figure 4

Visual representation of the CFA model tested in Study 1



Note. H = Honest instructions, SD = Social desirability instructions. The social desirability scale and the Big Five Inventory measured with social desirability instructions serve as indicators of the latent psychological factor of social clear-sightedness (i.e., solid arrows between the latent factors and the indicators in SD). Correlations between residual errors of knowledge of social desirability are fixed to zero. Dotted arrows represent the possible impact of social clear-sightedness on participants' self-descriptions under honest instructions. Correlations between residual errors of self-descriptions under honest instructions are included to be freely estimated. Correlated uniquenesses are included between variables measured using the same items with honest and social desirability instructions to consider common method variance.

5.1.1.4 Descriptive Statistics of Study 1's Variables

Table S1

Means, standard deviations, correlations and reliability coefficients for all variables measured with social desirability (SD) and honest (H) instructions (Study 1).

	M	*SD*	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
1. Conscientiousness (SD)	4.63	.61	.91											
2. Extraversion (SD)	3.86	.54	.31*	.69										
3. Agreeableness (SD)	4.52	.50	.66*	.30*	.82									
4. Openness (SD)	4.33	.53	.59*	.36*	.51*	.78								
5. Neuroticism (SD)	1.70	.71	-.68*	-.41*	-.62*	-.46*	.87							
6. SDS (SD)	11.15	2.22	.67*	.20*	.49*	.43*	-.54*	.79						
7. Conscientiousness (H)	3.48	.72	.27*	.02	.14*	.09	-.17*	.15*	.84					
8. Extraversion (H)	3.39	.81	.06	.23*	.03	.04	-.09	.02	.08	.86				
9. Agreeableness (H)	3.78	.62	.19*	.07	.37*	.17*	-.16*	.19*	.22*	.05	.79			
10. Openness (H)	3.60	.59	-.08	-.02	-.08	.16*	.12*	-.05	.03	.20*	-.05	.75		
11. Neuroticism (H)	3.01	.90	-.05	-11*	-.08	.05	.32*	-.03	-.14*	-.28*	-.18*	-.02	.86	
12. SDS (H)	6.17	2.51	.12*	.11*	.10	.06	-.11*	.20*	.29*	.04	.43*	.05	-.32*	.59

Note. * $p < .05$. Reliability coefficients are reported in the diagonal.

5.1.2 Study 2

5.1.2.1 Information regarding Study 2's Material

Study 2 was a 2 (conditions: "anonymity" vs. "visibility") x 2 (instructions: honest vs. social desirability) within-participant experimental plan. In this section, material for the conditions ("anonymity" vs. "visibility") is presented. As the instructions (honest vs. social desirability) were the same as in Study 1, there are not detailed again in this section. Both instructions were presented in both conditions.

5.1.2.2 Experimental Induction for Study 2

Emails

Email for the "Anonymity" Condition. "Bonjour, Merci beaucoup d'avoir accepté de répondre à un questionnaire sur la personnalité. Ce questionnaire est totalement anonyme. Vos noms sont enregistrés dans le système pour savoir si vous avez complété le questionnaire ou non, ce qui nous permettra de vous attribuer les crédits. Cependant, vos noms ne peuvent en aucun cas être reliés au contenu de vos réponses. Rappel : dans quelques semaines, vous recevrez un autre questionnaire à remplir, qui fait partie de la même étude ; les points vous seront attribués après avoir rempli ce deuxième questionnaire. Pour accéder à ce questionnaire, cliquez sur le lien ci-dessous. !! ATTENTION !! Veuillez cliquer sur ce lien uniquement si vous avez l'intention de remplir le questionnaire maintenant ; vous ne pourrez pas revenir sur la première page du questionnaire si vous cliquez une deuxième fois sur ce lien. De plus, veuillez remplir ce questionnaire en une seule fois."

Email for the "Visibility" Condition. " Bonjour FIRSTNAME LASTNAME, Merci beaucoup d'avoir accepté de répondre à un questionnaire sur la personnalité. Pour accéder au questionnaire, cliquez sur le lien ci-dessous. !! ATTENTION !! Veuillez cliquer sur ce lien

uniquement si vous avez l'intention de remplir le questionnaire maintenant ; vous ne pourrez pas revenir sur la première page du questionnaire si vous cliquez une deuxième fois sur ce lien. De plus, veuillez remplir ce questionnaire en une seule fois."

Introductory Pages

Introduction of the "Anonymity" Condition. "Bonjour, Votre participation à cette étude va vous donner la possibilité de mieux vous connaître. En effet, dans cette étude, vous allez remplir un questionnaire de personnalité. Vous obtiendrez alors des informations sur votre profil de personnalité à la fin du deuxième questionnaire (à compléter dans quelques semaines). Vos réponses sont totalement anonymes car il n'y a aucun moyen de vous relier à vos réponses. Afin de garantir la validité du test de personnalité que vous allez remplir, il vous est demandé de répondre aux questions suivantes de la façon la plus honnête possible. Acceptez-vous de participer à cette étude ? Si oui, cliquez sur « suivant »."

Introduction of the "Visibility" Condition. " Bonjour, Je suis enseignant à l'Université de Lausanne et je mène actuellement une étude auprès des étudiant·e·s de l'Université. En effet, de nombreuses études dans le domaine de la personnalité ont permis d'identifier les caractéristiques personnelles que les étudiant·e·s doivent avoir pour se faire apprécier d'autrui et notamment des enseignant·e·s d'université. Dans le cadre de cette étude, je cherche donc à identifier les étudiant·e·s qui correspondent le plus à ce prototype de l'étudiant·e sympathique. Votre participation à cette étude va me donner la possibilité de mieux vous connaître. En effet, dans cette étude, vous allez remplir un questionnaire de personnalité. Je serai alors en mesure d'évaluer vos réponses et de voir dans quelle mesure celles-ci correspondent au prototype de l'étudiant·e sympathique. Vos réponses ne sont pas anonymes car il y a moyen de vous relier à vos réponses. Afin de garantir la validité du test de personnalité que vous allez remplir, il vous est demandé de répondre aux questions suivantes

de la façon la plus honnête possible. Acceptez-vous de participer à cette étude ? Si oui, cliquez sur « suivant ». ”

5.1.2.3 Material for Study 2

The Big Five Inventory 2 (BFI-2)

15 items (three per personality dimension) out of the 60 proposed in the full version of the BFI-2 (Soto & John, 2017b) were selected. This selection was based on a previous study conducted on 390 Swiss French speaking first year psychology students. In Soto and John's (2017b) BFI-2, each of the five personality dimensions contains three facets. In our 390-participant study, the three items obtaining the highest factor loadings with honest instructions on each dimension were therefore selected, with the constraint that each of the three items selected for one personality dimension should tap in one on the three facets of this dimension, thus retaining one item per facet. Participants were asked to indicate how much they agreed with the items (i.e., "I see myself as someone who…") on a five-point scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*). The 15 selected items are displayed in the following Table S2.

Table S2

Items of the BFI-2 selected for Study 2, their French translation and factor loading on their respective dimension.

Big Five dimension	Big Five facet	Factor loading on the dimension	Original item	French translation
Extraversion	Sociality	0.71	Is outgoing, sociable	Est sociable, extraverti·e
	Assertiveness	0.40	Has an assertive personality	A une forte personnalité, s'exprime avec assurance
	Energy level	0.47	Shows a lot of enthusiasm	Montre beaucoup d'enthousiasme
Agreeableness	Compassion	0.51	Is compassionate, has a soft heart	Est bienveillant·e, a le cœur tendre
	Respectfulness	0.70	Is respectful, treats others with respect	Est respectueux·se, traite les autres avec respect
	Trust	0.42	Has a forgiving nature	Est indulgent·e de nature
Stability	Anxiety	0.84	Is relaxed, handles stress well	Est détendu·e, gère bien le stress
	Depression	0.67	Feels secure, comfortable with self	Est en confiance, à l'aise avec soi-même
	Emotional volatility	0.65	Is emotionally stable, not easily upset	Est tempéré·e, pas facilement troublé·e
Conscientiousness	Responsibility	0.30	Is dependable, steady	Est fiable, stable
	Organization	0.94	Is systematic, likes to keep things in order	Est méthodique, aime garder les choses en ordre
	Productiveness	0.59	Is persistent, works until the task is finished	Est persévérant·e, travaille jusqu'à ce que la tâche soit finie
Openness	Aesthetic sensitivity	0.60	Is fascinated by art, music, or literature	Est fasciné·e par l'art, la musique, ou la littérature
	Intellectual curiosity	0.48	Is complex, a deep thinker	Est complexe, un·e penseur·se profond
	Creative imagination	0.75	Is original, comes up with new ideas	Est créatif·ve, plein d'idées originales

The Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale

Based on the same 390-participant study used to select the 15 items of the BFI-2, three items out of the 13-item French version of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale (Verardi et al., 2010) were selected. Again, the three items obtaining the highest factor loadings with honest instructions were selected. Participants were asked to indicate whether each of the three following items was true or false for them: No matter who I'm talking to, I'm always a good listener ($\lambda = 0.25$); I'm always willing to admit it when I make a mistake ($\lambda = 0.31$); I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable ($\lambda = 0.38$).

Additional Measure in Study 2: The Situational Eight DIAMONDS (RSQ8)

In Study 2, at the beginning of each condition, items extracted from the RSQ8 (Rauthmann et al., 2014) were included for exploratory purposes. Rauthmann and colleagues (2014) proposed this self-reported psychometric instrument (RSQ8) to measure situational characteristics. The goal of these authors was to allow the study of behaviors in context by assessing how people form an impression about the situation they are in. Their taxonomy encompasses eight different situation types forming the DIAMONDS acronym—Duty, Intellect, Adversity, Mating, pOsitivity, Negativity, Deception, and Sociality—, as well as situational expectancies, affordances, and current behaviors for each situation type. Among these dimensions, only two were selected for the present research: Duty and Sociality. The goal of including these items was to see if participants understood the hierarchical work-related context manipulated in the introductory page, i.e., facing a university professor. The Duty situation was therefore selected, as it is work- or study-related, involving hierarchical relationships, at workplace or university for example. To contrast, the Sociality situation was chosen as it implies a more informal or friendly setting, thus allowing to see if the manipulation was not interpreted as such. Practically, the four items of the Duty situation type—e.g., "A job needs to be done"— as well as the four items of the Sociality situation

type—e.g., “A reassuring other person is present”—were included in Study 2, on which participants had to answer on a 9-point scale ranging from 1 (*not at all characteristic of the situation at hand*) to 9 (*totally characteristic of the situation at hand*). In the “anonymity” condition, as expected, results indicated that participants reported the situation as more Duty ($M = 6.85$, $SD = 1.33$) than Sociality ($M = 4.77$, $SD = 2.34$): $t(545) = 14.35$, $p < .001$. In the “visibility” condition, also as expected, results indicated that participants reported the situation as more Duty ($M = 7.01$, $SD = 1.34$) than Sociality ($M = 4.76$, $SD = 2.26$): $t(539.58) = 15.48$, $p < .001$. As these items were included for exploratory purposes to test the instrument, its results were not reported in the main manuscript.

5.1.2.4 Visual representation of the structure of the model tested in Study 2

Figure 5

Visual representation of the CFA model tested in Study 2



Note. H = Honest instructions, SD = Social desirability instructions. The same model specifications as in Study 1's model (cf. Figure 4) are applied, but for readability concerns, correlations between residual errors of self-descriptions under honest instructions and correlated uniquenesses between variables measured using the same items with honest and social desirability instructions are not visually represented here. Additional specifications of this model: estimation of two social clear-sightedness latent variables, one in the "anonymity" condition and one in the "visibility" condition; addition of six latent control variables, one for each scale used to measure self-descriptions with honest and social desirability instructions in both conditions. Solid arrows between social clear-sightedness and its indicators represent stable cross-situational relationships whereas dotted arrows represent variable cross-situational relationships. Correlations between all latent variables are included in the model but not visually represented here.

5.1.2.5 Descriptive Statistics of Study 2's Variables

Table S3

Means, standard deviations and correlations for all variables measured with social desirability (SD) and honest (H) instructions (Study 2).

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	*M*	*SD*
1. Conscientiousness (SD)	.32*	.41*	.32*	.35*	.63*	.31*	.24*	-.03	.03	.05	.03	-.03	4.57	0.59
2. Extraversion (SD)	.41*	.43*	.32*	.36*	.53*	.14*	.02	.36*	.15*	-.01	.15*	-.02	4.02	0.61
3. Agreeableness (SD)	.47*	.44*	.51*	.40*	.41*	.15*	.14*	.11	.39*	.09	.07	.15*	4.43	0.53
4. Openness (SD)	.34*	.37*	.42*	.59*	.38*	.24*	.02	.08	.18*	.47*	.03	.03	4.06	0.76
5. Neuroticism (SD)	.58*	.60*	.46*	.40*	.46*	.31*	.03	.07	.14*	.07	.25*	.02	4.01	0.83
6. SDS (SD)	.43*	.25*	.40*	.32*	.51*	.26*	-.02	-.10	.10	.13*	0	.32*	0.93	0.19
7. Conscientiousness (H)	.30*	-.02	.18*	-.04	-.04	-.03	.81*	.23*	.12*	.01	.16*	.11	3.62	0.80
8. Extraversion (H)	.01	.35*	.04	.02	.06	-.14*	.19*	.82*	.25*	.15*	.47*	.01	3.27	0.84
9. Agreeableness (H)	.08	.15*	.40*	.15*	.04	.09	.25*	.18*	.65*	.20*	.17*	.42*	4.12	0.62
10. Openness (H)	.08	.07	.11*	.48*	.08	.12*	-.01	.11*	.21*	.85*	.10	.04	3.71	0.85
11. Neuroticism (H)	-.01	.15*	.06	.08	.27*	-.01	.23*	.39*	.17*	.06	.81*	.14*	2.81	0.84
12. SDS (H)	.04	-.05	.15*	.10	.03	.34*	.14*	.03	.41*	.15*	.21*	.61*	0.66	0.28
M	4.53	4.09	4.56	4.15	4.03	0.91	3.59	3.25	4.12	3.75	2.78	0.64		
SD	0.65	0.67	0.48	0.76	0.86	0.20	0.82	0.85	0.60	0.83	0.90	0.30		

Note. * $p < .05$. Correlation coefficients between the two conditions are reported in the diagonal. Correlations for the "anonymity" condition are presented below the diagonal ($N = 348$) whereas correlations for the "visibility" condition are presented above the diagonal ($N = 301$). Means and standard deviations for the "anonymity" condition are reported in the lower part of the table, and in the right part of the table for the "visibility" condition.

5.2 Appendices of the Second Research Line

5.2.1 Budgeting Task Instructions and Experimental Induction for the Pilot Study

5.2.1.1 Experimental Condition ("Professors")

Low Budget

"Voici un certain nombre de qualités. Vous possédez un budget fictif de 36 Chf. que vous pouvez utiliser librement afin d'acheter la quantité souhaitée de ces qualités. Votre objectif est celui de décrire un étudiant Universitaire sympathique, un étudiant qui a tout ce qu'il faut pour se faire apprécier de ses enseignants. Vous devez distribuer tous les 36 Chf à votre disposition."

Medium Budget

"Voici les mêmes qualités présentées auparavant (dans un ordre différent). Maintenant vous possédez un budget fictif de 72 Chf. que vous pouvez utiliser librement afin d'acheter la quantité souhaitée de ces qualités. Votre objectif est toujours celui de décrire un étudiant Universitaire sympathique, un étudiant qui a tout ce qu'il faut pour se faire apprécier de ses enseignants. Vous devez distribuer tous les 72 Chf à votre disposition."

High Budget

"Voici les mêmes qualités présentées auparavant (dans un ordre différent). Maintenant vous possédez un budget fictif de 108 Chf. que vous pouvez utiliser librement afin d'acheter la quantité souhaitée de ces qualités. Votre objectif est toujours celui de décrire un étudiant Universitaire sympathique, un étudiant qui a tout ce qu'il faut pour se faire apprécier de ses enseignants."

5.2.1.2 Control Condition ("Ideal Self")

Low Budget

"Voici un certain nombre de qualités qui peuvent ou non s'appliquer à vous. Vous possédez un budget fictif de 36 Chf. que vous pouvez utiliser librement afin d'acheter la quantité souhaitée de ces qualités. Votre objectif est celui de décrire la personne idéale que vous aimeriez être à l'aide de ces qualités. Vous devez distribuer tous les 36 Chf à votre disposition."

Medium Budget

"Voici les mêmes qualités présentées auparavant (dans un ordre différent). Maintenant vous possédez un budget fictif de 72 Chf. que vous pouvez utiliser librement afin d'acheter la quantité souhaitée de ces qualités. Votre objectif est celui de décrire la personne idéale que vous aimeriez être à l'aide de ces qualités. Vous devez distribuer tous les 72 Chf à votre disposition."

High Budget

"Voici les mêmes qualités présentées auparavant (dans un ordre différent). Maintenant vous possédez un budget fictif de 108 Chf. que vous pouvez utiliser librement afin d'acheter la quantité souhaitée de ces qualités. Votre objectif est celui de décrire la personne idéale que vous aimeriez être à l'aide de ces qualités. Vous devez distribuer tous les 108 Chf à votre disposition."

5.2.2 Budgeting Task Instructions and Experimental Induction for Study 1 and Study 2

5.2.2.1 Duty Condition

Low Budget

"Voici un certain nombre de traits de caractère. Vous possédez un budget fictif de 36 CHF que vous pouvez utiliser librement afin d'acheter la quantité souhaitée de ces traits de caractère. Votre objectif est de décrire l'étudiant·e universitaire qui a tout ce qu'il faut pour se faire apprécier par ses enseignant·e·s dans la situation suivante : il·elle est avec un·e de ses professeur·e·s à l'Université afin de discuter des modifications à apporter à un document écrit qu'il·elle doit lui rendre. Plus vous utilisez de l'argent pour "l'achat" d'un trait de caractère, plus cela veut dire que vous considérez ce trait comme important pour se faire apprécier dans cette situation. Par exemple, si vous utilisez 6 CHF pour la qualité "enthousiasme" et 2 CHF pour la qualité "persévérance", vous dites essentiellement que l'enthousiasme est beaucoup plus importante pour vous que la persévérance pour se faire apprécier des professeur·e·s. Vous devez distribuer l'entièreté des 36 CHF à votre disposition (ni plus ni moins). En bas de la page, un compteur indique la quantité du budget déjà attribuée ainsi que la quantité encore à attribuer. L'étudiant·e universitaire qui a tout ce qu'il faut pour se faire apprécier par ses enseignant·e·s dans cette situation : "

Medium Budget

"Voici les mêmes traits de caractère. Maintenant, vous possédez un budget fictif de 72 CHF que vous pouvez utiliser librement afin d'acheter la quantité souhaitée de ces traits de caractère. Votre objectif est toujours de décrire l'étudiant·e universitaire qui a tout ce qu'il faut pour se faire apprécier par ses enseignant·e·s dans la situation suivante : il·elle est avec un·e de ses professeur·e·s à l'Université afin de discuter des modifications à apporter à un document écrit qu'il·elle doit lui rendre. Plus vous utilisez de l'argent pour "l'achat" d'un trait

de caractère, plus cela veut dire que vous considérez ce trait comme important pour se faire apprécier dans cette situation. Par exemple, si vous utilisez 6 CHF pour la qualité "enthousiasme" et 2 CHF pour la qualité "persévérance", vous dites essentiellement que l'enthousiasme est beaucoup plus importante pour vous que la persévérance pour se faire apprécier des professeur·e·s. Vous devez distribuer l'entièreté des 72 CHF à votre disposition (ni plus ni moins). En bas de la page, un compteur indique la quantité du budget déjà attribuée ainsi que la quantité encore à attribuer. L'étudiant·e universitaire qui a tout ce qu'il faut pour se faire apprécier par ses enseignant·e·s dans cette situation : ”

High Budget

“Voici les mêmes traits de caractère. Maintenant, vous possédez un budget fictif de 108 CHF que vous pouvez utiliser librement afin d'acheter la quantité souhaitée de ces traits de caractère. Votre objectif est toujours de décrire l'étudiant·e universitaire qui a tout ce qu'il faut pour se faire apprécier par ses enseignant·e·s dans la situation suivante : il·elle est avec un·e de ses professeur·e·s à l'Université afin de discuter des modifications à apporter à un document écrit qu'il·elle doit lui rendre. Plus vous utilisez de l'argent pour "l'achat" d'un trait de caractère, plus cela veut dire que vous considérez ce trait comme important pour se faire apprécier dans cette situation. Par exemple, si vous utilisez 6 CHF pour la qualité "enthousiasme" et 2 CHF pour la qualité "persévérance", vous dites essentiellement que l'enthousiasme est beaucoup plus importante pour vous que la persévérance pour se faire apprécier des professeur·e·s. Vous devez distribuer l'entièreté des 108 CHF à votre disposition (ni plus ni moins). En bas de la page, un compteur indique la quantité du budget déjà attribuée ainsi que la quantité encore à attribuer. L'étudiant·e universitaire qui a tout ce qu'il faut pour se faire apprécier par ses enseignant·e·s dans cette situation : ”

5.2.2.2 Sociality Condition

Information

As the instructions for the budgeting task were essentially the same across Study 1 and Study 2, the instructions for the low, medium, and high budgets in full are only showed for the Duty condition (cf. previous section). In the next section, we only show the Sociality condition instructions for the low budget. The changes in the medium and high budget are very similar to what has been changed in the Duty condition budgets' instructions.

Low Budget

"Voici un certain nombre de traits de caractère. Vous possédez un budget fictif de 36 CHF que vous pouvez utiliser librement afin d'acheter la quantité souhaitée de ces traits de caractère. Votre objectif est de décrire l'étudiant·e universitaire qui a tout ce qu'il faut pour se faire apprécier par ses camarades/ami·e·s dans la situation suivante : il·elle est avec des ami·e·s dans un café pour boire un verre et discuter de son dernier week-end. Plus vous utilisez de l'argent pour "l'achat" d'un trait de caractère, plus cela veut dire que vous considérez ce trait comme important pour se faire apprécier dans cette situation. Par exemple, si vous utilisez 6 CHF pour la qualité "enthousiasme" et 2 CHF pour la qualité "persévérance", vous dites essentiellement que l'enthousiasme est beaucoup plus important pour vous que la persévérance pour se faire apprécier d'ami·e·s. Vous devez distribuer l'entièreté des 36 CHF à votre disposition (ni plus ni moins). En bas de la page, un compteur indique la quantité du budget déjà attribuée ainsi que la quantité encore à attribuer. L'étudiant·e universitaire qui a tout ce qu'il faut pour se faire apprécier de ses camarades/ami·e·s dans cette situation : "

5.3 Appendices of the Third Research Line

5.3.1 Study 1

5.3.1.1 Experimental Induction for Study 1

Emails

Email for the "Anonymity" Condition. « Bonjour, Merci beaucoup d'avoir accepté de répondre à un questionnaire sur la personnalité. Pour accéder à ce questionnaire, cliquez sur le lien ci-dessous. »

Email for the "Visibility" Condition. « Bonjour {FIRSTNAME} {LASTNAME}, Merci beaucoup d'avoir accepté de répondre à un questionnaire sur la personnalité. Pour accéder à ce questionnaire, cliquez sur le lien ci-dessous. »

Introductory Pages

Introductory Page for the "Anonymity" Condition. « Bonjour, Votre participation à cette étude va vous donner la possibilité de mieux vous connaître. En effet, dans cette étude, vous allez remplir un questionnaire de personnalité. Vous obtiendrez alors des informations sur votre profil de personnalité à la fin du questionnaire. Vos réponses sont totalement anonymes car il n'y a aucun moyen de vous relier à vos réponses. Afin de garantir la validité du test de personnalité que vous allez remplir, il vous est demandé de répondre aux questions suivantes de la façon la plus honnête possible. Acceptez-vous de participer à cette étude ? »

Introductory Page for the "Visibility" Condition. « Bonjour, Je suis enseignant à l'Université de Lausanne et je mène actuellement une étude auprès des étudiants de l'UNIL. En effet, de nombreuses études dans le domaine de la personnalité ont permis d'identifier les caractéristiques personnelles que les étudiants doivent avoir pour se faire apprécier d'autrui et

notamment des enseignants d'université. Dans le cadre de cette étude, je cherche donc à identifier les étudiants qui correspondent le plus à ce prototype de l'étudiant sympathique. Votre participation à cette étude va me donner la possibilité de mieux vous connaître. En effet, dans cette étude, vous allez remplir un questionnaire de personnalité. Je serai alors en mesure d'évaluer vos réponses et de voir dans quelle mesure celles-ci correspondent au prototype de l'étudiant sympathique. Vos réponses ne sont pas anonymes car il y a moyen de vous relier à vos réponses. Afin de garantir la validité du test de personnalité que vous allez remplir, il vous est demandé de répondre aux questions suivantes de la façon la plus honnête possible. Acceptez-vous de participer à cette étude ? »

5.3.1.2 Social Desirability Instructions (Same in Both Conditions)

« Parfois, on répond aux questionnaires en essayant de donner une certaine image de soi-même. Imaginez maintenant que les mêmes questions qu'avant vous soient posées par vos enseignants et que vous deviez les convaincre que vous êtes un(e) étudiant(e) sympathique. Essayez de vous mettre dans ce rôle-là pour répondre aux questions. En d'autres termes, ce qu'on vous demande ici c'est d'essayer de montrer que vous êtes un(e) étudiant(e) qui a tout ce qu'il faut pour se faire apprécier d'autrui, en l'occurrence vos enseignants. »

5.3.1.3 Descriptive Statistics of Study 1's Variables

Table S4

Means, sd, correlations and reliability coefficients for all variables measured with social desirability (SD) and honest (H) instructions in Study 1.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	*mean*	*sd*
1. C (SD)	.91 / .91	.60	-.68	.35	.30	.67	.41	.13	.04	.19	-.01	.04	4.67	0.58
2. A (SD)	.49	.78 / .77	-.50	.37	.16	.63	.35	.37	.06	.01	-.07	.07	4.50	0.46
3. N (SD)	-.63	-.54	.84 / .75	-.56	-.39	-.58	-.26	-.18	.18	-.18	-.04	-.12	1.67	0.54
4. O (SD)	.50	.31	-.37	.74 / .81	.35	.33	.23	.09	.05	.50	.02	-.03	4.27	0.55
5. E (SD)	.45	.30	-.43	.26	.74 / .70	.10	.11	.03	-.07	.07	.16	-.05	3.91	0.54
6. SDS (SD)	.66	.48	-.52	.23	.43	.77 / .71	.32	.13	-.02	-.01	-.02	.17	0.87	0.15
7. C (H)	.26	.09	-.11	-.01	.25	.13	.85 / .82	.07	.05	.07	.09	.24	3.61	0.68
8. A (H)	.06	.34	-.11	-.01	.02	.02	.09	.72 / .71	-.20	-.02	-.01	.40	3.94	0.51
9. N (H)	.07	-.00	.25	.08	.04	.12	-.17	-.35	.85 / .83	-.07	-.21	-.36	2.87	0.80
10. O (H)	.03	-.03	-.00	.32	.02	-.17	.09	.01	-.04	.76 / .73	.11	-.04	3.62	0.57
11. E (H)	.14	.14	-.13	.02	.51	.08	.30	.01	-.23	.07	.88 / .85	.09	3.46	0.80
12. SDS (H)	.11	.17	-.17	-.09	.11	.16	.37	.52	-.42	.10	.24	.63 / .61	0.52	0.20
mean	4.56	4.47	1.75	4.25	3.81	0.84	3.37	3.85	2.98	3.59	3.28	0.50		
sd	0.63	0.46	0.66	0.51	0.58	0.18	0.74	0.54	0.86	0.62	0.84	0.20		

Note. ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$. Correlations for the "anonymity" condition are presented below the diagonal ($N = 198$) whereas correlations for the "visibility" condition are presented above the diagonal ($N = 198$). Reliability coefficients for each condition are reported in the diagonal (for anonymity and visibility conditions, respectively). Means and standard deviations for the low evaluative pressure condition are reported in the lower part of the table, and in the right part of the table for the high evaluative pressure condition.

5.3.2 Study 2

5.3.2.1 Experimental Induction for Study 2

Emails

Email for the "Anonymity" Condition. « Bonjour, Merci beaucoup d'avoir accepté de répondre à un questionnaire sur la personnalité. Ce questionnaire est totalement anonyme. Vos noms sont enregistrés dans le système pour savoir si vous avez complété le questionnaire ou non, ce qui nous permettra de vous attribuer les crédits. Cependant, vos noms ne peuvent en aucun cas être reliés au contenu de vos réponses. Pour accéder à ce questionnaire, cliquez sur le lien ci-dessous. !! ATTENTION !! Veuillez cliquer sur ce lien uniquement si vous avez l'intention de remplir le questionnaire maintenant ; vous ne pourrez pas revenir sur la première page du questionnaire si vous cliquez une deuxième fois sur ce lien. De plus, veuillez remplir ce questionnaire en une seule fois. »

Email for the "Visibility" Condition. « Bonjour FIRSTNAME LASTNAME, Merci beaucoup d'avoir accepté de répondre à un questionnaire sur la personnalité. Pour accéder à ce questionnaire, cliquez sur le lien ci-dessous. !! ATTENTION !! Veuillez cliquer sur ce lien uniquement si vous avez l'intention de remplir le questionnaire maintenant ; vous ne pourrez pas revenir sur la première page du questionnaire si vous cliquez une deuxième fois sur ce lien. De plus, veuillez remplir ce questionnaire en une seule fois. »

Introductory Pages

Introductory Page for the "Anonymity" Condition. « Bonjour, Votre participation à cette étude va vous donner la possibilité de mieux vous connaître. En effet, dans cette étude, vous allez remplir un questionnaire de personnalité. Vous obtiendrez alors des informations sur votre profil de personnalité à la fin du questionnaire. Vos réponses sont totalement

anonymes car il n'y a aucun moyen de vous relier à vos réponses. Afin de garantir la validité du test de personnalité que vous allez remplir, il vous est demandé de répondre aux questions suivantes de la façon la plus honnête possible. Acceptez-vous de participer à cette étude ? Si oui, cliquez sur « suivant ». »

Introductory Page for the "Visibility" Condition. « Bonjour, Je suis enseignant à l'Université de Lausanne et je mène actuellement une étude auprès des étudiant·es de l'UNIL. En effet, de nombreuses études dans le domaine de la personnalité ont permis d'identifier les caractéristiques personnelles que les étudiant·es doivent avoir pour se faire apprécier d'autrui et notamment des enseignant·es d'université. Dans le cadre de cette étude, je cherche donc à identifier les étudiant·es qui correspondent le plus à ce prototype de l'étudiant·e sympathique. Votre participation à cette étude va me donner la possibilité de mieux vous connaître. En effet, dans cette étude, vous allez remplir un questionnaire de personnalité. Je serai alors en mesure d'évaluer vos réponses et de voir dans quelle mesure celles-ci correspondent au prototype de l'étudiant·e sympathique. Vos réponses ne sont pas anonymes car il y a moyen de vous relier à vos réponses. Afin de garantir la validité du test de personnalité que vous allez remplir, il vous est demandé de répondre aux questions suivantes de la façon la plus honnête possible. Acceptez-vous de participer à cette étude ? Si oui, cliquez sur « suivant ». »

5.3.2.2 Social Desirability Instructions (Same in Both Conditions)

« Parfois, on répond aux questionnaires en essayant de donner une certaine image de soi-même. Imaginez maintenant que les mêmes questions qu'avant vous soient posées par vos enseignant·e·s et que vous deviez les convaincre que vous êtes un·e étudiant·e sympathique. Essayez de vous mettre dans ce rôle-là pour répondre aux questions ci-dessous. En d'autres termes, ce qu'on vous demande ici est d'essayer de montrer que vous êtes un·e étudiant·e qui a tout ce qu'il faut pour se faire apprécier d'autrui, en l'occurrence de vos enseignant·e·s. De

1 : "Désapprouve fortement", À 5 : "Approuve fortement", Je suis quelqu'un qui ... »

5.3.2.3 Descriptive Statistics of Study 2's Variables

Table S5

Means, sd, correlations and reliability coefficients for all variables measured with social desirability (SD) and honest (H) instructions in Study 2.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	*mean*	*sd*
1. C (SD)	.86 / .89	.77	-.74	.53	.64	.73	.37	.22	-.06	.10	.11	.16	4.51	0.77
2. A (SD)	.67	.82 / .87	-.67	.60	.57	.68	.20	.35	-.05	.19	.07	.21	4.41	0.56
3. N (SD)	-.73	-.61	.91 / .92	-.55	-.54	-.75	-.15	-.13	.25	-.14	.02	-.18	1.93	0.83
4. O (SD)	.55	.61	-.53	.81 / .85	.51	.45	.07	.15	-.02	.44	.14	.08	4.28	0.62
5. E (SD)	.39	.29	-.53	.50	.74 / .76	.48	.26	.36	-.02	.18	.29	.16	3.77	0.55
6. SDS (SD)	.74	.70	-.73	.50	.34	.76 / .82	.21	-.13	-.09	.14	.02	.24	0.83	0.22
7. C (H)	.25	.12	-.07	.06	.07	.06	.76 / .80	.32	-.24	.04	.26	.36	3.44	0.73
8. A (H)	.15	.32	-.09	.11	.04	.13	.38	.77 / .79	-.13	.11	.08	.47	3.81	0.56
9. N (H)	-.06	-.07	.23	-.03	-.11	-.09	-.36	-.34	.88 / .87	-.07	-.25	-.40	3.18	0.77
10. O (H)	.09	.11	-.02	.21	.11	.03	.04	.14	-.05	.84 / .84	.17	.12	3.81	0.66
11. E (H)	.01	-.04	-.01	-.00	.33	-.11	.30	.07	-.36	.22	.82 / .81	-.07	3.26	0.63
12. SDS (H)	.10	.19	-.07	.09	.02	.14	.41	.60	-.48	.21	.17	.64 / .66	0.48	0.21
mean	4.57	4.46	1.89	4.36	3.75	0.87	3.49	3.85	3.17	3.75	3.20	0.49		
sd	0.61	0.48	0.75	0.50	0.51	0.19	0.67	0.53	0.78	0.67	0.62	0.20		

Note. ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$. SD = Social desirability instructions, H = Honest instructions, C = Conscientiousness, E = Extraversion, A = Agreeableness, O = Openness, N = Neuroticism, SDS = Social desirability scale. Correlations for the "Duty with low evaluative pressure" condition are presented below the diagonal ($N = 198$) whereas correlations for the "Duty with high evaluative pressure" condition are presented above the diagonal ($N = 198$). Reliability coefficients for each condition are reported in the diagonal (for low and high evaluative pressure conditions, respectively). Means and standard deviations for the low evaluative pressure condition are reported in the lower part of the table, and in the right part of the table for the high evaluative pressure condition.

5.3.3 Study 3

5.3.3.1 Experimental Induction for Study 3

Emails

Email for the "Duty" Condition. « Bonjour {FIRSTNAME} {LASTNAME}, Merci beaucoup d'avoir accepté de répondre à un questionnaire sur la personnalité. Pour accéder à ce questionnaire, cliquez sur le lien ci-dessous. !! ATTENTION !! Veuillez cliquer sur ce lien uniquement si vous avez l'intention de remplir le questionnaire maintenant ; vous ne pourrez pas revenir sur la première page du questionnaire si vous cliquez une deuxième fois sur ce lien. De plus, veuillez remplir ce questionnaire en une seule fois. »

Email for the "Sociality" Condition. « Bonjour {FIRSTNAME} {LASTNAME}, Merci beaucoup d'avoir accepté de répondre à un questionnaire sur la personnalité. Pour accéder à ce questionnaire, cliquez sur le lien ci-dessous. !! ATTENTION !! Veuillez cliquer sur ce lien uniquement si vous avez l'intention de remplir le questionnaire maintenant ; vous ne pourrez pas revenir sur la première page du questionnaire si vous cliquez une deuxième fois sur ce lien. De plus, veuillez remplir ce questionnaire en une seule fois. »

Introductory Pages

Introductory Page for the "Duty" Condition. « Bonjour, Je suis enseignant à l'Université de Lausanne et je mène actuellement une étude auprès des étudiant·e·s de l'UNIL. En effet, de nombreuses études dans le domaine de la personnalité ont permis d'identifier les caractéristiques personnelles que les étudiant·e·s doivent avoir pour se faire apprécier des enseignant·e·s d'université. Dans le cadre de cette étude, je cherche donc à identifier les étudiant·e·s qui correspondent le plus à ce prototype de l'étudiant·e qui a tout ce qu'il faut pour se faire apprécier de ses enseignant·e·s. Votre participation à cette étude va me

donner la possibilité de mieux vous connaître. En effet, dans cette étude, vous allez remplir un questionnaire de personnalité. Je serai alors en mesure d'évaluer vos réponses et de voir dans quelle mesure celles-ci correspondent au prototype de l'étudiant·e qui a tout ce qu'il faut pour se faire apprécier de ses enseignant·e·s. Vos réponses ne sont pas anonymes car il y a moyen de vous relier à vos réponses. Afin de garantir la validité du test de personnalité que vous allez remplir, il vous est demandé de répondre aux questions suivantes de la façon la plus honnête possible. Acceptez-vous de participer à cette étude ? Si oui, cliquez sur "suivant". » »

***Introductory Page for the "Sociality" Condition*.** « Bonjour, Je suis étudiant en master à l'Université de Lausanne et je mène actuellement une étude auprès des étudiant·e·s pour une toute nouvelle association, "FriendUnil", qui souhaite promouvoir les amitiés au sein de l'Université. De nombreuses études dans le domaine de la personnalité ont permis d'identifier les caractéristiques personnelles que les étudiant·e·s doivent avoir pour se faire apprécier de leurs camarades/ami·e·s d'université. Dans le cadre de cette étude, je cherche donc à identifier les étudiant·e·s qui correspondent le plus à ce prototype de l'étudiant·e qui a tout ce qu'il faut pour se faire apprécier de ses camarades/ami·e·s. Votre participation à cette étude va me donner la possibilité de mieux vous connaître. En effet, dans cette étude, vous allez remplir un questionnaire de personnalité. Je serai alors en mesure d'évaluer vos réponses et de voir dans quelle mesure celles-ci correspondent au prototype de l'étudiant·e qui a tout ce qu'il faut pour se faire apprécier de ses camarades/ami·e·s. Vos réponses ne sont pas anonymes car il y a moyen de vous relier à vos réponses. Afin de garantir la validité du test de personnalité que vous allez remplir, il vous est demandé de répondre aux questions suivantes de la façon la plus honnête possible. Acceptez-vous de participer à cette étude ? Si oui, cliquez sur "suivant". » »

5.3.3.2 Social Desirability Instructions

Social Desirability Instructions for the "Duty" Condition. « Parfois, on répond aux questionnaires en essayant de donner une certaine image de soi-même. Imaginez maintenant que les mêmes questions qu'avant vous soient posées par vos enseignant·e·s et que vous deviez les convaincre que vous êtes un·e étudiant·e sympathique. Essayez de vous mettre dans ce rôle-là pour répondre aux questions ci-dessous. En d'autres termes, ce qu'on vous demande ici est d'essayer de montrer que vous êtes un·e étudiant·e qui a tout ce qu'il faut pour se faire apprécier d'autrui, en l'occurrence de vos enseignant·e·s. De 1 : "Désapprouve fortement", À 5 : "Approuve fortement", Je suis quelqu'un qui ... »

Social Desirability Instructions for the "Sociality" Condition. « Parfois, on répond aux questionnaires en essayant de donner une certaine image de soi-même. Imaginez maintenant que les mêmes questions qu'avant vous soient posées par vos camarades/ami·e·s et que vous deviez les convaincre que vous êtes quelqu'un de sympathique. Essayez de vous mettre dans ce rôle-là pour répondre aux questions ci-dessous. En d'autres termes, ce qu'on vous demande ici est d'essayer de montrer que vous êtes un·e étudiant·e qui a tout ce qu'il faut pour se faire apprécier d'autrui, en l'occurrence de vos camarades/ami·e·s. De 1 : "Désapprouve fortement", À 5 : "Approuve fortement", Je suis quelqu'un qui ... »

5.3.3.3 Descriptive Statistics of Study 3's Variables

Table 7

Means, sd, correlations and reliability coefficients for all variables measured with social desirability (SD) and honest (H) instructions in Study 3.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	*mean*	*sd*
1. C (SD)	.82 / .71	.54	-.48	.26	.41	.45	.22	.05	.05	-.01	.24	-.02	4.24	0.50
2. A (SD)	.56	.81 / .80	-.57	.38	.26	.52	.06	.20	.05	.11	.14	.06	4.51	0.41
3. N (SD)	-.66	-.57	.84 / .90	-.30	-.50	-.59	.05	.02	.31	.02	-.23	-.08	1.96	0.72
4. O (SD)	.40	.47	-.43	.79 / .83	.43	.13	-.28	-.05	.12	.38	.16	-.23	4.05	0.59
5. E (SD)	.52	.42	-.49	.37	.72 / .81	.20	-.06	-.09	-.04	.11	.30	-.06	3.81	0.56
6. SDS (SD)	.60	.59	-.55	.21	.33	.69 / .74	.03	-.05	-.12	-.18	.04	.18	0.85	0.18
7. C (H)	.39	.15	-.23	.06	.25	.18	.78 / .69	.14	-.08	-.03	.18	.26	3.64	0.61
8. A (H)	.14	.40	-.19	.13	.22	.20	.23	.76 / .79	-.28	-.01	-.02	.44	3.84	0.53
9. N (H)	.18	-.04	.05	.06	-.02	.07	-.32	-.20	.88 / .90	.15	-.22	-.55	2.95	0.82
10. O (H)	.05	.10	-.07	.21	.01	-.13	-.10	.05	.15	.85 / .85	.36	-.09	3.65	0.70
11. E (H)	.17	.15	-.17	.04	.45	.07	.30	.20	-.19	-.07	.80 / .87	.12	3.31	0.72
12. SDS (H)	-.04	.20	-.09	-.11	.07	.10	.36	.59	-.44	-.06	.20	.52 / .67	0.53	0.21
mean	4.65	4.39	1.72	4.34	3.81	0.87	3.66	3.82	2.99	3.73	3.42	0.50		
sd	0.51	0.48	0.55	0.51	0.48	0.17	0.75	0.51	0.79	0.72	0.59	0.18		

Note. ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$. SD = Social desirability instructions, H = Honest instructions, C = Conscientiousness, E = Extraversion, A = Agreeableness, O = Openness, N = Neuroticism, SDS = Social desirability scale. Correlations for the "Duty with high evaluative pressure" condition are presented below the diagonal ($N = 107$) whereas correlations for the "Sociality with high evaluative pressure" condition are presented above the diagonal ($N = 103$). Reliability coefficients for each condition are reported in the diagonal (for Duty and Sociality conditions, respectively). Means and standard deviations for the Duty condition are reported in the lower part of the table, and in the right part of the table for the Sociality condition.

5.3.4 Study 4

5.3.4.1 Experimental Induction for Study 4

Emails

Email for the "Anonymity" Condition. « Bonjour, Merci beaucoup d'avoir accepté de répondre à un questionnaire sur la personnalité. Ce questionnaire est totalement anonyme. Vos noms sont enregistrés dans le système pour savoir si vous avez complété le questionnaire ou non, ce qui nous permettra de vous attribuer les crédits. Cependant, vos noms ne peuvent en aucun cas être reliés au contenu de vos réponses. Pour accéder à ce questionnaire, cliquez sur le lien ci-dessous. !! ATTENTION !! Veuillez cliquer sur ce lien uniquement si vous avez l'intention de remplir le questionnaire maintenant ; vous ne pourrez pas revenir sur la première page du questionnaire si vous cliquez une deuxième fois sur ce lien. De plus, veuillez remplir ce questionnaire en une seule fois. »

Email for the "Visibility" Condition. « Bonjour {FIRSTNAME} {LASTNAME}, Merci beaucoup d'avoir accepté de répondre à un questionnaire sur la personnalité. Pour accéder à ce questionnaire, cliquez sur le lien ci-dessous. !! ATTENTION !! Veuillez cliquer sur ce lien uniquement si vous avez l'intention de remplir le questionnaire maintenant ; vous ne pourrez pas revenir sur la première page du questionnaire si vous cliquez une deuxième fois sur ce lien. De plus, veuillez remplir ce questionnaire en une seule fois. »

Introductory Pages

Introductory Page for the "Anonymity" Condition. « Bonjour, Je suis étudiant en master à l'Université de Lausanne et je mène actuellement une étude auprès des étudiant·e·s pour une toute nouvelle association, "FriendUnil", qui souhaite promouvoir les amitiés au sein de l'Université. De nombreuses études dans le domaine de la personnalité ont permis

d'identifier les caractéristiques personnelles que les étudiant·e·s doivent avoir pour se faire apprécier de leurs camarades/ami·e·s d'université. Votre participation à cette étude va vous donner la possibilité de mieux vous connaître et de voir si vous correspondez à ce prototype de l'étudiant·e qui a tout ce qu'il faut pour se faire apprécier de ses camarades/ami·e·s. En effet, dans cette étude, vous allez remplir un questionnaire de personnalité. Vous obtiendrez alors des informations sur votre profil de personnalité à la fin du questionnaire. Vos réponses sont totalement anonymes car il n'y a aucun moyen de vous relier à vos réponses. Afin de garantir la validité du test de personnalité que vous allez remplir, il vous est demandé de répondre aux questions suivantes de la façon la plus honnête possible. Acceptez-vous de participer à cette étude ? Si oui, cliquez sur "suivant". » »

***Introductory Page for the "Visibility" Condition*.** « Bonjour, Je suis étudiant en master à l'Université de Lausanne et je mène actuellement une étude auprès des étudiant·e·s pour une toute nouvelle association, "FriendUnil", qui souhaite promouvoir les amitiés au sein de l'Université. De nombreuses études dans le domaine de la personnalité ont permis d'identifier les caractéristiques personnelles que les étudiant·e·s doivent avoir pour se faire apprécier de leurs camarades/ami·e·s d'université. Dans le cadre de cette étude, je cherche donc à identifier les étudiant·e·s qui correspondent le plus à ce prototype de l'étudiant·e qui a tout ce qu'il faut pour se faire apprécier de ses camarades/ami·e·s. Votre participation à cette étude va me donner la possibilité de mieux vous connaître. En effet, dans cette étude, vous allez remplir un questionnaire de personnalité. Je serai alors en mesure d'évaluer vos réponses et de voir dans quelle mesure celles-ci correspondent au prototype de l'étudiant·e qui a tout ce qu'il faut pour se faire apprécier de ses camarades/ami·e·s. Vos réponses ne sont pas anonymes car il y a moyen de vous relier à vos réponses. Afin de garantir la validité du test de personnalité que vous allez remplir, il vous est demandé de répondre aux questions suivantes

de la façon la plus honnête possible. Acceptez-vous de participer à cette étude ? Si oui, cliquez sur "suivant". » »

5.3.4.2 Social Desirability Instructions (Same in Both Conditions)

« Parfois, on répond aux questionnaires en essayant de donner une certaine image de soi-même. Imaginez maintenant que les mêmes questions qu'avant vous soient posées par vos enseignant·e·s et que vous deviez les convaincre que vous êtes un·e étudiant·e sympathique. Essayez de vous mettre dans ce rôle-là pour répondre aux questions ci-dessous. En d'autres termes, ce qu'on vous demande ici est d'essayer de montrer que vous êtes un·e étudiant·e qui a tout ce qu'il faut pour se faire apprécier d'autrui, en l'occurrence de vos camarades/ami·e·s. De 1 : "Désapprouve fortement", À 5 : "Approuve fortement", Je suis quelqu'un qui ... »

5.3.4.3 Descriptive Statistics of Study 4's Variables

Table S7

Means, sd, correlations and reliability coefficients for all variables measured with social desirability (SD) and honest (H) instructions in Study 4.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	*mean*	*sd*
1. C (SD)	.79 / .80	.49	-.66	.33	.49	.54	.30	.04	-.15	.05	.06	.14	4.23	0.63
2. A (SD)	.66	.83 / .82	-.56	.31	.52	.66	.12	.40	-.17	.10	.18	.16	4.50	0.45
3. N (SD)	-.70	-.76	.91 / .90	-.31	-.61	-.56	-.14	-.10	.34	-.07	-.10	-.21	2.02	0.72
4. O (SD)	.39	.55	-.41	.83 / .81	.43	.29	-.15	-.03	.10	.52	.15	-.06	4.10	0.54
5. E (SD)	.51	.42	-.49	.38	.82 / .76	.45	.13	.16	-.16	.14	.32	.12	3.73	0.51
6. SDS (SD)	.69	.65	-.70	.25	.28	.71 / .75	.05	.18	-.11	.07	.06	.20	0.81	0.21
7. C (H)	.39	.05	-.07	-.19	.11	.17	.76 / .77	.26	-.28	-.13	.12	.29	3.53	0.65
8. A (H)	.19	.45	-.22	.24	.10	.16	.26	.77 / .80	-.24	-.01	.07	.48	3.92	0.53
9. N (H)	-.06	-.04	.20	.03	.10	-.04	-.20	-.08	.89 / .89	.31	-.26	-.31	3.01	0.78
10. O (H)	-.12	.12	.07	.44	.02	-.06	-.20	.07	.16	.85 / .84	.23	.02	3.70	0.68
11. E (H)	.08	-.04	.09	.14	.34	-.11	.27	.12	.03	.21	.83 / .82	.03	3.24	0.62
12. SDS (H)	.07	.09	-.07	-.12	-.19	.13	.50	.40	-.50	-.14	.01	.49 / .65	0.49	0.21
mean	4.25	4.48	1.98	4.13	3.84	0.85	3.56	3.90	3.04	3.77	3.19	0.53		
sd	0.64	0.46	0.73	0.58	0.59	0.18	0.67	0.49	0.79	0.64	0.64	0.18		

Note. ** $p < .01$, * $p < .05$. SD = Social desirability instructions, H = Honest instructions, C = Conscientiousness, E = Extraversion, A = Agreeableness, O = Openness, N = Neuroticism, SDS = Social desirability scale. Correlations for the "Sociality with low evaluative pressure" condition are presented below the diagonal ($N = 144$) whereas correlations for the "Sociality with high evaluative pressure" condition are presented above the diagonal ($N = 153$). Reliability coefficients for each condition are reported in the diagonal (for low and high evaluative pressure conditions, respectively). Means and standard deviations for the low evaluative pressure condition are reported in the lower part of the table, and in the right part of the table for the high evaluative pressure condition.