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## The Role of Transnational Elites in shaping the evolving Field of Internet Governance

Chenou Jean-Marie

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FACULTÉ DES SCIENCES SOCIALES ET POLITIQUES  
INSTITUT D'ÉTUDES POLITIQUES ET INTERNATIONALES

**The Role of Transnational Elites in shaping the evolving  
Field of Internet Governance**

THÈSE DE DOCTORAT

présentée à la

Faculté des Sciences Sociales et Politiques  
de l'Université de Lausanne

pour l'obtention du grade de

Docteur en sciences politiques

par

Jean-Marie Chenou

Directeur de thèse:

Professeur Jean-Christophe Graz, IEPI-CRII, Université de Lausanne

Membres du jury:

Professeure Anna Leander, Department of Management, Politics and Philosophy, Copenhagen  
Business School

Professeure Michèle Rioux, Département de Science Politique, CEIM, Université du Québec à  
Montréal

Professeur Dominique Vinck, Institut des Sciences Sociales, Université de Lausanne

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Fabien Ohl



## Résumé

La gouvernance de l'Internet est une thématique récente dans la politique mondiale. Néanmoins, elle est devenue au fil des années un enjeu économique et politique important. La question a même pris une importance particulière au cours des derniers mois en devenant un sujet d'actualité récurrent. Forte de ce constat, cette recherche retrace l'histoire de la gouvernance de l'Internet depuis son émergence comme enjeu politique dans les années 1980 jusqu'à la fin du Sommet Mondial sur la Société de l'Information (SMSI) en 2005. Plutôt que de se focaliser sur l'une ou l'autre des institutions impliquées dans la régulation du réseau informatique mondial, cette recherche analyse l'émergence et l'évolution historique d'un espace de luttes rassemblant un nombre croissant d'acteurs différents. Cette évolution est décrite à travers le prisme de la relation dialectique entre élites et non-élites et de la lutte autour de la définition de la gouvernance de l'Internet. Cette thèse explore donc la question de comment les relations au sein des élites de la gouvernance de l'Internet et entre ces élites et les non-élites expliquent l'émergence, l'évolution et la structuration d'un champ relativement autonome de la politique mondiale centré sur la gouvernance de l'Internet.

Contre les perspectives dominantes réaliste et libérales, cette recherche s'ancre dans une approche issue de la combinaison des traditions hétérodoxes en économie politique internationale et des apports de la sociologie politique internationale. Celle-ci s'articule autour des concepts de champ, d'élites et d'hégémonie. Le concept de champ, développé par Bourdieu inspire un nombre croissant d'études de la politique mondiale. Il permet à la fois une étude différenciée de la mondialisation et l'émergence d'espaces de lutte et de domination au niveau transnational. La sociologie des élites, elle, permet une approche pragmatique et centrée sur les acteurs des questions de pouvoir dans la mondialisation. Cette recherche utilise plus particulièrement le concept d'élite du pouvoir de Wright Mills pour étudier l'unification d'élites *a priori* différentes autour de projets communs. Enfin, cette étude reprend le concept néo-gramscien d'hégémonie afin d'étudier à la fois la stabilité relative du pouvoir d'une élite garantie par la dimension consensuelle de la domination, et les germes de changement contenus dans tout ordre international.

A travers l'étude des documents produits au cours de la période étudiée et en s'appuyant sur la création de bases de données sur les réseaux d'acteurs, cette étude s'intéresse aux débats qui ont suivi la commercialisation du réseau au début des années 1990 et aux négociations lors du SMSI. La première période a abouti à la création de l'Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) en 1998. Cette création est le résultat de la recherche d'un consensus entre les discours dominants des années 1990. C'est également le fruit d'une coalition entre intérêts au sein d'une élite du pouvoir de la gouvernance de l'Internet. Cependant, cette institutionnalisation de l'Internet autour de l'ICANN excluait un certain nombre d'acteurs et de discours qui ont depuis tenté de renverser cet ordre. Le SMSI a été le cadre de la remise en cause du mode de gouvernance de l'Internet par les États exclus du système, des universitaires et certaines ONG et organisations internationales. C'est pourquoi le SMSI constitue la seconde période historique étudiée dans cette thèse. La confrontation lors du SMSI a donné lieu à une reconfiguration de l'élite du pouvoir de la gouvernance de l'Internet ainsi qu'à une redéfinition des frontières du champ. Un nouveau projet hégémonique a vu le jour autour d'éléments discursifs tels que le multipartenariat et autour d'institutions telles que le Forum sur la Gouvernance de l'Internet. Le succès relatif de ce projet a permis une stabilité institutionnelle inédite depuis la fin du SMSI et une acceptation du discours des élites par un grand nombre d'acteurs du champ. Ce n'est que récemment que cet ordre a été remis en cause par les pouvoirs émergents dans la gouvernance de l'Internet.

Cette thèse cherche à contribuer au débat scientifique sur trois plans. Sur le plan théorique, elle contribue à l'essor d'un dialogue entre approches d'économie politique mondiale et de sociologie politique internationale afin d'étudier à la fois les dynamiques structurelles liées au processus de mondialisation et les pratiques localisées des acteurs dans un domaine précis. Elle insiste notamment sur l'apport de les notions de champ et d'élite du pouvoir et sur leur compatibilité avec les analyses néo-gramsciennes de l'hégémonie. Sur le plan méthodologique, ce dialogue se traduit par une utilisation de méthodes sociologiques telles que l'analyse de réseaux d'acteurs et de déclarations pour compléter l'analyse qualitative de documents. Enfin, sur le plan empirique, cette recherche offre une perspective originale sur la gouvernance de l'Internet en insistant sur sa dimension historique, en démontrant la fragilité du concept de gouvernance multipartenaire (*multistakeholder*) et en se focalisant sur les rapports de pouvoir et les liens entre gouvernance de l'Internet et mondialisation.

## Abstract

Internet governance is a recent issue in global politics. However, it gradually became a major political and economic issue. It recently became even more important and now appears regularly in the news. Against this background, this research outlines the history of Internet governance from its emergence as a political issue in the 1980s to the end of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in 2005. Rather than focusing on one or the other institution involved in Internet governance, this research analyses the emergence and historical evolution of a space of struggle affecting a growing number of different actors. This evolution is described through the analysis of the dialectical relation between elites and non-elites and through the struggle around the definition of Internet governance. The thesis explores the question of how the relations among the elites of Internet governance and between these elites and non-elites explain the emergence, the evolution, and the structuration of a relatively autonomous field of world politics centred around Internet governance.

Against dominant realist and liberal perspectives, this research draws upon a cross-fertilisation of heterodox international political economy and international political sociology. This approach focuses on concepts such as field, elites and hegemony. The concept of field, as developed by Bourdieu, is increasingly used in International Relations to build a differentiated analysis of globalisation and to describe the emergence of transnational spaces of struggle and domination. Elite sociology allows for a pragmatic actor-centred analysis of the issue of power in the globalisation process. This research particularly draws on Wright Mill's concept of power elite in order to explore the unification of different elites around shared projects. Finally, this thesis uses the Neo-Gramscian concept of hegemony in order to study both the consensual dimension of domination and the prospect of change contained in any international order.

Through the analysis of the documents produced within the analysed period, and through the creation of databases of networks of actors, this research focuses on the debates that followed the commercialisation of the Internet throughout the 1990s and during the WSIS. The first time period led to the creation of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) in 1998. This creation resulted from the consensus-building between the dominant discourses of the time. It also resulted from the coalition of interests among an emerging power elite. However, this institutionalisation of Internet governance around the ICANN excluded a number of actors and discourses that resisted this mode of governance. The WSIS became the institutional framework within which the governance system was questioned by some excluded states, scholars, NGOs and intergovernmental organisations. The confrontation between the power elite and counter-elites during the WSIS triggered a reconfiguration of the power elite as well as a re-definition of the boundaries of the field. A new hegemonic project emerged around discursive elements such as the idea of multistakeholderism and institutional elements such as the Internet Governance Forum. The relative success of the hegemonic project allowed for a certain stability within the field and an acceptance by most non-elites of the new order. It is only recently that this order began to be questioned by the emerging powers of Internet governance.

This research provides three main contributions to the scientific debate. On the theoretical level, it contributes to the emergence of a dialogue between International Political Economy and International Political Sociology perspectives in order to analyse both the structural trends of the globalisation process and the located practices of actors in a given issue-area. It notably stresses the contribution of concepts such as field and power elite and their compatibility with a Neo-Gramscian framework to analyse hegemony. On the methodological level, this perspective relies on the use of mixed methods, combining qualitative content analysis with social network analysis of actors and statements. Finally, on the empirical level, this research provides an original perspective on Internet governance. It stresses the historical dimension of current Internet governance arrangements. It also criticises the notion of multistakeholderism and focuses instead on the power dynamics and the relation between Internet governance and globalisation.





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## **Chapter 1: Introduction. What is Internet governance? Why does it matter?**

The recent revelations by Edward Snowden of the existence of large-scale surveillance programmes conducted by the US National Security Agency in cooperation with most of the major Internet companies, as well as the reactions to these revelations, shed once more light on the strategic significance of the Internet in contemporary international relations. In addition to the growing size of the Internet-related economic activities, the fact that issues of national sovereignty are influenced by the Internet justifies the increasing interest of international relations scholars in this issue. In this context, it becomes crucial to explore what type of institutions might discuss issues such as the US dominance on the Internet. The Snowden revelations also question the basic principles that drive Internet governance. Who is going to discuss whether privacy should underlie future Internet regulations?

Of course, these issues go far beyond the scope of Internet governance studies. In order to address the issue of US dominance on the Internet, one would need to investigate structural trends in the global political economy that are at work at least since the end of World War II. Issues like privacy are not limited to privacy on the Internet. The Internet is only a new telecommunication medium where broader and older issues are translated. It would be misleading to think that an analysis of the history of Internet governance might bring a totally new perspective on international relations. However, the struggle for the definition of Internet governance determines the scope of issues addressed by Internet governance institutions. Moreover, some issues are directly influenced by the mode of governance that has been chosen for the Internet. For instance, policy-related issues have been marginalised in Internet governance and decision-making institutions focus on technical issues. As a result, issues such as privacy or the balancing of US power on the Internet are not part of Internet regulation debates. This is why it is interesting to look specifically at the history of Internet governance to understand why these debates are outside the scope of existing institutions and how broader debates are translated into Internet governance issues.

Against this background, the present thesis explores the recent history of Internet governance and analyses the evolution of power dynamics in the field. Internet governance does not directly encompass all activities conducted on the Internet, even if they are to some extent influenced by it.

More precisely, the research investigates what is to be governed on the Internet; and who has a say in the definition of Internet governance. Beyond the struggle for definition, the actors involved in the implementation of Internet governance are also analysed.

Rather than focusing on one actor such as the US government or Google Inc., this study investigates the transnational coalitions of powerful actors that have shaped the governance of the Internet since its creation. To this end, the research relies on a cross-fertilisation between international political economy and international political sociology perspectives. It uses the concept of transnational elites to analyse the most influential actors of Internet governance, but also analyses the global dynamics of order and change in Internet governance. The objectives of this research are twofold. First, Internet governance is used as a case study to investigate forms of governance that are typical of the current globalisation process. The research aims to evaluate the potential contribution of elite sociology and the work of Bourdieu to the globalisation literature. Second, the perspective adopted in this study allows for a critique of mainstream accounts of the history of Internet governance. It notably provides an alternative to the multistakeholder reading of Internet governance debates.

The research explores how an international political sociology approach may help to overcome some shortcomings of critical global political economy in providing a comprehensive actor-centred perspective on world politics. Against this background, the research aims to contribute to Bourdieusian international relations through the study of a new transnational field: the field of Internet governance. Though not without problems, the use of Wright Mills' concept of power elite in transnational settings and its combination with Bourdieusian international relations looks promising. However, the limitations of Wright Mills due to his lack of a theory of domination remain important when translated to global politics. This is why this study relies on a neo-Gramscian perspective when it comes to order, domination, and hegemony. The resulting theoretical framework has evolved constantly during the empirical analysis and is summarised in its current version in chapter 4.

As far as the case of Internet governance is concerned, this research explores the power dynamics that have shaped the Internet governance system over the last 20 years. Most of the literature on Internet governance is either produced by scholars/practitioners and rooted in a problem-solving perspective, or relying on state-centred perspective of mainstream International Relations. Contrary to these approaches, The present study evidences the domination of certain groups of non-state actors in Internet governance and their collaboration with powerful state actors in the definition and

institutionalisation of Internet governance.

Internet governance is thus described as the process of production of hegemonic projects aiming at the unification of a power elite and at its acceptance by non-elites. The study evidences the constant instability of the system and the need for the power elite to evolve and adapt the hegemonic project to a changing context. The history of Internet governance is the history of the emergence of a transnational field, understood as a social space of struggle and domination, notably structured by the dialectical relationship between the power elite and counter-elites.

Before going into the details of the analysis, the following sections briefly present the definition of what is meant by “Internet governance” in this research. Then, the importance of Internet governance in the global political economy and the relevance of Internet governance as a case study of “new” forms of governance in the globalisation process is discussed. Finally, a brief outline of the thesis summarises the content of the different chapters.

### **1.1. What is Internet governance?**

The definition of the Internet is one of the main struggle in the field of Internet governance. Depending on the definition of the Internet, a more or less wide range of issues pertain to Internet governance. Different uses of the network correspond to different visions of what the Internet is. This became all the more true with the convergence of several telecommunication media towards the Internet. Moreover, the focus on one or the other aspect of the Internet is used by actors as a way to promote a particular governance system, a particular set of norms, or a particular institution.

Internet is at the same time a library, where users seek information (databases, online newspapers, etc.), a multimedia telecommunication network (e-mail, telephone over IP, etc.), a virtual marketplace, a place to exchange information and digital products and services, etc. More and more social interactions take place on the Internet. For each of these uses, an independent governance system exists, since these online activities correspond to already regulated activities. For example, e-commerce is regulated by general commerce laws as well as specific regulations. The exchange of information and digital products correspond to a number of norms including freedom of speech, protection of intellectual property, as well as specific norms such as anti online piracy laws. However, there is a common set of “shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes that shape the evolution and use of the Internet” (WGIG, 2005). This broad



definition is itself the result of a struggle to define the boundaries of Internet governance. Thus, it is not neutral. However, it is flexible and consensual enough to complete more exclusive and rigid definitions. It encompasses all the issues identified by the UN-sponsored Working Group in Internet Governance (WGIG) in 2004, and the issues generally addressed by the literature on Internet governance. Kurbalija (2012) presents the issues related to Internet governance into five “baskets”<sup>1</sup>: the issues related to the technical functioning of the Internet, the issues related to cyberlaw, the issues related to e-commerce, the issues related to development, and finally the sociocultural issues.

### *Infrastructure and standardisation*

The first basket includes what was historically the first concern of Internet governance. The Internet is first and foremost a computer network that requires computer languages, standards and a physical infrastructure of cables, servers and routers to function. The definition of Internet governance is sometimes limited to this set of technical and infrastructure issues. This is the most specific and autonomous aspect of Internet governance, where specialised decision-making institutions exist.

The use of the network (web, mail, telephony, etc.) entails a number of technical issues. First, the information circulates through a physical infrastructure of wired and wireless telecommunication networks. These networks are mostly owned by private companies and regulated both nationally and internationally. A number of actors are already involved in the operation, from the Internet Service Provider, the telecommunication carrier, the national telecommunication authority, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and other organizations acting in the realm of the regulation of the global telecommunication market.

The technical functioning of the Internet also requires a number of standards that make the communication between all the devices possible. This includes infrastructure standards (such as WiFi and Ethernet), and Transfer Protocol standards (TCP/IP: Transfer Control Protocol/ Internet Protocol) that allows the division of the information into packets and their routing over the network. Internetworking also requires a unique identifier for each device connected to the network (IP address) and a hierarchic system of addresses (the domain Name System). Both infrastructure and technical standardisation are tackled by a number of public, private, regional and global organisations that are key actors in the governance of the Internet.

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<sup>1</sup> The term basket is a reference to the three baskets identified by the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe in the final act of the Helsinki conference in 1975 as the main issues to be dealt with by the organisation. They included the politico-military, the economic and environmental, and the human baskets.

### *Legal issues*

Secondly, most aspects of Internet governance touch upon legal issues. Two elements are particularly discussed in the context of Internet governance debates: the issue of the relevant jurisdiction for online activities; and the protection of intellectual property on the Internet (for a literature review of cyberlaw, see chapter 2).

Since an increasing volume of social and economic activities have taken place on the Internet since the mid-1990s, the issue of conflicting jurisdictions for disputes that relate to online activities became a crucial element of Internet governance. For example, the issue has been raised of what jurisdiction applies to a website of a US company that sells Nazi memorabilia in Europe, where it is forbidden (TGI, 2000). On a similar vein, it is not always clear when a court such as the European Court of Human Rights is competent to judge. The court did not admit the complaint by two Moroccan nationals against a Danish newspaper for the case of the publication of cartoons of Muhammad because of the lack of jurisdictional link (ECHR, 2006).

Another prominent legal issue related to Internet governance is the online protection of intellectual private property. This issue includes the protection of trademarks. For example, the protection of trademarks in domain names was amongst the main issues debated in the 1990s. The protection of intellectual property also includes the protection of copyrights on the Internet. The network makes it easy to share copyrighted content online in a digital form. The issue has generated a lot of discussion, court cases and legislation over the last 15 years. The difficulty to enforce the existing instruments of national and international law related to the protection of intellectual property rights on the Internet raises the question of the need for new mechanisms or the adaptation of copyright law to the new environment.

### *Economic issues*

The development of e-commerce was the main motivation of the US administration when they promoted the commercialisation of the Internet in the 1990s. In 1998, the World Trade Organisation adopted a ministerial resolution on e-commerce<sup>2</sup> as well as a “Work Programme on electronic

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2 See [http://www.wto.org/english/tratop\\_e/ecom\\_e/mindec1\\_e.htm](http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ecom_e/mindec1_e.htm), last accessed 8 April 2014.

commerce”<sup>3</sup>. The Work programme mandate both the Council for Trade in Services and the Council for Trade in Goods to examine aspects related to e-commerce understood “as the production, distribution, marketing, sale or delivery of goods and services by electronic means”<sup>4</sup>. The size of business-to-consumer e-commerce is estimated to be around 1 trillion dollar for 2013<sup>5</sup>. Although the size of e-commerce is smaller than expected, it still represent an important and rapidly growing business sector. As a consequence, it requires different types of regulation, including on consumer protection such as the OECD Guidelines for Consumer Protection adopted in 2003 (Kurbalija 2012, p. 108-109).

Taxation of e-commerce also became a key element of the debates recently. Back in the 1990s, the White House promoted a worldwide tax-free cyber-marketplace (Clinton & Gore, 1996, see chapter 5). This vision was partially implemented since tax avoidance is easier online because of the blurriness of territorial boundaries on the Internet. For example, large US e-commerce companies like Amazon Ltd. and Google pay very little taxes in Europe thanks to complex tax avoidance strategies (Bowers & Wintour, 2013). In a context of economic and public debt crisis, the G20 group of industrialised countries and the OECD started in April 2013 a plan to clamp down on tax avoidance (Bowers, 2013). E-commerce companies like Amazon are directly targeted since the plan requires that transnational firms with extensive warehouse operations in foreign countries should pay taxes in these countries (OECD, 2013).

### *Development issues*

Development issues were not the main concern of Internet governance debates in the 1990s. However, the internationalisation of the network, the adoption of the UN Millennium Development Goals and the emergence of economies from the South changed the landscape and affected the field of Internet governance (see chapter 6). In 2000, the G8 summit in Okinawa conceptualised the idea of Information and Communication Technologies for Development (ICT4D). As the Internet became more important in developed economies (especially in the optimistic context of the pre-DotCom crisis), the issue of the “digital divide” became more significant. As a result, strategies to

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3 See [http://www.wto.org/english/tratop\\_e/ecom\\_e/wkprog\\_e.htm](http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/ecom_e/wkprog_e.htm), last accessed 8 April 2014.

4 Ibid. §1.3.

5 This figure should be compared to the \$22,520 trillion trade in goods and commercial services estimated by the WTO and the UNCTAD for 2010. Interactive Media in Retail Group estimates a \$1.25 trillion, close to the \$1.3 trillion estimated by eMarketer while Goldman Sachs estimate is \$963 billion (Fredikson, 2013). It should be noted that these figures are far below the predictions of the same organisations for 2004-2005 before the DotCom crisis (\$4.5 to 7.3 trillion were expected for 2004-2005 by Gartner and Goldman Sachs) (Fredikson, 2013).

bridge the digital divide have been implemented, especially by some intergovernmental organisations like the ITU. Significant progress has been made as far as ICT in general are concerned. Most of this progress is due to the exponential growth of mobile telephony (ITU, 2013). In contrast, the digital divide is much wider in terms of worldwide Internet use. According to the ITU, by the end of 2013 only 2.7 billion individuals use the Internet (about 39 per cent of the world population).

The issue of the digital divide overlaps with all of the issues outlined above. For example, the digital divide includes issues of infrastructure. The number and quality of the submarine cables that connect a country to the global network determine the stability of Internet access in one country and its bandwidth. This issue is illustrated by the case of the Georgian lady that cut off most of Armenia's Internet access for several hours in 2011 while scavenging for copper cables. She accidentally sliced through the cable through which 90% of Armenian Internet data was transferred (Parfitt, 2011).

### *Sociocultural issues*

Kurablja (2012) identifies a number of issues that do not pertain completely to the aforementioned categories. He regroups them into the “sociocultural basket”. Such issues include Human rights, freedom of expression, privacy, cultural diversity, multilingualism etc. The fact that these issues are not labelled as “legal” or “economic” illustrates the fact that they are considered second-class citizens in the field of Internet governance. Sociocultural issues struggle to make their way into the agenda of Internet governance. One exception is likely to develop in the future. The issue of privacy (already mentioned at the beginning of this chapter as a pressing issue since the Snowden revelations) might become an important topic of Internet governance in the coming years, because of the pressure exercised by some powerful actors like Brazil and the European Union that have been targeted by surveillance programmes.

The different issues outlined in this section represent the broad definition of Internet governance that is used in the present research. The particular aspects of each issue will not be treated in details since the main question remains the definition of Internet governance, its institutions, and its dominant actors. Therefore, this study will not focus on any initiative, issue-area, or institution. It will analyse the evolution of the boundaries of the whole field and the evolving structuration of the field. The objective is not to analyse a given topic of Internet governance but rather to use Internet

governance as a case study of the autonomisation of transnational fields and transnational elites.

## **1.2. *Transnational elites and Internet governance***

The analysis of the large scope of issues and actors potentially included in the study of Internet governance requires the definition of boundaries and typologies in order to make sense of a complex world. The present study relies on sociological concepts such as elites and fields to analyse the role of powerful actors in a specific issue-area. However, the focus on actors and on the specific realm of Internet governance does not mean that reflections on order and change in international relations are abandoned. The thesis tries to combine the analysis of specific actors in a given field with the study of global and structural dynamics.

### **1.2.1. Approach and methods**

While the theoretical framework and methodology are described in greater details in chapter 3, the general idea of the thesis is to analyse power dynamics in the globalisation process through the case of Internet governance. To this end, the study uses a number of methods such as qualitative content analysis and social network analysis, in a historical perspective in order to analyse the power of transnational elite, its unification around hegemonic projects, the dialectical relationship between elites and counter-elite and the evolution of a transnational field embedded in a global field of power.

The study combines an international political sociology approach with a critical global political economy perspective. This means that the thesis investigates power in the globalisation process and the global structures that shape the actions of agents from a neo-Gramscian perspective. Historical structures and the production of hegemony are at the heart of the analysis. However, in contrast to neo-Gramscian accounts of Internet governance, the study takes the particularities of Internet governance and the power of agents seriously. Rather than focusing on the structural power of capital and disciplinary neoliberalism (Gill and Law, 1989, Gill, 1995), the thesis analyses the specific translation of structural dynamics in a limited and relatively autonomous social space and their embodiment by specific actors. This is why the thesis introduces two concepts from political sociology to the study of globalisation. First, it borrows the concept of field from Bourdieu. The concept has already been introduced to IR by the growing international political sociology literature. The concept of field – and especially transnational field – allows for a localisation of agents' practices within a social space of struggle and domination. It helps to avoid the

national/international dichotomy that undermines the ability of IR to study globalisation. Second, the thesis explores the heuristic value of the concept of transnational elites to provide an actor-centred and dynamic perspective on power dynamics entailed by the globalisation process. The concept of transnational elites stresses the fact that dominant actors are not reproduced within the transnational field but rather come from other national and transnational fields with their specific forms of capital, world-views and *habitus*. Against this background, the thesis analyses the unification of different specialised elites around a shared project to form a transnational power elite within a transnational field. A power elite exists when specialised elites become ideologically coherent and institutionally interchangeable (Wright Mills, 2000 [1956]). This power is understood as a dialectic relationship with counter-elites and non-elites.

In order to study the power of transnational elites in the field Internet governance, the thesis relies on a number of complementary methods. First, the topography of the field – its boundaries and space of relative positions – is explored through social network analysis. As a result, two main databases of Internet governance actors have been constructed. They include a total of 900 individuals and 350 organisations in two key moments of the history of Internet governance: during the creation of the ICANN, and during the WSIS (see Annex 2 and 4). Given the ahistorical character of social network analysis, it is combined with a more historical perspective on the genealogy of the field (Bourdieu, 2012) and its relations to historical structures (Cox, 1981). analysis results in the identification of a chronology of Internet governance. Internet governance emerged as an international relations issue in the context of the privatisation and liberalisation of telecommunications and of globalisation of the economy (see chapter 4). The emergence of Internet governance as a political issue triggered the first political crisis and the first institutionalisation of the field around the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) in the second half of the 1990s (see chapter 5). The evolution of the global political economy soon after the creation of the ICANN affected Internet governance and threatened the stability of the ICANN order (see chapter 6). As a result, non-dominant actors raised the issue of Internet governance during World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS, 2002-2005). The debates of the WSIS on Internet governance are analysed in chapter 7 and 8. They brought about some changes to the ICANN order and corresponded to a new context in the global political economy. Since the WSIS, the field of Internet governance has shown a relative stability. However, the potential for change is analysed in the concluding chapter (chapter 9).

The different stages of the history of Internet governance are characterised by a certain configuration of the relationship between elites and counter-elites. This relationship is explored both at the interrelational level through social network analysis and prosopographical elements, and at the discursive level through critical discourse analysis. The networks present not only the evolving boundaries of the field but they also represent the positions of actors and institutions within the field. As a result, they are useful to identify elite and non-elite actors (see section 3.2). Moreover, they can be used to analyse the institutional interchangeability of the elite and to criticise the multistakeholder narrative. This data is combined with some prosopographical elements and some qualitative interviews in order to investigate elite circulation over time and to specify qualitatively the different type of elites within the field.

Critical discourse analysis identifies statements and re-construct discourses out of the available documents produced in the two historical moments. These documents include policy documents, reports, drafts, mailing lists, congressional hearings, newspaper articles, and other documents. Statements were identified in these documents and then classified into categories to finally produce a typology of discourses on Internet governance (see Annex 3). In the case of the World Summit on the Information Society, the position of the different discourses within the field, and the relationships between discourses are analysed thanks to social network analysis of actors' statements (see section 3.2 for more details and Annex 4 for the data).

Finally, these mixed methods are combined in order to explore the hegemonic character of elite rule and the potential for change in each order. The use of “mixed methods” in order to analyse the field of Internet governance is justified by the quantity of data available and the ambition to produce a qualitative actor-centred analysis. It allows for a structural view of the field and the relational position of actors, as well as a detailed analysis of actors' strategies.

### **1.2.2. 10 claims about Internet governance as a case-study of contemporary dynamics in international relations**

As we have seen, the thesis is an attempt to analyse power in the globalisation process through the case of Internet governance. It argues that the critical global political economy literature can be fruitfully combined with insights from an international political sociology perspective in order to analyse the translation of global structural dynamics into diversified fields of social interaction and

the power of transnational elites as a key category of actors in the globalisation process. Translation is here understood both as “a movement from one space to another, and an expression of a particular concern in another modality” (Rose and Miller, 1992, p. 181). It is used to stress the relative autonomy of the dynamics within a field as well as their embedding in the structural process of globalisation. This theoretical inquiry allows for an original perspective on the history of Internet governance that evidences the unification of transnational elites around a shared project, and the process of hegemony production to ensure the reproduction of this project. This contribution can be itemised into ten claims that are explored and articulated throughout the book. These claims, although different in their nature, converge to explain why the study of Internet governance is useful to understand the globalisation process and what can be learnt from this case-study about power in world politics. The following points follow a logic order; first, the thesis acknowledges some commonly-accepted postulates. Second, it relies on more specific ontological and epistemological postulates from the critical literature in international political economy and international political sociology. Third, it formulates original hypotheses and an original research program. Finally, it draws some conclusions from the empirical analysis of Internet governance.

I. As a point of departure, the study rests on the commonly-accepted postulate that *communications are a key element of globalisation processes and the Internet is the central medium of communication of the current globalisation process*. If globalisation can be vaguely defined as a process of space-time compression (Harvey, 1989), communications and transportation are two key elements of a globalisation process that allow the integration of markets, the inter- or transnationalisation of finance and production, and the diffusion of culture. In his analysis of globalisation, Scholte stresses the importance of communications both for the late-19th century wave of globalisation with the advent of the telegraph; and for the current globalisation process marked by the development of Information and Communication Technologies such as satellites, mobile telephony, and the Internet (Scholte, 2005).

II. Internet governance is chosen as a case-study not only because it is at the heart of the development of new modes of communication that enable the globalisation process. At the same time, the thesis explores the hypothesis that the form Internet governance has adopted since the 1990s is a consequence of the globalisation process. *Internet governance is typical of “new” modes of governance as generated by the globalisation process*. The argument has often been made in the global political economy literature. As a governance system mainly designed in the 1990s, Internet governance epitomises the trend towards neoliberal forms of transnational and private governance



(Graz & Noelke, 2008, esp. Part III). In order to confirm this hypothesis, the context of the institutionalisation of Internet governance is explored in chapter 4 and the ideological elements that underpinned the creation of the ICANN are explored in chapter 5. Moreover, the in-depth analysis of the role of different types of actors in the early institutionalisation of Internet governance investigates the importance of non-states actors.

III. The shift towards transnational and private governance was a structural trend in the 1990s. However, in order to avoid the tendency of critical studies to over-emphasise the structural elements and the macro-level, the thesis relies on a Bourdieusian international political sociology perspective. In this view, *world politics is divided in relatively autonomous fields (national and transnational) with their own stakes, actors and logics*. Although Internet governance is deeply embedded in global dynamics, the translation of these dynamics in Internet governance differs from its translation in other issue-areas. This postulate of Bourdieusian IPS is useful to provide a differentiated analysis of world politics. While the concept of field has been used to study a number of transnational social spaces like the European Union or the field of security (for an overview, see chapter 3), the thesis is an original attempt to use the concept of field to study Internet governance.

IV. Once world politics is viewed as divided between distinct fields, and given the fact that a Bourdieusian conception of field entails the existence of dominant agents within the field, it can be argued that *the history of Internet governance is the history of the emergence of a transnational field, with its own elites*. Bourdieusian sociology rejects the economicist conception of capital and advocates for the analysis of different forms of capital. The power of dominant actors within a field relies on distinct resources that need to be empirically analysed. The following empirical research evidences the fact that Internet governance has become gradually autonomous from other related fields, such as international telecommunications regulation and computer networking science. It also shows that specialised elites have emerged in the field, relying not only on financial capital, but also on social, political and scientific capitals. As a result, domination in Internet governance is not viewed as the domination of a transnational capitalist class but rather as the domination of specialised elites that are specific to the field of Internet governance.

V. In addition to the field of Internet, the study devotes particular attention to the dominant actors within the field. These actors come from different countries, they are affiliated with different institutions and rely on different resources to exercise power. Rather than separating these groups in national or institutional categories, the research studies them as transnational elites and proposes an

original definition: *Transnational elites are powerful groups of actors that interact within a transnational field beyond national borders.* While some literature exist on transnational elites, it is argued here that a more systematic study of these groups could be an important contribution to globalisation studies.

VI. These transnational elites, like national elites can be competing for power. This is the description of pluralist democracy. However, as demonstrated by Charles Wright Mills for the US society in the 1950s, these elites are not always competing. They sometimes unite to form a single, ideologically coherent, power elite, where individuals circulate from one position of power to another. The research formulates the hypothesis that this phenomenon is likely to be found at the transnational level as well. *Transnational elites might unite around a shared project to form a transnational power elite.* In this case, their domination is not exercised over a national polity, nor over the global political economy as a whole, but rather over a transnational field. This is why the thesis explores empirically the possibility that different specialised elite unite around a shared project to exercise domination within a transnational field.

VII. Informed by neo-Gramscian global political economy, the thesis does not take the power of elites for granted. Even though the power elite is united, its domination over a field is only possible if some kind of consent exist among non-elites. Thus, the research analyses the production of hegemony in the field of Internet governance as a dynamic process involving counter-elites and non-elites. *The power of transnational elites can be either contested or for the most part accepted.* Thus, the study of the power elite must be coupled with an analysis of the relationship of the power elite with non-elite groups in order to avoid the shortcomings of some elite sociology. As a result, the thesis applies a dialectical method to the study of elite in order to investigate the process of hegemony production, and the potential for change contained in any given order.

VIII. The process of hegemony production is concomitant with the process of definition of the boundaries of the field. The analysis of world politics in terms of fields is not a reification of the boundaries between different issue-areas. It is rather *an evolutionary analysis of the struggles to define the boundaries of a given field that goes hand in hand with the struggle for domination within the field.* Internet governance is an emerging field whose boundaries are still very porous and unstable. The very definition of Internet governance has evolved and is likely to change in the coming years, thereby including and excluding issues and actors.

IX. The thesis also evidences the fact that Internet governance has gone through several crises that led to the reconfiguration of the borders of the field as well as its elite. The commercialisation of the Internet in the early 1990s generated a crisis that led to the creation of the ICANN in 1998. The changing context created the conditions favourable to the questioning of the order by non-dominant actors during the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in the early 2000s. *The present study on the unification of a transnational power elite evidences the unstable character of elite power.* It is more a history of crisis and change than a history of order and reproduction. However, the way in which the different crisis have been settled tend to create an increasingly hegemonic system of institutions and discourses.

X. The WSIS crisis of the early 2000s led to the creation of a renewed hegemonic discourse articulated around the notion of multistakeholderism and a hegemonic governance system with non-binding institutions created as a way to produce consent. However, the World Summit on the Information Society has created a fragile system that is currently in crisis. While outside of the scope of this study, the dissensions evidenced during the World Conference on International Telecommunications in 2012, the Snowden revelations in 2013, and the forthcoming debates on Internet governance are elements of a new crisis of hegemony. Consistently with the critical tradition, *the thesis argues that the current crisis can only be understood in relation to the history of Internet governance.* This is why the present research on the emergence of Internet governance as an international relations issue is relevant for the understanding of the current debates and the analysis of possible futures for Internet governance (see chapter 9).

### **1.3. Outline of the thesis**

One of the main objective of the thesis is to avoid the separation of the theoretical reflection from the empirical analysis of Internet governance. This is why the literature review and the description of the theoretical framework (chapter 2 and 3) combine elements of the study of Internet governance in particular, with elements of an international political sociology perspective. The following chapters analyse the history of Internet governance while trying to continue the theoretical reflection of transnational elites, order and change in the global political economy.

Chapter 2 presents a review of the extant literature. It starts from the specific question of Internet governance and broadens the perspective in order to relate the specific issue of the regulation of the global computer network to the broad issues discussed by international relations scholars. It

specifically insists on the embedding of Internet governance in the global political economy and explores the potential contribution of critical International Political Economy in the study of Internet governance. However, it criticises the tendency of critical IPE to over-generalisation and its focus on structure and advocates for an actor-based critical perspective informed by recent developments in International Political Sociology.

Chapter 3 describes the International Political Sociology approach used in the study. It insists on three elements that are key to the approach. First, it explains how the political sociology of elites can bring actors back to critical perspective. Second, it explains a possible articulation of elite sociology to neo-Gramscian IPE as a way to keep non-elites in mind in the study of domination. Finally, it draws upon the increasingly rich literature on the use of Bourdieu's concepts in the study of IR to locate elites and hegemony within a transnational field.

Chapter 4 goes back to the genealogy of the field of Internet governance. It recalls its original autonomisation from related fields. This analysis of the emergence of a relatively autonomous field is key to explain why structural trends like the shift to neoliberal policies were translated differently in the field of Internet governance compared to fields like the international telecommunication regulation.

Chapter 5 analyses the first key crisis in the history of Internet governance. The crisis was generated by the commercialisation of the network in the beginning of the 1990s and was temporarily settled by the creation of the ICANN. The chapter explains how different elites united around the ICANN project. It explores the ideological cohesion around the early developments of multistakeholderism and self-regulation and describes the interchangeability of elites.

Chapter 6 focuses on the transition between the crisis of the 1990s (1992-1998) and the crisis of the World Summit on the Information Society (2002-2005). While these two moments are generally seen as keystones in the history of Internet governance, the period of transition is rarely analysed. This chapter is also an attempt to use Bourdieu as a theoretician of change. In contrast to the focus on reproduction that is often associated with Bourdieu, this chapter represent a case-study of an analysis of change with Bourdieu's tools.

Chapter 7 analyses the profound crisis that was evidenced during the first phase of the WSIS (2002-2003). This crisis existed at the ideological level as well as at the level of actors. Although this crisis

has been largely overcome during the second phase of the WSIS, the opposition revealed during the crisis continues to structure the field of Internet governance. The analysis of the WSIS 1 crisis is crucial for the understanding of current developments in the field of Internet governance.

Chapter 8 studies the production of hegemony in a field marked by a deep crisis between the two phases of the WSIS (2004-2005). The power elite of Internet governance was able to settle the crisis and to build consent through its reconfiguration and the creation of new institutions and new discourses. The settlement of the crisis described in this chapter is the current mode of governance of the Internet. It benefited from a quasi-hegemonic status during several years but can be now considered once again in crisis.

Finally, chapter 9 draws some empirical conclusions from the analysis of the history of Internet governance. It argues for an analysis of Internet governance in terms of elites rather than in terms of stakeholders. It recalls the complexity of the process of elite unification and the instability of any given order. It also draws some theoretical conclusions on the complementarity of international political economy and international political sociology approaches and insists on the heuristic value of concepts such as transnational fields and transnational elites in globalisation studies. Finally, it explores the contradictions of the governance model created during the WSIS and introduces the current crisis in order to explore possible futures for Internet governance.

## Chapter 2. The study of Internet governance and International Relations

As we have seen in the introduction, the purpose of this research is to provide new insights both on the theoretical level through the introduction of an international political sociology perspective to *problématiques* usually addressed by critical global political economists, and at an empirical level on the study of the institutionalisation of Internet governance in the last 25 years. While the original objective was first and foremost theoretical, this chapter focuses on the existing literature on Internet governance and locates the contribution of the research within this emerging interdisciplinary field. It argues that the literature on Internet governance lacks a critical approach that takes into account the specificities of the field. The following chapter will describe this approach and its operationalisation for the study of Internet governance. The structure of the argument in these two chapters reflects a research process that has constantly oscillated between an empirical study of Internet governance and a theoretical investigation about elitism in world politics.

Internet governance has attracted an increasing scholarly interest since the late 1990s from various disciplines. It needs to be differentiated from the study of Internet usage and the study of the content that can be found on-line. As DeNardis puts it:

“Internet governance scholars [...] examine what is at stake in the design, administration, and manipulation of the Internet's actual protocological and material architecture. This architecture is not external to politics and culture but, rather, deeply embeds the values and policy decisions that ultimately structure how we access information, how innovation will proceed, and how we exercise individual freedom online.” (DeNardis, 2013)

Thus, Internet governance raises a number of crucial issues for political science and international relations. These questions have sometimes been limited by the theoretical perspective chosen by Internet governance scholars. The following sections argue that Internet governance studies suffer from an isolation from theoretical debates that are taking place in social sciences and that an IR perspective on Internet governance defines a crucial object of world politics, highlighting important issues of power and domination. It is further argued that traditional IR approaches are ill-equipped to fully analyse Internet governance. Critical global political economy could inform Internet

governance debates since Internet governance illustrate the processes at work in the current globalisation process. However, the chapter concludes that global political economy remains often too structural and undifferentiated in its description of globalisation. That is why the present study completes the structural analysis of globalisation with insights from a more agent-based international political sociology perspective.

## **2.1. Internet governance studies: from inter-disciplinarity to un-disciplinarity**

The history of the emergence of Internet governance as an object of scholarly research is strongly related to the genesis of the field of Internet governance and its institutionalisation in the late 1990s. As a result, most of Internet governance studies are rooted in a “problem-solving” perspective (Cox, 1981). Against this background, legal studies of Internet governance have played a crucial role and occupy a privileged space in the literature on Internet governance. A great variety of disciplines also study the issue, ranging from communication studies to political science and economy. Hence, the interdisciplinary scholarly debate on Internet governance is structured along specific questions rather than theoretical stances or disciplinary boundaries.

### **2.1.1. A historiographical overview of the emergence of Internet governance studies**

The first scholarly publications on Internet governance were attempts by law scholars to define the legal norms applicable to the “cyberspace”, following the adage “*ubis societas, ubi jus*”. Arguably, the first book on Internet governance was published in 1995 (Katsh, 1995). Thus, there is almost twenty years of scholarly literature on Internet governance, primarily authored by law scholars. Early publications on Internet governance raised the issue of Intellectual Property in a digital age, and the consequences of Intellectual Property on the allocation of Internet domains (Dueker, 1996). However, the analysis of Intellectual Property law applicable on the Internet soon raised the issue of borders and national sovereignty (Johnson & Post, 1996); and subsequently of how to govern cyberspace (Lessig, 1999; Liu, 1998; Post, 1997). The main question of Internet governance studies had emerged and began to structure a scholarly debate. Most of this debate took place among US law scholars, but some scholars in communication studies and political science became involved

around the creation of the ICANN (Mathiason and Kuhlman, 1998); legal scholars in Europe also took part in the debate (Kur, 1996).

Simultaneously, the Internet economy was booming and the stakes were becoming higher. Universities in the United States created centres in law schools to institutionalise the study of cyberlaw. Among the first centres was the Center for Law and Technology, created in 1995 at Berkeley law school and specialising in Intellectual Property. The Center grew to encompass broader cyberlaw issues over the years. In 1997, Jack Balkin founded the Information Society Project at Yale law school with the broader project of being “an intellectual center addressing the implications of the Internet and new information technologies for law and society, guided by the values of democracy, development, and civil liberties”<sup>6</sup>. In 1998, the Berkman Center for Internet & Society was created at Harvard Law School, notably by Jonathan Zittrain, as one of the first research centre to focus exclusively on Internet-related legal issues. The Berkman Center evolved with the academic field and became an inter-faculty and interdisciplinary initiative in 2008. In 2000, the Stanford law school also created a specialised centre: the Center for Internet and Society, founded by Lawrence Lessig. The pioneers were followed by a great number of cyberlaw centres in US universities. In the early 2000s, the trend spread outside the United States. However, most of the new research centres had an interdisciplinary focus and were not attached to law schools. Some of the most famous examples include the Oxford Internet Institute created in 2001, the Centro de Tecnologia e Sociedade of the Fundação Getulio Vargas' law school (2003), the Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic of the University of Ottawa (2003); the Internet Governance Project academic network based at the School of Information Studies at the university of Syracuse; and more recently the Alexander von Humboldt Institut für Internet und Gesellschaft in Berlin (2012).

The centres and departments, as well as the scholars affiliated with them, played an important role in Internet governance since the creation of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). Legal scholars were involved in alternative projects of institutionalisation of Internet governance at the end of the 1990s and questioned the legitimacy of the ICANN. They formed a counter-elite at the turn of the millennium (see chapter 6). As we can see from the list of institutions, it is also around the turn of the millennium that centres specialising in Internet governance became more interdisciplinary. The creation of the Oxford Internet Institute in 2001 involved for example a historian and a political economist.

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6 See the description of the Centre at <http://www.yaleisp.org/about/history>, last accessed 8 April 2014.



The history of the Internet had indeed become an object of scholarly research since the origins of the network were debated and had consequences on its management. Was the United States historically bound to control the network? Was the origin of the network civilian or military? Some studies were published in the late 1990s but mainly offered a US-centred view of the history of the Internet (Abbate, 1999; Hafner, 1998). The history of the network continues to draw scholarly attention and earlier accounts are still debated (e.g. Townes, 2012).

Political economists also started to study Internet governance with the rise of the Dot.com economy in the late 1990s. While most of economic studies were limited to the analysis of e-commerce without engaging in the institutional and political consequences of the organisation of the market, some studies offered a new perspective on Internet governance based on economic theories. The most famous example is Milton Mueller's "Ruling the Root" (2002), that relies on a perspective of institutional economics. The creation of the governance system is, in this view, a consequence of the marketisation and allocation of limited resources. In this case, Internet domains were a scarce resource that needed market mechanisms to be distributed.

Finally, political scientists and International Relations scholars also entered the debate on Internet governance. The following section (2.2.) on the IR perspective on Internet governance will look into this literature with greater detail. While some authors were not participating directly to the specific debate on Internet governance but rather to more general IR and political science debates, some exceptions existed from the end of the 1990s (Mathiason and Kuhlman, 1998; Paré, 2003; Simon, 1998).

Before the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), the scholarly debate on Internet governance had become interdisciplinary and had spread geographically to include some European scholars. Internet governance became gradually one of the most debated issue during the World Summit on the Information Society (see chapter 7). Since the Summit was a large event organised by the United Nations and attended by a great variety of non-state actors, it raised consciousness at a worldwide scale on the importance of Internet governance. The effect on scholarly publications was similar. The number of publications on Internet governance increased, giving birth to a somewhat disaggregated field of study.

Following the WSIS, a Global Internet Governance Academic Network (GigaNet) was created to:

“support the establishment of a global network of scholars specializing in Internet governance issues; promote the development of Internet governance as a recognized, interdisciplinary field of study; advance theoretical and applied research on Internet governance, broadly defined, and; facilitate informed dialogue on policy issues and related matters between scholars and Internet governance stakeholders”.

GigaNet was created in conjunction with the first meeting of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) and still holds its annual symposium as a coupled event with the IGF meeting. Today, the network has 180 members distributed globally<sup>7</sup>. Once again, the evolution of the scholarly debate and its institutionalisation echoes the evolution of the field of Internet governance. Through the IGF, as well as through other forums, scholars play an active role in the governance of the network. This is why the literature on Internet governance cannot be read in abstraction from the genesis and evolution of the field. As we will see in the development of the research, scholars have been part of a counter-elite after the creation of the ICANN (chapter 6) and some of them became part of the civil society fraction of the power elite after the WSIS (chapter 8).

From the generic questions of norms, borders and sovereignty in cyberspace, the study of Internet governance has encompassed a wide variety of issues, from the standardisation to the relationship between Information and Communication Technologies and development (ICT4D). Some of the core of the research remains concerned with the global institutions of Internet governance, and emanates from individuals involved in the politics of Internet governance, while other specialised researches focus on aspects only loosely related to the general structuration of Internet governance and remains in more academic circles. The following sections try to outline the main issues addressed by Internet governance studies and advocate for a development of a critical IR perspective on Internet governance spanning the scope of more specialised issues by questioning order and change in Internet governance.

### **2.1.2. An Internet governance framework**

The history of Internet governance as a scholarly field shows the interdisciplinary character of Internet governance studies. Few authors have tried to make sense of these disciplinary divisions to

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<sup>7</sup> See <http://giga-net.org/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

offer a general overview of Internet governance studies. The efforts by DeNardis (2013, 2014) to map the emerging field of Internet governance studies remain important exceptions. DeNardis is an associate professor at American University on Washington D.C and a fellow of the Yale Information Society project. With a background in engineering and science and technology studies, she analyses the Internet architecture and governance from a technical as well as social science point of view. She identifies five themes that are addressed by the literature on Internet governance (DeNardis, 2013): the control of critical Internet resources, the design of protocols, the issue of Intellectual Property Rights related to Internet governance, the security and management of the infrastructure of the network, and the communications rights affected by the governance of the Internet.

### *The control of critical Internet resources*

Critical Internet Resources (CIR) were among the first element that attracted scholarly attention at the end of the 1990s. Critical Internet resources refer to logical resources that are unique to the Internet such as Internet (IP) addresses and the Domain Names System (DNS). They are thus different from the physical infrastructure of the network (see below) and the virtual resources that are not unique to the Internet such as electromagnetic spectrum management (which is shared with other telecommunication networks). The debates of the 1990s were essentially about what institution should be in charge of the management of critical Internet resources, and especially the root zone file of the Domain Names System (Mueller, 2002).

Most of the literature on the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) can be classified in this category (Christou & Simpson, 2007; Froomkin, 2000, 2002; Klein, 2002; Kleinwachter, 2002; Mueller, 1999; Paré, 2003; von Arx, 2003). Because of the central role of the US government in the management of the Domain Names System, IR scholars, and especially realists, have studied the ICANN and the management of the DNS (see section 2.2).

The slightly more technical issue of IP addresses is less discussed outside Internet governance circles. However, the allocation of a unique IP address to each machine connected to the network is an essential function of Internet governance (DeNardis, 2009). It has been historically tackled by the Internet Assigned Number Authority, which is now part of the ICANN, and five Regional Internet Registries (RIRs). One of the most important issue in this respect is the transition from an older version of the protocol – that limits the number of IP addresses (and thus of machines connected to the network) to 4.3 billions – to a newer version (IPv6) virtually removing the limits to

the number of machines connected to the network (Dell, 2010; DeNardis, 2009; Mueller, 2010a).

Despite the important literature on the ICANN and the management of domain names, it is only one among a number of other issues. According to DeNardis (2013), the issue of domain names received “disproportionate” attention from the media and civil society because of its visibility and because of the debates of the 1990s. However, DeNardis fails to acknowledge that the debates over domain names and the ICANN have been essential to the definition of the frontiers of the field of Internet governance. This is why they are at the heart of the scholarly debate and will be the main focus of the historical analysis of the genesis of the field of Internet governance in the 1990s in the present study.

### *Internet protocol design*

According to some authors, the Internet can be defined as a telecommunication network using the TCP/IP protocol suite (Townes, 2012). Although the Internet uses a large number of other protocols, the focus on TCP/IP to define the Internet illustrates the centrality of the designing and adoption of protocols in the functioning of the network. Protocols are standards that allow different hardware to be compatible and to interconnect. Other important protocols include among others Wi-Fi standards, and Ethernet to connect locally to the network; HTTP, FTP to exchange information and files, and VoIP to transmit voice over the Internet. Like all standards, they are not neutral and are means of control (Galloway, 2004). Several institutions are involved in standardisation related to the Internet and evidence power relations in the global political economy (Graz, 2002). Literature specialising in Internet governance has also addressed the consequences of standardisation and protocol design on the governance of the network. Some authors have studied a specific standard-setting organism, like the Internet Engineering TaskForce (Froomkin, 2003). The importance of “open” standards in Internet governance triggered a debate on what constitutes an “open” standard (DeNardis, 2011). However, the issue of standards and protocols in Internet governance is rarely addressed in terms of power; and the openness of most of the protocols used on the Internet has been treated as an example of healthy competition rather than a political and economic struggle. As the chapter 4 shows, the struggle between TCP/IP and X.25 and other computer networking standards were crucial in the structuration of the field of Internet governance already in the 1980s (Abbate, 1999; Townes, 2012). The openness of protocols was only one aspect of the struggle between telecommunication operators, computer manufacturers and computer scientists.

As we have seen from the historical overview of the emergence of Internet governance as an object of study, Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) were one of the main concerns in the debates around the allocation of domain names in the 1990s. Domain names can be defined in a purely technical fashion as a sequence of characters designed to be easier to remember than an IP address (Postel, 1996). However, the legal view is different. The issue entailed rapidly the need to know who was the legitimate owner of a particular domain name. Subsequently, the body in charge of allocating a domain name to an individual or an organisation needed to be legitimate and to offer guarantees in terms of IPR (Komaitis, 2010). The literature on trademarks and domain names, and on the Uniform Domain-Name Dispute-Resolution Policy (UDRP) set up by the ICANN and the WTO is extensive (e.g. Geist, 2001; Sharrock, 2001).

Another issue related to IPR gained importance over the years. While most of the underlying protocols and standards that allow the functioning of the network are open, an increasing number of royalty-bearing patents are involved in internetworking operations. According to some scholars, this type of IPR is becoming “the central policy problem in intellectual property law” (Lemley, 2007 quoted in DeNardis 2013), as illustrated for example by the patent war in the telecommunication industry. The issue affects Internet governance since an increasing number of standards emanate from organisations that do not rely on the policy of open standards implemented by the Internet Engineering TaskForce (IETF) or the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) (Samuelson, 2007). The issue of IPR connects with the issue of protocol design and standardisation (DeNardis, 2011). Even within open standards, the question of IPR is also of increasing importance. One recent example is the attempt by companies such as Google, Microsoft and Netflix to introduce Digital Restrictions Management technology in the newest version of the Hypertext Markup Language (HTML 5). The objective is to protect proprietary audio and video content that is increasingly posted on the Internet directly in HTML code rather than through proprietary software such as Flash and Silverlight media players<sup>8</sup>.

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8 The newest version of the HTML language (HTML 5) features markups such as <audio> and <video> that allows the playback of audio and video content without the need for additional software. For more information on HTML5 see [http://www.w3schools.com/html/html5\\_intro.asp](http://www.w3schools.com/html/html5_intro.asp), last accessed 8 April 2014. For more information on DRM in HTML 5, see for example [http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/02/23/microsoft\\_google\\_netflix\\_html5\\_drm\\_infection/](http://www.theregister.co.uk/2012/02/23/microsoft_google_netflix_html5_drm_infection/), and <http://www.defectivebydesign.org/no-drm-in-html5> for a critical view, websites last accessed 8 April 2014.

## *Internet Security and Infrastructure Management*

The issue of Internet security and infrastructure management is tackled by the growing literature on cybercrime and cybersecurity (Brown & Marsden, 2013; Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010; Dunn Cavelty & Mauer, 2007; Dunn Cavelty, 2013; Knake, 2010). Essential features of the Internet such as the Domain Names System need to be secured and are subject to different threats. The routing of packets on the network is also an important issue of cybersecurity studies (Mueller, Schmidt, & Kuerbis, 2013) and an important entry point for surveillance and control. Cyber-attacks like the Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS), hacktivism and cyberterrorism have also drawn significant attention in the last decade (Arquilla & Ronfeldt, 2001; Weimann, 2005). Cyber-warfare and the consequences of the Internet for international security is also widely discussed, as well as the growing importance of cyberstrategies (Carr, 2011; Farwell & Rohozinski, 2011). Many specialised domains of cybersecurity are studied like the security in the cloud (Farrell, 2010), or the security of the Internet of things (Weber, 2010); and explore the issue of institutional arrangements that can provide a political management of cybersecurity. This literature stands at a crossroad between computer science, security studies and Internet governance. While most of it is anchored in a realist understanding of security and sovereignty (see section 2.2), some authors explore the question of the respective roles of non-state actors and states in the governance of security on the Internet (Mueller, 2010). In spite of the many specificities of cybersecurity studies and the breadth of the issues under study, some of the underlying questions remain in the realm of political science and question the role of actors and institutions in the securitisation of the network.

## *Internet governance-related communications rights*

The management of the network has important consequences on some of the basic communication rights of the users (Pavan, 2012). The consequences of the management of the network at a national and at an international level on the freedom of expression of users is a key issue both in the politics of Internet governance, and in the scholarly literature (e.g. Papacharissi, 2002). An important part of the literature on Internet governance focuses on the restriction to freedom of expression on the Internet (Deibert, Palfrey, Rohozinski, & Zittrain, 2008, 2010, 2011). While most of these studies regard the Internet as an empowering tool for the users that is undermined by the policies of some states, others have a more critical stance on the emancipatory potential of the Internet (Morozov, 2011, 2013), or focus on the role of corporations in restraining freedom of expression on the network (MacKinnon, 2012; Zittrain, 2008).

Some scholars use the notion of a right to communicate, which was a political struggle led by Third World countries in the 1970s and reappeared on the occasion of the World Summit on the Information Society (Frau-Meigs, 2012; Pickard, 2007). The right to communicate differs from the freedom of expression of Internet users, since it is based on a Human rights understanding of communication, applicable to users and non-users of the Internet, with consequences on the need of a universal access to the network.

Another concept that has drawn some scholarly attention in Internet governance studies is the notion of privacy (Bennett, 2003; Lin, 2002; Woo, 2006). The issue is becoming of utmost importance in the “information economy”, where users' personal data is a valuable resource (Langenderfer & Cook, 2004). An increasing amount of research on the consequences of “big data” on individuals' privacy is being conducted (e.g. Lee, 2013).

Finally, the notion of “network neutrality” is treated as a fundamental principle of Internet governance, and even as a right of Internet users. Network neutrality is the principle that intermediaries should treat all data on the Internet equally, not discriminating or charging differentially by user or content. The relevance of the principle is discussed in the political sphere as well as in Internet governance literature (Wu & Yoo, 2007; Wu, 2003; Yoo, 2004, 2005) and triggered a debate among economists (e.g. Economides & Hermalin, 2012).

### **2.1.3. The danger of un-disciplinarity: how to handle a complex framework?**

The framework described in the previous section leaves aside most of the more generalist literature on Internet governance. Specialised issues of Internet governance are often crucial to understand the underlying dynamics, but generalist accounts tackle important issues that determine more specialised debates. For example, the literature on the design of the protocols and standards of the Internet needs to be read in the context of a privatisation of governance; the issue of the management of critical Internet resources touch upon the question of sovereignty in Internet governance. The study of specialised issues of Internet governance may allow for an analysis of broader issues.

The disaggregation of the debates as presented in the previous section, is not only a matter of

classification and categorisation. Scholars often specialise in one or the other debates and tend to leave aside broader aspects of Internet governance. Moreover, most of the literature on Internet governance relies on a problem-solving tradition (Cox, 1981). As we have seen, the historiography of Internet governance studies is closely related to the political history of the field. Scholars are important actors of Internet governance. This is why they privilege practical knowledge of a limited aspect of Internet governance over a general understanding of the historical and structural dynamics of the field.

In a field originally dominated by computer scientists, the political debates have evidenced a certain technological determinism that influenced the literature on Internet governance (see chapter 4). As a consequence, technology-centred perspectives are common in Internet governance studies. In this view, the physical architecture as well as the protocols and standards of the Internet determine policy issues. This is why many studies are limited to a particular aspect of Internet governance that could explain social and political behaviours, rather than the other way around (i.e. How pre-existing power relations affect the governance of the Internet?). The debate on network neutrality has been for example framed in this way. Net neutrality was presented as a fundamental principle inherent to the nature of the network (Wu, 2003). The object of the study thus became not the definition and origins of the principle but the adaptation of actors to this technological law. The scholarly literature then influenced policy-makers; and laws to protect the network neutrality flourished worldwide without the principle having been properly discussed beforehand. Critical approaches that try to investigate the social, economic and political bases of a given order are all the more marginalised in Internet governance since the origins of political interactions are sought in the technological design of the network. Scholarly debates are often mixed with advocacy without reflexivity. Favouring network neutrality comes down to advocating for political economic interests of some actors (e.g. content producers, the United States), while criticising network neutrality leads to the defence of other interests (e.g. telecommunication firms). Likewise, multistakeholderism is treated as a fundamental principle generated by the decentralised nature of the network's architecture and few studies analyse the meaning and political consequences of the principle. These specialised debates avoid the vocabulary of social sciences where network neutrality could be translated in terms of power in the global political economy and multistakeholderism could be translated into a debate around sovereignty, transnational private actors, or elitism.

The rejection of the technological determinism that undermines most of mainstream accounts of Internet governance does not imply an adoption of an economic or social determinism (Akrich,



2012). A move away from the structuralist tendency of critical political economy requires that account be taken of the influence of the evolving character of both actors and the technology itself. While it is necessary to acknowledge the conditions of production of a given technology such as the Internet to understand the struggles for the definition of the regulation of this technology, it does not imply that the technology has no agency at all. The Internet, like any other technology, has grown autonomous from its original inventors. Technical objects are more than the pure materialisation of social relations. They become uncontrolled and are subject to unintended uses and transformations (Vinck, 1999; 2009). While current uses of the Internet are affected – and even limited – by the successive technological designs of the network, the evolution of uses changed the functionality and purposes of the network. Historians and sociologists of science and technology insist on the role of users as actors of innovation through the processes of displacement, adaptation, extension and diversion (Akrich 2012a). Displacement refers to the broadening of the scope of the usages of a technology. Adaptation includes the small modifications of a technology by skilled users. Extension refers to the addition of some elements to a given object in order to extend its functionalities. Finally, diversion refers to the important modification of an object that prevents any return to its original function. The Internet has been through these different processes – except arguably the process of diversion – on a regular basis during the last decades. Since the Internet is generally described as a particularly flexible technology<sup>9</sup>, these processes are all the more crucial to understand the very nature of the technology. The first and most striking example is the generalisation of the use of the e-mail (see Abbate, 1999 and also chapter 4). The invention of search engines, the “web 2.0” revolution and the growing size of the Internet traffic outside the web – notably through “apps” – are other example of the relatively autonomous evolution of the technology. While the first concern of the thesis is the political struggles around the definition and institutionalisation of Internet governance, it should be noted that these struggles do not address a fixed object, they take place around an evolving technology. This is why the issue of domain names is typical of the 1990s, when users were expected to type directly the URL of a given website into their browser's address bar. A few years later, users were not typing “cars.com” to buy a car online. They used search engines. Against this background, the importance of domain names as a governance issue decreased (see chapter 6).

On a similar level, it would be misleading to isolate the political debates around the governance of the Internet from the technological controversies that marked the evolution of the network (Callon,

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<sup>9</sup> The relatively “open” nature of the technology in terms creation of new standards and protocols or the updating of the existing ones is generally referred to as an enabling factor of innovation.

1981). It is argued here that one of the founding technological controversy is the struggle between the TCP/IP and the X.25 networking models (see Abbate, 1999, and chapter 4). The fact that the decentralised, computer-based TCP/IP prevailed over a more centralised network relying on less powerful devices is a central element in the structuring of the debates of the 1990s. Another important technological controversy that underly the political debates since the 1990s is the issue of the single root. Does the Internet require a single centralised and authoritative root in order to ensure an efficient routing and a perfect match between domain names and IP addressed or does the de-centralised nature of the network allow for the creation of several roots? (Internet Architecture Board, 2000 – RFC 2826) These controversies precede and determine to a certain extent the scope of technological choices available. As a result, some of the debates of Internet governance are “post-technological” (Callon, 1981) in spite of their technical character. They do not question a certain model and reify previous technological choices.

Of course, a large literature rooted in social sciences and cautious of the limitations of both technological and social/economic determinisms does exist. In the study of Internet governance, reflections on the notion and institutional forms of governance is as important as the understanding of the functioning of the network. Multistakeholderism, as a form of organising governance has been studied by a number of scholars since the World Summit on the Information Society (Antonova, 2008; Malcolm, 2008; Mathiason, 2008; Raboy, Landry, & Shtern, 2010). Others have focused on how power is exercised in Internet governance and the institutional logics that underpin Internet governance (Benedek, Bauer, & Kettemann, 2008; Brousseau, Marzouki, & Méadel, 2012; Drake & Wilson III, 2009; Flyverbom, 2011; Rioux et al., 2013). The role of the state in these governance settings has also been analysed (Braman, 2009; Drezner, 2004; Goldsmith & Wu, 2006; Rioux, 2004). This literature is coherent with political science debates about power in the globalisation process and will be detailed in the following section.

While the generalist literature is closer to the debates of social sciences and address some of the pressing questions about power in Internet governance, the lack of disciplinary anchorage of the literature and the technical character of the debates sometimes leads to an undisciplined rather than interdisciplinary debate.

Against this background, the present study tries to locate the analysis of Internet governance in the realm of social sciences. While interdisciplinarity is needed for a comprehensive approach to the phenomenon of Internet governance; the technical, historical and legal knowledge of the debates is

re-framed in a social science perspective. As the following chapter shows, the study of Internet governance can be used as a case-study to analyse the role of certain types of actors in global governance and to stress the issues of power and domination. Thus, the thematic review of the literature outlined earlier will be completed with a theoretical classification of the literature in order to connect with the debates of political science and international relations. Whereas the literature on Internet governance draws upon a wide variety of scholarly traditions, the use of the term governance hints towards an analysis of social relations of power.

The concept of governance, although criticised, is important to the analysis of the management of the Internet (Sylvan 2013). Governance can describe a wide variety of structures and processes that cannot be described as government and are more institutionally embodied than an abstract rule. The concept can be used to study the complex sets of both formal and informal institutions and rules and the existence of both private and public actors and institutions without ruling out a priori any actor or process. It is a concept that allows at the same time the study of global governance through multilateral institutions and the transnational private governance (see table 2.1). It encompasses the various types of relationships that can be created between states, markets and institutionalised regulation, from auto-regulation to international regimes (Rioux, 2005). Governance is used in this research as in most studies of Internet governance since there are no widely accepted alternative to the use of this concept when trying to describe this particular form of organising world politics. It is however not used in a prescriptive way to differentiate good semi-privatised and efficient governance from the outdated model of multilateralism. The concept is a useful base for a study of a complex transnational political process. It does not imply a horizontal political process nor the absence of domination and may be the first step of an analysis of power relations in world politics.

	Formal	Informal
Public	International institutions and intergovernmental regimes	transgovernmental networks and policy communities
Private	Private regimes, self-regulatory bodies, law merchant, etc.	transnational policy networks, NGOs, advocacy coalitions, transnational interest and value groups

Table 2.1: Transnational governance structures and processes (taken from Cerny, 2010, p. 187)

Beyond specific questions of Internet governance such as intellectual property rights or network neutrality, the design and definition of a governance system is at stake. Arguably, the search for a

transnational governance system for the Internet echoes further attempts in other field to manage world politics. As a result, the theoretical classification of Internet governance studies outlined below is similar to the classification of the diverging theoretical positions in the globalisation debate.

## ***2.2. An IR perspective on Internet governance: tentative classification of approaches***

The following classification of Internet governance shows that mainstream approaches such as liberalism and realism make important contributions to the understanding of Internet governance. While liberal approaches insist on the role of private actors, realist approaches shed light on power struggles in Internet governance. However, mainstream approaches fail to acknowledge the dynamics at play in the creation of transnational governance systems. A richer contribution is made by the analysis of transnational private authority that draws upon international political economy approaches. The particular contribution of this study, as described in the following chapter, is to be understood as compatible and complementary to this latter category.

### **2.2.1. The limits of traditional IR approaches**

It is important to note that the “information revolution” and information and communication technologies (ICTs) have not arisen the same interest in traditional IR approaches than in other fields such as economics. Thus, a large part of the literature listed below is not part of core IR debates. Moreover, most of the research is focused on the ICANN and not on the creation of a complex governance system over several decades. Two main approaches on Internet governance can be described, namely realism and liberalism.

#### *Realism and Internet governance*

Realist approaches are critical of the notion of globalisation and minimise the changes that have occurred in the last decades. They do not see globalisation and the rise of ICTs as a major change in global politics. They emphasise the persistence of the role of the state and the influence of power politics in international relations (Waltz, 2000). In this view, struggles around the institutionalisation of Internet governance do not differ from traditional power politics between states. Furthermore, Internet governance is used as a least-likely case to confirm their hypotheses about world politics.

While the Internet is supposed to epitomise the erosion of borders and the emergence of non-state actors in world politics, realist studies of Internet governance proved the continuing centrality of states (Drezner, 2004). The regulation of human activities on the network is still divided in national jurisdictions and the Internet remains territorialised (Goldsmith & Wu, 2006). International arrangements are negotiated among states with different capacities. Given the dominant position of the US in the international system, Internet governance, like many other issue-areas, is heavily influenced by US power. Thus, many studies on Internet governance focus on the ICANN as an American institution that personifies American power (Cukier, 2005). Realists insist on the control that the US government exercise over the ICANN through the different contracts that have linked the corporation to the Department of Commerce. The US government is theoretically able to reject any new top-level domain and to delete existing ones. Some authors use the example of the re-delegation of the “.iq” country-code top-level domain after the US invasion of Iraq (de La Coste, 2006)<sup>17</sup>. The military origins of the network strengthen the analysis of the Internet as a tool of US power (Roland & Shiman, 2002).

The main influence of realist thinking in Internet governance beyond the analysis of US hegemony is to be found in the flourishing literature on cyber-security. The International Telecommunication Union define cyber-security as:

“the collection of tools, policies, security concepts, security safeguards, guidelines, risk management approaches, actions, training, best practices, assurance and technologies that can be used to protect the cyber environment and organization and user’s assets. Organization and user’s assets include connected computing devices, personnel, infrastructure, applications, services, telecommunications systems, and the totality of transmitted and/or stored information in the cyber environment. Cybersecurity strives to ensure the attainment and maintenance of the security properties of the organization and user’s assets against relevant security risks in the cyber environment. The general security objectives comprise the following: availability, integrity, which may include authenticity and non-repudiation, and confidentiality.”<sup>10</sup>

Cyber-security has attracted increased scholarly attention since the terrorist attacks of September 2001. While not always rooted in a realist theoretical framework (Deibert & Rohozinski, 2010; Dunn Cavelt, 2013), a large part of the literature is addressing the issue of the defence by states of digital infrastructures against threats by terrorists (Weimann, 2005), “hacktivists”(Arquilla &

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<sup>10</sup> See ITU-T X.1205 “Overview of Cybersecurity”, available at <http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/studygroups/com17/Pages/cybersecurity.aspx>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

Ronfeldt, 2001), or other states (Carr, 2011; Farwell & Rohozinski, 2011). Simultaneously to the scholarly literature, the term has been increasingly used in think tanks (Knake, 2010), defence ministries, and intergovernmental organisations (Gelbstein & Kamal, 2002). Against most analysis of Internet governance focusing on private actors, cyber-security research brought the state back in Internet governance studies (Dunn Cavelty, Mauer, & Krishna-Hensel, 2007; Dunn, Krishna-Hensel, & Mauer, 2007). National cyber-security strategies, as well as intergovernmental cooperation, can be analysed in a traditional realist framework of security studies. The fact that digital infrastructures are means and targets of attacks does not radically change the national management of threats. Arguably, cyber-security studies are closer to traditional IR debates than other Internet governance studies. Scholars are generally located in research centres dedicated to security studies rather than in communications departments. Hence, they tend to participate to other debates and their object of study is different from the generalist research on Internet governance. The scholarly debate is beginning to be institutionalised, as illustrated by the recent creation of the cyber-security centre at Oxford university. Despite this gradual emancipation of cyber-security research from Internet governance studies, the contribution of these debates is important to the field. The focus on sometimes more traditional issues of security and sovereignty provide interesting insights to the Internet governance debate. The restructuring of state power in cyberspace also questions the transformation of the state and how power is exercised in new forms of governance (Radu, 2012).

Realist studies are important for the analysis of Internet governance on three main accounts. First, the Internet is not a de-territorialised space where states have no power or legitimacy. Early enthusiasts of the cyberspace concept focused on the idea of a de-territorialised network where physical space had no influence. The first years of institutionalised Internet governance illustrated the international tensions generated by the US domination of critical Internet resources such as the root servers, the domain name space or the IP addresses. Realist studies of Internet governance brought the question of jurisdiction and state power back to the debates (Goldsmith & Wu, 2006).

Second, they also insisted on the material elements of the telecommunication network. Physical infrastructures, such as cables or servers, and users as well as service providers are located in a specific territory within a national jurisdiction. They are also unevenly distributed between states. Infrastructure elements such as routers, servers, and global Internet exchange points are distributed among states with different capacities (Schemeil, 2012). The location of the root name servers, responsible for the first step of the translation of domain names into IP addresses, has attracted

particular attention since these servers were originally all based in the US (Cukier, 2005). T

Third, the study of the geopolitics of the Internet have shed light on important power struggles at the inter-state level (Godeluck, 2002; Frau-Meigs, 2012). The issue of the US hegemony in Internet governance has been a strong concern in policy discussions. The first scholarly accounts on Internet governance did not fully address the issue. It is only with the development of the realist IR studies that the phenomenon began to be analysed in depth (Schemeil, 2012). Recent debates about the possibility of a cyber-cold war between China and the US illustrate the importance of power politics in Internet governance (DeNardis, 2014). Even if the history of Internet governance cannot be reduced to inter-state competition, traditional international politics need to be taken into account to understand global Internet politics.

The focus on territories and jurisdictions, on material elements and on inter-state competition are important contributions of the realist approach to Internet governance studies. However, realist Internet governance studies show some limitations. First realist studies of Internet governance tend to understate one of the key characteristics of Internet governance: the institutionalized and legitimized role of private actors, most of them acting on a transnational scale. This is a major change in international telecommunications politics that needs to be fully analysed. The ICANN is a private non-profit corporation acting under Californian law, the World Summit on the Information Society consecrated the notion of multistakeholderism according to which governments are one category of stakeholders equal to others. States are important actors of Internet governance but non-state actors acquired a greater importance than in other fields. While it is important to take states and intergovernmentalism into account, other types of actors and other modes of governance co-exist with them in the governance of the network (Mueller, 2010).

Second, realist studies tend to overstate the power of the US government over the Internet. For example, the control over the Domain name system is very limited. Would the US government decide to delete an important domain name, other states and companies could use copies of the Domain name system that are backed up in several places distributed worldwide. The Internet is a distributed network that could function without some of its US elements. As we are going to see in this study, the US domination is to be found in the power of US-based transnational Internet firms and in the domination of US engineers over the standardisation processes rather than in the theoretical control of the US government over the network.

Third, the focus on inequalities between states tend to obscure the inequalities within nations-states. While North-South digital divide and the lack of influence of some states are crucial elements of Internet governance, the number of people participating to the definition of the rules of the game in the field of Internet governance is limited in OECD countries as well. Divisions in terms of class, race and gender in Internet governance need to be taken into account. The resources required to actively participate in Internet governance forums generate exclusion on an international as well as on a local scale. Thus, the present study combine the analysis of inter-state exclusion and the analysis of elitism (see chapter 3).

### *Liberalism and Internet governance*

The most influential IR approach in Internet governance studies is liberalism. While not always explicitly stated, a large part of the literature relies on the assumptions of rational actors cooperating to solve cross-border issues. This category also include soft constructivist accounts of norms adoption in Internet governance. This literature is policy-oriented and many researchers adopting this approach are also actively involved in the various forums of Internet governance.

Since the literature is policy-oriented, it often lacks a clear theoretical framework. However, it is generally based on some classical IR concepts, such as the notion of regimes. The definition of Internet governance that is used by most authors is a reformulation of Krasner's famous definition of regimes as “implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations” (Krasner 1983). It was adopted by the UN-sponsored Working Group on Internet Governance in 2005 under the leadership of some IR and political science scholars. However, the regime theory was developed in the 1980s and went through a process of adaptation to a period and an issue-area particularly affected by the globalisation process. Thus, the WGIG took into account non-state actors and its definition reads:

“Internet governance is the development and application by Governments, the private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes that shape the evolution and use of the Internet.” (WGIG, 2005)

Regime theory is not the only influence that can be found in the liberal literature. It also draws heavily on the transnational relations and liberal globalisation literatures. Liberal IR started in the



1970s to include non-state actors as a new “level” in international relations (Keohane & Nye, 1972). While the regime theory of the 1980s focused on states for historical as well as for historiographical reasons<sup>11</sup>, the 1990s witnessed a renewed interest for non-state actors in liberal IR. Globalisation studies described the retreat of the state and the rise of non-state actors (e.g. Badie, 1995; Ohmae, 1999). In this view, transnational flows include – and are enhanced by – the development of information and communication technologies. This type of thinking, sometimes dubbed “hyperglobalism” (Anheier & Juergensmeyer, 2012), also include the claim of a radical transformation of society and the emergence of the information age and a network society (Castells, 2009). This argument fits particularly well in the Internet governance debate, where networks, information and communication are ubiquitous (Mueller, 2010).

Liberal literature on governance has influenced the field so much that it is almost unanimously now referred to as Internet governance rather than regulation of the Internet or global Internet policy. Like in other issue-areas, there is no single authority in charge of Internet governance (Rosenau & Czempiel, 1992). Arrangements involving multiple actors and *ad hoc* institutions must be created. Liberal governance studies insist on the horizontal character and on the pluralism of these processes. The concept of stakeholders, as used in Internet governance studies, illustrates the management of a global issue in a political space that is not dominated by states.

Other concepts developed in liberal and soft constructivist IR are influential in Internet governance studies. The concept of epistemic communities (Haas, 1992) is sometimes used to describe the role of experts and scholars in Internet governance (Cogburn, 2005). Global civil society participation in Internet governance is also sometimes described as the emergence and practices of transnational advocacy networks (Keck & Sikkink, 1998), especially in the context of the World Summit on the Information Society (Mueller, 2010). Transgovernmental networks is another concept that highlights the creation of networks of actors beyond traditional state-to-state diplomacy (Slaughter, 2004). It has been increasingly used by liberal scholars to study various issue-areas. However, because of the focus on non-state actors in Internet governance studies, the more general term of networked governance is more widely used (Kahler, 2009).

Against this background, Internet governance studies of the late 1990s and 2000s drew upon liberal

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11 The inter-state tensions of the 1980s made transnational cooperation less important on the agenda of mainstream researchers and even early advocates of a transnational turn moved back to more traditional state-centred IR (Keohane & Nye, 1977). The neo-neo debate generated by the publication of Waltz' influential book (Waltz, 1979) also reinforced the state-centrism of the debates.

concepts such as governance and focused on the role of private actors. However, multistakeholderism became the key concept of liberal Internet governance studies. The notion of multistakeholderism, taken from organizational and management studies (Antonova, 2008, p. 40), broadens the scope of regime theory to embrace the role of a large scope of private actors in this kind of governance models. In the 1980s, organizational studies began to look beyond shareholders to include “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the activities of an organization” (Freeman, 1984, p. 46). The idea was to include the affected parties in the management of the firm in order to democratise it. The notion of stakeholder was not widely used in political science and international political economy before the end of the 1990s<sup>12</sup>. In a similar fashion to the management of the firm in the 1980s, the idea of multistakeholderism is to include affected parties in the management of global issues and in the regulation of global networks such as the Internet. There is a strong normative assumption of political liberalism in the concept of multistakeholderism. In this view, any affected group or individual has a say in the governance of the Internet, which includes every single Internet user, but also non-users since they are affected by their exclusion from the network. This is why multistakeholderism is associated with global or transnational democracy (Bexell, Tallberg and Uhlin, 2010; Kleinwächter, 2008a).

Through the concept of multistakeholderism, liberalism became the official theory of Internet governance, used by UN institutions, the ICANN, and private actors. The often tacit, references to the principles of liberalism and pluralism that characterised a large part of the literature on Internet governance were acknowledged and adopted in the Tunis Agenda through the inclusion of the definition of the WGIG quoted earlier. With the object under study defined as Internet “governance” and the organising principle being multistakeholderism, the assumptions of liberal political science became deeply embedded in the field. The lack of discussion of these concepts ensured the domination of liberal thinking on Internet governance in the last decade<sup>13</sup>.

Liberal perspectives on Internet governance have been essential in the structuring and in the development of the field of Internet governance studies. Their focus on actors, and especially non-state actors, have helped to grasp the extent of the change embodied in the ICANN and other Internet governance institutions. They have also developed a detailed description of the processes

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12 Unlike management studies, database of political science scholarly articles list few occurrences of the term stakeholder in the 1980s and early 1990s. It is towards the end of the decade, and especially in the 2000s that the use of the term seems to become widespread.

13 The concept of multistakeholderism is beginning to be debated in policy as well as in scholarly circles (Radu and Chenou, 2013). See also the Internet Society questionnaire on multistakeholderism. A report is available at <http://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/bp-msfinalreport-20132210-en.pdf>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

and practices of actors in Internet governance (Kleinwächter, 2004; Mathiason, 2008; Mueller, 2002). The analysis of networks of actors is also a major contribution of liberal Internet governance studies. Concepts such as transnational advocacy networks and epistemic communities take seriously the role of some particular types of actors in Internet governance. Moreover, the concept of governance itself helps us to look at regulations beyond states and intergovernmental organisations. The particular attention given to the specificities of the field of Internet governance (e.g. Drake & Wilson III, 2009) offers a detailed and differentiated analysis of the history of Internet governance that is sometimes downplayed by more structural accounts of Internet governance (see next section). While beyond the scope of this literature review, the importance of liberal Internet governance studies for advocacy and institutionalisation purposes must also be acknowledged.

However, liberal accounts of Internet governance suffer from severe drawbacks that have limited the potential contribution of the field to the IR and political science disciplines. The main limitation is certainly the lack of analysis of the issues of power and domination. While multistakeholderism theoretically ensures that every type of actor act on an equal footing, the reality of the negotiations shows dynamics of power and domination. Governments, large transnational corporation, civil society organisations, and individuals are not equal actors. Multistakeholderism, like other modes of governance, entails exclusion and domination. Only elite actors are able to fully participate in Internet governance processes, while users – and to a greater extent non-users – of the Internet are excluded. The problem-solving perspective of liberal Internet governance studies prevent a questioning of the underlying structures of social inequalities. The focus on the particularities of Internet governance fails to acknowledge the embedding of Internet governance in the global political economy and the penetration of the structures of domination within the field. Furthermore, the political choices that have been made are sometimes obscured by a technological determinism that links the political structure of Internet governance with the very nature of the technology (Mathiason, 2008). The very concept of stakeholder remains ambiguous (Ruwet, 2010) and multistakeholderism obscures the elitist character of Internet governance.

To conclude, liberal Internet governance studies are useful in the unique knowledge and level of details that they provide on Internet governance. However, their lack of theorisation of power struggles and domination prevent their full inclusion in the scientific debates of IR and political science. They are often used in this study as references but their findings must be constantly placed in the context of the global political economy to be understood as part of global politics. The following section present the missing link between Internet governance studies and global political

economy but also underlines some limitations of structural explanations of Internet governance. The chosen solution to the dilemma between detailed description of the field, as developed by liberal perspectives, and a theoretically-informed account of Internet governance as a case-study of the globalisation process will be explored in chapter 3.

### **2.2.2. Critical approaches: the rise of private authority in world politics and the dead-end of structuralism**

Unlike realist approaches that undermine the evolution of world politics and liberal approaches that fail to analyse the evolving changing patterns of domination, critical approaches to global political economy offer a more useful perspective on globalisation that allows for a deeper understanding of the history of Internet governance. This section will focus on the concepts of globalisation and transnationalisation as analysed by critical approaches and will outline the specific contribution of neo-Gramscian approaches.

Critical approaches to global political economy have analysed the globalisation process without leaning towards hyperglobalism<sup>14</sup>. Globalisation is in this view a political process, in which agency plays a crucial role. However, critical scholars criticise the sceptical view of the realists (Hirst, Thompson, & Bromley, 2009) and acknowledge the extent of the changes brought about by the globalisation process. One important element of globalisation is the transformation of the state. Critical approaches do not explain globalisation as a retreat of state authority but rather as a transformation of the state. According to Cerny for example, the state moved away from its role as welfare state to become a competition state (Cerny, 1990, 1997). Whereas the welfare state de-commodified sectors such as health and education and regulated them outside of the market, the competition state commodifies itself in order to become more competitive and economically more efficient. In a similar fashion, Jessop describes a Schumpeterian workfare state replacing the Keynesian welfare state (Jessop, 2002). The analysis of the transformation of the state in the last decades is particularly important in order to understand the changing patterns of regulation in the telecommunication sector in the 1980s and 1990s and the context of the emergence of Internet governance. Chapter 4 explores into more details the privatisation of Internet governance in the early 1990s and the reliance of market-based mechanism rather than intergovernmental regulation.

Beyond the transformation of the state, the globalisation process entails an enhanced role for private

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<sup>14</sup> Marxist accounts of globalisation as a structural phenomenon driven by the natural expansion of capitalism (Harvey, 1989) are not included in this categorisation.

actors in the global political economy and the creation of various forms of transnational private authority. The literature on private authority in the global political economy is large and the case-studies are varied (Braithwaite & Drahos, 2000; Cutler, 2003; Cutler, Haufler, & Porter, 1999; Graz & Nölke, 2008; Hall & Biersteker, 2002; Haufler, 2001, Rioux, 2004). The main coherence between these studies is the idea that authority that was previously exercised by public agencies and states are increasingly delegated to the private sector. Far from offering a clear-cut distinction between public and private authority, this literature informs us on the evolving relationship between state and non-state actors and the public/private hybridisation of authority (Graz, 2006). The hybridisation of authority entails a number of issues around new modes of governance, such as multistakeholder forums and raise the questions of participation and legitimacy (Graz & Nölke, 2008). The analysis of the various modes of governance of the globalisation process echoes the analysis of actors' practices within these forums, as studied by international political sociology approaches.

The relation between transnational private authority and neoliberalism is also a constant element of critical studies of global political economy. Transnational private authority is not only about the inclusion of non-state actors in the regulation of specific sectors, it is also about imposing a model that relies on market forces and individualises processes, which is not without questioning the legitimacy of such models (Graz & Nölke, 2008). Consistent with neo-Gramscian approaches, globalisation is seen as constituted by a neoliberal historical bloc. As Gill (1995, p. 406) puts it, “the neoliberal concept of globalisation suggests that the privatisation and transnationalisation of capital are either inevitable or desirable from a broad social viewpoint” and that free competition and free exchange entail economic efficiency, welfare and democracy, “and a myth of virtually unlimited social progress”. Indeed, the evolution of telecommunication regulation in the 1980s (see chapter 4), and the institutionalisation of Internet governance in the 1990s (see chapter 5) are consistent with such dominant ideology.

Internet governance illustrates this phenomenon since ICANN was created as a private institution responsible for the execution of tasks that were carried out by an intergovernmental organisation in earlier telecommunication systems. Thus, the question of ICANN's legitimacy and its reliance on a particular vision of market regulation was crucial in the politicisation of the Internet governance debate. The delegation of public authority to private actors entails an analysis of who the actors that exercise this hybrid authority are. Again, the variety of actors does not allow for a simple answer to that question. Specialised firms, experts, professional groups (Dezalay, 2004; Seabrooke, 2011), certifiers (Graz & Hartmann, 2012) or even celebrities (Richey & Ponte, 2008) can play an

important role on the regulation of global markets. Several attempts to construct a comprehensive picture of these actors exist, through concepts such as transnational capitalist class (Sklair, 2001), or global elite (Rothkopf, 2009). Other authors analyse the actors of global decision-making in the general direction taken by global capitalism in elite clubs (Gill, 1990). However, the structural and global focus does not allow for an understanding of the specific actors and processes in each sector where transnational private authority is exercised. The following chapter advocates for the use of the concept of elites as a way to comprehend the variety of actors involved in transnational private authority, while ruling out the analysis of a single global elite or capitalist class.

While the emergence of transnational private authority is analysed from different theoretical perspectives, a large part of the literature is influenced by Gramsci and constitutes the most comprehensive critical framework in global political economy. Neo-Gramscian perspectives are critical in the sense that they question the existing order, and explores how it came into being. In this view, the historical analysis of the emergence of norms, institutions and practices is crucial (Cox, 1981). Contrary to static and a-historical accounts of a given order, the emergence and evolution of world orders, as well as the existing prospects for change are central to a neo-Gramscian analysis of global political economy. As illustrated by chapter 4, the history that led to the emergence of Internet governance is closely related to the evolution of the global political economy as described by neo-Gramscians (Gill, 1990)

Neo-Gramscian scholarship has been primarily concerned with a re-conceptualisation of hegemony in IR (Rupert 1995; Bieler & Morton, 2004; Cox, 1981; Gill, 1993). Hegemony in traditional IR is understood as a dominance of one state based on its material capacities (especially economic and military). Drawing upon Gramsci's definition of hegemony as consensual but "protected by the armour of coercion" (2010 [1948-1951]), Cox claimed that hegemony might prevail within a world order when *material capacities*, *ideas*, and *institutions* fitted coherently. That is, when domination is accepted "as the natural order of things" (Cox, 1994, p. 366) through the prevalent collective image of world order, through the existence of institutions, and through material power (Morton, 2003). Hegemony explains the relative stability of a given historical order. Hegemony is constructed within three spheres of activity: *the social relations of production* that define the main collective actors, *forms of state* understood as state-civil society complexes, and *world orders* (Cox, 1981, p. 138). This framework allows for an analysis of hegemony and change at different levels, through the analysis of particular configurations of these elements. This framework is dynamic since the dialectic relations between spheres, and historical structures, are ever changing. Historical structures

are defined as persistent social practices reproduced and transformed by human activity (Bieler & Morton, 2001; Morton, 2003). Although critical research sometimes adopt a structuralist view of social relations, neo-Gramscian scholarship offer the necessary tools to take agency seriously. That is why neo-Gramscian scholars focus on historical blocs to describe a moment of relative stability of a given order and insist on its transitory character.

Historical blocs are another concept taken from Gramsci that is applied to the global political economy. Gramsci defined historical blocs as “unity between nature and spirit (structure and superstructure), unity of opposites and of distincts” (Gramsci, 1999, p. 337). It represents the historical moment of hegemony, when the interests of the dominant class have been propagated and accepted throughout society. A historical bloc in a given society can be then expanded internationally and become a world order. Cox (1987) described the post-World War 2 order as *Pax Americana*, characterised by the Bretton Woods system and “embedded liberalism” (Ruggie, 1982). This historical bloc corresponded to a form of state (the Keynesian welfare state), a Fordist accumulation regime and the internationalisation of both production and the state (Cox, 1987; Gill & Law, 1989). This particular world order was institutionalised in the UN system. In the telecommunication sector, this particular world order resulted in the reform of the International Telecommunication Union as well as several national reforms leaning towards the Keynesian form of state (see chapter 4). The evolution of this order that started in the 1970s with the end of the Bretton Woods system affected the evolution of telecommunication regulation. The Internet was popularised and Internet governance became institutionalised in a new world order characterised by globalisation and the rise of transnational capital (Gill, 1990). This is where neo-Gramscian approaches are in accordance with the theories about the transformation of the state and the analysis of globalisation outlined before.

Critical approaches informed by Gramscian concepts are better equipped to analyse the emergence and the dynamics of semi-privatized and transnational forms governance such as the ICANN system and other Internet governance forums. Internet governance materialized as an international political issue within a context of a general trend towards commercialization and privatization of various sectors, in a context of transformation of the state. Critical approaches describe the general context of the rise of Information-led capitalism (Schiller, 1999) or Knowledge-Based Economy (KBE) (Jessop, 2006). Critical approaches also analyse the effects of neoliberal globalization on Internet governance (Lee, 2009; Simpson, 2004; Sum, 2003; von Bernstorff, 2003).

However, critical approaches to Internet governance epitomize the danger of structuralism in critical approaches in IR and global political economy. These analyses tend to obscure the specificities of Internet governance, in terms of actors, ideas, and institutions. They offer a rather uniform view of globalization and tend to focus on hegemonic actors that cover a wide scope of the global political economy, such as the United States (von Bernstorff 2003; Sum 2003) or a transnational elite whose influence applies to every realm of international relations (Lee 2009). As we will see in the following chapters, neoliberalism was not the only ideology that had some legitimacy in the emerging field of Internet governance, and the actors involved were different from other issue-areas. The process and the actors that shape a specific policy area to make it fit the project of neoliberal globalization require further attention.

By determining *ex ante* the driving force behind change, critical accounts of Internet governance reproduce the limitations of structuralist theories and fail to fulfil the “structurationist” (Giddens, 1986) potential of neo-Gramscian approaches, where structures are constantly reproduced and transformed by agency and where coherence and stability are historical and temporary phenomena. For example, some studies of the global elite, or the transnational capitalist class (especially Sklair, 2001) assume that a common class interest exist among the CEOs of large transnational firms. Carrol and Fennema (2002) presuppose the existence of a transnational business community and failed to analysed the process of its formation<sup>15</sup>. Likewise, some critical approaches to Internet governance assume that a global elite was already existing *ex ante* and exercised its power in the institutionalisation of Internet governance (Lee, 2009). Others focused on the ideology of neoliberalism and its diffusion in Internet governance without taking sufficiently into account the actors of the process of “neoliberalization” (Belfrage & Ryner, 2009).

There is a growing critique of the exaggeratedly structural focus of critical approaches that advocates for the necessity to take agency and particularities more seriously (Hobson and Seabrooke, 2007). One critique is aimed at the Eurocentrism of critical approaches that allegedly neglect the dynamics of other regions and local translations global phenomena (Hobson, 2007). For some authors, critical IPE is more focused on the overall global structures to the detriment of sectoral or local ones (Phillips, 2005). As a consequence, non-Western, local and sectoral particularities are sometimes neglected by critical approaches. Internet governance, for example, has particular characteristics related to its specific history and its politicisation process that can not

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<sup>15</sup> In this last case, it is important to note that Carrol later took on the task of studying the process of unification (Carroll, 2010).



be directly related to the global trend of neoliberal globalization. The "technical community" featuring mostly computer engineers working in the academia continues to play a vital role in the governance of the Internet, which sometimes allows it to oppose the logics promoted by the private sector and transnational telecommunications firms. Libertarian ideas are an important source of ideological discourse of governance actors of the Internet. If these ideas are often compatible with the dominant neoliberal ideology at the global level, they sometimes differ, especially on the issue of intellectual property rights. Far from being anecdotal idiosyncrasies, these features are essential to the understanding of a number of debates and political struggles that might influence other areas of world politics. Struggles at the ideational level have to be thoroughly analysed in order to shift the focus from the "hegemony of production", focusing on material elements, to the "production of hegemony" (Sum and Jessop, 2013).

Moreover, the critical approaches also tend to study the structural aspects such as the global spread of ideologies and their influence on political implementation without taking into account the interactions between actors. If individuals are obviously present in the critical approaches of IPE, they are often treated as exogenous to the structure, as objects of structural constraints, rather than as elements of structures (Berry, 2007). Structures do not exist in the absence of their reproduction by agents. It is through these interactions that the consequences of structural domination can be analysed. As pointed Knafo (2010), for any actor that is constrained by structures, another is empowered by it. While critical authors seek to compensate for the structuralism of critical approaches by considering resistance of non-dominant actors, they study only very partially change among dominant actors. Accordingly, they analyse prospects of revolution rather than evolving power structures. Structures are a medium through which some groups exercise their domination over other actors (Knafo, 2010). Because of their focus on macro structures (Bieler & Morton, 2001), critical approaches sometimes offer a totalising image of globalisation that misses the specific dynamics that lead to the domination of an ideology or a group of actors in a specific specific issue-area (Cerny 2010). Moreover, a structural perspective highlights reproduction over change. Change is more likely to take place at a meso level through the interactions of agents (Knafo 2010). For example, critical accounts of European integration offer examples of the role of agents in social change (van Apeldoorn, 2002; Bieler, 2010; Cafruny & Ryner, 2007).

Two main attempts to overcome the limitations of critical approaches have developed over the last few years. The first one is the "practice turn" in international relations (Adler & Pouliot, 2011a, 2011b; Adler-Nissen, 2012; Neumann, 2002). These scholars claim that the focus on practices

promises to avoid traditional dichotomies such as agent and structure, stability and change and ideas and matter (Adler & Pouliot, 2011c). Thus, the “practice turn” seems to offer a way to overcome the structuralism of critical approaches to Internet governance. Practices are located and differentiated and are also constantly evolving. However, the focus on practices is not a theoretical framework. As Adler and Pouliot acknowledge, the concept of practices is vague enough for various “theoretical preferences” to accept it (Adler and Pouliot, 2011c). The present study adopts a particular standpoint on practices inspired by Bourdieusian sociology (see chapter 3). A theoretically-informed analysis of practices can fruitfully complement structuralist accounts of Internet governance without reproducing the shortcomings of liberal perspectives. Against this background Bourdieusian international political sociology allows for a critical understanding of practices in relation to the dynamics of sectoral and global domination.

A second attempt to bring agents back in the analysis of global political economy can be found in the IPE literature. “Everyday” IPE promises to shed light on the relationship between individual agents' behaviour and global structures of the political economy (Hobson & Seabrooke, 2007). According to Watson (2013), two different strands analyse two elements of this relationship. First “everyday politics” analyses how change is generated through the undermining of existing structures by small-scale local activities (Kerkvliet, 2005). Second, “everyday life” analyses how individual behaviour is disciplined by global structures (Davies & Ryner, 2007). While everyday IPE take agency seriously, the link between local individual agency and global structures is not completely theorised in these approaches. Again, Bourdieusian international political sociology enables us to relate individuals with global structures through concepts such as field, *habitus* and capital. Against the focus on non-elite actors of everyday IPE, the present study uses the sociology of elites to analyse Internet governance. However, it acknowledges the critique emanating from everyday IPE that elite studies often take for granted the legitimacy of elite discourses and actions (Seabrooke, 2006). This is why, the analysis of transnational elites in Internet governance is combined with the analysis of the fragility of consent of non-elite groups in order to take into account the capacity of non-elite groups to “shape change beyond organised resistance” (Seabrooke, 2007).

To conclude, a complex framework is needed to analyse the richness of Internet governance. The chapter argues that while an interdisciplinary analysis is required, it must be anchored in a theoretically-informed disciplinary debate. International relations and political science offer an interesting framework to analyse the power dynamics that are at work in the definition of the rules

of the game in Internet governance. These rules affect different actors, institutions and issues. Mainstream IR approaches are unable to fully address complex, transnational and semi-privatised governance system such as Internet governance. Critical international political economy is certainly the most useful framework to analyse Internet governance. However, critical accounts of Internet governance have often relied on a structuralist understanding of critical IPE and especially, neo-Gramscian scholarship. This observation echoes a broader dynamic in critical IPE. While Cox' writings feature elements that allows for the analysis of change and agency, critical IPE has tended to focus more on stability and structures.

Against this background, recent strands of literature in IR and IPE have tried to bring agency back in critical approaches. As the following chapter argues, the contribution of this recent literature can be included in an international political sociology approach. Agency and practices can be analysed in relations to structures and domination. The focus on agency should not necessarily mean a neglect of structures.

Finally, some non-structuralist critical analysis of Internet governance exist and are complementary to the present study. Foucauldian approaches and science and technology studies offer another way to analyse power in a non-structuralist way (Antonova, 2008; Flyverbom, 2011). Some feminist studies of Internet governance also exist and provide crucial elements in the analysis of domination (Gurumurthy & Gurumurthy, 2008; Gurumuthy, Jeet Singh, Mundkur, & Swamy, 2006). With a focus that differs from mainstream Internet governance studies, these alternative accounts of Internet governance provide original thinking about Internet governance that will be used throughout this study.

### **Chapter 3. The study of transnational elites in Internet governance**

The review of the existing literature on Internet governance takes us back to the core question addressed by political science: Who governs? As we have seen in the previous chapter, this question has not been fully answered by existing literature on Internet governance. The focus on states and on ideology are not satisfying. The common focus on a particular issue fails to tackle the struggle around the definition of Internet governance. Liberal approaches neglect power differentials among actors and treat every actor as equal. The critical actor-centred analysis conducted in this study draws upon political sociology to analyse power beyond national societies. It is centred around concepts such as elites and field that can be found in the work of sociologists such as Wright Mills and Bourdieu. The following chapter claims that these concepts can be useful to construct an international political sociology perspective that allows for a detailed description of the specificities of Internet governance and for a critique of liberal approaches. While the concepts were developed for the analysis of national societies, this chapter explores ways to adapt them to transnational settings. As Wright Mills puts it, “for every epoch and for every social structure, we must work out an answer to the question of the power of the elite” (Wright Mills, 2000, p. 23). The fact that some contemporary social structure are transnational in scope should not discourage us to take on the task defined by Wright Mills.

The previous chapter started from the issue of Internet governance to describe its embedding in international relations' *problématiques*. This chapter proceeds the other way around, from the general question of who governs to its operationalisation in the analysis of the specific case of Internet governance. The objective is to present a framework that allows for a non-structuralist critical analysis of Internet governance. While sympathetic to the “practice” and the “everyday” turns in IR and IPE, the following framework is an attempt to anchor an actor-centred analysis in a critical project related to the general questions addressed by neo-Gramscian scholarship. The focus on elites and actors represents a “structural constructivist” perspective on the relationship between actors and structures (Bourdieu, 1987) rather than an underestimation of the effects of structures.

The first section presents the international political sociology approach that constitutes the theoretical framework of the present study. The second section describes the methodology used to operationalise concepts such as power elite and field in order to study the recent history of Internet

governance.

### **3.1. The International Political Sociology approach**

The conceptual framework of the present study is particularly based on the work of two sociologists that are sometimes combined in critical analysis of power structures. The first author is Charles Wright Mills (1916-1962), whose analysis of the “power elite” is here completed with the Gramscian concept of “hegemony”. The second is Pierre Bourdieu (1930-2002), whose concept of field is used to analyse a space of social interactions that is not limited by national borders but rather defined by power struggles.

#### **3.1.1. Elites, hegemony and challenges**

The concept of elite(s) has been widely used in political science and political sociology. The iron law of oligarchy described by Michels (Michels, 2009) that opposes a powerful few to less powerful or dominated masses has been evidenced by many sociologists and political scientists since the pioneering work by Vilfredo Pareto (Pareto, 1917). Still, the vagueness of the concept has undermined the outreach of elites theories in social sciences (Scott, 2008, p. 27). Charles Wright-Mills developed a useful classification of elite theories. He listed four main definitions of elites (Wright Mills, 2000, p. 385):

- The first conception defines the elite as a group of individuals that hold important institutional positions in a given society. Individuals are ranked according to their institutional position and to the position of their institution in the society. Heads of the ministerial cabinets, the main churches, the military or the biggest firms among others form the elite.
- The second conception ranks individuals according to the statistics of selected values to characterise the highest tier as the elite. The elite then comprises the richest, the most intelligent or the most skilled individuals in a given area depending on the criteria privileged by the observer.
- The third conception defines the elite as “a clique-like” set of people. The elite is a network of individuals that is “conscious, coherent, and conspiratorial” (Meisel, 1962). This conception describes cohesion among the elite on a scale that ranges from visions of an elite sharing some values and ideas to a vision denouncing a unified and secret elite conspiring to

rule a given country.

- The fourth conception is based on morality and claims that certain personality types have higher morale values than others. Their rule is therefore legitimate and appropriate.

These four conceptions have very different consequences for the analysis of elites. The first conception focuses on institutions and institutional power. The second one focuses on assets, resources, or forms of capital. The third one insists on the unity of the elite, and can be related to the analysis of a “class for itself” in the Marxist tradition, but also hints towards conspiracy theories. The last definition is a conservative one to justify elite power. Wright-Mills sums up the four conceptions in one sentence: “[...] What they head up, what they have, what they belong to, who they really are” (Wright Mills, 2000, p. 385). These four ideal-typical visions illustrate the diversity of the use of the concept and are useful to classify existing theories on elite(s). Drawing upon these conceptions, it is possible to formulate a general definition of elites that encompasses the different visions. John Scott defines elites as holders of power within a social field (Scott, 2008, pp. 27–28). Elements of the four visions outlined by Wright-Mills can be included in this definition, leaving the articulation between them to the empirical study. Focusing on power allows us to differentiate between elites as powerful social groups and other “superior” groups of less relevance to political and social theory (Scott, 2008). The notion of social field acknowledges the fact that institutions and sources of power (forms of capital) might be different from one social realm to the other. Moreover, it does not limit the analysis of elites to the national level. It allows for an analysis of transnational elites, defined *as groups of individuals from different national territories that exercise power within a particular area of social life and interact as a network beyond national boundaries*. Transnational elites are therefore a specific kind of actor in international relations. They are individuals and groups rather than institutionalised organisations. They exercise relational or structural power within a specific social field through political authority, economic dominance, or discursive resources. They act transnationally, in areas of social life that transcend national boundaries and their influence is to be found at a global level or at least beyond national borders.

Due to the dominant state-centrism in IR theories, the concept of elite has been used mainly in the sense of a national elite and there are few studies of transnational elites. The notion of a “foreign policy establishment” in the United States illustrates this inside-out approach. National elites have been seen as relevant to the analysis of international politics in that they influence the definition of a state’s foreign policy. In this view, because of shared long-term interests among military, political and business leaders, a consensual elite exists in the domain of foreign policy. That is why foreign

policy is believed to be more consensual and stable than domestic policies<sup>16</sup>. However, this approach to international relations is partial and biased. World politics are not the sum of foreign policies adopted by the different states of the system, and even less so in a context of globalisation. Along with national elites, transnational elites exercise power and are therefore relevant to the study of international relations. The concept of transnational elites allows us to grasp a reality beyond state-to-state relations and to analyse world politics from a really transnational perspective.

Several approaches are close to what is here defined as transnational elites (even if terms differ). First, a Marxist approach clearly applies elite sociology to the world society. Leslie Sklair's transnational capitalist class comprises the heads of the biggest transnational firms. He interviewed executive and managers from global firms and analysed their role in the control of the process of globalisation. He concludes that an emerging transnational capitalist class is beginning to act as a transnational dominant class in some spheres and cooperates to overcome the contradictions inherent to a global consumerist capitalism (Sklair, 2001). Although Sklair uses the term class to define his object, elite sociologists could claim that he is in fact studying a corporate elite, based on institutional positions, rather than a class since the global corporate elite lack the class consciousness associated with the definition of class (Scott, 2008). A sociological debate has discussed the existence of such a class (Carroll, 2010; Carrol & Carson, 2003; Carrol & Fennema, 2002; Robinson & Harris, 2000) and evidences the transnational nature of the corporate elite (Kentor, Jeffrey Jang, 2004; Wagner, 2005).

However, most transnational historical materialists deny the a priori existence of a unified transnational capitalist class and use the concept of elites clubs, or planning groups, to describe the ongoing process of class formation among globalising elites (van der Pijl, 1984). According to these approaches, transnational elite clubs serve as places of cohesion and definition of projects of society. Among them, the trilateral commission played a crucial role in advocating for a liberalised economy during the 1970s and 1980s, favouring transnationally mobile fraction of capital over more geographically stable capital (Gill, 1990). Other examples would include the Mont-Pèlerin Society and the Davos World Economic Forum (Graz, 2005). Transnational historical materialism stresses the need for capitalist economy of a project that can be shared among the elite and accepted by populations. Drawing upon Gramsci's conception of hegemony, such a project serving the

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16 A great number of studies focused on foreign policy preferences in the US. from an elite versus masses perspective since the Vietnam war, especially during the 1970s and 1980s. For an introduction, see (Chittick and Billingsley, 1989). A constructivist account of the relation between public opinion and foreign policy elites can be found in Risse-Kappen (1991).

interests of the powerful and accepted by the people is defined as a hegemonic project. To sum up this approach, transnational elites are groups of people in commanding positions in the global capitalist economy that meet from time to time to consolidate a capitalist hegemonic project. In this sense, elites come from different types of organisations that share a common interest in the stability of a global capitalist system. These forums usually gather members of governments and parliaments, managers and executives of transnational firms, economists and political scientists from leading universities and some important individuals from civil society. Transnational historical materialists use the term elites because a global capitalist class would only exist if it had a far greater level of cohesion and shared ideas and values than these elites actually have.

In a more comprehensive though less precise way, Robert Cox described the global economy as a *nébuleuse* to which states become more and more accountable. In his view, this *nébuleuse* is a “transnational process of consensus formation among the official caretakers of the global economy” (Cox, 1992) that takes place through official intergovernmental bodies (OECD, G7, IMF etc.) as well as through unofficial forums (Trilateral Commission, Bilderberg conferences, etc.). The *nébuleuse* concept translates the blurry nature of this transnational social force. It includes the actors involved in the process, the discourses they promote and the structural power of capital upon which it depends.

The idea of a *nébuleuse* and the focus on processes of formation avoid the limitations of a Marxist conception of the elite. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the point of departure of the present study is this kind of non-structuralist critical accounts of domination in global politics. One way to study *nébuleuses* and elite unification is to build upon the work of Wright Mills, who addressed a similar research agenda for the post-WW2 US society.

Wright Mills (2000 [1956]), in his classical research on the power elite in the United States, shows that separate and sometimes competing elites may, in certain historical contexts, unite around a common project that can in turn be imposed on society in general. First, Wright Mills identifies three sources of power embodied by the three most important types of specialized elite: the military elite, the business elite and the political elite. Wright Mills clearly makes a difference between these elites and does not presuppose cohesion between them. They are each constituted of independent individuals at the head of their respective institutions. He rejects the Marxist concept of class that implies a political domination of the economic elite. His definition of elite is based on the analysis of institutions:



“For they are in command of the major hierarchies and organizations of modern societies. They rule the big corporations. They run the machinery of the state and claim its prerogatives. They direct the military establishment. They occupy the strategic command posts of the social structure [...]” (Wright Mills, 2000, p. 4)

Despite this analytical distinction, Wright Mills shows empirically that the cohesion of the elite in terms of interests and perceptions, and the circulation between specialised elites were such that one could speak of a relatively unified power elite in American society after World War II. Such cohesion is a matter of historical contingency. In times of crisis, the diverging interests of different fractions of the elite tend to fade away and the preservation of a given order tend to prevail. Indeed, the analysis of Wright Mills is historical and he explains how the modern US society gave more power to formal and centralised institutions such as the government, the military and the big corporations.

Thus, it is important to be able to differentiate between a situation where specialised elites compete and a situation where a unified power elite exists. Apart from the historical trend described by Wright Mills, two elements are crucial. The first criterion is the circulation and interlocking of the elite. Wright Mills used the term interchangeability to describe the dual phenomenon of multiple-hat and revolving door that characterise members of the power elite. The more interconnected and porous the institutions are, the more united the elite is.

“The inner core of the power elite consists, first, of those who interchange commanding roles at the top of one dominant institutional order with those in another: the admiral who is also a banker and a lawyer and who heads up an important federal commission; the corporation executive whose company was one of the two or three leading war material producers who is now the Secretary of Defence; the wartime general who dons civilian clothes to sit on the political directorate and then becomes a member of the board of directors of a leading economic corporation.” (Wright Mills, 2000, pp. 287–288)

The second criterion defined by Wright Mills is a mix of psychological similarity, social intermingling and explicit co-ordination. This broader aspect includes the class consciousness, the shared social origins and the similar lifestyles of the members of the elite. These aspects are less developed in the present study because of the global character of the elite. However, the element of co-ordination is important since members of the elite sometimes realize that their own interests could be realized more easily if they work together (Wright Mills, 2000, p. 19). The consequence of the second element of the unity of the power elite is a shared ideology and a shared political project.

In the case of post-WW2 America, the shared vision was a definition of international reality as basically military. This is what Wright Mills refer to as “military metaphysics”, which correspond to a Cold War mindset. Indeed, because of pre-existing psychological reasons, and socialisation processes, the military metaphysics were already accepted by civilian members of the power elite, without the need for indoctrination by the military (Wright Mills, 2000, p. 222). While the unification process on the ideological level is less developed in Wright Mills' work, the shared political project is a key consequence of both the similar socialisation of the members of the elite, and of the formal and informal co-ordination among elites.

Thus, a power elite exist when the two elements of unity are met: the *interchangeability* of positions (institutional interlocks and circulation), and the shared *metaphysics* (or ideological unity). These two elements are used by Wright Mills to criticise pluralist theories that theorised the link between elite competition and democracy (Dahl, 1961).

The concept of power elite and the methodological tools developed by Wright Mills may be particularly useful for a study of change in the forms of governance of the global political economy. Indeed, the hybridization between private and public authority that is characteristic of the current globalisation process is primarily implemented at the elite level, both nationally and transnationally (Cutler, 1999; p. 203). Transnational elites in the plural, can be recruited from private sector as well as from national bureaucracies, be composed of experts from universities and business leaders. This definition allows us to study these new forms of governance identified by the critical approaches of International Political Economy while focusing the analysis on groups of individuals and their interactions. It also allows an empirical analysis of the emergence of a dominant group in a particular issue-area, how it evolves and how it is contested. The two criteria developed by Wright Mills to evaluate the pluralism of a power structure can be used to study the competition and unification processes of elites in transnational social spaces as a way to grasp the complexity of a global restructuring of power (Kauppi & Madsen, 2013). The study of transnational elites addresses several of the issues outlined in the previous chapter:

1. The study of transnational elites encompasses a wide range of different networks of actors in the global political economy. Transnational elites include actors such as government official acting in transgovernmental networks<sup>17</sup> (Slaughter, 2004, 2009), scientists and experts

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<sup>17</sup> The concept of transgovernmental networks allows for a combination of the analysis of national elites and their behaviour in transnational settings. In this view, governmental and judiciary elites do not act only through the state but can act transnationally as networks. Although not synonymous to the notion of transnational elites, the governmental

organised in epistemic communities (Davis Cross, 2013; Haas, 1992) or invisible colleges (Stone, 2001, 2002, 2004), professions and experts (Abbott, 1988), and corporate elites (Carroll, 2010).

2. The study of transnational elites is clearly positioned in a world politics paradigm and avoids methodological nationalism. The study of transnational interactions of elites does not impose a clear-cut distinction between internal and external policy. Transnational actors are also rooted and embedded in local contexts and the study of their national origins (and national capital) is a key element of the analysis of transnational elites (Kauppi & Madsen, 2013).
3. A sociological approach to transnational elites avoids the structuralism that characterise some critical accounts of the global political economy and takes actors seriously. As we have seen in the previous chapter, some Gramscian-inspired analysis, and especially in the realm of Internet governance, downplay the role of agents in the reproduction and change of a given order. The sociological study of actors and practices helps to avoid this pitfall.
4. The study of transnational elites allows for a critical assessment of power struggles and domination. The focus on actors sometimes entails a neglecting of structures and tends to overemphasise competition among actors like in the liberal/pluralist tradition. The concept of elites is a way to insist on power differentials among actors and stresses the process of domination in a given social field.
5. Finally, the study of transnational elites can be combined with other sociological approaches such as the Bourdieusian conception of fields (see following section), and with a neo-Gramscian understanding of stability and change in the history of the global political economy. While Wright Mills has been criticised for having no theoretical framework to conceptualise power and stability in a society (Barrow, 2007; Burawoy, 2008), the empirical and methodological approach designed by Wright Mills is compatible with broader critical social theories.

The last contribution of the concept of elites to a critical international political sociology perspective needs to be explained in more details since it does not come out of the previously described work of Wright Mills. The concept of power elite does not allow by itself to conceptualize stability and change. The existence of elites or a unified power elite is only possible in relation to the masses or non-elites. The stabilisation of elite power depends on a form of acceptance from the public and

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networks can point to the role of national elites acting transnationally. However, this perspective only allows to study political elites, which are far from constituting the majority of the important actors of the globalising process.

from its institutionalisation. Whereas Wright Mills offers a detailed description of the power elite, he only briefly addresses the masses upon which the domination of the elite is exercised (Wright Mills, 2000, pp. 298–324 chap. 13 on “The Mass Society”).

In this chapter, Wright Mills defines two ideal-types of society. The first type is a society of publics: a true democracy where the governors act under the active scrutiny of the governed and where the existence of a power elite is impossible. The second type is a mass society: “an abstract collection of individuals” where the power elite faces no resistance (Wright Mills 2000: 301-304). The society of publics is the society described by the liberal enlightenment with an active civil society. The analysis of Wright Mills is the transformation of the US society into a mass society. The emergence of mass media and the shift in the ratio of the speakers and the listeners created the conditions for the emergence of a mass society, where the power elite is left unchallenged by the absence of active publics.

Consistent with the neo-Gramscian scholarship described in the previous chapter, this study postulates that the consent of the governed is active rather than passive. This is why, the concept of hegemony is preferred to the concept of mass society. Sociologists have shown at a micro level how this active consent work in practice (Burawoy, 1982, 2008). The masses play by the rules of the game defined by the elite because they are able to defend some interests. Gramscian hegemony presupposes that “account be taken of the interests and the tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is to be exercised” (Gramsci 2001: 373).

The Gramscian concept of hegemony, introduced into the IR debate by Robert Cox, goes beyond the study of elites and analyses the consent of the governed. Hegemony is understood in this context as a rule in which the consensual aspect of power is in the foreground while coercion is used only in marginal cases (Cox, 1993). Whereas Wright Mills examines cohesion within the elite between different groups or types of specialized elites, the notion of hegemony extends this cohesion beyond the elite. We can therefore distinguish two (simultaneous) elements in the manufacturing of consent: first, different and sometimes competing elites unite around a shared project and circulate between institutions to form a power elite; second, the acceptance of elite rule is ensured through the creation of active consent among non-elites. This is Gramsci's third moment in the relation of forces, after the first moment of material relation of forces, and the second of class consciousness:

“A third moment is that in which one becomes aware that one’s own corporate

interests, in their present and future development, transcend the corporate limits of the purely economic class, and can and must become the interests of other subordinate groups too.[...] it is the phase in which previously germinated ideologies become “party”, come into confrontation and conflict, until only one of them, or at least a single combination of them, tends to prevail, to gain the upper hand, to propagate itself throughout society— bringing about not only a unison of economic and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity, posing all the questions around which the struggle rages not on a corporate but on a “universal” plane, and thus creating the hegemony of a fundamental social group over a series of subordinate groups.” (Gramsci, 1999, pp. 405–406)

Thus, hegemony is not about imposing its will over apathetic masses. It is the process by which a particular interest gains its legitimacy as expression of the general interest through political means. This is why some authors focus on the process of “production of hegemony” in order to stress the dynamic character of hegemony and the importance of interactions (e.g. Jessop, 2006) The need for elite co-ordination and for support by non-elites rules out any automatism of elite power. The existence and domination of a power elite is a complex political process that needs to be empirically evaluated in each case. Moreover, the relative fragility of elite rule opens the door to resistance and change.

While hegemony and the institutionalization of elite power allow for a relative stability, it does not mean that this dominance is unchallenged. To the contrary, the elite is constantly reconfigured challenged and influenced by the attitude of non-elites and counter-elites excluded from the institutionalization of power. The evolving context in which the elite operates is also a source of continuous change. The first challenge to the power elite comes from counter-elites (organised resistance). Counter-elites are composed of large and formally organized groups of individuals without formal authority (Rocher, 2005). These challenging elites oppose the power elite and act outside the formal institutions of power (Scott, 2008, pp. 39–40). They are not in positions of power in the field dominated by the power elite but might benefit from resources acquired in other related fields and invest these resources in the field of the power elite in order to bring about a change. The existence of counter-elites explains the need for adaptation of the power elite in order to discourage mobilization that would endanger their power. The scarcity of the literature on counter-elites might result from the fact that researchers have a tendency to privilege the study of successful elites that made their way into the power elite. However, the excluded elite groups are important to understand the dynamic character of the rule of a power elite and to analyse the prospect of change. In Wright Mills' analysis for example, institutions such as churches and families had lost momentum in US history after WW2. As a consequence, elite families and religious elite were not part of the core of

the power elite. Their exclusion could be analysed in terms of counter-elites: Powerful groups that are not taken on board in the unification of a power elite (see chapter 6).

Second, Resistance to the elite can also come from non-elites. Non-elites, in a hegemonic situation, do not question the power elite. Wright Mills then speaks of masses in which political communication is rare and mobilisation is absent. The mass can however become a public and play a role in generating change. One criterion used by Wright Mills to evaluate the probability of mobilisation is the type and level of communication in non-elites on important issues (Wright Mills, 2000, p. 304). This is why studies in global political economy and IR have increasingly studied the everyday practices of individuals and groups (Seabrooke, 2006). Corporate power depends on the situation of the firm in the market, hence eventually from the behaviour of the consumer. Political elites obviously depend directly on their election by non-elite individuals. Changing patterns of behaviour might lead to changes in the power elite. Although the influence of non-elites has been overestimated by pluralist and liberal studies of politics, the accumulation and repetition of non-elite practices have consequences on the power of a given elite.

Third, change can occur within the institutions of power, through a reconfiguration of the cohesion between different elites (Scott, 2008). Indeed, the project and the ideological cement that unite different factions of the elite, or different specialized elites, is produced and reproduced by the interaction of these different groups and is subject to change and constant readjustment. The inclusion of new groups and new ideas in the power elite is also an example of elite-driven change (see chapter 8).

Finally, change can correspond to an evolution of the field dominated by a power elite. The next section will discuss the emergence and the evolution of field in relation with the global field of power.

The stability of the power elite depends on a relatively delicate balance between the various groups that compose it; on a balance of power with counter-elites offering an alternative; and on a hegemonic relationship with non-elites. These conditions explain the difficulty for a particular order to achieve stability and provides entry points for the analysis of change. Hegemony is never completely achieved and every order contains the seeds of the next one<sup>18</sup>. Change is most usually a

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18 This element has been highlighted by most Neo-Gramscian scholarship, from Cox and his analysis of world orders (Cox, 1981), to recent developments like Cultural Political Economy (Jessop and Sum, 2014, forthcoming) that analyses the only partially-constituted “imagined economies”, and non-structuralist scholarship (Cafruny and Ryner,

change *in* the power elite, through a process of elite reconfiguration around a new project and through inclusion / exclusion of new groups. But change can also be a revolution and a change *of* the power elite in the case of a seizure of power by counter-elites or in the case of a rallying of the public to counter-hegemonic projects. Thus, elite sociology can provide interesting insights on the dynamics of global power and complement existing IR theories. However, an important limit of the use of elite sociology in global politics is the absence of a global society and a global state. Thus, concepts developed exclusively for the analysis of a national society need to be adapted to a transnational environment. One way to conceptualise social relations beyond national societies is to start the analysis from a different social space of interactions. The present study relies on the concept of field, as developed by Bourdieu, that is increasingly used in international relations to overcome the limitations of methodological nationalism.

### **3.1.2. Fields and transnational power structures**

While the sociology of elites brings the actors back in critical research, Bourdieu's sociology addresses another limitation of critical IR theories. Bourdieu's social theory is rich and this section does not attempt to give a comprehensive account of Bourdieu's potential contributions to the study of international relations. Rather, it explores how Bourdieu's sociology contributes to avoid a certain universalism and an exaggerated tendency to generalisation that characterise some critical perspectives (see previous chapter). It argues that Bourdieu's sociology, and especially the concept of field, helps to bridge the gap between the study of individual actors and the study of global structures of power. Thus, I will first define the concept of field and explain how it is used to study Internet governance as a transnational field. Second, I will explain how Bourdieu can be combined with the focus on actors of the sociology of elites in order to complement a critical literature in international relations inspired mainly by Gramsci.

#### *The concept of field*

Research on elites is generally conducted at a national level, and sometimes at a global level. The literature shows some examples of alternative levels of analysis (usually focused on the European case, see for example Cohen, 2011; Georgakakis, 2012; Kauppi & Madsen, 2013). However, in areas such as Internet governance, power lies in a transnational space of social interactions. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the national framework is inadequate to study the dynamics that

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2007) that describes “minimal” hegemony as opposed to “integral” hegemony.

transcend borders. However, the assumption of the existence of a global elite or dominant transnational capitalist class that dominates the entire international system is hampered by the diversity and complexity of the world politics. As stated by Cerny (2010), whereas the domination by a small group of agents is possible at a sectoral level, it is much more difficult at a global level. Actors and issues are completely different from one domain (issue-area) to another. This is why Cerny calls for a world politics paradigm, where the unit of analysis would be the issue-area rather than the state in order to avoid methodological nationalism. However, the sectoral approach advocated by Cerny with its transnational neo-pluralist perspective loses sight of the relations and interdependence between issue-areas and the embedding of specific issue-areas in global dynamics that transcend sectoral divisions. The neo-pluralist framework also lacks a conceptualisation of the competition between sectors. The concept of field, as developed by Bourdieu (1993, 2000), provides an alternative to concepts such as sector and issue-area. It helps to consider the complexity and the heterogeneity of world politics, which are minimised by structural approaches. However, it does not imply a clear separation between fields, or a competition within each sector that entails pluralism. It offers a more accurate conceptualisation on two levels. Internally, it allows for the analysis of the one field's specific logic, relatively autonomous from other fields and insist on social struggles within the field. At the global level, it provides an outline of a theory of the unequal relations between different sectors and of the evolving relationship between fields and a global social space.

There is now a growing literature on the use of the notion of field in international studies. Although Bourdieu developed his framework through the analysis of fields located within a national field of power, and despite the difficulty of translation entailed by the use of a framework developed at a national level to study transnational phenomena, the distinction between the national and the international is blurred by the globalisation process and national and transnational spaces are interlocking (Dezalay, 2004). Bourdieu defines a field as a structured space of positions whose properties depend on their position within this space<sup>19</sup>. A field is both a field of forces and a field of struggles. This type of space can be found in a number of areas in the national context, for example the literary field (Bourdieu, 1991) the scientific field (Bourdieu, 1976), the political field (Bourdieu, 2000) and the national field of power (Bourdieu, 2012). The question of what constitutes a field and how to define a field's borders has been identified as a major issue in the operationalisation of the concept. However, a historical and evolutionary perspective allows to identify the autonomisation of

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19 The notion of fields is complex in Bourdieu's work and evolves through time. The most comprehensive attempt to define it can be found in a book chapter entitled "Some properties of fields" (Bourdieu, 1993, pp. 72–79).



one issue-area from other pre-existing ones. In the case of Internet governance, as developed in chapter 4, the stakes are different both from the field of international telecommunications, and from the field of computer networking. The network grew internationally beyond the scope of the US national field of power. Thus, it can be argued that because of its relative autonomy from broader fields, the field<sup>20</sup> of Internet governance is a coherent and useful unit of analysis of the meso-level.

According to a growing literature of more or less orthodox Bourdieusian IR<sup>21</sup>, the concept of field is relevant beyond the national borders. A field is not a geographical space but rather a space of social interactions. As such, it does not necessarily need to be embedded in a national field. Drawing upon Bourdieu's "Some properties of fields" (Bourdieu, 1993, pp. 72–79), Mérand and Pouliot stress three principal dimensions in the definition of a field that can be used in international studies (Mérand and Pouliot 2008, 2012). First, a field is a space of power relations. Each actor within a field holds a differentiated position. A field is defined by the domination exercised by a number of actors. The position of each actor can be analysed since actors are holder of certain forms of capital<sup>22</sup>. Although Bourdieu uses the term "dominant" rather than "elites", the analysis of domination in a field is compatible with the tools and concepts developed by the sociology of elites (see sub-section below). Second, fields are defined by the stakes of the game. While the dynamic of domination transcends fields (homologies), the stakes of the game are specific to each field. This is why the notion of field helps to avoid the generalising tendency of critical approaches. Global dynamics are translated into field-specific stakes. This makes fields autonomous from one another. Actors play a game in a field, whose rules are specific to the field. Here the notion of "stakeholders" that is used in Internet governance takes another meaning. The field of Internet governance is constituted by the interactions of individuals and groups that have defined common objects of struggle (common stakes) related to the regulation of the telecommunication network. Third, some of the rules of the game in the field are taken for granted and allow the interactions of the various

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20 Some authors use terms as sub-field, and meta-field in order to provide a scale of the borders of the field. However, since a sub-field is relatively autonomous from the field and since fields are relatively autonomous within the meta-field, both correspond to the definition of a field. Thus, the concepts of sub-field and field are used interchangeability depending on the referent. Internet governance is a sub-field of international telecommunications and of the global political economy, but it is also a field in itself.

21 It should be noted that theoretical stances on Bourdieu's contribution to IR range from a "war-machine against traditional IR" according to Bigo, to an approach compatible with existing theories, and especially constructivism, according for example to Pouliot. These differences were visible during the round-table presentation of the edited volume on Bourdieu in International Relations (Adler-Nissen, 2012) at the annual convention of the International Studies Association in 2013 in San Francisco.

22 Bourdieu is famous for its encompassing definition of capital beyond purely economic capital. The notion of social capital is now widely used in social sciences. Cultural and symbolic capitals are also important elements of Bourdieusian IR. The "national capital", coined by Bourdieu in one of his rare attempts to study the international could also be useful for an international political sociology. See chapter 9 for an introduction of this particular form of capital.

actors in the field. Bourdieu introduces the concept of a *doxa* of the field: some elements that are beyond discussions and outside of the struggles of the field and that are commonly accepted by actors. Of course, these elements are not neutral and reinforce the position of the orthodoxy, the world-view of dominant actors. At least in the case of an emerging field such as Internet governance, the *doxa* is evolving and some ideas and norms structure the debates for a small number of years before a new crisis occur and generate some changes in the *doxa*.

With this definition, the notion of field can be used for a variety of transnational social spaces characterised by their relative autonomy. Two objects of study have attracted most of Bourdieusian IR. First, the political sociology of the European integration represent a direct translation of Bourdieusian sociology to a supranational (or transnational) context (Adler-Nissen, 2008; Cohen, 2011; Cohen & Vauchez, 2007; Frankel & Højbjerg, 2007; Georgakakis, 2009, 2011, 2012, 2012; Georgakakis & de Lassale, 2007; Georgakakis & Weisbein, 2010; Guiraudon, 2003; Jenson & Mérand, 2010; Kauppi, 2003, 2005; Madsen, 2007; Mérand, 2006, 2010; Vauchez, 2007, 2008, 2011, 2013). The main goal of the political sociology of European integration is to shed light on the role of actors, their positions and their ideas in the European integration project (Saurugger, 2008). This type of analysis draws notably on the notion of field to study European spaces of interactions between elites, professionals or “Eurocrats”. They provide an alternative to state-centred and institutionalist perspectives on the integration process. The European Union may be the case, where transnational fields are more likely to emerge since the integration process is more advanced than in other global regions. At the global level, no sectoral integration process is as developed as at the European level. It became relatively common for professions and interest groups to be organised at the European level. The existence and influence of European institutions is also an indicator of the existence of transnational European spaces of interactions. However, this does not mean that the emergence of transnational fields is limited to the European case. Sectoral global integration has fostered the emergence of transnational fields in very specialized areas.

Security in its broadest sense has been the most studied issue by Bourdieusian IR beyond the European case (Bigo, 2005, 2011; Leander, 2005, 2010a, 2010b; Olsson, 2013). Bourdieusian security studies all contribute to the critique of mainstream security studies and to the emergence of a more sociological understanding of security issues. Bourdieusian concepts have been used to explore transnational fields of security professionals (Bigo 2005, 2011). They have also been used to introduce culture in security studies (Williams, 2012). The focus on practices rather than actors (states and institutions) has brought new insights on the field of security (Leander 2011; Pouliot,

2010). Notions like symbolic violence and symbolic power question the struggles for legitimacy in security matters beyond the idea of the state's monopoly over legitimate violence (Olsson, 2013).

The potential contribution of Bourdieusian sociology to international studies is even more important. Beyond the European case and the analysis of the field of security that has been already prepared by these pioneering works, Bourdieu's concepts and methods could contribute to a critical perspective on world politics. This contribution would be complementary to the existing literature on critical global political economy that constitutes one of the main critical project of the IR discipline. Recently, this potential has been acknowledged in several congresses, workshops and publications (Adler-Nissen, 2012; Bigo & Madsen, 2011; Leander, 2011). As Adler-Nissen puts it, the Bourdieusian project is not about adding yet another dead French thinker to IR (Adler-Nissen, 2012, p.1). It is about re-thinking the key categories of IR, focusing a critical perspective on practices and actors, and bringing reflexivity to the discipline. The present study aims to use Bourdieusian concepts beyond the study of European integration and security to evaluate their potential to study Internet governance. It is also an attempt to link the recent Bourdieusian trend in International Political Sociology to the critical tradition in International Political Economy. In order to present more than just a theoretical reflection on field, *habitus* and hegemony, it is rooted in the empirical analysis of Internet governance and draws upon the less theory-oriented work of Wright Mills to anchor the theoretical reflection to the more concrete question of who governs the Internet.

The notion of field is an interesting bridge between neo-Gramscian global political economy and the sociology of elites. It locates the actor-centred analysis in a social space. Indeed, Bourdieusian sociology, and especially the concept of field, revolves around the notion of space. Positions within the field determine to a certain extent the interactions between actors and their discourses. Ideas are situated within heterodoxy or orthodoxy. And the fields themselves are situated within a national, or in the case of transnational fields, global field of power. Moreover, the issue of the necessary adaptation of Bourdieusian sociology to International relations remains to be fully explored. Neo-Gramscian scholarship has a long tradition of debates around the use of Gramsci's theory in the study of global political economy that could inform the application of Bourdieusian concepts to a different context.

As we have seen, the sociology of elites has mainly been used at a national level, with a few attempts to investigate a global elite. However, if we take Scott's definition of holders of power within a field, the study of elites does not need to be carried out within a reified container, be it the

state or global capitalism. Through the notion of field, a meso-level analysis of the domination of certain actors within coherent social spaces is possible. The power of the elite is exercised in a determined, though evolving, social space. And this space can be transnational. The analysis of elites in a field level raises some methodological issues that will be discussed in the next section.

Not only actors and their practices are located within a field of forces, discourses and ideas also participate to the structuring of the field. First, some elements, world-views and rules of the game are taken for granted within the field. They represent the *doxa*, what goes without saying (Bourdieu, 1977, p. 166). The *doxa* binds the field together since actors have to agree on something in order to be able to interact and compete (for example the scientific field relies on reason). Beyond the undiscussed *doxa*, the opposition between orthodoxy and heterodoxy represent one of the dynamic aspects of the field. The present study insists on the attempt by dominant actors in the field (the power elite) to safeguard certain elements of their ideological cement (the orthodoxy) within the *doxa* of the field. Some elements such as self-regulation in the 1990s and multistakeholderism in the 2000s lie somewhere between the orthodoxy and the *doxa*. This process is all the more important since the field of Internet governance is young and loosely institutionalised. A successful attempt by the power elite to translate orthodoxy into elements of the *doxa* automatically excludes heterodox ideas from the field. They cannot be discussed within the field any more. However, the process of autonomisation of the field is not irreversible. The existence of a field depends on the existence of a battlefield. The exclusion of all debates within the field would certainly lead to its loss of relevance and ultimately to its disappearing. This process has rarely been studied by Bourdieusian sociology and international political sociology. However, the dynamic character of the relations among fields and within a field of power entail a precarious character for the field. The process of excluding heterodox idea is an ambiguous one. On the one hand, it might reinforce orthodoxy and even put elements of the orthodoxy out of the reach of the struggles into the *doxa*. On the other hand, it threatens the very existence of the field, especially in the case of emerging transnational field that are still in the process of autonomisation from other fields.

In spite of its relative autonomy, a field is not completely isolated from the rest of social life. The evolution of a field depends on global structural tendencies. A field is influenced by, and influence other neighbouring fields. Some authors transpose Bourdieu's conceptualisation of interacting fields embedded in a national field of power to the global level (e.g. Mérand and Pouliot, 2008). In this conception, a field is a relatively autonomous and sometimes transnational space with its own stakes and rules of the game. However, global dynamics transcend fields. Homologies can be found in

different fields. The opposition between a dominant group A and a group B in the social field as a whole is reproduced in the more specialised fields in homologous forms as the opposition of a dominant group A1 and a dominated group B1 (Lane, 2006 p. 91). Fields emerge and evolve in relation to other fields. This is why the concept of field allows not only for a detailed analysis of field-specific stakes and dynamics, but also for an analysis of the relations between fields and of the position of a given field in the global field of power. The field evolves in a global context with multiple fields. The frontiers of the field fluctuate in relation with other fields (Bigo, 2005 p. 58). While fields are differentiated, Bourdieu's social theory remains a global social theory. The relationship between fields is not theoretically pre-defined and requires an empirical study in order to keep in mind the complexity of the social world. Bourdieu analyses the exchange rate between different forms of capital acquired in different fields in order to describe the possibility for agents to play in different fields (Bourdieu, 1991). A way to conceptualise the relationship between fields is to postulate the existence of a field of power, a global space of struggle for power, where the hierarchy between fields is at stake and where the exchange rates between different forms of capital are determined. Bourdieu describes such a field of power at the national level, generally constituted by the state itself (Bourdieu, 2012). Some authors use the concept of an “international field of power” (Mérand and Pouliot, 2008). This notion allows for a re-introduction of ideas such as interstate competition, and the existence of non-state actors that are influential beyond their specific field, at a global level. This idea is similar to the “*nébuleuse*” described by Cox (1996) or to the idea of global elites. The notion of international (or global) field of power relates the Bourdieusian analysis of a specific field to the global vision of critical global political economy. It is within the global field of power that the hierarchy of the different transnational (sectoral and national) fields is defined and where change, as analysed by critical IPE, occurs.

Table 3.1. From Wright Mills to Gramsci *via* Bourdieu

Approach	Sociology of elites	Bourdieuian sociology	Neo-Gramscian IPE
Main Author	Wright Mills	Bourdieu	Cox
Main concepts	Power elite, metaphysics	Field, Habitus, capital, doxa	Hegemony
Contribution to the project	Unification process of different elites, focus on agency	Analysis of relatively autonomous (transnational) spaces	Analysis of consensual domination and order, agency of the dominated
Shortcomings for the project	Lack of a theory of power and domination, lack of agency of non-elites	Difficulty of operationalisation (e.g. field frontiers, methodology)	Over-generalisation, tendency to materialism and structuralism

As summarised in table 3.1.1, the definition of one field's frontier appears as one of the main challenge for an Bourdieusian approach to IR. The emergence and dynamic evolution of the field, might re-define the frontiers of formerly autonomous fields and include them partially or totally (Bigo, 2005). The analysis of the genealogy of the field, its differentiation and autonomisation from other fields, the merger of formerly independent fields is necessary but insufficient. The analysis of the evolution of the field *vis-à-vis* the fields that it partially absorbed and replaced; and *vis-à-vis* neighbouring and even competing field is also necessary. Chapter 4 describes the autonomisation process of Internet governance both from the field of computer science, and from the field of international telecommunication regulation. However, this story is not a thing of the past. The evolving relationship between Internet governance and these neighbouring fields continue to shape the fields' boundaries. Chapter 6 present an interesting example of the evolution of the field at the turn of the millennium. It takes an evolutionary perspective on Bourdieu's concept of field. Drawing upon the dynamic readings of Bourdieu by French regulationists (Boyer, 2008; Lordon, 2003), it explores how a field evolves. Far from the static space of social reproduction that some authors saw in Bourdieu's work (DiMaggio, 1979; more recently Savage and Williams, 2008), the field is here understood as a space of change, both internally through the practices of actors and within a global field of power, through the reconfiguration of its frontiers and through the evolution of its position within the global field of power. In a similar fashion to Boyer, who defined Bourdieu as a theoretician of change (Boyer, 2003, 2008), and consistently with some dynamic readings of Bourdieu's sociology of elites (see below), Bourdieusian international political sociology often focus on the dynamic and changing character of social interactions rather than primarily on

reproduction.

*Bourdieu, Gramsci and Wright Mills: the hegemony of transnational power elites*

Bourdieu, Gramsci and Wright Mills represent three important contributions to social sciences, and potentially to international studies. However, they analyse different phenomena with different tools. This section explains why these three authors are merged in the study of transnational elites in Internet governance. It argues that these three approaches are compatible and coherent in order to study Internet governance. First, more and more sociologists combine Wright Mills and Bourdieu in the study of elites. Second, while the concept of field is interesting in order to avoid the globalising and totalising tendency of critical IPE, the Gramscian concept of hegemony remains more adequate than Bourdieu's concepts such as "common sense" and *habitus* in order to analyse consensual domination at a transnational level.

As we have seen, the sociology of elites was very important for early sociologists. Later, the work of Wright Mills re-created a scholarly debate around the notion of elites. However, this debate has suffered from its ambiguous position in relation with liberal pluralism and Marxism. Liberal pluralists rejected the notion of a power elite that criticised the conception of liberal democracy. Marxists, on the other hand, preferred the notion of class to analyse domination. They criticised Wright Mills for his lack of a general theory and for the empiricist character of his research (Barrow, 2007). Moreover, the definition of the concept of elites has not always been very precise (Scott, 2008). As a result, the sociology of elites, including Wright Mills' work on the US power elite, remained marginal in the social sciences for some decades. However, recently, a number of sociologists and political scientists re-discovered the sociology of elites, the notion of a power elite, and even combined Wright Mills and Bourdieu in order to overcome the lack of a general framework for the study of domination in Wright Mills' research.

Indeed, Bourdieu's conceptual tools allows for a renewed analysis of social structures that draws neither upon the idea of class, nor on a liberal/pluralist framework. According to Froud *et al.* (2006), Bourdieu's main contribution to the study of elites is the focus on individual resources (forms of capital) rather than on the definition of a class as an aggregation of structural position. This focus puts human agency at the center of the analysis of social classes (Savage, Warde, & Devine, 2005). Thus, elites can be studied beyond the traditional focus on the "establishment" or on the big firms' boards. Individuals can have different resources, assets or capitals that gives them

influence in a given realm. While a Marxist analysis would focus only on economic capital to explain domination, a Bourdieusian analysis can describe process of domination in different fields based on different forms of capital. Bourdieu's description of the literary or the scientific fields highlights the importance of non-economic capitals in a number of social spaces. Just like Wright Mills' specialised elites, a Bourdieusian look on elites allows for the analysis of elite division, notably because of the different forms of capital that they hold (Froud et al., 2006 p. 35). As we have already argued, the location of the power of elites within a field is one of the most important aspect of this type of analysis. The possibility for a number of agents to span fields because of the capital they acquired in their specific field is all the more important in modern globalised capitalism (Froud et al., 2006 p. 36).

This short presentation of the use of Bourdieu in contemporary elite sociology evidences a number entry points for the combination of Bourdieu and Wright Mills. First, both authors postulate the existence within a given social space of a number of different elites rather than a pre-defined dominant class. For Wright Mills, elites come from different institutions like the church, the military, or the large corporations. For Bourdieu, they rely on different forms of capital acquired in different sub-fields. Bourdieu offers a generalisable framework that complements Wright Mills' description of the specific institutions and situation of the post-WW2 US society. On the other hand, the detailed analysis of the unification process of the power elite, with its ideological and institutional components, is an interesting alternative to Bourdieu's focus on the reproduction of elites (e.g. Bourdieu, 1998). The dialectical process of elite competition and elite unification described by Wright Mills highlights the dynamic character of elites' interactions. This analysis can contribute to the efforts by contemporary elite sociology to use Bourdieu's concepts without falling into the description of the sole process of elite reproduction (Savage & Williams, 2008).

François Denord's analysis of the power elite within a national field of power (Denord, Hjellbrekke, Korsnes, Lebaron, & Le Roux, 2011; Denord, Lagneau-Ymonet, & Thine, 2011; see also his preface in the latest French translation of "The Power elite": Mills, 2012) combines a Millsian analysis of the unification of a power elite and a Bourdieusian analysis of the field of power as a field of struggle for power by the holders of different capitals. In this perspective, the field represent a framework for the analysis of the competition and hierarchisations of different elites, along with their possible unification within a power elite. This type of analysis is particularly relevant at a transnational level since elites in a transnational field come by definition from different (national and/or sectoral) fields and are holders of different forms of capital. As a result, they compete as



much as they seek unification in order to structure the field. The combination of Wright Mills and Bourdieu gives a contingent and dynamic character to the analysis of elites in transnational fields. Bourdieu allows for an analysis of elite power beyond national societies and based on different forms of power and legitimacy. Wright Mills insists on the dynamic relations between specialised elites rather than on the reproduction and embedding of domination in social practices. This is why the combination of the two authors has been privileged by Kauppi and Madsen in their analysis of transnational power elites in the European social space (Kauppi and Madsen, 2013).

While Bourdieu seems to provide an interesting framework to apply Wright Mills' concepts and methods beyond the national social space, some elements justify the fact that this study focuses on the concept of field but does not rely on a whole orthodox Bourdieusian theoretical framework. In particular, the use of Bourdieu is here combined with neo-Gramscian International Political Economy, notably its reflections on hegemony, order and change. Two reasons drove me to build upon Gramsci's hegemony rather than on Bourdieu's symbolic domination in spite of my use of Bourdieu's notion of field throughout the study. The first one is the now long tradition of Gramscian IPE that evidenced the fact that Gramsci's concept of hegemony is useful to address domination and consent in transnational historical structures whereas Bourdieusian IPS does not provide many empirical studies about symbolic domination at a transnational level. The second reason is the more institutional character of hegemony, as opposed to the deeply internalised character of symbolic domination and *habitus*. Bourdieu defines the *habitus* "systems of durable, transposable, dispositions (Bourdieu, 1977 p. 72) As Burawoy (2008) puts it: "Symbolic domination rests on the bodily inculcation of social structure, and the formation of a deep unconscious habitus whereas hegemony at work rests on individuals being inserted into specific institutions that organize consent to domination, itself a condition for the mystification of exploitation. *Symbolic domination is seared into the individual psyche whereas hegemony is an effect of social relations on the individuals who carry them.*" Given the recent, transnational, changing and interstitial character of the field of Internet governance, domination is more likely to be exercised at an institutional level than at the level of *habitus*.

Bourdieu analyses primarily stable fields, with a long history of evolution and reproduction, such as the French *Grandes Ecoles* or the field of literary production. A direct and full transposition of Bourdieu's theoretical framework would undermine the analysis of one of the most important feature of transnational social interactions: their fluidity. This is why Bourdieusian sociologists are usually cautious with the translation of Bourdieusian concepts to the transnational realm. A good

example is provided by Vauchez's discussion of transnational fields as “weak” fields (Vauchez, 2008, 2011). In order to avoid a reification of transnational fields and an exaggeration of the importance of the *doxa* or the *habitus* that are long-term productions of “solid” fields, the theory of domination in this study is borrowed from critical IPE. It draws upon decades of reflections on the translation of the concepts of power, order, domination and hegemony to the analysis of the global political economy. The empirical results of this study show the rapid pace of the evolution of ideas and institutions in the field of Internet governance. While I sometimes use concepts such as *doxa*, their application to an emerging and rapidly-evolving transnational field modify their interpretation.

As a result, the point of departure of this study remains the critical IPE literature. As argued in the previous chapter, political sociology is used as a way to avoid over-generalisation and structuralism. The focus on elites, individual actors and small groups, puts agency at the heart of the analysis, and Bourdieusian International Political Sociology offers a more differentiated perspective on global politics through the analysis of intermeshed and interacting fields within the global field of power. The analysis of transnational power elites within a given social field aims to be a contribution to an already-existing critical IPE literature and not an attempt of translation of Wright Mills' and Bourdieu's work to the global level.

In parallel to my own research on the existence of a transnational power elite in Internet governance, other researchers tried to combine Wright Mills and Bourdieu and to translate their concepts for the study of transnational dynamics. In 2013, Niilo Kauppi and Mark Madsen edited *Transnational Power Elites: The new Professionals of Governance, Law and Security* (Kauppi and Madsen, 2013). Their objective is to propose a framework of analysis and a research strategy to study “the myriad of formal and informal institutions and policy-fields”. Such a strategy “cuts across the institutional façade and instead tackles some of the underlying questions of the process at large” (Kauppi and Madsen, 2013, p. 207). While limited to the study of European integration, their research is an important contribution to the emergence of an International Political Sociology that would consider basic sociological questions such as power, identity and class (Kauppi and Madsen, 2013, p. 210). They conclude that their strategy and the sociological concepts they use might be useful in order to understand inter-, supra- and transnational social configurations. Drawing upon their conclusions, I argue that these concepts and methods can be an important contribution to the study of the globalisation process. The present study can indeed be viewed as an attempt to pursue their strategy beyond the case of European integration. However, since European integration arguably represents the inter-, supra- and transnational social configuration that is most similar to

the nation-state, the limitations inherent to Kauppi and Madsen's work are even more present when their research strategy is applied to other transnational objects.

Kauppi and Madsen identify an interchangeability of European elites that is similar to Wright Mills' description of post-WWII United States. They also provide some evidence of the class identity of such elites. However, they do not identify a common *metaphysic* similar to the military metaphysics identified by Wright Mills. This difference is not anecdotal. The military metaphysic is the central project around which the power elite unifies in Wright Mills work. It is the ideological cohesion that is necessary for a unified power elite to exist.

The analysis of the ideological cohesion requires concepts and methods that cannot be found in the work of Wright Mills. As we have argued, the uncovering by Wright Mills of the existence of a common military metaphysics that united the power elite was more a combination of deep empirical knowledge and of common sense rather than the result of a methodological analysis of his data. This is why the sociology of elites is here combined with neo-Gramscian IPE. Neo-Gramscian IPE has a long tradition of analysis of ideational elements from the importance of ideas in the theoretical construction proposed by Cox (1981), to the analysis of disciplinary neoliberalism by Gill (Gill, 1995) or even the cultural political economy developed, among others, by Jessop (e.g. Jessop, 2006). Through concepts such as hegemony, hegemonic project, ideology, and economic imaginary, neo-Gramscian IPE takes ideational and discursive elements more and more seriously in its analysis of the reproduction of a capitalist world order.

Kauppi and Madsen have no theoretical or methodological tools to analyse the ideology of transnational power elites. As a result, they focus on institutional aspects of elite domination without digging into the ideational realm. One risk associated with such a research strategy is to reproduce a misleading idea of pluralism in (European and) global politics. While there is no single conspirational project of European elites, the process of European integration is not an erratic process depending on the articulation of different elites with different interests and world-views. There is a strong selectivity in the imaginaries that surround European integration (Jessop, 2004). As suggested by Neo-Gramscian literature, the metaphysics of European integration and other transnational integration projects might be found around the necessity of reproduction of a capitalist order. Market liberalisation, disciplinary neoliberalism, competitiveness and the like could be looked at as possible elements of an ideological cohesion of European elites (van Apeldoorn, 2002; van Apeldoorn & Horn, 2008; Bieler, 2010).

Another risk in the study of transnational power elites is the isolation from international relations debates and the creation of two different strands of research: a global political economy perspective analysing the global dynamics and world orders but not their specific translations on the one hand; and an international political sociology perspective analysing field-specific or region-specific dynamics but lacking the ambition to offer an alternative to mainstream international relations. This is why the study of transnational power elites is here combined with neo-Gramscian IPE as a way to overcome some shortcoming of critical IPE without giving up the ambition of an analysis of world order(s).

### ***3.2. Methodology: the study of a transnational power elite within a transnational field***

The framework outlined in the previous section requires both quantitative and qualitative methods in order to determine the evolving boundaries of the field of Internet governance, the interchangeability and ideological cohesion of the power elite, and finally the consensual character of elite power and its acceptance by non-elites.

#### **3.2.1 Taking evolution and change seriously**

In spite of the differences between the scientific traditions that are combined in the theoretical framework of this study, one main common aspect is the importance of history for these authors. All of them reject a-historical analysis and explore the evolution of social structures over time.

One of the main criticism addressed by Cox to mainstream theories is their a-historical character (Cox, 1981). Cox, like Gramsci, draws upon Vico to understand “human structures” as a “continuing creation of new forms” that include ever-changing forms of mind and evolving social relations and institutions (Cox, 1981, p. 213). To this end, Cox uses the “method of historical structures” (Cox, 1981, p. 220). The method consists in the analysis of a limited, historically located, totality<sup>23</sup>. A study of the historical situation related to this limited totality, together with the study of the emergence of rival structures, provides an evolutionary character to the analysis. It is within this framework that change can be analysed. According to Cox, historicism is a research program opposed to positivism. It aims to reveal historical structures that are particular to a historical moment and where some kind of regularities might prevail (see the 1985 postscript of

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<sup>23</sup> The idea of a “limited totality” is here interpreted not only in terms of chronological limits, but also in terms of social limits, as expressed by the concept of field.

Cox's most famous article in Cox, 1986). The most important element of such a research program is the transformation from one structure to another. This research can be carried out in two ways (Bieler & Morton, 2003):

- The research can follow the three levels, or spheres of activity identified by Cox. First, the process of production generates social forces that differ from one historical structure to another. These social forces in turn produce ideas, for example in the form of hegemonic projects. Then, hegemonic projects are concretised through particular forms of states. Finally, the particular form of state is transferred to the sphere of world order.
- An alternative research program is to focus on the subaltern classes in their interplay with the ruling classes.

Neither of these two routes is followed completely in this study. The first type of research is more adapted to the analysis of the *longue durée* and relies heavily on the state as a key level, which is not always the case in modern globalised capitalism. The second route is an important reminder that elite-research is not self-sufficient and that the interplay between the elite and non-elites (or counter-elites) is necessary (see discussion above in section 3.1.1). However, the sole focus on subaltern actors reproduces exactly the same limitations it criticises. Instead of the focus on stability and elites, the focus on the dominated groups and resistance is only half of the story. As a result, the following chapters are informed by the Neo-Gramscian historicist methodology but rely also on more empirical and meso-level analysis developed by political sociology.

Whereas power structure research inspired by Wright Mills has focused on the study of a given order (e.g. Dye & Domhoff, 1987) rather than on a historicist view of evolution and change, it should be reminded that Wright Mills' work is essentially an analysis of the profound transformation of the US society after World War II. *The Power Elite* describes the centralisation of power in the US society during the 20th century. Out of the five orders described in his previous work (Gerth & Mills, 1953), only three are central to the specific power structure of post-WWII US society: the economic, the political, and the military sphere. The bureaucratisation and centralisation of social life has undermined the role of the kinship and the religious orders. The society turns into a society of masses, where the power of the elite remains unchallenged. This transformation is, according to Wright Mills, "one of the keys to the social and psychological meaning of modern life in America" (Wright Mills, 2010). Change is thus analysed in each institutional order and at the level of the whole social structure. Change can occur within the structure through a change of personnel, or

because of the changing number, type of and power balance between institutions. In this regard, the thinking of Wright Mills is similar to the neo-Gramscian analysis of historical structures and change. As Gerth and Wright Mills put it: “every model of social structure implies a model of social-historical change; history consists of the changes which social structures undergo” (Gerth & Wright Mills, 1953 p. 399-401).

Bourdieuian sociology also offers some valuable tools in order to analyse historical change. First, a field is a social space of interactions that gradually became autonomous. This is why the genealogy of a field can be studied. The first step is thus the inquiry of the genesis of this space. According to Guzzini (2012, p. 88), the first research avenue is for the researcher to establish whether, on the international or transnational level, a given space of social interactions has reached the degree of autonomisation that is entailed by the concept of field. The process of autonomisation from other international fields, and from national fields needs to be analysed in order to define the boundaries of the field. Second, a field is a dynamic environment. Although Bourdieu has been criticised for his focus on reproduction, earlier work by Bourdieu provides some interesting ways to analyse change. This has inspired more evolutionary readings of Bourdieu, as exemplified by the work of Boyer (Boyer, 2003, 2008) and Lordon (Lordon, 2003) in the field of political economy. Chapter 6 is an application of a Bourdieuian analysis of change to the field of Internet governance. Finally, the position of a field within the global field of power and the exchange rate between any given forms of capital evolve through time.

Informed by these historicist approaches, the present study analyses the emergence of Internet governance as an international policy issue, as well as the evolution of the field of Internet governance in a time of crisis. Internet governance is thus analysed as a process rather than as a set of institutions, norms and principles. The process of governing the Internet is part of a broader process aiming at governing the global political economy. Neither Internet governance nor global governance in general represent a stabilised order. The purpose of this study is to investigate the trial-and-error process that emerged in the 1990s and evolved in the 2000s and to analyse the power dynamics that underpin it.

First, this study researches the genealogy of the field of Internet governance. It looks at the technical evolution that led to the creation of the global network, but also, and most importantly, at the autonomisation of Internet governance. Internet governance became gradually autonomous from computer networking science and from international telecommunication regulation. However, it

remained closely linked to these two fields. The genealogy of the field of Internet governance allows for a definition of its (evolving) boundaries. Internet governance is not only about creating technical standards and protocols that allow the interconnection of several computers. It is not either a typical issue of telecommunication regulation: the actors and stakes were different from the early structuration of the field. In particular, this study focuses on the first institutionalisation of the field in the late 1990s. The institutionalisation of the field represents a first moment of crisis in the field, that was triggered by the commercialisation of the network and ended with the creation of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN). The crisis occurred between 1992 and 1998, with the bulk of the political crisis taking place between 1996 and 1998. During this period, not only the boundaries of the field have been defined, but also the dominant principles and coalitions of actors have emerged. The changes within the field correspond to more global dynamics since the institutionalisation of Internet governance was deeply influenced by the power of the US on the international scene and by the ideology of neoliberalism.

Second, this study looks at the World Summit of the Information Society (2002-2005) as a new crisis in the field of Internet governance. Again, the dynamics within the field are related to more global structural tendencies such as the emergence of new powers, the consequences of the terrorist attacks of September, 11, 2001 on international relations, the burst of the Dotcom bubble etc. These structural trends were translated in the field of Internet governance through a growing discontent with the existing governance system embodied by the ICANN. This is why this historical sequence witnessed a reform of the ICANN, several discussions on Internet governance at the global level, and especially the emergence of Internet governance as the main item on the agenda of a historically important UN conference. The second crisis of Internet governance gave birth to several changes within the field in the form of new institutions, new norms and principles and a reconfiguration of the position of different actors in the field.

The definition of these historical moments does not entail the analysis of several different and unrelated power (or historical) structures. Following Cox, what is of most interest here is the transition to one order to another. Only through the analysis of the constant evolution of the field, one can have a critical perspective on the power dynamics at any given time. This is also true for the current situation that is often analysed a-historically by liberal pluralists. The historical perspective provides a way to understand the long-term power dynamics and the structuration of current debates.

### 3.2.2. Analysing Internet governance as a transnational field

The validity of the concept of transnational field depends on the possibility to identify a coherent social space where actors struggle around common stakes. This entails the crucial issue of determining the social topology of the field. A field is defined by its boundaries as well as by the varied positions of the actors within the field. In his field theory, Bourdieu rejects substantialist thinking and advocates for a “relational” thinking, which “identifies the real not with substances but with relationships” (Bourdieu, quoted in Swartz, 2012, p.61)<sup>24</sup>. Two methods seem to best fit the Bourdieusian project of a relational thinking about social structures: correspondence analysis and social network analysis (de Nooy, 2003). While Bourdieu himself and most of his followers preferred correspondence analysis<sup>25</sup>, some authors argue for the introduction of social network analysis in the analysis of fields (Anheier et al., 1995; Mohr, 2013; de Nooy, 2003). According to them, social network analysis can contribute to the analysis of fields on several accounts. First, recent developments in social network analysis allow for different analysis than what existed when Bourdieu advocated for correspondence analysis, especially in terms of visualisation. Contemporary visualisation algorithms distribute the nodes in the graph and help visualise the proximity of actors and organisations in a similar fashion to multidimensional scaling techniques used in correspondence analysis (De Nooy, 2003, p. 315). Social network analysis has thus become a useful tool to visualise fields. More importantly, social network analysis points to a different understanding of social structures that can be useful to analyse transnational fields (de Nooy, 2003). Social network analysis shows manifest relations between individuals. In the present case, these manifest relations include co-authorship of documents, affiliation to the same organisation, attendance to the same event, or comments on one another’s statements. In a Bourdieusian perspective, these intersubjective relations result from social structures. As a result, a focus on intersubjective relations is at least insufficient, or even misleading. This is why most Bourdieusian sociology analyse properties of people and organisations (attributes) rather than intersubjective relations. However, the fact that intersubjective relations are a consequence rather than a cause of social structures does not disqualify social network analysis in the study of fields (de Nooy, 2003). Intersubjective relations and institutional affiliations are manifestations of the structure of the field. Social network analysis can thus map out the actors, institutions and the effects of the structure of the field. While further work is required to investigate the less visible structure of the field, social network analysis is a

24 The term relationship might be misleading here: Bourdieu differentiates between intersubjective interactions between agents and objective relations that exist “independently from individual will and consciousness” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 72). The object of his sociology is the study of objective relations.

25 Although Bourdieu defines a field as a network (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; p. 77), he explicitly rejects social network analysis as a method to analyse fields relationally (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992).



relevant method in order to analyse the topology of the field.

Another objection to the use of social network analysis is its focus on the present rather than on the historical emergence of a given structure. Social network analysis provides a snapshot of the relations between actors and institutions at time  $t$  but does not include data on the emergence and evolution of a given situation. Consistently with the theoretical framework outlined in the previous section, the methods used in the present study are first and foremost historical. This is why several networks have been built in order to focus on evolution and change rather than stability. A first network (though not relying on comprehensive data) evidences the transnational character of the emerging field of Internet governance as soon as in the 1980s (see chapter 4). A second network tries to map out the field of Internet governance in the second half of the 1990s (see chapter 5). Finally, a third network analyses the interactions of the agents from the field of Internet governance that were participating in the World Summit for the Information Society in the mid-2000s (see chapter 7 and 8). The particular attention given to the genealogy of the field and its evolution avoids the a-historicist character of some social network analysis and ensures the coherence between the theoretical argument and the data analysis in the present study.

Just like some of Bourdieu's theoretical framework requires adaptation for the study of transnational fields (see previous section), social network analysis seems to be an interesting way to outline the topography of a transnational field such as Internet governance. Bourdieu's use of correspondence analysis has been criticised for its tendency to reduce struggles in a field to a unique logic: the control of the whole field (Mohr, 2013). In long-established sub-national fields, this limitation is balanced by the fact that the researcher might be able to identify the main logic of the field since actors are well conscious of it after decades of interactions. However, in emerging transnational field, the variety of stakes and logics among very different actors is a crucial element that needs to be acknowledged at the theoretical as well as at the methodological level. Consistent with the introduction of Wright Mills' concepts in the theoretical framework in order to study the differentiated socialisations, capitals and practices of transnational elites, social network analysis does not determine *a priori* the most important dimensions that structure the field but rather offers a visualisation of institutional affiliations and social interactions that is a first step towards an understanding of the underlying logics and the objective positions held by actors in the field. Moreover, the focus on institutions is coherent with the use of Gramscian hegemony to describe a domination that relies more on institutions rather on an acquired *habitus* in emergent transnational fields such as Internet governance. Finally, social network analysis tends to focus on practices rather

than attributes in the description of the field (de Nooy, 2003). Again, this type of thinking seems to fit well the study of emerging transnational fields, where practices are constantly evolving and the relative value of capitals and attributes are still subject to rapid change.

As a result, social network analysis can be a useful tool to study fields in terms of power, especially transnational fields, since it focuses on one aspect that is essential: the interactions between actors. It can be useful in order to reconstruct the field and to analyse practices. However, Bourdieu's objections to social network analysis should remind us that the method cannot be used as the unique methodological tool to analyse the field. Further methods are necessary to explore the structure of the field beyond interactions and to reveal the objective positions of actors within the field. This is why social network analysis is used more in an exploratory fashion in the present study and why it is combined with critical discourse analysis and prosopographical elements.

Social network analysis is used mainly in two ways. First, it is used as a way to draw the boundaries of the field. Active participation in the debates around the definition of Internet governance is a good indicator of the inclusion of an individual, or an organisation, in the field of Internet governance. There was no single forum during the first period. The data used in the construction of the network includes the list participants to a number of conferences, summits, and hearings on Internet governance, the authorship of policy documents, the search for influential commentators between two different versions of the same document and the boards of the major institutions involved in the debates in the 1990s. This sources helped to build a database of 343 individuals and 100 organisations, as well as documents and events (see annex 2). The data is not exhaustive. The archive of some conferences were not available and some events and institutions might be missing. However, the repetition of the same names after the inclusion of a number of institutions in the database tends to show that the bulk of the actors of Internet governance in the 1990s is included in the data. For the second time period, the data includes the list of participants to the different preparatory meetings of the WSIS, the list of participants to the two phases of the summit, and the list of participants to the process of the Working Group on Internet Governance (members of the group, secretariat, commentators). This data represent a database of approximately 550 individuals and 250 institutions. In addition to the individuals' names and institutional affiliation, their statements during the Summit are used to build networks of participants (see Annex 4). The field of Internet governance in the mid-2000s cannot be equated to the WSIS. However, the increasing importance of the WSIS as a key forum in the discussions about Internet governance ensured a representation of all important organisations in the Summit. The network analysis is slightly

different from the first time period since by definition, all participants to the WSIS participated in the same event. The analysis looks rather at the regularity and inequality of the participation to the meetings (participation is weighted according to the status of the participant from audience to speaker, and chair). In spite of the differences in the collection and treatment, the data allows for an analysis of the evolution of the elite between the 1990s and the WSIS (see annex 2 and 4). The analysis is conducted using the UCINET software and visualisations are produced in NetDraw (Borgatti *et al.*, 2002; Borgatti, 2002).

Second, social network analysis is combined with more qualitative methods to draw the topography of the field, the relative position of actors within the field and the structure of power of the field. The visualisation of a field in the form of a network can provide indications of the respective positions of actors within the field. First, the inclusion of an actor (individual or organisation) in the network depends on its participation to Internet governance debates. Moreover, isolates<sup>26</sup> are generally excluded from the graphs for the sake of clarity. Second, the position of nodes in the network is also an indication of their position within the field. For example, visualisation algorithms seek the visualisation that present the shorter links and the less intersections possible (Borgatti *et al.*, 2014). As a result, actors that have more relations among them tend to be grouped in the same area of the graph, while marginal actors appear in less connected areas of the graph. Moreover, measures of centrality are often used in network visualisation as a way to highlight more connected actors. The three following figures illustrate the way social network analysis can help highlight some properties of a field. Figure 3.1. is a random network of 8 nodes and 10 links. It could represent 8 individuals having relations of friendship (links between two nodes) or not (no links between two nodes).




Figure 3.1. Example of network

Figure 3.1 has been drawn “free-hand” and does not result from a visualisation algorithm. The same

<sup>26</sup> Isolates are nodes without any ties to other nodes.

network looks different when re-drawn by a social network analysis software based on a layout algorithm (see figure 3.2)<sup>27</sup>.




Figure 3.2. Example of network visualised in a spring embedder layout

The second graph highlights the different positions of nodes such as 1 and 7 in the network. The more marginalised position of node 7 appears clearly. Node 6 is an isolate: it has no link to any other node in the network. Finally, if we add a centrality measure to determines the size of the nodes<sup>28</sup>, the relative position of each node in the network is stressed. This is what is shown in figure 3.3.

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27 In this case, the network has been drawn in Visone 2.7.3 and re-drawn by the software using the spring embedder layout algorithm.

28 In this case, the betweenness centrality determines the size of the node. Betweenness centrality is the number of shortest paths between all vertices that pass through that node. It is often used to determine “broker” roles of actors within a network (Borgatti et al., 2014).




Figure 3.3. Example of network with node size determined by betweenness centrality

These simple indicators are used in the present study in the definition of elites, counter-elites and non-elites. The mapping of a complex field such as Internet governance in the form of a network helps to visualise the more connected, more central actors that form the elites and the more marginalised actors. These observations are then complemented by qualitative data analysis in order to confirm and substantiate these findings. Indications given by the graph produced by social network analysis is even more interesting if the network includes discourses and statements rather than individuals and institutions only (see more details on discursive elements below).

The network visualisation is here used mainly as a descriptive method. No further calculation is applied to the data and the analysis is corroborated with qualitative analysis. However, using social network analysis coupled with qualitative content analysis is useful in order to locate documents, discourses, and actors within a given negotiation, and ultimately within the field. Compared to other methods used in Bourdieusian sociology (for example multiple correspondence analysis), it focuses on actor practices and discourses in a given process rather than on their long-term characteristics. It also highlights actors' discourses and arguments that are more dynamic than their *habitus*. The social network analysis of discourses also represent an interesting addition to the “institution-based” social network analysis usually used in the Millsian tradition of power structure analysis in order to evidence elite circulation and interlocks<sup>29</sup> (see section below).

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29 See See <http://www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

### 3.2.3. Investigating the existence of a power elite

The study of power structures in a Millsian tradition generally relies on social network analysis coupled with content analysis<sup>30</sup>. Social network analysis is a useful method in order to study the institutional interlocks that are characteristic of the existence of a power elite. The method is used to test the first criteria defined by Wright Mills to determine the existence of a power elite: the interchangeability of positions. It can show for example whether individuals holding key positions within an institutional order such as the military or large companies are closely linked with individuals holding power position within political institutions. However, interchangeability is not sufficient to prove the existence of a power elite. Social network analysis helps to visualise links but does not tell much on the nature of these links. Qualitative analysis is required in order to analyse if these links evidence competition or cohesion.

*Interchangeability: social network analysis and qualitative data*

While social network analysis can be useful to determine the topology of a field, it is also used more traditionally in this research as a way to analyse the relationships between actors, and especially elites (for an overview of social network analysis in political science, see Ward, Stovel, & Sacks, 2011). Social network analysis is useful to visualise and analyse the connections and flows between different types of nodes (actors, organisations, documents, etc.). Such analysis allows to study patterns in relationships between units. In the case of elite sociology, interlocking directorates is one oft-used method to research the existence of a unified economic (or business) elite at a national and at a transnational level (Carrol & Fennema, 2002; Kentor, Jeffrey Jang, 2004; Mach, David, & Bühlmann, 2011; Mizruhi, 1996). Social network analysis is also used for the study of political elites, or transgovernmental networks (e.g. Thurner & Binder, 2009). In the case of the emerging field of Internet governance, social network analysis is mainly useful in order to present an alternative view to the pluralist/liberal tradition. The purpose is to analyse the links between actors and institutions in order to de-construct the stakeholder categories. Social network analysis looks beyond the main affiliation of actors and analyses the links between different elites. It focuses on elite circulation and elite interchangeability. The different specialised elites involved in Internet governance rely on different resources (or different forms of capital): technical knowledge, financial capital, political power, etc. They are affiliated with different types of institutions (private organisations, standardisation bodies, companies, governments, intergovernmental organisations,

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30 *Ibid.*

etc.). However, social network analysis can reveal to what extent and in which settings they collaborate. The method used here is mainly the elaboration of a database of a large number of individuals, their institutional affiliation, and their participation to different processes such as conferences, the direct drafting of policy documents, or the submission of comments on these drafts. This data is then visualised in the form of 2-mode networks (fig. 3.4) or one-mode network (fig. 3.5).




Figure 3.4. Example of a 2-mode network





Figure 3.5. Example of 1-mode network

A 2-mode network includes individuals and institutions (organisations, documents, events). In the example in figure 3.4, individuals 1, 2 and 3 participated in event A. 2-mode networks provide an institutional definition of the elite, as used in the Millsian tradition. Elites are powerful actors affiliated to powerful institutions. The same data can also be visualised as direct links between 1, 2 and 3 (fig. 3.5). One-mode networks help to visualise the interchangeability of the elite. Instead of a focus on institutions, one-mode networks highlight interpersonal relations. A repetition of these links between members of groups that are *a priori* different in terms of national origins, institutional affiliation, resources and attributes (forms of capital) gives an alternative perspective to the dominant stakeholder narrative.

The network visualisations are elements of a study of power relations and – combined with qualitative analysis – illustrate the existence of an elite.



Node	Description	Example
A	Key institution in Internet governance	Internet Engineering TaskForce
B	Key document in Internet Governance	ICANN by-laws
C	Key institution in Internet Governance	IBM
D	Marginal document in Internet Governance	Non-binding civil society declaration
E	Marginal institution in Internet Governance	UNESCO

Figure 3.6. Power differentials in a two-mode network<sup>31</sup>

Figure 3.6 is an imaginary network that exemplifies a reading of a network visualisation in terms of elite power. Elite actors are connected to key institutions (A,C) that participate in the drafting of key policy documents (B). The individuals represented by nodes 1,2 and 3 are likely to be part of the elite of Internet governance whereas individuals 4,5 and 6 are likely to be part of non-elite actors or of a counter-elite. Centrality measures (node size) tend to strengthen this observation. This institutional definition of the elite then requires to be complemented by the qualitative analysis of the practices of these actors.

Indeed, the interconnections between elites does not prove the existence of a power elite in itself

<sup>31</sup> Visualisation of fig. 3.6 is a spring embedder graph of a two-mode network with a measure of *eigenvector* centrality determining the size of the nodes.



since social network analysis is not able to demonstrate whether the cooperation is competitive or consensual, or even conspirational. However, it presents a systematic mapping of the relations within a field at a given historical moment and hints towards an interchangeability of elite positions. It represents a first step in the analysis of the existence of a power elite within a given field. The rest of the analysis depends on qualitative data, and the historical perspective that allows for an analysis of socialisation processes within the field.

Prosopography has been a key component of elite studies, especially in historical perspectives (Verley, 2001; Daviet-Vincent, 2006). It is also a method used by Bourdieu and his followers. Prosopography is a kind of collective biography that can help to explore the structure and evolution of a field. Broady (2002) defines Bourdieusian prosopography as the study of individuals belonging to the same field through a comprehensive collection of data for each and every individual. However, the purpose of prosopography is not the study of individuals but rather the study of the field (Broady, 2002). This type of research is certainly useful under the conditions described by Broady. The clear identification with Bourdieusian sociology and the objective of field-analysis helps to avoid the lack of theory of prosopography criticised by some authors (Lemerancier and Picard, 2010).

However, prosopography suffers from a number of limitations. The first limitation is the “comprehensive” character of the data that is required. The collection of the data requires an important amount of work, especially for the study of transnational fields. Second, the comparison between biographies is made difficult by the variety of origins and features of the individuals. Because of these limitations, and especially because of the impossibility of a comprehensive data collection, no systematic prosopographical study has been carried out for this research. Instead, the biographies of a sample of individuals have been analysed in order to define typical elements of the biographies of certain specialised elites.

The data used in the analysis of biographical information comes from the biographies of elite individuals that are available on the websites of their various organizations. This data is completed with information from websites such as [icannwiki.org](http://icannwiki.org), where contributors can post biographical elements on individuals involved in Internet governance. Social networks like [facebook.com](http://facebook.com), and especially [linkedin.com](http://linkedin.com) are also valuable sources of information. While not systematic and comprehensive, this method allows for the description of several typical biographies that correspond to specialised elites. Then, these different biographies can be compared in order to understand their

significance for the field. For example, it is interesting to see what type of institution individuals were affiliated to when they were first involved in Internet governance. Here, specialised elites such as the “technical” elite, the civil society elite, the political elite and the business elite can be defined. Then the circulation of these elites is interesting to compare. The collected data is important to deconstruct the stakeholder categories that are used by mainstream Internet governance studies. It is also interesting to look at gender and differences in terms of nationalities in the different specialised elites.

This type of analysis is conducted for the board members of the ICANN since its creation, for a number of randomly selected members of institutions like the Working Group on Internet Governance and the Internet Engineering Taskforce, or the G8 DotForce. Prominent individuals, whose names are often to be found in the various forums of Internet governance over the years, have been preferably chosen for two reasons. First, they are more likely to present a pattern of evolution within the field compared to individuals that might come at grips with Internet governance on a given occasion and then go back to other fields. Second, the fact that they are well-known individuals multiply the data available on their successive affiliations. They are more likely members of different expert groups, where their biographical information is used as a legitimisation element. They are also more likely to be listed in websites like [icannwiki.org](http://icannwiki.org) and to be the subject of newspaper articles.

The combination of social network analysis, prosopographical elements and a historical perspective on the evolution of actors' circulation among institutions offers multiple ways to investigate the interchangeability of elite positions, which is the first element that proves the existence of a power elite in the Millsian tradition.

#### *Metaphysics: critical discourse analysis and social network analysis of statements*

Wright Mills further investigates the existence of a power elite through the study of shared metaphysics<sup>32</sup> among the members of the elite. In other words, ideological cohesion is a necessary condition in the definition of a power elite. Ideological cohesion is analysed in this study through qualitative content analysis inspired by critical discourse analysis, and through a social network analysis of statements.

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32 For a different presentation of the research on ideological cohesion anchored in a Cultural Political Economy framework, see Chenou, 2013a. Wright Mills “shared metaphysics” could be understood as a “dominant economic imaginary”.

The debates on Internet governance have taken place to a large extent online and within arenas where meetings minutes, report, preparatory and final documents are archived. As a result, several thousands of pages from hundreds of documents were retrieved for this research. It should be noted that some on-line documents were accessed through the Internet Archive since some web-pages do not exist any more. Some important sources like the archive of the NewDom mailing list could not be completely retrieved. The data analysis follows two different paths. For the first time period, the less structured and incomplete data is analysed through the construction of categories, the identification of broader discourses about Internet governance and the analysis of their position within the field of Internet governance. For the second period, the data is gathered from two UN websites and the archive is complete. Thus, the research strategy was slightly different. Rather than broad discourses, precise statements are categorised and identified within the documents. Then, their relationships are visualised using social network analysis, and their influence – or lack of influence – on the final documents of the conference is analysed.

For the first time period, the study is based on the qualitative content analysis of 15 versions of 4 main policy documents produced between 1996 and the creation of the ICANN in 1998 (See Annex 3). These are the documents that explicitly described a governance model for the Internet. The analysis follows an inductive category-building approach in order to compare common themes among documents (Boyatzis, 1998). I created categories and used them to evaluate the commonalities and differences between the models presented in each document. Categories are related to the possible modes of governance of the Internet, ranging from public to private, from national to global, from technical to political, and from non-market to market-enabling. The same categories were then applied to public comments on these documents as well as to other documents from the same period that did not describe a concrete governance model but reflected key principles advocated by specific groups (e.g. Clinton & Gore 1996, ICC 1998, Boston Working Group 1998; Open Root Server Confederation 1998). The results were interpreted to identify broader discourses about Internet governance (see chapter 5) in relation with concepts that can be found in the literature of the late 1990s such as neoliberalism and global public goods.

The identification of discourses through the analysis of a number of statements is a common research strategy in critical discourse analysis. Discourses can be understood “as the general domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualisable group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated practice that accounts for a number of statements.” (Foucault, quoted in Fairclough, 2003,

p. 121). Discourses are ways of representing aspects of the world from a particular perspective (Fairclough 2003, p. 124). In this case, they relate to the regulation of Internet and echo broader discourses about the governance of globalisation. The identification of discourse is an important element of elite research. Discourses are not equal within a given field, they are elements of the relationships between agents in the field. Thus, they compete, and one discourse or several discourses can dominate others. Bourdieu, used the distinction between orthodoxy and heterodoxy to refer to the unequal position of a given discourse within a field (Bourdieu, 1984). Discourses are at the same time object of struggle to define the orthodoxy of a field and resources that individuals deploy in relating to one another (Fairclough 2003, p. 124). Critical discourse analysis thus tries to identify the “naturalized preconstructions [...] that are ignored as such and which can function as unconscious instruments of construction” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992).

The identification of discourse relies on an analysis of the texts that draws particular attention to the use of a certain vocabulary and certain semantic relations. For example, some documents refer to the Internet as a global marketplace (e.g. Clinton & Gore, 1996) while others refer to a global public good (IAHC, 1997). Some documents insist on security issues, while others stress the emancipatory potential of the network. The debates evidence the different representations of the Internet that existed at a given time and can be categorised as discourses. Their relative influence in the drafting and adoption binding and non-binding policy documents shows their position within the field. This influence can be evaluated qualitatively (see Annex 3) and quantitatively (see below). Moreover, critical discourse analysis can help to investigate the emergence of a consensual discourse among different elites – through the imposition of a dominant discourse, or through the hybridisation of several dominant discourses. This consensual discourse is a crucial element of the cohesion of the power elite as well as a necessary step towards hegemony.

Qualitative content analysis based on inductive category-building is coupled with social network analysis. The purpose of adding social network analysis to the qualitative content analysis is to focus on the relationships between individuals, institutions and the categories that can be found in the documents. This is why, instead of the broad discourses identified in the first phase, the analysis of the second time period relies on the visualisation of the varied positions of actors' statements within the field. Since the data on the second period is comprehensive and located in one given place (the WSIS website), a process of negotiation can be usefully described. Both the coding of the documents and the matrix of the statements' network is made with Discourse Network Analyzer (see Annex 4). This software was designed precisely to analyse policy processes and negotiations

through the analysis of the linkages between statements from various actors and institutions. After the same process of inductive category-building used for the first period, the documents are coded in the software according to the following model:

Actor/Institution/Document A stated on date D that X (e.g. UNESCO stated on October 12, 2004, that Internet governance should be multilateral)

A link exist when two actors, institutions or documents share the same statement (within a given time-window). The result is a visualisation of different types of network (Leifeld, 2012):

- one-mode networks of actors (only one set of actors), institutions or documents sharing one or several statements (see fig. 3.5)<sup>33</sup>;
- two-mode networks of actors, institutions or document as the first type of node; and statements as a second type of node (see fig. 3.4)<sup>34</sup>.

These networks highlight the differentiated positions of discourses within the field as well as the relations between actors and discourses. They are important to investigate the ideological cohesion of elites. They are also used in order to measure the consensual character of elite rule.

### **3.2.4. Measuring hegemony**

As we have seen in the theoretical framework, the cohesion and interchangeability of the power elite are crucial elements for the establishment of an order within a given field. The level of acceptance of elite rule is the important factor to determine the stability of this order and the potential for change. As a result, measuring hegemony is part of a historicist and evolutionary research agenda.

The analysis of hegemony in Internet governance evaluates two criteria. First, the study measures the consensual character of elite rule. Second, the research investigates the existence of alternative discourses and social forces. This type of analysis combines the two research strategy of Neo-Gramscian international political economy outlined before (Bieler & Morton, 2003).

First, the analysis of the consensual character of elite rule reconstructs the Coxian combination of

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33 In this case, 1,2 and 3 would represent individuals, while edges would represent shared statements.

34 In this case, A would represent a statement and 1,2 and 3 would represent individuals or organisations.

social forces, ideas and institutions. The fact that particular social forces produce a hegemonic project that is then institutionalised, for example in the form of the ICANN or the Internet Governance Forum, shows a certain level of acceptance. This is why Cox relates the creation of institutions to hegemony (Cox, 1981, p. 137). Thus, the creation of the ICANN and the IGF are here analysed as processes of hegemony production. Institutions tend to legitimise a particular order and to canalise resistance. As a result, the Coxian framework is used here to analyse the historical process of hegemony production as the creation of a negotiated and institutionalised order. This type of analysis relies primarily on the identification of hegemonic project and on the institutional history of the field of Internet governance. It corresponds to the historicist approach outlined before.

Second, the analysis of hegemony requires the identification of potential alternative discourses and social forces. This is why the present study analyse the evolution of the position of discourses within the field. Formerly marginal discourses can become dominant over time. This is for example the case of a sovereigntist discourse on Internet governance with its focus on security issues that became dominant after the 2001 terrorist attacks on the US territory. Alternative social forces are analysed through the concept of counter-elites. The analysis of counter-elites entails the identification of organised forms of resistance outside the dominant institutions of the field. The emergence of an academic counter-elite after the creation of the ICANN illustrates this process (see chapter 6). The study of alternatives is conducted through qualitative analysis of discourses and of the history of institutions. It is also complemented by social network analysis of individuals, organisations, and statements. Indeed, the two main types of social network analysis described earlier both evidence the existence of alternative actors and discourses. They can be used to measure the position of these alternative actors. These alternative actors can remain marginal – a small number of marginalised actors that are not united around a counter-hegemonic project – or they can constitute a counter-elite with a shared discourse and organised around particular institutions.

To conclude, the combination of international political economy and political sociology offers a complex and flexible framework to analyse the history of Internet governance as the history of the emergence of a transnational field organised around the struggle for the definition of Internet governance. This framework can be operationalised through the combination of qualitative and quantitative methods in order to investigate the emergence and evolution of a field, the existence of a power elite and the process of hegemony production. The following chapters present a particular perspective on the history of Internet governance relying on a series of concepts and a historical data collection analysed through mixed methods.



## Chapter 4. The history of telecommunication regulation and the autonomisation of the transnational field of Internet governance

On May, 24 1844, Samuel Morse officially opened the first electric telegraph line between Washington D.C and Baltimore when he sent the famous words “What hath God wrought” over the 60-kilometre line. Although this was not the first transmission of a message at some distance, the technology was simple and reliable enough to become an important mean of telecommunication over the years. Rich countries rapidly built their own national network, which contributed to the unification of sometimes distant territories. However, problems of interconnection and compatibility between different national networks remained. For example, a message sent from Paris to Brussels had first to be transmitted to operators on the French side of the border who handed it over to operators on the Belgian side of the border; the message could then be sent to Brussels. Lines were generally not connected internationally and technically incompatible. States thus began to sign bipartite agreements and regional agreements to allow and regulate international telegraphy.

In 1865, some twenty years after Morse's message, 20 state plenipotentiaries gathered at a conference in Paris that gave birth to the International Telegraph Union (ITU). The ITU was one of the first intergovernmental organization<sup>35</sup>. Intergovernmentalism became a prominent mode of governance in world politics in the late 19th century and in most of the 20th century, covering a wide range of issues and broadly studied by International Relations scholars. The preamble of the treaty of Paris contains the principles that were going to be promoted by many international regimes and that are core to liberal state-centred approaches to global governance such as regimes theory.

“Equally animated by the desire to ensure to telegraphic correspondences exchanged between their respective states the advantages of a single a reduced fare, to improve the current conditions of international telegraphy, and to establish a permanent understanding between states while keeping their freedom of action regarding measures that do not affect the whole service, decided to conclude a convention to this effect.”<sup>36</sup>

State sovereignty (here the freedom of action of states on their own territory), inter-state

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35 See “International Telegraph Conference (Paris, 1865)”, available on the ITU website at <http://www.itu.int/en/history/plenipotentiaryconferences/Pages/1865Paris.aspx>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

36 See “Convention télégraphique internationale de Paris” (1865), pp.1-2. Available on the ITU website at <http://www.itu.int/en/history/plenipotentiaryconferences/Pages/1865Paris.aspx>, last accessed 8 April 2014, author's translation.



cooperation (with the idea of shared interests and absolute gains through cooperation) and the project of a durable liberal peace (here called permanent understanding) seemed to be key principles for the functioning as well as for the academic understanding of international regimes. The Internet has a somewhat similar history and is to a certain extent a more recent development of the same global communication infrastructure. However, the development of the Internet was not regulated by the ITU and it did not give birth to another intergovernmental organization either. On the contrary, the governance of the Internet as it exists rejects the idea of intergovernmentalism.

While many studies of Internet governance explain this institutional difference by the nature of the technology itself (see for example Mathiason, 2008, p. 33), the analysis offered in this chapter tries to link the specific institutional history of Internet governance to the broader history of telecommunications governance in a political economy perspective. The basic premise behind such a perspective is that the use and the governance of a technology is shaped by a broader social and historical context rather than the other way around. Technological determinism might lead to a certain neglect of history because of a focus on present and future governance. It has even been used in some cases to advocate for changes in the institutions based on technical reasons. Intergovernmentalism is allegedly bureaucratic and inefficient while privatized and technical forms of governance are seen as efficient and responsive. On the contrary, a historical perspective on the emergence of Internet governance as a political issue allows for a contextualisation of the issues at stake, the positions of actors, and the origins of discourses. The chapter presents first the historical context of telecommunication regulation as epitomising the changes in the global political economy since the late 19<sup>th</sup> century. Then, it focuses on the emergence of a relatively autonomous field of Internet governance in the last decades of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. This historical context is necessary to understand the more recent developments of the 1990s and 2000s in the field of Internet governance.

#### ***4.1. The history of telecommunication regulation***

This section rejects the periodisation used by many Internet governance studies that takes the invention of the Internet (or its popularization) as a breaking moment in the history of telecommunications. For example, Mathiason (2008) divides the history of telecommunications into two periods of time: before the Internet and after the Internet. Drake (2009) identifies three “NetWorld orders” in the history of telecommunications regulation. While there are strong similarities between the second one (1980-1995) and the third one, especially in terms of the

dominant ideology, Drake argues that the changes implied by the invention of the Internet justifies a division between these two orders. Contrary to this technology-based classification, this section calls upon a periodisation that is more common in International Political Economy and arguably more adequate to analyse institutional change in telecommunication governance (Wilkin 2001; Lee 1996). The section explores three different periods of time that are characterized by a particular set of ideas, institutions and social forces (Cox 1981). The first period is the 19th Century liberalism and internationalization that witnessed the creation of the ITU. The second period is the post-war liberalism that has been conceptualized as “embedded liberalism” (Ruggie 1982). This is a time of intergovernmental cooperation in the form of intergovernmental organizations. The ITU remained at the center of telecommunications regulations in spite of many technological “revolutions” such as satellites. The last historical period is characterized by globalization and neoliberal regulation. Like in other issue-areas, deregulation, privatization and liberalization affected telecommunications. It is in this last period that the Internet was actually created and popularized.

#### **4.1.1. The origins of telecommunication regulation in the 19th century liberalism**

The liberal internationalist tradition has long advocated for the creation and empowerment of international institutions in order to allow the emergence of a peaceful and prosperous world (for an overview, see Murphy, 1994). Liberal internationalists, despite their differences and the width of the historical scope considered, have played the role of intellectual leaders in the foundation of a world order relying upon intergovernmental organizations (Murphy, 1994, pp. 33-34). According to Murphy, liberal international institutions have historically carried out two primary tasks, each one linked with either political or economic liberalism. The first task has been to foster industry. The second has been to manage potential conflicts. The regulation of telecommunications and the history of the International Telecommunications Union needs to be analysed according to this framework. Telecommunications are essential to the creation and perpetuation of international markets. They are part of the infrastructure that allow what has been described as the internationalization or the globalization of the economy. But telecommunications have also been subject to politicization because of the importance of the technological gap between developed and developing countries.

The International Telegraph Union is the product of a first wave of institutionalization of

international regulation in several realms of the international political economy before the first World War. The ITU was the first among a number of Public International Unions built along liberal institutionalist lines<sup>37</sup>. This wave took place in a context of economic internationalization under British leadership. The creation of the ITU in 1865 corresponds to the apogee of *Pax Britannica* (Cox, 1992), if we consider the British hegemony started to decline already in the 1870 (Lee, 1996). The ITU mandate was clearly to foster industry by enabling international telecommunications. The creation of the ITU fostered the creation of a pan-European telegraph network through the adoption of the Morse code as an international standard for telegraph transmissions (Coddington and Rutkowski, 1982). Moreover, it also offered an institutional framework to resolve future issues related to technological innovation in the telegraph system. The Paris Telegraph Convention provided that the parties to the Convention would meet on a regular basis to keep up with technological change. In 1868, an International Bureau was established in Berne, giving the ITU the formal structure of a modern intergovernmental organization. It also applied the liberal ideals with the establishment of the “one state, one vote” principle that was going to become a basic rule of intergovernmentalism. However, the ITU was loosely integrated with the technical consultative committees being independent from the secretariat and the plenipotentiary conference. The consultative committee on telephony had even its own secretariat. The only links between the Berne Bureau and the committees were the right for any member-state to participate in the work of the committees, and publication by the secretariat of the committees' recommendations (Coddington Jr 1991).

The ITU originally gathered member-states that had a publicly-owned telecommunication infrastructure. This is why both Britain and the United States with their privately-owned networks did not join the ITU. Britain attended the 1868 conference and accepted the final documents in the name of British India. After nationalizing its own domestic telegraph network, Britain fully joined the ITU at the following conference. Britain soon imposed a rule that allowed colonial powers to vote on behalf of their colonies (Hills, 2002). The US declined to join until 1932. From the beginning, the US advocated for a full participation of private companies in ITU proceedings. These efforts had some success since private companies were allowed to participate and advise, but not to vote, on the revision of telegraph regulations from 1872 (Lee, 1996, pp. 61; International Telegraph Conference, 1872). In telephony, however, the existence of private companies was more widespread and the consultative committee on telephony was open to Recognized Private Operating Agencies (RPOA) (Coddington, 1991).

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37 Public “International” Unions here mainly means “European” since the United States did not join many of these unions and relied more on a hemispheric cooperation. However, given the extent of European imperialist rule, these unions actually had a global reach despite their European origins.

The record of the ITU in this first historical period according to its goal of fostering industry by providing a telecommunication infrastructure to international markets was partially met. The ITU was essential to the internationalization of markets within Europe (Murphy, 1994, pp. 86-88) but was increasingly undermined by nationalistic and imperialistic behaviour and mercantilist protectionism (Lee, 1996, p. 59). The telegraph was together with the transportation revolution essential to the internationalization of the economy of the late 19th century but it was also a vector of nationalism since it provided an 'efficient means of establishing central control and government' (ITU centenary publication quoted in Coddington and Rutkowski, 1982). Nationalism and imperialism at the end of the Pax Britannica influenced the evolution of telecommunications regulation. The ITU fostered the unification of a European telegraphic network but never managed to impose a single fare for telegraphy, which was part of its initial mandate. Despite these shortcomings, the number of member-states grew steadily until the first World War. In 1914, the ITU had 48 members and the Radio-telegraph conferences 43.

Hills (2007, pp. 10-15) describes five models of national/international telecommunications regulation, three of which already existed before the second World War (see figure 4.1). The first half of the 20th century witnesses a competition between these models, parallel to a competition among powerful countries that advocated for one or the other model. First, the European State model was the one implemented by the International Telegraphic Union. National monopolies (Post and Telecommunications administration, acting both as service providers and regulators) operate within their national borders and international traffic goes from a national terminal to another national terminal before its internal distribution. Second, the end-to-end model operates across borders through a unique operator's network. This model was implemented by International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) company in the 1930s (Hills, 2007, p. 10)<sup>38</sup>. The British Empire also followed this model, with a monopoly of Cable & Wireless Ltd from 1928 onwards<sup>39</sup>. The Western Union Model is similar to the end-to-end model as far as international traffic operated by domestic companies is concerned. On the other hand, foreign companies' traffic towards domestic market (in this case US market) is stopped at the border. Transatlantic telegraph networks before 1939 followed this model<sup>40</sup> which is a mix of protectionism of the American market and imposition of

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38 ITT is a private telecommunications company (now ITT Corporation) that acquired several telecommunications firms abroad in the 1920s, notably in Puerto Rico, Cuba and Spain. The expansion of its network allowed ITT to control the traffic from these countries to the end user in the US using their own lines.

39 Cable & Wireless Ltd results from the merger of Eastern Telegraph Company and Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company.

40 In 1911 Western Union and AT&T refused to interconnect British transatlantic lines to the U.S domestic network.

free trade abroad. The evolution of institutions in the first half of the 20th century favoured both the United States as a country and the end-to-end model, fostered by the participation of private actors in the regulation of the sector at an international level.




Figure 4.2. Models of National/International Regulation, adapted from Hills (2007, p.11)<sup>41</sup>

Before the second world war, telecommunications went through two major technical innovations combined with the continuing decline of Britain and the rise of several powers. First, the telephone was invented in the 1870s but was not widely used until the end of the first world war. It was then incorporated into the technologies regulated by the ITU. However, the most important technological change was the invention and diffusion of wireless telegraphy. Wireless telegraphy was all the more important before the war since it allowed communications between ships and the land. Because of the scepticism of national public monopolies, most of the development of radio was led by the private sector. Thus, the importance of private actors such as Marconi, the Italian father of long-distance radio transmission was acknowledged as early as in the first preliminary conference on wireless telegraphy in 1903<sup>42</sup>. One of the main purpose of this conference was to stop Marconi's monopolistic practices. Indeed, the Marconi company refused the telecommunications between their own equipments and other equipments (Coddington, 1991). While the attempt was defeated by the support of Britain and Italy to Marconi, the conference did succeed in the creation of an 'informal'

As a result, American companies could use the British network whereas British companies could not use the U.S network. (Hills 2002, 138-139; Hills 2007, 11-12)

41 Hills describes five models, only the first three correspond to the early years of the ITU. Hills adds an 'Empire rules' model to describe American hegemony in telecommunications during Pax American, and a WTO model that entered into force with the WTO 1997 agreement on basic telecommunications.

42 The Italian delegation to the conference made reservations to the final protocol of the conference related to already signed agreements with Marconi. See the Final Protocol of the Preliminary Conference on Wireless Telegraphy (Berlin, 1903) available at <http://www.itu.int/en/history/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

organization to regulate wireless telecommunications (Coddington, 1991), the International Radio-telegraph Union (IRU). Wireless telecommunications became regulated separately from the wired telegraph under the Radio-telegraph Convention. Unlike wired telegraphy that was regulated by a convention signed by states that had monopoly over telecommunications, the radio-telegraph convention was signed both by monopolist and non-monopolist states. If countries like the United States could develop a wired network independently from Europe, radio-telegraphy required a centralized allocation of frequencies (Hills, 2007, p. 31). As a result, the United States as well as Great Britain participated from the beginning to the regulation of wireless telecommunications<sup>43</sup>. Radio frequencies were allocated according to the 'first come, first served' principle like Internet domain were going to be allocated towards the end of the century. This minimal regulation is a way to let the market decide rather than establishing a heavy regulation as it existed in the wired sector. The Radio Regulations of 1927, outcome of a conference held in Washington, illustrate this attitude towards regulation. The limited resource of radio frequencies would be best exploited if the users were able to choose freely without much regulatory interference (Lee, 1996, p. 62). Efficiency is already associated with the market while unnecessary regulation is seen as an interference. A strong participation of the private sector within advisory committees was also foreseen (International Radio-telegraph Union, 1927, art. 33). In the conference itself, the participation of private companies was already "impressive" (Anon., 1928, p. 76). These elements evidence the domination of a competitive model of regulation, as advocated by the United States on the negotiations (Hills, 2007). The United States had been proposing a merge of the two conventions into a single organization (for example with a proposal for a Universal Electrical Communications Union in the early 1920s). Meanwhile, the ITU also evolved with a more important role given to expert technical committees. Technical committees were not allowed to take full part to the negotiations of new regulation but had an important advisory role. This dual nature of telecommunications regulation in the early 20th century and the debates between intergovernmentally-regulated national monopolies and internationally-regulated competitive markets is reminiscent of more recent debates on Internet governance, even if national monopolies have disappeared under neoliberal pressure towards liberalization and privatization.

In 1932 at the Madrid conference, the international telegraphic convention and the international radio telegraphic convention merged. The cohabitation within the same institution of a 'continental

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43 Great Britain had been reluctant to participate to an organization that threaten its position in the telecommunications sector as a country and through the Marconi company. However, the Titanic disaster of 1912 convinced the British government that the necessity of interoperability was more important for its economy than the narrow interests of Marconi patentees (Murphy, 1994, p. 88).

European' approach to telecommunication regulation, a British 'empire rule' and an American 'end-to-end' approach gave the newly-born International Telecommunications Union<sup>44</sup> a hybrid status. With its origin in the *Pax Britannica* period of liberal internationalism in Europe, the institution kept elements such as the 'one state, one vote' principle and its headquarters in Europe. However, the increasingly important role given to the private sector, expert committees, and the private ownership of telecommunications networks gave the ITU the characteristics of a standard-setting body for international markets. The division between states that had a monopolistic position on their territories over telecommunications services and states that had a privately-held, competitive telecommunications sector raised issues about the functioning as well as the mandate of the institution (Anon., 1932). The first few years of the new ITU were not impressive in terms of achievements since internationalism decreased in the 1930s and since governments had more urgent issues to deal with than international telecommunications.

It is during the second World War that the shift from British to American hegemony in telecommunications materialized. The United States had tried to open up the telecommunications of the British Empire before the war without much success. It was only with the signature of the Lend-Lease that the US was in position to impose its national interest in the telecommunications regulations of the British empire (Hills, 2007, pp. 34-35). Great Britain was forced to abandon the monopoly of Cable & Wireless Ltd. and to allow competition between radio companies on the same routes. Without the benefits of a monopoly in the British empire, Great Britain was not in a position any more to compete with the United States in the design of a new ITU after the war.

#### **4.1.2. Post-war embedded liberalism and the evolution of the ITU**

After the war, the ITU started its activities again, yet with some major changes. As Hills (2007) puts it, the ITU was brought under US control. It became an important part of what has been described as *Pax Americana* (Cox, 1992). As a symbol, the post-war conferences that revived the ITU were held in Atlantic City, in the United States. Because of the war, the attitude of the United States towards regulation had changed<sup>45</sup>. In 1943, a telecommunication act divided the international from the national market. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) had acquired a key role in

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44 While the acronym of the organization is the same as the International Telegraphic Union (ITU, before 1932), the change in the naming is important. The International Telecommunications Union (ITU, after 1932) has a mandate that covers any type of telecommunications, wired and wireless.

45 The role of the State and the military during the war, as well as the ambiguous attitude of firms like ITT towards Nazi Germany explain this change. For example, the US army had the largest wire and radio system in the world. Hills (2007) analyzes in depth these domestic changes in the U.S.

the regulation of the sector, and a state-to-state model prevailed as far as the international market was concerned (Hills, 2007, pp. 36-39). The vision proposed by the US differed from 19th-century liberalism. As Murphy (1994, p. 168) puts it, the United States like all capitalist states had embraced some version of the Keynesian orthodoxy that linked labour and capital at a national level and foresaw a greater role for the state. Intergovernmental organizations were seen as essential to this liberal world order. The Europeans, sometimes reluctant to participate to these changes, were not able to impose many concessions to the triumphant United States<sup>46</sup>. The new state-centred vision of telecommunications regulation did not imply an exclusion of the private sector. Telecommunications firms, especially from the US, were also present at the conference. However, they were part of a member-state delegation, generally headed by a civil servant from a ministry of PTT or a regulation agency such as the Federal Communications Commission in the US<sup>47</sup>. Whereas private companies had had until then the right to have direct relationships with the Berne Bureau, they were subordinated to governments in the renewed ITU (Hills, 2007, p. 50). While the most common affiliation amongst the delegates and representatives was a civil administration (PTT ministries, public broadcasting and telecommunication companies, diplomats and MPs) accounting for 57 per cent of the participants, the private sector still represented 18 per cent of the participants<sup>48</sup>. 'Embedded liberalism' is also a form of liberalism that gives priority to the market, but the market is embedded within a set of institutions that regulate it. The ITU was part of the complex structure of the United Nations System that institutionalized the new liberal world order.

The ITU, both because of its inclusion within a broader set of intergovernmental organizations, and because of its new structure represent a good example of the institutions that characterize the 'embedded liberalism' period (Ruggie, 1982). The new structure of the ITU was far more integrated than the loose institution that it used to be. Four organs were created. The conference claimed that the ITU was a technical organization, which mandate was to ensure the effectiveness of telecommunications while preserving the sovereign autonomy of member-states to regulate them on their own territory (International Radio-telegraph Union, 1947, Preamble)<sup>49</sup>. The Plenipotentiary Conference became the supreme legislative organ where the 'one state, one vote' principle applied.

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46 They could however keep the secretariat in Switzerland although the US government had planned to move it to New York.

47 The list of participants and their institutional and country affiliations are available in the directory of the conference, available at <http://www.itu.int/en/history/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

48 Ibid.

49 The technical character of the ITU has been used by delegates throughout the conference to make some very political points about the exclusion of Spain, the associate member status of countries like the Baltic countries and the People's Republic of Mongolia or to rule out the two-third majority that existed in the United Nations (Summary Records of the Plenary Meetings of the Plenipotentiary Conference, Atlantic City, 1947, available at <http://www.itu.int/en/history/>, last accessed 8 April 2014).



It met once in a decade until the 1960s and on a more frequent basis since then. The Administrative Council is a more restrained body of 18 member-states that represented and continued the work of the Plenipotentiary Conference between the conferences. While the Berne Bureau of the ITU had strong links with the Swiss administration<sup>50</sup>, the new General Secretariat was an internationalized body, supposedly more independent from the interest of a single member-state. After harsh negotiations, the Secretariat was moved from Berne to Geneva. The already existing International Consultative Committees (CCIs to use the common French acronym) were integrated in the structure of the ITU. There was one for Radiography (CCIR), one for telephony (CCIF) and one for wired telegraphy (CCIT) (International Radio-telegraph Union, 1947, art. 3). As 'technical' organs, they were supposed to remain independent from the Plenipotentiary Conference and thus had their own secretariat (International Radio-telegraph Union, 1947, art. 8). CCIs are the organs of the ITU that allowed participation of the private sector since personal of "recognized private operating agencies" could be members of the CCIs (International Radio-telegraph Union 1947, art. 8 §3). Finally, a new organ was created: the International Frequency Registration Board (IFRB). The IFRB was supposed to manage the radio frequency spectrum according to purely technical criteria. However, because of the reluctance of great powers to abide by IFRB rules, the "first come, first-served" principle remained the basis of frequency allocation after the second world war (Lee, 1996, p. 72). It is worth noting that the International Telecommunication Convention of 1947 excluded part of the business of private operating companies from its regulatory mandate (International Radio-telegraph Union 1947, art. 40)<sup>51</sup>. This, in fact, meant that end-to-end networks operated by private companies, most of them from the US, were not subject to ITU regulation (Hills, 2007, p. 62).

With the institutionalization of telecommunications regulation around a single intergovernmental organization, the post-war governance system was solid and could adapt some major technological changes that had emerged during the war and developed in the following years. Indeed, the post-war period was a turning point in the history of telecommunications with an exponential rise of the telecommunications sector in the global political economy. Much of this expansion was linked to military-industrial complexes in a context of cold war. The research on encryption that was essential

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50 All Directors of the ITU until 1947 had been Swiss citizens.

51 Article 40 reads : "Members and Associate Members reserve for themselves, for the private operating agencies recognized by them and for other agencies duly authorized to do so, the right to make special arrangements on telecommunication matters which, do not concern Members and Associate Members in general. Such arrangements, however, shall not be in conflict with the terms of this Convention or of the Regulations annexed thereto, so far as concerns the harmful interference which their operation might be likely to cause to the radio services of other countries". International Telecommunication Convention, 1947, available at [www.itu.int/history](http://www.itu.int/history), last accessed 8 April 2014.

during the second world war continued and led to swift progress in computing. Likewise, the military expenditures related to rockets boosted the research on launchers and satellites, which became central to modern telecommunications. In the US, companies like ITT (Hills, 2007, pp. 54-56) and AT&T, but also to companies involved in spacial research benefited from the public investments of the beginning of the Cold War. In Europe, most of these large companies were publicly-owned and benefited from a status of national champions in the competition for international market shares.

While the ITU played an important role in the technical regulation of some of the most recent technologies, the decolonisation movement created another major issue in the realm of telecommunications. In the 1960s, a growing number of developing countries had other concerns about international telecommunications governance. The basic concern was that despite political independence gained through the decolonization process, developing countries from the periphery remained economically dependent of the centre. Questions of underdevelopment and equality were highly political and differed from the technical aspect the negotiations on telecommunications had taken within the ITU. As such, the claims by developing countries were not only a threat for the position of rich countries but also a threat for the post-war liberal order as institutionalized in the ITU. In the United Nations in general, claims of a New International Economic Order grew stronger during the 1970s. In the more specific realm of telecommunications, developing countries tried to impose a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) on the agenda of international telecommunications regulation. The basic issue was the unequal flow of information from the centre to the periphery. The means as well as the content of information and communication were an instrument of domination of the periphery by the centre, especially the US. While the bulk of the struggle for a NWICO took place in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) that was seen by developing countries as a better terrain to make their demands, the movement affected the ITU. The debate on content of information and communication was limited in the ITU but the issue of equity in the regulation of technical means of telecommunications was raised. The first outbreak of the struggle led by developing countries took place during the 1965 Plenipotentiary Conference. Taking advantage of their numerical superiority, developing countries tried to expel Portugal and South Africa from the ITU because of their political practices. They could use the precedent of the denial of the voting right of Spain after the second world war. This first affirmation of their newly-acquired power led to more fundamental demands. Lee (1996, p. 82), points out three main demands related to the NWICO in the ITU in the early 1970s. First, developing countries claimed for an equitable access to

the orbit-spectrum resource. Second, they advocated for an increased development assistance by the ITU. Finally, they demanded an increased representation of low-income countries in decision-making bodies.

Orbit spectrum management was one of the first issue to be politicized by developing countries in the realm of telecommunications regulations. The United States and the USSR, along with other rich countries, were occupying the best portions of the orbit spectrum at the expense of developing countries that did not have the material resources to compete for them. As a result, developing countries started claiming for a more planned allocation of orbit-spectrum resources that allowed for an equitable access to telecommunication resources. The 'first come, first served' principle that had prevailed according to the liberal ideal of unhindered innovation was increasingly criticized, both by developing countries and some developed countries such as France, Sweden and Canada. As a more technical aspect of the NWICO, this claim made its way to the World Administrative Radio Conference on Maritime Mobile Telecommunications (WARC-ST) of 1971 (International Telecommunications Union, 1971). To these allegedly technical claims, the ITU gave a technical response. As a result, the share of the radio frequency spectrum allocated to space services was increased in the benefit of latecomers. The WARC-ST also recognized the limited aspect of the orbit-spectrum resource and denied to any country the privilege of priority of access. However, it did not take any action to tackle the inequity problem. A most radical attempt by developing countries to claim their rights was the Bogotá declaration of 1976. The declaration, signed by eight equatorial countries, aimed at the recognition of their sovereignty over the segment of the geostationary orbit that corresponded to their territories (Equatorial Countries, 1976). The declaration met as little success in the ITU as in the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (UNCUPOUS). It was ruled out by the ITU as being a legal and political issue rather than a technical issue (International Telecommunication Union, 1977). Although the NWICO movement failed to change the global regulation of orbit spectrum, it was seen as an increasing politicization of the ITU and a threat to dominant interests within the Union. As a result, the rejection of these claims was an important step stone in the affirmation of the ITU as a technical organization as defined by the most powerful actors.

The second claim by low-income countries met much more success. The need for development assistance had been acknowledged by the institution since the 1952 Plenipotentiary Conference (Coddington, 1989). Programs existed, led by the Secretariat's technical cooperation department, with funds coming from the UNEP and voluntary contributions by member-states (Lee, 1996, p. 88).

However, the assistance activities of the ITU remained very limited. The issue became more important as the number of developing countries in the ITU grew. The Plenipotentiary conference of 1965 established a special fund for technical cooperation (International Telecommunication Union, 1965). However, these elements clashed with the dominant vision of the ITU as a technical coordination institution. In the NWICO context of the 1970s, low-income member states continued to criticize this narrow vision of telecommunications regulation. The ITU recognized on various occasions during the 1970s that underdevelopment resulted from colonization and that underdeveloped countries needed assistance (Coddington, 1989). In the 1982 Plenipotentiary conference, Algeria, the Maldives and Pakistan proposed to allocate 10 per cent of the ITU budget to development issues. Although developing countries failed to pass the proposal because of the strong opposition of rich countries, the idea of a development fund in the ITU budget began to make its way. Ten years later, the Telecommunication Development Sector (ITU-D) was created.

The last claim is the now classical issue of participation. In 1974, developing countries comprised about 74 per cent of the total ITU membership (Lee, 1996, p. 90). Although the Plenipotentiary Conferences abide by the 'one state, one vote' principle, equal participation was only a smokescreen. As we have seen from the 1947 participation figures, the size of the delegations varied a lot from one member state to the other. Of course, low-income countries faced much more difficult issues regarding participation. Furthermore, participation does not necessarily mean active participation. Non-material resources such as knowledge of the English or French languages and technical expertise were even tougher obstacles to the active participation of developing countries. The problem was even worse in the less democratic bodies and especially in the CCIs, where transnational private interests were represented and active – unlike developing countries. Despite continuing demands by developing countries, the only response was the openness of ITU organs, which consistently with liberal thinking should have led to representation of a plurality of interests.

The ITU, from its creation to its relative politicization by the NWICO, has been at the centre of telecommunications regulation despite major technological changes. Institutional changes have been limited to reforms of the Union rather than the creation of competing institutions. However, both the changes within the global political economy and the increasing importance of information and communication technologies in the development of capitalism offered a new context that fostered radical institutional change during the emergence of Internet governance. While technological determinism sees the information revolution as the main reason for the institutional changes that occurred in telecommunications governance in the late 20th century, critical

perspective analyse the information revolution within a historical trend in the global political economy. The importance of the information revolution in contemporary capitalism must not be underestimated. However, the global trend towards neoliberalism needs close attention to explain the regulatory changes.

### **4.1.3. The neoliberalization of telecommunications**

As we have seen, research on coding and decoding during the second world war led to a rapid progress in computing. Computers were not intended to become means of telecommunications. Even the first research on networking were not trying to create a telecommunication network (Peter, 2004). However, computer networking and data exchange are key elements in the “information revolution” that changed the international regulation of telecommunications. Simpson (2004) describes thoroughly the rise of the neoliberal networking drive and the birth of a “digital capitalism”. Data communications were needed by big companies for applications such as real-time transactions (for example airline ticketing), production scheduling and research and development. Data communications were outside the national monopolies' domain (Drake et Wilson III, 2009, p. 17) and thus escaped their control. In the US, big companies like banks, insurance companies, retail chains, car manufacturers and oil companies began to advocate for competition and private networks in the Federal Communications Commission. They claimed that computers data network were independent from the existing telecommunications networks and thus should not be regulated in the same way. In fact, computers networks increased the use of the existing infrastructure and competing lines. Big business succeeded in changing what was the fundamental feature of the telecommunications regulation in the United States. Since these companies were transnational firms and that firms in other countries saw the risk of a technological gap between them and the US companies, the pressure for liberalization soon went global. These pressures echoed the global trend towards neoliberalism. Harvey defines neoliberalism as:

“a theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practices.” (Harvey, 2005, p. 2)

While neoliberalism was a massive ideological movement in every sphere of social life from the

1970s and at least to the early 2000s, the link with information and communication technologies is especially strong. Since every action is integrated into the market, every action needs to be an informed decision based on a sufficient amount of information. Information and communication technologies are needed to produce, store, transfer and analyse this amount of information (Harvey, 2005, p. 3).

The rise of neoliberalism originated in the crisis of the “embedded liberalism” world order, in which the ITU played the most important role in the telecommunications sector. As we have seen in the ITU, developing countries had begun to demand changes in the governance system. These demands were even stronger in the United Nations with the call for a New International Economic Order. In reaction to these demands, neoliberalism became a guide for political action for powerful states, based on four premises (Cerny, 2010). First, the economy must be more open, the flow of goods and capital must be free. Second, the state must adopt a strict financial orthodoxy through an anti-inflationary and deficit reduction policy. Third, it must transform itself to limit its interventionism and turn into a competition and regulatory state. Finally, governance must be reinvented through the inclusion of the private sector and non-state actors. Thus, Cerny (1990; 1997) describes a shift in the functions of the state during this period from a welfare state to a competition state. Unlike the welfare state that applied outcome-oriented policies, the competition state acts like a firm trying to gain market shares in the world economy. One necessary way to achieve this goal is to create markets where they did not previously exist. As a result, the function of the state changed from the decommodification of economic and social sectors to the commodification of the state itself. In this view, services such as telecommunications can not stay away from the market under the justification of a greater public interest. They need to become competitive markets open to transnational capital, which requires privatizations, liberalization, and deregulation of the telecommunications sector.

Parallel to the emergence of the competition state, the role of intergovernmental organizations changed. While the post-war multilateral organization was seen as a regulative institution for the creation of an international market where states maintained autonomy in their internal matters, the neoliberal intergovernmental organization foster neoliberal policies among its member states and participate to the creation of de-regulated, competitive markets at the global level. Like the competition state, intergovernmental organizations have become transmissions belts for neoliberalism. This conception of a changing role for intergovernmental organizations is based on a broader notion of international organization 'as a historical process rather than a given set of institutions' (Cox, 1979, p. 374). Neo-Gramscian accounts of intergovernmental organizations

propose an interesting framework to analyse changes over time in the relative influence of one or the other institution, or the changes of influence within an institution. The first intuition of neoliberal governments such as the Reagan administration was to move away from intergovernmental organizations, even from the International Monetary Fund. However, they soon realized that some global governance was needed because international free trade requires some global rules of the game (Harvey, 2005, p. 80). As a result, the panorama of intergovernmental organizations changed drastically. The 'politicized' organizations that had been at the centre of the struggle for a New International Economic Order were victims of the neoliberal moment. The US and its closest allies withdrew from UNESCO, and cut their funding of the United Nations. On the other hand, 'economic' institutions benefited from the changes. The Bretton Woods institutions and the OECD became central to the diffusion of neoliberal practices. Given the neoliberal focus on competitive markets and intellectual property rights, organizations such as the WIPO, the GATT and later the WTO were strengthened by the neoliberal turn. This empowerment was accompanied by a move towards construction of legal or constitutional devices to remove or insulate substantially the new economic institutions from popular scrutiny or democratic accountability (Gill, 1992). In this sense, international economic institutions are seen as part of a new constitutionalism that sets up a market civilization (Gill, 1995). Finally, the 'technical' institutions were alternatively criticized and used by dominant forces, depending on the perceived degree of politicization of the discussions and the utility of the institution for market purposes. While the beginning of the neoliberal wave was associated with the crisis of multilateralism (Cox, 1979; Murphy, 1994), the decade of the 1990s marked a renewed interest in intergovernmental institutions with the rise of the discourse on globalization and global governance. In the global governance discourse, intergovernmental organisations are seen as key actors in the management of the negative externalities of the globalisation process. The discourse on global governance is not necessarily in contradiction with neoliberalism since it does not question the neoliberal character of globalisation. By stressing the possibility of a “sustainable” capitalist globalisation, the discourse on global governance offers “terrains of compromise” rather than an alternative. This is why it can be described as a hegemonic discourse (Brand, 2005). In this view, intergovernmental organisations are necessary to the stability of a neoliberal world order.

Under the triple activism of transnational firms, competitive states and neoliberal IGOs, the regulation of telecommunications changed drastically at the turn of the 21st century, providing a particular context for the creation of a governance system for the Internet.

In the telecommunications sector, the outcome of neoliberal thinking comprises the privatization of publicly-owned telecommunication companies, the liberalization of telephone and data markets, the creation of new markets for long-distance and data communication, the deregulation and neoliberal re-regulation of existing markets, the shift to a neoliberal state with its consequences on the telecommunication ministries and regulation agencies, and finally the transformation of existing actors and the emergence of new actors in the regulation of telecommunications, including transnational firms and intergovernmental 'economic' organizations.

The neoliberal trend in telecommunications originates in the data networks. During the 1970s, data telecommunications began to expand faster than voice (Hills, 2007, p. 94). Big users of data such as the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) or the Société Internationale des Télécommunications Aéronautique (SITA) were allowed to operate their own private networks. Recommendation D.6 of the ITU's International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee of 1984 represent a breach in the telecommunications monopolies:

“Recognizing the principle that (circuits and message) switching and transmission are the exclusive function of Administrations, the establishment of a private leased circuit network may be authorized to meet the specific technical and operational requirements of certain customers, if requirements cannot be met by the public network or by specialized networks set up by Administrations.” (CCITT, 1984, § 6.1)

Similarly, in the US, a distinction was introduced by the 1980 Computer II decision between 'basic' (i.e. voice) services and 'enhanced' (i.e. data) services (Federal Communications Commission, 1980)<sup>52</sup>. The idea was that users of data services could be gradually recognized as Recognized Private Operating Agencies and thus meet the condition to escape ITU's regulation thanks to the 'special arrangements' clauses that had existed since 1947. At the same time, several countries liberalized their telecommunications market. For example, Great Britain privatized its national carrier in 1984 and opened the market for competition. The US and Japan also introduced and reinforced competition in their domestic market. Through the data networks regulations, these countries tried to impose liberalization to the rest of the world. The combined efforts to globally liberalize telecommunications did not prove really efficient in the 1980s with only nine countries following the trend (Schiller, 1999, p. 44). The global move towards neoliberalism was accompanied by international organizations rather than neoliberal states.

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52 For a legal account on the FCC Computer decisions and their consequences see Cannon (2002).



The ITU changed during the 1980s and 1990s. Similarly to when it embraced the post-war *Pax Americana* model, the ITU transformed again to become an important element of the neoliberal world order. According to Lee (1996), the ITU fulfilled five functions within the new world order. First, it embodied the material, ideological and institutional forces of particular historic blocs, first the post-war embedded liberalism, then neoliberalism. Second, the ITU embodied rules that facilitated the expansion of hegemony. Third, the ITU ideologically legitimated the norms of the hegemonic world order thanks to its aura of 'technical' institution. Fourth, the ITU co-opted the elites from peripheral member-states to prevent the formation of counter-hegemonic forces. Finally, the ITU absorbed counter-hegemonic ideas such as the NWICO movement.

The transformation of the ITU was not immediate and undisputed. At the beginning of the 1980s, the US almost withdrew from the ITU because of its technical assistance programs that were seen as similar to the work of other UN specialized agencies (and thus not 'technical') (Murphy, 1994, p. 258)<sup>53</sup>. But soon, the ITU promoted policies that were more compatible with neoliberal ideas with relative success. In 1988, the International Telecommunications Regulations of the ITU opened the way to competition in long-distance communications<sup>54</sup>. However, because of the concerns about the interoperability of private networks using proprietary standards raised notably by Nordic countries, the neoliberal end-to-end model was not endorsed by the ITU. The state-to-state model – despite the recognition of private networks and the sovereign right of member states to regulate telecommunications on their own territories – was reaffirmed. The GATT, the World Bank, the OECD, the EU and the WTO took the leading roles in the neoliberalization of telecommunications (see below). The ITU was rather a follower and it is only in the 1990s that it fully embraced the neoliberal ideology. At the end of the 1980s, the secretary general of the ITU appointed a group of experts to write a report on the restructuring of the ITU. The expert group published a report in 1989 that was very critical of public telecommunication operators and of the involvement of governments in the regulation of telecommunications (Hansen, 1989). This report was put on the agenda of the 1989 Niza Plenipotentiary Conference, which also witnessed the appointment of Pekke Tarjanne, that had led the privatization and liberalization of the Finnish telecommunications sector, as ITU new secretary general (Anon., 1989). Together with an important ideological change towards neoliberalism, the ITU also went through an institutional restructuring. The ITU was divided in the three sectors that still exist within the institution. The ITU-R sector is responsible for

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53 The threat of a U.S withdrawal from the ITU came just after the first plenipotentiary conference was organized in a developing country in Nairobi in 1982. Since the 1970's, developing countries represented the majority of the member states.

54 See, ITU (1988) "International Telecommunications Regulations", available at <http://www.itu.int/publ/T-REG/en>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

the radio-communication sector and replaces the CCIR and the IFRB. The ITU-D sector is responsible for development policies and is a concession made to the developing countries. The ITU-T is the standardization body both in wireless and wired communication technologies. Consistent with neoliberal restructuring elsewhere, the role of the secretary general was strengthened and he was to be supported by a Strategic Policy and Planning Unit and a Business Advisory Forum that represented the interests of the private sector at the highest level of the institution. Each sector had its own plenipotentiary conference to avoid the huge 'politicized' plenipotentiaries of the 1970's and 1980's. The restructuring also enhanced the partnership with the World Bank (Hills, 2007, p. 126).

While the ITU followed the general neoliberal trend, it did not assume the leading role in the worldwide movement of liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation of the telecommunications sector. Intergovernmental organisations that were not active in the telecommunications sector took the initiative to promote neoliberal reforms. The British case became an example for international liberalisers. British Telecom was a bureaucracy and became in 1982 a private company<sup>55</sup>. The privatisation was also accompanied by the creation of a regulator in the telecommunications sector that was independent from the government. Soon after, the World Bank published its first report on telecommunications and development to promote the British model (Saunders et al., 1983). However, the Bank expertise led to the creation of private monopolies rather than competitive markets. Thus, the state-to-state system survived the campaign (Hills, 2007, p. 174). Liberalization and the creation of competitive markets stemmed more from regional institutions in the North. Already in 1987, at a time when most of the telecommunication regulation still took place within a state-to-state system, the European Commission published a Green Paper on the development of a common market for telecommunications (European Commission, 1987). The paper stressed the 'inevitable trend' towards restructuring of the telecommunications sector. It placed the European Commission in a position to advocate for liberalization of the telecommunications sector at the occasion of the creation of the single market in 1992. In 1994, the European commission agreed to liberalize the telecommunications market by 1998. In other regions, the pressure of the US for a liberalization of telecommunications sectors proved successful. When the NAFTA came into force, the telecommunications sector was explicitly included (NAFTA, 1994, chap. 13). The OECD was also a forum where neoliberal policies in the telecommunications sector were promoted but it lacked the power to implement its ideas. An important role in the neoliberalization of

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<sup>55</sup> Hills (2007, 158-159) describes the privatization of British Telecom as a 'socialized' privatization since shares were offered at a discounted price to the general public with some advantages in order to get consent from the population and weaken unions' opposition. According to Hills, this practice is equivalent to 'mass bribery'.

telecommunications has been played by the General Agreement on Trade in Services and the World Trade Organisation. After more than a decade of lobbying efforts by transnational service companies for the introduction of service in the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, a group for Negotiations on Services was created during the Uruguay Round, starting in 1986 (Drake and Nicolaidis, 1992). The idea was to write a legally-binding telecommunication annex to the GATS. The first draft, presented in October 1989 envisaged the liberalization of telecommunications markets (Hills, 2007, p. 186). The provisions of the document went clearly in opposition to the ITU rules with the authorization of private end-to-end networks, proprietary standards and a limitation of state sovereignty in telecommunications matters. Under pressure from the EU and developing countries, the draft annex was limited to 'enhanced' services. The final document adopted in 1994 recognized the role of the ITU in regulation and did not replace its practices by new policies (Hills, 2007, p. 195). However, as we have seen, the ITU had changed by that time and was more eager to implement neoliberal policies. The newly-created World Trade Organisation then started to negotiate on basic telecommunications, a sector that had been excluded from liberalisation until that date. In 1997, the Basic Agreement on Telecommunications was the first sectoral agreement under the General Agreement on Trade in Service. Telecommunications that once were regulated by “cooperatives arrangements” became a globally traded service (Guermazi, 2009). The role of the state changed and market-led governance became the rule (Humphreys and Simpson, 2008). Basic telecommunications became part of the mandate of the GATS together with enhanced telecommunications. A framework was given for further unilateral liberalization that could then become legally-binding and subject to the WTO dispute settlement procedures. This is under this new regime that most of the liberalizations took place.




Figure 4.6. Commitments to liberalization under WTO regime (1996-2012)

The end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, when the Internet became global, were the years of major liberalization and privatization of telecommunications on a global scale. The

involvement of 'economic' intergovernmental organization in the regulation of the telecommunication sector illustrates the changing role of telecommunications in a 'post-industrial' society (Bell, 1976). The globalised service sector was perceived as the major source of growth for the following decades. Telecommunications were central to the development of a service-oriented global political economy (Mansell and Raboy, 2011). First, telecommunications had become a key product both in services and in production of telecommunications goods. Second, telecommunications are essential to the development of the financial sector, which relies on the rapid transmission of data. Third, telecommunications are at the heart of the revolution in military affairs and the security sector. As such, the stakes for a regulation favouring growth and profits and the status quo in terms of dominant interests, have grown higher during the second half the 20th century. The Internet, which had first developed as a by-product of the computer scientists' efforts to build computer networks, changed to become the “backbone” of the telecommunications sector.

## **4.2. The genesis of the field of Internet governance**

If we rule out technological determinism as an explanation of the institutional changes brought about by Internet governance issues, two other frequent explanations are the material domination of the US and the ideological domination of neoliberalism. While both are historically true, none of them seems to be sufficient. American hegemony and the supposed distrust of the US towards intergovernmentalism is questioned by the history of the ITU. As Lee (1996) argues, after the politicization of the ITU in the 1960s and 1970s, the Union had returned to its “technical” role, consistent with both US and neoliberal interests. In the 1990s, the ITU transformed itself in an organization convinced by neoliberal premises and working in cooperation with the World Bank and the WTO. Thus, when Lee wrote her analysis, the ITU was back at the heart of the institutional framework of the US-dominated neoliberal world order. There was no reason, neither for the US, nor for neoliberal capitalist interests, to bypass the ITU and to create new institutions. I argue here that the explanation of these institutional changes are to be found in the creation of a new transnational policy field, strongly related but yet relatively autonomous from the traditional telecommunications field. New actors and new ideologies that were not equally present in the telecommunications field had an impact on institutional changes.

### **4.2.1. Origins of Internet governance in computer science**

The Internet can be technically defined as a computer network based on the Transmission Control

Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) protocol suite. As such, the Internet is the direct successor of the ARPANET, a network financed by the US Department of Defence and created in the 1970s. This explains why most histories of the Internet are US-centric (Ceruzzi, 2003; Ceruzzi, 2012; to a lesser extent Abbate, 1999). While the influence of US engineers and the US government has been essential to the development of the Internet, the focus on the US is not without consequence on the conceptualization of the governance of the network. The governance of the Internet, perceived as a US technology, has been considered as a US domestic issue. The 'internationalization' of both the technology and its governance is thus described as a second phase, stressing the importance of the distinction between the national and the international. Despite the involvement of US actors, it is worth taking a transnational look at the history of the Internet. The ARPANET was indeed funded by the US Department of Defence, but network engineers had enough autonomy to build the network they wanted (Townes, 2012). The role of European engineers has long been underestimated. The network was in fact transnational almost from the start. In contrast with the dominant American Internet history, Townes shows that already in 1972, foreign engineers were invited to a demonstration of ARPANET and an 'International Network Working Group' was created. Moreover, the first non-US connection to ARPANET was created in 1973, only 5 years after the launch of the project and 4 years after the first nodes were created in the US (Townes, 2012). The social space where different visions and strategies competed to acquire scientific authority can be described as a scientific field (Bourdieu, 1975; Bourdieu, 1976).

When computing developed in the 1950s, computers were very expensive and enormous machines used at the same time by several users. The first method of sharing the resource was batch processing, which meant taking the tasks one after the other. Abbate (1999, p. 24) describes the arduous process:

“In the typical programming cycle, the user of a batch processing computer would begin by writing out a program on paper. Then the user or a keypunch operator would punch holes in a set of computer cards to represent the written instructions. The user would bring the deck of punched cards to the computer center, where an operator would feed them into a punched-card reader and transfer the data to magnetic tape. When the computer became available, the operator would load the tape and run its batch of programs, and eventually he or she would return a printout of the results to the various programmers. If a user's program turned out to have errors, the user would have to rewrite it, punch another set of cards, and submit the cards again, perhaps waiting hours for a chance to return the program and collect the results. Often users had to repeat this cycle numerous times before a program would work correctly.”

Progress in the sharing of computer resources was urgent. Time sharing made the situation for users

much better. Instead of running an entire program after the other, time-sharing computers would treat data from various terminals at the same time, devoting a fraction of second to each program. Thus, response from the computer was almost immediate and the resource much better exploited. Terminals could be in the same building as the main computers but they could also communicate with the computer through a modem and a telephone line (Abbate, 1999, 25). Packet switching came as an improvement of the communication between host computers and terminals. Donald W. Davies, a computing researcher at the British National Physical Laboratory (NPL), proposed dividing the messages into standard-size packets travelling through a network of nodes from the terminal to the host computer. Packet switching was a way to reduce the costs of communication and improve the quality of message transmission (Abbate, 1999, pp. 26-27). It was much more efficient than other data transmission models that required extensive use of telephone lines or even dedicated leased lines. In the late 1960s, the NPL built a packet switching network that would become a model for other attempts such as ARPANET. Around the same time, Paul Baran and Larry Roberts in the US were also working on 'distributed network' to transmit information along different routes to make networks more resilient, and on the splitting of information into pieces. In the 1960s, the computer science community was beginning to gather around the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the US Department of Defence that had the much-appreciated advantage of a very rapid and generous policy regarding the allocation of their important funding. Through personal networks and scientific conferences, the persons and institutions that were going to participate into ARPA computer network were selected by their peers (Hafner, 1998; Abbate, 1999, p. 56). In 1968, the ARPANET was theoretically designed but the researchers still needed a machine capable of serving as Interface Message Processor, an essential part of the network. While several manufacturers were proposed, a small consulting firm Bolt Beranek and Newmann (BBN) was chosen by Larry Roberts, then head of the networking project. The choice of the company over much larger manufacturer like IBM or already functioning machines such as the ones developed by DEC and Honeywell can also be explained by the scientific nature of the field where academic credentials and personal networks are capitals that are more valued than pure material capabilities. BBN was part of the personal network of the research team, and scientific dialogue already existed between the team and BBN researchers like Robert Kahn. Most of the staff of BBN were former or active faculty members of Harvard and MIT (Robert Kahn, quoted in Abbate, 1999, p. 57). Without the capacity of actually building the Interface Message Processor, BBN would then use its strong ties with Honeywell to sub-contract the hardware manufacturing. In 1969, the ARPANET was launched, connecting several computer science centres throughout the US and using packet-switching to transmit data. The ARPANET became the largest computer network in the world but an important

step was still to be taken. Several networks existed and used different protocols. The challenge was to find a way to make these different networks communicate to create an Internet. During the 1970s, computer scientists tried to integrate existing networks through the standardization of the packet-switching protocols. The field was informally institutionalized around the Network Working Group convened by Roberts to work on host protocols.

Despite the origins of the funding, the Network Working Group and its collaborators functioned in a relative autonomy from the Department of Defence. The management of the group served as a link but also as a filter between researchers and the Department of Defence. As Townes (2012) shows, some of the elements of the research were kept outside of the reports to the funding authorities. For example, the transnational spread of the network was constantly minimized in order to stay within the scope of the military mandate. The British and Norwegian nodes of the network were not represented in one of the most reproduced map of the ARPANET published in 1985 and a footnote explained that experimental satellite connections were not shown on the map (Townes, 2012). Interestingly, in a period marked by the controversies on the US intervention in Vietnam, the debate was absent from the discussions of the computer science field (Abbate, 1999). This tends to show that the military applications of the research were not salient in the minds of the researchers. Tensions within the field were rather related to the status of the research, with the division between engineering and fundamental research being reproduced in the field. The engineers at BBN had a difficult relationship with the theoretical scientists at UCLA and Network Analysis Corporation (Abbate, 1999). These tensions were managed, like in most academic environments, through a culture of debates and open dialogue within informal environments. Instead of a top-down rule-making process, the field adopted the practice of the Request For Comments (RFC) in 1969. The name suggest the idea of a work-in-progress rather than an authoritative rule. The RFC 3 summarize the philosophy behind RFC as as a “hope to promote the exchange and discussion of considerably less than authoritative ideas” (Crocker, 1969a, RFC 3). However, as essential elements of the social struggle of the field, the RFCs were clearly a form of legitimizing certain ideas while rejecting others.

“Documents proposed to be RFCs are reviewed by the RFC Editor and possibly by other reviewers he selects. The result of the review may be to suggest to the author some improvements to the document before publication. [...] In some cases it may be determined that the submitted document is not appropriate material to be published as an RFC. In some cases it may be necessary to include in the document a statement based on the reviews about the ideas in the document. This may be done in the case that the document suggests relevant but inappropriate or unsafe ideas, and other

situations. The RFC Editor may make minor changes to the document, especially in the areas of style and format, but on some occasions also to the text.” (Postel and Reynolds, 1997, RFC 2223)

RFCs became an institutionalized way to exercise some form of censorship of heterodox ideas, which is one of the most profound domination practice of the scientific field (Bourdieu, 1976, p. 100) Against this background, the 15 most prolific RFC authors accounted for 23 per cent of the RFC production from 1969 to 1997<sup>56</sup>. This is a share similar to the 20 per cent produced by the 665 authors of a single RFC in the same period<sup>57</sup>. It also comes as no surprise that the RFC editor, Jon Postel from UCLA, himself author of almost 6 per cent of the RFCs from 1969 to 1997<sup>58</sup>, became a key actor of Internet governance debate in the following years, even when the scientific field collided with much broader political economic interests.




Figure 4.7. Pioneers: Postel, Crocker and Cerf use zucchini, tin cans and drawings to represent the primitive Net they helped create, *Newsweek*, August, 8, 1994<sup>59</sup>.

56 The 15 most prolific authors were respectively J. Postel, M. Rose, A. McKenzie, J. Reynolds, K. McCloghrie, S. Crocker, R. Braden, D. Crocker, V. Cerf, Y. Rekhter, G. Malkin, A. Bhushan, E. Harslem, W. Simson, and D. Walden. The percentage is calculated from a directory of RFCs by author created by Graphcomp in 1997, available at [http://graphcomp.com/info/rfc/rfc\\_stat.html](http://graphcomp.com/info/rfc/rfc_stat.html), last accessed 8 April 2014.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid.

59 The three computer scientists have reportedly spent 8 hours preparing the photo that was shot for *Newsweek* magazine at the occasion of the 25th anniversary of the ARPANET and in a period of rapid growth and commercialization of the Internet. See <http://www.refondation.org/blog/1247/jon-postel>, last accessed 8 April 2014.



The scientific field model tends to make power relations less visible and the image of relaxed, informal and consensual discussions that is often presented does not correspond to the stakes raised by the millions of dollars of research funding and sub-contracting that were available for computer scientists. The struggle for scientific capital have also been harsh since computer networking was at the edge of computer science during these years and was also recognized beyond specialized circles. The comments following the sudden death of Jon Postel in 1998 demonstrate the position acquired in the field by the main holders of scientific capital (Cerf, 1998, RFC 2468).

As the following network visualization shows (figure 4.8), most of the institutions that were central to the structuration of the field were academic networks or universities. The universities play a dual role of cultural capital providers and institutionalization of the relations of power within the field. The role of former graduates students at UCLA or the MIT is central to the governance of the field. Moreover, some universities became the nodes of the ARPANET, giving their researchers and students a research object to compete for scientific capital. On the contrary, private companies, with the important exception of Bolt, Beranek and Newmann were not as involved in the research as they were going to be in the following years. The more practically-oriented research conducted by the R&D departments did not have the same prestige as the research conducted at universities. While providing most of the funding, the ARPA and its specialized Information Processes Techniques Office (IPTO) did not employ directly a majority of researchers. Its role was more directed towards coordination and subcontracting to universities. The creation of an International Networking Working Group (INWG) in 1972 is essential to understand the transnational character of the field<sup>60</sup>. The INWG was created at the occasion of an academic conference and became a Technical Committee of the International Federation of Information Processing (IFIP), a scientific organization that had been established under the auspices of the UNESCO in 1960. One of the concerns behind the creation of the International Working Group was the possibility to influence international standards on internetworking. Through the IFIP, the researchers gained access to the ISO and to the CCITT of the ITU (McKenzie, 2011).

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<sup>60</sup> One of the member of this group published an account of the role of the INWG in the creation of the Internet, available at <http://alexmckenzie.weebly.com/inwg-and-the-conception-of-the-internet-an-eyewitness-account.html>, last accessed 8 April 2014.




Figure 4.8. The network of actors and institutions of the early computer internetworking research field (1970s)<sup>61,62</sup>

The network representing the affiliation of computer networking scientists (see fig. 4.8) provides evidence of the central role of the International Networking Group (INWG) and of the NetWorking Group (NWG). Elite universities of the US were the main institutions involved in the computer networking field (especially UCLA, Stanford and the MIT). The link with the military-industrial

61 This affiliation network draws upon data on individuals and insitutions involved in the development of the Internet. Sources of secondary literature include Abbate 1999; Townes 2012; Mueller 2002; Hafner 1998 and Norberg, O'Neill, and Freedman (1996). Primary sources include accounts by the actors of the period (McKenzie 2011), (Stewart 2000); oral histories collected by the Computer History Museum available at <http://www.computerhistory.org/collections/oralhistories/>, last accessed 8 April 2014; and Crocker (1969), RFC 3, Rulifson (1969), RFC 5 and Crocker (1969b), RFC 24). A total number of 69 individuals are considered important actors of the field in the 1970s.

62 In this representation of the networks, nodes represent individuals and institutions, their size corresponds to their *eigenvector* centrality in the network (The centrality of a node is proportional to the centrality of the nodes to which it is adjacent). While centrality needs to be used with caution in affiliation networks, it is useful here to show the centrality of both actors and institutions, taking into account the size of the institution (Faust 1997).

complex is evidenced by the relatively important position of Bolt, Beranek and Newman. While the transnational scope of the field appears in the network visualisation, the differentiated positions of US scientists with respect to European scientists are shown by the relatively marginal position of European actors within the network in terms of location (position in the network) and in terms of centrality (node size). The transnational perspective on the history of Internet governance requires an acknowledgement of the crucial role of US national capital in the field's genealogy. The network also highlights the key position of some individuals such as Vinton Cerf, whose key role in Internet governance has continued until now; Robert Kahn, often referred to as one of the “fathers” of the Internet; and BBN's Alex McKenzie. The dominant actors in the scientific field of computer networking became later key actors in the autonomisation of Internet governance from the field of telecommunication regulation. Moreover, various informal networks and institutions such as the Request for Comments were created in the 1970s within a scientific field. While the networks of actors and structures of the field evolved in the 1980s, they kept the model of a scientific field, organized around universities and research centres. It is only in the early 1990s that the situation was going to change with the commercialization and the popularization of the Internet.

#### **4.2.2. Competing logics between fields**

Unlike traditional national fields as studied by Bourdieu (1991; 1998; 2000a), the autonomisation of the field of Internet governance does not come from a historical process of specialization and complexification that provide the field with a distinct logic and a relative autonomy. The emergence of a field usually corresponds to the gradual differentiation and autonomisation of a specific space of social interactions (Bourdieu, 1998, p. 265). Computer science had become a scientific field on its own long before the researches on internetworking. What was at stake was rather the ability of the field to maintain its independence when it converged with the field of telecommunications. The issue of convergence is thus not only a technical issue related to the convergence of telecommunications towards Internet-based telecommunications (telephony, broadcasting etc.), it is also a convergence of social and political universes. Since computer communications used traditional telephone lines, convergence was inevitable. When electronic mail was introduced on the ARPANET, the network that had been designed for resource-sharing became an actual communication network. Soon, the e-mail became by far the most important activity on the network. However, the emerging field of Internet governance was not swallowed by the much bigger field of telecommunications. Internet governance is marked by its origins in the field of computer science and, as Townes argues, reflects the traditional norms of academia (Townes, 2012,

p. 22). As such, it was originally different from the regulation of other means of telecommunications.

However, Internet is no longer regulated by scientists and scientific prestige is not the main capital around which the struggles are structured. Internet started as a scientific experiment but was then commercialized as a revolutionary mean of telecommunication. One of the decisive moments for the evolution of the field is arguably the choice of the networking standards during the 1970s. If the Internet is technically defined as a network using the TCP/IP protocol suite, it is because TCP/IP is the 'winning' set of standards for internetworking. In the 1970s, it was only one form among other of data transmission between computers. Thus, there is a need for an explanation of how the TCP/IP standard became dominant. Internetworking was about allowing networks to communicate, using the same language. Standards selection was the first political economic issue of Internet prehistory. Elite scientists and technicians from the computer science field were able to impose the standards they had created, and therefore did not abide by the norm that dominated the telecommunication field.

In 1977, the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) developed by Vinton Cerf and Robert Kahn became functional. One year later, Xerox engineers added the Internet Protocol (IP) for message routing purposes. TCP/IP was used to connect the ARPANET to a satellite-based network called SATNET. Internetworking proved effective. However, TCP/IP was not the only standard developed to interconnect networks. It was not even the unique protocol used in the ARPANET until 1982 (Townes, 2012). Several proprietary standards existed. IBM developed a System Network Architecture in 1974; Xerox proposed the Xerox Network Services and the Digital Equipment Corporation came out with the Digital Network Architecture (Abbate, 1999, p. 149). Proprietary standards were problematic since they worked only with hardware developed by the company. Only IBM seemed to be in a position to impose its proprietary standards because of its position in the market. Telecommunications companies saw the threat of a domination over data communication by IBM and its proprietary standard. They lobbied in the ITU and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) for the creation of international public standards. This is how the prominent competitor of TCP/IP emerged: ITU's X.25<sup>63</sup>. The difference between TCP/IP and X.25 is part of the historical struggle in telecommunications regulation between end-to-end private networks and

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63 The ISO developed a standard for interconnection that was meant to deal with the threat of incompatible proprietary standards: The Open Systems Interconnection. Many countries adopted the standard and both X.25 and TCP/IP claimed to fit in OSI. However, because of the relatively instable field of computer technology, the standard remain very general and incomplete. By 1992, OSI was "clearly dead" (Salus 1995, 226 quoted Townes 2012) .

national monopolies.

TCP/IP relies on the idea that the users' computer take the primary responsibility for maintaining reliable connections. That meant that the network in itself did not need to be as reliable as telephone networks since the error checking was made by end users' computers. As advocated among others by Pouzin, the network functions were reduced to a minimum (Abbate 1999, p. 125). This concern stems from the unreliable packet switching radio network that Kahn wanted to connect to the ARPANET. TCP had the capacity to provide error-free connection from host to host through an unreliable network and by checking for errors and re-sending the packets that contained errors. However, the problem of interconnection with non-TCP networks remained. That was the role of IP, a simple protocol that could be used on gateways that connected different networks. Hence, gateways did not need to do any re-routing, their role was limited to the transfer from one network to another, with the end computers doing the routing job. Because of military funding, the TCP/IP protocol suite was presented in terms of military usefulness. However, both Abbate and Townes argue that the protocol suite reflected the ideas and interests of the transnational community of researcher far more than any military or economic interest (Abbate 1999, p. 150; Townes, 2012). Consciously or not, these interests of the computer scientists were in line with those of computer firms and opposed to public and private telecommunications firms. Telecommunications firms had been trying to provide the most reliable networks for technologically simple terminals like telephones. TCP/IP reversed the vision of the network by relying on sophisticated terminals like computers and diminishing the importance of the quality of the network. Computer terminals were the part of the network that was controlled by scientists. Network connections such as telephone lines were controlled by telecommunication operators.

ITU X.25 standard remained in the logic of the field of international telecommunications, where data communications were perceived as an extension of telephony. In the early 1970s, most telecommunications firms from developed countries were planning to build large data networks on national territories and to connect them internationally. They turned to ITU's Consultative Committee on Telegraph and Telephony to develop a common standard. The X.25<sup>64</sup> was rapidly created in order to be approved by the CCITT 1976 plenipotentiary conference. X.25 foresaw a much more important role to the network than TCP/IP. X.25 networks could be accessed through relatively simple terminals because the routing was made by the network's nodes<sup>65</sup>. For this reason,

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64 X is the letter of the data communication protocols in the ITU.

65 The most famous X.25 network was the French Minitel, shut down in 2012, which provides an interesting example of a simple terminal (leased by France Telecom) connected to a centrally-monitored network.

the network had to be reliable. Several data networks used X.25 in the following year for network communications and internetworking. The move was successful since the hardware manufacturers and even IBM started to incorporate X.25 in their software (Abbate, 1999, p. 154). However, the 'Internet community' that had developed the TCP/IP protocol suite, backed by the US government were harsh critics of X.25. While TCP/IP and X.25 were not technically incompatible, the vision of a data network they represented was completely different.

TCP/IP allowed for a more diverse Internet, connecting different private and public networks, while X.25 was intended to be a universally-shared standard. In a context of liberalization in the 1970s in the US and 1980s in Great Britain, TCP/IP had the advantage to be able to connect competing networks. X.25 was designed for highly reliable monopolistic networks. As we have seen in the previous section, the general trend was towards liberalization and diversification of the networks. Moreover, Internet governance issues escaped the traditional telecommunications field. It stood between the field of computing and the field of telecommunications and was soon to emerge as a relatively autonomous transnational field (see below). Computer manufacturers and computer scientists were important actors in the debates and were clearly opposed to the ITU/telecommunication approach. Finally, the US supported TCP/IP as a US and publicly-funded technology that also had military purposes. Against this background, X.25 could not become the dominant standard in data communication and networks converged towards TCP/IP and ARPANET in the following years.

<b>Network</b>	<b>Protocol</b>	<b>Funded by</b>	<b>Use</b>	<b>Year Begun</b>
NPLNET	packet-switching	UK	research	before 1969
ARPANET	TCP/IP	US	research, govt	1969
CYCLADES	packet-switching	France	research	early 1970s
SATNET	TCP/IP	US	research	1975
USENET	UUCP	users	public	1979
EUNET	X.25, later TCP/IP	users (Europe)	academic	mid-1980s
ACSNET	UUCP	Australia	academic	1980s?
SPEARNET	X.25	Australia	academic	1980s?
CSNET	TCP/IP, X.25	NSF (US)	academic	early 1980s
BITNET	IBM protocol	users	academic	1981
FIDONET	Fido protocols	users	public	1984
EARN	UUCP	users (Europe)	academic, research	1984
JUNET	UUCP	corporations (Japan)	academic	1984
NSFNET	TCP/IP	NSF (US)	academic	1986
NORDUNet	X.25, also TCP/IP	Nordic countries	academic	1986
UUNET	UUCP	commercial	commercial	1987
WIDE	TCP/IP	Japan	academic, research	1988

Table 4. 1. Internet Precursor, Associated and Similar Networks, 1969–89 (adapted from Townes 2012, 14).

The victory of TCP/IP over X.25 is important in the definition of the rules of the game in Internet governance. Rather than a network heavily controlled by telecommunications companies, the network relied on the ability of computers hardware and software to manage the connection. This element gave computer scientists and computer manufacturers a central position in the field. Although the logic of a telecommunication network took over the Internet, the scientific elite was able to impose its position on a crucial issue. The choice was made through a campaign by scientists to de-legitimise the X.25 based on scientific arguments (see for example Padlipsky, 1982, RFC 874 and its mix of academic and informal style). The strong ties of the scientific field (through previous funding and subcontracting relations) between the scientific field and the US government provided the TCP/IP with a strong ally when it came to international definition of standards. However, it is the transnational scientific elite as a whole that advocated for the TCP/IP against X.25. Some of the most vocal critics of the X.25 were the members of the French research team led by Louis Pouzin (Abbate, 1999).

While networks converged towards what was becoming 'the' Internet, the use of the network and the applications changed. First, the Internet did not become a resource-sharing network to use the power of computers remotely. Rather, the calculation capacities of computers grew exponentially and most of the work could be carried out at a local level. Use of the Internet diversified since the early days of ARPANET. The File Transfer Protocol was developed in 1972 and one year later it was beginning to be used to send e-mails. E-mails became rapidly the most successful application of the Internet. Although e-mailing already existed in time-sharing computers, the possibility to use it on a transnational network made it an indispensable tool. E-mail was the application that transformed a computer network into a telecommunication network (Abbate, 1999, p. 111). After these breakthroughs, applications did not develop as fast as the network and Internet remained a text-based interface with few applications. The situation did not change drastically until the 1990s. In the early 1990s, services like Gopher and Wide-Area Information Server (WAIS) started organize the information available on the network but there was no single program to connect to the different services and use the different applications available to the user (Ceruzzi, 2003). The real change came with the invention of the World Wide Web by Tim Berners-Lee and his team at the CERN. The revolution of the Web was to organize information through hypertext and to add multimedia to the text-based experience of early users (Berners-Lee and Fischetti, 2008). The Web allowed new services to be developed and paved the way to the massive popularization of the Internet. The CERN team started distributing the Web software through the Internet in 1991. Two years later, a

US researcher team developed the first web browser called Mosaic. Acknowledging the business potential of web browser, this team soon left the research to work on a commercial version of Mosaic called Netscape. With the development of Personal Computers, search engines and other software, the Web became popular beyond the tech-savvy Internet community. In the mid-1990s, the regulation of the Internet became an issue of global political economy, different from telecommunications regulation and outside the specialized field of computer science.

### **4.2.3. The structure of the field in the mid-1990's**

As we have seen, the Internet was at first a research network. Even if it was funded by the US Department of Defence, academics were increasingly autonomous in the daily management of the network. During the 1980s, the number of civilian users connected to the ARPANET increased and the military users moved to their own network (Abbate, 1999, p. 183). This is why the focus on the military aspects of Internet history is not sufficient. The rise of civilian Internet was fostered by the creation of a research network funded by the US National Science Foundation (NSF). After some discussion, including around the choice of a protocol, CSNET became operational in 1982 and was a university network based on the TCP/IP protocol and connected to the ARPANET. The network was supported by the ARPANET elite. CSNET became the heart of Internet growth. Contrary to the ARPANET, the conditions to connect to the network were relatively non-restrictive, even if commercial use was prohibited. Already in 1983, the Department of Defence split the ARPANET into the MILNET, dedicated to military activities, and the civilian ARPANET (Abbate, 1999, p. 185). During the 1980s, the NSF took the lead and built a large high-speed national network that would serve as backbone for dozens of regional networks. However, the regional networks were created but were still connected through the ARPANET. At the end of the 1980s, the NSFNET replaced the ageing ARPANET as the Internet backbone. The transfer occurred between 1988 and 1989. On 28 February 1990, the ARPANET (to which were connected all the networks that built the Internet) was officially dismantled.

During the “academic” period of Internet governance and until 1992, commercial use of the public infrastructure – the NFSNET backbone – was prohibited. However, commercial activities started in 1988 when Vinton Cerf convinced the government to provide MCI with limited access for “experimental use” of commercial e-mail services (Shah and Kesan, 2007). Towards the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, the privatization of the backbone was demanded by many actors. Consistently with the structural trend of the period, privatisation was the dominant proposal



and alternative plans were hardly considered (Kahin, 1990, RFC 1192).

A first step towards privatisation was the creation of Advanced Network Services (ANS), a not-for-profit corporation created by MCI and IBM. ANS became the subcontractor of NSF that managed the backbone. Later, ANS created a for-profit subsidiary to offer commercial services on the same infrastructure as the NSFNET (Abbate 1999, 196). The monopoly situation of ANS in commercial services drew much criticism and led to Congressional hearings that recommended the competitive privatization of the Internet backbone in order to offer opportunities to other commercial services (Shah et Kesan, 2007). Parallel to the public backbone, a number of privately-held commercial networks existed operated by telecommunications carriers. The dominant idea was to hand the backbone over to these companies (Abbate, 1999, p. 198).

In 1992, commercial use was allowed under certain conditions and the plan for privatization and the management of the backbone through multiple commercial backbone providers was envisioned. Finally, in 1995, the transition was effective and the NSFNET was retired. The Internet did not rely any more on a backbone network such as the ARPANET or the NSFNET. Multiple commercial backbone providers constituted a market-operated network. Consistent with the privatization of telecommunications network in many pioneering countries in the 1980s, the Internet was a loosely-regulated private network. The operators of the new Internet backbone were telecommunications companies such as Sprint and AT&T. Internet governance was not subject to computer scientists regulation any more but emerged as a relatively autonomous sub-field of the telecommunications field, just when the latter became one of the most important aspect of the global political economy.

As long as the regulation of the network was embedded in the field of computer science, economic and political stakes were low and actors struggle for forms of capital typical of the academia such as academic prestige and research funding. Democratic procedures and representation issues were not at the heart of the debates. Peer-reviewing and consensus-based decision making were the main regulation practices. Institutions created within the scientific field of computer networking such as the Internet Engineering TaskForce have often been taken as an example of Internet's consensus-based decision making (Froomkin, 2003). However, this type of functioning does not exclude domination. Mueller (2002) speaks about an ARPANET elite of the most senior networking experts that continued to manage the network as it was growing beyond academia.

The first institutionalisation of Internet governance took place within the field of computer science.

US computer scientists dominated the field and the institutionalisation, while transnational in scope, occurred in the US. First, an Internet Activities Board (IAB) was created in 1983. The IAB was a board of 10 persons, each supervising a task force. The chair appointed the board member and Vint Cerf served as a chair during the first 8 years of the IAB. Jon Postel had a specific role in the early regulation of the Internet since he was the “*de facto* Internet standard process” (Mueller, 2002). With the Internet growing and the NSF taking more responsibility in the management of the network, one of the original task force supervised by the IAB took more importance and began to be open to participation. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) began to meet publicly in 1986<sup>66</sup>. The IETF was a loosely-institutionalized organization without formal membership, organized around mailing list and functioning according to rough consensus. Informal rules (including dressing code), openness, the non-proprietary nature of the standards contributed to the vision of the IETF as a model of non-hierarchical decision-making (Froomkin 2003)<sup>67</sup>. However, the IETF remained under the supervision of the IAB controlled by the ARPANET elite (Mueller 2002). In the 1980's, the scientific field maintained the same logic of functioning that it had in the 1970's despite some evolution in the positions of agents in the field. Institutions were funded by various departments and agencies of the US government, establishing strong links between the scientific field and a national field of power. In 1988, the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority was mentioned for the first time (Internet Architecture Board, 1988, RFC 1083). Jon Postel was the person acting as the IANA. As such, he was in charge of domain names and IP addresses assignment functions. According to the ARPANET elite, his authority stemmed from the legitimacy of the IAB (Malkin, Marine, and Reynolds, 1991, RFC 1207). The standard-setting institutions gained access to the ITU during the neoliberal turn in the Union. Anthony Rutkowski, a US adviser to ITU's secretary general Tarjanne was appointed to the IAB to serve as a transmission belt between the computer science field and its open and flexible nature and the telecommunication world (Mueller, 2002). Finally, in 1992, the creation of the Internet Society organized the various institutions of Internet governance. The Internet Society (ISOC) was to head the IAB, the IETF and the Internet Research Task Force, to provide a legal umbrella to the participants to the various activities of the technical community; and to provide the institutions with reliable funding. Rutkowski became ISOC's first chair. Rutkowski's appointment, as well as the tensions around the role of the institutions at the beginning of the 1990s and the privatization efforts of the NSF, show the transition from a scientific field to an emerging field, strongly related to the telecommunications field.

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66 See <http://www.ietf.org/meeting/past.html>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

67 One striking example of the return of hierarchies on an allegedly non-hierarchical institutions is the June 1992 IAB's decision to implement an OSI protocol against the recommendation of the IETF (Mueller 2002).

The regulation issues at the beginning of the 1990s were also changing, reflecting the shift from academic struggles to the constitution of an autonomous sub-field of the global political economy. With the Internet becoming an important telecommunications network as well as a booming market, the issue of domain names became crucial. Domain names were originally created to facilitate the technical operation of the Internet. As the Request for Comments that created the Domain Names System states:

“As applications grow to span multiple hosts, then networks, and finally internets, these applications must also span multiple administrative boundaries and related methods of operation (protocols, data formats, etc.). The number of resources (for example mailboxes), the number of locations for resources, and the diversity of such an environment cause formidable problems when we wish to create consistent methods for referencing particular resources that are similar but scattered throughout the environment.” (Mockapetris, 1983, RFC 882)

The different labels of domain names were not supposed to have any particular meaning other than technical. They were used to translate an easily readable string of letters into an IP address. For example, the DNS can resolve the address [www.google.com](http://www.google.com) into an IP number such as 64.233.191.255. What was only intended to be easy for human beings began to become valuable. With the growing commercial use of the Internet, trademark owners claimed their intellectual property, not only on their brands and products names but also on similar names. The domain names thus acquired economic value and generated intellectual property conflicts. Hence, the major issue around which the structuration of the field crystallized was the allocation of domain names. The system that had prevailed in the computer science field could no longer work in such a competitive and economically-valued sector. The issue of who is in charge of the domain names echoes the broader issue of Internet governance. The debates about domain names triggered struggles of how Internet should be regulated and by whom. The emerging field of Internet governance still had to decide the way it was going to be institutionalized in order to define the arena in which struggles were going to take place and the rules of the game that were going to structure the field.

The actors that participated in the debates of the mid 1990s were not only the computer scientists and network engineers that had regulated the Internet so far. The US government obviously remained in an important position during the debates. However, the responsibility shifted from the NSF and defence research agency to the Department of Commerce. The change illustrates the continuing conversion of the US state into a neoliberal competition state. The US government

helped to create a market for domain names rather than keeping the Internet out of the market for research purposes.




Figure 4.9. Separated fields of early Internet governance and international telecommunications before the commercialization of the Internet

While Internet governance became a sub-field of international telecommunications, it acquired its own logic and maintained a certain autonomy in relation to the field of telecommunications. Despite its embeddedness in the field of international telecommunications, Internet governance as a sub-field has “its own logic, its rules and its specific regularities” (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992, p. 79). The fundamental struggle at stake in the field was the definition of a governance system for the Internet. Many agents struggled to impose their vision to the field. Computer scientists managed to translate the scientific capital (prestige and scientific legitimacy) and the social capital (networks of people in the industry and in the US government) acquired in the scientific field to be able to play a crucial role in the emerging field of Internet governance. It is because of its specific history of the field and the powerful scientists that the field of Internet governance differs in terms of logics and rules of the game from the broader field of international telecommunications. In this particular context, scientists participating to the debates organised through mailing lists and elite experts were in a position to struggle for the definition of the Internet governance system on an equal footing with powerful government representatives, intergovernmental organizations and transnational firms.




Figure 4.10. Emergence of a new sub-field in the international telecommunications field (mid-1990s)

A great variety of actors were involved in the emergence of a new field of Internet governance. The traditional actors of the telecommunications field were directly affected by the decisions made on Internet governance, the most promising business sector of telecommunications in the 1990s. Telecommunications firms (some of them already privatized, some of them as public administrations) tried to defend the model prevailing in telecommunications governance which granted them with important power. Intergovernmental organizations, both technical (the ITU and the ISO) and economic (WTO, OECD, WIPO) were also involved in the field's struggles of the 1990s. Similar to the scientific elite, computer manufacturers and early Internet-oriented businesses used the sub-field of the Internet to gain access to the telecommunications field. Powerful government and their communication administration were also part of the key players of the field (among others the US and the FCC, the European Commission and the DG of Information and Communication Technologies). As the Internet was perceived as an extension of existing markets, transnational firms organized around the defence of intellectual property and their associations entered the field of Internet governance. As a result of technological convergence, content producers such as entertainment companies were already deeply involved in the field of telecommunications

governance. Finally, individuals and organizations from the public (users of the Internet and more generally civil society actors) got involved at a very early stage. Interestingly, because of the scientific and academic origins of the field, academics of other disciplines (especially lawyers) were easily integrated in the emerging field (see chapter 6).

The emerging field was institutionalised with the creation of the ICANN in 1998 (see chapter 5). Institutionalisation is a process of elite coordination and is an essential part in the process of imposing hegemony in a field. The emergence of a new transnational field of Internet governance, different in terms of actors and stakes from the computer science field that had regulated the early Internet led to institutional change. This change cannot be explained only by the structural dynamic of neoliberalization at work in the broader field of telecommunications. It cannot be explain by the sole field-specific characteristics either. Institutional change, that led to the creation of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), is best explained by the parallel dynamics of a changing context in the broad field of telecommunications and the emergence of an autonomous sub-field of Internet governance, deeply marked by its origins in the field of computer science in terms of ideology and actors.

## ***Conclusions***

The institutions of Internet governance created in the 1990s stem from two different dynamics. The first one is the more structural trend in the global political economy towards neoliberalization. This dynamic transformed the field of telecommunications through the privatization of public service providers, the liberalization and deregulation of existing markets and through the creation of new markets. Because of this trend, new actors, such as the 'economic' intergovernmental organizations, entered the field. The historical actors were transformed by the neoliberalization of telecommunications. States became competition states and commercialized what had been public administrations, and gave away their regulatory power to independent regulation agencies. On the contrary, private carriers were reinforced by the neoliberal moment. Finally, the International Telecommunication Union, that has been the keystone of international regulation of telecommunications since the late 19th century, transformed into a neoliberal intergovernmental organization fostering privatizations and market creations. The second dynamic took place at a much more micro level. A part of the scientific field concerned with computer networking started organizing their field through institutions such as networks and informal standard-setting bodies. When the Internet was commercialized in the early 1990s, some of the elite computer scientists

were able to exchange the scientific capital acquired in their field into a political power to influence the debates of the emerging field of Internet governance, which became an autonomous sub-field of the international telecommunications field.

Thus, the three main explanations of institutional change in Internet governance do not seem sufficient to explain the nature of the change. The creation of the ICANN is not only a consequence of the decentralized nature of the network and the technical impossibility of a central intergovernmental regulation. It is not a unilateral decision by the US government to take advantage of its power over the Internet either. Finally, it is not the simple application of the neoliberal ideology to the realm of Internet governance. The fact that Internet governance in the late 1990s had some characteristics of a scientific field while responding to a neoliberal logic of regulation gave birth to innovative institutions. The ICANN epitomizes this institutional change with its private not-for-profit nature, the role of computer scientists and its market-enabling mechanisms. This perspective on the emergence of the transnational field of Internet governance allows us to analyse institutional change both at the structural level of the meta-field and at the micro-level of the field. It avoids the pitfalls of technological determinism and structural determinism and provides an alternative to conventional explanations of the history of Internet governance.

## **Chap. 5. The Emergence of a Transnational Power Elite of Internet Governance**

While the previous chapter has focused on the emergence of Internet governance as a relatively autonomous transnational field, the present chapter explores the emergence of a transnational power elite within the field. This perspective draws on two arguments. First, Internet governance was discussed at an elite-level in the 1990s and the debates excluded non-elite actors through the marginalisation of some discourses and some institutions. Second, contrary to the pluralist perspective that became dominant in Internet governance studies, the different elites within the field were not competing. Their practices during the 1990s fulfilled the two criteria that define a power elite in Wright Mills' theory: they were ideologically coherent and institutionally interchangeable.

This perspective contrasts with the dominant multistakeholder mythology of Internet governance studies. For example, Mueller (2002) analyses the process as a competition between different stakeholders groups. According to Mueller, there were eleven stakeholders in Internet governance that participated in the debate of the 1990s: the US government, Network Solutions Inc., the “technical community”, research and education networking organizations, trademark and intellectual property interests, large telecommunication and e-commerce corporations, prospective market entrants, local and regional Internet services providers, country-code registries, civil society and civil liberties organizations, and international organizations and national governments (Mueller, 2002; table 8.1). All of them had clear and expressed interests. The creation of a new governance regime resulted from the debate between these stakeholders.

Although the history of Internet governance evidences the power differentials among “stakeholders”, most authors still rely on the misleading concept of multistakeholderism to describe Internet governance (Mathiason, 2008). This chapter argues that the debates on Internet governance in the 1990s are better described as the process of unification of different specialized elites to form a transnational power elite of Internet governance. Since the responsibility over the network was unclear in the mid-1990s, several groups of actors issued documents that proposed new governance models. Most of these documents were publicly commented upon and debated. Different views of what Internet governance should be underpinned the debate. Some perspectives were in a dominant position and were represented in the most influential documents, while others were marginalized. The first section explores the consensus-building process that can be found in the policy documents



and analyses multistakeholderism, Internet exceptionalism and technical regulation as the base of elite consensus as well as the hegemonic discourse of Internet governance. The second section describes the institutional circulation of the elite and stresses the existence of individuals affiliated to several organisations at the same time (multiple-hat phenomenon) among the key players of the debates. The analysis is carried out thanks to social network analysis and prosopographic elements.

### **5.1. Elite ideological cohesion**

The competing discourses on Internet governance stemmed from very different actors who did not have the same institutional position. However, like Wright Mills' specialized elites, the authors of the discourses had some legitimacy in their own domain and benefited from powerful positions within their institutional hierarchies<sup>68</sup>. The “technical community” of computer scientists had controlled and regulated the Internet for many years, and they claimed to have the right to continue to do so. As we have seen in the previous chapter, they had organised a governance system of their scientific field around a series of institutions. The authors of the policy documents appeared at the top of the organizational charts of organizations such as the Internet Architecture Board, the Internet Society and the Internet Engineering Task Force. They were often affiliated with top-level US universities. The Clinton administration had the state legitimacy to rule over what was seen by many as an American network. Intergovernmental organizations had also some legitimacy since the Internet was part of a telecommunication system that had been historically regulated by the International Telecommunications Union. The ITU as well as the World Intellectual Property organisation were key institutions in fields closely related to Internet governance. The whole debate was open and many commentators claimed their legitimacy as representatives of the “Internet community.” The Internet was only beginning to become a political issue. There was no pre-existing model for its governance and it was possible for almost each of these elite groups to influence the institutionalisation of Internet governance.

#### **5.1.1 The policy documents of the Internet governance debate of the 1990s**

During the debates on Internet governance, several successive documents suggested different models of governance. Each of the documents listed below was a possible basis for the creation of a governance model because of the institutional status of the authors and because of the inclusion in

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<sup>68</sup> In Bourdieusian terms, specialised elites' members held different forms of capital acquired in their “home” field, as described in the previous chapter for the case of the scientific-technical elite.

the documents of most of the features of a governance system. Documents that were describing a governance system with the creation of institutions and the specifications of a market for domain names are not included in the list. For example, the declaration on e-commerce made by diverse corporate and US governmental interests are not included (Clinton & Gore, 1996), ICC 1998). Documents that were not backed by the important institutions of the field are not described either (Boston Working Group, 1998; Open Root Server Confederation, 1998) <sup>69</sup>. The list of documents that are analysed in this section is consistent with what is generally analysed by the literature on Internet governance debates in the 1990s (especially, Mueller 2002)<sup>70</sup>.

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69 These advocacy groups were created in the last years of the politicisation of Internet governance and were not in a structural position to impose their views.

70 It should be noted that the present study insists on the process of redaction of the documents and takes into account drafts and comments, which is not always the case in the literature. Moreover, the authorship of the documents is not analysed in terms of stakeholders but rather in terms of coalitions of specialised elites.

	Draft Postel			gTLD-MoU			White Paper			ICANN by-laws and MoU					
<b>Policy Documents</b>	Draft Ymbk	Draft Denninger	Draft Masek	Draft Postel	IAHC Draft	IAHC Final Report	gTLD-MoU	CORE-MoU	NTIA RFC	Green Paper	White Paper	ICANN by-laws (iteration 1)	ICANN adopted by-laws (iteration 6)	Revised ICANN by-laws	ICANN/ DoC MoU
<b>Comments</b>	NewDom mailing list + quoted comments			NewDom mailing list and public comments			Public comments related to specific RFCs			Public comments			International Forum on the White Paper, mailing lists		
<b>Examples of changes between versions</b>	Radical increase of the number of new gTLDs			creation of a Policy Oversight Committee, exclusion of existing gTLDs from the new regulation			Concerns over antitrust impunity and functional and geographical diversity of the board members.			Provisions about transparency, openness and accountability					

Table 5.1. Overview of policy documents, comments and modifications from 1996 to 1998

➤ *Draft Postel*

The first document, the Draft Postel, was a document produced by Jon Postel (who had been in charge of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority<sup>71</sup>) and other Internet Engineering Taskforce members on the basis of a technical and political discussion where cyber-libertarian elements were included. The legitimacy of the document to propose a new governance system stemmed from the fact that the IANA had been in charge of the allocation of domain names and thus claimed the right to continue to do so under new circumstances. Domain Names policies were to be controlled by the scientific/technical organization created in the scientific field and before the commercialization of the network. Other aspects were intended to be “determined, and coordinated, by contractual agreements between private interests” (Postel 1996: Abstract). The main objectives of the document were to allow open competition in domain name registration and to provide a legal and financial umbrella to the IANA in its activities related to domain names policies since “the net becomes larger and more commercial” (Postel 1996: §1.5.3). The document also stressed the idea of competition and introduced the statement which claimed that open and free-market competition had proven itself in other related services (Postel, 1996: 1.5.2). Furthermore, it stated that domain names were not supposed to reflect trademarks and that the trademark problem had no solution, which prompted many reactions.

➤ *GTLD-MoU*

A few months later, the generic Top-Level Domains Memory of Understanding (gTLD-MoU) was drafted by the International Ad Hoc Committee, whose creation was recommended in the Draft Postel. However, it was not only a technical committee as described by the Draft Postel, since it included representatives from various intergovernmental organizations, the National Science Foundation, and trademark interests, as well as intellectual property lawyers. The language was different from the Draft Postel:

”The Internet top level domain space is a public resource and is subject to the public trust. Therefore any administration, use and/or evolution of the Internet TLD space is a public policy issue and should be carried out in an open and public manner in the interests and service of the public. Appropriately, related public policy needs to openly balance and represent the interests of the current and future stakeholders in the Internet name space.” (IAHC 1997)

The IAHC proposed a non- regulatory policy framework in the form of a Memorandum of

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71 See chapter 4.

Understanding (MoU) signed by both the public and private sector. The International Telecommunication Union (ITU) was to be the depository for the gTLD-MoU and to publish the list of signatories. Trademarks were strongly protected with a 60-day publication period of any application for a domain name prior to its inclusion in the database. This period would have left trademark owners with a lot of time to investigate possible trademark infringement. This internationalized governance system was the first attempt to introduce a multistakeholder governance system for the Internet. The gTLD-MoU also relied on a global public good discourse and stressed the importance of intergovernmental organizations. This policy document, emanating from technical/scientific elite as well as from the historical regulatory institution of telecommunications and strongly influenced by the corporate elite of trademark holders was about to be implemented in the late 1990s. However, small Internet entrepreneurs and cyber-libertarians, backed by the US government criticized the proposal for not taking into account their interests (Mueller 2002).

➤ *White Paper*

In parallel to the gTLD-MoU process, the White Paper on Internet Governance was drafted by the US Department of Commerce after a process of consultations and negotiations. It had also benefited from the previous work and collaboration of some of the authors of the previous documents. It took into account the criticisms raised at the gTLD-MoU and proposed a competitive market for Internet domains. This market was to be regulated by private bodies rather than public organizations:

“The US. Government is committed to a transition that will allow the private sector to take leadership for DNS management. Most commentators shared this goal. While international organizations may provide specific expertise or act as advisers to the new corporation, the US. continues to believe, as do most commentators, that neither national governments acting as sovereigns nor intergovernmental organizations acting as representatives of governments should participate in management of Internet names and addresses.” (NTIA, 1998)

The US government claimed its control over Internet governance through the contract it had established with NSI for domain names registration. It thus intended to hand over this control under some conditions:

“In withdrawing the US. Government from DNS management and promoting the establishment of a new, non-governmental entity to manage Internet names

and addresses, a key US. Government objective has been to ensure that the increasingly global Internet user community has a voice in decisions affecting the Internet's technical management.” (NTIA 1998)

The White paper only dictates a number of conditions under which the private sector was to create a new institution. It is more a set of policy guidelines than a comprehensive institutional framework proposal. However, the requirements are precise and not neutral. They address the same issues as the other documents and favour some types of solutions. The White Paper is thus a crucial element of the debate.

➤ *ICANN by-laws and Memorandum of Understanding with the Department of Commerce*

Finally, the ICANN by-laws and Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) are the documents that actually created the institution. They were drafted by a group of individuals, including Jon Postel, the leader of the technical community that was organized around the Internet Society and the Internet Engineering Taskforce, employees of Network Solutions Inc., the company that had the monopoly on Internet registration, and two lawyers. They proposed the creation of a new corporation that followed the rules established by the White Paper on Internet Governance. This document represents the views of what Mueller (2002) called the “dominant coalition”. As described in the following section, these documents evidence an evolution of the governance system towards a consensual institutionalisation, accepted by distinct elite groups. In this sense, these documents were instrumental in the unification of a power elite as described by Charles Wright Mills (2000). The proposed institution was a not-for-profit corporation acting under a Memorandum of Understanding with the US Department of Commerce. Its mandate was the collaboration in domain names policies, including trademark issues, the creation of new top-level domain names and the promotion of competition in domain names registration:

“in recognition of the fact that the Internet is an international network of networks, owned by no single nation, individual or organization, the Corporation shall, except as limited by Article 5 hereof, pursue the charitable and public purposes of lessening the burdens of government and promoting the global public interest in the operational stability of the Internet by (i) coordinating the assignment of Internet technical parameters as needed to maintain universal connectivity on the Internet; (ii) performing and overseeing functions related to the coordination of the Internet Protocol ("IP") address space; (iii) performing and overseeing functions related to the coordination of the Internet domain name system ("DNS"), including the development of policies for determining the circumstances under which new top-level domains are added to the DNS root system; (iv) overseeing operation of the

authoritative Internet DNS root server system; and (v) engaging in any other related lawful activity in furtherance of items (i) through (iv).” (ICANN, 1998)

The articles of incorporation of the ICANN also stress the role of the organisation in the creation and management of new markets:

“The Corporation shall operate for the benefit of the Internet community as a whole, carrying out its activities in conformity with relevant principles of international law and applicable international conventions and local law and, to the extent appropriate and consistent with these Articles and its By-laws, through open and transparent processes that enable competition and open entry in Internet-related markets. To this effect, the Corporation shall cooperate as appropriate with relevant international organizations.” (ICANN 1998)

The next section will explore in further details the evolution of the policy debate that led to these particular documents.

### **5.1.2. The evolution of regulation in the policy documents**

While these documents emanate from different institutions, they were not competing. Most authors were involved in the drafting of several of these policy documents. They do not appear at the same time but rather as a series of documents taking into account the strengths and weaknesses of the former ones. This evolution is consistent with the view of a unification of different elite groups with different projects towards a consensual project. However, the evolution does not correspond either to a pluralist competition of interests. The broader discourses about Internet governance outlined below show us the similarity and ideological compatibility of dominant discourses as well as the necessary exclusion of alternative discourses. The evolution of the policy documents and the process of unification of different elite groups fit well with the intermediate theoretical position of Wright Mills. Should a single ruling class (global elite or transnational capitalist class) have existed prior to the politicisation of Internet governance, the consensus-building phase would not have been necessary. Diverging views and interests would have been less important and conflictive. However, a pluralist competition would have shown a much greater degree of variety of ideological perspectives and a far narrower degree of compatibility among competing documents. The exclusion of a wide range of alternatives stresses the lack of openness of the political arena.

As Table 5.2 shows, the Draft Postel starts from a technocratic and limitedly inclusive perspective that evolved towards the imprecise notion of multistakeholderism. This move evidences the need to

include other groups, already called stakeholders in the 1990s, to create a viable institutional framework. The description of this framework evolves but remains within a similar objective.

Although the documents have different statuses and writing styles, they all propose a governance system organized around new institutions. While some stress the technical aspects of the transition and others envisions the functioning of a new market, several categories can be found throughout the documents. The following categories have been constructed inductively from the comparison of the four families of documents outlined before (see Table 5.1). Consistently with critical discourse analysis, statements were identified and then grouped into categories (see Annex 3). Finally these categories were analysed in order to find correspondences between these categories and broader discourse about Internet governance (Fairclough, 2003). The discourses reflect the main issues associated with the creation of transnational private authority as described by a rich literature (Cutler et al., 1999; Braithwaite and Drahos, 2000; Haufler, 2001; Graz and Nölke 2008). They offer a framework to analyse the nature of the envisioned governance system as well as the structure of the market for domain names. They address the nature of the market in terms of degree of competition and protection of existing trademarks (which relates to the role of existing dominant firms). The categories also analyse the institutional nature of the new governance system. In particular, the institutional embeddedness of the new system is discussed (the relation between new institutions and existing ones, and particularly the US state and intergovernmental organizations), the nature of the funding as well as the importance of the budget. The categories are also concerned with the nature of the policies that were going to be implemented by the new institution, as well as the type of resources needed and the scope of participation. Two categories require special attention since they answer the crucial questions of what is Internet governance (policy type) and who should govern the Internet (scope of participation). These two categories are crucial to differentiate between several discourses on Internet governance that existed in the 1990s and that will be described in more details in the next section.



Table 5.2. Institutional models of Internet governance<sup>72</sup>

Document	Draft Postel	gTLD-MoU	White Paper	ICANN by-laws and MoU
Date	June 1996	February 1997	June 1998	November 1998
<b>Degree of competition</b>	Very high (many TLDs <sup>73</sup> and competing registrars <sup>74</sup> /registries <sup>75</sup> )	High (competing registries and registrars, few TLDs)	Average (competing registrars, few TLDs)	High (competing registries and registrars, few TLDs)
<b>Trademarks protection</b>	None	Very strong ( <i>a priori</i> )	Very strong for famous TM ( <i>a priori</i> ), strong for the rest ( <i>a posteriori</i> )	Very strong for famous TM ( <i>a priori</i> ), strong for the rest ( <i>a posteriori</i> )
<b>Institutional embeddedness</b>	Organ of the Internet Society	MoU <sup>76</sup> signed by private organisations, states, and international organizations	MoU with the US Department of Commerce	MoU with the US Department of Commerce
<b>Funding</b>	Private funding of the Internet Society by applicants and registries (small budget)	Private funding by applicants and registries (average budget)	Private funding by domain name registries and regional IP registries (reasonable budget)	Private funding by registries and public funding (estimated ¼ public funding for the first 6 months) (large budget)
<b>Policy type</b>	Technical regulation	Technical regulation (with some broader policy-related aspects)	Technical regulation	Technical regulation
<b>Resources</b>	Technical/Scientific expertise	Technical expertise, financial and legal resources, legitimacy	Technical expertise, financial and legal resources	Technical expertise, financial and legal resources
<b>Scope of participation</b>	Technical experts only	Internationalized multistakeholderism	Multistakeholderism	Advisory multistakeholderism and explicit rejection of (inter-)governmental participation

72 Table 5.2 relies on categories inductively built from the qualitative content analysis of the documents described in Table 5.1 (Boyatzis, 1998). Conceptually, they correspond to different features that allow for a characterization of “hybrid” transnational private authority (Graz, 2006) on the public-private continuum, the local-global continuum, and the market-state continuum. The table containing the statements that were used in order to construct these categories is reproduced in Annex 3.

73 TLDs stands for Top-Level Domains such as “.com”, “.org” etc.

74 "Registrar" means the entity which is authorized to enter and modify the Second Level Domain (SLD) data maintained by a Registry, in response to requests by entities seeking to be assigned a SLD (IAHC 1997).

75 Registry means those roles and activities involved in the administration of a Top Level Domain (such as “.com”) in the Domain Name System, and encompasses all of the services needed for assignment and maintenance of that TLD and its registrations.(IAHC 1997).

76 Memorandum of Understanding

Table 5.2 shows an evolution of the proposed models from a scientific/technocratic independent private regulation of an unregulated market with no trademark protection towards an institution closely related to the US state promoting a competitive market but also strong trademarks protection and stakeholder participation. However, the shift should not be overstated. Most of the elements of the first documents can still be found in the more recent ones. The first drastic change is the inclusion of trademark protection, whose importance was denied by the Draft Postel. It became a central element as soon as in the gTLD-MoU. The second important change is the participation of stakeholders beyond the scientific/technical elite that had regulated the Internet before its commercialisation. Most of the other elements are more or less stable through the documents. The compatibility of the documents and the relative stability of the solutions provides evidence a certain ideological coherence. In our view, this clearly reflects the similarities between the three dominant discourses on Internet governance and the exclusion of marginal ideas.

### **5.1.3. Dominant and marginalized discourses**

The policy documents produced in the second half of the 1990's in order to create a governance system for the Internet echo three dominant discourses. Two other discourses can be found in the commentaries to the policy documents. They can be qualified as alternative discourses since they were not represented in the documents that concretely prepared the creation of the governance system and were not supported by dominant institutions in the field. Finally, the documents that actually created the ICANN reflect a hegemonic discourse in the sense that it was able to build a consensus among the elites in spite of the differences between their favoured discourses. At the same time, the hegemonic discourse was able to co-opt non-dominant actors without “touching the essential” of an elite-driven governance system (Gramsci 2001: 373). Discourses are broader than plans to develop a particular institutional framework to regulate the Internet. They address the issues of what Internet governance is and who should govern it. The characterisation of the suggested institutional frameworks into broader discourses helps us to understand the underlying ideas and principles that can be found in the documents. However, they are not necessarily explicit. The extrapolation of the policy documents into broader discourses is based on several publications of the end of the 1990s. This categorisation is essential to understand the possibility of a consensual discourse among elite groups and the necessary exclusion or co-optation of ideologically different views of the governance of the network.

➤ *The neoliberal discourse*

The White Paper on Internet Governance issued by the Clinton administration can be described as a neoliberal project. The neoliberal views were also the most influential in the documents that actually created the ICANN. While neoliberalism is a multidimensional phenomenon, some important elements are the focus on individual freedom, the protection of private property and economic *laissez-faire* (Harvey 2005)<sup>77</sup>. The Clinton administration had described its vision of the Internet in a more generic document about e-commerce a few months before the White Paper (Clinton & Gore, 1996). The document foresees an active role of the state in the creation of new, loosely-regulated markets. As the third principle reads:

”Where governmental involvement is needed, its aim should be to support and enforce a predictable, minimalist, consistent and simple legal environment for commerce.” (Clinton & Gore, 1996: 3)

The main purpose of the neoliberal regulation of the Internet is the creation of a market for domain names (ICANN and DoC, art. II, section C §2). The institutions and rules that are created by the documents are bound to ensure a smooth functioning of the market; they are the by-products of its creation. The role of the institution is to ensure stability for the infrastructure of the network, to protect private (intellectual) property, and to foster competition. For neoliberals, the market is the *locus* of innovation and efficiency, and the problem-solving capacity of a transnational private governance system is based on its promotion of market forces. Multistakeholderism is also praised as more inclusive, and thus more legitimate, than intergovernmentalism through the participation of stakeholders. The role of the state is important to actively create and support transnational institutions in order to delegate some of its functions. The neoliberal discourse is supportive of a transnational and private model of governance based on the principles of multistakeholderism and limited to technical issues:

”As set out below, the US. Government is prepared to recognize, by entering into agreement with, and to seek international support for, a new, not-for-profit corporation formed by private sector Internet stakeholders to administer policy for the Internet name and address system. [...] The organization and its board should derive legitimacy from the participation of key stakeholders.” (NTIA 1998)

Multistakeholderism is an individualization of political participation in which individuals do not rely on institutions to take part in decision-making. The competition and market-based arbitration

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<sup>77</sup> See chapter 4 for a more detailed description of the translation of the neoliberal ideology in telecommunications.

between individual interests is seen as the most efficient type of regulation. The neoliberal discourse can be summarized by the idea that individualized, market-based competition are superior to other modes of organization (Mudge, 2008, p. 706-707). Multistakeholderism in a neoliberal perspective is the institutionalisation of such a mode of organization.

➤ *The Cyber-libertarian discourse*

The cyber-libertarian discourse is best illustrated by the Draft Postel. It emerged in the early days of the Internet and can be summarized by its motto: “Hands off the Internet” (Thierer, 2009). Cyber-libertarian discourse was very common among IT and networking specialists and a “cyber-elite” of science fiction writers and young entrepreneurs whom gravitated around *Wired* magazine. The discourse was thus influential in the small population that was aware of the potential of the Internet in the first half of the 1990s (Flichy, 2001: 126-133). The basic premise of cyber-libertarianism is Internet exceptionalism: The Internet creates a new world and changes social relations, which makes existing regulations obsolete. Cyberspace is, by definition, a world of freedom and equality, and any intervention might threaten these characteristics.

“Governments of the Industrial World, you weary giants of flesh and steel, I come from Cyberspace, the new home of Mind. On behalf of the future, I ask you of the past to leave us alone. You are not welcome among us. You have no sovereignty where we gather. [...] We believe that from ethics, enlightened self-interest, and the common-weal, our governance will emerge. [...] We hope we will be able to build our particular solutions on that basis. But we cannot accept the solutions you are attempting to impose.” (Barlow, 1996)

Cyber-libertarian positions on commercial aspects of the Internet are less clear. They favour market solutions over regulation and strongly defend individual economic freedom. While some cyber-libertarians seem to reject the concept of property in cyberspace and its implications for intellectual property rights protection (Atkinson, 2010: 2), others are defenders of intellectual property rights as an extension of traditional property rights (Thierer 2009). The cyber-libertarian discourse proposes a model of transnational private governance that escapes the authority of the state. It is based on a different understanding of the history of the Internet where the network has been created by private initiatives independently from the state. Legitimacy of the governance model stems from the technical and scientific validity of the solutions proposed, as evaluated by peers. Participation to technical forums is open but relies on knowledge resources. The Internet questions in this view the idea of sovereignty and conceptualize Internet governance outside the power structures of the global political economy. The Draft Postel does not explicitly refer to cyber-libertarian ideas, although

some of its authors are cyber-libertarians (see section 5.2). The self-organization of the Internet community through its own institutions and the total absence of any reference to government contracts is an implicit endorsement of a cyber-libertarian discourse. Moreover, Internet exceptionalism has been influential in the more recent documents.

➤ *The Global Public Good discourse*

Although the concept of global public goods has only been popularized since the end of the 1990s by researchers of the United Nations Development Program (Kaul 1999), the discourse on the need for international cooperation to manage trans-boundary flows and threats had been present throughout the 1990. As far as Internet governance is concerned, the global public good discourse can be found in the declarations by intergovernmental organizations and some non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The gTLD-MoU, authored by members of the technical community with representatives from IGOs reflects, to a certain extent, this discourse. Public goods are defined in economic literature as goods that are non-rival in consumption (consumption by one person does not prevent further consumption) and nonexcludable (no people or groups of people are excluded from the use of the good). Kaul et al. add a criterion to qualify a good as a global public good: their benefits are quasi universal in terms of countries (covering more than one group of countries), people (accruing to several, preferably all, population groups), and generations (extending to both current and future generations, or at least meeting the needs of current generations without foreclosing development options for future generations) (Kaul et al. 1999: 2-4). Drawing upon the definition by Kaul et al., Spar (1999) defines the Internet as a public good. According to this discourse, Internet governance requires state intervention at both a national and multilateral level (Spar 1999: 356-358). As a global public good, it cannot be unilaterally managed as a US policy issue by the US government. These elements were strongly acknowledged by the gTLD-MoU<sup>78</sup>, which was written in the name of the Internet community as a whole, but also in the ICANN by-laws that stressed the importance of international representativeness. The global public good discourse is ambiguous on the respective roles of the state, the market and intergovernmental organizations. While a maximalist definition of global public goods would imply a decommodification of public goods, a minimalist definition refers to the failures of the market and the means to address them through collective arrangements, without questioning the power structures that lie behind them (Bissiriou and Kern 2005). In this perspective, the market is the referent and the economy defines the field of action of the policy (Gabas and Hugon, 2001; p. 33). The global public good discourse related to Internet governance epitomizes a minimalist definition

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<sup>78</sup> See references to the Internet as a public resource in the previous section.

of global public goods (IAHC 1997) and favours a transnational private governance model involving states and intergovernmental organisations.

➤ *Marginalized discourses*

Marginalized discourses were absent from the proposed models of Internet governance. However, they clearly appear in the comments and reactions to the proposals. They also existed as more scholarly discourses as the institutionalization of Internet governance was debated. The status of these discourses changed over time and they were the basis of the opposition to the neoliberal model that prevailed with the creation of the ICANN. The sovereigntist and the anti-marketisation discourses underpinned the resistance to the ICANN and the alternatives that have been proposed since its creation.

First, a sovereigntist discourse envisions a governance system where states play a crucial role. It generally focuses on the security issues related to the Internet and the need for regulation to address them. During the 1990s, some people in the United States developed a nationalistic discourse on Internet governance. This discourse was influential in the US Parliament. The Internet had been created by US citizens with US citizens' tax money and, thus, could not be “given away” (Parisi 1998). These kinds of arguments were called upon by US industry representatives during the congressional hearings on the Domain Name System (US House of Representatives 1997). National security issues and geopolitical interests were evoked. The sovereigntist discourse also exists in other countries as a reaction to US domination of the Internet. Early comments on the Internet as a new technology discussed the threat of its use for criminal purposes and terrorist activities (G7/P8 1996). For the sovereigntist discourse, the legitimacy of Internet governance institutions clearly lies in the state. National jurisdictions should be able to control portion of the Internet. In this sense, multistakeholderism was not seen as a viable mode of regulation of the network.

Like the sovereigntist discourse, the anti-marketisation discourse is sceptical about the premises of the information society and the new economy. The anti-marketisation discourse was already weakened in the mid-1990s by the previous marketisation of the backbone of the Internet. It was still an important discourse in social science faculties and non-dominant universities. As Birdsall puts it, in a clashing speech given at the I'Net 96 conference,

“I do not accept that it is the Internet that is transforming society. [...] I maintain that the Ideology of Information Technology is a set of values and propositions

that represents an inherent extension of capitalism's drive to commodify all spheres of economic and cultural life. This ideology links the adoption of information technology with free-market values and the commodification of information.” (Birdsall 1996)

According to the anti-marketisation discourse, the main change that was occurring along with the emergence of the “information age” was the commodification of information as a new realm of capitalist development. The Internet is one of the elements of digital capitalism (Schiller 1999). The embedding of the global network in capitalistic structures prevents emancipatory use of the Internet and favours dominant actors and big businesses (Simon 1998). In order for the Internet to fulfil its emancipatory potential, a real political arena had to be created where Internet governance could be debated beyond elite circles (Birdsall 1996). According to this discourse, transnational private governance cannot address social issues because of its narrow scope. Moreover, it does not offer sufficient participation and legitimacy and represent an institutionalisation of neoliberalism. Like the sovereignist discourse, it was hardly audible in the 1990s.




Figure 5.1. Internet governance discourses and hegemony

#### 5.1.4. Internet exceptionalism, technical governance and multistakeholderism as elements of an ideological cohesion among elites

The identification of dominant and marginal discourses as well as a number of precise statements

belonging to a specific discourse allows for the analysis of common and diverging elements. Three elements can be considered consensual among dominant discourses on Internet governance: Internet exceptionalism, the technical character of Internet governance and multistakeholder participation. Out of these three elements, two are issues of organisation of the regulation that can be found in the policy documents and one is a more general understanding of the Internet as illustrated in the discourses. The general assumption is Internet exceptionalism. The organizational principles are the notion of a technical governance of the Internet and multistakeholder institutions. The emergence of a hegemonic discourse about Internet governance can be unfold as two concomitant processes. First, the ideological unification of an elite is necessary to find a common point of view among elite groups. This element is key in the definition of a unified power elite. Second, the imposition of this point of view to non-dominant groups must rely on a certain degree of acceptance by those groups (the Gramscian notion of hegemony). This section will focus the first process while the second one will be analysed in further details in the chapter 6. Even if some degree of coercion is possible because of the involvement of sovereign governments, the consensual aspect of power is even more salient in a transnational field than at a national level.

The ideological cohesion of the elite is not as simple domination of a particular discourse and/or a particular group of actors in Internet governance, it is a process of consensus-building among different discourses and different elite groups (see figure 5.1). While consensus that emerged among dominant discourses of Internet governance is not in contradiction with neoliberal ideas that dominated the global political economy of the 1990s, it results from field-specific dynamics and represent an aggregate of dominant discourses. The focus on the market as the principle of organisation of Internet governance is the main contribution of the neoliberal discourse to the field of Internet governance. This focus on the market has implications in terms of promotion of competition and elimination of “unnecessary” regulations. From the cyber-libertarian discourse, a discursive rejection of (inter-)governmental participation prevailed. The focus on technical expertise and the references to the “Internet community” are also consistent with a cyber-libertarian discourse. Finally, the global public goods discourse imposed elements on the “international” character of the network and the rejection of unilateralism. The consensus between the three dominant discourses is reflected in the three principles discussed in this section.

The idea of a major change in social, political, and economic life brought about by the Internet is shared by the neoliberal, cyber-libertarian, and, to some extent, the global public good discourses. The expression “Internet exceptionalism” (Wu 2010) is derived from the notion of American



exceptionalism that can be traced back to Alexis de Toqueville (de Toqueville, 1840: 36-37). According to Internet exceptionalism, cyberspace would be a *terra nullius* in which social relations and laws have no historical existence and must be re-invented. Thus, tenants of Internet exceptionalism advocated for the abolition of existing rules and the creation of a totally new governance system. The overarching role of the state and intergovernmental organizations was to be replaced by the initiatives of the individual actors. Private funding ensured the impossibility for the state to co-opt the process. Without a state or an international institution to arbitrate between individual initiatives, the regulation was left to market forces. Transnational private governance could thus be presented as the adequate base for the creation of a governance regime.

The notion of Internet exceptionalism is most obviously advocated by cyber-libertarians who see the information age as the age of freedom, away from traditional government and state sovereignty (Huber 1997; Postel 1996). But Internet exceptionalism can also be found in neoliberal thinking on the network, as advocated by the Clinton administration (Clinton and Gore 1997: 1). The global public good discourse, as used by the UNDP, advocates for an important involvement of governments and international organization in world politics. It does not clearly sympathize with the notion of the information society (Kaul, 1999). However, the tenants of the global public good discourse acknowledge that the power of the state is undermined by globalization and especially by the Internet. While the Internet is considered a public good, authors like Spar rules out any public provision of the network. She even sees the regulation of private provision as “unwieldy” because of the specific history of the Internet. According to Spar, the only solution left to the state is a subsidiarity principle in which governments only intervene where the market does not (Spar, 1999: 355-356). By acknowledging the specificity of the Internet, the global public good discourse was not in a position to offer an alternative to the Internet exceptionalism thesis. It tends to accept the idea that the Internet transforms the way in which governments can intervene. The gTLD-MoU, which uses this kind of discourse, thus recognizes “the unique characteristics of the Internet” (IAHC 1997: 1), and proposes a self-regulatory structure (IAHC 1997: 2) in an attempt to re-invent global public good governance beyond multilateralism. This is why the global public good discourse remained with a minimalist definition of global public goods and did not oppose Internet exceptionalism.

The second organisational principle that is shared in the documents as well as in the discourses is the purely technical nature of the regulation. The issue at stake in the 1990s was the assignment of domain names and IP addresses. These two activities were important aspects to determine who gets

what in the emerging markets related to the Internet. Yet, the issue was framed in terms of stability and technical feasibility. The economic, political and social aspects were not developed in the policy documents. The Draft Postel ignores the non-technical consequences of Domain names management. It even negates the trademarks and intellectual property problem. Litigation is left to national courts and no policy-making body is envisioned (Postel 1996). The generic Top Level Domain Names Memorandum of Understanding is the documents that most clearly address policy issues.

“*Conscious*, that the management and administration of the DNS raises significant public policy issues that include, *inter alia*, appropriate and equitable allocation of global name resources, market supply and access to DNS registration services, and intellectual property concerns;” (IAHC 1997, Preamble)

The document even foresees the creation of a Policy Oversight Committee to specifically address issues that were not purely technical. However, the mandate of the committee as well as its composition remains technically-oriented. The members of the committee were to be knowledgeable individuals from the scientific institutions such as the Internet Architecture Board or the Internet Society, and representative of the ITU, the WIPO, and the International Trademark Association (IAHC 1997, section 6). The only policy issue beyond technical management seem to be the protection of trademarks. As we can see from the most recent history of the politicisation of the Internet, this issue is only a limited aspect of the political implications of Internet governance. Moreover, the mandate of the Committee is limited to technical changes such as the addition of a new Top-Level Domain or a new registrar (IAHC 1997, section 6).

The White Paper limits the functions of the new institutions to four domains, all of them closely related to the technical management of Internet names and numbers:

”1. oversee the operation of the Internet root server system; 2. To oversee policy for determining the circumstances under which new top level domains would be added to the root system; and 3. To coordinate the development of other technical protocol parameters as needed to maintain universal connectivity on the Internet. 4. To set policy for and direct the allocation of IP number blocks” (NTIA 1998)

Once again, the broader social and economic aspects of these operations are underestimated. For example, the document states that:

“The new corporation does not need any special grant of immunity from the antitrust laws so long as its policies and practices are reasonably based on, and no broader than necessary to promote the legitimate coordinating objectives of the new corporation.” (White Paper)

This type of statement shows that the consequences of this purely technical management of domain names and IP addresses were not acknowledged. The assignment of different tiers of IP addresses blocks to companies had important consequences in the market power of a given firm and had been harshly criticised during the 1990s<sup>79</sup>. Domain names allocation also prompted significant commercial disputes. Several antitrust lawsuits have indeed been filed against ICANN several years after its creation with the argument that the Corporation had used its monopolistic position to distort the market on several occasions<sup>80</sup>.

Finally, the ICANN by-laws and Memorandum of Understanding with the US Department of Commerce stick to the technical mandate defined by the White Paper (ICANN and DoC 1998, art. 2 section B). Policy advice was to be provided by other institutions such as the WIPO. Issues of access or civil liberties that were raised in the comments<sup>81</sup> to the various proposals were not taken into account in the design of the institution.

While the technical nature of Internet governance has been widely questioned and criticised in the early 2000s, the third organizational characteristic of Internet governance has remained at the core of the *doxa* of the field of Internet governance since the 1990s. Multistakeholderism is both an organizational model and a normative stance on how the Internet should be governed<sup>82</sup>. This dual nature of the concept can be traced back to its origins in management studies in the 1980s. The stakeholder perspective on the corporation is an alternative way to look at the firm, more comprehensive – and even democratic according to some authors – than the shareholder/stockholder perspective (Crane, Driver, Kaler, Parker, & Parkinson, 2005; Matten & Crane, 2005). The idea is to include “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the activities of an organization” (Freeman, 1984, p. 46). This imprecise definition leaves space for interpretation in various contexts.

The elitist character of the stakeholder model is evidenced by Kochan and Rubenstein (Kochan & Rubenstein, 2000, p. 373), who suggest three criteria for identifying significant stakeholders:

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79 Interview with Karl Denninger, 3 October 2012. For an overview of IP addresses classes and classful and classless networking, see <http://oreilly.com/catalog/coreprot/chapter/appb.html>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

80 One recent example is the lawsuit filed by the porn company Manwin because the ICANN was imposing a fee to protect the company's domain name in the newly-created “.xxx” top-level domain. See <http://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/181077/judge-allows-antitrust-lawsuit-against-icann.html>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

81 See for example the comment of CNNIC to the IAHC proposal, 15 January 1997.

82 Multistakeholderism was not as commonly used in Internet governance in the 1990s as it was during and after the WSIS. Many documents referred to self-regulation. This is why most authors associate the emergence of the term with the WSIS. As stated in the following paragraph, the term stakeholder was already used in the 1990s. Moreover, there is no substantial difference between what was called self-regulation in the 1990s and multistakeholderism in the 2000s. This is why the term is described here as part of the *doxa* of Internet governance since the late 1990s.

1. They supply resources that are critical to the success of the enterprise.
2. They place something of value “at risk”; that is, their own welfare is directly “affected by the fate of the enterprise.”
3. They have “sufficient power” to affect the performance of the enterprise, either favourably or unfavourably. (definition quoted in Post et al., 2002)

While the first two criteria are not discriminatory enough in order to provide a precise definition of stakeholders, the third one clearly establishes a distinction between stakeholders and other affected groups based on power.

The notion of stakeholder is also associated with the retreat of the welfare state (MacIntyre, 1999; Froud et al., 1996), especially as a way to re-frame the description of the redistribution of benefits in a privatisation process. The notion of stakeholder benefits plays down the benefits of the shareholders and focuses on the benefits of the consumers and employees. The context of Internet governance was somewhat similar, with a need to re-invent an inclusive governance system after the privatisation of the network. Against this background, the problematic concept of stakeholderism emerged in Internet governance, with its imprecise scope, elitist implications, and negation of redistributive conflicts (see Ruwet, 2010 for a discussion in a similar context).

The first reference to the participation of stakeholders to the governance of the Internet appeared in the gTLD-MoU. Governance mechanisms were supposed to include “the widest possible range of Internet stakeholders” (IAHC 1997), including both “current” and “future” stakeholders (IAHC, art. 1, sect. 2). The White Paper also mentions stakeholders several times, albeit with different qualities. Sometimes the stakeholders are used in a general sense, sometimes the document refers to “private sector” or “key stakeholders”. It even warns against capture of the future institution by “a narrow group of stakeholders”. The variety in the use of the term evidences the lack of a clear definition of Internet stakeholders.

The ICANN by-laws create a multistakeholder governance model since they follow previous requirements in that domain, even if they do not use the term in 1998. The Memorandum of Understanding between the ICANN and the US Department of Commerce recalls the principles of competition and private coordination as a way to meet and enhance Internet users’ choice as well as their needs (ICANN and DoC 1998: art. II, section C). As a strictly private institution, the ICANN Board excludes the official representation of national governments and intergovernmental organization (ICANN 1998: art. V, section 5). The documents rule out any intergovernmental type

of governance and restrains (inter-)governmental participation to an advisory committee that consults with the board of the corporation. Furthermore, unlike other advisory committees (e.g., DNS root server, membership, and independent review), the governmental advisory committee does not have the power to initiate a procedure of advice on its own: The Board is supposed to notify the committee of any proposal upon which it seeks comments (ICANN 1998: art. VII, section 3a). Multistakeholderism usually puts state and non-state actors on an equal footing, which is consistent with a neoliberal conception of the state. However, multistakeholderism in the ICANN does explicitly exclude governmental and intergovernmental participation. This exclusion is consistent with the idea of private stakeholders expressed in the White Paper. Moreover, multistakeholderism in the early ICANN is only an advisory mechanism, since the board of the corporation must have the initiative of regulation. The documents that created the ICANN go further than the limited role of the state as advocated by the neoliberal discourse. The market-enabling institutional role is not carried out by the state but by a private transnational not-for-profit corporation.

It is worth noting that the strictly transnational and private character of Internet governance was less an actual commitment than a discursive tool for the elites to find a common ground. In fact, the US Department of Commerce retains a crucial role in Internet governance. The description of this role is to be found in the Memorandum of Understanding between the US Department of Commerce and the ICANN (ICANN and DoC 1998) rather than in the by-laws. The MoU came after the creation of the ICANN and after the heated debates on the transnational and private character of the institution. The Department of Commerce was responsible for providing oversight to the work of the ICANN (ICANN and DoC 1998: art. V, section A) and was expected to fund one-fourth of the expenses of the organization in the first six months (ICANN and DoC 1998). Moreover, the role and the expertise of intergovernmental organisations such as the World Intellectual Property Organization was recalled (ICANN and DoC 1998: art. V, section C). The European Commission and the Australian government also participated informally in the nomination process of the ICANN board (Mueller 2002: section 8.2.3). In practice, powerful governments, and especially the United States, and some intergovernmental organizations were playing an important role in the new governance system. Multistakeholderism is a flexible concept that permitted the inclusion of all powerful actors. On the discursive level, however, the role of governments and intergovernmental organization was negated in order to stick with the idea of private multistakeholderism that was instrumental for the cohesion of the power elite. The different fractions of the elite were thus able to unite around the creation of the ICANN.

The following section will focus on the individuals and groups that benefited from this consensus based on Internet exceptionalism, technical regulation and multistakeholderism.

## **5.2. Interchangeability: circulation of elites and interlocking institutions**

In addition to the ideational aspect of the unification of the power elite, the links between the individuals pertaining to different specialized elite groups question the multistakeholder and pluralist perspective on early Internet governance debates. This section presents the elite networks of the 1990s in the field of Internet governance and focuses on some key actors that exemplify the circulation of elites. The pluralist view underestimates the connections of the actors beyond their stakeholder group. If we stick to the description of the two processes, there seems to be a clear-cut distinction between the main stakeholders. The different documents produced during the politicisation of Internet governance have different natures. On the one hand, the technical community produced their documents, first on their own and then by including some other stakeholders. On the other hand, the US government produced their documents through a more classical political process. At the end, a consensus was found in the documents that created the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers by including most of the stakeholders and reconciling the two leading stakeholders (see Table 5.3). The documents have different authors and the resulting consensus include directly or indirectly all of the key stakeholders.

Table 5.3. The multistakeholder view of Internet governance in the 1990s (participation of the main stakeholders to Internet governance documents)

Stakeholder	Date	Technical community	US government	Network solutions	Trademark holders
Draft Postel	August 1996	X	-	-	-
gTLD-MoU	February 1997	X	-	-	X
White Paper	June 1998	-	X	-	X
ICANN by-laws	November 1998	X	X	X	X

However, a closer look at this process could tell something different. If we make a network analysis including the actors of Internet governance in the 1990s, not only the main authors but also the

influential commentators and if we look at the institutional affiliation of the individuals, we can see many links between the actors and the stakeholder categorisation becomes blurred.

### **5.2.1. Elite networks in the 1990s**

Wright Mills' approach to the power elite is based on the institutional positions of individuals that give them the ability to make decisions having major consequences (Wright Mills 2000). According to Wright Mills, it is not important whether these individuals actually make the decisions or not, they are able to act because they are in command of the “major hierarchies and organizations of modern society” (Wright Mills 2000). This strictly positional method has been criticized, especially with the development of social network analysis that can help combine various methods in order to study elite networks and power structures (Knoke, 1993). This is why the following elite networks constructions rely on positional, decisional and to some extent reputational and relational methods.

The *positional method* requires the identification of key institutions in the field and the analysis of the individuals at the top positions within these institutions. In the case of Internet governance, both the transnational nature of the field and its lack of institutionalization make this study difficult. However, some institutions can be taken into account in order to identify specialized elites similar to Wright Mills' corporate, political and military elites. First, a technical/scientific elite had created institutions within the scientific field of computer science. Thus, members of the Internet Society Board of Trustees, the Internet Engineering TaskForce Steering Group, the Internet Architecture Board and the Board of Trustees of the American Registry for Internet Numbers and the IANA Transition Advisors Group were in a position to speak in the name of the “technical community”. On the US governmental side, the Inter-agency Working Group on Internet Domains and the National Telecommunication and Information Agency of the Department of Commerce and the subcommittees on Trade and on Technology and Innovation of the US House represented the major institutions involved in Internet governance. Foreign governments and intergovernmental organizations granted some highly-positioned individuals specializing in Internet governance with important influence over the debates. This is the case of the personnel from the DG XIII of the European Commission, the representatives of the French, Australian, German, Japanese and English governments, and the officials of the ITU and the WIPO. Finally, the corporate elite was institutionalized around the Global Internet Project, the World Information Technology and Services Association and the International Chamber of Commerce.

The *decisional method* aims to identify the actors that were effectively influential in determined decision-making situation. Based on the policy documents described in the previous section, influential actors can be identified. First, the authors of the documents were clearly the most influential actors. Second, while the documents were generally open to public comments, some commentators of the documents proved more influential than others. This influence can be observed in the changes between different versions of the policy documents and between the different documents. The Draft Postel resulted from a series of four documents, each of them being largely commented on the NewDom mailing list. The gTLD-MoU came after two draft documents, each of them commented publicly and on the NewDom mailing-list. The Council of Registrars MoU, an application document of the gTLD-MoU was also the object of a round of public comments. The archive of the specific IAHC mailing list is not available any more. The NTIA Request of Comments and the Green Paper were the most widely publicly-commented documents. The discussion, as well as the numerous conference calls and meetings among elite actors (Interview with Karl Denninger, October, 3, 2012), provided the elements for the redaction of the White Paper. Finally, the ICANN by-laws were modified on 7 occasions and a round of public comments, as well as an international forum, competing proposals and several mailing lists, brought many diverging ideas into the discussion. Qualitative appreciation of the impact of these changes is necessary. Substantial changes regarding trademarks and the role of the governmental monopolistic contractor Network Solutions Inc. have occurred during the debates. The changes in the by-laws of the ICANN to include more participation and transparency were more discursive and did not affect the institutional structure of the ICANN on the long term (see chapter 6). The table 5.2.2 presents a summary of the different versions of the documents and lists some example of changes advocated by some commentators.

The *reputational method* has not been used systematically to construct the database of elite actors. However, the literature on early Internet governance and especially Mueller (2002) provide a number of names that were used to check the collected data. The interviews conducted during the research process were also opportunities to provide some perspectives on who the influential actors were during the processes.

Finally, the *relational method* has also been used as a control with the inclusion in the database of several socializing events that took place during the historical period and that were related to Internet governance issues. Participants to the plenaries of several conferences bringing together



scholars and practitioners, such as the yearly Inet conferences or the conferences organized by the Berkman Center of Harvard University were included in the network analysis.

The social network analysis of Internet governance in the 1990s results in a 2-mode network comprising of 343 individuals, affiliated to 100 organizations, involved in the redaction of 6 families of policy documents and participating to 10 events. This general data allowed for the creation of the following visualizations and the formulation of the following remarks on the structuration of the field of Internet governance in the 1990s.


As shown in the first visualization (figure 5.2), the network of individuals, organizations and policy documents does not show a clear-cut distinction between stakeholder groups. Even if network analysis should be used with caution because of the non-public and undiscovered links that might exist between individuals and institutions, a multistakeholder environment should have evidenced the existence of several groups whose relations are more important within the group than with other groups. However, none of the standard functions available in the software provide elements hinting towards the existence of coherent stakeholder groups<sup>83</sup>. What can be found in the visualization is the existence of a centre of more closely-related actors and institutions, directly involved in the redaction of the documents and a number of peripheral nodes. The scientific elite organized around the Internet Society and its related organizations is represented in the centre of the graph, along with the corporate elite (essentially computer and telecommunications firms and obviously the monopolistic government contractor NSI) and the political elite is represented by the US Department of Commerce, other US governmental agencies and the European Commission. Some broker institutions between specialised elites – like the FNCAC as a forum gathering the technical and the US political elite – appear as central in the network. Of course, the visualisation has some limitations since it shows only the relationship that are explicitly stated in the available archives. For example, no direct connection between the core participants and the Australian government appears in the graph despite the important role that the latter played in the nomination of the first ICANN board (Mueller 2002)<sup>84</sup>. In spite of the failure of the International Ad Hoc Committee (IAHC) to implement a governance system for the Internet, the centrality of the Committee, evidenced by the size of the node in fig. 5.2, shows the influence of its members. It is also an indicator of the interchangeability of the elite rather than of the competition between different interests. Several elite actors participated in the different attempts to create a governance system for

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83 The cliques, clans, K-core and factions describe groups that transcend stakeholder classification in terms of actors and institutions (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002).

84 An individual from Australia was nominated among the Board member but had no institutional ties with the Australian government.

the Internet.



NSI: Network Solutions Inc.	ORSC: Open Root Server Confederation	FNCAC: US Federal Networking Council Advisory Committee
DoC: US Department of Commerce	ISOC: Internet Society	GIP: Global Internet Project
IAHC: International Ad Hoc Committee	ITAG: IANA Transition Advisory Group	CORE: Council of Registrars
ICANN MoU: Memorandum of Understanding between the ICANN and the DoC	IAB: Internet Architecture Board	ISP: Internet Service Provider


Figure 5.2. The network of actors, institutions and policy documents of Internet governance in the 1990s<sup>85</sup>

85 For the sake of clarity, socialization events have been removed from the data, therefore reducing the number of individuals. The visualization excludes the “isolate” nodes that are not connected to other nodes. Square nodes

The focus on institutions provides an overview of the important actors of the global political economy involved in the debates on Internet governance in the 1990s. The second visualization, focusing on organizations rather than on individuals tend to show the hybridisation of the field with an interrelated network of scientific, economic and political organizations (see figure 5.3).

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represent institutions and circles represent individuals. The size of the nodes is related to the *eigenvector* centrality of the node in the network. As recalled before (see chapter 4), *eigenvector* centrality in 2-modes networks should be analyzed with caution but provide interesting information on the centrality of a node. Colors stem from the measure of k-core groups but are not necessarily relevant here (Borgatti et al., 2002).



APNIC: Asia Pacific Network Information Center (Regional Internet Registry)	ITAG: IANA Transitory Advisory Group	W3C: World Wide Web Consortium	ETNO: European association of Telecommunication Network Operators
ARIN: American Registry for Internet Numbers	NSF: US National Science foundation	IAHC: Internet Ad Hoc Committee	INTA: International Trademark Association
IETF: Internet Engineering TaskForce	IAB: Internet Architecture Board	UIT: International Telecommunication Union	NSI: Network Solutions Inc.
DoC: US Department of Commerce	FNC: US Federal Networking Council	GIP: Global Internet Project	
ISOC: Internet Society	DoD: US Department of Defence	EFF: Electronic Frontier Foundation	

Figure 5.3. Network of organizations involved in the redaction of Internet governance policy documents and early institutionalization of the field in the 1990s<sup>86</sup>

86 This network is based on the same data than the previous one (i.e. excluding socialization events and isolates) and represent an affiliation network of the organizations and documents (the relations between the nodes depend on the affiliation of individuals and their participation in the redaction of the documents even if the individuals are not shown in the graph).

The network of the organizations of the field of Internet governance in the second-half of the 1990s provides evidence of the rapid commercialization of the network of the late 1980s and early 1990s. While academic purposes were mandatory to connect to the NSF backbone until 1992, several commercial companies had gained access to the network. Start-ups were created by technically well-informed individuals and the requirements of scientific purposes were considered a "joke" because of the quasi-automatic acceptance of the application<sup>87</sup>. Moreover, large telecommunication companies had begun to operate parts of the network. This is why AT&T, Sprint and even European telecommunications firms are represented in the network. Computer manufacturers were in an influential position during the debates because they hired directly some of the individuals that were in charge of the network through their universities and research centres. Compared with the scientific field of the 1970s (see chapter 4), the role of corporate actors is salient. BBN Planet, the Internet Service Provider division of the precursor firm of the Internet governance field was acquired by GTE in 1997. This acquisition exemplifies the empowerment of telecommunications firms. Indeed, GTE was one of the largest independent telephone company after WWII. As a result of the juridicisation of the stakes of Internet governance, several law firms played a key role in the period. Because of the reduced size of law firms, they do not stand out in the network visualization but their role as brokers was crucial for the institutionalisation of Internet governance.

The Global Internet Project deserves special attention since it was created as a corporate platform specialising in Internet governance to advocate for corporate interests in the negotiations. It was an international group of senior executives and served as an advisory committee to the World Information and Telecommunication Association (WITSA). According to its website, the WITSA is a consortium of ICT industry associations and currently has members from 82 countries around the world and represent more than 90 percent of the world ICT market. This kind of professional association is a form of institutionalisation of global specialized elites and the GIP represented this structural power within the field of Internet governance. Members of the GIP came from several key players of the information and telecommunication sector such as Visa, Deutsche Telekom and Fujitsu The Information Technology Association of America (ITAA) served as secretariat for the GIP. While the GIP was not the loudest voice in the public comments to the policy documents, its determination to have a say in the debates was evidenced by their website:

"The GIP is not a lobbying organization. Its primary goal is not to shape government regulation, but instead promote industry actions that will minimize

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<sup>87</sup> Karl Denninger, himself an early Internet entrepreneur (see following pages) has not heard of any application being rejected (interview with Karl Denninger, October, 3, 2012).

the need for such regulation. The GIP calls upon governments to encourage private sector solutions to Internet policy challenges. Its members are working to anticipate and address potential situations that could develop as the Internet grows so that government action will not be required."<sup>88</sup>

The International Chamber of Commerce was also involved in the debates but with a less specialized focus on Internet governance and a broader perspective on the Internet economy (International Chamber of Commerce, 1998).

Far from a cyber-libertarian view of Internet governance, US governmental agencies and the European commission remained at the heart of the field. While the documents stressed the importance of the exclusion of governmental and intergovernmental actors in the management of domain names and IP addresses, the network of actors clearly shows that US governmental agencies related to the National Science Foundation and the Department of Commerce were central for the gathering of different elites. The European Commission was a latecomer in the debate but the political and economic power of the European Union granted the Commission with an important power of influence when the ICANN was created and its board selected (Mueller 2002).

The network also evidences the unequal balance between national affiliations of the different actors. US-based organizations represent a large majority. Several actors from the Triad that was dominating the global political economy in the 1990's are involved, as well as organizations from Oceania. The Asia-Pacific region is often mentioned (e.g. The APNIC registrar, the Asia Pacific Political and Legal Workshop in June 1996) but it is completely dominated by actors from Australia and Japan, with some participation from New Zealand. Together with the neoliberal ideology, the domination of the Triad over the global political economy is an essential feature of the 1990s. Its translation in the field of Internet governance evidences the importance of the national capital in transnational fields.

### **5.2.2. Elite career and institutional interlocks**

The linkages evidenced at a general level by the network analysis of the Internet governance debate of the 1990s can be illustrated by some more precise examples of actors that were in a brokering

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<sup>88</sup> See the "About us" page of the Global Internet Project available at <http://www.witsa.org/gip/about/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

position between specialised elites. Different profiles were represented in these broker positions.

First, some individuals came from a different field and could thus adopt a more "neutral" stance and language in order to create consensus on several issues. This is the case of Ira Magaziner, the information technology czar of the Clinton administration. In spite of his experience in the private sector in consulting firms<sup>89</sup>, most of Magaziner's careers is linked to the US political field and more specifically to the Democrat party. His role in Internet governance started as he was asked by the US President to draft a report on electronic commerce. According to Magaziner, the consensus-building was at the heart of the project after the failure of the health care system reform<sup>90</sup>. His institutional position gave him an arbitration role in the debates of the 1990s. Magaziner initiated the neoliberal policy of Internet governance by introducing the principles that were going to lead future action, among them the leadership role of the private sector, the minimalist role of the state, the uniqueness of the Internet and the need to create a large electronic market. A similar consensus-building role was played by lawyers, among them the influential Joe Sims who drafted the ICANN by-laws. Legal language was important to reconcile diverging views and to find a common base between groups of individuals with very different professional backgrounds.

Another type of profile is the individual deeply involved in the institutions of his specialized elite groups but who is also affiliated with other specialized institutions, either at the same time (multiple-hat phenomenon), or through chronological circulation (circulation of elites). The most famous example is Jon Postel. He was in charge of the allocation of domains names and Internet Protocol addresses until the reform of the system and thus held a dominating position within the field of computer science before the commercialization of the Internet (see chapter 4). He was one of the senior IT specialists involved in the development of the Internet and a founding member of the Internet Society and of the Internet Architecture Board (Cerf, 1998). As such, his voice was very influential among the so-called technical community. He had worked on government research projects, especially on Internet's ancestor ARPANET since he was a graduate student (Postel, 1997). Jon Postel had strong contacts within the US administration. Much has been written on the mistrust between the technical community and NSI's monopoly on the .com domain that would have started the debates about Internet governance. However, Jon Postel had been working in a close relationship with NSI for years. He was part of NSI's application to the National Science Foundation contracting solicitation. Postel was to become the chairman of an advisory panel and his

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89 See <http://www.energycongress.com/program/iramagazinerbio.htm>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

90 See <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/cyberspace/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

Information Science Institute at the University of Southern California was to become subcontractor of NSI for several specific tasks<sup>91</sup>. As the IANA, Postel was responsible of the allocation of class A IP addresses to several large companies such as IBM and AT&T, which allowed them to have a substantial competitive advantage by owning a much larger choice of IP addresses than smaller firms<sup>92</sup>. Postel was directed by the ISOC Board to develop a business plan to implement his project presented in the Draft Postel<sup>93</sup>. Consequently, Postel appointed the IAHC members. In 1998, Postel appointed a IANA Transition Advisory Group (ITAG) together with Brian Carpenter, an IBM employee. The role of the ITAG was to reflect on the creation of a new non-profit corporation to manage Internet names and numbers (Mueller 2002). In order to put pressure on the government, Postel re-directed the root from NSI's official root server to a server he operated at the University of Southern California (Mueller 2002). While this redirection could have been considered as a federal offence, Postel claimed that he was running a test and no charges were raised against him. This test occurred just when the government was finishing the redaction of the Green Paper (Mueller 2002). Postel then endorsed the Green Paper and suggested modifications<sup>94</sup>. Thanks to his position in the debates, he was later able to co-author the by-laws of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers with Don Telage, CEO of the monopolistic commercial registrar of Internet domain NSI (ICANN, 1998). Don Telage and Jon Postel were serving at the same time in the board of the American Registry for Internet Names. The fact that the ICANN was considered favouring large corporate interests and even a gift made to IBM, NSI and other companies<sup>95</sup> has to be analysed in relation with the role of Jon Postel in the processes. The charismatic character of Jon Postel gave his actions a special significance. Muller (2002) describes an "emotional" endorsement of the Postel-Sims ICANN proposal at the 42nd IETF meeting in August 1998:

"A member of the audience stood up and asked the attendees to give Jon Postel a standing ovation for all his good work the last 20 years and his work on his latest 'new IANA' draft". Postel efforts were endorsed by acclamation with a few notable exceptions. Almost all of those present had never read either proposal." (Mueller 2002, section 8.2.2)

Jon Postel died of a heart attack in October 1998, just before the official creation of the ICANN.

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91 See <http://www.rs.internic.net/nsf/nis/>, last accessed through the Internet Archive on 8 April 2014.

92 See the allocation of IPv4 class A addresses at [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List\\_of\\_assigned\\_/8\\_IPv4\\_address\\_blocks](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_assigned_/8_IPv4_address_blocks), last accessed 8 April 2014.

93 See the minutes of the meeting of the ISOC Board of Trustees at <http://www.isoc.org/isoc/general/trustees/mtg09.html>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

94 See Public comments available at <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/legacy/ntiahome/domainname/proposals/comments/comments.html>, last accessed on 8 April 2014.

95 See "Secret Meeting Shows ICANN - IBM Dependence", at [http://www.cookreport.com/index.php?option=com\\_content&view=article&id=157:811&catid=47:2000&Itemid=63](http://www.cookreport.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=157:811&catid=47:2000&Itemid=63), last accessed 8 April 2014.



According to Muller, a large part of the legitimacy of the new institution was lost with his death (Mueller 2002, section 8.2.3).

Similarly important was the role of Postel's close high-school friend Vinton Cerf, also a senior networking specialist and co-inventor of the TCP/IP protocol suite that is the technical basis of the Internet (Abbate, 1999). Vinton Cerf was also involved in the governmental networking projects financed by the US department of defence (Abbate, 1999). But he was also vice-president of technology strategy at MCI (later MCI-Worldcom), one of the major telecommunications company in the United States. As we have seen, MCI was involved in the commercialization of the Internet. At the end of the 1980s, it started providing the transmission circuits for the NSF backbone<sup>96</sup>. Cerf was also responsible for the creation of the first commercial e-mail service for MCI, which happened before the official authorisation of commercial activities on the Internet (see chapter 4). Vinton Cerf was also very active in the institutionalisation of the networking computer science field as the promoter of the idea and later a founding member of the Internet Society and served as its chair from 1992 to 2001<sup>97</sup>(Mueller 2002). In 1998, he worked directly for the Global Internet Project, the business lobby involved in Internet governance issues (Mueller, 2002; section 8.1.2). In this position, he was a broker between computer scientists and large transnational companies, like Postel had been with NSI. Therefore, he played a crucial role in gaining support from large transnational firms to the ICANN. He organized the fund-raising effort that was essential for the ICANN to start functioning:

"IBM, MCI Worldcom, Ascend Communications, GTE Interworking and Cisco Systems are proposing that the GIP take the lead in an effort to raise upwards of \$500,000 necessary to "bootstrap" the new, non-profit Internet management corporation. The GIP envisions raising \$25,000 to \$50,000 from 15 to 20 companies to achieve this goal. Such start-up funding would cover the expenses of the corporation for the first 4-6 months of operation." <sup>98</sup>

Vint Cerf had also close ties with the U. S government since he reportedly participated since the very beginning to the governmental efforts to ensure the creation of a new governance system. He has been praised for its involvement in the drafting of the Framework for E-commerce issued by the

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96 See <http://www.nsf.gov/about/history/nsf0050/internet/launch.htm>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

97 See <http://www.isoc.org/isoc/general/trustees/board.php>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

98 Press release by the Global Internet Project in September 1998, available at [www.gip.org](http://www.gip.org), last accessed through the Internet Archive 8 April 2014.

White House<sup>99</sup>. He was certainly a strong supporter of the process<sup>100</sup>. While speaking directly in the name of MCI during the debates<sup>101</sup>, Cerf consistently refused to be portrayed as an advocate of corporate interests and insisted on his university and research experience:

"just one question about the analysis, you sort of put me in the "supplier" pigeon hole. I just wondered whether my involvement with ISOC/ISTF, Gallaudet University (board member), Wiley (Networking Council series) and other assorted educational and research activities (e.g. Internet2, IPNRG) counted for anything in your calculus.

[...] In the GIP, I do try to represent an industry perspective – that was the intention in forming GIP. However at ICANN, I try very hard NOT to represent industry alone or the protocol/technical community, alone, or any other group alone. I see the job of ICANN director as much broader than that and that ICANN, and those who depend on its choices, are not well served by narrowly viewed perspectives."<sup>102</sup>

While not directly involved in the nominations of the ICANN Board members in 1998 (Mueller 2002), he became himself a board member for the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers from 2000 to 2007<sup>103</sup>. Cerf is now a Chief internet Evangelist at Google Inc.<sup>104</sup>; a board member of the American Registry for Internet Numbers<sup>105</sup>; and the president of the Association for Computing Machinery<sup>106</sup>.

Another individual involved with the institutionalization of the computer networking field, Anthony M. Rutkowski had a different personal history. Rutkowski had a formation both in law and in electrical engineering. He worked at the Federal Communication Commission for 12 years from 1974 to 1986<sup>107</sup>. During his time at the FCC, Rutkowski worked as a US delegate to the ITU and

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99 See comment by Educom Net to the Green Paper, available at <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/legacy/ntiahome/domainname/proposals/comments/comments.html>, last accessed on 8 April 2014.

100 See Vinton Cerf's interview with PBS, available at <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/cyberspace/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

101 Cerf signed the comments by MCI to the Green Paper, available at <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/legacy/ntiahome/domainname/proposals/comments/comments.html>, last accessed on 8 April 2014.

102 See the exchange<sup>3</sup> between Hans Klein and Vint Cerf in the comments of the Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR) report on "Cyber-Federalist No. 4 -- Analysis of the ICANN-Named At Large Nominees", available at [http://cpsr.org/prevsite/internetdemocracy/cyber-fed/Number\\_4.html/](http://cpsr.org/prevsite/internetdemocracy/cyber-fed/Number_4.html/), last accessed 7 October 2012. The whole dialogue is an interesting illustration of the limits of the stakeholder concept and multistakeholdersim governance model.

103 See <http://www.icann.org/en/general/board.html>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

104 See <http://www.google.com/press/pressrel/vintcerf.html>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

105 See [http://www.arin.net/about\\_us/bot.html](http://www.arin.net/about_us/bot.html), last accessed 8 April 2014.

106 See <http://www.acm.org/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

107 See <http://www.ngi.org/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

participated to the MacBride Commission at the UNESCO<sup>108</sup>. He was at the same time a part-time faculty member at the New York Law School<sup>109</sup>. He authored a book and several articles about the ITU and international telecommunication regulation (see for example Coddington & Rutkowski, 1982). In 1986, Rutkowski joined the MIT and worked among other things on Open Network Architectures. The MIT was among the most active universities since the beginnings of computer networking. At the same time, Rutkowski was Counsellor to two different Secretary-Generals of the ITU<sup>110</sup>. The second one was Peter Tarjan, the architect of the neoliberal turn of the ITU (see chapter 4). Rutkowski participated in the transformation of the ITU and was conscious of the changes he had helped bring about:

"When I left the ITU and went back to the private industry, I'll never forget the emphatic statement by a leading industry corporate president in a planning meeting – We the industry are the ITU today" (Hills, 2007, p. 130)

Rutkowski was invited by Cerf to join the Internet Architecture Board in 1990 to become its 'international person' (Mueller 2002, section 5.4.4). Rutkowski became the executive director of the Internet Society at its creation. He was an admirer of the IETF methods and considered them a model for international standardization. However, maybe because of Rutkowski different background, conflicts arose in the ISOC and Rutkowski left the Board in 1995 (Mueller 2002, section 5.4.4). From 1992 to 1994, Rutkowski worked as Director of Technology Assessment in the Strategic Planning Group of Sprint International, a telecommunication company that was very active in early commercial Internet. He was also Sprint's White House liaison during these years<sup>111</sup>. When the IAHC formed by Postel made their draft report public, Rutkowski's harsh critique was very influential<sup>112</sup>. He stressed the intergovernmental character of the IAHC agreement and the lack of adequate legal procedure. He refused the idea that the Top-Level Domain Space could be seen as a public resource and appealed to the US government to regulate the process. It is not clear whether Rutkowski was already a consultant for NSI at the time of the publication of the brief or if the consultancy began later (Mueller 2002, section 8.2.1). Nevertheless, the need for government intervention was clearly in the interest of NSI, a long-date government contractor. Rutkowski then was member of several groups close to US government-led efforts to create a new governance system such as the President's Framework for Global Electronic Commerce task force, and the

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108 Ibid.

109 Ibid.

110 Ibid.

111 Ibid.

112 Brief of Anthony M. Rutkowski, 2 April 1997, available at [www.wia.org/pub/dns-brief.html](http://www.wia.org/pub/dns-brief.html), last accessed through the Internet Archive 8 April 2014.

Harvard Kennedy School GII Project. Rutkowski took part of the efforts to propose an alternative to the ICANN in 1998 in the International Forum on the White Paper. Rutkowski was appointed vice-president of NSI in 2000. When NSI was sold to VeriSign Inc., a large Internet registry and registrar company, Rutkowski continued to work with the firm. In 2009, Rutkowski returned to the ITU where he was appointed as ITU-T Study Group 17 (Security) Rapporteur for Cybersecurity<sup>113</sup>.

Other individuals like John Patrick had a far lower degree of circulation since he joined IBM in 1967 and left the company when he retired in 2001. However, this durable position did not impede Patrick to be involved in several other institutions that were very important in the creation of a new governance system for the Internet in the 1990s. In 1994, Patrick was a founding donor of the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), the leading standard organization for the Web<sup>114</sup>. Patrick was also a member of the Internet Society and a senior member of the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)<sup>115</sup>. In 1995, Patrick became IBM's Vice President of Internet technology. The same year, he founded the Global Internet Project and became its chair. Despite IBM history of proprietary internetworking standards (see chapter 4), the company managed to become rapidly a leader of TCP/IP Internet. The Global Internet Project became a platform to push forward the ideas of self-regulation of the Internet, with IBM in a structurally dominant position. Patrick stated modestly that:

"One surprise is that most of the governments of the world have resisted the temptation to regulate the Internet, I wouldn't say it was because of the Global Internet Project. It's more because governments realized that they really didn't understand it."<sup>116</sup>

Patrick and IBM were instrumental in the support of the fragile ICANN in its first years (see chapter 6) and were able to manage the tensions between ICANN and NSI in order for the Corporation to survive the power struggles.

These individuals were at the heart of the connection between the institutions dating back to the structuration of the scientific field of computer networking and the large computer and networking companies. They are core to the power elite described in greater details in the following section. However the networks of the previous section show other actors, who were to some extent influential in the process but who can not be described as member of the power elite. Small

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113 See <http://www.ngi.org/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

114 See <http://fr.opera.com/press/releases/2004/01/30/>, 8 April 2014.

115 See <http://fr.opera.com/press/releases/2004/01/30/>, 8 April 2014.

116 See <http://newsroom.cisco.com/feature-content?articleId=668094&type=webcontent>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

entrepreneurs and individuals affiliated with small companies, together with some scholars tried to oppose the elite project. Network visualisation tend to obscure the nature of the relationships and some individuals listed before had rather antagonistic relationship with the power elite. If the power of this elite rested upon their institutional positions (Wright Mills 2000) in the computer networking field, in the academia, in government-funded specialized institutions, in intergovernmental organizations or in large corporations, some other important actors can be found in what can be described as a counter-elite, primarily that had the knowledge resources to participate both in the technical/scientific debates, and in the more general policy debate. Their lack of institutional leverage condemned their attempts to determinate some features of the new governance system, but their voice had to be heard in order for the system to have some legitimacy and for the power elite to reach hegemonic status (see chapter 6).

The counter-elite can was organized around the Open Root Server Confederation (ORSC) and the Boston Working Group (BWG). These two institutions struggled until the creation of the ICANN to defend a perspective that was consistent with the field's doxa (based on Internet exceptionalism; and neoliberal, cyber-libertarian or minimalist public good discourses) but that was in favour of non-dominant actors.

Karl Denninger was a member of the ORSC. He founded MCSNet in 1987 and became CEO of the company. MCSNET was a successful Internet company in the Chicago area around the time of the commercialization of the network. Denninger was opposed to the attempts by Postel to design a new governance system. He published an Internet Draft as soon as January 1996 to propose the creation of a great number of new general Top-level Domains to introduce competition in the market of domain registration. A strong supporter of the cyber-libertarian discourse<sup>117</sup>, the main objective of Denninger was to avoid monopolistic behaviours in the market for domain names. Together with other pioneering entrepreneurs, he founded the ORSC to make an alternative proposal to the ICANN by-laws that were very conservatives it terms of new top-level domain names. Although this attempt failed and Denninger denounced the capture of the new corporation by a handful of individuals, he thinks that this movement was influential in the long-term since the ICANN is now changing its policies<sup>118</sup>. The counter-elite has indeed participated in raising concerns about the ICANN and to question its legitimacy, which led to the fragility of the consensus around

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117 He declares that his political views are libertarian and was among the first individuals who launched the idea of a Tea Parties movement in the US after the election of US President Obama. See [www.market-ticker.org](http://www.market-ticker.org) and interview with the author 3 October 2012.

118 Interview with the author, 3 October 2012.

the corporation (see chapter 6).

Among the Boston Working Group, Karl Auerbach has been one of the loudest opponent to the concept of multistakeholderism<sup>119</sup>. Auerbach was also a small entrepreneur even though he worked for Cisco between 1998 and 2001. He participated to the elaboration of the TCP/IP protocol. The Boston Working Group has been influential in the enhancement of participatory and transparency mechanisms in the ICANN. As an advocate of elections to the ICANN Board, Auerbach was a candidate and was elected as a board member for North America in the only ICANN election that took place in 2000 (see chapter 6). He is also famous to have successfully filed suit against ICANN when he was a board member for the lack of transparency of the institution (see chapter 6).

As we can see with these examples, the classification of an actor in one or the other stakeholder category is arbitrary or at least historically unstable. The "power elite vs. counter-elite" perspective offers a more useful way to categorize the actors of the Internet governance debates of the 1990s<sup>120</sup>. The examples given in this section illustrate the circulation and multiple-hat phenomena that marked Internet governance elites. However, this individualistic perspective aims at a better description of a broader picture. The following section tries to bridge the gap between the prosopographic analyses and the analysis of institutions by providing an attempt to characterize the institutional structure of the field of Internet governance in the 1990s.

### **5.2.3. The transnational power elite of Internet governance in the ICANN**

The connections among different actors evidenced in the former section can be theoretically described as the emergence of a power elite of Internet governance. This concept allows us to grasp the history of Internet governance with a different look and can help understand the institutionalisation of Internet governance in the 1990s as the institutionalisation of a particular field within a more general context.

The debates on the allocation of Internet domain names and Internet Protocol addresses in the 1990s led to the creation of what was defined earlier as a transnational power elite. The political process was not a competition among diverging interests and world views. It was a process of inclusion-exclusion that defined which actors were going to be part of the power elite of Internet governance.

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119 See <http://www.cavebear.com/archive/rw/igf-democracy-in-internet-governance.pdf>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

120 The description of the counter-elite is developed in chapter 6.

The heart of the power elite is to be found in the US around some elite technical experts, a few key institutions of the US government, especially in the department of commerce, the computer manufacturer and leading telecommunications companies. This emerging power elite had to cope with the vast majority of the private sector who were only interested in the protection of trademarks and some influential law firms and integrated these actors. On a transnational/international level, some big transnational companies, especially from Europe and Japan, as well as some powerful governments were able to weigh in the debates. The European Commission, the OECD and the WIPO were the key intergovernmental organisations whose employees participated in the creation of a transnational power elite of Internet governance. This emerging elite was unified around a project described in the various documents published during the debates and especially the By-laws of the newly-created ICANN. The idea behind this project is the creation of a new, loosely-regulated market for Internet domain names. This lucrative market was to be free from state regulation and from international oversight, except for a strong protection of intellectual property rights of the big transnational firms. The matter was treated as a technical issue, that had few political and social consequences. As such, the ICANN had a technical mandate and was led by the technical authorities.

The Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers is only one institution among others that takes part in the governance of the network. However, it is the institution that better illustrates the result of the political struggles of the 1990s. The ICANN represents the institutionalisation of the power of the transnational elite of Internet governance. The other institutions of Internet governance were not as politicized as the ICANN (for example the standardisation bodies such as the IETF or the W3C), others were national or regional (ministries, Council of Europe etc.), others were focusing on a specific issue such as e-commerce (OECD) or intellectual property (WIPO). Moreover, most of these institutions played a role in the debates surrounding the creation of the ICANN or its early functioning. Finally, the structure of the ICANN illustrates the elitist tendency of the institution despite the claims of an open and participative system. Mueller (2002; section 8.2.3) despite his description of a pluralist process reaches the conclusion of an institution captured from the start by the dominant actors.

The ICANN's structure is clearly dominated by the Board and by the technical management. As stated by the by-laws: "the powers of the Corporation will be exercised, its property controlled and its business and affairs conducted by or under the direction of the Board" (ICANN 1998, art. IV §1a). The board is also entitled to change the by-laws and the structure of the organization. The

Supporting Organizations can make recommendations and nominate a certain number of members of the Board (ICANN 1998, art. V §4 and art. VI). The elite within the ICANN is thus to be found among the people that chose the initial Board members beforehand, the Board members and the supporting organizations (see figure 6.1). The advisory committees, especially the governmental advisory committee, were given little power (see chapter 6).

According to Muller (2002), a list of board members was first drafted by an IBM lobbyist, Roger Cochetti, with suggestions from Postel and his lawyer, the European Commission and the Australian government. While this closed process remains largely undocumented, the resulting project was criticised by the public, especially for the elitist character of the board election<sup>121</sup>. The most reliable source on the issue is the answer sent by the US Department of Commerce to the inquiry of the chairman of the Committee on Commerce of the US house of representatives, Thomas J. Bliley, Jr about the involvement of the Department of Commerce in the ICANN creation process<sup>122</sup>. According to the Department of Commerce, Jon Postel, Joe Sims and the organizers of the International Forum on the White Paper were officially in charge of the selection. Canada, Australia and the DG XIII of the European Commission expressed their interest to have respective nationals represented on the Board: the European Commission had three candidates, the Canadian government had two and the Australian one. IBM's Roger Cochetti was indeed preparing a list of individuals in the summer of 1998 and told the Department of Commerce that he had selected Esther Dyson (see below). While the official position of the Department of Commerce was to avoid any suggestion or intervention, Ms. Burr recognized in the letter that she had recommended that critics of IANA such as Jay Fenello, a ORSC member, be involved in the selection of the Board.

The names of the members of the interim board of the ICANN in 1998 are consistent with this process. Three Europeans and one Australian were selected; and Esther Dyson was appointed as the board chairman<sup>123</sup>. Besides the selection of Esther Dyson by an IBM employee, a former IBM employee, George Conrades was selected, showing the influence of the company on the corporation. Conrades had also worked at another Global Internet Project Company, GTE and at BBN. The European Commission chose the deputy-director of the DG XIII, Eugenio Triana, to

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121 Public comments available at <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/legacy/ntiahome/domainname/proposals/comments/comments.html>, last accessed on 8 April 2014.

122 Letter from John Sopko, Chief Counsel for Special Matters, U.S Department of Commerce to Thomas J. Bliley, Jr, chairman of the Committee on Commerce of the U.S house of representatives, 5 November 1998, reproduced at <http://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/text/acn9-2.articles/acn9-2.a04.txt>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

123 See <http://www.icann.org/en/news/announcements/icann-pr-26oct98-en.htm>, last accessed 8 April 2014. It seems that the Canadian government was not as successful in its lobbying effort as other governments.



become an ICANN director. Linda S. Wilson was a former advisory council member for the US National Science Foundation Director. Her profile of scholar is reminiscent of the academic management of the network in the 1970s and 1980s. Jun Murai was also a scholar and an Internet Society Board Member. In spite of the technical mandate of the institution, the board selection evidences an attempt to represent a variety of powerful actors in the field of Internet governance. Rather than a strictly transnational private authority as described in the discourses and policy documents, the selection of the Board illustrate a more classical concern of geographical repartition and a mix of direct and indirect relations between the institutional elite and the corporate elite.




Figure 5.4. Ego-network of the first ICANN board<sup>124</sup>

124 Network visualization based on the figure 5.2.2, focusing on the ego-network of the ICANN board (Borgatti et al., 2002). An ego-network is a subset of a larger network focusing on one node, in this case the first ICANN board. It represents the “neighbourhood” of the node: the nodes that are connected to the ego through a short path. The aim is here to show the institutional affiliations of the members of the first ICANN board to provide evidence of the influence of some members of the power elite. See Hanneman, R and Riddle, M. “Introduction to social network methods”, available at [http://faculty.ucr.edu/~hanneman/nettext/C9\\_Ego\\_networks.html](http://faculty.ucr.edu/~hanneman/nettext/C9_Ego_networks.html), last accessed 8 April 2014.

The structuration of the field of Internet governance in the 1990s illustrates the concept of a transnational field. A set of institutions organize the power struggles of the agents of the field. One central institution, the ICANN, has been at the center of the debates in the second-half of the 1990s and epitomizes both the unification and the hybridization of the field. The creation of the ICANN was the first Internet governance issue to raise public concern and all the agents and the institutions of the field participated. As such, and as described by Mueller (2002) the issue of the Domain Names System is constitutive of Internet governance as a global political issue. It is also constitutive of a transnational field. The field is hybrid since it results from the collision of the scientific field of computer networking and the global political economic field of telecommunications. The central institution of the field illustrates this dual nature. It has a primarily technical mandate and the technological-scientific elite played a crucial role in its creation. On the other hand, its board is populated by political and business elites that participate in the regulation of a new telecommunication market.

The field of Internet governance is divided between dominant agents pertaining to transnational power elite and dominated non-elite groups. Some of the non-dominant groups attempted to change the rules of the game in the field by relying on some strong ideological elements such as private initiative and Internet exceptionalism. While they had some influence on the institutionalization of the field, they were not able to impose a different model.

## ***Conclusions***

A transnational power elite emerged at the occasion of the institutionalization of the field of Internet governance in the second half of the 1990s. Ideological cohesion was ensured by a neoliberal model of governance with the co-optation of some other important discourses such as the cyber-libertarian and a minimalist version of the global public goods discourse. Marginalized actors were excluded from the debates if they did not abide by the doxa of the field, mainly characterized by Internet exceptionalism. The power elite was also unified by the circulation of its members. The circulation of elites was chronological, with individuals moving from one organization to the other; as well as simultaneous, with individuals having multiple affiliations at the same time. The unification of the power elite has been described both by a social network analysis and prosopographic methods. These findings question the multi-stakeholder/pluralist model that describes the competition between interest groups and institutional models. The chapter shows that this competition was limited to a number of projects that were consistent with the doxa of the field and that the

boundaries between stakeholder groups were unstable and blurred. Counter-elite groups, relying on cyber-libertarian and global public good discourses were co-opted to ensure institutionalized consent. However, the consensus was very fragile and the concessions made by the power elite were so marginal that the model was highly unstable. It exemplified the idea of a “minimal hegemony” (Carfruny and Ryner 2007). The following chapter further investigates the fragility of the consensus and the dialectics of hegemony and resistance in the first years of existence of the ICANN.

## **Chap. 6. Broadening the scope of Internet governance (1999-2002)**

The institutionalization of the field of Internet governance around the creation of the ICANN in 1998 did not bring about a stabilization of the field's frontiers and structure. The hegemonic project of the ICANN failed to create a consensus beyond elite groups. The rapid transformations of the field at the turn of the millennium further undermined its stability. The elite-led reform of the ICANN was not sufficient to avoid an open crisis of the field and the redefinition of its frontiers.

This chapter analyses the transition period between the creation of the ICANN and the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) that took place between 2003 and 2005. This transition is important because of the redefinition of the frontiers of the field that took place during these years. While Internet governance was institutionalized in 1998 with a focus on technical management of the network and with a clear exclusion of political and social issues, the WSIS debates illustrate the broadening of the realm of Internet governance. Several accounts of Internet governance in the 1990s and the creation of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) exist (Froomkin, 2000; Klein, 2002; McDowell & Steinberg, 2001), many authors studied the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in 2003-2005 (Flyverbom, 2011; Frau-Meigs, 2012; Raboy, Landry, & Shtern, 2010). Some authors even analysed the two moments separately (Antonova, 2007; Kleinwächter, 2000; Kleinwächter, 2008; Mueller, 2002; Mueller, 2010). However, few of these studies address the changes that occurred between these two historical moments. Internet governance in the 1990s was focused on the issue of the domain name system: the question of who decided to assign a given name in the “.com” or “.de” to a particular person or organization. The debates during the WSIS had a much broader definition of what Internet governance was, and addressed social and political issues related to the management of the network. This is an important change in the understanding of the issue. Yet, the literature on Internet governance often takes the change for granted and explain the broadening of the issue-area by the discontent provoked by the ICANN. This explanation is far from sufficient since every governance system is criticized and even fought by a certain number of actors without generating change in a systematic way. The sociology of Bourdieu allows us to think about change in a more comprehensive way. Changes in the nature of actors and in their strategies are analysed in relation with their positions in the field. Change in the practices of actors have a different impact on the field depending on their positions within it.

The chapter explores first the fragility of the hegemonic project of the elite and the failure of the manufacturing of consent in the field. It then addresses the factors of change that existed in the field during the transition period by applying a typology of factors developed by Bourdieu (Bourdieu 2005) and used by French regulationists (Boyer 2003, 2008) to analyse institutional change. Finally, the chapter analyses the failure of an elite-led reform to restore hegemony in the field.

## **6.1. The fragility of the hegemonic project of the power elite**

The consensus that permitted the creation of a power elite of Internet governance in the second half of the 1990s was only one of the two elements that are required for the stability of a field. The acceptance of elite rule by non-elites is also necessary for a given order to prevail. As we have seen in chapter 3, the notion of hegemony, taken from Gramsci is an interesting addition to Wright Mills' power elite. that presupposes that “account be taken of the interests and the tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is to be exercised” (Gramsci 2001: 373). Unlike Wright Mills, Gramsci elaborates on a situation where mobilisation exists, but where the *active* rather than *passive* consent of the public allows the power elite to rule (Burawoy 1982, 2008). The dynamic character of hegemony and the importance of agency need to be analysed in the process of managing active consent (Birchfield 1999). In this view, hegemony is a bidirectional movement: a centrifugal movement of domination from the power elite towards non-elites, but is also a polycentric movement of active consent that involves non-elites (Graz, 1999, p. 132). The power elite needed more than a passive consent of non-elite groups. It had to secure the active consent of already mobilised groups that were not included in the dominant positions of the field. The ICANN represented not only a repartition of institutional power among elite groups, it was also a hegemonic project seeking broader consent in the field.

### **6.1.1. The manufacturing of consent and the notion of multistakeholderism**

The first and most sustainable aspect of hegemony is the consent of the dominated. The process of manufacturing consent through the creation of institutions has been studied by neo-Gramscian IPE. Open institutions are key elements of the stability of the field. Institutions are an expression of hegemony (Cox 1996: 137), and the ICANN can be described as an expression of the hegemony (or at least a hegemonic project) of a transnational power elite in Internet governance. The emerging power elite of Internet governance had to make some concessions in order for their rule to be

accepted by non-elite groups. To be able to speak in the name of “the Internet Community,” as claimed by the gTLD-MoU (IAHC 1997: 1), the emerging power elite had to express its leadership in terms of the general interest or that of Internet users. As Cox puts it:

“Institutions may become the anchor for such a hegemonic strategy since they lend themselves both to the representations of diverse interests and to the universalisation of policy.” (Cox 1996; p. 137)

The emerging power elite had to institutionalize Internet governance in a way that provided some space for the participation of actors with diverging views without endangering its domination. That is why, after the initial Draft Postel that only proposed an expert group, the notion of participation appeared as new documents were drafted and several options were envisaged. Different notions are used in the documents (i.e., participation, representation, openness, inclusiveness), but all were based on the idea that the new governance system had to include the variety of Internet governance actors and Internet users. This necessity paved the way for the creation of a multistakeholder governance system. Because of the unclear definition of a stakeholder, this was an unbinding measure to allow participation.

Intergovernmental participation as proposed by the gTLD-MoU (IAHC 1997: introduction and art. II, section 6) and consistent with a global public good approach was ruled out by the US government. It disappeared from other official documents. According to a realist understanding of world politics, this decision can be seen as a mere defence of the national interest. The US government had a hegemonic position in Internet governance that it was not eager to let go. However, this exclusion of any (inter-)governmental participation can be best understood as part of a consensual elite discourse that relies upon both neoliberal and cyber-libertarian assumptions (see chapter 5). Arguably, the US had little to fear from the representation of the ITU and the World Intellectual Property Organization, which accounted to no more than two votes in a 12-member board; or from the signature of the gTLD-MoU by other governments.

International participation was replaced by the less precise notion of multistakeholderism, which recommends the inclusion of the various interest groups with stakes in Internet governance. The notion of multistakeholderism opens the door to the participation of some powerful states and intergovernmental organizations without endangering the discursive cohesion among the elite. Multistakeholderism also foresees the participation of non-elite actors and is, thus, at the heart of the “manufacturing of consent” (Burawoy, 1982). The White Paper on Internet Governance remains

unclear about the actual role of the stakeholders that are supposed to participate in the new institution, but the ICANN by-laws describe in great detail the ways in which participation would be carried out. In fact, Internet governance debates in the 1990s had aroused a relatively strong interest beyond elite circles. Many of the newcomers and outsiders, along with small businesses, were not taken into account when the ICANN was created. The International Forum on the White Paper (IFWP), that was designed to discuss the issues raised by the White Paper on Internet Governance and to imagine the new institution, was bypassed with the drafting of the ICANN by-laws by well-connected members of the emerging elite. Mueller, who was a IFWP participant, offers a first-hand account on this process (Mueller 2002). The issue of participation was thus crucial to gain some support, or at least to prevent vocal hostile reactions, from non-elite actors.

The ICANN by-laws, as of November 1998, provide for three types of participation/representation (ICANN 1998: article VI):

- The supporting organizations (SO) with substantial power in the institution (initiative) and the competence to elect Board members;
- The advisory committees, which have far less power (advisory on their own initiative or even asked by the Board); and
- The at-large membership, which the drafting team was reluctant to include and whose actual creation and powers remain vague in the by-laws.

As we have seen in the previous chapter, the power elite was central in the selection of ICANN Board members and also in the management and staff of the ICANN. It was also represented in the Board and the supporting organizations (see figure below, adapted from Mueller (2002: section 9.1). The participatory discourse – aimed at non-elite groups – concerned the at-large membership and the advisory committees<sup>125</sup>.

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<sup>125</sup> The chart in the figure 6.1.1 only shows the Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC). The ICANN by-laws also provides that two other advisory committees be created : the DNS Root Server System Advisory Committee and a temporary Advisory Committee on Membership (ICANN 1998, art. VII §3).




Figure 6.1. The ICANN organizational chart in 1998 (adapted from Mueller 2002)

The ICANN is a structure that is clearly dominated by the Board. The advisory committees, especially the governmental advisory committee, were given little power. However, the mere inclusion of non-dominant actors in the structure of the institution hints at a softer exercise of domination, based on its consensual character. Thus, the ICANN can be described as a hegemonic project. While the notions of Internet exceptionalism and technical regulation appealed to powerful actors whom might see regulation or the involvement of governments as a threat to their power, the notions of participation and multistakeholderism<sup>126</sup> are aimed at the non-elite groups that seek some arena in which to express their concerns in a more or less democratic way. Participation, as a key

<sup>126</sup> The notion of multistakeholderism served both as an element of cohesion among elite groups because of its focus on private actors, but it was also useful to co-opt non-elite groups. That is why the notion of multistakeholderism is so central in the field of Internet governance.



category of the formal documents, is the central notion around which the consensual aspect of the domination by the power elite is constructed. As such, it is central in the documents that were written by the elite and aimed at a larger public. However, the hegemonic strategy of the institutionalisation of Internet governance maintained serious contradictions in the relations between the power elite and non-elite groups. It can be described as a “minimal hegemony” that proved unstable (Cafruny & Magnus Ryner, 2007). It relied not only on the openness and consensual participation of non-dominant actors but also on the exclusion of actors and on the coercion of others.

### **6.1.2. The coercive character of domination**

First, the failure of the International Forum on the White Paper (IFWP) process marked the exclusion of counter-elites. This movement, together with the more consensual aspect of participation illustrate the dual nature of hegemony where persuasion is protected by the armour of coercion (Gramsci, 1999, p. 532). The exclusion of actors is an important aspect of domination and a necessary step to manage consensual rule. If this exclusion applies to important actors with institutional power in the field or especially in other fields, the process of exclusion is not a step towards consensus but rather the creation or the strengthening of counter-elites. The case of the failure of the International Forum on the White Paper illustrates the difficult balance between consensus-building and the strengthening of counter-elites.

The International Forum on the White Paper was created in July 1998 at the Global Incorporation Alliance Workshop in Reston, Virginia. The Forum intended to be the “open” and “consensus-driven” process including all “stakeholders” called upon by the White Paper on Internet Governance released by the US government one month earlier (NTIA, 1998). The first meeting included many of the important actors that had been discussing the governance of the network in the previous years and a number of newcomers, many of them from the academia<sup>127</sup>. Several issues were discussed like the profile of the future entity that was going to manage Internet domains, the composition of the board and the membership, trademarks, but also the broader issues of privacy and security<sup>128</sup>. Other meetings were held in Geneva and Buenos Aires. From the beginning, members of the power elite

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<sup>127</sup> The role and the participation of the Berkman Center of Harvard's Law School evidence the increasing influence of legal scholars in the field. See <http://www.domainhandbook.com/giaw-attend.html>, last accessed 8 April 2014. The center became the moderator of the workshop for the following meetings (Mueller 2002).

<sup>128</sup> This is one of the first attempt to broaden the definition of Internet governance that is characteristic of the factors of change discussed in the following section.

tried to restrain the mandate of the Forum:

“We need to design and implement a new organization and this new organization needs to take up the challenge of sorting out a number of aspects of the domain name system. However, we can separate the formation of the organization from solving the domain name issues.”<sup>129</sup>

As we have seen, the power elite was already working on the creation of the institution and needed the consent of non-dominant groups through the meetings. They did not want to see the fundamental issues discussed. However, despite the efforts of the power elite, the Forum was suggesting a model that diverged in many ways from the first drafts by the elite (Mueller 2002). The participants to the Forum criticized the institution designed by the elite for the lack of a membership structure, the self-selection of the board, the fact that articles could be changed at any time by the board, with no particular majority required and the by-laws that could be changed by 2/3 of the board <sup>130</sup>.

As a result, the IFWP process was by-passed by the elite and the institutionalisation of Internet governance continued without the support of the Forum (see chapter 5). Consensus was impossible on a broad basis. Some of the participants to the Forum questioned the legitimacy of the future institution. Concerns were especially raised by legal scholars. These actors were thus excluded from the final negotiations. Consensus was obviously easier to reach on a narrow participatory basis but important actors were left aside. Some early Internet entrepreneurs and many academics were outraged by the failure of the IFWP. More than marginal actors, they were real counter-elites, threatening the stability of the consensus. Indeed they were powerful individuals and organisations that held scientific and technical capital rather than non-elites. As a result, the failure to gain their support significantly undermined the legitimacy of the ICANN in the field (see following section). The use of coercion and the explicit exclusion of important actors illustrate the fragility of the consensus established by the elite. The IFWP was an attempt to persuade non-dominant groups. Its failure represented a source of instability for the domination of the power elite in the field.

While a transnational institution like the ICANN does not have a monopoly of legitimate violence like the state does, coercion was also part of the hegemonic project of the power elite. The US

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129 Statement by Jon Postel at the Reston meeting, written on the 1st of July 1998 and Read by Tamar Frankel, available through the Internet Archive at [http://americas.ifwp.org/statement\\_postel.htm](http://americas.ifwp.org/statement_postel.htm), last accessed 8 April 2014.

130 Exchange between Jim Dixon and Amadeu Abril i Abril on the IFWP mailing list on 25 August 1998, available at <http://list.ifwp.org/archive/1998/aug/25/>, last accessed through the Internet archive on 8 April 2014.

government intervened in some occasions to set the boundaries of legal political action in Internet governance. During the negotiations on the future of domain names managements, several actors took steps towards an alternative solution, incompatible with the emerging elite's project. In 1996, entrepreneurs like Karl Denninger and Eugene Kashpureff started set up alternative registries that were independent from the official registry held by Network Solutions. New top-level domain names were available on these alternative registries such as “.biz”, “.web” or “.xxx”. These alternative domains could be accessed through alternative DNS root but needed to be included in the official DNS root zone in order to become accessible to the majority of users<sup>131</sup>. Soon, these entrepreneurs started registrations in their own registries of new domain names. Efforts by alternative registries to have their top-level domain names inserted in Network Solution's database to become official were frustrated. In July 1997, Eugene Kashpureff hacked the Network Solutions' registration procedures: registrants were redirected to his AlterNIC website and encountered a protest message against Network Solutions' monopoly (Mueller, 2002, Chapter 7.3.2). The page also had a link to the official registration page. In spite of the relative harmlessness of the hack, Kashpureff faced a civil lawsuit by Network Solutions, and a criminal lawsuit by the Federal Bureau of Investigations on charges of wire fraud (Diamond, 1998). The civil lawsuit was settled by the payment of a token amount for legal fees and a public apology made on the Internet. However, Kashpureff was arrested in Canada in October 1997. He was extradited to the US after two months of custody in Canada while fighting extradition, and pleaded guilty during his trial<sup>132</sup>. Kashpureff was sentenced five years of probation. In spite of the support from some circles, Kashpureff and the alternative root movement were de-legitimized by the hack and their position was weakened in the longer term<sup>133</sup>.

The response of the US government was different when Jon Postel, a prominent member of the emerging power elite, hijacked most of the traffic on the network. On January 28, 1998, only two days before the US government released an important policy documents on the management of Internet domains, Jon Postel sent an e-mail to all secondary root servers<sup>134</sup> asking them to re-direct

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131 The shifting from the official DNS root to an alternative one is a simple configuration that can be carried out in all operating systems. It only requires adding new IP addresses to the DNS server list. Once changed, users can still access the official DNS root but also alternative top-level domains. Alternative roots have always existed since 1996 and some are still active. For an overview, see [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alternative\\_DNS\\_root](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alternative_DNS_root), last accessed 15 November 2012. The Internet Architecture Board expressed its hostility towards the idea of multiple roots, stating that “There is no getting away from the unique root of the public DNS” (Internet Architecture Board, 2000)

132 See the record of the U.S attorney at <http://www.irational.org/APD/CCIPS/kashpurepr.htm>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

133 Interview of the author with Karl Denninger, 3 October 2012.

134 There were thirteen root servers in 1998. “The root name servers are a critical part of the Internet because they are the first step in translating (resolving) human readable host names into IP addresses that are used in communication

the traffic to his own server rather than the usual A root server operated by Network Solutions. Two third of the secondary root servers followed the order and re-directed their traffic to Postel's server. To illustrate the potential consequences of the re-direction, Mueller (2002) stresses the fact that Postel could have changed the root domain, the top hierarchy of the whole domain names system. He could have for example added or deleted any top-level domain. While he did not do so, the importance of the political action was much greater than Kashpureff's protest message. However, Postel was asked by the US government to stop his "experiment" and no charges were pressed against him. Ira Magaziner, The US government Internet czar only publicly stated that any further attempt to manipulate the root would be prosecuted as a criminal offence (Muller 2002).

Non-compliance with the rules of the game could be sanctioned by coercive measures by the state depending on the position of the non-compliant actor. The authoritative position of the US government on the Kashpureff hack or on the recognition of a specific institution as the new corporation that would manage domain names illustrate the ambiguous position of the state in transnational fields. It is always a coercive institution of last resort when consensual domination fails. The role of the US government in the institutionalisation of Internet governance in the 1990s also evidences the coercive aspect of domination. While soft law, open dialogues and consensual agreements were raised as the standards of decision-making in the field of Internet governance, governments and national courts played a crucial role to maintain a certain order in the field.

### **6.1.3. The formation of counter-elites**

In their 2007 book, Cafruny and Ryner differentiate between an "integral hegemony" that prevailed during the Bretton Woods system; and a "minimal hegemony" in the post-Bretton Woods crisis (Cafruny & Ryner, 2007). In the integral hegemony era, the dominants were prepared to make concessions to promote stability and legitimacy. In a minimal hegemony, they draw "on [their] structural power to pursue a more narrowly based policy that externalizes domestic social and political problems." (Cafruny & Ryner, 2007, p. 8). The system remains hegemonic: subordinate forces still consent to the prevailing order. However, the stability is not ensured since the consent is not based on concessions by the dominants but rather on the power of structures and inter-subjective norms. A minimal hegemony is likely to produce discontent and counter-elites since consent is only normative and does not correspond to an actual repartition of the benefits of a given order.

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between Internet hosts." ([http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Root\\_name\\_server](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Root_name_server), last accessed 8 April 2014). The A root server is the authoritative one and was operated by Network Solutions. The twelve other root servers are called secondary root servers.

The concept of minimal hegemony describes the situation in the field of Internet governance after the creation of the ICANN. While a certain consensus still existed on the principles that ruled the field such as Internet exceptionalism and multistakeholderism, the institutionalisation of the field clearly left aside a number of important actors. This section briefly describes the discontent of important actors and the formation of counter-elites before the factors of change in the field are analysed from a broader perspective (see section 6.2).

While individual actors such as Auerbach (see chapter 5) have been important in the transition of the field, I will focus here on academics as counter-elites, since they represent a more coherent social group. ICANN as an institution has been criticised in academic circles, especially by law scholars. This critique gained scientific legitimacy with some publications in academic journals and found an institutional basis in research centres. Counter-elites were dominated in the field of Internet governance but followed their capacity to span fields to bring the challenging to another field, where they had the opportunity to prevail. Counter-elites are thus not only powerful individuals, they are powerful individuals that are formally organised (Rocher, 2005) and that act outside of the formal institutions of power of the field (Scott, 2008, pp. 39-40). The formation of counter-elites is a critical failure of the hegemonic project.

Academics participated as commentators in the debates on Internet governance in the 1990s. The Berkman Centre for Internet and Society of the Harvard University Law School became the institutional base of the International Forum on the White Paper. Lawrence Lessig, a member of the Centre was consulted as an expert on the ICANN during the US House hearings on the ICANN (Investigations, 1999). Jonathan Zittrain, another member of the Centre, was deeply involved in the IFWP and ran later for election as an at-large board member of the ICANN. Other legal scholars were important members of the Forum, including Michael Fromkin, from the University of Miami, Victor Khanna and Tamar Frankel from Boston University. Scholars from other fields were also included like David Farber, from the University of Pennsylvania who was working between the fields of computer science and public policy; Milton Mueller, from the University of Syracuse; and Craig Simon from the University of Miami. Fromkin and Farber also created Icanwatch, whose mission can be read on their website:

“Our premise can be simply stated: The Internet is a global resource of incalculable value, and nothing is of greater importance to its future than the way

in which ICANN performs its role as manager of the Domain Name System. All Internet users worldwide have a stake in these ongoing events, and our job is to serve as a central point of reference, a kind of hill overlooking the often-chaotic information landscape, from which anyone seeking a better understanding of these developments can survey the ever-changing terrain.”<sup>135</sup>

The academic counter-elite has played a crucial role to foster the transformation of the field that occurred between 1999 and 2005. As we will see in the following section, their writings and statements accompanied the factors of change in the field of Internet governance. They continuously questioned the legitimacy and the procedures of the ICANN and served as references for the demands made by new actors in the field. For some of them, they are also a link between the narrow field of Internet governance in the 1990s and the broad field during the World Summit on the Information Society.

The action of counter-elites cannot be analysed without looking at the broader conditions for change that existed in the field, but their leading role in the production of ideas and discourses should not be underestimated. The hegemonic project of the power elite failed to create an enduring consensus. As a minimal hegemony, it relied on the coercive power of the US state and on the exclusion of important actors. However, the exclusion of important actors led to the creation of a counter-elite of academics, full of resources in their own field to question and threaten the elite project. The field of Internet governance at the turn of the millennium, thus, presented an unstable environment that created the conditions of the success of the factors of change in the field.

#### **6.1.4. Non-elites, technology, and changes in the use of the Internet**

The regulation of a rapidly changing medium like the Internet raises some issues of adaptation. While the governance system of the ICANN resulted from a debate that dated back to the mid-1990s, the Internet had changed at the turn of the millennium. While it is necessary to avoid technological determinism in the study of Internet governance, the changes in the use of a technology are key elements in the evolution of its governance (Akrich, 2012a).

First, the number of Internet users rose from 16 millions to 587 millions between December 1995, at the beginning of the debate on Internet governance, and September 2002. From less than 0.5 per cent of the world population, the use of Internet – and thus its governance – concerned almost 10

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<sup>135</sup> See <http://www.icannwatch.org/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

percent of the world's population at the time of the ICANN reform<sup>136</sup>. The reach of the regulation of the network exceeded by far the technology enthusiasts and the academic communities of the mid-1990s to become a significant issue for many individuals, with no technical background. The geographical distribution was also starting to change, with more users from Japan and Europe.

The use of the network also change in nature. Whereas sex and entertainment represented the majority of web search in 1997, keywords related to commerce and people were increasingly searched for in 2001 (Spink, Jansen, Wolfram, & Saracevic, 2002). While e-commerce was more an ideological argument of the Clinton administration in 1996 (Clinton & Gore, 1996), the economic importance of the network was increasing. The technology went through a period of significant extension of its uses, fuelled by the growing number of users and improvements in bandwidth and user experience.

The cumulative innovations in the uses of the network, from instant messaging to blogs and Internet-based file sharing, was described by some commentators as the rise of the web 2.0. This adaptation (Akrich, 1998) did not result from a technological change of the network itself but rather of the software and social uses present on the Internet (Oreilly, 2007). Much like the e-mail was an unexpected innovation that changed the resource-sharing network into a telecommunication network (see chapter 4 and Abbate, 1999), the Internet at the turn of the millennium was a very innovative technology, which made new issues raise and change the importance of existing issues. For example, some commentators argued that with the generalisation of the use of search engines, domain names were not as important as they were in the 1990s. Even if such statements need to be nuanced, the changing practices of Internet were a challenge for the governance of the network. It is thus necessary, when analysing the factors of change in the field of Internet governance, to bear in mind the importance of the technology itself, and of the practices of the non-elites, even if their influence on the institutions of the field were minimal.

The turn of the millennium can be thus described as a process of translation (Callon, 1986). The small circle of specialist and the limited uses of Internet in the 1990s were transformed into a major and comprehensive telecommunication medium connecting millions of people. This process entailed the displacement and reformulation of interests, actors and of the network itself that is described in the following section as a profound evolution of the field of Internet governance.

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<sup>136</sup>Data collected by Internet World Stats, available at <http://www.internetworldstats.com/emarketing.htm>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

## 6.2. Factors of change in the field of Internet governance

As we have seen in chapter 3, a dynamic reading of Bourdieu allows for an analysis of evolution and change within a field, beyond a more traditional focus on reproduction and *habitus*<sup>137</sup>. In the context of the analysis of economic issues and global capitalism, the French regulation school has used Bourdieu in order to analyse change in institutions and in forms of regulation (Boyer, 2003, 2008; Lordon, 2003). This section represents an attempt to use Bourdieu's categories in order to analyse change in the field of Internet governance between the creation of the ICANN and the WSIS. While the field is a space of positions that determines the extent of the possible, social agents have freedom of actions and do not only reproduce the structure of the field, they also affect it. They are “virtuosos” (Bourdieu, 1977) who can improvise and do not need to follow strictly the rules of the game. This explains why the very definition of the stakes in the field of Internet governance changed so drastically between 1998 and 2003. Boyer (2008) summarizes five factors of change in Bourdieu's attempt to create an economic anthropology (Bourdieu, 2005). They will be applied to the field of Internet governance in the following paragraphs.

First, change can be brought about by *dominant actors* in the field. Innovation by dominant actors rules out the identical reproduction of the field. In fact, for the domination to be effective, dominants have to innovate and dictate the “tempo” of the transformations (Bourdieu, 2005). Change can thus be part of a strategy by dominant actors to reproduce the inequalities of the field. While Bourdieu, and consequently Boyer focus on dominant actors, it could be added that non-dominant actors can also initiate change under certain conditions. Counter-elites (non-dominant groups in a position to contest the domination of the dominants) can acquire a “feel for the game” and innovate with efficient strategies.

Another common factor of change in a field is the *entry of new agents*. These agents may be able to exchange a specific capital acquired in another field to become important in their new field. The sociology of elites has studied the ability of elites to span fields (Savage & Williams, 2008). The process of entry of new agents is continuous in many fields but emerging fields or fields in crisis (see below) are more likely to experience massive migrations of agents.

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137 According to some authors, the dual nature of Bourdieu's sociology is irreconcilable. One strand of his work would focus on reproduction and *habitus* while another would analyze practices and change (King, 2000). For others, this duality represent a complex and nuanced approach that can be applied to concrete practices and interactions (Bigo, 2011; Boyer, 2003, 2008). Finally, other authors argue that there is an evolution in Bourdieu's work towards a more dynamic sociology (Swartz, 2003; Lordon, 2003).



Fields, while relatively autonomous, are related and occupy different positions within the national or global field of power. Bourdieu has been concerned during most of his life by the national field of power but some of his latest writing hint towards a stronger focus on globalization and the international (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1999; Bourdieu, 2005). The *frontiers of the field can change* because of the changes in the broader context and this, in turn, can affect the structuration of the field.

The state is, according to Bourdieu, the most important factor of change affecting the field from the outside. Even if this idea is more obvious at a national level, it is still relevant for the study of change in transnational fields. The *competition for power over state power* remains as the conflicts over public intervention do not disappear in a globalising world. The opposition between the public and the private have in fact been the most debated issue throughout the existence of Internet governance.

The last factor of change is the *de-synchronization of the field*. The de-synchronization between the *habitus* and the field is related to the other changes outlined before. It is however a more profound change since it is a crisis of the field. Internet governance was arguably in a state of crisis since its institutionalization around the ICANN and the study of individuals factors of change can help us describe the nature of this crisis.

Bourdieu presents therefore a complete framework to analyse change, which is compatible with certain reflections of institutional economics (Boyer, 2008) and which seem promising to study changes in transnational contexts. Despite the particularities of the field of Internet governance at the turn of the century, it is an interesting case of a rapidly-changing and transnational field that is likely to present many of the factors of change described by Bourdieu. However, this framework is used here simultaneously with a transversal perspective on elites and non-elites. While Bourdieu focuses his analysis on dominant actors and actors entering the field directly at dominant positions, the factors for change in the field of Internet governance have to be understood in relation with the formation of a counter-elite and in a context of changing practices by the masses, as described in the previous section.

In order for the ICANN governance system to work, three elements were required: a consensus among elite actors on the ICANN; a consent from non-dominant actors; and an exclusion of political and social issues that had to be dealt with in other fields. However, these elements were not

met despite the hegemonic project of an emerging elite. Tensions soon appeared among dominant actors such as the newly-created ICANN together with supporters like IBM and the Department of Commerce on the one side, and the monopolistic domain-name registration company Network Solutions Inc. on the other side. The “minimal hegemony” (Cafruny & Magnus Ryner, 2007) that had prevailed when the creation of the ICANN obtained some support by civil society organizations and scientific elites did not last when the board of the new corporation started meeting behind closed doors, rejected participation and openness, and decided to create a tax on domain-name registration (Liu, 1998). Finally, non-technical issues could not be delegated to other fields on a long-term basis. The rapid growth of the Internet inevitably raised issues such as access and privacy that were to become more and more important in the following years. The situation from 1999 to 2002 was a situation of continuing crisis that was not settled by the institutionalization of the field. Against this background, factors of change were numerous and pressing.

### **6.2.1. Innovation and dominant actors**

The first factor of change is the behaviour of dominant actors. The hegemonic project of the ICANN, backed by a corporate elite organized around the Global Internet Project<sup>138</sup>; powerful governments; the scientific elite and the monopolistic Network Solutions Inc. was put in danger by the different understandings of the following steps towards Internet governance.

Network Solutions (NSI) signed in October 1998 an amendment to its cooperative agreement with the US government (US government & Network Solutions Inc., 1998). The company agreed to recognize the future ICANN and to hand over some of its function to the new corporation after a transition period. The possibility for Network Solutions to operate as a registry or a registrar after this period was included in the agreement<sup>139</sup>. Thus, Network Solutions could continue its lucrative business, had no hurry to recognize the ICANN and to enter in an agreement with it, and was going to be able to benefit from its former position as a monopolistic company in the future market for

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138 The Global Internet Project is a corporate platform specializing in Internet governance to advocate for corporate interests in the negotiations. It is an international group of senior executives and served as an advisory committee to the World Information and Telecommunication Association (WITSA). According to its website, the WITSA is consortium of ICT industry associations and currently has members from 82 countries around the world and represent more than 90 percent of the world ICT market. See [www.gip.org](http://www.gip.org), last accessed through the Internet archive on 8 April 2014.

139 "Registrar" means the entity which is authorized to enter and modify the Second Level Domain (SLD) data maintained by a Registry, in response to requests by entities seeking to be assigned a SLD. Registry means those roles and activities involved in the administration of a Top Level Domain (such as ".com") in the Domain Name System, and encompasses all of the services needed for assignment and maintenance of that TLD and its registrations. (IAHC, 1997)

domain names. This position was in contradiction with ICANN's interests. The corporation needed the contract with Network Solutions and especially the financial contribution in order to function (Mueller 2002). The tensions between these two key actors of the system led to an evolution of the structuration of the field. The consensus that existed around the ICANN faded away as Network Solutions was trying to gain support within the US political elite by taking advantage of the multiple criticisms raised at the ICANN. ICANN supporters, and especially the Global Internet Project and some key member of the scientific elite wanted to get rid of Network Solutions (Cook, 2000). As early as 1999, the ICANN as a corporation was in danger of bankruptcy (Cook, 2000).

However, these tensions were settled and the elite consensus on the existence of the ICANN was preserved. The Global Internet Project (GIP) launched a fund-raising campaign to provide the ICANN with sufficient funding until the agreement with Network Solutions. IBM and MCI-Worldcom were the coordinators of the campaign<sup>140</sup>. The Committee on Commerce of the US House of Representative organized hearings that brought together the two conflicting parties on July, 22, 1999. Although the title of the hearings was: “Domain Name System Privatization: Is ICANN out of control?”, Network solutions was on the defensive during the hearings and while ICANN could be presented as “nothing more or less than the embodiment of the consensus of the Internet community as a whole” (Investigations, 1999 Testimony of Esther Dyson, Interim Chairperson, ICANN), Network Solutions failed to convince the Committee members that the ICANN was “off-track”. A week later, a meeting gathered representatives of IBM, Network Solutions and the Internet Society to settle the dispute. According to Cook, “both sides had agreed that it was in the interest of each that NSI survive in order to pay the ICANN tax” (Cook, 2000, p. 31). The remaining issues of the amount that Network Solution would pay to the ICANN and how long they could benefit from their monopoly were solved within a few months and in September 1999, tripartite agreements were signed<sup>141</sup>. Network Solutions recognized the ICANN and abandoned some of its privileges in the registrar business in exchange of an extended monopoly in the registry business. Towards the end of 1999, the elite consensus was saved and the ICANN could again claim its position as the overarching institution of Internet governance.

However, the main weakness of the ICANN was not the possible lack of consensus on the existence of the corporation; it was its limited and technical mandate that proved problematic. Dissensions

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140 See [www.gip.org](http://www.gip.org), last accessed through the Internet archive on 8 April 2014.

141 See <http://archive.icann.org/en/nsi/nsi-agreements.htm>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

appeared on this issue among intergovernmental organizations previously supportive of the ICANN. The OECD – an early supporter of the privatization process and adviser to the ICANN – quickly moved away from domain names and addressing issues to address the broader issues of digital divide and the promotion of global economic growth through the Internet. The inclusion of development issues was especially threatening to the technically-oriented governance system by pointing at one of the most pressing issue on a worldwide basis: inequalities in Internet access. Two reports illustrate this broadening of Internet governance issue in the OECD: “Understanding the Digital Divide” (OECD 2001a) and “Bridging the Digital Divide: Issues and Policies in OECD Countries” (OECD 2001b) raised a number of issues that were far beyond the scope of the ICANN and that broadened the definition of Internet governance. The reports acknowledge that the lack of access to ICTs and especially the Internet hindered the development of a “knowledge-based economy”(OECD 2001a, 1). While confident that competition and liberalization would foster Internet access, the reports included issues such as education, urban/rural divide, age, gender, ethnicity and multilingualism. These issues already existed before the creation of the ICANN but they were thought to be outside the scope of Internet governance. Only non-dominant actors raised them in the comments to the official policy-documents but they were excluded from the discussions (see chapter 5). The inclusion of social and political issues by dominant actors soon after the creation of the ICANN reflected changes outside the field (see section 4), but also an increased awareness from the dominant actors that Internet governance could not be limited to technical issues.

The European Union is another example of such a change. It had participated in the creation of the ICANN and especially in the board selection process (see chapter 5). However, the interests of the European governments differed from those of other dominant actors in the field. While supportive of the ICANN, the European Union manifested in several documents concerns about other issues. The European Council resolution on the “Organisation and management of the Internet”, of October 2000 stressed the transitional character of Internet management and the need to resolve further issues and the importance of for example “personal data protection” besides competition and Intellectual Property Rights (Council of the European Union, 2000, para. 3). The Council also encouraged intergovernmental initiatives in the Governmental Advisory Committee of the ICANN, the WIPO and the ITU (Council of the European Union, 2000, para. 4).

Even the scientific elite overcame its neglect of broader policy issue with the success of the Internet and the possibilities it opened on a worldwide basis. Vinton Cerf's Request for Comment 3271

(2002) summarized the new spirit of the Internet Society hierarchy with its motto “Internet is for everyone”, and its focus on issues such as access and privacy instead of a narrow technical definition of Internet governance.

The move by dominant actors towards a broader definition of Internet governance was a direct threat to the technical governance system organized around the ICANN. While the tensions about the functioning of the ICANN could be overcome without changing the focus of Internet governance by a simple re-adjustment of the repartition of the benefits among dominant actors and a more inclusive policy of the corporation (Mueller 2002, chap. 9), the changing focus of some dominant actors was a more serious threat, albeit less obvious at the time, to the consensual aspect of the system.

### **6.2.2. Entry of new agents**

The entry of new agents in the field of Internet governance is closely linked with the issue of consent. While a precarious consent had been created around the ICANN in 1998, the rapid growth of the number of individuals and organizations involved in Internet governance between 1999 and 2002 represented a threat for the equilibrium of the field. The elite of Internet governance needed to open the field and its main institution in order to keep some legitimacy. Because of the lack of openness in the board selection and later in the first board meetings, the perception of the ICANN was not good in many circles (Liu, 1998). The death of Jon Postel, one of the creators of the Internet and a charismatic moral support for the ICANN system, just before the creation of the corporation “robbed the organization of its moral centre, a good part of its institutional memory and most of what remained of its legitimacy” (Mueller, 2002, 8.2.3). Against this background, the ICANN elite had to implement some transparency procedures and to organize at-large elections of five at-large directors to the board. The board of the ICANN also permitted the empowerment of the Governmental Advisory Committee to gain some legitimacy at the international level. These moves opened the door of the field, and even of its core institution, to new actors. Two main categories of actors entered the field during this period: the hackers and developing countries.

The elections of five at-large directors to the ICANN board on October 2000<sup>142</sup> saw the victory of

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142 The election took place on-line through the [www.election.com](http://www.election.com) website from the 1st to the 10th of October 2000. 34035 individuals voted. See <http://members.icann.org/index.html> and <http://www.election.com/us/icann/icannresult.html> (through the Web Archive), last accessed 8 April 2014 .

opponents to the ICANN in Europe and in North America. Karl Auerbach, who was elected in North America was part of the effort of the Boston Working Group to form a counter-elite group during the last rounds of negotiations around the creation of the ICANN. He was thus already an actor in the field, though a non-dominant one. His election is part of a classical struggle between orthodox and heterodox positions within a field. His candidate page read:

“ICANN is Internet governance. ICANN's decisions affect all users of the Internet. ICANN should be open to all. ICANN should be fair. ICANN should be impartial. ICANN is few, if any, of these things. My candidacy is one of reform — deep, substantial, and fundamental reform. My candidacy is one that is founded on the belief that the Internet should not be controlled and dominated by those who aspire to nothing higher than mass marketing. It is my position that individual people ought to have a major voice in the governance of this revolution we call the Internet.”<sup>143</sup>

The case of Andy Mueller-Maguhn, who was elected in Europe, is slightly different. He had been a member of the Chaos Computer Club since 1985 and its speaker since 1990. The Chaos Computer Club (CCC) describes itself as the biggest European association of hackers<sup>144</sup>. The CCC had not been involved in the debates of Internet governance in the 1990s. However, the evolution of the Internet towards a commercial network with “anti-theft locks, filter, police and prisons” (Müller-Maguhn, 2000)<sup>145</sup> forced the hackers to act and try to infiltrate what they saw was Internet's government:

“Since we – the Netizens- do not want to let these thieves wreck our public space, we had to get pro-active [...] Personally I am also in the government now and *de jure* somewhere in November. And, also then, I will still keep the public space free from commercial rules of the game, protect the free flow of information and give the bits their free space. [...] and since governments, as centralistic, hierarchic systems, only invite to abuse it, and are obstacles to its development, I will let the whole thing run as decentralized as possible, and for this reason, it must be transparent”(Müller-Maguhn 2000)<sup>146</sup>

While the cyber-libertarian discourse had had some influence during the debates that led to the creation of the ICANN, this type of anti-marketisation discourse inspired by hacker philosophy was

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143 Available at <http://members.icann.org/cand/16.html>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

144 See <http://www.ccc.de/de/home?language=en>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

145 “Und da natürlich Diebstahlsperren einbauen wollen, Filter, Polizisten und Gefängnisse”. Translation by the author.

146 “Und da wir - die Netzbewohner - jetzt keine Lust haben, uns den öffentlichen Raum durch diese Diebe kaputt machen zu lassen, mußten wir ein bißchen pro-aktiv tätig werden.[...] Nominell bin ich jetzt also in der Regierung und *de jure* irgendwann im November. Und auch dann will ich immer noch den öffentlichen Raum frei von kommerziellen Spielregeln halten, den freien Informationsfluß hüten und den Bits ihre Freiräume geben. [...] und da Regierungen als zentralistische, hierarchische Systeme nur dazu einladen, mißbraucht zu werden, und entwicklungshemmend sind, würde ich das Ganze gern so dezentral wie möglich ablaufen lassen, und dazu muß es transparent werden”. Author's translation.

new in the field at the beginning of the 2000s. Around the same time, the free software community began to address the issue on freedom on the Internet, as illustrated by the request of a “.gnu” top-level domain by the Free Software Foundation in 2000 in order “to support the public and defend the public's rights in cyberspace”<sup>147</sup>. While at-large members were marginalized in the board and the critical directors resigned in the following years (Muller 2002), the entry of actors such as hackers and their discourses in such a visible position was not without consequences on the field.

The other important category of new actors in the field is developing countries. The Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC) permitted the entry of developing countries and their empowerment. Originally, the GAC had been designed as the least powerful of the advisory committees, acting only on ICANN board's request (ICANN, 1998). Influence by powerful governments had taken place elsewhere. The US government supervised the ICANN according to a Memorandum of Understanding between the ICANN and the US Department of Commerce (ICANN & DoC, 1998) and the Australian government as well as the European Commission had actively participated to the selection of the board of the corporation<sup>148</sup>. Developing countries had been largely excluded from the debates. However, during the first years of operation of the GAC, developing countries started participating in the debates on Internet governance, and the GAC was empowered within the ICANN and in the field of Internet governance more broadly. At the first GAC meeting in Singapore in March 1999, several important developing countries were present, such as Argentina, Brazil or China<sup>149</sup>. The GAC quickly became a key player and could be considered soon another supporting organization with power by far exceeding those of a simple advisory committee (Mueller 2002, 9.7). Governments claimed authority on the Country Code top-level domains (such as “.ch” or “.dk”) and a say on names referring to territories, languages or regions (Mueller 2002). While Europeans governments were among the most active in the GAC, together with the European Commission, the representation of developing countries grew steadily (Kleinwächter, 2002). Even if the direct effects of this participation was limited in the early 2000s, it was essential to raise awareness about Internet governance issues as well as to create knowledge of the institutions and mechanisms in developing countries (Antonova, 2007, pp. 285–286).

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147 <http://archive.icann.org/en/meetings/yokohama/eoi12.htm>, last accessed 8 November 2012.

148 See the letter from John Sopko, Chief Counsel for Special Matters, U.S Department of Commerce to Thomas J. Bliley, Jr, chairman of the Committee on Commerce of the U.S house of representatives, 5 November 1998, reproduced at <http://www.ais.org/~jrh/acn/text/acn9-2.articles/acn9-2.a04.txt>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

149 See <https://gacweb.icann.org/display/gacweb/GAC+Meetings+Archive>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

Year	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Africa	2	3	3	7	13	17
Middle East and North Africa	3	4	4	5	6	8
Asia – Pacific	14	18	19	19	21	24
Europe	23	26	30	30	31	37
Latin America and the Caribbean	5	7	9	10	11	11
North America	2	2	2	2	2	2
Members	49	60	67	73	84	99
Observers	5	5	5	6	6	9
Total	54	65	72	79	90	108

Table 6.1. Composition of the Governmental Advisory Committee of the ICANN, by region, 1999-2004 (adapted from Mathiason, 2008, p. 89)

The entry of actors that were completely outside the *doxa* of the field participated to the transformation of the field and the open crisis of 2003-2005. Hackers had links with a number of NGOs interested in human rights and privacy protection and the entry of developing countries set the conditions for a renewed debate on a New World Information and Communication Order in the Internet era. Both categories of actors were favouring a politicization of the debates and denouncing the “technical” aspect of Internet governance in the ICANN system.

### 6.2.3. Changes outside the field

While Internet governance was a relatively autonomous field drawing limited attention at the turn of the century, changes in the global political economy and in the global field of power affected this situation and created the conditions for change within the field. The period from 1999 to 2002 is a contrasted one. In the months that followed the creation of the ICANN, the Dotcom bubble grew and the contribution of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) to economic growth and productivity gains, especially in the US was praised (Oliner & Sichel, 2000). The idea of a knowledge-based economy relying on the development of ICTs became part of the economic imaginary of many actors of the global political economy (Jessop, 2005). The most famous example of the importance that ICTs and the knowledge economy took in this period is the Lisbon strategy of the European Union (European Council, 2000).



The Dotcom bubble is a consequence of the enthusiasm generated by the prospects of a fast-growing economy and a fourth industrial revolution. The low interest rates in the US in 1998-1999 participated to the growth of the Dotcom bubble. From 1995 to 2000, the NASDAQ composite index rose exponentially from 1000 to 5000 points with a doubling of the index in only one year between 1999 and 2000<sup>150</sup>. While telecommunications companies (many of them recently privatized) and hardware manufacturers invested to meet future demand, a booming number of start-ups found investors ready to invest in any project related to the ICTs and especially the Internet. Companies such as the clothes retailer “boo.com” in Europe or “pets.com” in the US illustrate the tendency: they raised important amounts of money and gained visibility but sold hardly anything. The climax was reached in March 2000 but changing monetary policies and the condemnation of Microsoft in a monopoly case marked the end of the growth of the bubble.

The burst of the Dotcom bubble, the financial scandals, and the terrorist attacks of September 2001 in the US also marked the period of transition, leaving the field of Internet governance transformed by the rising political and economic concerns around the Internet.

First, the Dotcom bubble collapsed in March 2000. Within a year or so, many Dotcom companies disappeared through mergers, acquisitions or bankruptcy during this period, while the remaining ones saw their shares' prices sharply drop. The structure of the Dotcom market was profoundly transformed with some large surviving firms such as Amazon, Google or E-bay dominating the market. The end of the Dotcom bubble also affected the broader field of telecommunications. In early 2001, America Online merged with Time Warner in the biggest merger operation in American business history, which illustrate a movement of merger and acquisitions that affected the telecommunication and entertainment markets in this period (Arango, 2010). Another giant of the field, Worldcom (that resulted from the merger of MCI and Worldcom) saw its growth strategy undermined by concerns on the creation of a monopoly and started massive fraud, which led to the scandal and its bankruptcy in 2002 (Romero & Atlas, 2002).

The burst of the Dotcom bubble did not put an end to the enthusiasm towards a knowledge-based

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150 <http://www.nasdaq.com/aspx/StatisticalMilestones.aspx#Nasdaq%20Composite%20Index%20Records>, accessed 8 April 2014.

last

economy and the potential of ICTs and the Internet. Soon after the collapse of the bubble, observers warned against an overestimation of the effects of the bubble (Litan, 2001). Many economists described the Dotcom bubble as an adjustment period that was not going to affect further growth. They differentiated the Internet bubble, a short-term and highly unstable growth, and the Internet boom, a long-term improvement of productivity and a vector of new markets (Varian, Farrell, & Shapiro, 2004).

The burst of the bubble coincided with the terrorist attacks in the US in September 2001 that increased the financial consequences of the economic turmoil. Moreover, the attacks put security issues at the heart of Internet governance<sup>151</sup>. While the ICANN system had been created to accompany the creation of a market for domain names and the development of E-commerce, cybersecurity became the buzzword of Internet governance in the early 2000s. Between 2002 and 2003, the UN General Assembly passed two resolutions related to cybersecurity (UNGA 2001, 2002) and several governments increased the legal framework to combat cybercrime and cyberterrorism. In 2002 at the Prague Summit, the NATO put cyberdefence for the first time on its political agenda<sup>152</sup>. The political and security aspects of Internet governance were not tackled by the ICANN system. However, they became pressing issues in the early 2000s. The security aspect was part of the movement towards the broadening of the scope of Internet governance and contributed to the idea that the ICANN was not sufficient to tackle all Internet-related policy issues.

At the end of the transition period, the field of Internet governance had experienced the effects of a changing context. Internet was still seen as a vector of economic growth, but also as an unstable market and a potential tool and target for terrorist and criminals. Against this background, the optimistic view of a technical and private governance of the network suffered an important drawback and more traditional political issues emerged.

#### **6.2.4. Competition of power over state power**

Much has been written on the authority of the US government on the ICANN. One of the most striking examples can be found in the amendment 11 to the cooperative agreement between Network

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<sup>151</sup> While the issue of cyberterrorism appeared already in the 1990s in the media, especially in France because it was then the target of terrorist attacks, very few mentions of issues related to cybersecurity appear in the documents of the 1990s. The dominant vision in the US was that of a cyber-marketplace.

<sup>152</sup> See [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-B7A14B06-0777A6C2/natolive/topics\\_78170.htm?](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-B7A14B06-0777A6C2/natolive/topics_78170.htm?), last accessed 8 April 2014.

Solutions and the US Department of Commerce. The agreement provided that Network Solutions “shall request written directions from an authorized USG [United States Government] official before making or rejecting any modification, additions or deletions to the root zone file” (US government & Network Solutions Inc., 1998). This meant that neither the ICANN nor Network Solutions had the authority to add or delete top-level domains. The US Department of Commerce still had legal authority over the domain name space despite the creation of the ICANN. As Froomkin puts it:

“ICANN’s only reason for existence, and the sole source of its power over the DNS, is that the thirteen root servers treat it as authoritative, and that the government instructed NSI, another contractor, both to defer to ICANN on policy and to pay it money.” (Froomkin 2000, 108)

The result of the creation of the ICANN was a hybrid system where the boundaries between the public and the private were blurred (Zittrain, 1999). This situation led to problems of legitimacy and a debate on the role of the US government (Froomkin, 2000). While the ICANN managed the technical functioning of the Internet (the “plumbing” in Dyson's words<sup>153</sup>), some of its functions had clear political consequences. Following the guidelines of the US government expressed in the White Paper (NTIA, 1998) the ICANN created a Uniform Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP). This dispute resolution mechanism was designed by the World Intellectual Property Organization and was a strong intellectual property protection mechanism for trademark owners. However, as claimed by Froomkin (2000), the UDRP lacked the safeguards of a legal process. The registrants suspected of trademark violation had their legal rights limited in several ways. The choice of a cheaper and faster process than legal procedures was a significant political choice “changing the legal rights accruing to more than twenty million contracts” (Froomkin 2000, 101).

Was the US government handing over authority to an unaccountable private institution? The debate spread outside the US. The European Commission was for example worried because of the fact that:

“Even within their narrowly defined remit, it is already the case that ICANN and the GAC are taking decisions of a kind that governments would, in other contexts, expect to take themselves in the framework of international organisations”. (European Commission, 2000, para. 9)

Similar concerns existed in the developing world as well as among civil society organizations. While the idea of a reform of the ICANN system was gaining increasing interest from various

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153 See Investigations (1999 Testimony of Esther Dyson, Interim Chairperson, ICANN).

groups, the content of a possible reform did not make consensus. As far as the public/private issue was concerned, three options were considered: a renewed ICANN or another organization of similar nature, an intergovernmental organization, or a free market solution (Zittrain 1999). A renewed ICANN or another attempt to create a public-private partnership would have been a way to maintain the idea that Internet regulation was to take place between the state and the market. The creation of an intergovernmental organization or the handing over of ICANN functions to the ITU would have been a drastic change with regard to the (short) history of the network. This solution was a clear threat to the power elite of Internet governance. The last solution was an unregulated market. It had been favoured before the creation of the ICANN by cyber-libertarians. In a context of growing discontent with the corporation, the free-market solution was again seen by some as a possible reform.

Of all the debates around the ICANN, the choice between public and private regulation and the role of the state, and especially the United States, was one of the most important. The institutionalization of Internet governance at the end of the 1990s around the ICANN had only been a very unstable and precarious solution to the problem. While a consensus had been found between different elite groups on the public-private character of the ICANN, this solution had not reached a hegemonic status among non-elite groups that remained critical of the lack of clarity on the issue.

### **6.2.5. De-synchronization of the field**

As we have seen, the notion of *habitus* is more difficult to manage in the analysis of transnational fields. The variety of national habitus coexisting within a field and the evolutionary and interstitial character of transnational fields makes it difficult for durable dispositions to emerge. However, the autonomisation of Internet governance from the field of computer networking science (see chapter 4) created a certain incompatibility between pre-existing logics, procedures, world-views and institutions, and the new nature of the field. While the regulation of the network had some stability in terms of *habitus* and strategies of actors in the 1970s and 1980s, the rapid changes that started with the commercialization of the network in the early 1990s provoked a state of crisis that could not be solved by the creation of the ICANN. Agents in the regulation of the network before the commercialization had diverse experience and institutional affiliations. Many were computer scientists hired by US universities but the field was already transnational (with actors from Europe, Australia and Japan); it included governmental actors such as the US National Science Foundations and the US Department of Defence; it also included private companies (government contractors and

computer manufacturers). The field of telecommunications was related to Internet governance but it remained relatively autonomous. In spite of this diversity, a certain homology existed between different *habitus* that allowed the field to follow certain rules of the game. Competition and domination took place within a field where the stakes were common to all actors. In that situation, the *habitus* could function as:

“the product of the incorporation of objective necessity, of necessity turned into virtue, [it] produces strategies which are objectively adjusted to the objective situation even though these strategies are neither the outcome of the explicit aiming at consciously pursued goals, nor the result of some mechanical determination by external causes. Social action is guided by a practical sense, by what we may call a ‘feel for the game’” (Bourdieu, quoted in Bigo, 2011)

After the commercialisation of the Internet, the main objective of Internet governance became the creation of a new market. New logics and new stakes appeared in the field. Long-standing practices such as informal meetings, Requests For Comments and consensus-building between peers proved inefficient to manage a global telecommunication network. Not only the actors changes, but also the practices of rule-setting became more politicised and the stakes of decision-making became higher. The field did not turn into a classical international policy field with established diplomatic rules and behaviours. It remained a hybrid transnational field, where scientific practices and technical logics mixed with transnational business practices and geopolitical struggles. Against this background, the creation of the ICANN did not solve the issue of the definition of Internet governance and did not define the nature and boundaries of the field.

### **6.3. The failure of the ICANN as a hegemonic project**

In order to respond to the increasing pressures for change in the field of Internet governance, the power elite developed a reform project for the ICANN. More than an institutional reform, the reform of the ICANN aimed at a broader objective of stabilisation of the field and addressed some of the issue outlined in the previous section. Similarly to the at-large election, the reform was an attempt to co-opt the counter-elite as well as some newcomers in the field such as developing countries. However, the ICANN reform failed to maintain the ICANN as a hegemonic project and placed the World Summit on the Information Society as an inevitable *locus* of politicisation and resistance.

### 6.3.1. The reform of the ICANN

On November 15, 2001, the ICANN mandated a Committee to restructure the ICANN. Six months later, the name of the Committee and its mandate were changed into a Committee on ICANN evolution and reform<sup>154</sup>. Its mandate was to investigate a possible change in the structure of the ICANN considering input from the “community” and ICANN's stakeholders. More fundamentally, it was to prepare recommendations to the board of the corporation on the essential function and missions to be fulfilled by the ICANN. This broad mandate reflected the concern expressed by the power elite on the legitimacy of its core institution in the field of Internet governance. The idea was to clearly state the technical aspect of ICANN activities and to neutralise the growing political debate<sup>155</sup>. The objectives of the reform were centred around the notion of participation of a full range of Internet users, including individuals, academic institutions, large and small businesses, non-commercial entities (including consumer groups), and other non-governmental organizations<sup>156</sup>. The reform was thus specifically aimed at the emerging counter-elite, whose institutional affiliation was mainly in the academia and to a lesser extent in NGOs. The Committee on ICANN evolution and reform was formally launched at a meeting in Accra, Ghana, in March 2002.

The creation of the Committee came just after the publication of a report entitled “ICANN – The case for Change” authored by ICANN President Stuart Lynn. The report recommended a profound reform of the ICANN. It was a plea for the ICANN model as well as a significant proposal of reform:

“To the Internet Community: ICANN's assigned mission – to create an effective private sector policy development process capable of administrative and policy management of the Internet's naming and address allocation systems – was incredibly ambitious. Nothing like this had ever been done before. ICANN was to serve as an alternative to the traditional, pre-Internet model of a multinational governmental treaty organization. The hope was that a private-sector body would be like the Internet itself: more efficient – more nimble – more able to react promptly to a rapidly changing environment and, at the same time, more open to meaningful participation by more stakeholders, developing policies through bottom-up consensus. It was also expected that such an entity could be established, and become functional, faster than a multinational governmental body. [...] But despite this progress, all the original expectations of ICANN have

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154 See resolutions 01.132 and 02.20 in the ICANN board meeting minutes of November 15, 2001 and March, 14, 2002, available at <http://www.icann.org/en/groups/board/documents>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

155 “[...] Some in the community believe that it would be useful, in the context of these discussions, to reaffirm and clarify ICANN's limited mission for technical management and administration of the DNS, administration of Internet address space, and administration of technical protocol identifiers”, ICANN board meeting minutes 15 November 2001, available at <http://www.icann.org/en/groups/board/documents>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

156 Resolution 02.20, § a, ICANN board meeting minutes, 14 March 2002, available at <http://www.icann.org/en/groups/board/documents>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

not been realized. [...] for a resource as changeable and dynamic as the Internet, a traditional governmental approach as an alternative to ICANN remains a bad idea. The Internet needs effective, lightweight, and sensible global coordination in a few limited areas, allowing ample room for the innovation and change that makes this unique resource so useful and valuable. [...] I have concluded that ICANN needs reform: deep, meaningful, structural reform, based on a clear-headed understanding of the successes and failures of the last three years. If ICANN is to succeed, this reform must replace ICANN's unstable institutional foundations with an effective public-private partnership, rooted in the private sector but with the active backing and participation of national governments.” (Lynn 2002)

The committee worked during several months, and benefited from comments by many actors in the field<sup>157</sup>. From the start of the process, non-dominant actors tried to advocate for substantial changes in the governance system. The director of the Telecommunications Standardisation Bureau of the ITU, Houlin Zhao, submitted a note on “ITU-T and ICANN Reform”<sup>158</sup>. The difference in the tone adopted by the ITU on Internet governance matters in the 1990s and at the beginning of the 2000s is striking. While in 1996, Robert Shaw tried to convince the “Internet community” that the ITU was evolving towards a private governance model<sup>159</sup>, Houlin Zhao opposed the difficulties faced by the ICANN to the success of ITU-T:

“It is widely acknowledged that the ITU-T performs its tasks to the general satisfaction of industry, governments, and the public at large, using processes that are open, transparent, and ensure accountability to all stakeholders. [...] In summary, ITU-T is an effective public-private partnership, rooted in the public sector but with the active backing and participation of industry players.”<sup>160</sup>

The Director of the Telecommunication Standardisation Bureau of the ITU proposed a cooperation between the ITU and the ICANN as a way to overcome the limitations of a private not-for-profit corporation.

In May and June 2002, the committee on ICANN evolution and reform published a document on the mission and core values of the ICANN and a blueprint for reform. These documents questioned

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157 The documents related to the reform process are available at <http://archive.icann.org/en/committees/evol-reform/links.htm>, some of them through the Internet archive, last accessed, 8 April 2014.

158 Text available at <http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/tsb-director/itut-icann/ICANNreform.html>, last accessed through the Internet Archive, 8 April 2014.

159 “The ITU-T's process is a very open one. Any company can join and participate in its discussions and proposals. But currently the voting members - the private sector typically makes these standards. But who has the final vote is the countries, and that might change in the near future”. Transcript from Robert Shaw's presentation at APPLE workshop, held on 28 June 1996 at the Sheraton hotel in Montreal, Canada. Available through the Internet Archive at <http://web.archive.org/web/19990422150030/http://www.glocom.ac.jp/resa/APPLE/APPLETOC.html>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

160 Text available at <http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/tsb-director/itut-icann/ICANNreform.html>, last accessed through the Internet Archive, 8 April 2014.

the *doxa* of Internet governance. While multistakeholderism remained at the core of the reform process as well as of the proposed values and structure, the uniqueness of the Internet was less used as a political argument in the debates. Moreover, the technical character of ICANN activities that had been instrumental for the project of the ICANN was negated. The committee's Working Paper on ICANN's Mission and Core Values clearly states that “policy-making is inherent in ICANN's responsibilities”<sup>161</sup> While the private character of the corporation is reaffirmed in the documents, the need is acknowledged to “act with sensitivity to governmental concerns for the public interest so that the need for direct governmental action is minimized”<sup>162</sup>

The Governmental Advisory Committee of the ICANN reacted to these publications and expressed its satisfaction with the stronger role devoted to the GAC in the proposed structure. It went even further to claim a transformation of the above value to:

“While remaining rooted in the private sector, recognise that government or public authorities are responsible for public policy and duly take into account governments' or public authorities' recommendations”<sup>163</sup>.

Only the US government's representative to the GAC opposed this change<sup>164</sup>. The GAC also supported the presence of a GAC liaison in the Board of the ICANN, at the exception of several governments from developed countries such as France, Switzerland and Germany<sup>165</sup>. The GAC, and especially the developing countries proposed a totally different ICANN where purely technical issues were to be discussed by the Board and technical bodies, while:

“the GAC is the main forum for the international discussion of public policy issues that may arise in ICANN's sphere of competence, along with the competent international organisations (e.g. ITU, OECD, WIPO). Due to the evolutionary nature of ICANN's mission, a different organisation of government participation, on a different legal basis, may be contemplated in the future.”<sup>166</sup>

This move by the GAC was an attempt to import the rules of more traditional diplomatic fields to

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161 See the section 2 of the Working Paper on ICANN Mission and Core Values, available at <http://archive.icann.org/en/committees/evol-reform/working-paper-mission-06may02.htm>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

162 ICANN Core Value [I]. Ibid.

163 See the GAC statement on ICANN reform, published on June, 26, 2002; available at <http://archive.icann.org/en/committees/gac/statement-on-reform-26jun02.htm>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

164 Ibid.

165 Ibid.

166 Ibid.



Internet governance and to tip the balance of regulation towards more involvement of governments.

The result of the reform process was embodied by the new by-laws of the corporation that entered into force on December 15, 2002 (ICANN, 2002). The resulting ICANN has been described as an ICANN 2.0 and as a public-private partnership (Froomkin, 2002; Kleinwächter, 2002; von Arx, 2003). The GAC was able to impose its new role in the institution. According to Kleinwächter (2002), this evolution has to be understood in relation with the changes outside the field and especially the terrorist attacks on the US territory. The reform was also accompanied by the nomination of a new CEO for the corporation, Paul Twomey, a former chair of the ICANN and a former Australian government member (Mathiason, 2008, p. 83). The GAC, while maintaining its former structure, became a central body of the ICANN, consistent with the growing role it had acquired in the first years of operation of the corporation.

The structure of the ICANN also changed (see figure 6.3.1). Supporting Organisations were reformed to separate the management of generic domain names such as “.com” or “.org” from the country-code domain names such as “.ch” or “.dk”. The Protocol Supporting Organisation was divided into three more specialised entities. More importantly, the reform created an At-Large Advisory Committee. The At-Large Advisory Committee was designed to include the “community of individual Internet users”<sup>167</sup>. As such, it became the organ representing the interests of non-elites in the ICANN. It replaced the membership that had been advocated for by the counter-elite during the International Forum on the White Paper. The idea of a global individual membership had been included in the original ICANN by-laws (ICANN, 1998) but was never implemented. The shift from a global membership to an At-Large Advisory Committee was a step back from the claims of a type of global legitimacy of the organisation and secured the marginal position of non-elite Internet users. The Board – as core organ of the power elite – remained the central decision-making body of the corporation (Mathiason, 2008). The by-laws provided that the board member be selected by a Nominating Committee, except from the president and those directors selected by the Supporting Organisations through their own nomination committee process. The “NomCom” procedure had been used by institutions like the Internet Engineering TaskForce (Hovey & Bradner, 1996 – RFC 2028) and was consistent with the field's scientific tradition of peer nomination instead of representation. The Nomination Committee was selected by the different bodies of the ICANN and then selected board members among candidates on a consensual basis. This process of board selection gave more power to the different bodies of the ICANN and ruled out the principle of at-

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167 Definition of At-Large, available at <http://www.atlarge.icann.org/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

large elections as experimented in 2000. The consequence was the limitation of the possibility for counter-elites to join the board and gain power within the organisation.




Figure 6.3. Organisational Structure of the ICANN under the 2002 by-laws<sup>168</sup>

Compared with the original structure, figure 6.3.1 shows the particular role of the GAC among advisory committees and the inclusion of an At-Large membership body. The new structure tended to respond to some pressures for change outlined in the previous section. First, the new role of the GAC corresponded both to the demands of developing countries and of the European Union; and to the continuing debate on the role of the state. The idea of the ICANN as a public-private partnership seemed more acceptable to many actors familiar with the concept. The At-Large Advisory Committee was a single body to offer participation to all other non-dominant actors. Finally, the role of the nominating committee was an answer to the legitimacy issues. However, the responses were insufficient. They left aside most of the controversies and the inclusion of counter-elite actors

<sup>168</sup> Available at <http://www.icann.org/en/structure/>, last accessed through the Internet Archive 8 April 2014. ASO stands for Address Supporting Organisation; GNSO for Generic Names Supporting Organisation, and CCNSO for Country Code Names Supporting Organisation.

was insufficient to make the system stable.

### **6.3.2. The failure of the reform and the redefinition of the frontiers of the field**

In spite of the efforts of the power elite to maintain hegemony in the field through a reform of the central institution of Internet governance, the reform failed to gain support from all groups of the counter-elites. While governmental elites were satisfied by the new role of the GAC, scholars and civil society organizations were not convinced by the At-Large Advisory Committee. Moreover, the reform addressed the problem of legitimacy and openness to respond to some pressures for change but most of them remained open after the reform. As a result, the hegemonic project of the ICANN, despite its reform, was a failure and did not prevent the crisis of Internet governance evidenced by the debates during the World Summit on the Information Society.

First, the reform only partially addressed the change in the dominant actors' strategies. While the documents published by the Committee on Evolution and Reform acknowledged the policy-making character of the ICANN, it did not specify in which ways the ICANN could address issues such as access or privacy. It did not make clear either, which institution was responsible of broader policy issues were the ICANN not to address them. The “thin” vs. “thick” ICANN debate was left unsettled. A “thin” ICANN focusing on strictly technical issues was demanded by some civil society organisations because it would allegedly be more accountable<sup>169</sup>. However, this strictly technical role had proven to be unrealistic since the regulation of domain names and IP addresses had important political and economic consequences<sup>170</sup>. Moreover, the focus on technical issues of the main institution of Internet governance left crucial aspects beyond the scope of a “thin” ICANN. As we have seen, the OECD and the European Union, but also the scientific elite were already moving beyond domain names to address issues such as access and privacy. If the ICANN could not be the forum for these governance issues, other forums had to be created. Another solution was to put Internet governance on the agenda of other existing policy forums. With the increasing number of

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169 See for example the comments of the Center for Democracy and Technology to the Committee on ICANN Evolution and Reform, May, 3, 2002; available at <http://www.cdt.org/dns/icann/020503ceir.shtml>, last accessed through the Internet Archive 8 April 2014. According to its website, the Center works “to promote democratic values and constitutional liberties in the digital age. With expertise in law, technology, and policy, CDT seeks practical solutions to enhance free expression and privacy in global communications technologies. CDT is dedicated to building consensus among all parties interested in the future of the Internet and other new communications media”; <http://www.cdt.org/mission/>, last accessed through the Internet Archive 8 April 2014.

170 See the section 2 of the Working Paper on ICANN Mission and Core Values, available at <http://archive.icann.org/en/committees/evol-reform/working-paper-mission-06may02.htm>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

policy forums addressing Internet governance issues, the unity of the field and its frontiers were at stake. Meanwhile the ICANN reform was discussed, debates on the directions of future steps in Internet governance were taking place during the preparatory meetings of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS). For example, the fifth principle of the European WSIS regional ministerial meeting, held in Bucharest in November 2002, read:

“[...] the information society is, by nature, a global phenomenon and issues such as privacy protection, consumer trust, management of domain names, facilitation of e-commerce, protection of intellectual property rights, open source solutions etc., should be addressed with the active participation of all stakeholders.”<sup>171</sup>

Domain names were becoming one among other issues in Internet governance, and the ICANN could not be the institutional setting for the broader policy debates.

Second, entering actors were not completely co-opted by the new corporation. New spaces had opened up for their participation without guaranteeing them the power to act within the new framework. The reform of the status of the GAC partially addressed the concerns of the developing countries. While the increased role of governments in the ICANN was a positive reform for the developing countries' governments, intergovernmental organisations respecting the one state, one vote procedures were still seen as more favourable to their interests. The historical influence of developing countries on the evolution of the ITU, while limited, was based on an equal representation of states, which was not the case in the GAC. In 2002, the GAC had only 73 members, including 30 European countries (Mathiason, 2008, p. 89) compared to an almost universal membership of the ITU.

For the hackers, the ICANN reform increased the power of the private sector and that of governments, which was against their objectives for the Internet. After the visibility acquired during the 2000 ICANN election, hackers did not find a space to represent their ideas and interests in the field of Internet governance. Unsurprisingly, the ICANN reform did not provide this specific group of actors with any opportunity of participation. The hackers organisations thus remained counter-elite actors, whose knowledge and capacity of action had some influence on the field, without participation in the institutions of the field.

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171 Final Declaration of the Pan European Regional Conference on the World Summit on the Information Society, Bucharest, November 2002, available at [http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/listing-all.asp?lang=en&c\\_event=rc|pe&c\\_type=all](http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/listing-all.asp?lang=en&c_event=rc|pe&c_type=all), last accessed 8 April 2014. Also quoted in (Kleinwächter, 2004)

Third, the reform of the ICANN was to a certain extent a reaction to the terrorist attacks of September 2001 (Kleinwächter 2004). However, it did not address other changes in the global political economy of the Internet. The focus on domain names did not seem as crucial as in the late 1990s, the rise of search engines like Google made domain names less visible and the organization of content more profitable than its creation (Couvering, 2008). The burst of the Dotcom bubble also slowed down the speculation around domain names for a few years<sup>172</sup>. While the regulation of what was becoming to be called “critical Internet resources” (Internet domains, root servers and Internet addresses) was still necessary for the functioning of the network, the evolution of the political economy of the Internet, and the growing importance of the field of Internet governance in the regulation of telecommunications were far beyond the scope of the limited ICANN reform.

Fourth, while the public-private partnership character of the corporation was successful in clarifying the status of Internet governance, the overarching role of the US government was still an issue for non-US actors. The growing importance of governments within the ICANN did not change the authority of the US Department of Commerce on the corporation. The authority of the ICANN still relied on the agreements signed by the US government. During the ITU plenipotentiary conference held in Marrakesh in October 2002, the role of the US government in Internet governance was harshly criticised (Kleinwächter 2004). The internationalisation of the ICANN was not on the agenda of the Committee on ICANN Evaluation and Reform and while it was demanded by many developing countries, the matter was not discussed during the reform and the debate is still unsettled today.

The process of the reform, while open, was still controlled by the ICANN. Some debates that were thought to be outside the scope of the ICANN were already taking place elsewhere. Some more radical suggestions for change were ruled out by the Committee as being “inconsistent with the basic premise that led to ICANN's creation”<sup>173</sup>. As a result, the reform failed to re-create the conditions of consent in the field of Internet governance. Like the original ICANN, the ICANN 2.0 left aside important actors and important issues that were likely to foment the politicisation of Internet governance and the conditions of resistance to the counter-elites. This is even the case with the academic and civil society counter-elite that was the primary target of the reform. Hans Klein, an associate professor at the Georgia Institute of technology summarized the failure of the ICANN

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172 See the biggest domain name sales on <http://www.domaining.com/topsales/>, last accessed 8 April 2014. While the biggest sales are recent, there were not many big sales between 2001 and 2004.

173 An example of the Committee ruling out proposals can be seen in the Committee's update regarding RIR suggestions, available at <http://archive.icann.org/en/committees/evol-reform/update-16sep02.htm>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

reform from a counter-elite point of view during the WSIS (Klein, 2005). He denounces a capture of the ICANN from the start through the capture of the International Forum on the White Paper by “powerful industry and technical stakeholders” (see previous section). He then adds three captures that occurred according to him during the first years of operation of the ICANN. First, the ICANN board was captured in 2002 since the principle of open elections was ruled out for board nominations and since the users representation on the ICANN board was eliminated. Second, the Internet Society (ISOC), originally a technical/scientific institution, was captured by “its largest corporate members”, which led to the indirect capture of the “.org” registry operated by the ISOC and of the At-Large Advisory Committee of the ICANN. Indeed, according to Klein, nearly 60 percent of the user-related organisation represented in the At-Large Advisory Committee were ISOC chapters. Finally, Klein describes the capture of the “.com” registry by Network Solutions, since the company was able to extend its control of the domain. As evidenced by Klein's account, the counter-elite was not co-opted by the ICANN reform; and opposition still occurred outside of the institution.

### ***Conclusions:***

The creation of the ICANN was an attempt by the power elite of Internet governance to institutionalise its domination over the field. As such, the ICANN can be described as a hegemonic project with two dimensions. First, the ICANN project was a consensus-building project for different specialised elites in the transnational field of Internet governance. Second, it was a hegemonic project in the Gramscian sense of a project aiming at consensual domination. The power elite made some concessions to non-dominant groups in order to co-opt them in the institutionalisation of the field. Once created, an institution can canalise and contain conflicts and resistance in a way that does not threaten the equilibrium of the field. However, the concessions made by the power elite were very limited. While a consensual forum had been designed to write the by-laws of the future institutions, bringing together the elite and possible counter-elites, the process was by-passed and the by-laws took little account of the demands emanating from non-dominant groups. Moreover, what seemed consensual in the mid-1990s was already problematic at the turn of the millennium. Indeed, the field of Internet governance witnessed rapid changes at the level of the actors, institutions, ideas and broader context.

Dominant actors had broadened their focus and designed new strategies for the future Internet governance. The limited issue of domain names and IP addresses was not seen by many dominant

actors as the sole problem of Internet governance any more. Issues such as access, privacy, and cyber-security were increasingly included in the strategies of dominant actors and were to a large extent outside the scope of what could be addressed by the ICANN or any other existing institution in the field. New actors reinforced the need to broaden the definition of Internet governance. Hackers and developing countries, each from its own position, advocated for a more comprehensive look at the economic and social consequences of Internet governance decisions. The context of the global political economy also pushed in favour of change. The Dotcom bubble showed that the economic and financial stakes of the governance of these new markets were very high. Billions of dollars disappeared from one day to another. Strategies oriented towards production and commerce-based growth rather than financial speculation on Internet domains seemed more reasonable, and this called for a geographical extension of the market through an increased access to the Internet. The development of the Internet became also tightly linked to security issues after the terrorist attacks of 2001. Technical regulation was not able to address geopolitical and strategic issues. The division between public and private regulation was not solved either by the creation of the ICANN (Kleinwächter, 2002). On the contrary, the hybrid character of the institution and its dependence on the US Department of Commerce raised more issues on the role of the state in Internet governance. To conclude, the concomitant factors of change in the field of Internet governance after the creation of the ICANN led to a profound crisis of the field. The fragile consensus that had been achieved over the definition of Internet governance that permitted different actors to develop their strategies was wrecked by a growing internal and external pressure for change. Internet governance evolved into a “weak field”, and it still remains to be seen if this status has been settled by the World Summit on the Information Society.

To this description, the empirical study of Internet governance as well as insights from the sociology of elites can bring two elements that enhance the dynamic aspect of the analysis: the role of elites and non-elites in the evolution of the field at the turn of the millennium. While Bourdieu focuses on dominant actors and the entry of new (powerful) actors, pressures for change came also from non-dominant actors in the field of Internet governance. First, counter-elites were able to mobilise their capital in other field to become important figures of the resistance to the power elite. An academic/civil society elite, comprising mostly of legal scholars, campaigned against the ICANN with a legal discourse on constitutionality, legitimacy and accountability. Governmental elites, and increasingly among them developing countries' representatives were able to oppose an efficient resistance to the ICANN model. Some hackers organisations also made their way into the

field and threatened the existing order. Finally, and perhaps more interestingly, non-elite actors changed the way they used the Internet. The practices of the non-elites affected the debates on the governance of the network. The “Web 2.0” might not have induced a participatory governance of the Internet but it definitely changed the way Internet governance could be exercised.



## **Chapter 7: Internet Governance in the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS): the road to the creation of a Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG)**

The World Summit on the Information Society was a large UN conference that took place between 2002 and 2005. The ITU took the lead role in the preparation of the Summit. The mandate of the summit was much broader than Internet governance. However, because of the situation of the field of Internet governance and the growing importance of the network in the global economy, the issue of Internet governance gradually became central to the Summit.

The Summit was divided into two phases. The first phase was held in Geneva in December 2003 and was prepared during several events throughout the years 2002 and 2003. As far as Internet governance is concerned, the results of the first phase were the acknowledgement of strong dissensions about Internet governance and the creation of a multi-stakeholder Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG). This chapter explores the road to the creation of the WGIG from a 'power elite vs. counter-elite' perspective and follows the development of the transnational field of Internet governance during the WSIS.

One of the main characteristics of the Summit is its multi-stakeholder nature and the participation for one of the first time in UN history of non-state actors in the WSIS<sup>174</sup>. The participation of civil society has received particular attention by the IR literature (Dany, 2012; Kleinwächter, 2008a; Mueller, 2010; Raboy & Landry, 2005). However, most of this literature focus on non-governmental organisations while the crucial role of the private sector has been less analysed. The focus of the chapter is different since it does not look at the WSIS from a statist perspective but rather from a field perspective. As we have seen in the previous chapters, the field of Internet governance involved different types of actors and governmental elites were one type of specialised elites among others. As a consequence, the inclusion of civil society (and business) actors is analysed as a continuation and generalisation of existing practices in the field of Internet governance. As Internet became the most important aspect of the field of telecommunications, practices from the sub-field of Internet governance were imposed in the field of telecommunications. The analysis of civil society participation in the WSIS is thus explored, not as an emancipatory movement from the state

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<sup>174</sup> The Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro had paved the way for the participation of non-state actors to UN summits a decade before, in 1992.

and the market, but rather as a space of struggle, following a neo-Gramscian definition of civil society (Cox, 1999; Colas 2002).

Struggles in the field of Internet governance concerned primarily the crisis of hegemony in Internet governance. The hegemonic project of a technical, semi-privatised, and multi-stakeholder governance of the Internet outside of the pre-existing institutions of telecommunication regulation became the focal point of the debates. During the analysis of this time period, around 1300 documents were considered, including agenda, statements, declarations, presentations, press releases and other documents. A search for the expression “Internet” in the documents produced around 650 results, around 130 contained the expression “Internet governance” while less than 70 contained the expression “ICANN”. The 650 documents mentioning the Internet were further analysed in the study and 150 were found to present a perspective on one of the aspects directly related to Internet governance. Critical discourse analysis was used in order to identify a number of statements within these documents (see Annex 4). These statements were then related to the discourses outlined in chapter 5 in order to analyse the evolution of these discourses. A social network analysis of these statements and their relations to individuals and institutions also helped to determine the positions of the actors and their discourses in the field of Internet governance. This analysis evidenced the existence of a power elite and a less coherent counter-elite within the field of Internet governance and a crisis of the hegemonic project of the ICANN. Finally, the issue of the definition of Internet governance is also analysed as a struggle to define the frontiers of the field of Internet governance and the questioning of the hegemony of the power elite.

The chapter first describes the WSIS and explains to what extent it was the consequence of the crisis of Internet governance. In a second section, the positions of actors and the discourses about Internet governance are analysed in order to understand the crisis of the hegemony and the rise of a counter-elite. The second phase of the Summit, and more particularly the work of the Working Group on Internet governance and its influence in the final declaration of the WSIS are explored in the following chapter.

### **7.1. *The WSIS***

While heated debates on the institutionalisation of Internet governance were taking place in the late 1990s, the ITU had been by-passed since the failure of the Memorandum of Understanding that it had supported with some elements of the future elite of Internet governance (IAHC, 1997; see

chapter 5). In 1998, the ITU was holding its plenipotentiary conference in Minneapolis, United States. During the conference, the Union decided to organise a World Summit on the Information Society that would be an opportunity to define the role of the institution in a changing context.

### **7.1.1. From the “Minneapolis deal” to the WSIS**

While the ICANN was being created in the Washington D.C region, the ITU was having its plenipotentiary conference in Minneapolis in October and November of 1998. Despite the geographical proximity and the simultaneity of the two events, the issue of Internet governance did not appear at the top of the agenda of the ITU conference. The Memorandum of Understanding that was seen a year before as the solution for an internationalised Internet governance was not even mentioned in the final declaration. The resolution 102 on the “Management of Domain Names and Internet Addresses” only invited the secretary-general of the organisation ‘to take an active part in the international discussion and initiatives of the management of domain names and internet addresses, which is being led by the private sector’ (International Telecommunication Union, 1998 resolution 102, §1). According to Kleinwächter (2004, p. 240), a 'Minneapolis deal' was struck between the US government and the ITU. In exchange of the recognition of the private sector leadership in Internet governance, the US withdrew its opposition to the organisation of a large conference on the information society. However, the deal did not settle the dispute over the respective roles of the US and the ITU in Internet governance. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the difficulties of the ICANN and the changing global context strengthened the position of the ITU in the field of Internet governance. Already in 1999, the ITU secretary-general Pekke Tarjanne accused President Clinton’s Internet adviser, Ira Magaziner, during the World Economic Forum in Davos, of hypocrisy regarding the private sector leadership and the autonomy of the ICANN from the US government (Kleinwächter, 2004, p. 240).

During the Minneapolis plenipotentiary conference, the proposal by Tunisian president Ben Ali to organise a World Summit on the Information Society focusing on the issue of development in the knowledge-based economy was endorsed by the organisation (International Telecommunication Union, 1998, resolution 73). The UN system as a whole was involved in the project with the ITU assuming the leading role (Mathiason, 2008, p. 99).

In 2001, it was decided that the Summit would be divided into two phases, in two different

locations. The Geneva phase would provide the resources for the Summit while Tunisia would be a symbolic location in the developing world to address issues of ICT for Development. The World Summit was authorised by a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA, 2002) that made no reference to Internet governance. However, during the preparatory meetings of the first phase of the WSIS, Internet governance started to appear as a key issue of the information society. The resolution also insisted on the multi-stakeholder character of the future Summit and stressed the role of international and regional institutions, civil society and the private sector.

The first phase of the WSIS was held in Geneva in December 2003 but the preparatory process started 18 months before. The preparatory process included five regional conferences and three meetings of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom). There was also an intersessional meeting between the second and the third meetings of the Preparatory Committee. The third meeting of the preparatory Committee (PrepCom 3) was itself divided into four sessions to settle the divergences before the Geneva phase of the Summit held from the 10th to the 12th of December 2003.

The second phase of the WSIS included three meeting of the Preparatory Committee, four regional conferences, two sub-regional conferences, several sessions of the three working groups (Group of Friends of the Chair, Task Force on Financial Mechanisms, and Working Group on Internet Governance). Finally, the Tunis phase of the Summit was held from the 16th to the 18th of November 2005.

	<b>Global Meetings</b>	<b>Regional Meetings</b>
<b>GENEVA PHASE</b>	<b>PrepCom 1</b> , <i>Geneva</i> , 1-5 July 2002	<b>Africa</b> , <i>Bamako</i> , 28-30 May 2002
	<b>Informal Meeting on content and themes</b> , <i>Geneva</i> , 16-18 September 2002	<b>Pan-European</b> , <i>Bucharest</i> , 7-9 November 2002
	<b>PrepCom 2</b> , <i>Geneva</i> , 17-28 February 2003	<b>Asia-Pacific</b> , <i>Tokyo</i> , 13-15 January 2003
	<b>Intersessional Meeting</b> , Paris, 15-18 July 2003	<b>Latin America and the Caribbean</b> , <i>Bavaro</i> , 29-31 January 2003
	<b>PrepCom 3</b> , <i>Geneva</i> , 15-26 September 2003	<b>Middle East</b> , <i>Beirut</i> , 4-6 February 2003
	<b>PrepCom 3A</b> , <i>Geneva</i> , 10-14 November 2003	
	<b>PrepCom 3B</b> , <i>Geneva</i> , 5-6, 9 December 2003	
<b>WSIS</b> , <i>Geneva</i> , 10-12 December 2003		

<b>TUNIS PHASE</b>	<b>PrepCom 1</b> , <i>Hammamet</i> , 24-26 June 2004	<b>Western Asia</b> , <i>Damascus</i> , 22-23 November 2004
	<b>PrepCom 2</b> , <i>Geneva</i> , 17-25 February 2005	<b>Africa</b> , Accra, 2-4 February 2005 <b>Asia-Pacific</b> , <i>Tehran</i> , 31 May – 2 June 2005
	<b>PrepCom 3</b> , <i>Geneva</i> , 19-30 September 2005; and <i>Tunis</i> , 13-15 November 2005	<b>Latin America and the Caribbean</b> , <i>Rio de Janeiro</i> , 8-10 June 2005
	<b>WSIS</b> , <i>Tunis</i> , 16-18 November 2005	

Figure 7.1. Chronology of the official meetings of the WSIS<sup>175</sup>

Consistently with the mandate set by the resolution of the UN General Assembly (56/183), the whole process was open to the participation of non-state actors. However, the multi-stakeholder approach was not followed without resistance by the ITU member states. Non-state observers were sometimes asked to leave the room and some of the early working groups consisted only of member states representatives (Kleinwächter, 2004). Overall, the participation of non-state actors was important, accounting to around 45 per cent in the Geneva Phase and to more than 60 per cent of the Tunis Phase (see Tables 7.2 and 7.3).

The first phase resulted in the publication of a Declaration of Principles and a Plan of Action while the outcomes of the second phase were the Tunis Commitment and the Tunis Agenda for the Information Society. These documents are crucial to the field of Internet governance and continue to set the terms of the debate after a decade and are continuously referred to by the actors as elements of the rules of the game in the field.

as of: 2003-12-12	Number of Participants	Number of Entities Represented
<b>States</b>	4590	175
<b>International Organizations</b>	225	50
<b>UN Bodies</b>	620	37
<b>UN Agencies</b>	347	13
<b>Non-Governmental Organizations</b>	3310	481
<b>Business</b>	514	98
<b>Guests</b>	471	
<b>Media</b>	970	631
<b>TOTAL</b>	11047	1486

Table 7.2. Participation to the Geneva Phase of the WSIS<sup>176</sup>

175 Adapted from Raboy and Landry (2005) for the Geneva phase and the official WSIS website for the Tunis phase. A number of WSIS-related conferences that took place between 2002 and 2005 outside the official process are not included in the chronology.

176 Source: [www.itu.int/ws/is/](http://www.itu.int/ws/is/), last accessed 8 April 2014.

as of 18.11.2005	Number of Participants	Number of Entities Represented
<b>TOTAL</b>	19401	
<b>States and European Community</b>	5857	174
<b>International Organizations</b>	1508	92
<b>NGOs and civil society entities</b>	6241	606
<b>Business sector entities</b>	4816	226
<b>Media</b>	979	642

Table 7.3. Participation to the Tunis Phase of the WSIS<sup>177</sup>

### 7.1.2. Internet governance in the broad WSIS agenda

As we have seen, Internet governance was only one among many issue discussed during the WSIS, it was not even intended to become such a crucial issue. As Kleinwächter (2004) recalls, the issue of Internet governance gradually made its way into the WSIS agenda. During the first event of the WSIS, the Bamako regional conference, the issue of Internet governance was not on the agenda of any of the 14 workshops. The final declaration does not make any reference to Internet governance. While the first meeting of the Preparatory Committee in Geneva was not focusing on Internet governance either, several participants raised the issue. The European Union called for:

“[...] new mechanisms for governance at global and national levels encompassing a) issues related to the sector like electronic communications regulatory frameworks, data protection, network security and cyber-security, legal aspects of e-commerce and internet governance as well as b) more general issues related to the new citizenship in the information age”<sup>178</sup>

The civil society group, representing 22 NGOs called for the democratisation of international bodies dealing with ICTs, including the ICANN and the IETF<sup>179</sup>. Countries like Brazil even went further and directly criticised the existing Internet governance system:

“Democratic and representative Governments should not be replaced by arbitrary groupings of private business and non-governmental institutions in decisions regarding the economic space brewing within powerful digital networks, such as

<sup>177</sup> Ibid.

<sup>178</sup> Reflections of the European Union, PrepCom 1, Geneva, 24 June 2002, available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

<sup>179</sup> Reflections of the Civil Society Group, PrepCom 1, Geneva, 5 July 2002, available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

the Internet. Organizing this new environment to the satisfaction of all, and ensuring the beneficial participation of developing countries and their societies is central to our work.”<sup>180</sup>

On the contrary, the Coordinating Committee of Business Interlocutors, chaired by the International Chamber of Commerce, expressed its support to existing institutions:

“Business should have a significant role in the formation of policy for technical management of the domain name system and the development of policy. Through the various Supporting Organizations of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), and in particular the Business Constituency of the Domain Name Supporting Organization (DNSO), business will continue to work to ensure continued stability and security of the Internet, as well as appropriate protection of intellectual property. [...] Governments should continue to support ICANN and its private sector leadership; support initiatives to ensure that the business community will have a sufficient voice in the technical management of the domain name system.”<sup>181</sup>

In November 2002, the pan-European meeting in Bucharest included the issue of Internet governance as a WSIS issue, more particularly the management of domain names, while not addressing the substance of the issue<sup>182</sup>. In January 2003, the Asian regional conference, held in Tokyo, added the issue of IP addresses to the Bucharest declaration<sup>183</sup>. Few days later in Bavaro, the regional conference for Latin America and the Caribbean explicitly referred to Internet governance by stating that Internet governance should be “multilateral, transparent and democratic”<sup>184</sup>. The rather consensual wording of the Bavaro Declaration was not taken up by the last regional conference, held in Beirut in February 2003:

“[...] the responsibility for root directories and domain names should rest with a suitable international organization and should take multilingualism into consideration. Countries’ top level-domain-names and Internet Protocol (IP) address assignment should be the sovereign right of countries. The sovereignty of each nation should be protected and respected. Internet governance should be multilateral, democratic and transparent and should take into account the needs of the public and private sectors as well as those of the civil society.”<sup>185</sup>

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180 Statement from Brazil, PrepCom 1, Geneva, 5 July 2002, available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

181 Input by the Coordinating Committee of Business Interlocutors (CCBI), PrepCom 1, Geneva, 5 July 2002, available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

182 Report from the Bucharest Pan-European Conference to the WSIS, 9 November 2002, available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

183 Report of the Tokyo Asia-Pacific Regional Conference for WSIS, 15 January 2003, available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

184 Report of the Bavaro Latin American and Caribbean Conference for WSIS, 29 January 2003, available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

185 Report of the Beirut Western Asia Regional Conference for WSIS, art. 2 §4, 6 February 2003, available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

The growing importance of Internet governance in the WSIS preparatory process echoed the heated discussions about Internet governance during the ITU plenipotentiary conference of Marrakesh in September-October 2002. The US and EU governments, backed by the private sector membership of the ITU were supporting the ICANN and the reform process, while a growing number of developing countries criticised the ICANN and the role of the US government in Internet governance (Kleinwächter, 2004, p. 242).

As a consequence of this controversy, the resolution 102 was modified in order to reflect the considerable critique addressed at the existing system. The references to the leadership and the key role of the private sector were replaced by the recognition of the important role of the private sector. The sovereignty of member-states over the country-code top level domains was emphasised (International Telecommunication Union, 2002, resolution 102). Moreover, a new resolution 103 also stressed the role of ITU member-states in the management of domain names and the need for an internationalised and multilingual domain name system (International Telecommunication Union, 2002, resolution 103). However, the separation of technical tasks and policy matters in the final acts of the Marrakesh plenipotentiary conference can be seen as a way to isolate the management of critical resources from the inevitable politicisation of Internet governance.

The second meeting of the Preparatory Committee in Geneva in February 2003 put Internet governance at the heart of the WSIS agenda. In July 2003, during the intersessional meeting of the Preparatory Committee in Paris, an Internet Governance Ad Hoc Working Group was created to discuss the issue. The group gathered state representatives and, apart from the first meeting, was closed to non-state participants. The group failed to reach a consensus and several possible formulations of the paragraphs on Internet governance remained at the end of the intersessional meeting. During the third meeting of the preparatory committee, discussions on Internet governance continued in the working group. The debate was heated and very polarized (Kummer, 2007). One observer reported:

“After one hour, I came back to the meeting room and confirmed what happened. What I could confirm is that there was no change of the deadlock among countries [...] I was told that the US wanted all internet governance related action items would be taken out if it could not reach any consensus. And some other countries proposed to leave those phrases as square bracketed<sup>186</sup>. But China strongly stick to

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<sup>186</sup> The common ITU procedure is to leave non-consensual text, or competing terminologies, square-bracketed until consensus has been reached.



their position that all those phrases should be discussed and concluded here and if it is postponed, developing countries should be in bad situation during the postponed term. [...] The whole impression what happened behind the curtain is that the emotional tension is much more deepening.”<sup>187</sup>

Internet governance was among the main issues that required the organisation of an unplanned session of the third preparatory committee just before the Geneva summit. According to Raboy et al. (2010), the Swiss delegation was determined not to let the Geneva summit fail and took the leadership in the final stage of the negotiations. Markus Kummer was mandated to push through a compromise. Because of the irreconcilability of the positions, Kummer quickly concluded that “the only way out was to establish a process to deal with these issues” (Kummer, 2007). In spite of the work of the Group and of the ongoing discussions about Internet governance during the last sessions of meetings of the Preparatory Committee, no agreement was reached before the Geneva phase of the Summit. Imprecise wording about Internet governance and the call for further negotiations were seen as acceptable by the diverging parties. Because the issue of Internet governance was still unresolved after the first phase of the Summit, it received an increased attention in the final documents with the creation of a specific Working Group between the two phases of the Summit. It then became a central issue of the Tunis phase.

As far as the Geneva phase is concerned, Internet governance was addressed by the two documents drafted during the preparatory process and endorsed by the Geneva conference. However, the elements that were addressing Internet governance were debated and the consensus that was found was on the further discussion of the issue in another institutional setting.

#### *Internet governance in the Declaration of principles*

Despite the difficulties met by the WSIS participants to reach a consensus on Internet governance, the issue had become central in the debates and needed to be addressed by the final documents. Many articles touched upon Internet governance. For example, the Declaration of principles addressed the issue of cyber-security and privacy (WSIS, 2003a, art. 35) even if it remains vague on the implementation of the principles. The only indication in the text was the need to reach the objectives of a global culture of cyber-security by enhancing security, data protection and privacy through international cooperation and with the support of all stakeholders and “international expert

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<sup>187</sup> Unofficial report of the debates on Internet governance by Chun Eung Hwi, General Secretary, PeaceNet, 25 September 2003, available at <http://www.wsisasia.org/chun-7-sep.25.htm>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

bodies”. Likewise, the protection of intellectual property rights, that had been so crucial in the Internet governance debates of the 1990s, was also discussed during the first phase of the Summit. While early drafts and comments by certain states and civil society called for a balance between intellectual property protection and the public interest<sup>188</sup>, the final declaration only acknowledged the role of both intellectual property and knowledge-sharing in the development of innovation and creativity without stressing the need to strike a balance between them (WSIS, 2003a, art. 42). The argument for the new formulation was brought in particular by the Coordinating Committee of Business Interlocutors: existing agreements on intellectual property protection were already reflecting a balance between the protection of property and the public interest<sup>189</sup>.

Three articles addressed directly and specifically the management of the network. They read:

“48. The Internet has evolved into a global facility available to the public and its governance should constitute a core issue of the Information Society agenda. The international management of the Internet should be multilateral, transparent and democratic, with the full involvement of governments, the private sector, civil society and international organizations. It should ensure an equitable distribution of resources, facilitate access for all and ensure a stable and secure functioning of the Internet, taking into account multilingualism.

49. The management of the Internet encompasses both technical and public policy issues and should involve all stakeholders and relevant intergovernmental and international organizations. In this respect it is recognized that:

- Policy authority for Internet-related public policy issues is the sovereign right of States. They have rights and responsibilities for international Internet-related public policy issues;
- The private sector has had and should continue to have an important role in the development of the Internet, both in the technical and economic fields;
- Civil society has also played an important role on Internet matters, especially at community level, and should continue to play such a role;
- Intergovernmental organizations have had and should continue to have a facilitating role in the coordination of Internet-related public policy issues;
- International organizations have also had and should continue to have an important role in the development of Internet-related technical standards and relevant policies.

50. International Internet governance issues should be addressed in a coordinated manner. We ask the Secretary-General of the United Nations to set up

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188 Draft declaration of principles, WSIS, Sub-Committee 2, art. 21, available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

189 CCBI comments on the Draft declaration and action plan, 14 November 2003, available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

a working group on Internet governance, in an open and inclusive process that ensures a mechanism for the full and active participation of governments, the private sector and civil society from both developing and developed countries, involving relevant intergovernmental and international organizations and forums, to investigate and make proposals for action, as appropriate, on the governance of Internet by 2005.” (WSIS, 2003a)

The three articles are the result of the long negotiations and the heated debate that characterised the discussions on Internet governance during the preparatory process. The debates on article 48 focused mainly on the description of the Internet as a *global facility*, as opposed to competing wordings such as *global public good*, as advocated for example by the Brazilian representatives, or *global resource*<sup>190</sup>. The affirmation that Internet governance should constitute a “core issue of the information society agenda” was also debated during the preparatory process. The formulation legitimated the role of the WSIS in Internet governance although some members of the power elite wanted to exclude any reference to Internet governance in the official documents<sup>191</sup>, or even that Internet governance was a misleading phrase and that only technical management of the network existed<sup>192</sup>. More importantly, divergences on the wording of article 48 existed on the qualifying elements of Internet governance. Many developing countries and some civil society organisations, as well as the ITU itself, advocated for an *intergovernmental* management of the Internet. The power elite – representatives of the private sector, of other civil society organisations and of most developed countries – wanted to exclude the ITU or any intergovernmental organisation from Internet governance. Since the idea of an intergovernmental body was a threat for the ICANN system, the final formulation used the less precise term of “multilateral”.

In order to avoid the deadlock of the divisions between supporters of an intergovernmental system and those of a multi-stakeholder system led by the private sector, article 49 introduced a separation between policy-related and technical issues and defined the role of each stakeholder according to the division. This division was a victory for the power elite – especially for the CCBI and ICANN

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190 The CCBI and WITSA representative Allen Miller stated that business had “some hesitation regarding the reference to the Internet as a global public good” and proposed the notion of “global resource”. CCBI intervention during the Intersessional meeting, 18 July 2003, available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014. The facilitation team on the draft declaration of principles took over the term “global facility” coined by the Nigerian delegation, albeit changing it from “global public facility” to “global facility”.

191 See for example the intervention by the AT&T representative Philip Wintrebert on behalf of CCBI during the WSIS in Geneva on 12 December 2003, available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

192 This statement was repeatedly made by CCBI and the International Chamber of Commerce. CCBI's final statement reads: “There has been much discussion at this summit about the issue of so-called 'internet governance'. Business believes that this term is a contradiction in terms/a flawed concept/an oxymoron”. Text available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014. The same argument was used by the Center for Global Communications (GLOCOM) of the International University of Japan, whose delegates were also members of the G8 Dot-Force (see following chapter).

delegations – over member-states delegation such as Brazil, France and New Zealand; inter-governmental delegations such as the UNESCO; and most of the civil society organisations. As we are going to see into further details in the following sections, the separation between technical/economic issues and policy issues paved the way to a division of labour between the ICANN elite and other actors. The ICANN elite could continue its “technical” management of the Internet while the role of states, civil society and intergovernmental organisations that were not already included in the existing governance system was limited to “policy” issues that did not touch upon the management of Internet core resources. Furthermore, the sovereign right of countries on their country-code top-level domain that was stressed in earlier drafts of the declaration was replaced by the statement of the obvious: “Policy authority for Internet-related public policy issues is the sovereign right of States”. While the declaration of principles addressed “the needs of both groups”, as stated by Kummer (Kummer, 2005, quoted in M. Raboy et al., 2010, 130), it did not address them on the same level. Once again, the balance found is better described by the Gramscian notion of hegemony than by the common notion of consensus (see figure 7.1.3).




Figure 7.1. The unbalanced consensus of art. 48-49 of the Geneva Declaration of Principles

*Internet governance in the Plan of Action*

The other final document of the Geneva phase of the WSIS was the Plan of Action, which aimed to translate the principles into concrete processes. General dispositions such as article 3 on the role of the different stakeholders are relevant for Internet governance issues. The concept of multistakeholderism that appeared in the field during the 1990s was taken over by the WSIS and the respective roles of governments, private sector, civil society and international and regional institutions was recalled (WSIS, 2003b, art. 3). The global culture of cyber-security mentioned by the declaration of principles was translated into an encouragement to contribute actively to the United Nations activities in the field (WSIS, 2003b, art. 12, § f and j), more precise and ambitious formulation were not included in the final plan of action<sup>193</sup>. The “enabling environment” section, which contains the principles of Internet governance in the declaration of principles, outlines several important initiatives for the management of the network:

“a. Governments should foster a supportive, transparent, pro-competitive and predictable policy, legal and regulatory framework, which provides the appropriate incentives to investment and community development in the Information Society.

b. We ask the Secretary General of the United Nations to set up a working group on Internet governance, in an open and inclusive process that ensures a mechanism for the full and active participation of governments, the private sector and civil society from both developing and developed countries, involving relevant intergovernmental and international organizations and forums, to investigate and make proposals for action, as appropriate, on the governance of Internet by 2005. The group should, inter alia:

*i.* develop a working definition of Internet governance;

*ii.* identify the public policy issues that are relevant to Internet governance;

*iii.* develop a common understanding of the respective roles and responsibilities of governments, existing intergovernmental and international organisations and other forums as well as the private sector and civil society from both developing and developed countries;

*iv.* prepare a report on the results of this activity to be presented for consideration and appropriate action for the second phase of WSIS in Tunis in 2005.

c. Governments are invited to:

*i.* facilitate the establishment of national and regional Internet Exchange Centres;

*ii.* manage or supervise, as appropriate, their respective country code top-

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<sup>193</sup> The Chinese delegation proposed for example to include concrete measures: “Measures should be taken to actively and effectively prevent the use of information technologies and resources for pornographic, violent and terrorist purposes as well as for criminal activities endangering national security so as to ensure the healthy development of information and networks”, Statement by Wang XuDong, Minister of Information Industry, People’s Republic of China, 10 December 2003, text available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

level domain name (ccTLD);

*iii.* promote awareness of the Internet.

d. In cooperation with the relevant stakeholders, promote regional root servers and the use of internationalized domain names in order to overcome barriers to access.

e. Governments should continue to update their domestic consumer protection laws to respond to the new requirements of the Information Society.

f. Promote effective participation by developing countries and countries with economies in transition in international ICT forums and create opportunities for exchange of experience. [...]

i. Governments and stakeholders should actively promote user education and awareness about online privacy and the means of protecting privacy.

j. Invite stakeholders to ensure that practices designed to facilitate electronic commerce also permit consumers to have a choice as to whether or not to use electronic communication. [...]

l. Governments, in collaboration with stakeholders, are encouraged to formulate conducive ICT policies that foster entrepreneurship, innovation and investment, and with particular reference to the promotion of participation by women. [...]" (WSIS, 2003b)

The general tone of the plan of action illustrated the neoliberal discourse that prevailed in the field of Internet governance, even if the elements of global public good discourses were more present than in the 1990s (see section 7.2). The articles presented a number of requirements to the governments in order to establish an enabling environment for the information society. It can be noted that if non-state actors were invited in the negotiations of the WSIS declaration, their role was not defined in the plan of action.

The mandate of the Working Group on Internet Governance was described in §b. It is interesting to note that the mandate is limited beforehand to the definition of policy issues related to the Internet and leaves the technical and economic parts out. References to the internationalisation of the management of the Internet that were supported by many countries including the European Union and Australia were left outside the plan of action<sup>194</sup>. Spam and other concrete Internet-related issues were also deleted from the Plan of Action. As a result, the Plan of Action did not include concrete Internet governance actions except for the creation of the WGIG. The promotion of a competitive environment and initiatives to raise awareness or to enhance knowledge were only incentives to let

<sup>194</sup> An earlier draft version of the plan of action included a paragraph stating: "governments should work to internationalize the management of Internet resources in order to achieve a universally representative solution". See Draft Plan of Action, 21 September 2003, art. 19 §f, available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

the market and the private sector manage the Internet, both nationally and globally, with a minimalist role for the state and intergovernmental organisations. Users were only referred to as consumers, which is consistent with the view of the Internet as a marketplace. Moreover, the references to the participations of stakeholders seem more directed towards the private sector than towards civil society organisations.

Despite the relatively harmless character of the Geneva documents for the power elite of Internet governance, these documents are the more intergovernmentalist documents to date in the field of Internet governance. While the notion of global public good was removed from the text, references to the role of the state and of intergovernmental organisations were still present. As we are going to see in the following chapter, the Geneva documents are more challenging to the power elite than the Tunis Declaration. It thus comes as no surprise that they have been referred to by counter-elites as a breach in the dominant model of Internet governance, notably during the World Congress on International Telecommunications in 2012. The Preparatory process of the Geneva phase of the WSIS remains the most turbulent period of the crisis of the field. The final documents that sanctioned the separation of technical and policy issue and institutionalised the policy debate with the creation of the Working Group on Internet Governance can be seen as the beginning of a settlement of the crisis and stabilisation of the positions.

### **7.1.3. The crisis of Internet governance in the WSIS**

The discussions about Internet governance during the WSIS were a direct consequence of the crisis of the existing institutions of the field of Internet governance and the pressing need for new forums. The WSIS became a *locus* of politicisation of Internet governance and redefined the frontiers of the field. The hegemonic discourse of Internet governance and the hegemony of the power elite were at stake during the debates. The ICANN had been created along the lines of Internet exceptionalism, multistakeholderism and technical regulation but these principles were debated during the first phase of the WSIS.

First, the idea of Internet exceptionalism had been instrumental to by-pass existing institutions and particularly the ITU. As the Internet was considered a new cyberspace rather than a development of existing telecommunication networks, the field gained its autonomy and could invent new rules of procedures. However, the idea of Internet exceptionalism was not shared by all participants to the WSIS. From the documents analysed in this study, only two refer to the fundamental differences

between the Internet and the “old” telecommunication system. The German delegation explained its support to the existing system by making a reference to the unique nature of the Internet:

“The organisational structures required for the management of the internet need to take account of the special features of this medium and to be able to respond rapidly to changing user expectations.”<sup>195</sup>

The Coordination Committee of Business Interlocutors stayed closer to the type of argumentation that existed in the 1990s and insisted on the fact that the technology required a new type of governance:

“The packet-switched Internet is fundamentally different from traditional circuit-switched telecommunications networks, and the old settlements The old settlement model does not adapt well to the value based Internet market place to promote infrastructure development and innovation.”<sup>196</sup>

Despite these two examples, the support to the ICANN and the existing system was generally explained by the success of the existing management rather than the unique and novel nature of cyberspace. The type of argument used was similar to the “If it ain't broken don't fix it” approach that was popular among technologists in the 1990s. For instance, the Internet Society spoke highly of the ICANN system:

“The unprecedented growth and innovation that we have seen in the Internet sector is due in large part to the lack of regulation and constraints on technology development. In addition, the processes employed have been open, democratic and inclusive and it's hard to see how these could be improved by a new intergovernmental body.”<sup>197</sup>

This type of argumentation could be found in many interventions by dominant actors. Instead of simply stating that the Internet could not be regulated by an intergovernmental organisation, supporters of the ICANN usually insisted on the possibility of reform and improvement of the corporation.

On the contrary, critics of the ICANN often strongly rejected the idea of Internet exceptionalism. The UNESCO delegate stated for example that:

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195 Intervention of the representative of the German government during the WSIS, 11 December 2003, available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

196 CCBI comments on the revised Draft declaration of principles, 27 October 2003, available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

197 ISOC Comments on Draft principles and action plan, 31 May 2003, available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.



“There is no need to proclaim new rights or to lay down new rules. Similarly, rather than seeking to harmonize legal cultures and systems which differ from State to State as far as concepts of rights and freedoms, their scope and hierarchical organization are concerned, it is preferable to develop ways of making those rights and freedoms effective in cyberspace.”<sup>198</sup>

This kind of rejection of Internet exceptionalism did not exist in the debates of the 1990s. For many participants, including representatives of developing countries and civil society organisations, the Internet could be treated like a mere medium through which information was exchanged. The Internet was thus not an entirely new space for social relations that required new rules, but rather a new technology that needed to be regulated according to existing social realities. This decline of Internet exceptionalism can be explained by some of the factors of change outlined in the previous chapter. The burst of the Dotcom bubble and the war on terror that permeated the cyberspace at the turn of the millennium evidenced the embeddedness of the Internet in existing social and political relations. The Internet was no exception to the financialisation of the economy or the unilateralism of the dominant state in the international system. Against this background, the claim that the Internet constituted a new space free of old rules and divisions was less convincing than in the 1990s. The nature of the forum also changed, and the optimism and technological-determinism that was shared by the private sector, the technological and scientific elite and the US administration in the 1990s was not dominant in an intergovernmental forum full of delegation from developing countries. Finally, the idea of Internet exceptionalism was less needed by the elite since the ICANN system had already been created outside of the traditional forums. There was no need to make the case for a novel governance system. The important point was to make this system acceptable to non-elite actors.

As a result, Internet exceptionalism was not a consensual idea in the WSIS<sup>199</sup>. The attempt by some actors like the Coordination Committee of the Business Interlocutors to exclude Internet governance from WSIS debates on this ground was a failure. However, the decline of Internet exceptionalism was not translated into a critique of the whole *doxa* of the field. The exclusion of the ITU from Internet governance was already deeply integrated in the field. Likewise, other basic principles such as the idea of multistakeholder governance and the focus on technical regulation resisted opposition and remained crucial in the field of Internet governance after the WSIS.

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198 Contribution by the UNECO, PrepCom 1, Geneva, 5 July 2002, available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

199 This argument is specially true for the first phase of the WSIS. Internet exceptionalism re-appeared in the WGIG.

The multistakeholder setting of the WSIS was certainly influenced by the experiments in Internet governance. Multistakeholderism was probably the central principle around which the field of Internet governance had emerged. In a context of growing non-state participation in the UN summits since the 1992 Rio summit, the WSIS was in itself a multistakeholder event. It thus comes as no surprise that multistakeholderism was embraced by many participants to the WSIS.

Different actors recalled their support to the participation of all stakeholders in the creation of the information society. State delegations from the developed North as well as developing and emerging countries insisted on the inclusion of the different stakeholders. The President of the Swiss Confederation, Pascal Couchepin<sup>200</sup>, and the Chinese Minister of Information industry<sup>201</sup> alike stressed the need to enhance cooperation between governments, intergovernmental organisations, the private sector and civil society in the building of the information society. The private sector, through the CCBI as well as the European Telecommunication Network Operators' Association (ETNO) stressed the need to take the interests of the different stakeholder into account. The representatives of civil society organisations also voiced their support to the multistakeholder model of governance. For example, Wolfgang Kleinwächter, speaking on behalf of the civil society Internet Governance Caucus (IGC), stated:

“Governance issues related to the Internet, primarily the technical coordination of internet identifiers, protocols and root servers, is a complex challenge which needs a complex reaction and has to include all stakeholders – civil society, private industry and governments. No single body and no single stakeholder group is able to manage these challenges alone.”<sup>202</sup>

Support to the multistakeholder nature of the governance of the information society, and particularly of the Internet, was one of the most frequent statement made by the participants, occurring 64 times in the 150 WSIS documents addressing Internet governance.

The general support to multistakeholderism was however not always a support to the existing multistakeholder ICANN system. The Cuban delegation insisted on the fact that:

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200 Address by Pascal Couchepin to the WSIS, Geneva, 12 December 2003, available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

201 Statement by Wang XuDong, Minister of Information Industry, People's Republic of China, 10 December 2003, text available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

202 Statement of Wolfgang Kleinwächter on behalf of the Internet Governance Caucus at the Intersessional Meeting of the Preparatory Committee in Paris, 16 July 2003, available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014. Kleinwächter was one of the legal scholars that were critical of the ICANN in the early 2000s (see chapter 6).

“Internet should not remain in the hands of the main owners of transnational capitals: it is imperative to create a democratic intergovernmental institution which regulates it and promotes international cooperation and the transfer of financial resources and technology.”<sup>203</sup>

The undemocratic and non-inclusive nature of the ICANN system was criticised by many participants from developing countries and civil society organisations. However, the critique was usually not addressed at the idea of multistakeholderism itself but rather at the capture of the ICANN by particular interests<sup>204</sup>. As a result, the critiques of the ICANN system were directed at the lack of stakeholders' representation rather than at the idea of multistakeholderism. For example, the co-coordinator of the Civil Society Internet Governance Caucus regretted that the participation of individual users had diminished with the reform of the ICANN because it undermined the necessary multistakeholder nature of Internet governance<sup>205</sup>.

Rather than an opposition between multistakeholderism and another principle such as intergovernmentalism, the differences between supporters and critics of the existing system related to the definition of multistakeholderism and the specific role of the different stakeholders in this kind of settings. While for some, the idea of multistakeholderism justified the leadership of the private sector and the limited role of states and intergovernmental organisations, for others it referred to the inclusion of non-state actors in processes dominated by states. The Brazilian delegation offered an example of such a perspective on multistakeholderism by stating:

“The plan of action [...] should emphasize the state's key role in the formulation and implementation of ICT-related policies, in partnership with international organizations, the private sector and civil society.”<sup>206</sup>

This view, also supported by organisations like the UNESCO and countries like the Russian Federation, made its way into an early draft of the declaration of principles. During the second meeting of the Preparatory Committee in February 2003, the WSIS secretariat and the Working Group of the Committee on Content and Themes took over the idea from the Western Asian

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203 Statement by H.E. Mr. Ricardo Alarcón de Quesada, President of the National Assembly of People's Power of the Republic of Cuba in the WSIS, Geneva, 11 December 2003, available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

204 See for example the statement by the Latin American and Caribbean Caucus at the WSIS in Geneva, 10 December 2003, available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/>, last accessed 8 January 2013.

205 Statement by YJ Park, co-coordinator of the civil society Internet Governance Caucus during the Intersessional meeting of the Preparatory Committee, Paris, 18 July 2003, available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

206 Brazilian comments on the draft Plan of Action, 31 May 2003, available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

regional conference that governments were the primary actors in the pursuit of issues like access for all<sup>207</sup>. This idea was included in the section on “enabling environment” but was suppressed in the final declaration.

As we can see from the networked visualisation of the concepts used by the participants in the following section (see figure 7.5), multistakeholderism was reinforced by the first phase of the WSIS despite its criticised results in the context of the ICANN. In spite of the competing perspectives that existed, the idea that the information society needed to be regulated with the participation of all stakeholders had become essential to the field of Internet governance and was permeating the broader field of telecommunication governance.

Another essential principle that prevailed during the debates of the 1990s and that defined the field of Internet governance was the idea of a purely technical regulation. However, the very idea of a UN summit on the information society seriously threatened the idea of a purely technical management of ICTs and the Internet. The global context had changed since the 1990s and the socio-economic and political issues associated with the governance of the Internet had become more salient. The most political body of the ICANN, the Governmental Advisory Committee, had acquired a new status in the corporation and the digital divide was at the centre of the preoccupations that led to the organisation of the summit. Unsurprisingly, many delegations recalled the need to include non-technical issues in the final documents. The civil society representatives demanded in the second meeting of the preparatory committee that the social and political consequences of technical standards be included in the discussions about Internet governance<sup>208</sup>. The claim was an important input of the civil society organisations throughout the preparatory process<sup>209</sup>. Again, the UNESCO and “emerging” countries like Brazil and India advocated for an inclusion of the broader social consequences of the governance of the information society<sup>210</sup>. Some developed countries like France and New Zealand also showed support to this broad agenda<sup>211</sup>.

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207 See the Beirut Declaration and the two draft declarations of principles published during the second meeting of the preparatory committee, available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

208 Declaración de la Sociedad Civil a la PrepCom 2, Geneva, 6 December 2002, available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

209 See for example the Youth Caucus Input, Geneva, 6 December 2002, available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

210 See the Brazilian contribution to the PrepCom 1 and the comments to the draft declaration of principles; or the address by the Indian representative at the WSIS on 11 December 2002. All documents are available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

211 See the address by Jean-Pierre Raffarin, French Prime Minister to the WSIS, 10 December 2003, available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

Although some participants denied the need to discuss Internet governance and claimed that a technical management was sufficient (see previous section), the majority of the contributions acknowledged the importance of socio-economic and political consequences. However, the discussions around the articles about Internet governance in the declaration resulted in a separation of technical issues and policy issues. While Internet governance narrowly defined was part of the “enabling environment” of the information society, policies were treated in specific sections including “e-health” or “e-business”. Public policy issues were treated as a relevant theme for the WSIS and further dialogue whereas the technical management was left to the private sector. The mandate of the Working Group on Internet Governance was primarily to identify these public policy issues related to the Internet. The consequences of the separation between political and technical issues will be further discussed in the following sections but it can be noted that it avoided a politicisation of the technical management of the Internet, which would have been a direct threat to the existence of the ICANN. The separation of technical and policy issues was continuously advocated by the representative of the Coordination Committee of the Business Interests and the International Chamber of Commerce. ICANN's CEO Paul Twomey reminded the limited technical role of the ICANN<sup>212</sup>. The separation was made clear by the intervention of the Italian delegation on behalf of the European Union:

“On the Internet Governance the European Union has a clear position. Governments must be involved when public policy issues are at stake, but it is not the role of governments to manage the Internet or to interfere in its free development.”<sup>213</sup>

The separation of technical and policy issues became a strong element of the struggle between the orthodoxy of the power elite and the heterodoxy of the counter-elites. Despite some heated debates, the separation was confirmed by the final declaration and the *doxa* of the 1990s prevailed. The creation of a Working Group on Internet Governance displaced and institutionalised the debate. This is why the WGIG is given special attention in the next chapter, as it became the *locus* of the reconfiguration of the elite.

The first phase of the WSIS addressed directly the issues raised by the crisis of the field of Internet governance. The participation of a number of new actors evidences the evolution of the field

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212 Speech by Paul Twomey, President and CEO of the ICANN during the WSIS, Geneva, 11 December 2003. Text available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

213 Intervention of Lucio Stance, Italian Minister for Innovation and Technologies, on behalf of the European Union, Geneva, 10 December 2003, available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

described in the previous chapter. The actors and stakes of the field had changed since the end of the 1990s. Issues of internationalisation, access, development and human rights appeared. Intergovernmental organisation such as the UNESCO became involved, large organisation representing business interests replaced the individual specialised firms of the 1990s. Governments worldwide participated in the debates around the definition of Internet governance. From a relatively autonomous sub-field of telecommunication regulation, Internet governance had become a major field of international politics with increased stakes and an important number of actors and institutions involved. Hence, the redefinition of the boundaries of the field through the struggle of the power elite and the counter-elites can be analysed during this event. The next section will explore the relationship between the discourses that had existed since the 1990s, the actors participating to the WSIS, and the hegemonic discourse of the power elite.

## ***7.2. Internet governance debates during the first phase of the WSIS***

While the deadlock of Internet governance debates was resolved with the final documents of the Geneva phase, it is interesting to analyse into more details the actors and the discourses that were struggling for the definition of the frontiers of the field. The debates of the 1990s triggered the emergence of a power elite around a shared discourse. However, the changes in the field during the first years of existence of the ICANN modified the situation. During the first phase of the WSIS, the participants were large institutions rather than individuals like in the 1990s. The neoliberal discourse that had prevailed in the 1990s by co-opting some elements of the cyber-libertarian discourse and the global public good discourse was criticised by many participants. In order to investigate the persistence of the power elite in the field of Internet governance, this section analyses the discourse that had been identified in the debates of the 1990s and explores the networks of actors in the first phase of the WSIS. The more individual analysis of elite actors will take place in the following chapter focusing on the second phase of the WSIS,

### **7.2.1. The evolving position of discourses within the field of Internet governance**

During the debates of the 1990s, five discourses offered competing visions on Internet governance. The neoliberal discourse was able to prevail, but it was adapted to the field by including some elements of the cyber-libertarian and global public good discourses. In chapter 5, these discourses were labelled as “dominant” discourses since they were present in the official documents that

discussed the future governance system for the global network. Two other discourses were marginal and only existed in the comments to the official documents. This section analyses the occurrences of these discourses during the first phase of the summit in order to analyse whether the positions of these discourses in the field had changed.

### *Neoliberal discourse*

The neoliberal discourse was still very present during the WSIS. Three elements best illustrate the importance of the neoliberal discourse.

First, the leadership of the private sector in the management of the network was presented as an essential feature of Internet governance by many participants. Diverse participants from the Council of Europe to the NGO Consumers International along with countries like the US and Sweden and obviously with the support of the Coordination Committee of Business Interlocutors advocated for self-regulation and market-based mechanisms to regulate the information society in general and the Internet in particular. As a result, these delegations were supportive of the ICANN because “private leadership [had] proven its worth”, “especially in the technical coordination of the Internet”<sup>214</sup>. The main argument for market-based regulation were the flexibility of this type of governance in a rapidly-changing sector and the promotion of innovation<sup>215</sup>. The ICANN was in this view the best solution for the management of the Internet:

“The United States believes that Internet infrastructure and services should be market-driven and that Internet interconnection agreements should *continue* to be negotiated on a private, commercial basis.”<sup>216</sup>

Second, the need for a pro-competitive regulation as a way to foster innovation and growth was another fundamental element of the neoliberal discourse. The ITU had been a promoter of privatisation, liberalisation and deregulation since its neoliberal turn in the early 1990s (see chapter 4), the notion of a pro-competitive environment as a necessary element for the development of the information society was thus not surprising in an ITU context. The support of institutions like the

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214 Address by the Swedish delegation to the WSIS, Geneva, 11 December 2003, available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

215 “This position is based upon the necessity to ensure a flexible and deliberative process that can work with and respond to the rapid development and evolution of the Internet in all parts of the world”, CCBI comments on the draft declaration of principles and plan of action, 27 October 2003, available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

216 US comments on the draft declaration and action plan, 30 May 2003, available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014. Emphasis by the author.

OECD and CCBI, and countries like the United States and Australia, to the liberalisation of telecommunication was consistent with the agendas put forward by these actors in the 1990s. The pro-competitive argument had also been taken over by the UN ICT TaskForce with a wording that was very similar:

“The Summit should address ways of putting in place a regulatory environment that will encourage competition and build incentives for the private sector to deliver services more effectively to address the financial, technical and social barriers, especially in developing and least developed countries.”<sup>217</sup>

The Internet Society also expressed its support to pro-competitive regulation. The Internet Society was at the heart of the power elite of Internet governance and had adopted a neoliberal discourse around the time of the creation of the ICANN, departing from an originally cyber-libertarian discourse:

“Government policies should foster competition in telecommunication services, Internet service provision, Internet-related software, and e-commerce applications.”<sup>218</sup>

Even if the liberalisation of the telecommunication sector was already at the agenda of several forums, including the World Trade Organisation, the first phase of the WSIS was seen by several actors as another opportunity to re-affirm the need for governments to adopt pro-competitive policies. The final documents of the Geneva phase insist on the need for a pro-competitive environment: no less than 5 articles of the declaration and 3 articles of the plan of action include references to competition.

Third, the debate around the protection of intellectual property rights evidenced the strength of the neoliberal discourse. Although a critique of intellectual property rights existed during the WSIS (see next paragraph), the support to existing intellectual property protection mechanisms prevailed. As we have seen, the need to balance between the public interest and the protection of intellectual property rights was replaced by a positive appraisal of the ability of existing mechanisms to preserve the public interest. Once again, this was a victory for the neoliberal discourse and a continuation of the arrangements of the 1990s.

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217 Contribution of the United Nations Information and Communication Technologies TaskForce to the WSIS preparatory process, 06 February 2003, available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

218 ISOC Comments on the WSIS draft declaration and plan of action, 31 May 2003, available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.



The dominant position that the neoliberal discourse had acquired in the debates that led to the creation of the ICANN was certainly maintained during the WSIS. However, it is important to note that the neoliberal discourse in the field of Internet governance had evolved since the 1990s. The focus on security had given the state a more important role. This hints towards an evolution of the neoliberal discourse away from cyber-libertarianism. While the general balance and hierarchy between the different discourses had changed, this was not at the expense of the neoliberal discourse. The neoliberal discourse, through the notions of private-sector leadership, market-based regulation, pro-competitive environment and protection of intellectual property was deeply influential in the Geneva declaration of principles and plan of action.

### *Cyber-libertarian discourse*

The change in the position of the cyber-libertarian discourse from the 1990s to the WSIS is impressive. While most of the documents and many of the comments of the 1990s referred to cyber-libertarian arguments, the discourse was almost absent from the first phase of the WSIS. As we have seen, the idea of Internet exceptionalism had lost momentum. Several factors can explain the fading away of cyber-libertarianism in Internet governance. First, the institutional framework of the debates was completely different during the WSIS. The fact that the summit was taking place in Europe, far away from the Silicon Valley undermined the position of the cyber-libertarian discourse. The UN setting, the procedures and norms of the conference favoured more institutional approaches and were not the perfect place for “hands-off the Internet” type of arguments. The nature of participants was also different from the debates of the 1990s. Internet entrepreneurs, early enthusiasts and promoters of the discourse were not participating to the WSIS. On the contrary, states representatives and employees of intergovernmental organisations accounted to more than half of the participants to the WSIS in Geneva.

The disappearance of the cyber-libertarian discourse can be nuanced in three ways. First, while a UN summit was not the most favourable place for cyber-libertarians, other Internet governance forums welcomed the supporters of the discourse. More technical bodies such as the IETF or the W3C still witnessed cyber-libertarian discourses. For example, an IETF mailing list exchange between Vint Cerf and Franck Martin about the WSIS proposed that the “broad” Internet governance issues be treated by the Internet Society, as representative body of the Internet

community, rather than intergovernmental forums<sup>219</sup>. Second, some of the ideas advocated by the cyber-libertarian discourse had already been accepted by the *doxa* of the field. As we have seen, Internet exceptionalism was not very successful during the WSIS but it remained one of the basic principle of the field and influenced the WSIS. Finally, some elements of the cyber-libertarian discourse could still be heard during the WSIS.

Lawrence Lessig, a member of the Berkman Centre of Harvard University was invited during the WSIS preparatory process as an information society visionary. Lessig represented the academic counter-elite that was criticising the ICANN, and a certain vision of cyber-libertarianism. The cyber-libertarian discourse had been unclear on the issue of intellectual property rights. While a fringe of the cyber-libertarian were supporters of the intellectual property rights in cyberspace as an extension of the material property rights, another fringe was very critical of the idea of intellectual property rights. The first fringe was more compatible with the neoliberal discourse and became involved in the ICANN<sup>220</sup>. The second one was rather critical of the direction taken by Internet governance. Lessig gave a speech at the WSIS on intellectual property rights and the information society:

“There is no doubt that we will have an Information Society. The only question is whether that Information Society will be free or feudal. A free society does not mean that there is no property. It does not mean that there are no markets. Freedom is obviously built in a place where property and markets coexist with the free exchange of ideas and a free exchange of culture.”<sup>221</sup>

The vision of new social relations brought about by the Internet is reminiscent of the discourses that had existed in the 1990s. Other participants, like the Linux society, proposed a similar perspective. However, these elements of cyber-libertarianism remained isolated and did not offer a comprehensive vision of Internet governance like it existed in the 1990s. The lack of participation of hackers at the WSIS contrasted with the critical, yet influential position they had acquired in the ICANN system. As a result, no typical element of cyber-libertarianism appeared in the final documents of the Geneva phase of the summit.

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219 Exchange between Franck Martin and Vint Cerf, Internet Engineering TaskForce Discussion, 8-9 December 2003, available at <https://www.ietf.org/ibin/c5i?mid=6&rid=49&gid=0&k1=933&k2=17951&tid=1358158990>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

220 Esther Dyson became the founding chairman of the ICANN after having published several cyber-libertarian manifestos in the previous years (see chapter 5).

221 “An Information Society: Free or Feudal”, address by Lawrence Lessig, 20 February 2003, available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

The position of the Global Public Good discourse in the field of Internet governance had evolved throughout the 1990s. While it was weakened by the by-passing of the ITU in the creation of the ICANN, some elements on the international nature of the Internet had remained. In a context of US unilateralism and because of the lack of internationalisation of the ICANN, part of the critique of the existing system was inspired by a global public good discourse. This became even more the case as the WSIS focused on development. Information and Communication Technologies, and above all the Internet, were treated as a way to promote economic and social development. The UNDP book on Global Public Goods (Kaul *et al.*, 1999) was part of the proposed bibliography of the WSIS<sup>222</sup>. However, direct references to the notion of global public goods were scarce.

As we have seen, the conceptualisation of Internet as a public good that was proposed by some developing countries and civil society actors was replaced by the notion of global facility. The public character of the Internet was not recognised in the final documents.

Similarly to the debates of the 1990s, the discourse on global public good remained limited to a minimalist definition and focused on the internationalisation of Internet governance (i.e. the “global” aspect) rather than on the public interest. The concern on the lack of internationalisation of Internet governance was broadly shared. Statements in this sense were voiced by countries such as Australia and Iran, the private sector, civil society organisations like the newly-created “Group for the Internationalisation of Cyberspace”<sup>223</sup> and even an ICANN representative<sup>224</sup>. The final declaration and plan of action recalled the need for a “multilateral” and “international” regulation of the Internet without taking position on the possibly intergovernmental or public nature of it.

For some (but by no means all) of its supporters, the internationalisation of Internet governance implied the intergovernmental regulation of the Internet. As we have seen, developing countries like Venezuela, China, Ethiopia, South Korea and Brazil and the countries represented in the League of Arab States were advocating for an intergovernmental Internet governance. The lack of consensus

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222 See WSIS bibliography, available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/bibliography.html>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

223 The Group for the Internationalisation of Cyberspace was created in Quito in 2001 by computer lawyers from South America. See <http://www.alfa-redi.org/gic>, last accessed through the Internet Archive, 8 April 2014.

224 Amadeu Abril i Abril, member of ICANN board of directors acknowledge that the U.S-centric “localisation” of the ICANN was a point that required improvement, presentation during the round-table of PrepCom 2, 19 February 2003, available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

between these countries and the Northern countries almost led to the failure of the summit (Kleinwächter, 2004; Kummer, 2007).

Despite the favourable context of the WSIS and the support of many developing countries, the Global Public Good discourse remained at the margins of the WSIS. Because of the strong demands made by some delegations on issues related to Internet governance, the door was not completely closed to intergovernmental (public) regulation of some policy-related Internet governance issues. The creation of the Working Group on Internet Governance was the guarantee for this type of discourse to continue to influence the debates.

### *Sovereignist/developmentalist discourse*

While the sovereignist discourse had been marginal in the 1990s and centred around US nationalism, the situation changed in the 2000s. The United States were not in a position any more to bluntly refuse internationalisation. On the other hand, developing countries used a sovereignist/developmentalist discourse to advocate for a funding of infrastructure by rich countries and to demand a democratic “one state, one vote” regulation of the Internet. Discourses on territory, borders, government, sovereignty and national security had appeared in the field of Internet governance, especially since the terrorist attacks on the United States (see chapter 6).

China offered an example of a discourse focusing on national security:

“Measures should be taken to actively and effectively prevent the use of information technologies and resources for pornographic, violent and terrorist purposes as well as for criminal activities endangering national security so as to ensure the healthy development of information and networks.”<sup>225</sup>

The link between ICTs and international stability and security had been already put forward by the Bishkek-Moscow conference early in the preparatory process<sup>226</sup>. While the debate in the 1990s was mainly framed in economic terms, the WSIS debate included an important discussion on security issues, and on the role of governments in this area.

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225 Statement by Wang XuDong, Minister of Information Industry, People's Republic of China, 10 December 2003, text available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

226 Final declaration of the Bishkek-Moscow Conference, 24 October 2002, available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

The importance of sovereignty was illustrated by the importance of the debate on the idea of governmental sovereignty over the country-code top-level domains (CC-tlds). As we have seen (see chapter 4), the authority on country-code top-level domains like “.ch” or “.dk” had been given by the Internet Authority for Names and Numbers (i.e. Jon Postel) to whoever claimed it first, and subsequently to whoever claimed it on the basis of some imprecise criteria. As a result, many CC-tlds were managed by university departments or private organisations. With the growing importance of Internet domain names, the authority on such domains became important for governments. They had been trying to gain back authority over the CC-tlds within the Governmental Advisory Committee of the ICANN. The issue was not resolved before the WSIS, and the summit became a forum for the claim of authority over CC-tlds. The issue was raised by Western Asian countries and was repeatedly addressed by Saudi Arabia. As van Arx and Hagen summarize the issue:

“US. control over the DNS may itself be used as a US. strategic military advantage as opposed to the target of a threat. For example, the US. could have decided not to create a country code for Palestine in view of its apparent support of Israel’s interests against Palestinian aspirations for sovereignty. Or it could decide to extend the UN. embargo against Iraq into cyberspace by deleting the Iraq .iq ccTLD. The more integrated the DNS becomes with “real-world” services, the more control over such services is ceded to whoever controls the DNS. Of course, if the DNS is vital to the national security of the United States, then parity of reasoning suggests that it is vital to every other country as well. Therefore, the national security arguments that the United States military and governmental officials have advanced favouring US. control over the DNS apply equally well to the interests of other nations. To the extent that the control over the root may be a national security concern to the US., it is also a concern to every other country with regard, at the very least, to its ccTLD.”(Van Arx & Hagen, 2002)

The failure of these countries to include the sovereignty over CC-tlds in the final declaration evidences the non-dominant character of the sovereingist/developmentalist discourse, but the time and energy spent on this debate also illustrate the importance of the discourse.

The claim for intergovernmental Internet governance, which emerged in the WSIS debate and which is characteristic of contemporary Internet governance debates; is more rooted in a sovereingist discourse than in a Global Public Good discourse. Critiques were aimed at the lack of influence of some countries in the system rather than at the basic principles of the system. Therefore, the sovereingist discourse that was completely marginal in the 1990s became central in the 2000s. Together with the fading away of the cyber-libertarian discourse, this change represent

the major discursive change of the WSIS. Since the first phase of the WSIS, the sovereigntist/developmentalist discourse has become an important counter-hegemonic discourse used by a counter-elite to challenge the power of the elite (see figure 7.4 and chapter 9).

### *Anti-marketisation discourse and the right to communicate*

The anti-marketisation discourse was marginal in the 1990s. Despite the shortcomings of the ICANN system, the evolution of the network as a booming economic sector made the non-commercial roots of the Internet less relevant to the debates. While the UN Commission on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) recalled the lack of evidence regarding the claim that competition explained growth in the use of ICTs<sup>227</sup>, the Cuban delegation took over the argument to state that:

“competition is only one out of many ways to drive down prices and to ensure the ongoing modernisation of networks and services. In several cases, an active involvement of governments through public investments and programmes of development, it is of strategic importance. Furthermore, international co-operation will be necessary to assist developing countries facing special difficulties in the fulfilment of this objective.”<sup>228</sup>

As we have seen, only the Cuban delegation criticised the relationship between Internet governance and the owners of transnational capital. The critique of the existing system was generally based on the lack of participation of developing countries and Internet users rather than on the ideological premises of the system<sup>229</sup>.

However, some countries and several civil society organisations advocated for an information society based on the human right to communicate rather than on economic development. This claim was compatible with the anti-marketisation view of Internet governance in the 1990s but stemmed from older debates in telecommunication policy. The campaign for the right to communicate represented the most powerful alternative to the dominant discourse in the WSIS. Based on the ideas of the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) and the work of the

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227 “Information and Communication Technology Development Indices”, UNCTAD, Geneva, January 2003, available at <http://www.itu.int/wsisis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014. The UNCTAD argument is based on (Kiiski and Pohjola, 2001).

228 Statement by H.E. Mr. Ricardo Alarcón de Quesada, President of the National Assembly of People’s Power of the Republic of Cuba in the WSIS, Geneva, 11 December 2003, available at <http://www.itu.int/wsisis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

229 Statement by YJ Park, co-coordinator of the civil society Internet Governance Caucus during the Intersessional meeting of the Preparatory Committee, Paris, 18 July 2003; Venezuelan proposal of topics for the WSIS, 3 December 2002; both texts available at <http://www.itu.int/wsisis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

McBride Commission (see chapter 4 and Frau-Meigs, 2012), the Communication Rights in the Information Society (CRIS) campaign was created in 2001. The CRIS campaign was influential in the WSIS preparatory process and during the first phase of the WSIS. It helped re-introduce the idea of a human right to communicate. As a result, the civil society contribution “Shaping Information Society for Human Needs” (Raboy et al., 2010) offered an alternative vision of the information society centred around the notions of social justice and human rights (Raboy et al., 2010). The discourse on the right to communicate also contributed to the structuring and organising of civil society participation in the WSIS (Mueller, 2010; Raboy et al., 2010).

However, the shifting focus of the summit towards Internet governance undermined the CRIS campaign since the civil society advocates specialising in Internet governance were far more favourable to markets and competition and far more sceptical of the involvement of governments (Mueller, 2010, p. 87). Civil society re-organised around the issue of Internet governance and moved away from the campaign on the right to communicate and from the anti-marketisation discourse. The right to communicate campaign had a limited influence on Internet governance issues and the repeated efforts by civil society representatives were unsuccessful to make the right to communicate endorsed by the final documents.

### **7.2.2. Elites and counter-elites during the WSIS**

The discourses outlined in the previous section were articulated and exploited by actors; they also shaped their interactions. They represented different perspectives around which elite groups could reach cohesion and around which counter-elite groups could be organised. In order for the study to be able to explore the structuration of the field beyond its discursive dimension, it is important to note that it is impossible to link a specific discourse to a specific interest group like it is conceptualised in a multistakeholder perspective. The following network analysis focuses on the dialectics of dominant and non-dominant actors in relation with their discourses.

The multistakeholder perspective tends to establish a relationship between the nature of the actor (civil society, private sector, state, etc.) and the discourse that is being supported (see for example Raboy et al. 2010, 32-33; and Mueller 2010). The result of a pluralist multistakeholder process would be the emergence of a consensus that would take into account the specific needs of all stakeholders. As we have argued earlier (see chapter 5), this perspective is unproductive since it tends to deny the divisions within the stakeholders' groups and to reify the blurry frontiers between

stakeholder groups.

In a multistakeholder perspective, governments represent one stakeholder. However, the major dissension during the first phase of the WSIS was between developing and developed countries (Kleinwächter, 2004; Kummer, 2007) Whereas Northern governments were satisfied with the ICANN system and the private sector leadership, Southern governments advocated for an intergovernmental regulation of the Internet. The division between countries with diverging interests is one of the most enduring feature of international politics and the WSIS came as a new episode in a long historical struggle. Even amongst dominant countries, an opposition between European countries and the US existed on the internationalisation of the ICANN system. While not critical of the market-based regulation, the European Union wanted a more important role in the ICANN. In the South, divergences appeared between countries demanding an intergovernmental organisation and countries accepting an improved ICANN. Emerging countries like Brazil started position themselves in a middle way between intergovernmentalism and multistakeholderism with the idea of a participatory process leaving the overarching authority to the state. Hence, governments did not have a shared agenda aiming at more state control or at an increased role for intergovernmental organisations. States' representatives were divided between supporters of the *status quo* and supporters of change.

The only coherent stakeholder group that participated to the WSIS was the private sector. In the field of Internet governance, the large firms had begun to institutionalise their cooperation in order to become more influential on the debates in the 1990s. The Global Internet Project was among the first attempts for the industry to organise within the field of Internet governance. The World Information and Technology Services Alliance (WITSA) was a broader umbrella organisation defending business interests. With the WSIS, the lobbying scaled up to the International Chamber of Commerce that was asked by the WSIS executive secretariat to “create the CCBI as a vehicle through which to mobilize and coordinate the involvement of the worldwide business community in the processes leading to and culminating in the Summit”.<sup>230</sup> The CCBI was open to all representative of business firms and business associations. Its members included among others: the Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD; the Global Business Dialogue on Electronic Commerce; the Global Information Infrastructure Commission; the World Economic Forum; the World Information Technology and Services Alliance; and the International Publishers

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<sup>230</sup> CCBI comments on the revised draft declaration of principles and plan of action, 27 October 2003, available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.



Association. This network of powerful business associations represented a very powerful actor in the WSIS. Its numerous documents and interventions were very influential in the final documents. In spite of the inevitable conflicts of interests within such a diverse constituency, the contributions of the CCBI show no signs of contradictions or incoherences.

The private sector was particularly influential in the WSIS since it had a double representation. Indeed, the creation of the CCBI did not prevent individual business representative to attend, usually speaking on behalf of their own firm as well as on behalf of the CCBI (Raboy et al. 2010, 30). This is why some of the CCBI contribution were made by ICC staff while others were made by representatives of firms like Microsoft and AT&T. The double representation is the result of a mix of UN procedure relying on the ICC to represent business interests and ITU procedures where individual firms are invited to participate. Moreover, the WSIS counted on the input of institutions like the UN ICT TaskForce and the G8 Dot Force, where business interests were already represented, to progress in the preparatory process. The status of the G8 Dot Force as a “key source of input” has been described as “curious” by Raboy et al. (2010, 17). It certainly reinforced the influence of the business elite since the G8 Dot Force had been supportive of their interests (see chapter 6).

Finally, the conceptualisation of civil society also proved problematic. As we have seen, it is important to make a difference between generalist civil society organisation fighting for the right to communicate and Internet governance civil society organisations that were already deeply involved in the politics of the field<sup>231</sup>. Another division in the civil society category is the inside/outside debate. While some organisations were participating in the WSIS meetings, others organised alternative events. WE SEIZE! was for example a gathering of activists and artists outside of the Palexpo complex where the WSIS was taking place. They rejected the notion of an “information society” in the capitalist system (Raboy et al. 2010, p. 106-107). Some of the alternative events were dismantled by the Geneva police. The more radical civil society organisations of hackers and activists did not take part in the summit. For the majority of less radical civil society organisations who took part to the summit, the inclusion meant also a kind of silencing since civil society manifestations in the streets are usually more influential in the public opinion.

Given the pro-market and technocentric vision that dominated the WSIS, civil society organisation

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231 As we have seen, the example of GLOCOM, whose representatives were also sitting in the G8 Dot Force, illustrates the particularities of civil society in Internet governance. The future role of the Internet Governance Caucus could also be interesting (see chapter 8).

faced a dilemma: participation meant some kind of acceptance of the dominant rules, while no participation meant the exclusion of alternative ideas. As a result, civil society organisations were divided and the achievements of civil society during the WSIS are judged differently by the two sides. While some commentators praise the achievements of the lobbying campaign and the defence of the right to communicate, others are critical of the outcome of the first phase of the summit (Raboy et al. 2010, pp. 122-123). For critics, WSIS offers an illustration of the management of civil society by the organisers (Mansell, 2012).





Figure 7.2. Co-occurrences network for the statement made during the first phase of the WSIS



hts Forum

Starting from different theoretical grounds, the following network visualisation (Figure 7.2) offers an alternative to the multistakeholder perspective<sup>232</sup>. Based on the co-occurrence of the same statements in the contribution of different actors, it shows the ideological and discursive links between different stakeholders. The network is based on the data analysed in Discourse Network Analyser 1.30 (Leifeld, 2012a). If two organisations made a statement pertaining to the same category within a time-window of 20 days<sup>233</sup>, an edge is created between them. As a result, the actors and documents that agreed on specific issues during a given time period are connected. The presence of strong links in the network gives an indication on the like-mindedness of some actors and documents or on the influence that an actor had on another actor or document. The systematic analysis of all documents referring to Internet governance allows for a comprehensive visualisation of the debates that reinforces the qualitative content analysis. Social network analysis is used as a way to avoid a certain selectivity in the use of the data and the reporting of the results that is sometimes entailed by qualitative content analysis (Bowen, 2009); and to provide “alternative perspectives to increase the credibility of findings” (Murphy and O’Leary, 1994)<sup>234</sup>.

The “core” of the network is constituted by the final documents of the Geneva phase of the WSIS: the declaration of principles and the plan of action. The actors that are closer to the core are the actors that used the same statement as the final documents within a limited time-frame. They can thus be described as influential and thus part of the elite. The actors that are on the “periphery” of the network are the actors whose statements were not included in the final documents. They can be considered non-elites or counter-elites depending on their degree of mobilisation. As shown in figure 7.2, the “core” appears to include private sector representatives; institutions like the ITU, the ICANN and the UN ICT TaskForce; states like France, Sweden and China<sup>235</sup>. On the other hand,

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232 The figure 7.2 is an adjacency network of organisation by organisation (including documents) created in Netdraw 2.123 (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002). Nodes represent actors and documents. Their size is based on their *eigenvector* centrality measure. The edge thickness is based on the weight of the link between the nodes. The weight of the link depends on the number of co-occurrences of the statements.

233 A time-window of 20 days was set as a way to limit the number of relations between institutions : most of the institutions shared a statement at some point during the almost two years of the first phase of the WSIS. The time-window allows a clearer visualisation of the mutual influence between institutions. “Whenever two actors make a statement within the time window, an edge is created. If the edge has already been present, the edge weight is increased. If at least one of the statements is made outside of the time window, the link is not established. This guarantees context sensitivity of the resulting network.” (Leifeld, 2012b)

234 This concern is often expressed by the tenants of “mixed methods”. See for example Tashakkorie and Teddlie (1998).

235 The differences between the Chinese declarations and the final documents have been described in the previous sections. However, the location of China close to the “core” might result from a shared concern with cyber-security issues. The location of some elite actors such as the US, the EU and the Internet Society in a less central position have different explanations. The US government made its comments early in the process of the WSIS and was not as vocal as other countries towards the end of the drafting process. However, the US statements all favoured the status quo (see figure 7.3 and Annex 4). The EU insisted on having Internet governance as a discussion theme during the WSIS, which make the EU appear in figure 7.4 along with marginalised actors. However, the EU is a

countries like Egypt and Venezuela, most of civil society organisations and intergovernmental organisations like the UNESCO are located in the periphery of the network, which provides evidence of their exclusion from the elite. It is interesting to note that civil society organisations specialising in Internet governance are located closer to the core than generalist civil society organisations. That is the for example case of Consumers International and GLOCOM. This is coherent with the claim made by Mueller (2010) that ideological differences existed between these two types of civil society organisations. Figure 7.2 illustrates the division of the field of Internet governance between a power elite and counter-elites rather than the existence of stakeholder groups. There is no proximity in terms of statements among governments or civil society organisations. These stakeholder groups are divided between supporters of the *status quo* and advocates of change. Some actors are member of a power elite of Internet governance while others are unsuccessfully contesting elite power.

If we turn to the “core” of the network, the following visualisation (7.3) presents the statements that were influential in the final documents and the actors that supported these statements<sup>236</sup>. We can find some of the important actors of the power elite of the 1990s. The US, Australian and some European governments are included, as well as the European Union. It is already the US and Australian governments and the European Commission that had participated to the selection of the first ICANN board members (see chapter 5). The ICANN and the Internet Society are also part of the “core” of the first phase of the WSIS. The private sector was also represented at the “core” but not by individual firms like it used to be the case in the 1990s, but by business associations instead. This illustrates the change both in the nature of actors and in the uses of the technology. As we have seen in the previous chapter, the Internet had become a key component of the economy. We can however see that a Microsoft representative served as a spokesperson for the CCBI, which is consistent with the role that the firm had acquired in the fields of Internet and telecommunication governance. Another business association is the association of European Telecommunication Network Operators, which gathers the large telecommunication firms (usually former state monopolies) that operated most of the European networks but also many networks outside Europe,

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central element of the power elite network (see figure 7.3) and shared the main statements favouring the status quo (see fig. 7.3 and Annex 4). Finally, the Internet Society had a more radical position on the exclusion of the ITU and the preservation of the status quo that was not fully embraced by the WSIS (see fig. 7.3 and Annex 4).

236 The network visualisation of fig. 7.3 is a subset of the visualisation of all actors and statements (not readable and thus not included) obtained in NetDraw 2.123 (Borgatti et al., 2002). The visualisation 7.2.3 has been obtained by choosing some statements that were common during the discussions and that were successful since they were included in the final documents. These statements are represented by the blue square nodes. Their size is based on their *eigenvector* centrality. Round red nodes represent actors that made the statement or documents that included the statement during the first phase of the WSIS. They are linked to the statements that they made (or that they included in the case of documents). Their size is also based on their *eigenvector* centrality Edges are not weighted.

notably in Africa. These operators were already represented in the field in the 1990s by France Telecom, Deutsche Telekom and British Telecom. Like other business interests, they scaled up their advocacy efforts and formed associations in order to defend their shared interests. Newcomers compared to the 1990s included the UN ICT TaskForce that had been created in 2000 (see chapter 6), and civil society organisations like GLOCOM and the Internet Governance Caucus (IGC)<sup>237</sup>.

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237 The Internet Governance Caucus was formed during the 2nd meeting of the Preparatory Committee. The co-founders of the caucus were Y.J Park and Wolfgang Kleinwächter. Both of them had been involved in the ICANN and especially issues of internationalisation and participation (Mueller, 2010, p. 102). In March 2003, a mailing list was created and hosted by the Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, an association involved with the counter-elite's efforts to reform the ICANN system. According to Mueller (2010), the Caucus was divided between those who wanted to open the debate on the ICANN system and those who supported the *status quo* (like Adam Peake, a GLOCOM and G8 Dot Force member). Supporters of the *status quo* followed the Internet Society position, who refused any (inter-) governmental involvement in Internet governance issues. Despite the divisions, the IGC grew continuously during the Geneva phase and became the most active civil society group during the second phase of the summit (see chapter 8).




Figure 7.3. Successful statements and actors during the first phase of the WSIS



In terms of statements, the “core” participants clearly embraced a neoliberal discourse. The support of the ICANN system, which had already been designed mostly along neoliberal lines, echoed the concern of the “core” participants regarding pro-competitive regulation, intellectual property protection, private-sector leadership, the exclusion of the ITU and intergovernmentalism from Internet governance, and, finally, a strong support of multistakeholder governance. These elements are all based on a neoliberal discourse. While the emerging power elite of the 1990s had to find a consensual discourse that included cyber-libertarian elements, the economic dominant discourse of the WSIS was a clear translation of neoliberal ideas in the sector of telecommunication and Internet governance. As a consequence, the dominant actors of the WSIS had the ideological cohesion, which is the first element of a power elite. The focus on individuals and their links and circulation will be treated in the next chapter. The need to internationalise the governance of the network and to increase participation is the only element that relies on a global public good vision. However, the wording was chosen in order to exclude references to global public goods and to intergovernmental regulation. Cyber-security had acquired a central place on the agenda. The only real concession made by the neoliberal advocates to the counter-elites is the acceptance of a debate on Internet governance in the WSIS. In the context of a much criticised ICANN and a move away from its limited mandate by several actors, the inclusion of Internet governance issues in the second phase of the WSIS was the very least that the power elite could do to keep some legitimacy in the field. This is why the technocentric neoliberal language was accompanied by some articles on the need of further dialogue on policy-related issues. The separation between the neoliberal and elite-driven management of critical Internet resources and the more inclusive policy discussion can be described as a new hegemonic project (see chapter 8).

If we now turn to the periphery of the network (as shown in figure 7.4), we can observe a mix of civil society organisations, a number of developing or emerging countries and some intergovernmental organisations<sup>238</sup>.

Generalist civil society organisations are located in the periphery, notably because one of their main concern was the right to communicate, which was not included in the final documents<sup>239</sup>. Some of

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238 The network visualisation of fig. 7.4 is a subset of the visualisation of all actors and statements (not readable and thus not included) obtained in NetDraw 2.123 (Borgatti 2002). The visualisation 7.4 has been obtained by choosing some statements that were common during the discussions but that were not included in the final documents. These statements are represented by the blue square nodes. Their size is based on their *eigenvector* centrality. Round red nodes represent actors that made the statement or documents that included the statement during the first phase of the WSIS. They are linked to the statements that they made (or that they included in the case of documents). Their size is also based on their *eigenvector* centrality Edges are not weighted.

239 The lack of centrality in the network visualisation of the right to communicate is due to the focus on Internet

the civil society organisations are represented in the two visualisation. This is the case of the Internet Governance Caucus. This presence in both network reflects the dual nature of the IGC, both an advocate of the *status quo* and a critique of the ICANN system.

The states represented in the periphery can be divided into three categories. First, some of them are dominant states that expressed some support to one or the other non-dominant statement. For example, the French Prime Minister advocated for a comprehensive approach to governance that would not separate technical from policy issues<sup>240</sup>. Other states were opposing completely what was seen as a US hegemony in Internet governance. These sovereigntist states were for example advocating for an intergovernmental governance for the Internet and a state sovereignty over the country-code top-level domains. These states were marginalised. They included delegations like Cuba, Venezuela and from the League of Arab States. China and Russia shared several concerns with dominant actors such as cyber-security on the one hand, and were critical of the ICANN system or claimed sovereignty on their CC-tLDs on the other hand. They also behaved as sovereigntist states but the issues that they were supporting had a different fate. Finally, some states can be classified as emerging countries. The term was beginning to be used at the time of the WSIS. In the context of the field of Internet governance, some states advocated for another vision of multistakeholderism, with a more important role for the state. They were not opposed to the ICANN system but claimed a more important participation in it. These states were mainly Brazil and India.

Some intergovernmental organisations were also located in the periphery because of their support to unsuccessful statements. For example, the UNCTAD was critical of the pro-competitive regulation and the importance given to the self-regulation of the private sector. This is also the case of an important actor for the participation of non-dominant actors: the UNESCO. The UNESCO started consulting with civil society organisations in February 2002 in order to prepare the WSIS (Raboy et al. 2010, 43). During the summit, the UNESCO held positions similar to those of generalist civil society organisations, including on the right to communicate. The UNESCO, which had been the centre of the struggle for a New World Order for Information and Communications several decades before, still proposed a marginalised discourse.

The statements made by the different peripheral participants did not form a coherent discourse. Elements of the sovereigntist discourse could be found, such as the claim of sovereignty over CC-

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governance documents. It does not mean that the right to communicate was not a central issue of the WSIS.

240 See the address by Jean-Pierre Raffarin, French Prime Minister to the WSIS, 10 December 2003, available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/documents/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

tIDs. Other elements stemmed from the global public good discourse, like the public and global nature of the Internet. Some peripheral states criticised the neoliberal nature of Internet governance while others supported it. The peripheral actors did not form an ideologically coherent counter-elite even if they could unite around some basic principles of enhanced inclusion of non-dominant actors.



### 7.2.3. Networks of institutions and discourses: the status of the hegemonic discourse

The WSIS presented an opposition between an ideologically coherent power elite defending the *status quo* and relying on a neoliberal discourse on the one hand; and a more heterogeneous combination of counter-elite actors criticising the *status quo* on different grounds and with different purposes. This opposition is more than an opposition between the South and the North since it transcended the stakeholder categories. States, intergovernmental organisations, and civil society organisations were organised around this dialectical opposition. This situation was precarious since this opposition was not institutionalised. The power elite was ruling the field of Internet governance whereas the counter-elites were simply excluded from the governance system. In order for the system to continue, some agreement had to be found between the two positions.

The following network visualisation present the most consensual statement in the different discourses<sup>241</sup>. As we can see, there was some room for manoeuvre to elaborate a new dialogue on a consensual basis. One of the most consensual statement was the need optimise connectivity and access. The use of information and communication technologies for development and the spread of the information society were the main objective behind the organisation of the WSIS. There was a shared interest to put forward this agenda. As we have seen in the chapter 6, access had become a crucial issue for dominant actors in the early 2000s. It was also a claim by non-dominant actors to improve access to ICTs and the Internet. Just like in the 1990s, multistakeholderism was a broadly accepted concept. While diverging views existed on the implementation of a multistakeholder governance system, very few participants criticised the idea of a participation of all stakeholders in the regulation of the information society. For the power elite of Internet governance however, multistakeholderism was a way to legitimise their power. It had been used to manufacture consent around the creation of the ICANN and it was used again during the WSIS to defend the existing system. As a matter of fact, the support to the ICANN in the “technical” management of the network was also a rather consensual claim. Against this background, further dialogue on Internet governance was to take the ICANN role for granted and to work on broader issues without questioning the existing system. Another broadly-shared view was the need for pro-competitive regulation in the telecommunication sector. After decades of intrusion of neoliberal ideas in the

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241 The network visualisation 7.5 is a “principal components” layout of the graph including all statements and all actors and documents obtained in NetDraw 2.123 (Borgatti et al., 2002). The objective of such a layout is to highlight the principal nodes of the network (i.e. those with the most links). The elements on the far-left of the network are the statement shared by the majority of actors.

telecommunication sector, and despite strong resistance until the 1990s (see chapter 4), the neoliberal discourse had prevailed in the field. Almost all participants were thinking about the information society in a framework of privatised, liberalised and de-regulated telecommunication sector.

Other elements stand out in the network as common statements without reaching the status of the previously described ones. Among these elements, the need for internationalisation of the Internet governance system was recalled by many participants and could also be viewed as a consensual statement. The focus on cyber-security was also common during the first phase of the WSIS. The role of intergovernmental organisations in this area was beginning to develop and there was a strong support to these initiatives. Multilingualism was also a concern for many participants and was shared both by dominant and non-dominant actors. The inclusion of multilingualism as an objective for the information society was thus not an issue. Finally, gender equality was mentioned by many participants. While a strong consensus existed on the importance of gender equality during the preparatory committee meetings, no concrete actions were planned and the final declaration was very weak on the issue of gender equality (Gurumuthy, Jeet Singh, Mundkur, & Swamy, 2006).




Figure 7.5. Hegemonic elements during the first phase of the WSIS

From the existing hegemonic discourse of the field of Internet governance, the notion of multistakeholderism was clearly reinforced by the first phase of the WSIS. The separation between technical and political issues was a continuation of a “technical only” regulation, with the creation of a space for policy-related dialogue. The only element that was not taken over by the WSIS was Internet exceptionalism. However, since the ICANN system was supported by the WSIS and since the ITU remained excluded from Internet governance, and since the private character of governance was not rejected, the political consequences of Internet exceptionalism remained basically unchallenged by the WSIS. The creation of the Working Group on Internet Governance opened the door for further debates about Internet governance and to a possible enhanced politicisation of the issue, but it was also the creation of a framework that protected the hegemonic discourse of the field.

While Internet governance was not supposed to be the centre of the discussions during the WSIS, the crisis of the field and the weakness of the ICANN reform imposed the issue to the WSIS participants. The first phase of the WSIS became a continuation of the crisis of the field of Internet governance. An opposition between supporters of the *status quo* and advocates of change marked the debates of the preparatory process. This opposition seemed at some point irreconcilable and the WSIS conference in Geneva was about to fail to deliver a final declaration and a plan of action (Kummer, 2007). The decision to create a Working Group on Internet Governance could be seen as a non-event: the parties agreed to disagree and delegated the difficult negotiations to an *ad hoc* working group. However, a closer look at the positions of the participants and at the final documents offers another perspective. In spite of the numerous critiques, the bulk of the *doxa* of Internet governance was not challenged by the first phase of the WSIS. The notions of multistakeholderism, private-sector leadership and a purely technical regulation were imposed by the supporters of the *status quo*. The mandate of the WGIG was to reflect on the policy-related issues but the support to the ICANN system prevented any substantial transformation of the field. The separation of technical and political issues meant that the power elite formed around the technical regulation was legitimised by the WSIS. The negotiations would continue on policy-related issues and on the increased participation of actors like developing countries or civil society organisations.

The first phase of the WSIS, thus, ended on a consensus that was likely to be able to solve the deep crisis of the field of Internet governance. The institutionalisation of a policy-related dialogue was essential to integrate the factors of change outlined in the previous chapter to the field of Internet



governance. New actors, social and political issues, the changing economic context and the struggle on the role of the state could not adapt a field organised around a technical regulation in the ICANN. The WSIS offered a political space to discuss these issues without challenging the existence of the ICANN system and of the power elite. In this sense, the creation of the WGIG is a first symbolic step towards a more flexible field, with a greater scope of participation, but also capable of protecting its core institutions and the interests of its power elite.

## **Chapter 8: Elite reconfiguration and hegemonic project 2.0**

The Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG) was created as a way out of the opposition between supporters of the status quo and advocates of change. Since the first phase of the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) had given Internet governance a prominent place on the agenda, an informed dialogue was needed in order to overcome dissensions before the second phase of the WSIS, held in Tunis in November 2005. The perception of the WGIG mandate was completely different in the two groups. The power elite saw the WGIG as a tool to inform the advocates of change on the successes of Internet governance as it existed and on the dangers of potential changes. Counter-elites saw the WGIG as the group in charge of the designing of a new governance system. The WGIG was thus a double-edged sword: both a potential threat and a potential legitimising tool for the existing order. The chapter argues that the WSIS, and especially the WGIG, resulted in a reconfiguration of the power elite and the differentiation of three different discourses that still structure the debates on Internet governance in 2013. However, the WSIS did not drastically changed the regulation system of the network and left the power elite relatively unchallenged. Hence, the outcome of the WSIS and the creation of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) can be described as a new hegemonic project aimed at the consolidation of the existing order. The institutionalisation of the policy dialogue on Internet governance in the IGF, the alliance between defenders of the status-quo and sovereignists, and the separation of “technical management” from political governance led to a renewed stability in Internet governance after the crisis of the failed ICANN reform and the first phase of the WSIS. Since the end of the WSIS, the field of Internet governance has not changed in a significant way. The following chapter thus offers the basis to understand current debates about Internet governance. The institutions, actors and discourses remained relatively stable. However, like in any field, the order in the field of Internet governance is based on the evolving relations between the power elite and counter-elites. The concluding chapter will then present the emerging powers in Internet governance and the perspectives of change.

### **8.1. The WGIG process**

The Geneva declaration of 2003 called for the creation of a multistakeholder Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG). In November 2004, the group was appointed by the UN Secretary-General. As defined by its chairman, the purpose “was to facilitate the negotiations that [were going

to] take place in Tunis<sup>242</sup> after the stalemate of the debates on Internet governance during the first phase of the Summit.

### **8.1.1. Setting-up the WGIG**

The creation of the WGIG as a consultative body to the UN Secretary-General allowed for a flexible and autonomous process of member selection and working methods. The WGIG, although an important body in the preparatory process of the second phase of the WSIS, was outside the formal WSIS structure and was designed as a multistakeholder dialogue forum.

The WGIG did not start from scratch and was able to build upon two events that took place between the end of the first phase of the WSIS and the formation of the WGIG: The ITU expert group in February 2004 and the UN ICT-TaskForce Global Forum on Internet Governance. Some of the speakers in these meetings became members of the WGIG, like Marcus Kummer, the future executive coordinator of the group, and several key participants from the civil society and private sector like Wolfgang Kleinwächter, William Drake, Ayesha Hassan, Don McLean, and Karen Banks. Others speakers became important commentators of the work of the WGIG like Izumi Aizu, Bertrand de la Chappelle<sup>243</sup>. Already, a consensus was beginning to emerge among these future participants to the WGIG process on the fact that Internet governance was difficult to define and could not be handled by a single international organisation (Mathiason, 2008, chap. 7). Moreover, the social capital acquired in the field by these individuals certainly explains their centrality in the work of the WGIG (see below).

The consultations on the establishment of the WGIG took place in Geneva on 20-21 September 2004. Discussions focused on the scope and working methods of the Working Group, as well as the selection of its members. Over 250 participants attended the consultations, most of them representatives of governments<sup>244</sup>. The discussions were organized in panels with once again several future WGIG members as speakers. While some consensual elements were acknowledged by the chair of the meeting such as the need for balanced representation, multistakeholderism, openness and transparency (Nitin Desai, quoted in Mathiason, 2008, chap. 7), some oppositions were expressed. In line with the debates of the first phase of the summit, diverging views existed on the

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242 See the press release by the U.N at <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/pi1620.doc.htm>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

243 They were members of the Nominating Committee of the civil society members of the WGIG and thus excluded from the selection. However, They became important commentators during the WGIG process.

244 See <http://wgig.org/meeting-september.html>, last accessed through the Internet Archive on 8 April 2014.

separation of political and social issues from technical ones, the appraisal of the ICANN system, and the mandate and composition of the WGIG.

For example, the working group was seen by some as “a steering committee rather than a prescriptive body”<sup>245</sup>, that “should refrain from expanding or interfering with other areas of policy concerns already addressed in reasonable degree”<sup>246</sup>. Some participants advocated for a narrow definition of Internet governance, generally coupled with a separation of technical and policy issues, while others advocated for a “holistic definition of Internet governance”<sup>247</sup>, since “technical issues have political implications and political issues have technical implications”<sup>248</sup>. Supporters of the status quo were critical of the very idea of a working group in Internet governance, and some even refused the notion of Internet governance (Flyverbom, 2011, p. 117). Since there was no way to avoid the creation of the WGIG, they tried to exclude the existing system from the work of the WGIG. Paul Verhoef, representative of the ICANN, acknowledged that “there [is] a void for addressing issues that are outside of [ICANN's] responsibility, and [ICANN] is very encouraged to see that there is discussion for filling this void”<sup>249</sup>. Both the EU and the US representatives encouraged the WGIG to take the existing system as a starting point and to build upon it rather than “duplicate the extensive body of work already under way in the global and regional bodies”<sup>250</sup>. In a completely different perspective, representatives of countries like China and Brazil called for a governmental leadership in the WGIG since the “WSIS [remained] first and foremost an intergovernmental process”<sup>251</sup>.

The members of the working group were thus selected along the consensual lines of balanced representation through informal consultations led by Markus Kummer and the WSIS adviser of the UN Secretary-General, Nitin Desai. They contacted Ayesha Hassan from the International Chamber of Commerce to select the private sector representatives and the Internet Governance Caucus to

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245 Statement by Ayesha Hassan, International Chamber of Commerce, 20 September 2004, available at <http://wgig.org>, last accessed through the Internet Archive on 8 April 2014.

246 Statement by Izumi Aizu, Internet Governance TaskForce of Japan, 20 September 2004, available at <http://wgig.org>, last accessed through the Internet Archive on 8 April 2014.

247 Statement by William Drake, Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility, 20 September 2004, available at <http://wgig.org>, last accessed through the Internet Archive on 8 April 2014.

248 Statement by the Egyptian representative, 20 September 2004, available at <http://wgig.org>, last accessed through the Internet Archive on 8 April 2014.

249 Statement by Paul Verhoef, ICANN, 21 September 2004, available at <http://wgig.org>, last accessed through the Internet Archive on 8 April 2014.

250 Statements by EU and US representatives, 20 September 2004, available at <http://wgig.org>, last accessed through the Internet Archive on 8 April 2014.

251 Statements by the Brazilian representative, 21 September 2004, see also the statement by the Chinese representative on the same day, both available at <http://wgig.org>, last accessed through the Internet Archive on 8 April 2014.

select the civil society representatives. While the selection of private sector members proved unproblematic in spite of the criteria to ensure balanced representation, the civil society nominations took more efforts (Flyverbom, 2011, pp. 52–57). The Internet Governance Caucus (IGC) acted as spokesperson of civil society. As we have seen, the IGC and other civil society groupings specialising in Internet governance had shown their ideological proximity with the positions of the power elite during the first phase of the summit (see chapter 7). IGC decided to use a nominating committee (“NomCom”) approach, that was used for example in the ICANN system. Flyverbom (2011) describes in details the selection process, where lists of candidates were drafted and then reduced by several IGC members according to whom was committed to the caucus and available. The NomCom<sup>252</sup> made the final selection from the 35 nominees from civil society and sent a list of 10 potential members and 8 connectors to other civil society groups, not intended to be full members of the WGIG<sup>253</sup>. 9 nominees from the main list were selected by the WGIG secretariat as well as 2 from the connectors' list to be members of the WGIG. The process and the selection of several IGC members was a way for IGC to occupy a privileged place amongst civil society representatives (Flyverbom, 2011, p. 59). This was criticised by other groups excluded from the WSIS, such as the Patent Copyright and Trademark Caucus, whose support to open source and free software was not represented in the WGIG (Flyverbom, 2011, p. 58). Finally, members representing governments were chosen by the WGIG secretariat according to UN criteria.

The final WGIG member list was released on 11 November 2004. It presented several aspects that gave the WGIG a counter-elite potential. First, governmental representatives represented the largest stakeholder group in the WGIG members (44%) (Mathiason, 2008)<sup>254</sup>. Most governments were unhappy with the private-sector leadership in Internet governance and the US oversight on the ICANN. Governments, especially from developing countries, had been an important force behind the ICANN reform and the empowerment of the Governmental Advisory Committee. Moreover, the US government preferred to maintain its distance (Mathiason, 2008). Members from developing countries accounted for almost 60% of the group (Mathiason, 2008), which was uncommon in previous Internet governance forums. Governments that had advocated for change during the first

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252 NomCom members included Bertrand de La Chappelle (WSIS-online.net), Adam Peake and Izumi Aizu (GLOCOM, IGTF-J and G8 DotForce), Renata Bloem (Conference of NGOs), and Valeria Betancourt (Association for Progressive Communications).

253 The list, as well as several e-mail exchanged during the process, can be found at <http://muguet.com/www.wsis-si.org/wgig.html>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

254 The classification by stakeholder is always difficult because of the blurriness of the notion. In response to a questionnaire submitted to the members of the WGIG, 37.5% of the respondents indicated that they were not affiliated with any of the proposed stakeholder categories (government, civil society, international organisation, business sector) (Kalas, 2007, p. 23).

phase of the WSIS were strongly represented (China, Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Iran, Cuba, Russia and several other developing countries). European countries were also strongly represented. While not critical of the privatised governance system, they were concerned with US oversight over the ICANN. Several scholars were members of the WGIG. While not directly members of the academic counter-elite that had been criticising the ICANN system, some influence of the existing critical literature on these members was a possibility. William Drake had for example advocated for a broad definition of Internet governance during the consultations on the establishment of the WGIG, which was a step away from the status-quo. A member of the Association for Progressive Communications (APC) was also present in the group. APC was an advocate of change and a central element of the campaign for Communication Rights in the Information Society (see chapter 7 and Mueller, 2010). Finally, the dominant institutions such as the Internet Society, the ICANN, the IETF and the intellectual property rights holders were less represented than in previous groups that had discussed Internet governance issues. However, some elements undermined the counter-elite potential of the WGIG. The following paragraphs present some information about the participants that mitigate the first impression on the WGIG, that describe the power dynamics at play in the WGIG, and analyse the process of the WGIG that led to a weak consensus.

If we take a closer look at the membership of the WGIG, it reflects more an evolution of the field and of its power elite after the creation of the ICANN than a rupture. While the US government was not directly represented among the members of the WGIG, the presence of the Deputy Director-General of the Directorate General Information Society and Media of the European Commission, together with representatives from the three countries that held the presidency of the Council of the EU between 2004 and 2005, illustrates the importance acquired by the European Union in Internet governance. Since the EU had been associated with the US government in the creation of the ICANN, and had continuously supported a private-sector-led and semi-privatised model of governance, the presence of EU members in the WGIG undermined the reformist potential of the group. Even if the EU and the US had been arguing on distributional issues related to Internet governance, the support to the overall model was guaranteed (see chapter 6).

The private sector was notably represented by two powerful advocates of the status-quo: the International Chamber of Commerce and the World Information Technology and Services Alliance (WITSA). Allen Miller, one of the representative of WITSA<sup>255</sup>, was also responsible for policy positions and advocacy of the Information Technology Association of America (ITAA) that had

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<sup>255</sup> The other representative of WITSA was Waudo Siganga.

been central in the process of creating the ICANN. Several other WGIG members had previous experiences with the ICANN system. Besides Alejandro Pisanty, who represented the board of the ICANN, Vittorio Bertola was the chairman of the ICANN At-Large Advisory Committee<sup>256</sup>. Avri Doria had been involved in the IETF, the Internet Research TaskForce, and had been appointed to the ICANN Generic Names Supporting Organisation<sup>257</sup>. Raúl Echebarría was in 1999 member of the Name Council of ICANN on behalf of the Non Commercial Constituency and a founding member of the Non Commercial Domain Name Holders Constituency of ICANN<sup>258</sup>. José Alexandre Bicalho, the Brazilian government representative, had also been representing Brazil in the Governmental Advisory Committee of the ICANN after having participated in its creation<sup>259</sup>. QiHeng Hu, the Chinese delegate, had been a member of the ICANN Committee on Internationalised Domain Names from 2000 to 2002<sup>260</sup>. Wolfgang Kleinwächter had participated in all ICANN Meetings from 1999 onwards. He was a member of ICANN's Membership Information Task Force, and the 2001-2002 At-Large Steering Committee<sup>261</sup>. Olivier Nana Nzépa had also been a member in the ICANN At-Large Committee. Charles Sha'ban was a member of the Intellectual Property Constituency (IPC) of the ICANN and had been the chair of ICANN's Internationalized Domain Names (IDN) Working Group. Charles Sha'ban was also a member of the Internet Society and of the International Trademark Association<sup>262</sup>. In total, almost a quarter of the WGIG members had previous experience with the ICANN.

Moreover, several socialisation groups and events had gathered several members of the WGIG before its formation. Juan Fernandez, the Cuban delegate was a member of the UN ICT TaskForce together with Lyndall Shope-Mafole, the South African delegate. The latter was also a member of the G8 Dot-Force with the Russian delegate Mikhail Yakushev. Several WGIG members like Alejandro Pisanti, Penh Hwa Ang, William Drake and Wolfgang Kleinwächter had been involved as speakers, moderators or organisers in the Internet Society-sponsored global INet conferences between 2000 and 2004<sup>263</sup>. The WSIS background material on Internet governance included papers authored by WGIG members such as Don McLean, Wolfgang Kleinwächter, William Drake, and the

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256 Biographical information of the WGIG members available at <http://www.wgig.org/docs>, last accessed 8 April 2014. Sometimes the information was completed by other sources like [icannwiki.org](http://icannwiki.org) and [linkedin.com](http://linkedin.com) profiles.

257 Ibid.

258 Ibid.

259 Ibid.

260 See <http://archive.icann.org/en/committees/idn/>, last accessed, 8 April 2014.

261 Biographical information of the WGIG members available at <http://www.wgig.org/docs>, last accessed 8 April 2014. Sometimes the information was completed by other sources like [icannwiki.org](http://icannwiki.org) and [linkedin.com](http://linkedin.com) profiles.

262 Ibid.

263 See <http://www.internetsociety.org/events/inet-conferences>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

representatives of the Association for Progressive Communications<sup>264</sup>. The two preparatory events on Internet governance related to the preparatory process of the second phase of the WSIS were also an opportunity for future WGIG members to meet and exchange views (Mathiason, 2008). Participants to the ITU forum on Internet governance (26-27 February 2004) included: Don McLean, Vittorio Bertola, Kangsik Cheon, William Drake, Ayesha Hassan, Wolfgang Kleinwächter and Jovan Kurbalija<sup>265</sup>. The UN ICT TaskForce global forum on Internet governance, held in New York on 25-27 March 2004 gathered the following future WGIG members: Nitin Desai, Markus Kummer, William Drake, Wolfgang Kleinwächter, Carlos Afonso, Don McLean and Raúl Echebarría<sup>266</sup>.

This overview of previous contact with ICANN and previous socialisation tend to show that some members, most of them from civil society and private sector, had participated in the work of the ICANN and knew each other beforehand. This might explain why the general feeling of WGIG members, fuelled by this experience, was that governments were “underestimating the Internet community”, showed “profound ignorance [...] and profound disrespect for the complexities of the Internet”, and seemed less “accountable to their constituencies” (Kalas, 2007, pp. 26–33). The relatively close ties between some members of the group, scholars, consultants, ICANN participants and representatives of the private sector certainly affected the working relationship with other participants.

The WGIG was funded outside the WSIS budget, and primarily by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation. Other contributions came from the French, Dutch, Norwegian and Japanese governments<sup>267</sup>. Contributions also came from non-governmental sources like the Numbers Resource Organisation, the Swiss Education and Research Network (SWITCH) and the Foundation for Multimedia Communications<sup>268</sup>. Interestingly, after having tried to oppose the creation of a WGIG, the ICANN Board decided to contribute to the WGIG budget to the amount of USD 100.000. In its decision, the ICANN board acknowledged the participation of several members of the ICANN community in the WGIG, as well as the importance of the WGIG to an “improved and better understanding of the Internet”<sup>269</sup>. For the ICANN board, the threat of a UN takeover of the Internet through the WGIG seemed to be counterbalanced by the potential benefits of a potential

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264 See <http://www.itu.int/wsis/background/index.html>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

265 See <http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/forum/intgov04/agenda.html>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

266 See <http://www.unicttaskforce.org/sixthmeeting>, last accessed through the Internet archive 8 April 2014.

267 While no precise budget is available, a list of contributors was posted on the WGIG website at <http://wgig.org/funding.html>, last accessed through the Internet Archive 8 April 2014.

268 Ibid.

269 See <http://www.icann.org/en/groups/board/documents/resolutions-20dec04-en.htm>, last accessed 8 April 2014.



legitimisation of the ICANN system by a UN body.

The WGIG was thus able to start its work by the end of November 2004. During an 8-month process, the group tried to fulfil its mandate and answer three basic questions related to the definition of Internet governance, the policy-issues implied by Internet governance, and the future of Internet governance. The process was a mix of on-line consultations and 4 face-to-face meetings, partly open to all WSIS participants and partly closed to facilitate negotiations.

23-25 November 2004	1 <sup>st</sup> WGIG meeting and open-ended consultations
December 2004-January 2005	Online consultations
14-18 February 2005	2 <sup>nd</sup> WGIG meeting
15-16 February 2005	Open-ended consultations with governments and all stakeholders
24 February 2005	Presentation of preliminary report to PrepCom-II
March 2005	Online consultations
18 April 2005	Open-ended consultations with governments and all stakeholders
19-20 April 2005	3 <sup>d</sup> WGIG meeting
May 2005	Online consultations
14 June 2005	Open-ended consultations with governments and all stakeholders
15-17 June 2005	4 <sup>th</sup> WGIG meeting (final drafting of the report)
July 2005	Submission of the report to the UN Secretary-General
18 July 2005	Presentation of the report to all stakeholders
19 July 2005	Workshop on Internet governance at the national level
<b>September 2005: PrepCom 3</b> <b>November 2005: WSIS Tunis</b>	

Table 8.1. WGIG process time-line (source: [www.wgig.org](http://www.wgig.org))

### 8.1.2. Elites and counter-elites in the WGIG

The WGIG process was widely followed beyond the working group. The open consultations gathered around 550 individuals from more than 250 institutions. While many individuals and organisations were only able to attend one or the other meeting, many states and non-state organisation followed the work of the WGIG on a regular basis. Figure 8.1 presents an overview of the participation in the process, with the most constant participants in the middle of the network visualisation of the process<sup>270</sup>. Over 250 statements, proposals and comments were made during the open sessions, while WGIG members mentioned about 2 to 3 thousands of e-mails exchanged by the members in addition to hours of meeting and debates<sup>271</sup>. Members of the power elite described in the previous chapter (ICANN, ARIN, Cisco, US delegation, EU commission, IETF, Telefonica, WITSA, etc.), as well as the less coherent counter-elites described in chapter 7 (Russian Federation, Brazil, India, Gender Caucus, UNESCO, ITU) were among the most constant participants. They are located at the centre of the graph and the size of the node representing these organisations is bigger because of their higher degree of centrality. Most non-elites participants only attended one or the other event. They are located at the margins of figure 8.1 and are represented by small nodes. Because of their limited participation, they were less likely to influence the outcome of the WGIG<sup>272</sup>. Based on the data on the participation of actors and on the divisions outlined in the previous chapter, the WGIG can be conceptualised as involving the power elite and the counter-elites of Internet governance.

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270 The network visualisation of the WGIG process in figure 8.1 is based on the lists of participants available on the WSIS website, available at [www.itu.org/wsis](http://www.itu.org/wsis), last accessed 8 April 2014. The figure represent the participation of institutions in the different meetings and consultations of the working group. Node size is calculated according to the *eigenvector* centrality of the node. Data was processed in UCINET and visualised in Netdraw (Borgatti, Everett, & Freeman, 2002).

271 The WGIG website archive contains over 300 documents including agendas, lists of participants etc. the content of 256 documents was both quantitatively and qualitatively analysed in this study. See [www.wgig.org](http://www.wgig.org), last accessed 8 April 2014. The amount of a-mails was discussed during the presentation of the WGIG report at the UN office in Geneva, on 18 July 2005. Transcript available through the Internet archive at [www.wgig.org](http://www.wgig.org), last accessed 8 April 2014.

272 Figure 8.1 does not show the names of non-elite actors but they included small-state governments, generalist NGOs and individuals.





Figure 8.1. Participation in the WGIG process



By the first meeting of the WGIG, no definition of Internet governance had been adopted by the group. However, four clusters of policy issues had been identified: the equitable distribution of resources (including issues such as allocation of IP addresses and management of the root servers system); access for all; stable and secure functioning of the Internet (including issues such as spam and cybersecurity); multilingualism and content (including intellectual property rights); and other issues for consideration. Little progress was made during the first meeting towards a consensus. Supporters of the status-quo continued to refuse the idea of Internet governance:

“It is misleading to use the term ‘Internet Governance’ when the Internet is clearly not a single entity to govern. It is more useful to refer to ‘Internet Coordination’. The multiple facets of the Internet require different types of coordination, each calling for specific competencies and sensitivities to balance the needs of the Internet user community globally and locally.”<sup>273</sup>

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273 Intervention by Lynn St. Amour, Internet Society, during the first meeting of the WGIG on 23 November 2004, available at [www.wgig.org](http://www.wgig.org), last accessed through the Internet archive, 8 April 2014.

On a less radical tone, they defended the existing institutions and advocated for a separation of technical issues, already addressed by the ICANN system, and the policy issues that were still to be tackled by other organisations.

“That is: ICANN's focus is on how the Internet works, our focus is not on how the Internet is used. And that focus is not on the entire working of the Internet, but solely on the Internet's unique identifier system”.<sup>274</sup>

“There are many, many critical aspects of the Internet that actually work very well at present. As aspects of the network, they seem to be good candidates for inclusion in the definition, but they are not suggested, simply because they present no visible problem right now.”<sup>275</sup>

Supporters of change remained very critical about the ICANN system and were insisting on the need to address specifically the issues of IP addresses assignment, domain name allocation and the US oversight on the ICANN:

“In the short term, the responsibilities in the MoU between the US Department of Commerce and ICANN should be transferred from the Department of Commerce to the UN Secretary General as a temporary step on the way to building a new multi-stakeholder body that must find broad based support from all stakeholders.”<sup>276</sup>

“Internet Governance is much more than just the management of domain names and IP addresses. Data protection, spam, cyber-security, multilingual and local content are Internet governance issues. Interconnection costs, the protection of IPR and the digital divide are also Internet governance issues. In most of these areas, the main responsibility lies with governments: yet, they lack the means to coordinate effectively and promptly at the international level”.<sup>277</sup>

“We should focus on the core activity of the management of Internet resources by ICANN, in particular top-level domains, which is where important issues remain

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274 Comment by Paul Verhoef, ICANN, before the first meeting of the WGIG on 21 September 2004, available at [www.wgig.org](http://www.wgig.org), last accessed through the Internet archive, 8 April 2014.

275 Intervention by Paul Wilson, APNIC, during the first meeting of the WGIG on 24 November 2004, available at [www.wgig.org](http://www.wgig.org), last accessed through the Internet archive, 8 April 2014.

276 Comment by Karen Banks, Association for Progressive Communications, before the first meeting of the WGIG on 21 September 2004, available at [www.wgig.org](http://www.wgig.org), last accessed through the Internet archive, 8 April 2014.

277 Comment by Cristiano Berbert, Brazil, before the first meeting of the WGIG on 21 September 2004, available at [www.wgig.org](http://www.wgig.org), last accessed through the Internet archive, 8 April 2014.

unresolved”<sup>278</sup>.

Between November of 2004 and February of 2005, 21 issue papers were drafted in order to assess the current situation on each single issue and to present a Strengths-Weaknesses-Opportunities-Threats (SWOT) analysis<sup>279</sup>. The papers were commented beyond the working group according to a specific format or directly during the consultations. On February 14-18, a second meeting of the WGIG took place, together with a meeting of the preparatory committee of the WSIS. The issue papers and the comments that had been submitted before the meeting were discussed. The discussion on the working definition of Internet governance also began. While most of the interventions repeated the arguments of the supporters of the status-quo on the one side and advocates of change on the other side. Some critique of the work of the WGIG appeared from different actors. First, commentators outside the working group had only two weeks to read the papers and comment on them, thereby limiting the value of their input<sup>280</sup>. More substantial critiques included the lack of consideration of alternative governance system (beyond the status-quo)<sup>281</sup>, an “unquestioning acceptance of the technological status quo”<sup>282</sup>, a lack of objectivity and critical take on the ICANN<sup>283</sup>, and repeated critiques on the “anti-copyright bias” of the issue papers<sup>284</sup>. Besides the two opposed positions and the critiques raised at the WGIG, most of the comments were supportive of the work of the group and tried to feed the group with their perspectives.

The third meeting of the WGIG was divided into a day of public consultations on April, 18, 2005 and a closed meeting on April, 19-20. The group started to turn the working papers into a draft report and discussed the definition of Internet governance (McLean, 2005). The crucial question of the assessment of existing mechanism and the possible creation of new ones. Like in the broader

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278 Intervention by Yoshio Utsumi, ITU, during the first meeting of the WGIG on 23 November 2004, available at [www.wgig.org](http://www.wgig.org), last accessed through the Internet archive, 8 April 2014.

279 Not all the themes identified by the WGIG were developed into a draft paper. Excluded themes were: Internet leased lines, peering and interconnection, spectrum policy, national infrastructure development, developmental aspects, critical infrastructure protection, electronic authentication, applicable jurisdiction, cross border coordination, freedom of information and media, privacy, and open-source and free software.

280 See comments by the Free Software Foundation, Fundación Vía Libre, and Karl Auerbach, 14-15 February 2005, available at <http://www.wgig.org/Comments-Papers.html>, last accessed through the Internet Archive on 8 April 2014.

281 See comment by Saudi Arabia, 14 February 2005, available at <http://www.wgig.org/Comments-Papers.html>, last accessed through the Internet Archive on 8 April 2014.

282 See comment by Karl Auerbach, 14 February 2005, available at <http://www.wgig.org/Comments-Papers.html>, last accessed through the Internet Archive on 8 April 2014. This debate re-opened the question of the necessity of a single root to make the Internet stable and reliable. However, this debate remained limited to technical experts that were already involved in the debates of the 1990s like Karl Auerbach, Louis Pouzin or people from the IETF.

283 See comment by Milton Mueller on behalf of the Internet Governance Project, 15 February 2005, available at <http://www.wgig.org/Comments-Papers.html>, last accessed through the Internet Archive on 8 April 2014.

284 See for example comments by Allen Dixon, International Federation of the Phonographic Industry and Laurence Djolokian, Motion Picture Association, 16 February 2005, available at <http://www.wgig.org/Comments-Papers.html>, last accessed through the Internet Archive on 8 April 2014.

field of Internet governance, opinions within the group differed. The idea of a multistakeholder forum to continue the debate on these issues emerged. A questionnaire was distributed within the group and beyond by the secretariat to gather opinions on the institutions in charge of Internet governance (McLean, 2005)<sup>285</sup>.

While the need for a new forum was consensual *within* the group, the mandate of the forum and its composition ranged from a non-binding discussion forum, providing “non-directive advice on best practice, similar [to] the OECD”; to an authoritative policy-making body<sup>286</sup>. The less consensual options favoured by certain participants outside the WGIG did not seem to be discussed within the group. For example, the management of the Internet by the ITU or the creation of a purely intergovernmental body do not appear in the summary of responses to the questionnaire. The rejection of any changes to the existing mechanisms, as advocated by some members of the Internet Society and of the private sector does not appear either. This exclusion of alternative models in the WGIG in spite of the presence of representatives of counter-elites indicates not only the power dynamics within the group that are difficult to report because of the closed and non-archives nature of most of the debates, but also the socialisation process in favour of the power elites' views within the group.

During the open consultations of the meeting, the idea of creating a forum to discuss Internet issues was evoked by several WGIG members<sup>287</sup>. It was strongly supported by civil society representative from the Civil Society Gender Caucus and the Mark2 group<sup>288</sup>. The Indian representative also supported the creation of a forum<sup>289</sup>. However, some participants saw the forum as a decision-making body, and the Indian delegate also added the idea of an intergovernmental body<sup>290</sup>. Supporters of an intergovernmental institution included Saudi Arabia, China and even two WGIG members<sup>291</sup>. Syria supported the idea of a coordinating and enhanced role for the ITU<sup>292</sup>. While some arguments favoured innovative solutions and rejected existing intergovernmental organisations drawing upon a discourse of Internet exceptionalism, this discourse was criticised and

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285 A summary of the WGIG members' responses to the questionnaire is available at <http://www.wgig.org/docs/IG-questionnaire-response.pdf>, last accessed, 8 April 2014; further comments are available on the WGIG website at <http://www.wgig.org/Comments-Papers.html>, last accessed through the Internet Archive on 8 April 2014.

286 <http://www.wgig.org/docs/IG-questionnaire-response.pdf>, last accessed, 8 April 2014.

287 See interventions by William Drake and Wolfgang Kleinwächter during the open consultations. Transcript available at <http://www.wgig.org/>, last accessed through the Internet Archive on 8 April 2014.

288 Ibid.

289 Ibid.

290 Ibid.

291 Ibid. See in particular the interventions by Lyndall Shope-Mafole and Qiheng Hu.

292 Ibid.



the notion of sovereignty was waived by a number of governmental delegations. Moreover, the special role of the state, even in a multistakeholder context, was reaffirmed not only by supporters of intergovernmentalism, but also by the European Union<sup>293</sup>. Finally, the role and evolution of the Governmental Advisory Committee of the ICANN was also discussed through the questionnaire and during the consultations.

The open consultations of the fourth and last meeting of the WGIG took place before the final drafting of the report by the WGIG on 14-17 June 2005. The positions and the discussion were very similar to the ones in the third meeting. Brazil and the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) insisted on the creation of a forum. However, Brazil wanted a decision-making body. Only China and Syria continued to call for the creation of an intergovernmental body. While a strong support of the status-quo was expressed during the meeting by participants such as ICANN, Internet Society and the ICC, only some representative of the technical elite opposed the creation of a forum<sup>294</sup> and considered the openness of existing institutions satisfactory<sup>295</sup>. The WGIG had a small margin of manoeuvre as it started its closed retreat session in the Château de Bossey to finalise the report. The group decided to propose four models for future Internet governance institutions in order to reflect the diverse opinions expressed within the group and during the consultations (McLean, 2005).

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293 Ibid.

294 See interventions by Brian Carpenter, IETF, and Alejandro Pisanty, ICANN/WGIG. Transcript available at <http://www.wgig.org/>, last accessed through the Internet Archive on 8 April 2014.

295 Ibid. See intervention by Lynn St-Amour, ISOC.







Figure 8.2. Ideological proximity in the WGIG process



Two network visualisations of the debates help understand the position of the WGIG with regards to the broader field of Internet governance. Figure 8.2 illustrates the ideological proximity of the institutions that participated in the debates of the WGIG based on their statements during the process (see the complete data in Annex 4)<sup>296</sup>. It shows who was influential in the process. The group of blue nodes at the right of the figure represent the institutions supporting status-quo. Their *eigenvector* centrality degree is higher than the advocates of change located on the left of the network, as evidenced by their bigger size. Moreover, these actor form a closely connected group as measured by the coloured *k-core* groups. The WGIG stands between this group and the advocates of change at the left of the visualisation. This social network analysis allows for a quantitative visualisation of the structural domination of some actors in the process. The power elite supporting the *status-quo* made a greater number of comments and repeated the same shared arguments in spite of the diverging interests of its members. On the other hand, the less central position of the advocates of change illustrates the limited number of interventions (nodes are smaller and thus less central), and the lesser degree of cohesion among them. There is no *k-core* group for the counter-elites but a number of different groups. This means that there was no shared project and argumentation among non-dominant actors.

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<sup>296</sup> Figure 8.2 is a visualisation in NetDraw 2.123 (Borgatti, 2002) of a network of the links between institutions based on shared statements during the WGIG debates produced with Discourse Network Analyzer 1.30 (Leifeld, 2012). The data comes from the documents and transcripts available on the WGIG website and are based on an inductive qualitative content analysis. Each link represent a shared statement between two institutions (nodes). The size of a node depends on its *eigenvector* centrality, which can be in this case an indication of a widely-shared statement or of a repeated statement. The colour of a node is based on its inclusion within a *K-core* group of more closely connected nodes. According to this quantitative measure, the WGIG itself would pertain to the closely connected group of the supporters of the status-quo, together with institutions like the ICANN, the ICC, the Internet Society and countries like the USA and Australia.




Figure 8.3. Position of actors in the WGIG process

Figure 8.3 represents another visualisation of the same data<sup>297</sup>. Whereas figure 8.2 illustrates the structural position of the actors in the negotiation, figure 8.3 shows the type of position that were advocated by the different actors. Institutions are represented by red circled nodes and statements appear as blue squared nodes. The support to the status-quo is the most important category, closely related to the separation of technical and political issues and the support to the private sector leadership. The WGIG stands again in the middle, close to the Internet Governance Caucus and the Internet Governance TaskForce of Japan. A less-centralised group advocates for a special role for the state in multistakeholderism, an enhanced role for the ITU or the creation of a policy-making institution. Categories like the focus on sovereignty and the questioning of the US oversight on the ICANN also pertain to this loosely-related group. Once again, this visualisation indicates that the clear-cut categories of the first phase of the WSIS between supporters of the status-quo and advocates of change were blurred during the WGIG process. The WGIG process evidenced the more consensual character of the debates and the emergence of diverging views amongst advocates of change. The reluctance of the members of the Working Group to advocate for change is translated in figure 8.2 by the affiliation of the group within the defenders of the status-quo, While the group had a reformist potential, the overview of the debates as visualised through social network analysis shows the structural domination of the power elite and the impossibility for the WGIG to bring about profound change in the field.

Figure 8.4 represents quantitatively the participation of WGIG members in the WGIG meetings and consultations<sup>298</sup>. Social Network Analysis is here used as a way to show the unequal nature of participation in loosely-structured multistakeholder processes. Because of the nature of their arguments, and because of their relationship to other members of the WGIG, some participants were structurally dominant in the group. Whereas some members were not even present to all meetings and never spoke in the consultations, others were constant speakers and presented and defended the ideas included in the draft versions of the report. While no data is available on the closed meetings where the Chatham House rule prohibited the attribution of a particular idea to an individual, the

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297 Figure 8.3 is a visualisation in NetDraw 2.123 (Borgatti, 2002) of a network of the links between institutions and statements during the WGIG debates produced with Discourse Network Analyzer 1.30 (Leifeld, 2012). The data comes from the documents and transcripts available on the WGIG website and are based on an inductive qualitative content analysis. Each link represent an occurrence of a specific statement made by an institution. Node size is based on the *eigenvector* centrality measure, which illustrate the centrality of a statement during the debates based on the number of occurrence and the number of institutions that made the statement.

298 The figure 8.4 is a subset of the data used in figure 8.1.2 focused on the WGIG members. Red circled nodes are members of the WGIG (including chair and secretariat). Blue squared nodes are WGIG meetings. Node size depends on the *eigenvector* centrality of actors. Edges' width depend on the tie strength. Participation to a meeting is valued 1 for simple participation, 2 for commentators, 3 for speakers. Visualisation produced in NetDraw 2.123 (Borgatti, 2002).

open consultations clearly show the leading role of some WGIG members, as illustrated by figure 8.4. The elements outlined in the presentation of the composition of the group are elements that explain this fact. Individuals with ICANN experience knew more about Internet governance issues than the governmental delegates. This experience differential is expressed in the questionnaire to the WGIG members, where governments are described as ignorant (Kalas, 2007). Again, the previous socialisation of several of the WGIG members that were used to participate in the same events certainly played a role. The national capital (Bourdieu, 2005) of US nationals or native English speakers should not be underestimated either. During the presentation of the report, one member of the group pointed at the lack of translation as “maybe the biggest mistake” since a French-speaking member needed the assistance of the secretariat to follow the discussions, which certainly limited the impact of his contribution. The same problem occurred for other non-English speakers<sup>299</sup>. Raw power was also used by dominant actors in some occasions. For example, the discussion paper on intellectual property rights was drafted by a civil-society member, who described himself as critical. The paper was criticized by representatives of the private sector, and, instead of trying to reach consensus, the paper was vetoed and could not be published on the website. According to a WGIG member, the “private sector member's dislike of the paper meant that it was simply 'canned” (quoted in Flyverbom, 2011, pp. 80–81). On the contrary, an ideologically-biased paper on privatization of telecommunications drafted by a private sector member was endorsed by the group in spite of the critiques (Flyverbom, 2011, p. 81). The most vocal members of the working group contributed to a book edited by William Drake and published by the UN ICT Taskforce (Drake, 2005). Half of the WGIG members contributed, as well as the chair, the coordinator and some members of the secretariat. One chapter written by the Cuban and the Egyptian representatives criticized the market-driven management of international Internet connection costs and its consequences for developing countries. Two other chapters by the representative of the Internet Society of China and the Saudi delegate proposed intergovernmental solutions to Internet governance issue. One chapter by a Brazilian civil society representative envisioned a deep reform and internationalisation of the ICANN. The rest of the book was written by representatives of the private sector and representatives of the civil society, mostly scholars, and none of these contributions advocated for significant change in the field of Internet governance. These authors are members of the policy elite of Internet governance that has been in charge of the Internet Governance Forum since its creation (see next section).

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<sup>299</sup> See the intervention by Willy Jensen, transcript of the WGIG report presentation, 18 July 2005, afternoon, available at <http://wgig.org/July-scriptafternoon.html>, last accessed 8 April 2014.



The WGIG failed to fulfil the promises of a reformist agenda that many non-dominant actors had hoped. The composition of the group, the power dynamics within the group and beyond in the field of Internet governance, turned the work of the group into a weak-consensus building process without any radical consequences for the field of Internet governance. The principle of multistakeholderism was used as a way to give more power to the elites than to the counter-elites. The WGIG illustrate the predominance of power dynamics in multistakeholder settings. The loosely-institutional process of the WGIG, with no translation and consultations taking place only in Geneva, favoured the experienced and powerful actors. While the frontal opposition of the defenders of the status-quo and advocates of change was overcome during the WGIG process, it is certainly more because of the US-China agreement than because of the solutions proposed by the WGIG (see next section).

An interesting development triggered by the WGIG process is the emergence of two distinct counter-elites instead of the relatively unified group of the first phase of the Summit. Some governments relied on a sovereigntist discourse, as described in chapter 5. They were insisting on sovereignty and favoured existing intergovernmental organisations such as the ITU, other actors (civil society organisations and increasingly governments like the Brazilian one) advocated for the creation of a new institution, including multistakeholder participation, albeit with decision-making powers. This position can be described as “reformist” and draws upon elements of the sovereigntist discourse, but also from the global public good discourse. This type of discourse acknowledges the influence of cyber-libertarian ideas in the field of Internet governance and accepts the idea of the need of new types of multistakeholder institutions to manage the new telecommunication network. As a Syrian delegate put it:




Figure 8.4. . Composition of the WGIG

“We have heard today three views: status-quo by majority; we have heard people asking for a forum; and we have heard some people supporting the existing UN specialized organizations.”<sup>300</sup>

This perspective contrasts with the view of a debate between ITU and ICANN (Kleinwächter, 2004) and with the opposition of the first phase of the Summit. It is crucial in order to understand future developments in the field of Internet governance. The division within the counter-elite was instrumental for the power elite to find a way out of the politicisation of the WSIS and continues to affect the field of Internet governance. The report of the WGIG as well as the debates towards the last meeting of the preparatory committee of the WSIS took into account the two main concerns of the counter-elites separately.

### **8.1.3. From the WGIG report to the Tunis Agenda**

The report of the WGIG was presented on July, 18, 2005 in the form of a 25-page document, together with a background report including indications on the diverging opinions within the group and comments from participants to the WGIG process. The documents were structured in 5 sections: an introduction, a working definition of Internet governance, a section on public policy issues, a section on stakeholders and their role, and finally a section on recommendations and proposals for action.

The first substantial contribution of the WGIG to the field of Internet governance is the working definition of Internet governance:

“Internet governance is the development and application by Governments, the private sector and civil society, in their respective roles, of shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programmes that shape the evolution and use of the Internet.” (WGIG, 2005, §10)

The influence of political scientists in this definition is revealed by its proximity to the definition of international regimes by Krasner (1983). However, the definition acknowledges the role of non-state actors in international policy-making. The definition encompasses both technical management and political and social issues. While the definition of Internet governance in the 1990s had been restricted to a technical management of the network in order to justify the creation of a politically

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<sup>300</sup> Intervention by a Syrian delgate during the 4th meeting of the WGIG, 14 June 2005, afternoon session, transcript available at <http://www.wgig.org/June-scriptafternoon.html>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

unaccountable institution, the politicisation of the issue and the evolution of the field since the creation of the ICANN imposed a broad definition of Internet governance. A tripartite governance is described and intergovernmental organisations are excluded from the definition. The possible role of the existing specialised intergovernmental organisations like the ITU and other UN bodies is excluded from the definition of the field. This exclusion corresponds to the prevailing *doxa* of the field based notably on the principles of Internet exceptionalism and multistakeholderism.

Thirteen policy issues were identified in the report. Some of the issues to be tackled implied change in the existing governance system. For example, the unilateral control by the United States government over the administration of the root zone files and system was clearly identified as an important political issue (WGIG, 2005, §15). Some other issues were cautiously evoked, like the cost of interconnection for developing countries or the balance between intellectual property rights owners and the rights of users (WGIG, 2005, §16 and §23). However, the relation of these issues with the history of the existing system and the identification of the sources of the problem were not addressed.

The role of the different stakeholders was described in generic terms, but the balance between them remained unclear. The role of the private sector was broadly defined, including its contribution to the drafting of national laws and its participation in national and international policy development (WGIG, 2005, §31) On the other hand, civil society role was largely outside the decision-making process, as a link between policy-making and society. Three other categories of stakeholder are described in §33 and §34, although they were excluded from the definition of Internet governance: the academic community (“one of [the] main source of inspiration, innovation and creativity”), the technical community and international organisations and forums.

The picture offered by the description of the role of stakeholders is consistent with a neoliberal discourse. Governments are mainly responsible of creating an “enabling environment”, which is characterised in the Geneva declaration of 2003 as pro-competitive and liberalised. The private sector plays an extensive role of “self-regulation” and participate to political decision-making at all levels. Civil society is considered a counter-power outside the decision-making and a legitimising body. Finally, intergovernmental organisations are subsidiary instruments with a very limited role. The specific mention of academic and technical communities is still a reminiscence of the academic field of computer networking and the special role of the scientific and technical elite. This particularity of the field benefited, in turn, the social science and law scholars that participated in

the WGIG.

The final part presented proposals of action in 4 clusters of issues. First, the report recommends the creation of a dialogue forum. Such forum was designed as a non-binding institution that could at best make recommendations (WGIG, 2005, §40 and §47). Second, the issues of global policy-making related to Internet governance and the oversight of the technical management of the network. Since the views diverged within the group and in the field in general, four models were considered in the report:

- A UN-anchored Global Internet Council (GIC), consisting of representatives of governments with multistakeholder advisory groups. The GIC would replace the Governmental Advisory Committee (GAC) of the ICANN and also enter in a memorandum of understanding with the ICANN to replace the US Department of Commerce.
- No oversight organisation and a reform of the GAC to enhance its role within the ICANN.
- An International Internet Council (IIC) tackling policy issues related to Internet governance and replacing the US government with regards to the oversight of the ICANN.
- A Global Internet Policy Council (GIPC) as a government-led mechanism for public policy issues, coupled with a World ICANN (WICANN), an internationalised ICANN, and a Global Internet Governance Forum (GIGF).

Three of the four models implied the creation of a new institution with decision-making powers. However, none of the proposed model implied the replacement of the ICANN and the Regional Internet Registries, and none addressed the issue of standardisation. As a result, the four proposed models were more conservative than some of the proposals during the WGIG consultations. In this sense, the WGIG fulfilled a hegemony-building role for the existing system by reducing the scope of the possibilities in future negotiations. The final recommendations on the policy issues identified in the second section of the report remained very consensual and did not consider substantial change either. It should be noted that while none of these proposals represented the claims of the counter-elites – the most conservative one – the second model, prevailed. The report presented elements of a weak consensus that was discussed in the third meeting of the WSIS preparatory committee: the creation of an Internet Governance Forum, and some measure to promote the internationalisation and an enhanced participation in the current system. Other elements of the consensus were discussed outside the WGIG.

While the WGIG report addressed the need for internationalisation of the ICANN, and for the creation of a new institution; and recommends the creation of an Internet Governance Forum, it did not address the concern expressed by many developing countries concerning sovereignty on the Internet. The sovereigntist counter-elite was supported by important actors such as China and the Arab countries. They advocated for a return to intergovernmental institutions like the ITU in order to protect their sovereignty over their country-code top-level domain as well as on the national part of the network. As we have seen, the ITU had been historically linked with the idea of sovereign countries, allowed to manage telecommunications at a national level, especially through a monopolistic public telecommunication firm. In spite of the participation of the private sector in technical bodies, the ITU was still an intergovernmental institution and was thus seen as a more appropriate institution to defend the sovereign rights of governments. The involvement of the ITU could in this view guarantee the observation of “national sovereign rights of each State to organize the use of the Internet nationally”<sup>301</sup>. China was the leading sovereigntist government because of the importance of Chinese Internet users and because of the representation of Chinese interests in the WGIG through the Internet Society of China:

“The authorization to the body who is taking care about the core resources of the Internet should be legally authorized by a multilateral process, by a multilateral that is – How to say that? – the sovereign states, that is the right of the sovereign states to select or delegate the right to a body, not – say, ICANN or something like that, to take care about the strategic resources of the Internet for them.”<sup>302</sup>

The US government decided to address the sovereigntist issue directly since it was not participating in the WGIG. On June 30, 2005, the US government published a document on “US. Principles on the Internet's Domain Name and Addressing System”<sup>303</sup>. While two of the four principles were supporting the status-quo and the ICANN, one was the recognition from the US government of the right of each country to manage its country-code top-level domain in a sovereign manner. The last principle was the need for a forum of dialogue on Internet governance issues. As a consequence, the Chinese government, which acted as the leader of the sovereigntist movement, stopped its attacks on the existing system during the WSIS (Kleinwächter, 2008). As the preparatory process of the second

301 Intervention by the Syria representative during the open consultation of the third meeting of the WGIG on 18 April 2005, available at [www.wgig.org](http://www.wgig.org), last accessed through the Internet archive 8 April 2014.

302 Intervention by Qiheng Hu, Internet Society of China and WGIG member, during the third meeting of the WGIG on 18 April 2005, available at [www.wgig.org](http://www.wgig.org), last accessed through the Internet archive 8 April 2014. The arguments used by the Chinese delegation were similar.

303 Document published on the U.S National Telecommunications and Information Administration on June, 30, 2005 ; available at <http://www.ntia.doc.gov/other-publication/2005/us-principles-internets-domain-name-and-addressing-system>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

phase of the WSIS entered in its last step (the third meeting of the Preparatory Committee), the balance between the power elite and the counter-elites was affected both by the WGIG process and by the US government's actions. Like for the first phase, enduring discussions about Internet governance resulted in the organisation of a second round of negotiations and PrepCom 3 was divided into two events. As shown in figure 8.5, China remained silent during the two events of the third meeting of the WSIS preparatory committee. Other advocates of sovereigntism, like Venezuela and Iran, were isolated in their support of an intergovernmental organisation. Intergovernmentalism was excluded from Internet governance by definition in the WGIG report, and in the debates by the silencing of China.

This situation led to an unprecedented situation, where a proposal by the European Union became the most reformist option since it advocated for an extensive internationalisation of Internet governance. The European Union proposal reiterated its adhesion to principles supported by the defenders of the status-quo like the improvement of current institutions rather than their replacement, the need to contribute to the stability of the system, and the separation of policy issues (tackled by governments) and day-to-day technical management (carried out by the existing institutions)<sup>304</sup>. However, the tasks of the new cooperation model encompassed tasks that were already dealt with by the existing system:

“The new cooperation model should include the development and application of globally applicable public policy principles and provide an international government involvement at the level of principles over the following naming, numbering and addressing-related matters:

- a. Provision for a global allocation system of IP number blocks, which is equitable and efficient;
- b. Procedures for changing the root zone file, specifically for the insertion of new top level domains in the root system and changes of ccTLD managers;
- c. Establishment of contingency plans to ensure the continuity of crucial DNS functions;
- d. Establishment of an arbitration and dispute resolution mechanism based on international law in case of disputes;
- e. Rules applicable to DNS system.”<sup>305</sup>

With the divided and partly co-opted counter-elites marginalised in the meeting, the debate took place within the power elite and evidenced the limited cohesion of the elite. While the European Union defended the *doxa* of the field, the unilateral oversight of the US government was

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304 EU/UK proposal during the PrepCom 3, Geneva, 28 September 2005, §63, available at [www.itu.int/wsis](http://www.itu.int/wsis), last accessed 8 April 2014.

305 Ibid. §64.

problematic for European actors. Moreover, the WSIS took place only two years after the US intervention in Iraq and strong transatlantic divisions remained. The US government criticised the proposal and feared that the unclear boundary between the level of principles and the level of day-to-day operations might lead to an involvement of governments, specifically European ones, in the functioning of the ICANN system (Kleinwächter, 2008, p. 22). While the conflict between the two fractions of the power elite was not resolved during the PrepCom, the rejection of the new cooperation model and the inclusion of a process towards “enhanced cooperation” in the Tunis Agenda can be seen as a compromise (see below).

As the following figure 8.5 shows<sup>306</sup>, the PrepCom 3 marginalised counter-elites and emphasised some consensual elements. For example, the support of the WGIG report and above all, the support of the status-quo in the field are the most shared statements. Relatively consensual statements include the internationalisation of the existing system and enhanced participation, the creation of an Internet Governance Forum, the new principle of sovereignty and the classic *doxa* principles of pro-competitiveness of the institutional environment, multistakeholderism, and the separation between technical management and policy issues. Some remaining issues included the means to improve access and connectivity in developing countries. Some insisted on the uneven share of the burden of the costs of international connectivity, while others focused on the need for a pro-competitive environment to ensure a more affordable telecommunication system. Another issue was the importance of open-source software for development. Some participants argued that open-source software was essential in the development of the information society, while others refused to favour a particular model for software development. The inclusion of specific paragraphs on human rights or the mentioning of concrete elements for a future reform of the ICANN were also debated. Some consensual statements such as the need for an Internet governance Forum included different perspectives on the nature and the mandate of such forum. While diverging views remained, the importance of the argument favouring the status-quo and the predominance of commentators such as the CCBI, the debates of the PrepCom 3 evidence the failure of the reformist projects.

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306 Figure 8.5 is a network visualisation of the debates during the two meetings of PreCom 3, in Geneva in September 2005 and in Tunis in November 2005. Circled red nodes represent actors and blue squared nodes represent statements. Node size is based on the *eigenvector* centrality measure and illustrate the frequency of a statement and of the closest statements related to it. Visualisation was based on data treated with Discourse Network Analyzer 1.30 (Leifeld, 2012) and was realised in NetDraw 2.123 (Borgatti, 2002).





Against this background, the outcome of the Tunis Summit, the Tunis Agenda, failed to reform the field of Internet governance (WSIS, 2005). Almost half of the Tunis Agenda was dedicated to Internet governance (WSIS, 2005, §29 to 82). The Agenda recalled the principles established in Geneva (see chap.7) and the working definition of Internet governance drafted by the WGIG. While consistent with the multistakeholder *doxa* of the field, the Agenda relied on a slightly different list of stakeholders, adding intergovernmental organisations and international organisations to the tripartite perspective of the WGIG limited to states, the private sector and civil society. International organisations was used to refer to private institutions such as the ICANN or the Regional Internet Registries (WSIS, 2005, §35). The reference to the technical and academic communities within the various stakeholder groups also made its way from the WGIG report to the Tunis Agenda (WSIS, 2005, §36). The Tunis Agenda recommends concrete steps to improve access and connectivity; for example through the creation of regional backbones and Internet exchange points. However, no particular actor was designated to achieve these goals and the first requirement was the need for a competitive environment rather than the pro-active effort demanded by developing countries (WSIS, 2005, §50).

The Tunis Agenda supported the existing principles and institutions of the field of Internet governance. §54 reiterated the importance of private-sector led development of the Internet and of pro-competitive environments. §55 endorsed the ICANN system and privatised management of the Internet. Moreover, §57 stressed the need to maintain the stability and security of the Internet, which was one of the main argument of the supporters of the status-quo (WSIS, 2005). This is why the Tunis Agenda can be seen as an important step towards the hegemony of the power elite. Counter-elites were silenced by the WGIG process and by bilateral arrangements. Moreover, the UN summit entailed a renewed legitimacy for the existing system and a broader support of non-elites.

The concerns of sovereignist countries were addressed in §63 that acknowledged the sovereignty of countries over their country-code top-level domain. Other disagreements were addressed by §65 on the need to maximise the participation of developing countries and by §67 that appealed for the creation of a new multistakeholder forum for continuous dialogue on Internet governance issues. §77 made clear that such dialogue forum was to be non-binding and with no oversight functions (WSIS, 2005).

In spite of a general support to the status-quo, the Tunis Agenda left a door open for deeper reforms in the field of Internet governance. Three paragraphs, based on the European proposal of a new cooperation mechanism, entailed possible change in the governance system:

“68. We recognize that all governments should have an equal role and responsibility for international Internet governance and for ensuring the stability, security and continuity of the Internet. We also recognize the need for development of public policy by governments in consultation with all stakeholders.

69. We further recognize the need for enhanced cooperation in the future, to enable governments, on an equal footing, to carry out their roles and responsibilities, in international public policy issues pertaining to the Internet, but not in the day-to-day technical and operational matters, that do not impact on international public policy issues.

70. Using relevant international organizations, such cooperation should include the development of globally-applicable principles on public policy issues associated with the coordination and management of critical Internet resources. In this regard, we call upon the organizations responsible for essential tasks associated with the Internet to contribute to creating an environment that facilitates this development of public policy principles.” (WSIS, 2005)

These three paragraphs were later used as the legal basis for a UN-led process towards reform in the field of Internet governance, mainly under the initiative of emerging powers (see chap. 9). Besides this breach, the Tunis Agenda was favouring the status-quo more than the Geneva principles. The evolution from the Geneva process to the Tunis Agenda, through the WGIG and other dialogues, is a successful attempt by the power elite to maintain its power. The separation of technical and political issues that had started in Geneva, was fulfilled in the Tunis Agenda with the exclusion of “day-to-day technical and operational matters” from public policy issues. While this differentiation is in fact impossible to make, its existence as a principle in the Tunis Agenda was a victory of the power elite against politicisation of Internet governance. The support expressed by the Tunis Agenda to the existing governance system demonstrates the failure of the counter-elite to seriously challenge the ICANN system during the WSIS. The *doxa* of the field of Internet governance, relying on multistakeholderism, pro-competitive environment, private-sector leadership and Internet exceptionalism not only survived the WSIS, but it also permeated the broader field of international telecommunications, as evidenced by the use of the same vocabulary for Internet governance and for the Information Society in general in the Tunis Agenda. While principles and institutions were strengthened and legitimised by the WSIS, the power elite was reconfigured and individual actors changed. The Internet Governance Forum is one of the most striking example of the rise of a policy-

oriented specialised elite rooted in civil society organisations. Its support to the status-quo in the field of Internet governance allowed for its integration to the power elite.

## ***8.2. The Internet Governance Forum as a new hegemonic project***

The WSIS was a threat for the existing order in the field of Internet governance. The first phase of the summit evidenced the division between the power elite and the counter-elites. However, through the WGIG process and the preparatory process of the Tunis phase, the situation changed and the power elite was reconfigured. Still, the power elite managed to maintain its domination over the field. The main outcome of the WSIS process for the field of Internet governance was the institutionalisation of the power of the civil-society elite and the separation of the technical and political issues. The situation of the field at the end of the WSIS can be considered as the most stable configuration in the history of Internet governance since it prefigured and has structured the debates until now.

### **8.2.1. Reconfiguration of the power elite and the IGF**

The power elite of Internet governance that unified at the end of the 1990s around the creation of the ICANN had been challenged in the early 2000s. An academic counter-elite had been criticising the lack of legitimacy and openness of the ICANN, developing countries' governments complained about their exclusion from Internet governance and hackers saw the ICANN system as a corruption of the cyber-libertarian ideal (see chapter 6). During the WSIS, these counter-elites were joined by civil society organisations focusing on broader issues like the right to communicate in their critique of the existing system. The WGIG process and its main outcome for the field of Internet governance, the Internet Governance Forum, generated a reconfiguration of the power elite, and a stabilisation of its power at the same time. The new institutional landscape and the new dominant imaginary of the field allowed for a renewed interchangeability and for an enhanced ideological cohesion within the power elite.

First, the WSIS process and the creation of the IGF were instrumental for the co-optation of counter-elites. The academic specialised elite became an important part of the civil-society elite that can be found in key positions at the IGF as well as in several advisory bodies at different levels (see next section for concrete examples). The former counter-elite of the turn of the millennium was co-opted by the creation of new institution and by a discourse on multistakeholderism that granted

them a specific role and a place at the table of future negotiations. An important part of the “civil society” stakeholder group includes scholars since the WSIS, most of them in the realm of law and social sciences. The specialised civil-society elite is also involved in the ICANN system through its most political bodies and sometimes serve in boards of institutions like the Regional Internet Registries. With the creation of the IGF and their inclusion in the power elite, the academic counter-elite softened their critiques of the ICANN system. The IGF, with its organisation in panels with keynote speakers in the plenary sessions provides an environment very similar to an academic conference and allow for an important participation and influence by the former academic counter-elite. If we look at the literature on Internet governance and to the programs of the various events of the main scholarly association on the issue, the Global Internet Governance Academic Network, the studies that are critical of the existing system tend to occupy a more reduced space than it was the case in the early 2000s, and during the WSIS (see chapter 2 for a literature review).

As we have seen, the co-optation of the developing countries counter-elite was done in two steps. The co-optation of sovereignist countries relied on the acceptance of a country's sovereign rights on its country-code top-level domain. This concession was made by the power elite in exchange of a support to the ICANN system by sovereignist countries, and particularly China (Kleinwächter, 2008). Furthermore, ICANN representatives made clear that the Governmental Advisory Committee of the ICANN would evolve<sup>307</sup>. Since the WSIS, the attitude of the US Department of Commerce regarding its oversight of ICANN activities also evolved. The term of the Memorandum of Understanding between the ICANN and the Department of Commerce in 2006 was announced as an important reform. The MoU was replaced by a Joint Project Agreement. While the changes were not substantial<sup>308</sup>, the change of attitude and vocabulary illustrated the efforts by the power elite to satisfy the sovereignist counter-elite. The co-optation of “reformist” powers that called for the creation of a new institution was made possible through the creation of the IGF. For example, the second IGF took place in 2007 in Brazil. The open character of the IGF ensured an increased visibility of developing countries. Like the academic elite, a strong representation of people from developing countries and reformist powers like Brazil in the specialised civil-society elite illustrates the reconfiguration of the power elite that had remained centred around the OECD countries. Participation to the Multistakeholder Advisory Group of the IGF and to other policy-oriented bodies, even within the ICANN, became more diverse since the WSIS. However, the co-optation of

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307 See the address by the President and CEO of ICANN during PrepCom 3, in Tunis on November 14, available at <http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs2/pc3/contributions/sca/Resumed/ICANN-A.pdf>, last accessed, 8 April 2014.

308 See “ICANN new MoU: Old Wine in a New Bottle”, by Milton Mueller, posted on the Internet Governance Project blog at <http://www.internetgovernance.org/2006/09/30/icanns-new-mou-old-wine-in-a-new-bottle/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

the counter-elite of developing countries seems less effective than the co-optation of the academic elite. The exercise of hegemony is a fine balance between concessions and the maintenance of the bulk of domination (Gramsci, 1999). In this case, the concessions were very limited. The acceptance by sovereignist countries of the perpetuation of the ICANN system was only possible for a limited period of time (Kleinwächter, 2008) and depended on future reforms of the ICANN. However, the termination of the Memorandum of Understanding between the ICANN and the US Department of Commerce did not give birth to a more acceptable situation for sovereignist countries. Likewise, reformist powers led by some emerging states and civil society organisations wanted a decision-making body, or at least a dialogue able to produce recommendations. However, the IGF remained a dialogue and its relation to policy-making was indirect. As such, the Internet Governance Forum could not embody the reform advocated by reformist powers. Despite this imperfect co-optation of the counter-elite of developing countries, the power elite managed to silence the counter-elite at the end of the WSIS and undermined its mobilisation efforts for several years (see chapter 9).

Second, the creation of the IGF institutionalised some form of resistance while excluding radical actors. By providing a space outside the ICANN system to discuss Internet governance issues, the creation of the IGF represented an institutionalisation of some forms of resistance. As Cox (1981) described it, the institutionalisation of resistance is essential for hegemony. While resistance grew outside the institutions controlled by the power elite before the WSIS, the IGF constituted a space for controlled resistance. For example, the IGF became the main space where the possible transfer of the ICANN control to the “international community” was discussed and the unilateral control of the US government was criticised<sup>309</sup>. However, several factors have limited the extent of the resistance within the IGF. First, the stakeholder balance rules have made sure that a representative of the ICANN system participate in each panel. Second, the socialisation process and the consensual character of the discussions have prevented radical discourses<sup>310</sup>. Third, the relatively limited attendance (usually below 2000) and awareness have limited the participation to a small number of organisations, whose work is closely related to Internet governance. These organisations are generally headed by members of the civil society elite that are for the most part supportive of the *status-quo*. However, the non-binding character of the forum and its relative openness favoured the emergence of critical discourses within the IGF more than within the ICANN system. Thus, the

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309 See the chairman's summaries of the IGF annual meetings at [www.intgovforum.org](http://www.intgovforum.org), last accessed 8 April 2014. For example, the issue was discussed at length in Rio de Janeiro in 2007.

310 First-time participants are offered an introductory session where the functioning of the IGF is presented. Many young participants are funded by the Internet Society through the ISOC ambassador program.

IGF can be described as a form of institutionalisation of hegemony and a taming of resistance, which is necessary for the power elite to be able to exercise its domination in the field. The most radical actors had been excluded after the ICANN election of 2000 (see chapter 6). During the Geneva Summit, hackers and hacktivists held a parallel event. In Tunis, many local civil society organisations were quasi-governmental organisations. In a discussion of civil society's participation in the WSIS, Ralf Bendrath, from the Heinrich Böll Foundation summarised the problem:

“Civil society has to avoid being drawn too much into the official process and resist the temptation to replicate the intergovernmental structures. Otherwise, it will end up with a group of professional NGOs that are recognized by the governments, belong to the international conference and policy jet-set, even might have some influence here and there, but are more or less decoupled from the grassroots work and the more radical positions of the broader social movements. As a participant at the Berlin meeting stated, 'multi-stakeholder processes are enabling and including, but also disciplining'”.<sup>311</sup>

While the concern expressed by Bendrath refers to governments and intergovernmental structures, it could also be related to the power of the elite in multistakeholder processes. While some NGOs become part of the “policy jet-set”, more radical movements are excluded. As a result, the existing order has sometimes been criticised in the IGF, but never in a radical way or by a large number of organisations and individuals. The situation of the first phase of the WSIS in Geneva, where a deep and comprehensive challenging of the ICANN system was supported by a majority of participants never happened again. This is why the Geneva declaration is still seen as the most radical document on Internet governance, notably because of the intergovernmental nature of the processes described in the Geneva declaration. The WGIG and the Tunis Agenda are considered more favourable to the status-quo<sup>312</sup>. While no document of similar significance for the field of Internet governance has been drafted after the WSIS, the tone of the discussions currently exclude the repetition of such a momentum.

Third, and perhaps more importantly, the Tunis Agenda and the creation of the IGF provided the

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311 Ralf Bendrath, “Civil Society processes in WSIS Phase II: Adaptation of working methods started, lessons still to be learned”, posted on the Heinrich Böll Foundation website on the WSIS, available at <http://www.worldsummit2003.de/en/web/379.htm>, last accessed 8 April 2014. Quoted in (Raboy, Landry, & Shtern, 2010, p. 84).

312 This reference is present in the Internet Governance Caucus mailing-list discussion, see for example the e-mail by Wolfgang Kleinwächter on 19 January 2013, where he states “If you read carefully the references in the ITU documents than they go back to the Geneva 2003 declaration which gives the governments the "only" role to decide on public policy issues related to the Internet by just "consulting" non-governmental stakeholders. This approach ignores widely the WGIG report and the Tunis Agenda which goes beyond Geneva and proposed "shared" policy development and decision making procedures.”

basis for a broader support to the status-quo. The WSIS was a large and open UN meeting. The recognition by the WSIS of the existing system of Internet governance was an unprecedented legitimisation of the ICANN system. While the ICANN had been criticised for its lack of legitimacy because of the process that led to its creation, the WSIS involved all member-states of the ITU, a number of intergovernmental representatives, a large civil society participation and an active business input mechanism. Moreover, the WSIS process lasted over two years. All of the possible options and discourses were represented during the WSIS, even if the structural domination of the power elite and the *doxa* of the field prevented any substantial change. The ICANN system and the power elite were strengthened and legitimised by the Summit. While legitimacy had been an issue for the power elite since the creation of the ICANN and unresolved by the 2002 ICANN reform, the WSIS generated a positive view of the ICANN. Redeemed from its original sin, the ICANN is now considered by some people an example of a legitimate institution, more than the WSIS or the ITU (Take, 2012). The WSIS thus affected the relationship between the power elite and non-elites in the field. The WSIS gave the institutions of Internet governance more visibility. Instead of a relatively small but very polarised field, the WSIS gave birth to a larger field with more legitimate institutions and a with broader base of non-elite actors accepting the existing order as a starting point for further discussions. Internet users amounted to one billion at the end of the WSIS<sup>313</sup>, almost 20 thousand individuals attended the Tunis summit, which main issue was Internet governance. Compared with the less than 150 million users<sup>314</sup> and less than a thousand individuals involved at the time of the creation of the ICANN, the field of Internet governance had evolved considerably and had become an important sub-field of telecommunication governance. The endorsement by the WSIS of the existing governance system was thus an important step in the maturation of the field.

Finally, the WSIS process perpetuated and reinforced the institutional fragmentation of the field. While the creation of an overarching institution tackling all issues related to Internet governance was supported by some participants, the power elite managed to maintain the fragmentation of the management of the network. At the eve of the WGIG process, the International Chamber of Commerce had produced a matrix of initiatives related to Internet governance in order to show that most Internet-related policy issues were already addressed<sup>315</sup>. The ICC identified three levels of initiatives: initiatives by national governments, by intergovernmental organisations and by the private sector. According to the ICC, most issues were addressed by private initiatives, ranging from

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313 According to the Internet World Statistics, available at <http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm>, through the Internet archive for previous years, last accessed 8 April 2014.

314 See <http://www.allaboutmarketresearch.com/internet.htm>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

315 Document available at <http://www.wgig.org/docs/icc.pdf>, last accessed through the Internet Archive 8 April 2014.



formal institutions like the ICANN to commercial negotiations among Internet service providers; Intergovernmental organisations as diverse as the ITU, the OECD, the WTO, the WIPO, the Council of Europe and other regional organisations were involved depending on the issue. Moreover, each issue also relied on a national legislation. As repeatedly stated by the ICC representatives, this complex matrix was sufficient and more appropriate than “top-down governance”. The WSIS did little to change the situation. It added an Internet Governance Forum encompassing all policy-related issues and started a process towards enhanced cooperation between all these actors. The fragmentation of governance prevented any democratic control of the management of the network. In spite of the pluralism that such fragmentation could have implied, the power elite was able to circulate and to act as brokers between the various institutions. The circulation of different elites between institutions is illustrated in table 8.2. Moreover, the Internet Governance Forum became the main institution that organised a civil society elite (see next section). The lack of a “one-stop shop” for Internet governance – as it was sometimes referred to during the WSIS – multiplied the need for resources to be able to follow Internet governance issues. It also prevented cross-issue mobilisation, as witnessed during the first phase of the WSIS. The institutional fragmentation of the field of Internet governance has, thus, been instrumental for the power elite to maintain its power. Similarly, the multiplication of forums and events has strengthened the position of the specialised civil-society elite that became an important part of the power elite. The rhetorical separation between technical and political issues is related to the creation of two specialised elites: the managing and the civil-society elite. However, as the next section shows, the specialisation of fractions of the power elite does not undermine its cohesion and the two elites are usually able to circulate between different bodies of the same institutions, and in multistakeholder groups and events.

### **8.2.2. Specialised elites in the power elite**

The reconfiguration of the power elite resulted from the empowerment of a specialised civil-society elite, participating in the increasingly numerous institutions of the field. The civil-society elite joined the already existing power elite of technical experts, business representatives and of political elite individuals working for powerful governments.

The power elite that unified around the project of the ICANN system in the late 1990s participated in the WSIS through institutions like the International Chamber of Commerce, the World Information and Telecommunication Service Alliance, the Internet Society, the Internet Engineering TaskForce, the regional registries, the ICANN and the supporting governments. Most of the

individuals that represented these institutions during the WSIS have a profile that is similar to the profile of most Internet governance elite in the 1990s. They have backgrounds in network engineering or intellectual property law, they advised or served as civil servants for dominant governments, worked in telecommunication or computer manufacturing firms and held important positions in the ICANN system.

Table 8.2 presents biographical information of some examples of very active WGIG participants in order to analyse circulation among the power elite<sup>316</sup>. It focuses on three type of circulation that are characteristic of the power elite: the national/transnational, the public/private and the institutional circulations.

The circulation between domestic organisations and international activities is a pattern that can be found for all specialised elites. Earlier affiliation to powerful institutions in their home country is an asset for individuals that become powerful in a transnational field. The combination of national capital – all of the examples shown in the table are from OECD countries – and international experience seems to be a common background of the power elite.

The mix of public-sector and private-sector experience is common to technical and political elites. The technical-scientific elite often relies on public funding for its research. They are sometimes affiliated with public universities. Political elite with private sector experience were likely to be more comfortable in the field of privatised Internet governance than lifetime civil servants. On the other hand, the business elite does not generally need experience in the public sector.

More important to our definition of a power elite is the circulation between institutions of Internet governance. Members of the power elite tend to represent their organisations in a variety of Internet-related forums. This is illustrated by the relatively small number of different participants in conferences, panels, expert groups and decision-making bodies of Internet governance. They also circulate chronologically between institutions. Most individuals have experience both in the ICANN system, and in the WSIS/IGF circles. Technical bodies also have more political positions (for example the board of trustees of the regional Internet Registries) that allow for non-technical elites to participate in their management. Technical elites are included in political forums based on their

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316 Sources for the biographical information include [www.netcaucus.org](http://www.netcaucus.org), [www.linkedin.com](http://www.linkedin.com), [www.wileyrein.com/](http://www.wileyrein.com/), [www.icannwiki.com](http://www.icannwiki.com); [www.wikipedia.com](http://www.wikipedia.com), [www.icann.org](http://www.icann.org), [www.vanityfair.com](http://www.vanityfair.com), [www.cs.auckland.ac.nz](http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz), [www.internetsociety.org](http://www.internetsociety.org), [www.intgovforum.org](http://www.intgovforum.org), [www.ripe.net](http://www.ripe.net), [www.Intgov.net](http://www.Intgov.net), [www.cyberlaw.harvard.edu](http://www.cyberlaw.harvard.edu), [www.muguet.com](http://www.muguet.com), [www.ietf.org](http://www.ietf.org), [www.iab.org](http://www.iab.org), [www.wgig.org](http://www.wgig.org), and Steele (2007), Mueller (2002), Mathiason (2008), Drake (2005).

“hands-on” knowledge of the Internet. As a result, there are no purely technical or purely political institutions headed by different specialised elites but rather a combination of different specialised elites in each Internet governance institution.

Table 8.2 illustrates the interchangeability of the elite as described by Wright Mills. A board member of a “technical” organisation such as the ICANN can be a former representative of a government during the WSIS that later created an NGO participating to the Internet governance Forum. He can then use his experience and network to work for a large transnational Internet company. The multiple affiliations of elite members and their circulation among institutions of the field of Internet governance are the two elements of what Wright Mills described as an interchangeable power elite.

Name	Specialised elite	Nationality	Education	National-Transnational Circulation		Public-Private Circulation		Institutional circulation in Internet governance
				Domestic experience	International experience	Non-Profit experience	Private experience	
Richard Beard	Political	US	PhD (University of Colorado)	US public administration	ITU council, Intelsat conferences, OECD Committee for Information, Computers and Communication Policy	US Department of State, Department of Commerce (NTIA)	AT&T, Wiley Rein LLP	NTIA, ITU council, OECD committee for information, computers and communication policy, US delegation at the WSIS*
Paul Twomey	Political	Australian	PhD in International Relations (Cambridge)	Australian public administration and consulting firms	Australian representative at WTO, OECD, APEC	Australian Trade Commission, Australia National Office for the Information Economy and Technology, founding chair of WEF's Global Agenda Council, advisory board of UN Digital Health Initiative	McKinsley & Company, own consulting and investment firm, Atlantic Council (US)	President and CEO of the ICANN*, WTO, OECD, chair of the ICANN Governmental Advisory Committee, WSIS
Mark Esseboom	Political	Dutch	Technical degree (Wisconsin-Madison)	Dutch public administration and diplomacy	OECD, EU presidency representative at the WSIS*	Dutch ministries and Diplomacy	IBM (post-WSIS)	WSIS, WGIG
Raymond Plzak	Technical	US	Technical degree (Wisconsin-Madison)	US Department of Defense and US companies	ICANN and IETF	US Department of Defense	Network Solutions, SAIC (DoD contractor)	American Registry for Internet Numbers*, Number Resource Organisation*, IETF*, Network Solutions, WSIS

\* Affiliation during the WSIS

Table 8.2. Elite profiles during the WSIS: specialised elites and circulation<sup>317</sup>

317 Author's elaboration from a number of biographical sources on 14 randomly-selected individuals with criteria such as important participation in the WGIG process, and diversity in terms of geography, gender and type of specialised elite. The purpose of the table is to highlight certain features that are common to several members of specialised elites or of the power elite. This method is inspired by critical prosopography. However, it does not intend to be a

Name	Specialise d elite	National ity	Education	National-Transnational Circulation		Public-Private Circulation		Institutional circulation in Internet governance
				Domestic experience	International experience	Non-Profit experience	Private experience	
Geoff Huston	Technical	Australian	-	Telstra	Internet Architecture Board	Australian National University, Australian University System	Telstra	Asia-Pacific Network Information Center*, IETF*, chair of the Internet Architecture Board*, WSIS
Brian Carpenter	Technical	UK	PhD in Computer Science	Universities of the US and New Zealand	CERN networking group (participated in the invention of the www)	CERN, honorary professor at the university of Auckland, Teacher at Massey University (NZ)	IBM	IETF*, chairman of the IETF, WSIS
Axel Pawlik	Technical	German	-	German universities	Réseaux IP Européens (RIPE)*	University of Dortmund	Creator of EuNet Deutschland GmbH	Réseaux IP Européens*, WSIS
Theresa Swineheart	Business	US	Law degree	MCI	ICANN	-	Director of e-commerce for MCI, executive director for Internet policy at Verizon	ICANN*, Board of Trustees of Internet Society, Multistakeholder Advisory Group of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF-MAG) since its creation
Ayesha Hassan	Business	French	Law degree, Master in International Policy Studies (Stanford)	Law firms	International Chamber of Commerce*, intergovernmental organisations (ICC representative)	-	Law firms	G8 DOTForce, WGIG, IGF-MAG, OECD, ICANN, UNESCO, IGF, ITU, EU, CoE
Lynn St Amour	Business	US	-	US transnational firms	Internet Society	-	General electric, DEC, AT&T	President and CEO of Internet Society*, WSIS
Marilyn Cade	Business	US	-	NGOs, ICT companies, TechAmerica	ITU, OECD, APEC, and ICANN, G20 ICT policy network,	NGOs, NetDialogue (joint Harvard-Stanford research project)*	Own consulting firm*, AT&T, ICC*	WGIG, ITU, OECD, ICANN business constituency*, UN Working group on improvements to the IGF, IGF

comprehensive prosopographical approach.

Name	Specialised elite	Nationality	Education	National-Transnational Circulation		Public-Private Circulation		Institutional circulation in Internet governance
				Domestic experience	International experience	Non-Profit experience	Private experience	
Wolfgang Kleinwächter	Civil Society	German	PhD International law and IR (Leipzig)	Universities in Finland, Russia, and the US, currently in Aarhus* (DK)	Evaluator of EU programmes, International Association for Media and Communication Research international council, German UNESCO Commission	European universities	-	ICANN membership information taskforce, ICANN At-Large steering group, ICANN NomComs, WGIG, UN, ITU, OECD, UNESCO, UNICTTF, ICANN board member (since 2013)
Izumi Aizu	Civil Society	Japanese	-	Internet Governance Taskforce of Japan*	G8 DOTForce	co-creator of GLOCOM at the University of Japan, Japan Internet Domain Name Council	Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (IPv6 advanced use study group)	ICANN membership committee, ICANN at-large advisory committee, G8 DOTForce, Internet Governance Caucus, Civil Society WGIG NomCom, IGF-MAG
Bertrand de La Chappelle	Civil Society	French	French <i>Grandes Ecoles</i> (Polytechnique, Sciences Po, ENA)	French Ministry of foreign Affairs	UN CSTD, International Diplomatic Academy	French Ministry of foreign Affairs, Director of Internet and Jurisdiction research project	Founder of an IT company, think-tank	UNCSTD, Civil Society WGIG NomCom, IGF-MAG, ICANN board (2010-2013)

The members of the original power elite of Internet governance were joined during the WSIS by other members with different backgrounds. Some of these new members were originally members of counter-elites but were satisfied by the evolution of Internet governance and the possibility of

their increased participation. They can be described as a specialised civil-society elite since they entered the field of Internet governance through the policy discussions rather than from the technical management of the network or its commercial exploitation. Similarly to the political elite of dominant states in the 1990s, the civil-society elite became involved in an already structured field and found their place in the institutional framework of the field. However, they differ from the political elite because they draw upon their expertise and networks to exercise their power on an individual basis while the political elite relies on national institutions and is more dependent on institutional structures and more subject to change. For example, the employees of the US Department of Commerce change, the personnel of the European Commission DGXIII as well. However, these institutions remain important. The same phenomenon is true for the business elite that circulate among different firms and even sectors. Political and business elites tend to have more stable career paths. Their circulation amongst Internet governance institutions is generally due to the fact that they represent their organisation in most Internet governance-related forums. This is why they can be influential at the WSIS, at the IGF, at ICANN, at the ITU and the OECD at the same time. On the contrary, the civil-society elite circulates over time between forums and institutions. More than the organisations they represent, they remain influential on an individual basis. Sometimes, they even represent their own consulting firm or NGO. This is characteristic of an individualisation of civil society. It can be argued that such elite already existed to a certain extent in the 1990s since some US-based civil liberties organizations participated in the early debates on Internet governance (see chapter 5). However, the WSIS can be seen as the date of birth of a transnational civil society of Internet governance. Moreover, the fragmentation of Internet governance, the multiplication of policy forums and the increased need of experts exacerbated its importance. Some examples of individual profiles illustrate the composition of this new fraction of the power elite.

In spite of their different backgrounds and sources of power, members of the specialised technical elite, lawyers' elite, business elite and civil-society elite gather in several forums like the Internet Governance Forum, some bodies of the ICANN, OECD and UN working groups and regional forums. The distinction between different specialised elite is, like in Wright Mills' work, an analytical differentiation that prevents arguments about a pre-existing unified elite. It is through the socialisation in the various forums and through political processes like the WSIS that the different specialised elite exchange their view and reach consensual agreement on the preservation of their domination. The frequent meetings of members of the power elite, the discussions about political processes contribute to maintain an ideological coherence and a shared political agenda. The

socialisation and exchange of ideas took place for several years mainly within the ICANN and in the Internet Society. By the end of the WSIS, the fragmentation of Internet governance offered many forums for the power elite; some of them were narrow in scope, some of them generic, some of them were targeting a specialised elite like the technical one, others became broad forums for dialogue between specialised elites. Against this background, the ICANN was not the central institution of Internet governance any more, the Internet Governance Forum, in spite of its lack of decision-making powers, can be seen as the main socialisation platform for the elite.

### **8.2.3. The field of Internet governance at the end of the WSIS**

The WSIS is an important stage in the genesis and institutionalisation of the field of Internet governance. This section provides an overview of the structure of the field at the end of the WSIS, whose understanding is crucial to analyse current power struggles and the respective positions of the power elite and emerging powers in the field (see chapter 9). First, the most important institutional change in the field since the creation of the ICANN is the creation of the Internet Governance Forum. Second, it is interesting to look at the general evolution of the power elite in the mid-2000s. Finally, I argue that the notion of field is still relevant after the WSIS in spite of the fragmentation of the field.

As we have seen, the Internet Governance Forum was designed during the WGIG process and endorsed in the Tunis Agenda. It has been argued here that, much like the ICANN in the 1990s, the Internet Governance Forum was more a hegemonic project of the power elite than an institution aiming at the reconciliation of the positions of the power elite and the counter-elites. In this perspective, the IGF is an attempt by the power elite to address the weaknesses of the ICANN and to enhance the consensual aspect of its domination by institutionalising the interactions of civil society. Seven years after its creation, it can be argued that the IGF has played the role of a hegemonic institution rather than a place for dialogue and experimentation of new ideas.

The purpose of the IGF was first evidenced by the funding of the organisation. The IGF is funded by a trust fund, and each year by the host country of the annual meeting. The original contributors to the trust fund included dominant states, mostly European (Finland, Switzerland, United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Japan, Norway and the EU); Internet registries (Nominet UK, SWITCH, Afilias, Number Resource Organization, Uninett Norid, AuDA, Verisign, ccTLD RU, Nic.at); telecommunication operators (Verizon, AT&T); other IT firms and business associations (Siemens,



CISCO, Nikkei DigitalCORE, CommunityDNS); consultancy firms (Summit Strategies International, MCADE LLC); the Internet Society and the ICANN<sup>318</sup>. Most of these funders participated in the WSIS as supporters of the status-quo.

The debates held at the IGF have been consensual. The affiliation of key speakers to the power elite, the exclusion of most radical actors and the tone of the discussions has prevented heterodox discourses about Internet governance<sup>319</sup>. Some IGF participants, both elite and non-elite, are beginning to question the model. Kieren McCarthy identified 5 main problems in the functioning of the IGF:

- “1. False rationales and unquestioned assumptions are used to drive decisions and reinforce the status quo
2. An over-reliance on self-reporting and a total lack of systemic information gathering and objective analysis leads to group-think
3. An inward focus and constant but largely unconscious effort to remove effective participation from outsiders stifles innovation
4. An over-staffed, voluntary advisory group combined with an under-staffed executive team means no real operational improvements are possible
5. The lack of either a carrot or a stick in driving change favours repetition over improvement”<sup>320</sup>

This was summarised by one IGF participant as “navel gazing”<sup>321</sup>. However, this perspective remains marginal and most of the IGF participants are still enthusiastic about the forum. If the weaknesses of the IGF as a hegemonic project start to appear after seven years of existence, it has been a major institutional change that favoured the power elite. As the following table (8.3) shows, the IGF addressed the main weaknesses of the ICANN as a hegemonic project and helped stabilise the domination of the power elite.

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318 See <http://www.intgovforum.org/cms/funding>, last accessed 8 April 2014. Since the extension of the IGF beyond the original 5-year mandate, new donors include NIC-Mexico, Google, Walt Disney Co., CGI.Br, and Amazon. Most of the funding is provided by European governments and the European Commission.

319 This statement is corroborated by the archive available at [www.intgovforum.org](http://www.intgovforum.org), as well as by the author's participation in the preparatory process and the annual meeting of the IGF held in November 2010 in Vilnius.

320 Kieren McCarthy, “Living in a Talk-shop bubble”, *.nxt*, 28 February 2013, available at <http://news.dot-nxt.com/2013/02/28/living-talk-shop-bubble>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

321 E-mail by Ian Peter to the Internet Governance Caucus mailing-list, 1 March 2013.

	Hegemonic project 1.0: The ICANN (1998)	Hegemonic Project 2.0: The IGF (2005)
Exercise of domination	- direct management of critical Internet resources	- socialisation of actors, perpetuation of the field's orthodoxy
Process of elite unification	- involvement of technical, business, law, and political elite around a shared neoliberal project (formation of a power elite)	- socialisation, networking within and among 'stakeholder groups' (perpetuation and evolution of the power elite)
Consensual character	- expertise and efficiency, perspective of future openness and transparency	- openness, informal character, no decision-making
Weaknesses	- lack of legitimacy, participation and transparency (elitist character), limited 'technical' scope	- loss of impetus, by-passing by emerging powers (see chap.9)

Table 8.3. A comparison of two hegemonic projects in the field of Internet governance

The WSIS marked the reconfiguration of the power elite. As we have seen, some counter-elite were co-opted in a more inclusive project. Some evolutions of the power elite are worth noting. As we have seen, the power elite was joined by a civil-society elite coming mostly from universities and civil society organisations. The main concerns of this new fringe of the elite were social issues rather than technical, juridical, or business ones. The evolution changed to a certain extent the composition of the power elite. First, the power elite became more internationalised, since many Europeans, but also some non-OECD actors were affiliated with the civil-society elite. Second, the gender balance changed to a limited extent. Women were excluded from the technical elite. They also tend to be less represented in governmental delegations and in top-level business positions. Again, the enhanced importance of the civil-society elite increased the number of women in elite positions in the field, while establishing a gendered division of labour<sup>322</sup>. The power elite also witnessed the enhanced role of larger scale organisations. Rather than individual firms and NGOs, business associations and networks of NGOs played a more important role.

It is important to note that the power elite is not an undifferentiated block, there are power differentials and competition among specialised elites. It is only in key moment in the history of the field that the power elite unite beyond the differences among its fractions and members to defend its domination over the field. As Wright Mills put it:

“There is a mutual attraction among those people who 'sit at the same terrace' – although this often becomes clear to them, as well as to others, only at the point at

<sup>322</sup> Decision-making and standardisation bodies are dominated by males from OECD countries while dialogue and non-binding forums are more geographically and gendered balanced. Some figures can be found in chap. 9.

which they feel the need to draw the line; only when, in their common defence, they come to understand what they have in common, and so close their ranks against outsiders” (Wright Mills, 2000, p. 11)

This is why the above argument about a power elite might seem exaggerated with regards to the day-to-day interactions in the field of Internet governance. However, the unification of the power elite appeared clearly at the time of the creation of the ICANN as well as during the WSIS. After the WSIS, power differentials between the technical, business, and part of the political elite on the one side and the civil-society elite on the other side re-appeared. The more open and diverse civil-society elite does not participate directly in the management of the Internet even if their contribution in the realm of discourses and ideas is crucial. Against this background, the evolution of the power elite towards the inclusion of more women, of more individuals from outside OECD countries, of more individuals affiliated with civil society organisations, of more non-dominant social forces in general, must be put into perspective. The evolution of the power elite occurs for a large part towards the margins of the power elite. Yet, the general defence of the status-quo against counter-elites during the WSIS has been nuanced in further developments of the field, with a somewhat more progressive and reformist civil-society elite.

The creation of the IGF and the reconfiguration of the civil-society elite participated in the extension of the frontiers of the field to include more policy-related issues and to its institutional fragmentation. Unlike sometimes broader international fields, Internet governance has no central institution. The governance of the network is fragmented and many organisations and forums matter. As we have seen in the previous section, the power elite is able to circulate between these forums and organisations. Some key historical moments allow for the power elite to unite and to present a coherent discourse and political agenda. Since the WSIS, the fragmentation has prevailed. However, the *doxa*, and more precisely the multistakeholder model, have permeated most of the institutions of the field, and even some institutions created outside the field. In spite of the institutional fragmentation, the existence of common stakes, a common power elite, and a common power struggle within civil society evidences the perpetuation of a transnational field of Internet governance.

The main issues at stake during the WSIS, and the main social forces that struggled around these issues still structure the field of Internet governance. The genesis and reconfiguration of a power elite of Internet governance in the 1990s and 2000s has been described in the previous chapters. Since no major politicisation of the field occurred in the last 8 years, the power elite remains. The

concluding chapter will explore the perspectives of change by focusing on emerging powers within the field. The two counter-elites identified in this chapter were not satisfied by the outcome of the WSIS. Thus, the stability of the field was not achieved beyond a short-term relief of the tensions. Much like in the aftermaths of the creation of the ICANN, the field of Internet governance witnessed a “minimal hegemony” (Cafruny & Ryner, 2007) rather than the unchallenged domination of a power elite over a mass society, as described by Wright Mills (see chap. 5). The ongoing debates about the frontiers of the field and between orthodox and heterodox positions evidence the dynamic character of the field.

## **Chapter 9 : Conclusions. The field of Internet governance after the WSIS**

The analysis of the history of Internet governance from the a perspective combining international political sociology and international political economy allows for two types of conclusions. First, the research presents a picture of the field of Internet governance informed by its evolution since its emergence. Against the dominant pluralist account of the history of Internet governance, the thesis has shown the emergence and evolution of a power elite of Internet governance. Second, the research contributes to the literature on globalisation studies with its meso-level and differentiated account of globalisation dynamics and its focus on powerful actors. The focus on actors avoids the structuralist tendency of critical approaches and present a dynamic and differentiated approach to transnational power. Finally, the research presented in this thesis helps us to understand current evolutions in the field of Internet governance, their origins, and some possible futures for the field. The history of Internet governance as presented in the previous chapters results from a number of dialectical relationships between for example elites and counter-elites and with neighbouring field. As a result, the relative stability of the field in the last 10 years cannot be understood as a stable order but rather as a precarious balance of forces that is likely to change in the coming years. The analysis of the history of Internet governance provides a different perspective on current developments in the field. The following sections analyse the status of the main elements outlined in the theoretical framework in order to describe Internet governance in the period that followed the WSIS. First, the structure of the field after the WSIS is described as a space of domination of a transnational power elite and as an expanding transnational space of interactions. Second, the dynamics of order and change in the field after the WSIS are described as a dynamic relationship among elites, between elites and non-elites and also between the field of Internet governance and other fields in the global field of power. Finally, the evolutionary perspective on the field of Internet governance is used in order to outline possible evolutions from the current situation on Internet governance, by drawing upon the discourses and coalitions of actors that have emerged in the last twenty years of Internet governance debates.

### ***9.1. The structure of the field of Internet governance after the WSIS***

The history of the field of Internet governance as presented in this study, can be interpreted in two ways. First, it can be seen as the emergence of a field, and the emergence of a power elite associated

to this field. In this case, the different crisis and institutional as well as elite reconfigurations are steps towards a more stable transnational field. Or, it can be viewed as a case-study of a transnational field, which would be inherently weak and unstable because of its transnational nature (For an introduction to the concept of “weak fields”, see Topalov, 1999; Vauchez, 2008, 2011). This section argues that the twenty years of history analysed in this study are best interpreted as the gradual emergence of a transnational field<sup>323</sup>. The two main reasons for this interpretation are the consolidation of a power elite over the years, and the definition of frontiers for the field.

### **9.1.1. The transnational power elite of Internet governance after the WSIS**

The power elite of Internet governance emerged in the 1990s. It was last re-configured during the WSIS in 2005. The power elite is currently constituted of a number of specialised elites, affiliated to different institutions and relying on different sources of power (or forms of capital). These specialised elites integrated gradually the power elite, but no reconfiguration has represented a revolutionary change within the elite. In order to understand the relative stability of the power elite it is important to map specialised elites and summarise how they unite to form a power elite. While it is argued here that this process is best understood as a process of power elite consolidation rather than a history of *ad hoc* and temporary coalition, the limits of elite power is also discussed.

#### *Mapping specialised elites in the field of Internet Governance*

While Wright Mills identified three main specialised elites that formed the power elite in the post-WW2 US society (military, business and political elites), the present study shows that the transnational power elite of Internet governance at the end of the World Summit on the Information Society includes four specialised elites. These elites are presented in the form of a Venn diagram in figure 9.1<sup>324</sup>.

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323 The weakness of the field is here understood as a transitory state that presents some similarities with the case of emerging colonial states as described by Steinmetz (2008, quoted in Vauchez, 2011).

324 Venn diagrams are used for example by Domhoff in order to map specialised elites within the power elite. See “Who rules America?” available at [www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica](http://www2.ucsc.edu/whorulesamerica), last accessed 8 April 2014.




Figure 9.1. The transnational power elite of Internet governance

Each of the specialised elites can be described in an ideal-typical way as being affiliated to certain types of institutions; to rely on a specific form of capital as source of power and of legitimacy; and to have joined the power elite at a precise moment. More detailed illustrations are to be found in chapter 5 and 8, where examples of individuals pertaining to these specialised elites are described with prosopographical elements. These profiles are summarised in table 9.1. The circulation of elites and the multiple-hat phenomenon makes this classification overly simplistic. However, the description in terms of specialised elites highlights the *process* of elite unification and avoids any deterministic perspective on the existence of a single elite (see chapter 3).

Specialised elite	Affiliation	Specific form of capital	Addition to the power elite
Technical-scientific elite	Internet Society, IETF, Regional Internet Registries, universities (computer science), etc.	Scientific capital	Managed the Internet from the start
Business elite	Internet companies, Telcos, software and hardware companies, etc.	Financial capital	Involved in the commercialisation of the Internet in the early 1990s
Policy elite	Governments, Intergovernmental organisations, etc.	Political capital	Debates of the 1990s for dominant actors (OECD governments, WIPO, EU, WTO...)
Civil Society elite	Civil society organisations, consultancy firms, universities (social sciences, law), acting on their individual capacity, etc.	Social capital	Debates of the 1990s for the most established members (mostly from the US), WSIS for most recent members

Table 9.1. Specialised elites in the field of Internet governance

In his farewell address to the American people in 1961, US President Dwight D. Eisenhower warned about the possible acquisition of unwarranted influence by the military-industrial complex (Eisenhower, 1961). This phrase became widely used by elite sociologists, foreign policy analysts and international relations scholars. But Eisenhower also mentioned another threat to pluralism: the emerging “scientific-technological elite” that might capture public policy processes. As we have seen in chapter 4, the first years of Internet governance epitomised this kind of technocracy. A small number of computer scientists managed the Internet without much external control. They managed to remain autonomous from the field of telecommunication and to design institutions such as the Internet Society and the IETF to govern the early Internet. The commercialisation of the network and the repeated political debates about Internet governance changed the situation and other specialised elites started to play an important role in Internet governance. This process is described at length in chapter 5. However, the power of the scientific-technological elite remained important in Internet governance. Technically-oriented organisations continue to be key actors in the management of the network. Organisations such as the Internet Society, the Internet engineering TaskForce, the five Regional Internet Registries, or to a lesser extent the World Wide Web Consortium are represented in every initiative related to Internet governance and are often leading such initiatives<sup>325</sup>. Even though battles around domain names do not have the same impact today than they had in the 1990s, the ICANN remains at the heart of the Internet governance system. The ICANN is not exclusively a technical institution managed by the scientific-technological elite but the board is still populated with members of this specialised elite. Several technical bodies of the ICANN such as the Root Server System Advisory Committee, the Security and Stability Committee or even the Domain Name Council are still in the hands of the scientific-technical elite. The technical-scientific elite originally followed the pattern of a scientific field, with positions in the field determined by the accumulation scientific capital. The evolution of the elite entailed a hybridisation and an increased importance of other forms of capital. However, scientific education, technical knowledge of the network, and experience in technical operations related to internetworking are still a crucial asset of the technical-scientific elite. The particular role of the technical-scientific elite explains why the dominant imaginary of the field in the 1990s contained not only elements of the neoliberal ideology but also elements of cyber-libertarianism (see chapter 5).

The business elite entered the field of Internet governance around the commercialisation of the

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<sup>325</sup> See for example the Montevideo statement on the future of Internet cooperation, 7 February 2013, available at [www.icann.org](http://www.icann.org), last accessed 8 April 2014.



network in 1992. It is not completely distinct from the scientific-technological elite since telecommunication companies and Internet companies massively hired “Internet pioneers” to manage Internet-related issues. The business elite was very influential in the creation of the ICANN, especially with companies like IBM and through the Global Internet Project (see chapter 5). While the members of the business elite represent competing firms, they agree on some core issues related to Internet governance such as self-regulation, the promotion of market-led mechanisms, and the protection of Intellectual Property Rights online. The composition of this elite changed over the years. The business elite included primarily hardware manufacturers and telecommunication firms in the 1990s. With the growth of online business, Internet companies such as PayPal, Amazon, Google, Facebook and the like now represent a driving force in Internet governance. In spite of the tensions between content-producers and carriers that are evidenced in conflicts such as the debate on network neutrality, a business elite specialising on Internet governance has emerged, notably through the International Chamber of Commerce. Other influential representatives of the business elite include the World Information Technology and Service Alliance, norms consortia such as the World Wide Web Consortium, and other *ad hoc* coalitions of corporate interests. This elite holds the financial capital that is necessary for the Internet economy to thrive. They used this capital to be influential in several forums such as the WSIS (see chapter 7 and 8) and more economic forums like the WTO and the OECD. In the years after the WSIS, the business elite has become the most visible elite in the field of Internet governance. This lead to a situation where a popular perception of Internet governance is that Google rules the Internet. While the power of the business elite should not be underestimated, it is only in conjunction to other specialised elites that the business elite is able to create a governance system that is accepted and reproduced by the majority.

The policy elite includes the most powerful actors of a broad institutional setting. They are the representatives of governments and intergovernmental organisations specialising in Internet governance. The policy elite does not include governments as a whole, but only those actors within governments that are able to act in transnational settings related to Internet governance. This is for example the case of the US National Telecommunication and Information Administration of the US Department of Commerce, the US Federal Communications Commission, the European Commission Directorate General for Communications Networks, Contents and Technology (formerly DG XIII), and ministries of telecommunications from a number of powerful states. Intergovernmental organisations such as the OECD, the Council of Europe, WIPO, the WTO and the ITU are also active in Internet governance and have some staff exclusively affected to the issue.

The policy elite rely on political capital, understood as a form of symbolic capital based on the credit given to a person or to an organisation in the form of socially recognised power (Bourdieu, 1981). This form of capital is not exclusive to the policy elite since it is by definition necessary to exercise power. However, this is the form of capital that is specific and most important to these individuals and organisations that are here defined as belonging to the policy elite. The policy elite participated in Internet governance at least since the 1990s and was successful in taking the leading role in the creation of the ICANN system, as described in chapter 5. The first emergence of the policy elite was limited to US organisations, some very specific intergovernmental organisations that were believed to be essential to the functioning of the network and to some European, Australian and Japanese actors. As we have seen in chapter 6, this geographically-limited elite was reconfigured in the early 2000s and during the WSIS to include some representatives of emerging countries and of some generalist intergovernmental organisations such as the United Nations<sup>326</sup>.

In the 1990s, only the three specialised elites described above formed the power elite. They designed an institutional base for their power in the field along the lines of a consensual discourse. This discourse relied heavily on neoliberal premises, but it also contained elements of cyber-libertarianism and to a lesser extent of a global public good discourse. Moreover, the power elite emerged as the result of the interchangeability of the members of the elite. As analysed in the following section, elites circulated among different types of institutions over the last years of the 1990s. They were also affiliated to several political, economic and technical institutions at the same time. However, the consent to their power was limited among non-elites and the ICANN failed as a hegemonic project. The field entered into a crisis that led notably to the reconfiguration of the power elite, to the creation of new institutions, and to the emergence of a renewed hegemonic imaginary (see below, section 9.2).

The civil society elite was the main beneficiary of the reconfiguration of the power elite during the WSIS. The civil society elite was excluded from the debates of the 1990s (see chapter 5). This is why the civil society elite can be considered as a counter-elite until the WSIS. The civil society elite, organised around mostly US-based civil society organisations and social science and law department and centres was very critical of the ICANN system. As explored in chapter 6, it pushed for a reform since the early years of the ICANN. The counter-elite was powerful outside the field of Internet governance, especially through elite US universities and their connections to members of the US power elite. As a result, it became the key target of the successive reforms of Internet governance in the 2000s. First, the ICANN reform of 2002 opened spaces for the representation of

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<sup>326</sup> For example, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has been involved since the mid-2000, when the Internet Governance Forum was also created.

the civil society elite within the ICANN. An At-Large Community was created. There are currently 140 local organizations in the At-Large community. An At-Large Committee represent these organizations within the ICANN. This is the most important place where the civil society elite is to be found in the ICANN system. Similarly, technical bodies opened up to members from civil society. This is for example the case of the Regional Internet Registries boards. After the WSIS, the creation of the IGF and its numerous related organisations offered a new space for the transnational civil society elites. For example, the Multistakeholder Advisory Committee of the Internet Governance Forum is an important organisational platform for this elite. Apart from some scholars from US elite universities, most of the members of the civil society elite do not rely on affiliations to powerful organisation to exercise their power. Chapter 8 describes the integration of this specific elite into the power elite. It should be noted that civil society elite are usually not affiliated with large generalist NGOs and have a different focus and agenda from generalist NGOs specialising for example in development and Human Rights. They mostly rely on social capital and scientific capital acquired mainly in law and social sciences. They are an essential element of the power elite since the WSIS. Most of the multistakeholder rhetoric and the claims for representativeness depend on the inclusion of the civil society elite.

This presentation in terms of specialised elites that is useful to characterise members of the power elite, should not be confused with the mainstream pluralist vision. Specialised elites do not correspond to stakeholder theory for two main reasons. First, specialised elites describe specificities of dominant actors in the field of Internet governance. They do not imply any type of representation of a possible constituency or stakeholder group (For a discussion in a different issue-area, see Ruwet, 2010). Stakeholder groups are not useful analytical categories in transnational governance. There is no organised “technical community”, or “civil society” with shared interests and visions that could be represented in decision-making bodies (see chapter 5). However, at the elite level, differences can be described with regards to what the sources of power of each specialised elite are as a way to analyse the unification of the power elite from *a priori* different elite groups. Second, there is no pluralism in Internet governance. The existence of a power elite rules out pluralism. Stakeholder groups can only exist in a pluralist environment, where they compete to influence policies. However, the present research has evidenced the interchangeability of the members of the power elite (important institutions in the field like the ICANN gather members of all specialised elites). It has also highlighted the shared ideational elements that constitutes the ideological cement of a single power elite.

### *The power elite of Internet governance*

Wright Mills defines a power elite as "those political, economic, and military circles, which as an intricate set of overlapping small but dominant groups share decisions having at least national consequences. Insofar as national events are decided, the power elite are those who decide them" (Wright Mills, 2000). The specialised elites of Internet governance form a power elite because they fulfil the two criteria defined by Wright Mills: interchangeability and ideological cohesion. These two criteria have been tested through a number of mixed methods often used in elite sociology. Interchangeability has been tested through the analysis of affiliation networks and through the identification of elite profiles from prosopographical elements. Ideological cohesion has been tested in several key moments in the history of the field through critical discourse analysis and a social network analysis including statements, individuals and organisations.

Members of the power elite are interchangeable. They circulate from one position to another, regardless of their original affiliation to a certain type of institution and to a certain specialised elite. For example, a member of the civil society elite represent a civil society organisation based on her knowledge of freedom of expression, and then acquire technical knowledge of the functioning of the network and social capital through her participation to committees and panels. She can then sit at the board of a Regional Internet Registry. Members of the power elite also wear multiple hats simultaneously. For example, a computer scientist can work in a university, with funding from the US Department of Defence, while advising a transnational firm on Internet governance issues. Chapter 5 and 8 provide a number of example of such elite trajectories in the field at two different historical moments: during the 1990s and during the WSIS. This interchangeability results form a certain ideological proximity (see below) but also from a socialisation process. Elite circulation goes back to the early days of the field, when a small elite managed technical as well as political aspects of the field. They were also hired by companies because of their unique knowledge of the network. However, as the field evolved and grew in size, the principle of elite interchangeability remained. One difference is that the original specificities of specialised elites are more marked than during the early days of the field. Most members of the power elite do not have a technical background in computer networking. The process of elite circulation requires an institutional setting that allows socialisation and dialogue between specialised elites. In this context, the Internet Governance Forum created after the WSIS plays a crucial role. It became the most important place for dialogue and elite socialisation. Caucuses and mailing lists during the preparation process are important steps towards acceptance of new participants, or for the socialisation that is required for

elite circulation. In the case of the civil society elite, new participants are often trained by specialised programmes such as the DiploFoundation programme on Internet governance<sup>327</sup> and often funded by the Internet Society<sup>328</sup>. Some of the trainees (or ambassadors as they are called when funded by the Internet Society) later hold positions of power in the field. Similar processes exist for the technical-scientific elite<sup>329</sup> and, in a somewhat different form, in the policy and business elites. This process allows for a certain degree of renewal of the elite while maintaining the same structure and the same individuals at the top of the hierarchy.

Ideological cohesion is a crucial element that allows elite interchangeability and that prevent a competition that would endanger the cohesion of the power elite. As discussed in chapter 5, the ideological cement of the power elite was basically a neoliberal understanding of Internet governance as a market-facilitating enterprise. The dominant discourse relied also heavily on the cyber-libertarian imaginary of a digital frontier (in the US historical sense of the word) and a cyberspace where social norms had to be re-invented. The dominant discourse also made some concessions to the global public good concept as a way to include non-US actors, and especially the policy elite affiliated with intergovernmental organisations and European governments. While the dominant imaginary made elite cohesion possible, it did not fully take into account the increasingly broad public affected by Internet governance issue. The dominant imaginary and the newly-created institutional system around the ICANN did not reach a hegemonic status. Non-US elites (both policy and business) as well as the civil society elites were left aside. This is why the situation rapidly evolved into a contested hegemony, as described in chapter 6. The WSIS was an opportunity to re-build a hegemonic imaginary (Jessop, 2006) in order to reconcile the supporters of the *status-quo* and the advocates of change. Multistakeholderism came out as a consensual concept around which elites could unite and that could be acceptable to non-elites. Indeed, multistakeholderism represent an alternative to intergovernmental governance. It explicitly offers the opportunity to each specialised elite to be represented in the institutions of the field. This is why the stakeholders defined by the Tunis Agenda correspond to the elites already present in the field: the “technical community” is a category tailored for the technical-scientific elite, governments, civil society, and the private sector are usual stakeholders (for example in tripartite negotiations) but they also

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327 A good example of this kind of promotion is the selection process for the IGF Multistakeholder Advisory Committee within DiploFoundation Internet Governance community. See <http://www.diplointernetgovernance.org/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

328 Internet Society's ambassador programme is described at <http://www.internetsociety.org/what-we-do/education-and-leadership-programmes/next-generation-leaders/igf-ambassadors-programme>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

329 Newcomers to ICANN meetings are expected to attend special sessions where they are taught about the functioning of the ICANN system. They also participate in socialisation activities that include parties and even singing (interview of a first-time participant to the ICANN meeting in Buenos Aires, November 2013).

correspond to specialised elites in the field of Internet governance. The Tunis Agenda also mentions the specific role of academics (since they represented an important share of the civil society elite) and of international organisations. Multistakeholderism was also an interesting concept to build up a hegemonic discourse since it echoes claims of pluralism, openness and democracy. The new hegemonic imaginary organised around the notion of multistakeholderism still included neoliberal elements and allowed the reproduction of the existing order with some marginal changes. Multistakeholderism is still the dominant imaginary in the field of Internet governance. It has been outside the scope of discussions from the end of the WSIS<sup>330</sup>. However, it has lost some of its consensual status since it is increasingly debated in non-elite circles.

While the power elite is able to promote and to benefit from the creation of hegemonic imaginaries, the reproduction of these imaginaries depend on a certain degree of acceptance by non-elites. Challenge can exist outside the power elite and can foment the emergence of counter-elites (see section 9.3 on emerging powers in Internet governance). The elitist character of Internet governance can only appear as legitimate if it is perceived as the result of democratic and pluralist processes. Wright Mills analysed the case of the post-WWII US society where formal democracy ensured legitimacy to the power elite. In transnational fields, such formal democracy does not exist and the acceptance of a given order depends on the construction of a complex imaginary. The association of the Internet with values such as freedom and equality are key elements in this context. However, the idea of a struggle between a free Internet and censorship in autocratic regimes might have been undermined by the Snowden revelations (Greenwald & MacAskill, 2013). Likewise, the perception of equal participation promoted by Internet tools like Twitter does not rely on strong evidence and is also fragile (Morozov, 2013). Dissensions might also appear within the elite. There is for example a tension between US and non-US elites on the redistribution of the benefits of the Internet economy. These tensions are sometimes expressed like in the debate around network neutrality where US content producers are opposed to European carriers. These conflicts are usually settled in a way that protect elite cohesion but the multiplication of these conflicts (for example on privacy) could threaten the unity of the power elite.

The description of the existence of a transnational power elite of Internet governance is the description of a constant process of elite unification and hegemony production. It should not be confused with accounts of a pre-existing unified elite (or transnational capitalist class) ruling the

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330 The nature of multistakeholderism as being beyond debates echoes the notion of *doxa* developed by Bourdieu. The term hegemonic imaginary is used in order to insist on the on-going process of hegemony-production that does not rule out a return of the debate on multistakeholderism.

Internet. However, the history of Internet governance is not the history of pluralist elite competition. Through processes of elite unification, elements of elite interchangeability and ideological cohesion, the structural domination of an elite over the field is secured.

### **9.1.2. The boundaries of the field**

The history of elite reproduction and reconfiguration takes place not within a fixed social space but within an evolving field of social relations. Indeed, the boundaries of the field are not pre-determined and fixed. They are affected by the relationship between one field and other neighbouring fields, and by the changing stakes, actors and organising principles of the field. Chapter 4 is an attempt to construct the genealogy of the field of Internet governance. Contrary to some conventional accounts on Internet governance as the result of US power or of a structurally dominant neoliberal ideology, the genealogy of Internet governance as a field stresses the emergence of an autonomous field of Internet governance from the hybridization of the field of computer networking science and telecommunication regulation. Practices have been durably affected by the history of the field and elements of scientific competition are still common practices in Internet governance and theoretical-technical knowledge of the network is still an important capital.

While the definition of Internet governance (and thus the stakes associated with it) was limited to technical issues in the 1990s, the WSIS sanctioned a broader definition that includes political, social and economic aspects (WGIG, 2005; WSIS, 2005). The new definition entailed the creation of new institutions such as the Internet Governance Forum, and the inclusion of the civil society elite within the power elite. This definition has been used since the WSIS by most actors, even previously reluctant one. The new definition extended the boundaries of the field. The inclusion of Internet uses in the definition virtually opened the door for an inclusion of a wide variety of content-related issues in the field of Internet governance. However, the field maintained its coherence because some issues were already addressed in other fields that remained autonomous from Internet governance while the field of Internet governance was structured according to the new definition.

As discussed in chapter 8, the WSIS divided Internet governance in two sub-domains. First, the WSIS acknowledged the existence of a “day-to-day” “technical operation” of the network, as implemented by existing organisations. The other broad domain was the Internet-related policy

issues that were to be treated in organisations such as the Internet Governance Forum as well as on governmental and intergovernmental levels. This division was also a hierarchisation of the issues. On the one hand, technical issues related to the Critical Internet Resources such as domain names and IP addresses. These were to be addressed by semi-privatised transnational organisations like the ICANN. Addressing these issues requires technical knowledge. As a result, only the top-tier of Internet governance elite, that has been socialised in elite circles and has acquired scientific capital can participate. On the other hand, broader issues are more loosely defined. They are addressed by non-binding organisation such as the IGF or in settings that are not directly influential in the field of Internet governance (such as the UN General Assembly). Here, a second-tier elite, including most of civil society elite that is excluded from the power elite is able to participate. This division echoes other structures of domination. Participation to the technical operation of the network requires more resources in terms of financial capital, expertise and knowledge of the English language and of the technical jargon. It also echoes gendered stereotypes since day-to-day management of the Internet is also associated with qualities generally attributed to men, such as technical knowledge of computer networks (Cooper, 2006; Vekiri & Chronaki, 2008). Participation to non-binding debates about broader issues is more open to non-OECD individuals (with some multilingualism implemented for example in the IGF, and remote participation for people that are not able to physically attend); and to women (with skills of dialogue and interest in social consequences of technology being easily associated with female qualities) (Gurumuthy, Jeet Singh, Mundkur, & Swamy, 2006). Figure 9.2.1 shows that the representation of OECD and non-OECD nationals in the ICANN board is not becoming more equal. As a result, 76% of the Board members since the creation of the ICANN were from OECD countries. Moreover, 90% were educated in OECD countries, and 42% in the US<sup>331</sup>. In a similar vein, 92% of the members of the secretariat of the IETF, the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG), since its creation were male<sup>332</sup>. These figures contrast with the yearly reports of the Internet Governance Forum where geographical diversity and gender balance are explicitly set as objectives for the organisers.

While the main stake during the first decades of the field was the definition of Internet governance itself, the adoption of an all-encompassing definition of Internet governance during the WSIS seemed to settle the issue. However, the definition remains vague on the description of the governance system. The respective roles of states and non-state actors is still open to debate. The

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331 Exceptions in place of education include 2 members educated in non-OECD European countries (Bulgaria and Latvia), one member in Kenya, two members educated in India, and two more in Brazil. One Chinese, one Australian, one U.S and one German Board member have no information on their place of education.

332 The name list is available from <http://unctad.org/en/Pages/CSTD/WGEC.aspx>, last accessed 8 April 2014.



definition of Internet governance avoids the issue with a long-debated phrase about stakeholders acting “in their respective roles” (WSIS, 2005). The limit between technical and policy-related issue is not clear either. Actors have high stakes in the inclusion of specific issues into day-to-day technical operation or in their exclusion from the core category of the field. As a result, the vague definition was useful to settle the crisis. It was instrumental for the creation of a new hegemonic project by the power elite. But it only displaced the stakes of the field from the definition of Internet governance to the form taken by its implementation. Five years after its creation, the mandate of the Internet Governance Mandate was extended in 2010 for another five years but improvements were expected (UNGA, 2011, §16). Non-dominant actors begin to show some sign of impatience regarding the lack of decision-making power of the Forum. Its model is showing some loss of impetus. From a maximum of 2100 participants in Rio in 2007, the turnover was around 2000 for several years and declined down to 1600 in 2012<sup>333</sup>. Current debates about Internet governance consider the creation of new institutions and a reform of the field (see below sect. 9.3). A struggle takes place in the ICANN related to the role of the Governmental Advisory Committee. Purely technical organisations are less concerned by the debates, but the over-representation of the technical elite in decision-making bodies is sometimes criticised by civil society organisations<sup>334</sup>. Overall, the repartition of tasks among the different institutions of the field; the participation to certain groups to one or the other activity; and the balance between actors are debates that still structure the struggles of the field. In a related manner, the conditions of representativeness and the process of selection are also at the heart of the debates.

The boundaries of the field determined in terms of actors are difficult to draw. Virtually 40% of the world population is affected by Internet governance as users of the Internet (ITU, 2013). Arguably, the remaining 60 % of the world population are also affected by the decisions of Internet governance even if they do not benefit from the use of the network. Their exclusion from Internet access depends to a certain extent on decisions taken in the field of Internet governance. The factor of being or not affected by the decisions taken in one particular field is thus not a good way to draw boundaries to the field. If we take only the individuals and organisations participating actively and expressively to the struggles around the definition and the implementation of Internet governance,

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333 One IGC mailing participants criticized “the thorough analysis of text, placements of commas, and meanings which may be attributed to words in various languages in all of the various WSIS and post WSIS documents [and] the decade of debates on the true meaning of multistakeholderism, and also on the true meaning of enhanced cooperation. I fear we have all become very inwardly focused. This constant navel gazing may lead to total irrelevance of IGF. Good luck to the MAG in moving us onwards from here. I think we have become rather stuck”, e-mail to the IGC list, 1 March 2013.

334 See the thread on “All power should be in the hands of the engineers?”, Internet Governance Caucus mailing list, November-December 2013.

the boundaries of the field are much more clearly defined. This is why this research considers the field of Internet governance rather than a vaguely defined field of the Internet. The construction of networks of actors and intersubjective relations like participation to forums and authorship of documents are innovative methods in order to map out a field. Because of the difficulty to collect data on the dispositions of actors in a transnational field, social network analysis seems an interesting way to draw the topography of a transnational field. However, because of the limitations of social network analysis to represent evolution, a historical perspective on the boundaries of the field is necessary. The number of actors involved in the field of Internet governance probably amounted to less than 500 in the 1990s (see section 5.2). The data collection for the social network analysis of chapter 5 are certainly not comprehensive but the repetition of the same names after the inclusion of a certain number of events and documents tend to show that the number of actors was probably along these lines. In contrast, the number of participants to the second phase of the WSIS accounted to almost 20'000 (see chapter 7, figures 7.2 and 7.3). Not all of them were involved in Internet governance issues, but arguably a good proportion of them became involved during the WSIS. Moreover, a lot of participants to Internet governance debates were not participating to the WSIS. This indicates a rapid growth of the field during these years. The growth is partly a case and partly a consequence of the broadening of the definition of Internet governance. With the stakes becoming more important, and the field gaining importance in the global field of power (see paragraph below), the number is probably continuing to grow steadily. This is why this study focuses on elite actors and organisations. While the power elite has also grown over the years, notably through the inclusion of the civil society elite, it seems that its growth did not follow the growth of the field itself. A quantitative analysis of the field today could provide an interesting perspective on this phenomenon but it is outside the scope of the present study.

The field of Internet governance emerged through a process of autonomisation from other fields such as the field of global telecommunication regulation and the field of computer networking science (see chapter 4). The autonomy of the field from the more established and institutionalised field of telecommunications regulation has been a driving force in the evolution of the field of Internet governance. In spite of the power of large telecommunication firms and powerful states in the field of global telecommunications regulation, the transnational field of Internet governance remained autonomous. The power of the scientific-technical elite and the specific forms of capital they were relying on, as well as the importance of a fraction of the business elite involved in content development, were key to the emergence of the field as it is now. Moreover, the place of the field within the global field of power has changed. The field of Internet governance has increasingly been

affected by, and affecting fields such as the global security field or the field of global finance. As a result, the field of Internet governance gained importance in the global field of power and capital acquired in this particular field is increasingly valued in other fields. For example, Internet governance experts like Vint Cerf express influential opinions on issues of privacy and freedom of expression. Cybersecurity experts are becoming more influential in the field of security, notably through the creation of cybercommands. Debates about tax evasion consider Internet companies as crucial actors and put the Internet economy at the heart of global cooperation against tax avoidance (Bowers, 2013; Bowers & Wintour, 2013). In 2011 the power elite demanded the adoption of multistakeholder process for the G8 meeting in Deauville<sup>335</sup>. As a result, Internet governance is no longer a marginal field in the global field of power. Not only has it gained its autonomy from neighbouring fields, but it also increasingly affects other fields.

The boundaries of the field of Internet governance are not fixed, they evolve according to the changing stakes, and the changing actors of the field. They also evolve in relation to the evolution of neighbouring fields and to evolutions in the global field of power. For example, national capitals are evolving over time (Bourdieu, 2005). Individuals and organisations from the so-called emerging economies have seen their national capital increase in relation to the OECD nationals. This explains why a number of emerging powers in Internet governance are based in emerging countries (see below, sect. 9.3). The analysis of the evolution of a particular field and its particular power elite, when coupled with the analysis of global trends and the evolutions in the global field of power indicates elements of a more general understanding of order and change in the global political economy. Beyond the empirical conclusions that help understand the current state of Internet governance, this study has brought some innovative insights on the contribution of an international political sociology perspective to critical approaches to international relations.

## **9.2. Transnational elites, order and change in Internet governance**

The specific case of Internet governance is a good illustration of how the analysis of a particular field might help understand more general dynamics. The field of Internet governance, and the different hegemonic projects that have emerged within the field, echo global dynamics. The institutionalisation of Internet governance in the 1990s epitomises the search for governance models coherent with the neoliberal globalisation process. The changes within the field in the 2000s illustrate the efforts to adapt the neoliberal model to the emergence of new powers and to the

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<sup>335</sup> See the open letter to Pres. Sarkozy by the Internet Governance Caucus, at <http://igcaucus.org/open-letter-president-sarkozy-eg8-meeting-plan>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

multiple crisis affecting the model. Against this general background, the power elite of Internet governance adapted its discourse and its projects to propose models that were acceptable to the public. The analysis of the evolution of the field in this research draws upon an evolutionary reading of Bourdieu, as advocated notably by French regulationists (Boyer, 2003, 2008; Lordon, 2003). The dynamics of a field involve three main elements. First, the process of elite unification around a shared project and the definition of a hegemonic project acceptable for non-elites is a constant process of consensus-building. Second, the reconfiguration of elite through the inclusion of new elements or the exclusion of a fraction of the elite is determined by the dialectical relationship between elites and counter-elites. Finally, the position of a given transnational field within the field of power evolves through time. The field of Internet governance is an example of the emergence of a new issue amidst the core issues of international political economy.

### **9.2.1. Elite unification and hegemonic projects**

One of the main contribution of this research on the theoretical/methodological level is an analysis of the production of hegemony focused on actors. The idea of a process of hegemony production (Jessop, 2006) highlights the importance of the process through which a given order becomes acceptable to the majority. At a global level, ideological elements such as disciplinary neoliberalism (Gill, 1995) shape the boundaries of the various models of governance. At the field-level, the production of hegemony requires a translation of global hegemonic imaginaries adapted to field-specific conditions. For example, the production of hegemony around the creation of the ICANN resulted from a dialogue and a consensus-building between different dominant discourses in the field. The globally-dominant neoliberal discourse was the most influential in the institutionalisation of Internet governance. However, elements of cyber-libertarianism and references to the Internet as a Global Public Good were also taken into account. The hegemonic discourse that prevailed was not the result of a consensus-building among all discourses present in the field. It was a process of selection and adaptation between discourses that were consistent with global structural dynamics and ideologically coherent<sup>336</sup>. Arguments about sovereignty and national security were discarded, as well as arguments in favour of an Internet governance system aiming at the public interest and generalised access to knowledge (see chapter 5). The analysis of the production of hegemony focused on the actors includes two levels. First, a consensus has to be found within the elite by building a consensus based on dominant discourses. Second, the elite discourse has to be accepted by non-elites. These two elements are simultaneous since the production of hegemony is not a one-

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<sup>336</sup> For a in-depth discussion of selectivity in the production of hegemonic imaginaries, see Sum & Jessop (2013).

way process from the elite to non-elites but rather a process of dialogue and trial-and-error that helps to create a hegemonic project.

First, dominant discourses in the field were dominant because of their compatibility with the dominant ideology of the global field of power in the 1990s, but they were also dominant because they were embodied and delivered by members of the elites of Internet governance<sup>337</sup>. The cyber-libertarian discourse was mainly represented within the technical-scientific elite that held a dominant position on the field. The neoliberal discourse was represented both by the business elite and by US policy elite. Finally, the Global Public Good Discourse was influential because it was important for the non-US policy elite and also as an element of consensus-building with non-elites. As such, the inclusion of Global Public Good discourse elements can be considered to a certain extent as a concession made by the elite to second-tier elites and non-elites. Thus, the hegemonic discourse that permitted the creation of the ICANN was based on the common ideological elements that underlay the discourses of the different elites of the field. Drawing upon similar ideological premises, the different specialised elites were able to find a common ground. As we have seen elements like private-sector leadership or the protection of intellectual property rights were widely shared among the elite and constitute the bulk of the hegemonic imaginary of Internet governance in the 1990s. A further analysis of the dispositions of transnational elites of Internet governance shaped by their previous histories as well by their socialisation in the field could shed some light on the fundamental elements that permit such ideological cohesion. The shared interests perceived by different specialised elites also are undoubtedly an important factor of consensus. As a result, different elites were able to agree on a number of principles that were to underlie Internet governance. While not sufficient, the consensus-building among the elite is necessary for a hegemonic project to emerge. The discursive exclusion of an important fraction of the elite makes hegemony impossible. This situation was illustrated by the attempt by the technical-scientific elite to build a governance system through the combination of cyber-libertarian elements and elements of the Global Public Good discourse (IAHC, 1997a). This project failed to include the neoliberal discourse and thus turned away the business and the US policy elites. This is why the project was not implemented and was later replaced by the more neoliberal ICANN project.

Consensus among the elites is a necessary but insufficient element of hegemony. Consent of non-

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<sup>337</sup> Although the relationship between dominant actors and dominant discourses resembles a chicken-and-egg problem, we can assume that discourses used by dominant actors are necessarily dominant while the contrary is not always true. Marginalised actors adopting dominant discourses might improve their position in the field but do certainly not become dominant by this simple adoption of a dominant discourse.

elites is also necessary. Hegemony production beyond the elite is the other element of the production of hegemony within a field. Whereas the debates of the 1990s were not much affected by non-elites because of the lack of awareness about Internet governance, non-elites were well-represented during the WSIS. Vague references to participation, transparency, accountability and openness had been sufficient in the 1990s to prevent the immediate formation of counter-elite movements. Thus, the analysis of the WSIS debates highlights broader consensus-building better. As we have seen (see especially chap. 7), developing countries governments, NGOs, and a number of marginalised intergovernmental organisations such as the UNESCO participated in the WSIS. They were not sharing the dominant vision of Internet governance that had prevailed in the 1990s based on self-regulation, market-enabling mechanisms and technically-oriented governance. The renewed hegemonic imaginary had not only to be able to make consensus within the elite, but it also needed to respond to the demands of non-elites. The solution was imagined by a group of experts where the renewed power elite was represented. First, as we have seen, the definition of Internet governance was broadened to include social, political, and economic issues. These issues were included but remained separated from core issues related to the technical management of the Internet. This separation protected the power elite from large-scale reconfigurations. Second, new institutions were created in order to continue the debates on Internet governance. Third, and most importantly, the hegemonic imaginary of multistakeholderism emerged. The imaginary of multistakeholderism drew upon elements of the 1990s such as Internet exceptionalism (old governance model are not suited for cyberspace), participation and openness. Multistakeholderism was consistent with the power elite's rejection of intergovernmentalism but also with the demands of enhanced participation from civil society groups and developing countries. The discourse on multistakeholderism echoes democratic ideals of pluralism, equality and participation. As a result, without touching the essential of elite power in the field of Internet governance, multistakeholderism became the new hegemonic imaginary. In other words, the renewed imaginary ensured a broad acceptance both among elites and non-elites of an elitist order in the field of Internet governance.

The two historical moments analysed in this study illustrate two types of situation in which hegemony is produced. First, hegemony can be produced through the tacit and passive consent of a public that is not aware of the stakes, or not willing to engage into political struggles. This is the situation defined by Wright Mills as a mass society, where the power of the elite is not challenged by apathetic masses. The second situation corresponds more to a Gramscian process of hegemony production, where groups of non-elites actively support an order that benefits the elite. This was

described by Burawoy at the micro-level of the industry (Burawoy, 1982, 2008). Workers play by the rules of the game in order to gain some satisfaction, or benefits. By doing so, they reproduce a capitalist order that unequally redistributes the produced value. At the global level, this process has been studied by neo-Gramscian Global Political Economy. Tenants of a Cultural Political Economy particularly insist on the process of hegemony production at the level of ideas (Jessop, 2006; Jessop & Oosterlynck, 2008; Sum & Jessop, 2013). At the level of a transnational field, the same process of hegemony production can be observed. Like in the analysis of a given firm, the active participation of dominated groups in the production of hegemony clearly appears. What might seem as an imposition by a pre-existing elite or class when we look at the global political economy as a whole, turns out to be a myriad of processes at the field-level, in which non-elite groups play an important role, not only in the reproduction of a given order but even in its production in the first place.

### **9.2.2. Elite reconfiguration and change**

Change as well can be analysed at the level of actors. The analysis of the history of Internet governance illustrate how the evolution of the composition of the elite, as well as the emergence of counter-elites can affect the whole structure of a field. As we have seen in chapter 6, one of the key elements that led to the crisis of Internet governance at the beginning of the 2000s is the failure to include some powerful groups within the elite. A few years later, some of these counter-elites were included within the power elite during the WSIS. This was for example the case of the civil society elite, that included some of the most vocal critics of the existing system.

Counter-elites are a major factor of change. In the case of the Internet governance field, three main categories of counter-elites have been described in this study. First, the scholarly elite emerged during the creation of the ICANN. As we have seen in chapter 6, the scholarly elite was based in prestigious US universities and stemmed mainly from law departments. The scholarly elite was not dominant in the field of Internet governance but held an important amount of capital in their home fields. As a result, they were able to position themselves as a real counter-elite in the field of Internet governance. They criticised the ICANN system because of its lack of participation mechanisms and legitimacy. They were also very critical of the process that led to its creation (Froomkin, 2000; Kleinwächter, 2002; Mueller, 1999). The scholarly counter-elite was a crucial actor in the imposition of an ICANN reform. It later participated to the WSIS. This is partly because of the advocacy of the scholarly elite that the definition of Internet governance was broadened at this occasion. As a result, many members of the scholarly elite became part of the power elite of

Internet governance. They were able to use the scientific capital acquired in other fields in order to become influential actors in Internet governance. Several authors of the most-quoted critical scholarly articles on the ICANN system at the turn of the millennium have now key positions within the ICANN system, as board members, as members of advisory councils of Regional Internet Registries, or as a regular participants to ICANN meetings<sup>338</sup>. The emergence of a powerful counter-elite fomented change in the field, and a reconfiguration of the elite. The case was different with another counter-elite. Hackers became important critiques of the ICANN system. They claimed that it epitomized the commercialisation of the Internet, away from their libertarian ideals. Like the scholarly elite, they used their hacking skills as capital to enter the field of Internet governance in the early 2000s. However, the election of a hacker to the board of the ICANN, and several manifestos were not able to influence the field in any significant way. Hackers were marginalised at least until the rise of the anonymous movement<sup>339</sup>. The third counter-elite that can be observed in the field of Internet governance is the policy elite of developing countries. Developing countries were excluded from the debates on Internet governance in the 1990s. Through other institutional settings where they were more powerful, they managed to gain importance in Internet governance issues. This was the case of the WSIS, which is described in chapter 8. But this is also the case since the WSIS, through the process of Enhanced Cooperation.




Figure 9.1. Board members by country of origin (cumulative)

338 For example, Wolfgang Kleinwächter became a member of the ICANN board in 2013. Milton Mueller became a member of the board of trustees of the American Regional Internet Registry in 2012.

339 The consequence of the anonymous movement on the field of Internet governance is beyond the scope of this study. But it seems that the lack of unity of the movement and the blurriness of the objectives of the movement make it difficult to qualify it as a counter-elite of Internet governance.



Change not only happens at the expense of the power elite, it can also occur within the elite as an evolutionary process. We have already seen how the definition of Internet governance changed and how the power elite changed accordingly to include the civil society elite. The power elite also gradually included more women and more individuals from non-OECD countries. However, the observations seem to indicate that an extension of the elite and the inclusion of formerly non-elite members with lower levels of capital tend to favour the emergence of a two-tier power elite. In the case of Internet governance, the greater role of new elites in institutions like the IGF and on issues related to non-technical governance contrasts with the continuing exclusion of new elites from core issues. Despite these differences, the longer-term trend seems to be a certain diversification of the power elite. This evolution is consistent with a hegemonic project of inclusion of potential counter-elites. However, the feasibility of a hegemonic reconfiguration of the elite depends on the level of contradiction of a given order. Minimal hegemony (Cafruny & Ryner, 2007) is likely to generate resistance and the emergence of counter-elites. In this case, the power of the elite is fragile and its evolution and extension problematic. In the case of an integral hegemony, the consent to the order is widely-shared and the reproduction and evolution of the elite is likely to take place smoothly. Recent developments in Internet governance tend to show that the evolution of the elite, and notably the inclusion of a civil society elite, is currently not perceived as sufficient in civil society circles<sup>340</sup>. This tends to indicate that the reproduction of the power elite is problematic and that hegemony remains minimal in Internet governance.

### **9.2.3. Transnational fields and the global field of power**

The last contribution of the present study to an international political sociology perspective is the analysis of how the dynamics of order and change within the field relate to the dynamics of order and change at the global level. As we have seen in chapter 3, global politics can be described as a set of semi-autonomous fields united by a global field of power (Mérand & Pouliot, 2008). The analogy to the field of power described by Bourdieu at the national level (e.g. Bourdieu, 2012) allows for a conceptualisation of the position of one given field relatively to other fields and of the evolving exchange rate between forms of capital acquired in different fields. The study of Internet governance as a field contributes to this perspective. The genealogy of the field of Internet governance explains the importance of a scientific/technical capital that still determines the dominant

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<sup>340</sup> This affirmation is based on the study of civil society mailing lists specialising in Internet governance such as BestBits and the Internet Governance Caucus.

position of the technical-scientific elite. The autonomisation from the field of international telecommunication regulation indicates the emergence of Internet governance as an independent field. It also helps to understand why the rejection of intergovernmentalism as a governance model and of the ITU as an actor of Internet governance has been so important in the history of the field. The interconnection between the field of Internet governance and the global economic field during the 1990s, and with the field of global security in the early 2000s has also contributed to the structuration of Internet governance and to the growing importance of Internet governance as a global issue.

Indeed, a dialectical relationship between a particular field and the global field of power can be analysed. Change within the field might generate change in the global field of power while structural trends in the global field of power affects the specific fields. Internet governance certainly epitomised the structural trend towards neoliberal models of governance in the 1990s that existed beyond this particular field. But the growing importance of the idea of multistakeholderism in the field of Internet governance has also affected other fields. While multistakeholderism was not invented in Internet governance, Internet governance is one of the leading fields where multistakeholder governance has become part of the hegemonic imaginary. This trend has extended beyond the field through actors and organisations that translated the principle of multistakeholderism in other fields. For example, many organisations adopt a multistakeholder rhetoric when they deal with Internet governance. This was the case of the eG8, this is also the case of the Council of Europe<sup>341</sup>. This model is sometimes repeated by these organisations for the discussion of different topics.

The global field of power is structured by two logics: the international competition of national elites; and the global competition of field elites. Forms of capital include different types of capital acquired in different fields. They also include national capital as an asset in the struggles entailed by international competition. As a result, a Bourdieusian perspective on International Relations addresses not only the relations of individuals within a social universe, but also the relations between these universes. Nations are such universes that are related among themselves and to other transnational universes. Far from undermining the importance of national power and the state, Bourdieusian IR can contribute to their re-framing within a more global perspective on power. As we have seen throughout the study of Internet governance, national capital determines to a certain extent the position of actors within the field of Internet governance. Moreover, governments are

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341 See <http://www.coe.int/t/information/society/>, last accessed 8 April 2014.

themselves important actors in the field. This has historically been the case especially for the US government and US actors relying on their national capital. However, the role of Australian and European actors in the creation of the ICANN and the role of China and Chinese actors such as the Internet society of China during the WSIS should not be underestimated. Moreover, the emergence of non-US governments in Internet governance is one of the major recent changes in the field. This is why the following section focuses on the importance of national capital in the emergence of new actors in the field of Internet governance as a way to address issues usually left to state-centric approaches.




Figure 9.2. National and transnational fields and the global field of power

The global field of power is a field where the exchange rate between different forms of capital is determined. The global field of power is also where a certain form of hierarchisation between fields takes place. In the global field of power, different forms of legitimacy compete since actors' legitimacy has been built in very different social universes. The global field of power is beyond the scope of the present study. However, the analysis of Internet governance as a transnational fields allows us to formulate some hypothesis on the global field of power that could be explored in further studies. Transnational elites are those groups that exercise power within a transnational field. They are different, although sometimes intertwined, with national elites. Transnational elites act within a social space where the stakes and the institutions are transnational. Global elites are those groups that act primarily in a national or a transnational field. However, they are powerful enough to be part of the global struggle for power. They participate to the production of a global hegemonic imaginary. Their “home” field needs to be important enough for their legitimacy to be recognised at a global level. Based on the study of the history of Internet governance, we can argue that it was not the case so far that the power elite of Internet governance had enough legitimacy and capital to

compete for power at a global level and to participate to the production of global imaginaries. However, with the Internet becoming more important in our daily lives, it is likely that transnational elites of Internet governance become more influential at a global level. The spread of the multistakeholder imaginary in the field of telecommunications illustrates this potential.

### **9.3. Current crisis and possible futures for Internet governance**

While the limitation of the research to the two historical moments of the ICANN creation and the WSIS was necessary for methodological reasons, the interest of the research is not only historical. Anchored in a Coxian tradition, the purpose of the research is to investigate the foundations of the current order, its contradictions, and the potential for change (Cox, 1981). This section is focused on emerging powers that could bring about change in Internet governance. Emerging powers are defined as social forces that are proposing alternative models of governance and that are likely to be influential in the transnational field of Internet governance. The two elements of the definition are important. First, emerging power are politically significant only if they are advocating for change. Emergence is primarily a political project. Supporters of the *status-quo* are not analysed as emerging powers. Second, emerging power must hold some capital that is likely to grant them with power in the field so that they can be described as counter-elites rather than non-elites. This section focuses primarily on national capital (Bourdieu, 2005), defined as the resources that an actor (individual or organisation) can mobilise because of the fact that she comes from a given country. National capital includes language skills, reputational capital of a given country, ability to mobilise financial capital, etc. Because of the rise of new economies in the global economic field, the value of some “emerging” national capitals is increasing. This section explores the potential for change entailed by the increase in national capital of a number of formerly non-dominant actors (firms, NGOs, governmental actors, individuals, etc.). In order to do so, it first defines the contradictions of the current Internet governance system and investigates if they can be considered as elements of a crisis of Internet governance. Second, the possibility of new actors to emerge in the field of Internet governance thanks to the growth of their national capital is discussed. Finally, the consequences of such a process of emergence are analysed in terms of possible futures for Internet governance.

#### **9.3.1. Is the WSIS order in crisis?**

Ten years after the first phase of the WSIS, the divisions evidenced at the time seem to continue to

structure the field of Internet governance. First, it seems that the hegemonic project that prevailed during the second phase of the WSIS produced a minimal hegemony that was not integral enough to contain the disagreements of non-dominant actors. Second, Internet governance is affected by the dramatic increase in value of some national capitals in the global field of power. As a result, emerging powers from emerging economies threaten the current order.

As we have seen in chapter 8, the second phase of the WSIS found a way out of the opposition between supporter of the *status-quo* and advocates of change. This hegemonic project was based on a discursive element: the multistakeholder imaginary. It was also relying on a dual institutional element: the Internet governance forum and the Enhanced Cooperation process. While the multistakeholder imaginary remains largely accepted in the field<sup>342</sup>, the implementation of the dual institutional element posed some problems. The Internet Governance Forum became rapidly part of the Internet governance ecosystem and participated to the institutionalisation of hegemony (see chapter 8). However, the Enhanced Cooperation process was interpreted very differently by different actors. The Tunis Agenda reads:

“69. We further recognize the need for enhanced cooperation in the future, to enable governments, on an equal footing, to carry out their roles and responsibilities, in international public policy issues pertaining to the Internet, but not in the day-to-day technical and operational matters, that do not impact on international public policy issues.” (WSIS, 2005)

The first years of the implementation of the Tunis Agenda were hardly leading to any change in the governance of the Internet. The ICANN system remained largely unchallenged even if the US oversight was slightly reformed. The Internet Governance Forum was hailed as an important space for dialogue but was not able to bring any change in the field. Enhanced cooperation was monitored by UN-DESA in the form of an annual report based on the contributions of 10 organizations involved in the governance of the Internet<sup>343</sup> where the organizations usually recalled their participation in the IGF as an effort towards enhanced cooperation.

Developing countries were trying to put forward a more ambitious agenda for enhanced cooperation

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342 Critiques about the principle of multistakeholder governance itself remain marginal, even though they are certainly increasing.

343 These organizations were: Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), International Telecommunication Union (ITU), World Wide Web Consortium (W3C), Council of Europe, Internet Society (ISOC), Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and Number Resource Organization (NRO), and the Internet Engineering TaskForce (IETF).

in the United Nations. In January 2009, a resolution that requested the Secretary-General to submit to the ECOSOC recommendations on how to implement the process towards enhanced cooperation was adopted by consensus by the UN General Assembly (UNGA, 2009 A/RES/63/202).

Following the report of the UN secretary-General, consultations were convened by UN-DESA in December 2010 in New York<sup>344</sup>. During the meeting, India, Brazil and South Africa (IBSA) made a joint statement to recall the need for an intergovernmental platform within the UN system in order to discuss the policy implications of Internet governance in a complementary fashion with the IGF (IBSA, 2010 §6). According to the statement, an intergovernmental working group would decide whether to create a new platform or use an existing one (IBSA, 2010, §8). In December 2012, the General Assembly mandated the UNCTAD to create a Working Group on Enhanced Cooperation (UNGA - General Assembly of the United Nations, 2012). The Working Group started its work in 2013 and is expected to produce a report in 2014. While the power elite of Internet governance is well-represented in the working Group, the fact that it mainly includes government representatives from developing countries might represent a threat to the existing order<sup>345</sup>. As a result, the separation of the process of enhanced cooperation illustrates the lack of an integral hegemony. There are a number of actors involved in the struggle to reform the existing order. Moreover, these actors seem to have found a forum to express their demands<sup>346</sup>. This is why the current situation can be described as a crisis of Internet governance, with counter-elite threatening the existing order.

The actors that are pushing for this reformist agenda are mainly actors from what has been described as “emerging economies”. In spite of the limitations of the concept, an increase of their power in the field of Internet governance over the last few years can be observed. Not only the Indian, Brazilian, South African, Kenyan, Chinese governments are gaining leverage in the field of Internet governance, but private-sector and civil society organizations from these countries are also becoming more influential. This is why emergence is better described as an increase in the value of a given national capital than as the enhanced material capacities of a state.

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344 Eighty-five written and oral contributions were conveyed in total by Governments, international organizations, civil society actors and private sector entities. (UNSG, 2011 E/2011/103).

345 See the membership list at [http://unctad.org/Sections/un\\_cstd/docs/cstd2013d04\\_Membership.pdf](http://unctad.org/Sections/un_cstd/docs/cstd2013d04_Membership.pdf), last accessed 8 April 2014.

346 It remains to be seen whether the efforts by the Brazilian government on the ICANN side will be fruitful. The Brazil meeting will take place in April 2014.

### 9.3.2. Possible futures for Internet governance

In addition to the current crisis of Internet governance, a number of elements are likely to shape the future of the field. First, the power elite of Internet governance still holds a position of power in the field in spite of the increasingly minimal and contested character of its hegemony. Second, a sovereigntist counter-elite has a strong institutional base in intergovernmental organisations and holds a dominant position in fields such as the global security field. In spite of the “free Internet” discourse, the power elite and the sovereigntist counter-elite share a concern for the continuing commercialisation of the Internet. Finally, a reformist counter-elite share with the power elite the democratic rhetoric but it advocates for a deep reform of the field.

	<i>Success of the sovereigntist counter-elites</i>	<i>Success of the reformist counter-elite</i>
<i>Reconfiguration</i>	Neoliberal cybersecurity scenario	“Free Internet” scenario
<i>Change</i>	Sovereigntist scenario	Participatory democracy?

Table 9.2. Possible futures for Internet governance

1. The first possible scenario is the preservation of the *status-quo*. Current efforts to reform Internet governance might end up strengthening the existing system. Just like the WSIS gave a sort of UN-legitimacy to a private governance model, the Enhanced cooperation process or the talks on ICANN reform led by Brazil could end up with another confirmation of the existing system with marginal reforms, or to the creation of new non-decision-making bodies. Despite the contradictions that undermine the stability the current order, the power elite remains discursively and institutionally strong. As we have seen, the power elite is represented in the Working Group on Enhanced Cooperation. They were successful at containing the reform proposals by emerging countries in the last years such as the IBSA project. Likewise, the preparation process of the meeting to be held in Brazil in 2014 has been to a large extent co-opted by the power elite<sup>347</sup>, which has been criticised by civil society organisations. After the World Conference on International Telecommunications in 2012, the power elite of Internet governance reacted to the intergovernmentalist arguments with a campaign on “free Internet” (Chenou, 2013; Jamart, 2013). The campaign was successful at least

<sup>347</sup> See for example the description of the INet platform by the Director General of APNIC, available at [http://www.circleid.com/posts/2013112\\_what\\_is\\_inet\\_to\\_me/](http://www.circleid.com/posts/2013112_what_is_inet_to_me/), last accessed 8 April 2014.

until the Snowden revelations (Chenou, 2013). While the argument on the necessity to support Google and other Internet giants to protect the Internet from autocratic governments is more difficult to make in the current context, it is possible that a new hegemonic imaginary emerge. This new hegemonic imaginary could legitimise the power of the elite by drawing upon principles such as freedom and multistakeholderism. The process of production of a renewed hegemony of the power elite could then resemble the WSIS process.

2. Another possible scenario is the continuation of the neoliberal cybersecurity synthesis that emerged towards the end of the WSIS (see chap 5, fig. ). In order to defend the neoliberal model of Internet governance, the US made an agreement with China before the second phase of the WSIS. In exchange of a recognition of the existing system by China, the US (followed by the power elite) accepted a mention to sovereignty on country-code Top-Level Domains (such as .cn) and to the active role of states in Internet-related policy issues in the Tunis Agenda (WSIS, 2005). The deal illustrated the counter-intuitive compatibility between economic deregulation and securitisation of the Internet. Indeed, the main argument of the supporters of such an exception to the neoliberal principle of self-regulation was the need for security. National security, as well as cybersecurity were left out of the self-regulation and multistakeholder governance models and of the IGF discussions. The deal epitomises the specific translation in the field of Internet governance of a “thick” definition of neoliberalism, as a “*transnational political project* aiming to remake the nexus of market, state, and citizenship from above” (Wacquant, 2010). More importantly, neoliberalism entails the articulation of economic deregulation *and* of “an expansive, intrusive, and proactive penal apparatus” (Wacquant, 2010). In the field of Internet governance, the economic deregulation preceded the securitisation of the Internet. However, since the 2001 terrorist attacks on the US, and coherently with the national security concerns of sovereignist states, Internet governance gradually included the penal aspect of neoliberalism, which justifies the exception to the rule of “small government” on security-related issues both at a domestic and at the international level. Depending on the acceptance by Internet users of massive surveillance programs and of repressive policies aimed at the protection of national security and of the good functioning of the market, the neoliberal cybersecurity discourse might shape the future of Internet governance and facilitate the inclusion of the sovereignist counter-elite into the power elite of Internet governance. The emerging “cybersecurity metaphysics” also entail an increased international competition and the multiplication of international security crisis potentially leading to cyberwars.

3. Should the inclusion of the sovereignist counter-elite fail, another scenario could be a deep



reform of Internet governance along sovereignist lines. The model favoured by some Arab States and countries like Russia is also supported by a lot of developing states that see the creation of an intergovernmental organisation, or the inclusion of Internet governance to the ITU mandate as the only possible reform of Internet governance. The sovereignist project is inspired by the regulation of telecommunications before their liberalisation and before the advent of the Internet. Until the 1980s, telecommunications were regulated by national governments at the national level and by intergovernmental agreements at an international level (see chapter 4). The field of international telecommunication regulation was a field where governments, and even governments from developing countries, held influential positions. The balance of power with the private sector was different from the current situation of the field of Internet governance. Moreover, the one-state one-vote principles gave the majority to developing countries. As a result, the sovereignist counter-elite is willing to impose an intergovernmentalisation of Internet governance that would include technical, but also policy-related aspects, and particularly those related to security. The opportunity for the sovereignist counter-elite relies in the fact that discussions are currently taking place in intergovernmental settings (UN General Assembly, UNCTAD, ITU). These traditional forums of international regulation favour governments over private actors, and coalitions among developing states. However, the counter-elite faces a hegemonic imaginary of Internet governance, and more globally of the Knowledge-Based Economy that structurally undermines governments' initiatives and non-market arrangements. Almost twenty years of anti-ITU, self-regulation, multistakeholder and freedom rhetoric have structured the field of Internet governance. Only a revolution in the field's imaginary would make the sovereignist project realistic. On the other hand, the consequences of the Snowden revelations, and the mistrust towards Internet firms and the Five-Eyes governments<sup>348</sup> is certainly an asset for the sovereignist project.

4. Finally, an emancipatory project can prevail if the reformist counter-elite is able to federate non-dominant actors around a project of reform of Internet governance. There is an important number of actors in the field of Internet governance that are dissatisfied with the current order but that do not wish to support a sovereignist project. However, the interests and ideas of this counter-elite are diverse. Emerging powers want to benefit from their newly-acquired national capital: they want a sit at the table of Internet governance. These emerging actors include governments, private sector and civil society organisations from countries such as India, Brazil and South Africa. They can also include civil society organisations from OECD countries that are not part of the power elite of Internet governance. These include mainly generalist civil society organisations involved in, but not

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348 United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand

specialising in, Internet governance. The counter-elite might also benefit from the tensions between the European Union and the US on issue such as privacy and network neutrality. Since a return to intergovernmentalism seems to be incompatible with the demands of these actors, a new conception of multistakeholderism as participatory democracy could be an option. Also, multistakeholder governance might include more than just issues of representation. A renewed multistakeholder governance for the Internet could put at the top of the agenda the politics of redistribution (Gurumurthy & Gurumurthy, 2008). Instead of the question of who should be represented in multistakeholder settings, the question becomes a question of who should be targeted by Internet governance policies. In a redistributive framework, these targeted groups would mainly be the marginalised groups that do not have access to the network, and who do not have a say on how it is governed. Such a change in the focus of the framing of multistakeholderism could foment a deep reform of the field of Internet governance directed towards a better inclusion of non-elites in the governance of the Internet.

Two possible futures for Internet governance entail the reconfiguration of the power elite to include discursive elements and members of two emerging counter-elites. Two other possible future entail a more profound reform of Internet governance, either in a sovereigntist direction, or in a reformist direction. In all cases, Internet governance seems to be at a crossroads (Radu, Chenou, Weber, 2013). In this context of crisis and instability, the international political sociology approach outlined in this book is certainly a good method to explore current development of Internet governance as another evolution of the field and a possible reconfiguration of its elite.

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# ANNEX 1. Matrix of the ARPANET Elite Network

	IPTO	MIT (Lincoln Lab)	NPL UK	Computer Corporation of America	Washington University in St. Louis	Network Analysis Corporation	UCLA	Stanford Research Institute (SRI)	Rand Corporation	BBN	NWG	Univ. Of Utah	UC Santa Barbara	Univ. Of Illinois	Telnet	Univ. Of Hawaii	Harvard	Xerox (PARC)	3Com
J.C.R. Licklider	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
L. Roberts	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
B. Weissler	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
R. Taylor	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
D. Davies	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
T. Manill	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
M. Clark	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
H. Frank	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
L. Kleinrock	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
E. Shapiro	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
J. Baran	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
D.C. Walden	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
J. Heath	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
R. Kahn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
S. Orstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
J. Barter	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
M. Crowther	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
D. Engelbart	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
S. Crocker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
V. Cerf	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
J. Postel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
J. Rutison	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
B. English	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
B. Duvall	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
C. Delcchie	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
S. Carr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
R. Stoughton	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
J. Heffner	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
A. Bushan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
J. McQuillan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
A. McKenzie	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
B. Weissler	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
H.W.J. Bourneight	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
C.R. Grossman	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
G.M. Goetz	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
R. Tomlinson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
N. Vidar	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
N. Avramson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
K. Metcalfe	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
K. Dalal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
E. Katz	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
C. Sunshine	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
E. Krstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
F. Pao	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
I. Rubin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
I. Zimmerman	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
C. Lehman	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
D. Boggs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
R. Cohen	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
R. Braden	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
D. Lynch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
D. Mockapetris	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
D. Clark	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
B. Barker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
M. Clesham	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
R. Despres	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
V. Dewiler	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O. Rini	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
K. Samuelson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
K. Sandum	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
B. Sexton	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
P. Shanks	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
C.D. Shepard	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
J. Tucker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
J. Cole	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
K. Fy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
P. Roverer	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

	USC	Univ. College London	INWG (1972)	Engineering Innovation Network	French PTT	Univ. British Columbia	IRIA	Bell Canada	Univ. Of Stockholm	UK Post Office	Canadian DPT of Communications	Logica UK	SDC	Mitre Corp.
J. C. R. Licklider	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
L. Roberts	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
B. Wiestler	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
R. Taylor	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
D. Davies	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
T. Marill	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
W. Clark	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
H. Frank	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
T. Kleinrock	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
E. Shapiro	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
B. Baran	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
D. C. Walden	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
F. Heath	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
B. Kahn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
S. Orstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
B. Barken	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
N. Crowther	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
D. Crowther	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
D. Engelbart	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
S. Crocker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
J. Carl	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
J. Foster	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
J. Kullison	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
B. English	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
B. Duvall	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
S. Delcotte	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
S. Carr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
R. Stoughton	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
J. Haerner	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
A. Ehusman	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
J. McQuillan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
A. Mckenzie	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
B. Wessler	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
W. J. Bouknight	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
G. R. Grossman	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
D. M. Grote	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
R. Tomlinson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
J. Vitell	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
N. Abramson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
R. Mercalle	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
V. Datal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
R. Karp	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
C. Surshine	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
P. Kirstein	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
F. Kuo	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
L. Pouzin	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
H. Zimmermann	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
G. Lehann	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
D. Boggs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
D. Cohen	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
R. Braden	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
D. Lynch	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
P. Mockapetris	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
D. Clark	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
D. Barber	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
B. Barker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
W. Clispsham	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
R. Despres	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
V. Dewiler	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
O. Rinal	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
K. Samuelson	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
K. Sandum	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
B. Sexton	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
P. Shanks	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0
C. D. Shepard	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
J. Tucker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
J. Cole	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
K. Fy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
P. Roverer	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1

**ANNEX 2. Matrix of the network of the field of Internet governance in the 1990s**

4=author ; 3=affiliated ; 2=commentor ; 1 = participant	Drift Postel	IAMC	Framework for e-commerce	White Paper	ICANN Bylaws	ICANN MOU	Interagency Working Group on Internet Domains	GIP	Price Waterhouse Coopers	First ICANN Board	ETF	IAB	ISOC Board of Trustees	ITAG	SCO	Spyglass Inc.	Visa	ISP Consortium	CASIE	Aldea Communicat ions
Jon Postel	4	0	0	2	4	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Randy Bush	4	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Karl Deminger	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0
Brian Carpenter	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alan Barrett	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robert Elz	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Geoff Huston	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Klesin	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lawrence Landweber	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nick Tiro	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sally M. Abel	4	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Perry Metzger	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jun Murai	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dave Crocker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Keith Nussbacher	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Don Heslin	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robert Straw	2	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
George Straw	2	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Maher	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Albert Trampotsch	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Beckwith Burr	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Andrew Pincus	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Larry Irving	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ira Magaziner	0	0	0	4	2	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
William M. Daley	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Joe Sims	0	0	0	4	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gabe Battista	0	0	0	4	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Zita Wenzel	0	0	0	4	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chris Clough	0	2	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Don Beage	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vilton Cerf	0	0	0	0	0	0	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Roger Cochetti	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mike Roberts	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Joe Dryden	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Svend Kraemer	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michael Sheridan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peter Harter	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dimitri Ystiahi	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sam Patrledge	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pascal Preston	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pat Boner	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peter Dawe	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John de Ridder	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Takatsasi Yamakawa	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mathew Copeland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Margo Langford	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dan Davies	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lee McKnight	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nathalie Gautraud	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peter Sandler	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sarah Harrison	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fod Barnes	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Charles Helein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ohad Finkelstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jeff Pulver	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Masatsugu Tsuji	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Barbara Dooley	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Barry Reversdran Greene	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bill Frezza	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Vixie	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Allan Sullivan	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Daniel Kaplan	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Keith Gymer	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Philip Sheppard	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eliy Hardwick	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michael T. Doughney	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kahryn A. Keimann	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ronald J. Fitzherbert	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Simon Higgs	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Matthew Skala	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kent Chispin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Carv Kapr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Collier-Brown	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Christopher Ansbler	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Thomas J. Hoffmann	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John R. Levine	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Clive Elliott	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Martin J. Duerst	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
William Allen Simpson	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

4=author ; 3= affiliated ; 2=commentor ; 1 = Participant	Drift Postal	IAMC	Framework for e-commerce	White Paper	ICANN Bylaws	ICANN MOU	Inter-agency Working Group on Internet Domains	GIP	Price Waterhouse Coopers	First ICANN Board	ETF	IAB	ISOC Board of Trustees	ITAG	SCO	Spyglass Inc.	Visa	ISP Consortium	CASIE	Aldea Communicat ions
Oliver MU C'reph- Lebond	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Douglas Koh	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Aveek Datta	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Walther H. Dieckmann	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dan Kolls	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stephen J. Page	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
A. Michael Salm	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alan Barrett	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michael Berkson	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Laina Ravenel-Greene	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Burou Lammun	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tony Rakowski	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Simon Bursau	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
VIII Foster	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ken Hart	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jim Ho Hur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Conrad	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brownlie Thomas	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Javier Sala	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tom Agoston	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sharon Eisner Gillett	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mitchell Kapoor	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mark Gould	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eric Hoffman	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scott Huddle	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Joseph Y. Hui	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Johnson	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brian Kahn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
James Keller	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Leslie King	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Don Mitchell	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Traele Monk	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Milton Mueller	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Carl Oppenstahl	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David G. Post	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Yakov Reznick	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Resnick	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Timothy J. Salo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Philip L. Sparbaro	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Vixie	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mark Corbit	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Carl Malamud	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Douglas Schoenberger	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eliase Gerich	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bob Frank	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bob Moskowitz	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Mockapetris	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mike St. Johns	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kiriler	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Karrienberg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Larry Landweber	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Williams	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Guy Almes	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alison Markin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Charles Pickering	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mrs. Morella	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mt. Barcia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Joseph Bordogna	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Andy Samovitz	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jim Courier	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robert E. Kahn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Farber	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Esther Dyson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gerardine Capdeboscq	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
George H. Corrales	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gregory L. Crew	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Frank Fitzsimons	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hans Kraaflenbrink	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eugenio Triana	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Linda S. Wilson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jim Fleming	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
William Burnington	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Karl Auerbach	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Garth	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Patrice Washington	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eric Lee	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Harris Miller	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Doug Humphrey	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kim Hubbard	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0



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Raymundo Vega Aguilar	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Twomey	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Steve Wolff	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Eskin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Patrick	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robert Foster	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Yukio Mizuno	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
James Clark	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Barry Sullivan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Gerdelman	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Melcho Nardis	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Gaudis	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Gape	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Marc Baroff	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Francis Durey	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tim Krauskopf	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Doug Michels	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Volker Steiner	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sidney Karin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
George Brandenburg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hemette Avram	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jim Beall Jr.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alan Batecky	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Matt Blaze	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Susan Estrada	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kenneth Famm	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Carol Henderson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kenneth Kigenslein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Richard Lehtinen	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Siu Loken	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ike Ness	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Carl Edward Oliver	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stewart Personick	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Thomas Rindfleisch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Comie Stout	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Harold Thompson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peter Dengate Thruish	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mikki Barry	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Patrick O'Brien	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ellen Rony	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peter Rony	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Schutt	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Erik Weisberg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Diane Cabell	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dave Corliss	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Richard Sexton	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Einar Steierud	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brian Reid	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dan Steinberg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Marc Hurst	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kenneth Fockler	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Christopher Ambler	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jay Fanello	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tim Gibson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tressa Kirby	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brian Adkins	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Izumi Azu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Susan Anthony	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kim Baylis	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Steve Babin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Steve Babin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jeff Black	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Barry Bluestein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tim Brosson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lorraine Brennan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Charles Brownstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Martin Burack	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Marilyn Cade	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gilee Harrah Cady	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ferry Cahoun	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jean Cantrell	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gene Crick	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ken Dutchfield	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Curran	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kenneth Cukier	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alan Davidson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sally Davis	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Susan Davis	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sarah Deutsch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vikram Dhawan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

4=author ; 3= affiliated ; 2=commentor ; 1 = Sponsors	Drift Postal	IAMC	Framework for e-commerce	White Paper	ICANN Bylaws	ICANN MOU	Inter-agency Working Group on Internet Domains	GIP	Price Waterhouse Coopers	First ICANN Board	ETF	IAB	ISOC Board of Trustees	ITAG	SCO	Spyglass Inc.	Visa	ISP Consortium	CASIE	Aldea Communicat ions
Jim Dixon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Carole Dobbs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sean Dorelan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Janis Doran	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Harry Einarway	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jon Emery	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jon Englund	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jose Esteves	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michael Fanelli	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Fares	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Harold Field	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ken Fokker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Forbes	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Richard Forman	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Martine Fox-McIntyre	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lorna Frangle	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lamar Frankel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michael Froomkin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Roberto Gaetano	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chuck Gomes	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jeffrey Graber	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ariel Grazer	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Graves	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nial Greenfield	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Patrick Greenwell	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robert Hall	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michalina Halke	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mark Harrington	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peter Harter	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rina Hartline	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Steve Hefflin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jason Hendlees	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Hill	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Holtzman	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Richard Hovey	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Deb Howard	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michelle Ibaev	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chris Israel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Craig Johnson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Kane	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ron Kawchuk	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Debra Kelly	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Victor Kharina	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chad Kistinger	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Joseph Klein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Boo Korzeniewski	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Silant Lev	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Adam Lim	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Roxanne Loveday	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hal Lubsen	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dave McClure	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mark McFadden	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scott McMahon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Mitchell	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Morley	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
William Morgan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sascha Morell	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brain Morris	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mike Nelson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Neldermyer	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Drew Olsen	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brian O'Shaughnessy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Adam Pease	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Patricia Podesta	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michael Provance	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Quinn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Quarterman	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Juliette Ravendran Greene	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sarah Reardon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tricia Rimo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Greg Rixon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Oscar Robles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Edward Rodriguez	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nesran Sarraf	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Howard Sarraf	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ricardo Sazon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Philip Seabro	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michael Schraeder	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Scovese	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

4=author ; 3=affiliated ; 2=commentor ; 1 = participant	Drift Postal	IAMC	Framework for e-commerce	White Paper	ICANN Bylaws	ICANN MOU	Inter-agency Working Group on Internet Domains	GIP	Price Waterhouse Coopers	First ICANN Board	ETF	IAB	ISOC Board of Trustees	ITAG	SCO	Spyglass Inc.	Visa	ISP Consortium	CASIE	Aldea Communicat ions
William Semich	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Garrett Sam	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
James Shaw	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Craig Simon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Charles Smith	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
Chidy Smith	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
Clint Smith	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Megan Stein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ken Stubbs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tracy Taylor	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Wayne Thelenol	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Harwood Torrence	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bernard Turcotte	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Larry Vaalen	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peter Vaek	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Susan Weisbon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eric Weisberg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Steve Weiss	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dave Weitzel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Danny Weitzner	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Heather Wilde	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jim Wilson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eric Warner	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jerry Wodinsky	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pindar Wong	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Wood	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jonathan Zittrain	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

4=author ; -3= affiliated ; 2=commentor ; 1 = Participant	Lockheed Maretta	Fausst, Gaeta and Lund	Unit Corporation Bell	Motion Picture Association	FNCAAC Advisory Committee	American Library Association	EuroSPA	Lawrence Berkeley NRT Lab	Brookings	University of Colorado	Sun Microsystem s	Fujitsu	Name.space Chapter	ISOC	Vicom	GTE Internetwork ing	W3C	EFF
Jon Postel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Randy Bush	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Karl Deminger	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brian Carpenter	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alan Barrett	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robert Elz	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Geoff Huston	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Klein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lawrence Landweber	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nick Tro	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sally M. Abel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Perry Metzger	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tim Murai	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dore Crocker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kliahk Nussbacher	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Don Heslin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robert Straw	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
George Straw	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Maher	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Albert Trampotsch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Beckwith Burr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Andrew Pincus	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Larry Irving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ira Magaziner	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
William M. Daley	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Joe Sims	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gabe Battista	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Zita Wenzel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chris Clough	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Don Teague	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vilmon Cerl	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Roger Cochetti	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mike Roberts	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Joe Dryden	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Svend Kraemer	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michael Sheridan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peter Harter	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dimitri Ysirlanti	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sam Pallridge	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paschal Preston	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pat Boner	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peter Dawe	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John de Ridder	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Takatsasi Yamakawa	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mathew Copeland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Margo Langford	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dan Davies	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lee McKnight	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nathalie Gautraud	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peter Sandler	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sarah Harrison	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fod Barnes	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Charles Helein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ohad Finkelstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jeff Pulver	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Masatsugu Tsuji	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Barbara Dooley	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Barry Ravensdran Greene	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bill Frezza	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Vixie	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Allen Sullivan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Daniel Kaplan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Keith Gymer	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Philip Sheppard	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eliy Hardwick	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michael T. Doughey	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kathryn A. Keimann	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ronald J. Fitzherbert	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Simon Higgs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Matthew Skala	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kent Chispin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Carv Karp	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Collier-Brown	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Christopher Ansbler	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Thomas J. Hoffmann	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John R. Levine	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Clive Elliott	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Marlin J. Duerst	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
William Allen Simpson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

4=author ; -3=affiliated ; 2=commentor ; 1 = Participant	Lockheed Martetta	Fausati, Gaeta and Lund	Unit Corporation	Bell	Motion Picture Association	FNCAC Advisory Committee	American Library Association	EuroSPA	Lawrence Berkeley NRL Lab	Brookings	University of Colorado	MNC	Sun Microsystem s	Fujitsu	Name.space	ISOC Chapter	Viacom	GTE Internetwork ing	W3C	EFF
Douglas Koch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Aveek Datta	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Walter H. Diekmann	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dan Kolls	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stephen J. Page	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
A. Michael Salm	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alan Barrett	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michael Berkson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Laura Ravenel-Greene	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bruno Lemun	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tony Rakowski	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Simon Bureau	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vinl Foster	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ken Hart	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jim Ho Hur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Conrad	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brownlie Thomas	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Javier Sala	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tom Agoston	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sharon Eisner Gillett	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mitchell Kapur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mark Gould	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eric Hoffman	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scott Huddle	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Joseph Y. Hui	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Johnson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brian Kahn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
James Keller	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Leslie King	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Don Mitchell	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tracie Monk	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Wilton Mueller	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Carl Oppetahl	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David G. Post	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Yakov Reznick	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Resnick	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Timothy J. Salo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Philip L. Sparbaro	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Vixie	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mark Corbit	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Carl Malamud	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Douglas Schoenberger	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Elise Gerich	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bob Frank	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bob Moskowitz	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Moskowitz	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mike St. Johns	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kirker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Karrenberg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Larry Landweber	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Williams	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Guy Almes	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alison Markin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Charles Pickering	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mrs. Morella	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mt. Barcia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Joseph Bordogna	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Andy Sarnovitz	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jim Courier	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robert E. Kahn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Faber	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Esther Dyson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Certraline Capdeboscq	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
George H. Corrales	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gregory L. Crew	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Frank Fitzsimmons	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hans Kraatenbrink	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eugenio Triana	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Linda S. Wilson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jim Fleming	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
William Burnington	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Karl Auerbach	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Garin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Patrice Washington	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eric Lee	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Harris Miller	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Doug Humphrey	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kim Hubbard	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

4=author ; -3=affiliated ; 2=commentor ; 1 = Party/Unit	Lockheed Marteta	Fausati, Gaeta and Lund	Unit Corporation Bell	Motion Picture Association	FNCAAC Advisory Committee	American Library Association	EuroSPA	Lawrence Berkeley NRT Lab	Brookings	University of Colorado	MNC	Sun Microsystem s	Fujitsu	Name space	ISOC Chapter	Vicom	GTE Internetwork ing	W3C	EFF
Raymundo Vega Aguilar	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Twomey	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Steve Wolff	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tom Eskin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Patrick	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robert Foster	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Yukio Mizuno	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
James Clark	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Barry Sullivan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Gerdelman	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michele Nardo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Gannon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Gape	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Marc Baroff	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Francis Durey	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tim Krauskopf	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Doug Michels	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Volker Steiner	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sidney Karin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
George Brandenburg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hemette Avram	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jim Beall Jr.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alan Balecky	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Matt Blaze	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Susan Estrada	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kenneth Flamm	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Carol Henderson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kenneth Kigenstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Richard Leblhaber	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Siu Loken	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ike Nessi	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Edward Oliver	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stewart Personick	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Thomas Rindfleisch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Comie Stout	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Harold Thompson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peter Dengate Thrush	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mikki Barry	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Patrick O'Brien	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eileen Rony	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peter Rony	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Schutt	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Erik Weisberg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Diane Cahill	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Diane Correas	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Richard Sexton	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Elmar Steferud	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brian Reid	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dan Steinberg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Marc Hurst	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kenneth Fockler	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Christopher Ambler	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jay Fanelo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tim Gibson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tressa Kirby	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brian Adkins	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Izumi Azu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Susan Anthony	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kim Baylis	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Steve Ballou/n	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jeff Black	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Barry Bluestein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tim Brieson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lorraine Brennan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Charles Brownstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Marvin Burack	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Marlyn Cade	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Glee Harrah Cady	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ferry Cahoun	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jean Cantrell	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gene Crick	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ken Gutchfield	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Curran	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kenneth Cukier	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alan Davidson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sally Davis	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Susan Davis	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sarah Deutsch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vikram Dhawar	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

4=author ; 3=affiliated ; 2=commentor ; 1 = participant	Lockheed Marteta	Fausatt, Gaeta and Lund	Unit Corporation Bell	Motion Picture Association	FNCAC Advisory Committee	American Library Association	EuroSPA	Lawrence Berkeley Nat'l Lab	Brookings	University of Colorado	MNC	Sun Microsystems	Fujitsu	Name space	ISOC Chapter	Vicom	GTE Internetwork In g	W3C	EFF
Jim Dixon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Carole Dobbs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sean Donelan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Janis Doran	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Harry Einarway	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jon Emery	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jon Englund	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jose Esteves	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michael Fanelli	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Fares	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Harold Field	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ken Focker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Foides	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Richard Forman	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Margene Fox-McIntyre	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jornh Frangle	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jamr Frankel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michael Froomkin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Roberto Gaetano	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chuck Gomes	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jeffrey Graber	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ariel Grazer	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Graves	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nial Greenfield	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Patrick Greenwell	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robert Hall	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michaela Halie	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mark Harrington	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peter Harter	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rina Hartline	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Steve Hefflin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jason Hendlees	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Hillal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Holtzman	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Richard Hovey	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Deb Howard	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michelle Ibaev	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chris Israel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Craig Johnson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Kane	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ron Kawchuck	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Debra Kelly	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Victor Khanna	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chad Kistingel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Joseph Klein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Boo Korzeniowski	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Silant Lev	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Adam Lim	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Koaxanne Loveday	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hal Lubsen	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dave McClure	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mark McFadden	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scott McMahon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scott Mitchell	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Monroy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
William Morgan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sascha Morell	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brian Morris	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mike Nelson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Niedemyer	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Drew Olsen	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brian O'Shaughnessy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Adam Peave	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Patricia Poolela	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michael Provance	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Quam	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Quarterman	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Juliette Ravendran Greene	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sarah Raardon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tricia Rimo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Greg Rixon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Oscar Robles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Edward Rodriguez	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nesran Sarafi	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Howard Sarfiri	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ricardo Sazon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Philip Scharbo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michael Schreiber	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Scovese	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

4=author ; 3=affiliated ; 2=commentor ; 1 = participant	Lockheed Martin	Fausst, Gaeta and Lund	Unit Corporation Bell	Motion Picture Association	FNCAC Advisory Committee	American Library Association	EuroISPA	Lawrence Berkeley Nat'l Lab	Brookings	University of Colorado	MNC	Sun Microsystems	Fujitsu	Name space	ISOC Chapter	Viacom	GTE Internetwork	W3C	EFF
William Semich	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Garrett Sern	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
James Shaw	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Craig Simon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Charles Smith	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chryd Smith	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Clint Smith	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Megan Stein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ken Stubbs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tracy Taylor	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Wayne Thelenol	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Harwood Torrence	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bernard Turcotte	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Larry Vaehn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peter Vaek	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Susan Weisn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eric Weisberg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Steve Weiss	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Danny Weitzel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Danny Weitzner	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Heather Wilde	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jim Wilson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eric Warner	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jerry Wodinsky	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pindar Wong	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Wood	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jonathan Zittrain	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0



4=author ; 3= affiliated ; 2=commentor ; 1 = participant	Information Technology Association of America	World Information Technology Services and Alliance	NEC Corp.	INTA	Electronic Data System Corp.	Ferwick and West	Sonnensche in Nath & Rosenthal	Kelo University	Oaska University	GIC	IBM	Telstra	FMC	NSF	FCC	DOC	DOD	European Commission	French government	British government
Jon Postel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Randy Bush	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Karl Deminger	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brian Carpenter	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alan Barrett	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robert Elz	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Geoff Huston	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Klein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lawrence Landweber	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nick Tiro	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sally M. Abel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Perry Metzger	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jim Murali	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dave Crocker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kliahk Nussbacher	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Don Heslin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robert Straw	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
George Straw	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Maher	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Albert Trampotsch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Beckwith Burr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Andrew Pincus	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Larry Irving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ira Magaziner	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
William M. Daley	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Joe Sims	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gabe Battista	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Zita Wenzel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chris Clough	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Don Teague	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vilton Celi	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Roger Cochetti	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mike Roberts	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Joe Dryden	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Svend Kraemer	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michael Sheridan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peter Harter	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dimitri Yslianti	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sam Paltridge	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pascal Preston	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pat Boner	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peter Dawe	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John de Ridder	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Takanashi Yamakawa	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mathew Copeland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Margo Langford	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dan Davies	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lee McKnight	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nathalie Gauraud	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peter Sandler	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sarah Harrison	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fod Barnes	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Charles Helein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chad Finkelstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jeff Pulver	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Masatsugu Tsuji	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Barbara Dooley	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Barry Ravensdran Greene	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bill Frezza	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Vixie	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Allen Sullivan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Daniel Kaplan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Keith Gymer	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Philip Sheppard	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eliy Hardwick	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michael T. Dougney	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kahryn A. Keimani	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ronald J. Fitzherbert	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Simon Higgs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Matthew Skala	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kent Chisgin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Carv Karp	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Collier-Brown	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Christopher Ansbler	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Thomas J. Hoffmann	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John R. Levrine	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Clive Elliott	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Marin J. Duerst	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
William Allen Simpson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

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Douglas Koch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Oliver MU Crepin-Lehond	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Aveek Datta	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Walter H. Diekmann	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dan Kolls	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stephen J. Page	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
A. Michael Salm	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alan Barrett	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michael Berkson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Laina Ravenel-Greene	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Burou Lamm	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tony Rakowski	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Simon Bureau	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
VIII Foster	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ken Hart	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jim Ho Hur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Conrad	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brownlie Thomas	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Javier Sola	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tom Agoston	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sharon Eisner Gillett	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mitchell Kapoor	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mark Gould	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eric Hoffman	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scott Huddle	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Joseph Y. Hui	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Johnson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brian Kahn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
James Keller	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Leslie King	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Don Mitchell	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tracie Monk	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Wilton Mueller	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Carl Oppenahl	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David G. Post	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Yakov Reznick	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Resnick	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Timothy J. Salo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Philip L. Sparbaro	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Vixie	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mark Corbit	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Carl Malamud	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Douglas Schoenberger	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eliel Gerich	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bob Frank	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bob Moskowitz	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Mackapatis	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mike St. Johns	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ritter	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Karriberg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Larry Landweber	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Williams	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Guy Almes	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alison Markin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Charles Pickering	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mrs. Morella	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mt. Barcia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Joseph Bordogna	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Andy Semovitz	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jim Courier	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robert E. Kahn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Farber	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Esther Dyson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ceratlaine Capdeboscq	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
George H. Conrath	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gregory L. Crew	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Frank Fitzsimons	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hans Kraatenbrink	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eugenio Triana	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Linda S. Wilson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jim Fleming	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
William Burnington	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Karl Auerbach	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Garin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Patrice Washington	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eric Lee	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Harris Miller	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Doug Humphrey	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kim Hubbard	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

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Raymundo Vega Aguilar	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Twomey	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Steve Wolff	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tom Evsah	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Patrick	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robert Foster	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Yukio Mizuno	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
James Clark	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Barry Sullivan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Gerdaiman	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Micheo Nardo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Gardois	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Gape	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Marc Baroff	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Francus Durey	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tim Kratskopf	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Doug Michels	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Volker Steiner	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sidney Karin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
George Brandenburg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hemette Avram	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jim Beal Jr.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alan Bateley	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Matt Blaze	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Susan Estrada	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kenneth Famm	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Carol Henderson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kenneth Kigasstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Richard Lehtaber	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Siu Loken	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ike Nessi	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Edward Oliver	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stewart Personick	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Thomas Rindfleisch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Comie Stout	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Harold Thompson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peter Dengate Thrush	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mikki Barry	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Patrick O'Brien	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ellen Rony	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peter Rony	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Schutt	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Erik Weisberg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Diane Cahill	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Uge Correas	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Richard Sexton	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Einar Stefnud	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brian Reid	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dan Steinberg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Marc Hurst	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kenneth Fockler	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Christopher Ambler	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jay Fanelo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tim Gibson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tressa Kirby	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brian Adkins	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Izumi Azu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Susan Anthony	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kim Baylis	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Steve Bellovin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jeff Black	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Barry Bluestein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tim Brieson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lorraine Brennan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Charles Brownstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Martin Burack	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Marilyn Cade	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Glee Harrah Cady	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ferry Cahoun	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jean Cantrell	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gene Crick	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ken Dutchfield	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Curran	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kenneth Cukier	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alan Davidson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sally Davis	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Susan Davis	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sarah Deutsch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vikram Dhawer	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

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Jim Dixon																			
Carole Dobbs																			
Sean Dorelan																			
Janis Doran																			
Harry Elnarawy																			
Jon Emery																			
Jon Englund																			
Jose Esteves																			
Michael Fanelli																			
David Fares																			
Harold Field																			
Ken Fooker																			
Paul Fooker																			
Richard Forman																			
Margene Fox-McIntyre																			
John Frangle																			
Lamar Frankel																			
Michael Froomkin																			
Roberto Gaetano																			
Chuck Gomes																			
Jeffrey Graber																			
Ariel Grazer																			
David Graves																			
Nial Greenfield																			
Patrick Greenwell																			
Robert Hall																			
Michalina Halie																			
Mark Harrington																			
Peter Harter																			
Rina Hartline																			
Steve Hefflin																			
Jason Hendlees																			
Paul Hillal																			
David Holtzman																			
Richard Hovey																			
Deb Howard																			
Michelle Ibaev																			
Chris Israel																			
Craig Johnson																			
Paul Kane																			
Ron Kawchuck																			
Debra Kelly																			
Victor Kenana																			
Chad Kesting																			
Joseph Klein																			
Bob Korzeniowski																			
Silvan Levi																			
Adam Lim																			
Roxanne Lovetday																			
Hal Lubsen																			
Dave McClure																			
Mark McFadden																			
Scott McMahon																			
Scott Mitchell																			
John Monroy																			
William Morgan																			
Sascha Morrell																			
Brain Morris																			
Mike Nelson																			
Paul Neldermyer																			
Drew Olsen																			
Brian O'Shaughnessy																			
Adam Peave																			
Patricia Poletata																			
Michael Provance																			
David Quinn																			
John Quarterman																			
Juliette Ravendran Greene																			
Sarah Raardon																			
Tricia Rimo																			
Greg Rikon																			
Oscar Robles																			
Edward Rodriguez																			
Nehran Sarraf																			
Howard Sartori																			
Ricardo Sawon																			
Philip Seabro																			
Michael Schneider																			
Paul Scouse																			

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William Semich	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Carrett Sem	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
James Shaw	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Craig Simon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Charles Smith	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cindy Smith	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Clint Smith	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Megan Stein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ken Stubbs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tracy Taylor	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Wayne Thelenol	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Harwood Torrence	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bernard Turcotte	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Larry Vaalen	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peter Vaek	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Susan Weisbon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eric Weisberg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Steve Weiss	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dave Weitzel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Danny Weitzner	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Heather Wilde	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jim Wilson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eric Winer	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jerry Wodinsky	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pinard Wong	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Wood	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jonathan Zittrain	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

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Jon Postel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Randy Bush	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Karl Deminger	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brian Carpenter	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alan Barrett	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robert Eiz	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Geoff Huston	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Klein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lawrence Landweber	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nick Tro	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sally M. Abel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Perry Metzger	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Linn Murali	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dore Crocker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kliahk Nussbacher	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Don Heslin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robert Shaw	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
George Straw	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Maher	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Albert Trampotsch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Beckwith Burr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Andrew Pincus	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Larry Irving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ira Magaziner	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
William M. Daley	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Joe Sims	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gabe Battista	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Zita Wenzel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chris Clough	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Don Teague	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vinton Cerf	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Roger Cochet	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mike Roberts	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Joe Dryden	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Svend Kraemer	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michael Sheridan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peter Harter	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dimitri Yslianti	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sam Partridge	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pascal Preston	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pat Boner	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peter Dawe	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John de Ridder	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Takatsuki Yamakawa	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mathew Copeland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Margo Langford	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dan Davies	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lee MCKnight	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nathalie Gauraud	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peter Sandler	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sarah Harrison	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fod Barnes	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Charles Helein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ohad Finkelstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jeff Pulver	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Masatsugu Tsuji	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Barbara Dooley	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Barry Ravensdran Greene	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bill Frezza	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Vixie	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Allen Sullivan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Daniel Kaplan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Keith Gymer	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Philip Sheppard	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eliy Hardwick	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michael T. Doughey	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kahryn A. Keimani	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ronald J. Fitzherbert	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Simon Higgs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Matthew Skala	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kent Chisgin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Carv Karp	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Collier-Brown	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Christopher Ansbler	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Thomas J. Hoffmann	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John R. Levine	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Clive Elliott	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Marlin J. Duerst	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
William Allen Simpson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

4=author ; 3= affiliated ; 2=commentor ; 1 =	Australian Government	OMPI	UPU	UIT	UNESCO	OECD	UNCTAD	APEC	University of Southern California	MIT	Harvard University	Stanford University	ARIN	Library of Congress	MCI-Worldcom	A&T	Cisco	Domainz	ACTA	British Telecom
Oliver MJ Cepch-Leshond	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Douglas Koh	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Aveek Datta	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Walter H. Diekmann	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dan Kolls	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stephen J. Page	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
A. Michael Salm	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alan Barrett	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michael Berkson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Laina Ravenstam Greene	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bruno Lammun	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tony Rakowski	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Simon Bureau	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vivi Foster	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ken Hart	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jim Ho Hur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Conrad	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brownlie Thomas	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Javier Sola	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tom Agoston	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sharon Eisner Gillett	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mitchell Kapoor	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mark Gould	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eric Hoffman	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scott Huddle	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Joseph Y. Hui	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Johnson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brian Kahn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
James Keller	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Leslie King	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Don Mitchell	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tracey Monk	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Milton Mueller	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Carl Oppenstahl	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David G. Post	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Yakov Reznick	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Resnick	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Timothy J. Salo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Philip L. Sparbaro	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Vixie	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mark Cerbit	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Carl Malamud	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Douglas Schoenberger	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Elise Gerich	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bob Frank	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bob Moskowitz	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Moskowitz	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mike St. Johns	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kirker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Karriberg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Larry Landweber	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Williams	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Guy Almes	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alison Markin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Charles Pickering	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mrs. Morella	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mt. Barcia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Joseph Bordogna	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Andy Sarnovitz	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jim Courier	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robert E. Kahn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Farber	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Esther Dyson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Catherine Carbobosa	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
George H. Conrath	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gregory L. Crew	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Frank Fitzsimons	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hans Kraatenbrink	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eugenio Triana	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Linda S. Wilson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jim Fleming	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
William Burnington	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Karl Auerbach	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Garth	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Patrice Washington	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eric Lee	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Harris Miller	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Doug Humphrey	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kim Hubbard	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

4=author ; 3= affiliated ; 2=commentor ; 1 = Participant	Australian Government	OMPI	UPU	UIT	UNESCO	OECD	UNCTAD	APEC	University of Southern California	MIT	Harvard University	Stanford University	ARIN	Library of Congress	MCI- Worldcom	A&T	Cisco	Domaintz	ACTA	British Telecom
Raymundo Vega Aguilar	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Twomey	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Steve Wolff	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tom Esvain	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Patrick	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robert Foster	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Yukio Mizuno	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
James Clark	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Barry Sullivan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Gerdelman	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michele Nardis	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Gurdiss	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Gape	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Marc Baroff	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Francis Durey	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tim Kratskopf	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Doug Michels	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Volker Steiner	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sidney Karin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
George Brandenburg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hemette Avram	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jim Beall Jr.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alan Balecky	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Matt Blaze	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Susan Estrada	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kenneth Flamm	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Carol Henderson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kenneth Klagsstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Richard Lehtinen	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Siu Loken	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ike Nessi	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Edward Oliver	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stewart Personick	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Thomas Rindfleisch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Comie Stout	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Harold Thompson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peter Dengate Thrush	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mikki Barry	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Patrick O'Brien	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eileen Rony	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peter Rony	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Schuit	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Erik Weisberg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Diane Cahill	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dore Corliss	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Richard Sexton	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Einar Steierud	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brian Reid	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dan Steinberg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Marc Hurst	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kenneth Fockler	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Christopher Ambler	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jay Fanelo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tim Gibson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tressa Kirby	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brian Adkins	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Izumi Azu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Susan Anthony	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kim Baylis	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Steve Ballou'n	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jeff Black	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Barry Bluestein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tim Bensen	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lorraine Brennan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Charles Brownstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Marvin Burack	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Marlyn Cade	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Glee Harrah Cady	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ferry Cahoun	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jean Cantrell	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gene Crick	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ken Dutchfield	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Curran	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kenneth Cukier	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alan Davidson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sally Davis	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Susan Davis	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sarah Deutsch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vikram Dhawar	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0



4=author ; 3= affiliated ; 2=commentor ; 1 = participant	Australian Government	OMPI	UPU	UIT	UNESCO	OECD	UNCTAD	APEC	University of Southern California	MIT	Harvard University	Stanford University	ARIN	Library of Congress	MCI-Worldcom	A&T	Cisco	Domainz	ACTA	British Telecom
Jim Dixon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Carole Dobbs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sean Donelan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Janis Doran	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Harry Elnarawy	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jon Emery	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jon Englund	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jose Esteves	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michael Fanelli	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Fares	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Harold Field	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ken Focker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Fockes	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Richard Forman	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Martine Fox-McIntyre	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Frangle	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lamar Frankel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michael Froomkin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Roberto Gaetano	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chuck Gomes	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jeffrey Graber	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ariel Grazer	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Graves	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nial Greenfield	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Patrick Greenwell	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robert Hall	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michalina Halke	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mark Harrington	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peter Harter	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rina Hartline	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Steve Hefflin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jason Hendlees	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Hillal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Holtzman	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Richard Hovey	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Deb Howard	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michelle Ibaev	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chris Israel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Craig Johnson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Kane	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ron Kawchuck	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Debra Kelly	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Victor Kharna	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chad Kistingel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Joseph Klein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bodo Korzeniowski	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Siuatt Levi	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Adam Lim	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Roxanne Loveday	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hal Lubsen	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dave McClure	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mark McFadden	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scott McMahon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scott Mitchell	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Monroy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
William Morgan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sascha Morrell	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brain Morris	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mike Nelson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Niedermyer	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Drew Olsen	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brian O'Shaughnessy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Adam Peave	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Patricia Poolela	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michael Provance	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Quam	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Quarterman	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Juliette Ravendran Greene	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sarah Reardon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tricia Rimo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Greg Rixon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Oscar Robles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Edward Rodriguez	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nearan Sarraf	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Howard Sartori	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ricardo Sawon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Philip Seabro	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michael Schreiber	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Scovese	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

4=author ; 3=affiliated ; 2=commentor ; 1 = participant	Australian Government	OMPI	UPU	UIT	UNESCO	OECD	UNCTAD	APEC	University of Southern California	MIT	Harvard university	Stanford University	ARIN	Library of Congress	MCI-Worldcom	A&T	Cisco	Domalniz	ACTA	British telecom
William Semich	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Garrett Sern	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
James Shaw	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Craig Simon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Charles Smith	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chidy Smith	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Clint Smith	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Megan Stein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ken Stubbs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tracy Taylor	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Wayne Thevenot	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Harwood Torrence	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bernard Turcotte	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Larry Vaalen	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peter Vaek	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Susan Weisbon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eric Weisberg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Steve Weiss	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dave Weitzel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Danny Weitzner	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Heather Wilde	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jim Wilson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eric Winer	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jerry Wodinsky	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pindar Wong	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Wood	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jonathan Zittrain	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

4=author ; 3=affiliated ; 2=commentor ; 1 = participant	Deutsche Telekom	Telstra	Federal Trade Commission	ITAA	Center for Global Communications	Netscape	CIX	APNIC	CERN	RIPPE	NSI	AIM	EDUCOM/Ed Iucase	Domain Names Rights Coalition	CORE	CompuServe/Oracle	AOL	University of Miami	San Diego Supercomputer center
Jon Postel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Randy Bush	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Karl Deminger	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brian Carpenter	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alan Barrett	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robert Elz	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Geoff Huston	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Klensin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lawrence Landweber	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nick Tro	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sally M. Abel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Perry Metzger	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Linn Mursi	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dore Crocker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Klenth Nussbacher	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Don Heslin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robert Straw	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
George Straw	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Maher	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Albert Trampsoch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Beckwith Burr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Andrew Pincus	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Larry Irving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ira Magaziner	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
William M. Daley	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Joe Sims	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gabe Battista	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Zita Wenzel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chris Clough	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Don Teague	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vinton Cerf	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Roger Cocheti	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mike Roberts	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Joe Dwyden	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Svend Kraemer	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michael Sheridan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peter Harter	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dimitri Ysaslant	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sam Partridge	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pascal Preston	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pat Boner	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peter Dawe	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John de Ridder	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Takanashi Yamakawa	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mathew Copeland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Margo Langford	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dan Davies	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lee MCKnight	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nathalie Gauraud	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peter Sandler	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sarah Harrison	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fod Barnes	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Charles Helein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ohad Finkelstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jeff Pulver	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Masatsugu Tsuji	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Barbara Dooley	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Barry Ravensdran Greene	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bill Frezza	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Vixie	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Allen Sullivan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Daniel Kaplan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Keith Gymer	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Philip Sheppard	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eliy Hardwick	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michael T. Doughey	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kathryn A. Keimani	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ronald J. Fitzherbert	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Simon Higgs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Matthew Skala	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kent Chispin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Carv Karp	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Collier-Brown	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Christopher Anshler	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Thomas J. Hoffmann	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John R. Levine	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Clive Elliott	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Marlin J. Duerst	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
William Allen Simpson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

4=author ; 3= affiliated ; 2=commentor ; 1 = participant	Deutsche Telekom	Telstra	Federal Trade Commission	ITAA	Center for Global Communications	Netscape	CIX	APNIC	CERN	RIFE	NSI	AIM	EDUCOM/Ed Icause	Domain Names Rights Coalition	CORE	CompuServe/Oracle	AOL	University of Miami	San Diego Supercomputer center
Oliver MJ Creigh-Leshond	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Douglas Koh	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Aveek Datta	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Walter H. Dieckmann	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dan Kolls	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stephen J. Page	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
A. Michael Salm	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alan Barrett	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michael Berkson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Laina Ravenel-Greene	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Burton Lammun	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tony Rakowski	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Simon Bureau	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
VIII Foster	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ken Hart	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jim Ho Hur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Conrad	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brownlie Thomas	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Javier Sola	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tom Agoston	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sharon Eisner Gillett	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mitchell Kapoor	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mark Gould	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eric Hoffman	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scott Huddle	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Joseph Y. Hui	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Johnson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brian Kahn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
James Keller	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Leslie King	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Don Mitchell	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tracie Monk	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Milton Mueller	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Carl Oppenbahl	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David G. Post	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Yakov Reznick	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Resnick	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Timothy J. Salo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Philip L. Sparbaro	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Vixie	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mark Cerbit	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Carl Malamud	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Douglas Schoenberger	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Elise Gerich	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bob Frank	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bob Moskowitz	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Mockapetris	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mike St. Johns	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kirill	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Karenberg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Larry Landweber	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Williams	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Guy Almes	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alison Markin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Charles Pickering	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mrs. Morella	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mt. Barcia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Joseph Bortogna	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Andy Semovitz	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jim Courier	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robert E. Kahn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Farber	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Esther Dyson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Catherine Carbobosa	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
George H. Corrales	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gregory L. Crew	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Frank Fitzsimmons	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hans Kraatenbrink	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eugenio Triana	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Linda S. Wilson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jim Fleming	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
William Burnington	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Karl Auerbach	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Gauth	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Patrice Washington	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eric Lee	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Harris Miller	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Doug Humphrey	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kim Hubbard	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

4=author ; 3=affiliated ; 2=commentor ; 1 = participant	Deutsche Telekom	Telstra	Federal Trade Commission	ITAA	Center for Global Communica- tions	Netscape	CIX	APNIC	CERN	RIFE	NSI	AIM	EDUCOMEd Icouse	Domain Names Rights Coalition	CORE	CompuServe/Oracle	AOL	University of Miami	San Diego Supercompu- ter center
Raymundo Vega Aguilar	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Twomey	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Steve Wolff	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tom Evsain	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Patrick	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robert Foster	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Yukio Mizuno	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
James Clark	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Barry Sullivan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Gerdelman	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Melvio Nardulo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Gurdiss	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Gape	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Marc Barloff	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Francus Durey	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tim Kruskopf	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Doug Michels	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Volker Steiner	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sidney Karin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
George Brandenburg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hemette Avram	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jim Beal Jr.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alan Balecky	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Matt Blaze	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Susan Estrada	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kenneth Flamm	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Carol Henderson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kenneth Kigenstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Richard Lehtinen	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Siu Loken	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ike Nessi	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Edward Oliver	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stewart Personick	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Thomas Rindfleisch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Comie Stout	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Harold Thompson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peter Dengate Thrush	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mikki Barry	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Patrick O'Brien	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eilan Rony	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peter Rony	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Schitt	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Erik Weisberg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Diane Cahill	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Diane Correas	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Richard Sexton	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Einar Steierud	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brian Reid	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dan Steinberg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Marc Hurst	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kenneth Fockler	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Christopher Ambler	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jay Fanelo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tim Gibson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tressa Kirby	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brian Adams	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Izumi Azu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Susan Anthony	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kim Baylis	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Steve Bellovin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jeff Black	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Barry Bluestein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tim Bresson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lorraine Brennan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Charles Brownstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Marvin Burack	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Marlyn Cade	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Glee Harrah Cady	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ferry Cahoun	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jean Cantrell	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gene Crick	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ken Dutchfield	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Curran	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kenneth Cukier	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alan Davidson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sally Davis	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Susan Davis	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sarah Deutsch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vikram Dhawar	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

4=author ; 3= affiliated ; 2=commentor ; 1 = participant	Deutsche Telekom	Telstra	Federal Trade Commission	ITAA	Center for Global Communications	Netscape	CIX	APNIC	CERN	RIPPE	NSI	AIM	EDUCCOMEd license	Domain Names Rights Coalition	CORE	CompuServe	Oracle	AOL	University of Miami	San Diego Supercomputer center
Jim Dixon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Carole Dobbs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sean Donelan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Janis Doran	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Harry Elnarawy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jon Emery	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jon Englund	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jose Esteves	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michael Fanelli	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Fares	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Harold Field	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ken Fooker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Fooker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Richard Forman	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Marlene Fox-McIntyre	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jornal Frangle	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lamar Frankel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michael Froomkin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Roberto Gaetano	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chuck Gomes	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jeffrey Graber	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ariel Graizer	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Graves	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nial Greenfield	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Patrick Greenwell	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robert Hall	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michalina Halke	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mark Harrington	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peter Harter	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rina Hartline	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Steve Hefflin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jason Hendlees	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Hillal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Holtzman	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Richard Hovey	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Deb Howard	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michelle Ibaev	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chris Israel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Craig Johnson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Kane	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ron Kawchuck	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Debra Kelly	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Victor Kharna	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chad Kittinger	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Joseph Klein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Boo Korzeniowski	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Silvati Lev	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Adam Lim	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Roxanne Lovetday	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hal Lubsen	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dave McClure	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mark McRadden	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scott McMahon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scott Mitchell	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Monroy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
William Morgan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sascha Morell	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brain Morris	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mike Nelson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Niedermyer	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Drew Olsen	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brian O'Shaughnessy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Adam Pease	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Patricia Poolela	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michael Provance	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Quam	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Quarterman	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Juliette Ravendran Greene	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sarah Reardon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tricia Rimo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Greg Rixon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Oscar Robles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Edward Rodriguez	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nesran Sarafi	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Howard Sarfari	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ricardo Sazon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Philip Scharbo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michael Schreiber	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Scovese	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

4=author ; 3=affiliated ; 2=commentor ; 1 = participant	Deutsche Telekom	Telstra	Federal Trade Commission	ITAA	Center for Global Communicat ions	Netscape	CIX	APNIC	CERN	RIFE	NSI	AIM	EDUCOM/Ed ucause	Domain Names Rights Coalition	CORE	CompuServe/Oracle	AOL	University of Miami	San Diego Supercompu ter center	
William Semich	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Carrett Sam	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
James Shaw	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Craig Simon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Charles Smith	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Cindy Smith	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Clint Smith	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Megan Stein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ken Stubbs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tracy Taylor	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Wayne Thevenot	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Harwood Torrence	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bernard Turcotte	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Larry Vaalen	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peter Vaek	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Susan Weisbon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eric Weisberg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Steve Weiss	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Danny Weitzel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Danny Weitzner	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Heather Wilde	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jim Wilson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eric Winer	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jerry Wodinsky	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pindar Wong	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Wood	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jonathan Zittrain	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Participant	Time Warner	ETSI	ICC	Chrysler	U.S. House	NSF Conference November 1995	Internet Administrator on Infrastructure e Février 1996	Services: Communication, Regulation and the Internet (OCCD) June 1996	Apple workshop June 1996	Coordination and administration of the Internet September 1996	Congressional hearing at September 1997	Congressional hearing at March 1998	INET 1998 Plenary	BWG	FWP steering committee	ORSC
4=author ; 3= affiliated ; 2=commentor ; 1 = Participant																
Jon Postel	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Randy Bush	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Karl Deminger	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brian Carpenter	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alan Barrett	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robert Eiz	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Geoff Huston	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Klein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lawrence Landweber	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nick Tro	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sally M. Abel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Perry Metzger	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lynn Mura	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dave Crocker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Klank Nussbacher	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Don Heslin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robert Shaw	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
George Strawn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Maher	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Albert Trampsoch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Beckwith Burr	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Andrew Pincus	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Larry Irving	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ira Magaziner	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
William M. Daley	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Joe Sims	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gabe Battista	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Zita Wenzel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chris Clough	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Don Teague	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vinton Cerf	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Roger Cochet	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mike Roberts	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Joe Dryden	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Svend Kraemer	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michael Sheridan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peter Harter	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dimitri Ypsilanti	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sam Partridge	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pascal Preston	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pat Boner	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peter Dawe	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John de Ridder	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Takanashi Yamaoka	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mathew Copeland	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Margo Langford	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dan Davies	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lee MCKnight	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nathalie Gautraud	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peter Sandler	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sarah Harrison	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Fod Barnes	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Charles Helein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ohad Finkelstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jeff Pulver	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Masatsugu Tsuji	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Barbara Dooley	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Barry Ravenstam Greene	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bill Frezza	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Vixie	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Allan Sullivan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Daniel Kaplan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Keith Gymer	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Philip Sheppard	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eliy Hardwick	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michael T. Doughey	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kahryn A. Keimani	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ronald J. Fitzherbert	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Simon Higgs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mathew Skala	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kent Chisgin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Carv Karp	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Collier-Brown	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Christopher Ansbler	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Thomas J. Hoffmann	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John R. Levine	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Clive Elliott	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Marlin J. Duerst	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
William Allen Simpson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0



4=author ; 3= affiliated ; 2=commentor ; 1 = participant	Time Warner	ETSI	ICC	Chrysler	U.S. House	NSF Conference November 1995	Internet Administrator on Infrastructure e Février 1996	Services: Communication, Regulation and the Internet (OICD) June 1996	APPLE workshop June 1996	Coordination and administration of the Internet September 1996	Congression al hearing at hearing September 1997	Congression al hearing at hearing March 1998	INET 1998 Plenary	BWG	FWP steering committee	ORSC
Oliver MJ Cepch-Lehond	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Douglas Koch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Aveek Datta	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Walter H. Diekmann	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dan Kolls	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stephen J. Page	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
A. Michael Salm	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alan Barrett	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michael Berkson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Laina Ravenel-Greene	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bruno Lammun	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tony Rakowski	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Simon Bureau	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Yvill Foster	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ken Hart	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jim Ho Hur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Conrad	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brownlie Thomas	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Javier Sola	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tom Agoston	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sharon Eisner Gillett	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mitchell Kapur	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mark Gould	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eric Hoffman	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scott Huddle	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Joseph Y. Hui	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Johnson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brian Kahn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
James Keller	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Leslie King	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Don Mitchell	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tracie Monk	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Wilton Mueller	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Carl Oppertahl	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David G. Post	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Yakov Reshter	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Resnick	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Imohly J. Salo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Philip L. Sparbaro	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Vixie	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mark Corbit	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Carl Malamud	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Douglas Schoenberger	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Elise Gerich	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bob Frank	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Moskowitz	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mike St. Johns	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ritter	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Karrenberg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Larry Landweber	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Williams	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Guy Almes	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alison Markin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Charles Pickering	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mrs. Morella	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mt. Barcia	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Joseph Bordogna	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Andy Sarnovitz	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jim Courier	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robert E. Kahn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Farber	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Esther Dyson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Seralaine Capdeboscq	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
George H. Corntaras	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gregory L. Crew	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Frank Fitzsimmons	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hans Kraatenbrink	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eugenio Triana	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Linda S. Wilson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jim Fleming	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
William Burnington	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Karl Auerbach	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Garrin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Patrice Washington	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eric Lee	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Harris Miller	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Doug Humphrey	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kim Hubbard	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

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Raymundo Vega Aguilar	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Twomey	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Steve Wolff	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tom Evsah	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Patrick	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robert Foster	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Yukio Mizuno	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
James Clark	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Barry Sullivan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Gerdelman	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Melito Nardio	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Gagnon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Gape	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Marc Benhoff	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Francus Durey	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tim Krauskopf	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Doug Michels	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Volker Steiner	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sidney Karin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
George Brandenburg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hennette Avram	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jim Beall Jr.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alan Balecky	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Matt Blaze	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Susan Estrada	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kenneth Flamm	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Carol Henderson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kenneth Kigenslein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Richard Lehtlader	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Siu Loken	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ike Nessi	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Edward Oliver	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stewart Personick	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Thomas Rindfleisch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Comie Stout	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Harold Thompson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peter Dengate Thrush	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mikki Barry	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Patrick O'Brien	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eilan Rony	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peter Rony	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Schutt	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Erik Weisberg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Diane Cahell	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Doge Corleas	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Richard Sexton	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Einar Steierud	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brian Reid	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dan Steinberg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Marc Hurst	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kenneth Fockler	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Christopher Ambler	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jay Fanelo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tim Gibson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tressa Kirby	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brian Adkins	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Izumi Azu	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Susan Anthony	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kim Baylis	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Steve Ballouin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jeff Black	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Barry Bluestein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tim Brosson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lorraine Brennan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Charles Brownstein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Marvin Burack	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Marlyn Cade	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Glee Harrah Cady	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ferry Cahoun	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jean Cantell	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Gene Crick	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ken Gutchfield	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Curran	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Kenneth Cukier	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Alan Davidson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sally Davis	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Susan Davis	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sarah Deutsch	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Vikram Dhawar	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

4=author ; 3= affiliated ; 2=commentor ; 1 = Participant	Time Warner	ETSI	ICC	Chrysler	U.S. House	NSF Conference November 1995	Internet Administrator on Infrastructure e Février 1996	Services Communication, Regulation and the Internet (OICD) June 1996	APPLE workshop June 1996	Coordination and administration of the Internet September 1996	Congression al hearing September 1997	Congression al hearing March 1998	INET 1998 Plenary	BWG	FWP steering committee	ORSC
Jim Dixon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Carole Dobbs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sean Dorelan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Janis Doran	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Harry Elmanawy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jon Emery	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jon Englund	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jose Esteves	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michael Fanelli	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Fares	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Harold Field	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ken Fooker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Fooker	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Richard Forman	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Martine Fox-McIntyre	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Frangle	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tamar Frankel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michael Fromkin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Roberto Gaetano	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chuck Gomes	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jeffrey Graber	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ariel Grazer	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Graves	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nial Greenfield	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Patrick Greenwell	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Robert Hall	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michalina Halie	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mark Harrington	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peter Harter	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Rina Hartline	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Steve Hefflin	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jason Hendeles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Hillal	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Holtzman	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Richard Hovey	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Deb Howard	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michelle Ibaev	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chris Israel	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Craig Johnson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Kane	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ron Kawchuck	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Debra Kelly	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Victor Khanna	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chad Kissinger	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Joseph Klein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Boo Korzeniowski	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Silvati Lev	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Adam Lim	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Roxanne Loveday	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Hal Lubsen	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dave McClure	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mark McRadden	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scott McMahon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Scott Mitchell	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Morley	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
William Morgan	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sascha Morrell	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brain Morris	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Mike Nelson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Nidermyer	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Drew Olsen	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Brian O'Shaughnessy	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Adam Peave	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Patricia Poole	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michael Provance	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
David Quam	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Quarterman	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Juliette Ravendran Greene	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Sarah Raardon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tricia Rimo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Greg Rixon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Oscar Robles	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Edward Rodriguez	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Nehran Sarraf	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Howard Sartori	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ricardo Samon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Philip Scharbo	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Michael Schriber	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paul Scovese	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

4=author ; 3=affiliated ; 2=commentor ; 1 = participant	Time Warner	ETSI	ICC	Chrysler	U.S. House	NSF Conference November 1995	Internet Administration Infrastructure February 1996	Services: Communication, Regulation and the Internet (OICD) June 1996	APPLE workshop June 1996	Coordination and administration of the Internet September 1996	Congressional hearing at September 1997	Congressional hearing at March 1998	INET 1998 Plenary	BWG	FWP steering committee	ORSC
William Semich	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Garret Sam	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
James Shaw	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Craig Simon	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Charles Smith	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chrydy Smith	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Clint Smith	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Megan Stein	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Ken Stubbs	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Tracy Taylor	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Wayne Thelenol	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Harwood Torrence	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bernard Turcotte	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Larry Vaehn	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Peter Vaesk	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Susan Weibson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eric Weisberg	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Steve Weiss	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Dave Weitzel	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Danny Weitzner	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Heather Wilde	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jim Wilson	0	0	0	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Eric Warner	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jenny Wodinsky	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Pindar Wong	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
John Wood	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Jonathan Zittrain	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

**ANNEX 3. From statements to categories: discourse analysis of the documents of the 1990s**

Document		Draft Postel			IAHC draft
Version	Draft Ymbk	Draft Deminger	Draft Masek	Draft Postel	19 December 1996
Date	January 1996	January 1996	August 1996	August 1996	
Principles	open and competitive marketplace	open, free-market competition	open, free-market competition	open, free-market competition	TLD space is a public resource and subject to the public trust
	operational stability of the DNS			domain names are not intended to reflect trademarks, copyrights or any other rights	DNS is an international resource representation of the stakeholders openness, stability fairness, protection of IP timely results
Type of new institution	creation of permanent bureaucracy is not desired	It is desirable to keep the IANA and IETF from becoming involved in operational and contractual aspects of the TLD registries.	ad hoc TLD group : There will be no institution of multiple registries per TLD in 1996 by the ad hoc committees, registry operators are encouraged to make such arrangements on their own initiative .	no new institution (but a working group)	GTLD administration and management will comprise multiple competing registrars, globally dispersed, under a Council of Registrars (CORE), established by a Memorandum of Understanding (CORE/MOU). IAHC delegates stewardship for the set of gTLDs to the Council of Registrars (CORE). <b>Important role for the IAHC itself</b>
	IANA + ad-hoc working group (seven members : 3 IANA, 2 IETF and 2 ISOC)	Cooperation between competing registries [is] specifically not assumed in this proposal, and is considered to be an operational aspect of a registry best determined, and coordinated, by contractual agreements between private interests.	IANA + ad-hoc working group (seven members : 3 IANA, 2 IETF and 2 ISOC)	IANA + ad-hoc working group (seven members : 3 IANA, 2 IETF and 2 ISOC)	CORE will be a not-for-profit association, funded through membership fees, on a cost-recovery basis
Competences of the new institution					CORE provides first-level oversight and coordination among those registrars, ensuring consistent service by registrars and fairness among them. The details of its management will be determined by CORE board of trustees.
					CORE will develop procedures for handling disputes among Registrars and/or other signatories preferably by binding arbitration.
					Creation of any future gTLDs is under the aegis and policy coordination of the CORE.

Document		Draft Postel			IAHC draft
Version	Draft Ymbk	Draft Deminger	Draft Masek	Draft Postel	19 December 1996
Date	January 1996	January 1996	August 1996	August 1996	
					Core will make available public reports and statistics available about registration activities during fixed reporting periods.
					Core will be a not-for-profit association, funded through member fees, on a cost-recovery basis
			150 new TLDs allocated to as many as 50 new registries, with no more than 2/3 in the same country		In order to ensure equitable international participation among registrars, IAHC has determined that a fixed number of Registrar will be initially allocated to each of the six (6) ITU designated geographical world zones.
					The selection of registries in a region will be a lottery among qualified participants.
<b>Representation / Participation</b>					
					<b>422</b>

Document	Version	Date	Draft Postal	Draft Postal	IAHC draft
Board composition	Draft Ymbk	January 1996	Draft Denninger	Draft Masek	August 1996



Document		Draft Postel			IADC draft
Version	Draft Ymbk	Draft Deminger	Draft Masek	Draft Postel	19 December 1996
Date	January 1996	January 1996	August 1996	August 1996	
<b>Other bodies of the new institution</b>					
<b>Competitive functions</b>	two types of charter are provided, commercial and public services, with the understanding that fees from commercial registry charters cross-subsidize low fees from public service efforts.	competing registries	competing registries		gTLD administration and management will comprise multiple competing registrars, globally dispersed, under a Council of Registrars (CORE) established by a Memorandum of Understanding (CORE-MOU).
<b>New gTLDs</b>	some argue that TLDs, like all global variables, should be few and created with great care. Therefore we suggest that one of the early public service proposals that should be seriously considered would be one which proposes a shared TLD which would have very open creation of sub-registries, thereby conducting the 1,000 experiment one level down.		150 TLDs, 50 registries	150 TLDs, 50 registries	IADC has decided to create further gTLDs as a means of increasing the level of competitive supply and access to the gTLD space for the global Internet community. (...) Therefore, IADC will develop an initially conservative approach to the number of additional gTLDs, through the initial expansion in the first annual round to a total of ten gTLDs. This entails the creation of seven new gTLDs.
<b>Status of existing gTLDs / NSI</b>	multiple registries for the COM zone, and registries for new TLDs will be created				IADC recommends that all existing gTLDs be shared in the same fashion.

Document		Draft Postel			IHC draft
Version	Draft Ymbk	Draft Denninger	Draft Masek	Draft Postel	19 December 1996
Date	January 1996	January 1996	August 1996	August 1996	
Trademark issues			domain names are not intended to reflect trademarks, copyrights or any other rights	domain names are not intended to reflect trademarks, copyrights or any other rights	It is desirable that a domain name application include sufficient information regarding the applicant and the applicant's intended use of the domain name to ensure applicant accountability and to ensure that sufficient information is available to enable trademark owners to assess the need for a challenge to the proposed SLD domain.
					It is recognized that trademark owners have a legitimate interest, under national trademark law, in policing against infringement, and that SLDs are capable of infringing trademark rights.
					[current] approach is inconsistent with basic tenets of trademark laws and principles of equity and fair play.
	The appeals process does not apply to disputes over IPR on names (trademark, service mark, copyright). These disputes are best left to arbitration or the courts ;				IHC strongly believes all gTLD registries and ISO country code registries should, therefore, publish applications for SLDs for a period of sixty (60) days prior to assigning the requested SLD to the applicant.
Transition					To ensure immediate availability of some domain names, it is recommended that gTLD registries offer « random alphanumeric » domain names which require no waiting period.



Document		White Paper		
Version	IAHC final report	GTLD-MoU	Framework for e-commerce	Green paper
Date	4 February 1997	28 February 1997	1 July 1997	30 January 1998
	a GTLD DNS Policy Advisory Board (PAB) is formed from GTLD-signatories, to obtain public and private sector consultation and review of POC and CORE activities.	Administrative Domain Name Challenge Panels (ACPs) will be established to administer the policy [that protects IP-related issues regarding SLDs]		coordinate the development of other technical protocols parameters as needed to maintain universal connectivity of the Internet
<b>Status of the new institution</b>	CORE will operate as a Swiss non-profit organization.	CORE will operate as a Swiss association (art. 60-79 of the Swiss Civil Code).		US headquartered, incorporated under US law as a not-for-profit organization
<b>Representation / Participation</b>	Up to 28 entities will be selected as registrars. The selection will use a regional quota mechanism, whereby up to four (4) qualified applicants will be selected from each of seven (7) global regions. The regional structure used is defined by the World Trade Organization.			board of directors form around the world
				participation of key stakeholders
				represents the interests of IP registrars, domain name registrars, domain name registrars, the technical community, and Internet users (commercial, not-for-profit, and individuals)
				Officials of governments or intergovernmental organizations should not serve on the board of the new corporation

Document	GTL D-MoU	White Paper		
Version	IAHC final report	GTL D-MoU	Framework for e-commerce	Green paper
Date	4 February 1997	28 February 1997	1 July 1997	2 July 1997
Board composition	<p>GTL D DNS Policy Oversight Committee (POC) comprising members named by ISOC (2), IANA(2), IAB (2), INTA(1), WPO (1), ITU (1) and CORE (1), depository (1, ex-officio)</p>	<p>IANA 2 ISOC 2 Representative of the Depository of this MoU 1 IAB 1 CORE 2 ITU 1 WPO 1 INTA 1</p> <p>Interim POC (PPOC) shall consist of the regular (non ex-officio) members of the IAHC</p>		<p>15 member-board : 3 directors (ARIN, APNIC and RIPE), 2 IAB (technical community), 2 designated by a membership association representing domain name registrars and registrars, 7 designated by a membership association representing Internet users (at least one not-for-profit and one and users, and the rest may be commercial users), 1 CEO</p>

Document		White Paper			
Version	IAH C final report	GTL D-MoU	Framework for e-commerce	RFC on Internet domain names	Green paper
Date	4 February 1997	28 February 1997	1 July 1997	2 July 1997	30 January 1998
Other bodies of the new Institution					
Competitive functions	gTLD administration and management will comprise multiple competing registrars, globally dispersed, under a Council of Registrars (CORE) established by a Memorandum of Understanding (CORE-MOU).				domain names and TLD registries should become competitive and market-driven
New gTLDs	Therefore, IAH C will develop an initially conservative approach to the number of additional gTLDs, through the initial expansion in the first annual round to a total of ten gTLDs. This entails the creation of seven new gTLDs.	an additional set of gTLDs beyond the extant « .com », « .org » and « .net » gTLDs in the DNS shall be created by IPDC			expansion of TLDs at a deliberate and controlled pace : up to five
Status of existing gTLDs /NSI	It is intended that all existing gTLDs eventually be shared.	Pending the expiration or appropriate amendment to the cooperative agreement under which the « .com », « .org » and « .net » gTLDs are presently administered, the « .com », « .org » and « .net » gTLDs shall not be subject to the provisions of this MoU. Likewise, until « .com », « .org » and « .net » gTLDs are subject to the provisions of this MoU, the registrar which administers those gTLDs shall not be considered to be a gTLD Registrar for the purposes of this MoU.			

Document		White Paper		
Version	IAHC final report	GTLD-MOU	Framework for e-commerce	Green paper
Date	4 February 1997	28 February 1997	1 July 1997	30 January 1998
	It is recognized that trademark owners have a legitimate interest, under national trademark law, in policing against infringement, and that SLDs are capable of infringing trademark rights.	<p><b>CORE-MOU (Appendix C)</b></p> <p>Intend to use the domain name : applicant affirms that he/she or it has a bona fide intent to use the domain name publicly within 60 days of registration, and to continue such use in the foreseeable future.</p> <p><b>CORE-MOU (Appendix C)</b></p> <p>Purpose of use of the domain name : applicant intend to use the domain name for the following purpose</p> <p><b>CORE-MOU (Appendix C)</b></p> <p>Reason for requesting the domain name : applicant requests this domain name for the following reason (check - conforms to applicant's name or variation thereof - other (provide explanation))</p>	<p>1. July 1997</p> <p>It may be possible to create a more temporary, passer-by regulatory regime that deals with potential conflicts between domain name usage and trademark laws on a global basis without the need to litigate. [...] Accordingly, the United States will support efforts already underway to create domestic and international fora for discussion of internet-related trademark issues. The Administration also plans to seek public input on the resolution of trademark disputes in the context of domain names.</p>	<p>domain databases, on-line dispute resolution mechanisms</p> <p>comments needed on TM clearance systems and jurisdiction issues</p>
	the IAHC believes that a sixty (60) day pre-registration period would be beneficial to all stakeholders. A 60 day pre-registration publication period should operate to encourage early pre-litigation resolution of potential disputes. To provide a domain name holder a stronger defense against a subsequent challenge by a trademark owner and to minimize registry involvement in litigation. However, in response to public comment received, and upon further considerations, the IAHC has determined that this 60 day period should be voluntary at the choice of the applicant, or at the choice of any registrar that chooses to implement a 60 day pre-registration period for all SLDs it registers.	<p>Applicant requests the 60-day waiting period.</p> <p><b>CORE-MOU (Appendix C)</b></p> <p>Core-MOU (Appendix C)</p> <p>Applicant requests the 60-day waiting period.</p>		<p>We also do not propose to establish a monolithic TM dispute resolution process at this time, registrars responsible for TM protection beyond the minimum procedures</p>
<b>Trademark issues</b>	<p>the IAHC also recognizes that CORE registrars are not the appropriate entities to enforce this policy. The policy is to be enforced, rather, by means of Administrative Domain Name Challenge Panels. These panels do not substitute for national or regional sovereign courts - they have authority over the domain names only, not the parties. Unlike courts, however, the challenge panels would have the ability to exclude certain names, such as worldwide famous trademarks, from all the CORE GTLDs. [...] The relevant trademark authority in that country create a trademark-specific sub-domain within the ISO 3166 country code top-level domain. [...] an appropriate international trademark administration organization, such as WIPO, the responsibility for the creation of an international trademark-related domain name space, under the international sudomain «.int.int »</p>	<p><b>CORE-MOU (Appendix C)</b></p> <p>ACP + WIPO Online Expedited Administration Rule sif mediation does not succeed within 30 days)</p>		
<b>Transition</b>	The IAHC believes that the establishment of trademark-specific domain names is desirable, for example to allow for voluntary registration of such names by trademark owners who are precluded, by the first-come first-served nature of current GTLD registration, from otherwise obtaining such domain names, or who otherwise choose to obtain a trademark-specific domain name. Such a trademark-specific domain space would provide an assurance that the domain name reflects valid trademark right.	This MOU shall enter into force from the date that it has been signed by both the IANA and the ISOC.		<p>U.S government will implement some changes (new gTLDs) etc. (PREGISER)</p>

Document Version	Document	ICANN bylaws proposal (IANA) Iteration 1	ICANN bylaws proposal (IANA) Iteration 2	ICANN bylaws proposal (IANA) Iteration 3	ICANN bylaws proposal (IANA) Iteration 4
Date	White paper 5 June 1998	17 July 1998	4 August 1998	24 August 1998	17 September 1998
Principles	competition				
	private coordination				
	bottom-up coordination				
	representation of stakeholders				
	stability				
Type of new institution	private, not-for-profit corporation, the U.S. continues to believe, as do most commentators, that neither national governments nor intergovernmental organizations acting as representatives of governments should participate in the management of Internet names and addresses.	(i) coordinating the assignment of Internet technical parameters as needed to maintain universal connectivity on the Internet		(i) coordinating the assignment of Internet technical parameters as needed to maintain universal connectivity on the Internet	(i) coordinating the assignment of Internet technical parameters as needed to maintain universal connectivity on the Internet
	allocation of number blocks to RIRs for the assignment of Internet addresses	(ii) managing and performing the functions related to the coordination of Internet address space		(ii) managing and performing the functions related to the coordination of Internet address space	(ii) performing and overseeing functions related to the coordination of the Internet protocol address space
Competences of the new institution	oversee the operation of an authoritative root server system	(iii) managing and performing functions related to the coordination of the Internet domain name system, including overseeing policies for determining the circumstances under which new top-level domains are added to the root system		(iii) managing and performing functions related to the coordination of the Internet domain name system, including overseeing policies for determining the circumstances under which new top-level domains are added to the root system	(iii) performing and overseeing functions related to the coordination of the Internet domain name system, including the development of policies for determining circumstances under which new TLD are added to the DNS root system
	determine the circumstances under which new TLDs are added to the root system	(iv) overseeing operation of the authoritative Internet root server system		(iv) overseeing operation of the authoritative Internet root server system	(iv) overseeing operation of the authoritative Internet root server system





Document Version	White paper	ICANN bylaws proposal (IANA) Iteration 1	ICANN bylaws proposal (IANA) Iteration 2	ICANN bylaws proposal (IANA) Iteration 3	ICANN bylaws proposal (IANA) Iteration 4
Date	5 June 1998	17 July 1998	4 August 1998	24 August 1998	17 September 1998
<p><b>Board composition</b></p>	<p>Interim board consisting of individuals representing the functional and geographic diversity of the Internet community. The interim board would likely need access to legal counsel with expertise in corporate law, competition law, IP law, and emerging Internet law. Interim board establishing a system for electing a Board of Directors for the new corporation that ensures that the new corporation's Board of Directors reflects the geographical and functional diversity of the Internet, and is sufficiently flexible to permit evolution to reflect changes in the constituency of Internet stakeholders. Nominations to the Board of Directors should preserve as much as possible the tradition of bottom-up governance</p>	<p>The initial board of directors shall consist of no fewer than five and no more than 15 directors. [...] Each board after the initial board shall be comprised as follows :</p> <p>3 directors nominated by the Address supporting Organization</p> <p>3 directors nominated by the Domain Name Supporting Organization</p> <p>3 directors nominated by the Protocol Supporting Organization</p> <p>6 directors nominated by the Internet Industry/User Supporting Organization</p>		<p>The initial Board shall consist of nine At large members. [...] The authorized number of directors shall be no less than nine and no more than nineteen.</p> <p>3 directors nominated by the Address supporting Organization</p> <p>3 directors nominated by the Domain Name Supporting Organization</p> <p>3 directors nominated by the Protocol Supporting Organization</p> <p>Nine At large directors, selected pursuant to a process to be established by a majority vote of all the At Large Board members of the initial Board.</p> <p>The person who shall be, from time to time, the President of the corporation.</p>	<p>The initial Board shall consist of nine At large members. [...] the president (when appointed) and those directors that have been nominated in accordance with these by-laws.</p> <p>The authorized number of directors shall be no less than nine and no more than nineteen.</p> <p>3 directors nominated by the Address supporting Organization</p> <p>3 directors nominated by the Domain Name Supporting Organization</p> <p>3 directors nominated by the Protocol Supporting Organization</p> <p>Nine At large directors, selected pursuant to a process to be established by a majority vote of all the At Large Board members of the initial Board.</p> <p>The person who shall be, from time to time, the President of the corporation.</p>
		<p>The Supporting Organizations shall serve as advisory bodies to the Board [...]. There shall at least be the following Supporting Organizations :</p> <p>(a) The Address Supporting Organization shall be composed of representatives from regional Internet address registries and other entities or individuals with legitimate interests in these issues</p> <p>(b) The Domain Name Supporting Organization shall be composed of representatives from name registries and registrars of generic/global and country-code top-level domains</p> <p>(c) The Protocol Supporting Organization shall be composed of representatives from Internet protocol organizations</p> <p>(d) The Industry/User Supporting organization shall be composed of representatives of organizations that represent Internet users.</p>			<p>have obligations to any other entity inconsistent with its duties to the Corporation. [...] Each supporting Organization shall be responsible for nominating directors for election to those seats on the Board designated to be filled by each Supporting Organization. The Supporting organizations shall be delegated the primary responsibility for developing and recommending policies and procedures regarding those matters within their individual scope (as defined by the Board in its recognition of each such Supporting Organization).</p> <p>There shall be at least the following Supporting Organizations :</p> <p>(i) The Address Supporting Organization shall be composed of representatives from regional Internet registries and any entities with legitimate interests in these issues [...] shall create an Address Council to make recommendations to the Board regarding operation assignment and management of Internet addresses and related subjects;</p> <p>(ii) The Domain Name Supporting Organization shall be composed of representatives from registries and registrars of TLDs, businesses and any entities that are users of the Internet and any other entities with legitimate interests in these issues [...] shall create a Names Council to make recommendations regarding TLDs including the operation, assignment and management of the DNS and other related subjects</p> <p>(iii) The Protocol Supporting Organization shall be composed of representatives from Internet protocol organizations and any other entities with legitimate interests in these issues [...] shall create a Protocol Council to make recommendations regarding the op-</p>

Document		ICANN bylaws proposal (IANA)		ICANN bylaws proposal (IANA)		ICANN bylaws proposal (IANA)	
Version	White paper	Iteration 1	Iteration 2	Iteration 3	Iteration 4		
Date	5 June 1998	17 July 1998	4 August 1998	24 August 1998	17 September 1998		
Other bodies of the new Institution		The Board may establish one or more committees. Committees are of two kinds : those having legal authority to act for the Corporation, known as Committees of the Board, and those that do not have that authority, known as advisory committees.				(a) There shall be a Governmental Advisory Committee. Members of the GAC shall be representatives of national governments, multinational governmental organizations and treaty organizations, each of which may appoint one representative to the Committee. The GAC should consider and provide advice on the activities of the Corporation as they relate to concerns of governments, particularly matters where there may be an interaction between the Corporation's policies and various laws, and international agreements. The members of the GAC should also provide a liaison function between their governments or multinational governmental organization and the Corporation.	
Competitive functions	registrars should compete but the issue of registries competition should be left for further consideration and final action by the new corporation. The U.S. government is of the view, however, that competitive systems generally result in greater innovation, consumer choice, and satisfaction in the long run.			The corporation shall not act as a DNS registry or registrar or IP address registry in competition with entities affected by the policies of the corporation.		The corporation shall not act as a DNS registry or registrar or IP address registry in competition with entities affected by the policies of the corporation.	
New gTLDs	we agree with the many commenters who said that the new corporation would be the most appropriate body to make these decisions based on global input. Accordingly, as supported by the preponderance of comments, the U.S. government will not implement new gTLDs at this time. expansion of TLDs at a deliberate and controlled pace						
Status of existing gTLDs /NSI							

Document	Version	ICANN bylaws proposal (ANNA)	ICANN bylaws proposal (ANNA)	ICANN bylaws proposal (ANNA)	ICANN bylaws proposal (ANNA)
Date	5 June 1998	17 July 1998	4 August 1998	24 August 1998	17 September 1998
<p>the U.S. government will seek international support to call upon the WIPO to initiate a balanced and transparent process, which includes the participation of TM holders and members of the Internet community who are not TM holders (...)</p>					
<p>(...) to develop recommendations for a uniform approach to resolving TM/domain name disputes; ... recommend a process for protecting famous TM in the gTLDs and evaluate the effects of adding new gTLDs and related dispute resolution procedures on TM and IP holders.</p>					
<p><b>Trademark issues</b></p> <p>domain name registrants pay/ registration fees at the time of registration or renewal and agree to submit infringing domain names to the authority of a court of law in the jurisdiction in which the registry, registry database, registrar, or the « A » root server are located. Registrant would agree to submit to and be bound by alternative dispute resolution systems for cases of cybersquating or cybersquatting. Registrants would agree to abide by processes that exclude, either pro-actively or retroactively, certain famous TM from being used as domain names except by the designated TM holder. Nothing in the domain name registration agreement or in the operation of the new corporation should limit the rights that can be asserted by a domain name registrant or TM owner under national laws.</p>					
<p><b>Transition</b></p>					

Document Version	ICANN bylaws proposal (IANA) Iteration 5 28 September 1998	ICANN adopted bylaws Iteration 6 6 November 1998	Revised ICANN bylaws 23 November 1998	ICANN MoU ICANN MoU 25 November 1998
<b>Principles</b>				competition
				private sector management
				bottom-up coordination
				representation of users, solid both domestic and international input
				stability
<b>Type of new institution</b>	pursue the charitable and public purposes of lessening the burden of government in providing for the operational stability of the Internet infrastructure by	pursue the charitable and public purposes of lessening the burden of government in providing for the operational stability of the Internet infrastructure by	pursue the charitable and public purposes of lessening the burden of government in providing for the operational stability of the Internet infrastructure by	ICANN
	(i) coordinating the assignment of Internet technical parameters as needed to maintain universal connectivity on the Internet	(i) coordinating the assignment of Internet technical parameters as needed to maintain universal connectivity on the Internet	(i) coordinating the assignment of Internet technical parameters as needed to maintain universal connectivity on the Internet	(i) coordinating the assignment of Internet technical parameters as needed to maintain universal connectivity on the Internet
	(ii) performing and overseeing functions related to the coordination of the Internet protocol address space	(ii) performing and overseeing functions related to the coordination of the Internet protocol address space	(ii) performing and overseeing functions related to the coordination of the Internet protocol address space	(ii) performing and overseeing functions related to the coordination of the Internet protocol address space
	(iii) performing and overseeing functions related to the coordination of the the functions related to the coordination of the Internet domain name space, including the development of policies for determining circumstances under which new TLD are added to the DNS root system	(iii) performing and overseeing functions related to the coordination of the the functions related to the coordination of the Internet domain name space, including the development of policies for determining circumstances under which new TLD are added to the DNS root system	(iii) performing and overseeing functions related to the coordination of the the functions related to the coordination of the Internet domain name space, including the development of policies for determining circumstances under which new TLD are added to the DNS root system	(iii) performing and overseeing functions related to the coordination of the the functions related to the coordination of the Internet domain name space, including the development of policies for determining circumstances under which new TLD are added to the DNS root system
<b>Competences of the new institution</b>	(iv) overseeing operation of the authoritative Internet root server system	(iv) overseeing operation of the authoritative Internet root server system	(iv) overseeing operation of the authoritative Internet root server system	(iv) overseeing operation of the authoritative Internet root server system

Document Version	ICANN bylaws proposal (ANNA) Iteration 5	ICANN adopted bylaws Iteration 6	Revised ICANN bylaws	ICANN MoU
Date	28 September 1998	6 November 1998	23 November 1998	25 November 1998
	(v) engaging in any other lawful activity in furtherance of items (i) through (iv)	(v) engaging in any other lawful activity in furtherance of items (i) through (iv)	(v) engaging in any other lawful activity in furtherance of items (i) through (iv)	(v) engaging in any other lawful activity in furtherance of items (i) through (iv)
<b>Status of the new institution</b>	A California Nonprofit Public Benefit Corporation	A California Nonprofit Public Benefit Corporation	A California Nonprofit Public Benefit Corporation	
	no more than one-half of the total number of At Large Directors serving at a given time shall be residents from any one geographic region and no more than two of the directors nominated by each Supporting Organization shall be residents of any one geographic region.	no more than one-half of the total number of At Large Directors serving at a given time shall be residents from any one geographic region and no more than two of the directors nominated by each Supporting Organization shall be residents of any one geographic region. <b>To the extent practicable, regular meetings should be held in different locations around the world on a regular basis.</b>	(1) at least one citizen of a country located in each of the geographic regions [ . . . ] shall serve on the Board (other than the initial Board) at all times (2) no more than one-half of the total number of At Large directors serving at any given time shall be citizens of countries located in any one geographic region (3) no more than one-half of the total number of Directors in the aggregate, elected after nomination by the Supporting Organizations shall be citizens of countries located in any one geographic region [ . . . ] This section shall be revised for time to time (but at least every three years) to determine whether any change is appropriate, taking account of the evolution of the Internet [ . . . ] <b>To the extent practicable, regular meetings should be held in different locations around the world on a regular basis.</b>	
	Membership : This article is reserved for use should the corporation elect to have members in the future.	Membership : <b>This article is reserved for use when the corporation has members.</b>	Membership : This article is reserved for use when the corporation has members.	
	No official of a national government or a multinational entity established by treaty or other agreement between national governments may serve as a Director. As used herein, the term « official » means a person (i) who is elected by citizens of a nation or (ii) who is employed by such government or multinational entity and whose primary function with such government or entity is to develop or influence governmental or public policies.	No official of a national government or a multinational entity established by treaty or other agreement between national governments may serve as a Director. As used herein, the term « official » means a person (i) who holds an <b>elective governmental office</b> (ii) who is employed by such government or multinational entity and whose primary function with such government or entity is to develop or influence governmental or public policies.	No official of a national government or a multinational entity established by treaty or other agreement between national governments may serve as a Director. As used herein, the term « official » means a person (i) who holds an <b>elective governmental office</b> (ii) who is employed by such government or multinational entity and whose primary function with such government or entity is to develop or influence governmental or public policies.	
<b>Representation / Participation</b>				
	Transparency : The corporation and its subordinate entities shall operate to the maximum extent possible in an open and transparent manner and consistent with procedures designed to ensure fairness. The Board shall publish, at least annually, a report [ . . . ] all minutes of Board Supporting Organization, (and any council thereof) and Committees meetings shall be made publicly available. The Board shall adopt policies and procedures through which a party affected by an action of the Board can seek reconsideration of any board action.	Transparency : The corporation and its subordinate entities shall operate to the maximum extent possible in an open and transparent manner and consistent with procedures designed to ensure fairness. [ . . . ] all minutes of Board Supporting Organization, and any council thereof) and Committees meetings shall be made publicly available. <b>The Board shall adopt policies and procedures through which a party affected by an action of the Corporation can seek reconsideration of any board action.</b>	Transparency : The corporation and its subordinate entities shall operate to the maximum extent possible in an open and transparent manner and consistent with procedures designed to ensure fairness. The Board shall publish, at least annually, a report [ . . . ] all minutes of Board Supporting Organization, (and any council thereof) and Committees meetings shall be made publicly available. <b>Any person affected by an action of the Corporation may request review or reconsideration of that action by the Board. The Board shall adopt policies and procedures governing such review or reconsideration.</b>	

Document Version	ICANN bylaws proposal (IANA) Iteration 5	ICANN adopted bylaws Iteration 6	Revised ICANN bylaws	ICANN MoU
Date	28 September 1998	6 November 1998	23 November 1998	25 November 1998
<p><b>Board composition</b></p>	<p>The initial Board shall consist of nine At Large members. [...] the president (when appointed) and those directors that have been nominated in accordance with these by-laws.</p> <p>The authorized number of directors shall be no less than nine and no more than nineteen.</p> <p>3 directors nominated by the Address supporting Organization</p> <p>3 directors nominated by the Domain Name Supporting Organization</p> <p>3 directors nominated by the Protocol Supporting Organization</p> <p>Nine At Large directors, selected pursuant to a process to be established by a majority vote of all the At Large Board members of the Initial Board.</p> <p>The person who shall be, from time to time, the President of the corporation.</p>	<p>The initial Board shall consist of nine At Large members. [...] the president (when appointed) and those directors that have been nominated in accordance with these by-laws.</p> <p>The authorized number of directors shall be no less than nine and no more than nineteen.</p> <p>3 directors nominated by the Address supporting Organization</p> <p>3 directors nominated by the Domain Name Supporting Organization</p> <p>3 directors nominated by the Protocol Supporting Organization</p> <p>Nine At Large directors, selected pursuant to a process to be established by a majority vote of all the At Large Board members of the Initial Board.</p> <p>The person who shall be, from time to time, the President of the corporation.</p>	<p>The supporting organizations shall serve as advisory bodies to the Board and shall have such power and duties as may be prescribed by the Board and these bylaws. [...] A Supporting Organization may not have obligations to any other entity inconsistent with its duties to the Corporation. [...] Each supporting Organization shall be responsible for nominating directors for election to those seats on the Board designated to be filled by each Supporting Organization.</p> <p>The Supporting organizations shall be delegated the primary responsibility for developing and recommending policies and procedures regarding those matters within their individual scope (as defined by the Board in its recognition of each such Supporting Organization).</p> <p>There shall be at least the following Supporting Organizations:</p> <p>(i) The Address Supporting Organization shall be composed of representatives from regional internet registries and any entities with legitimate interests in these issues [...] shall create an Address Council to make recommendations to the Board regarding the operation, assignment and management of internet addresses and related subjects.</p> <p>(ii) The Domain Name Supporting Organization shall be composed of representatives from registrars and registrars of TLDs, businesses and any entities that are users of the Internet and any other entities with legitimate interests in these issues [...] shall create a Names Council to make recommendations regarding TLDs including the operation, assignment and management of the DNS and other related subjects.</p> <p>(iii) The Protocol Supporting Organization shall be composed of representatives from internet protocol organizations and any other entities with legitimate interests in these issues [...] shall create a Protocol Council to make recommendations regarding the operation, assignment and management of protocol parameter, such as port numbers, enterprise numbers, other technical parameters and related subjects.</p>	<p>The supporting organizations shall serve as advisory bodies to the Board and shall have such power and duties as may be prescribed by the Board and these bylaws. [...] A Supporting Organization may not have obligations to any other entity inconsistent with its duties to the Corporation. [...] Each supporting Organization shall be responsible for nominating directors for election to those seats on the Board designated to be filled by each Supporting Organization.</p> <p>The Supporting organizations shall be delegated the primary responsibility for developing and recommending policies and procedures regarding those matters within their individual scope (as defined by the Board in its recognition of each such Supporting Organization).</p> <p>There shall be at least the following Supporting Organizations:</p> <p>(i) The Address Supporting Organization shall be composed of representatives from regional internet registries and any entities with legitimate interests in these issues [...] shall create an Address Council to make recommendations to the Board regarding the operation, assignment and management of internet addresses and related subjects.</p> <p>(ii) The Domain Name Supporting Organization shall be composed of representatives from registrars and registrars of TLDs, businesses and any entities that are users of the Internet and any other entities with legitimate interests in these issues [...] shall create a Names Council to make recommendations regarding TLDs including the operation, assignment and management of the DNS and other related subjects.</p> <p>(iii) The Protocol Supporting Organization shall be composed of representatives from internet protocol organizations and any other entities with legitimate interests in these issues [...] shall create a Protocol Council to make recommendations regarding the operation, assignment and management of protocol parameter, such as port numbers, enterprise numbers, other technical parameters and related subjects.</p>

Document Version	ICANN bylaws proposal (IANA) iteration 5	ICANN adopted bylaws iteration 6	Revised ICANN bylaws	ICANN MoU	
Date	28 September 1998	6 November 1998	23 November 1998	25 November 1998	
Other bodies of the new Institution	<p>The Board may establish one or more committees. Committees are of two kinds: those having legal authority to act for the Corporation, known as Committees of the Board, and those that do not have that authority, known as advisory committees.</p> <p>There shall be at least the following Advisory Committees:</p> <p>(a) There shall be a Governmental Advisory Committee. Members of the GAC shall be representatives of national governments, multinational governmental organizations and treaty organizations, each of which may appoint one representative to the Committee. The GAC should consider and provide advice on the activities of the Corporation as they relate to concerns of governments, particularly matters where there may be an interaction between the Corporation's policies and various laws, and international agreements. The members of the GAC should also provide a liaison function between their governments or multinational governmental organization and the Corporation.</p> <p>(b) There shall be a DNS Root Server System Advisory Committee. The Root Server System Advisory Committee should examine and advise on the security aspects of the root name server system. Further, the RSSAC should review the number, location, and distribution of root name servers considering the total system performance, reliability, business, and reliability.</p>	<p>The Board may establish one or more committees. Committees are of two kinds: those having legal authority to act for the Corporation, known as Committees of the Board, and those that do not have that authority, known as advisory committees.</p> <p>There shall be at least the following Advisory Committees:</p> <p>(a) There shall be a Governmental Advisory Committee. Members of the GAC shall be representatives of national governments, multinational governmental organizations and treaty organizations, each of which may appoint one representative to the Committee. The GAC should consider and provide advice on the activities of the Corporation as they relate to concerns of governments, particularly matters where there may be an interaction between the Corporation's policies and various laws, and international agreements. The members of the GAC should also provide a liaison function between their governments or multinational governmental organization and the Corporation.</p> <p>(b) There shall be a DNS Root Server System Advisory Committee. The Root Server System Advisory Committee should examine and advise on the security aspects of the root name server system. Further, the RSSAC should review the number, location, and distribution of root name servers considering the total system performance, reliability, business, and reliability.</p> <p>① Until such time as the process for the election of At Large directors shall be approved [...] there shall be an Advisory Committee on Membership. The members of the ACM shall consist of certain Directors selected by the Board as well as other persons appointed by the Board. The Chairman of the ACM shall be appointed by the Board and shall be a director. The responsibility of the ACM shall be to advise the Board on the creation of the membership structure [...]</p> <p>(d) Until such time as the Board adopts procedures for independent review [...] there shall be an Advisory Committee on Independent Review. The members of the ACORR shall consist of certain directors selected by the Board, as well as other persons appointed by the Board. [...] The responsibility of the ACORR shall be to advise the Board on the creation of the independent review process [...]</p>	<p>The Board may establish one or more committees. Committees are of two kinds: those having legal authority to act for the Corporation, known as Committees of the Board, and those that do not have that authority, known as advisory committees.</p> <p>There shall be at least the following Advisory Committees:</p> <p>(a) There shall be a Governmental Advisory Committee. Members of the GAC shall be representatives of national governments, multinational governmental organizations and treaty organizations, each of which may appoint one representative to the Committee. The GAC should consider and provide advice on the activities of the Corporation as they relate to concerns of governments, particularly matters where there may be an interaction between the Corporation's policies and various laws, and international agreements. The members of the GAC should also provide a liaison function between their governments or multinational governmental organization and the Corporation.</p> <p>(b) There shall be a DNS Root Server System Advisory Committee. The Root Server System Advisory Committee should examine and advise on the security aspects of the root name server system. Further, the RSSAC should review the number, location, and distribution of root name servers considering the total system performance, reliability, business, and reliability.</p> <p>① Until such time as the process for the election of At Large directors shall be approved [...] there shall be an Advisory Committee on Membership. The members of the ACM shall consist of certain Directors selected by the Board as well as other persons appointed by the Board. The Chairman of the ACM shall be appointed by the Board and shall be a director. The responsibility of the ACM shall be to advise the Board on the creation of the membership structure [...]</p> <p>(d) Until such time as the Board adopts procedures for independent review [...] there shall be an Advisory Committee on Independent Review. The members of the ACORR shall consist of certain directors selected by the Board, as well as other persons appointed by the Board. [...] The responsibility of the ACORR shall be to advise the Board on the creation of the independent review process [...]</p>	<p>The corporation shall not act as a DNS registry or registrar or IP address registry in competition with entities affected by the policies of the corporation. The Corporation shall not apply its standards, policies, procedures or practices inequally or single out any particular party for disparate treatment, unless justified by substantial and reasonable cause, such as the promotion of effective competition.</p>	<p>The corporation shall not act as a DNS registry or registrar or IP address registry in competition with entities affected by the policies of the corporation. The Corporation shall not apply its standards, policies, procedures or practices inequally or single out any particular party for disparate treatment, unless justified by substantial and reasonable cause, such as the promotion of effective competition.</p>
Competitive functions	<p>The corporation shall not act as a DNS registry or registrar or IP address registry in competition with entities affected by the policies of the corporation. The Corporation shall not apply its standards, policies, procedures or practices inequally or single out any particular party for disparate treatment.</p>	<p>The corporation shall not act as a DNS registry or registrar or IP address registry in competition with entities affected by the policies of the corporation. The Corporation shall not apply its standards, policies, procedures or practices inequally or single out any particular party for disparate treatment, unless justified by substantial and reasonable cause, such as the promotion of effective competition.</p>	<p>The corporation shall not act as a DNS registry or registrar or IP address registry in competition with entities affected by the policies of the corporation. The Corporation shall not apply its standards, policies, procedures or practices inequally or single out any particular party for disparate treatment, unless justified by substantial and reasonable cause, such as the promotion of effective competition.</p>	<p>The corporation shall not act as a DNS registry or registrar or IP address registry in competition with entities affected by the policies of the corporation. The Corporation shall not apply its standards, policies, procedures or practices inequally or single out any particular party for disparate treatment, unless justified by substantial and reasonable cause, such as the promotion of effective competition.</p>	
New gTLDs				<p>[ICANN agrees to [...]] collaborate on the design, development and testing a plan for creating a process that will consider the possible expansion of gTLDs.</p>	
Status of existing gTLDs /NSI					



Document Version	ICANN bylaws proposal (IANA) Iteration 5	ICANN adopted bylaws Iteration 6	Revised ICANN bylaws	ICANN MoU
Date	28 September 1998	6 November 1998	23 November 1998	25 November 1998
Trademark issues				ICANN agrees to [...] collaborate on the design, development and testing a plan for creating a process that will consider the possible expansion of gTLDs. The designed process should consider and take into account the following: [...] Recommendations regarding trademark/domain name policies set forth in the Statement of Policy; recommendations made by the WIPO concerning :
				(1) the development of a uniform approach to resolving trademark/domain name disputes involving cyberspace ;
				(2) a process for protecting famous trademarks in the generic top level domains ;
Transition				(3) the effects of adding new gTLDs and related dispute resolution procedures on trademark and intellectual property holders ;
				and recommendations made by other independent organizations concerning trademark/domain name issues.

**ANNEX 4. Statements on Internet governance during the WGIG Process**

date	person	organization	category	text
12.05.04	Adam Peake	IGC	balanced representation	Governments, the private sector and civil society will be represented by an equal number of members: a WGIG of between 19 and 32 members
12.09.04	Adam Peake	IGC	expertise	Women and men with a high level of experience in international ICT policy making and the issues the WGIG will address, comprised of:
12.09.04	Adam Peake	IGC	MISism	Membership of the working group must be balanced between participants from governments, the private sector and civil society, not favoring one group over any other
12.09.04	Adam Peake	IGC	OlG exclusion	In addition, a limited number of participants from intergovernmental and international Organizations and forums should be invited to join the working group as observers.
12.09.04	Adam Peake	IGC	separation technical/political	public policy issues involved
12.09.04	Adam Peake	IGC	transparency	Ex Parte reporting procedures, public archives and translation of materials
13.09.04	Izumi Azu	GTF	support of the status quo	should refrain from expanding or interfering with other areas of policy concerns already addressed in reasonable degree.
13.09.04	Izumi Azu	GTF	transparency	Be Transparent
20.09.04	William Drake	CPSR	broad definition of IG	Begin from a holistic understanding of internet governance
20.09.04	Arturo Delgado	Venezuela	discussion beyond WG	Reunión Presencial: evaluará y aprobará el documento presentado por el Pequeño Comité. Esta reunión se puede realizar en el marco de la Segunda PrepCom.
20.09.04	Michael Remmert	Council of Europe	enhance cybersecurity	Cybercrime
20.09.04	Ayesha Hassan	ICC	expand participation	It holds and expanding opportunities for participation in them to promote global and multi-stakeholder representation.
20.09.04	Mark Esseboom	EU	governmental leadership in WGIG	not less than half of the total number of participants should be governmental and intergovernmental representatives, while the remaining balance should cater for sufficient representation by the UN, its agencies and other international organizations, Civil Society representatives, and the private sector.
20.09.04	Masaaki Sakemaki	Japan	governmental leadership in WGIG	half of whom should come from the government (including intergovernmental organizations) and the rest from other stakeholders (including the business sector, international organizations and civil society).
20.09.04	Steinar Lindberg	Norway	improve GAC	The GAC cannot continue to have a mere counseling role to the ICANN
20.09.04	Alejandro Pizarry	UNAM	Internet exceptionalism	The uniqueness and novelty of the Internet, the diversity of degrees of spread of technology, literacy, and wealth across and within nations and regions, and the wide variety of cultures including the specific cultures of legal and judicial systems, individualistic vs. collectivist Weltanschauungen, etc., have given rise to some original and unique forms of organization, and to strong resistances to some of them.
20.09.04	Benoit Tabaka	FDI	Internet exceptionalism	l'espace ne fonctionne pas comme le monde auquel nous sommes habitués : il entretient un rapport au temps et à l'espace différent. l
20.09.04	Benoit Tabaka	FDI	Internet exceptionalism	complexité du réseau pose en effet un défi aux mécanismes traditionnels de régulation qui dominant un rôle privilégié à la réglementation publique. Désormais, les procédures d'élaboration de la norme semblent devoir s'ouvrir à une plus large concertation, voire à une négociation. P
20.09.04	Elizabeth Longworth	UNESCO	Internet exceptionalism	Information that makes it an inherently democratic and empowering force.
20.09.04	Milton Mueller	IGP	Internet exceptionalism	Group should consider how the implications of clear agreements on definitions, facts and norms could best be reflected in international agreements that could take into account the unique characteristics of the Internet.
20.09.04	Ayesha Hassan	ICC	limited role for the WGIG	The Secretary General's working group should convene as a steering committee rather than a prescriptive body.
20.09.04	Ayesha Hassan	ICC	MISism	making this working group a multi-stakeholder body.
20.09.04	Benoit Tabaka	FDI	MISism	s les acteurs concernés par le développement de l'internet et ses usages ont un droit légitime à participer à la définition des règles qui les régissent :
20.09.04	Hans Falk Hoffmann	CERN	MISism	Including all stakeholders.
20.09.04	Makana Ewe	UNECA	MISism	multi stakeholder partnership
20.09.04	Raymond Prak	ARIN/NRO	MISism	but also stakeholders who have participated or will participate in the development and operation of the Internet.
20.09.04	Richard Beard	USA	MISism	Recognizing the roles of all stakeholders.
20.09.04	Izumi Azu	GTF	Multilingualism	On the working method, only one special element I'd like to call upon your attention, which is a language.
20.09.04	Joseph Sarr	CR Dakar	Multilingualism	Diversité linguistique
20.09.04	Alexander Kuschtyev	Russia	n/a	CH-V
20.09.04	Bertrand de la Chappelle	WIS-Online	n/a	CH-V
20.09.04	Christian Wichard	WIPO	n/a	CH-V
20.09.04	Destree Miloshev	Athliss	n/a	CH-V
20.09.04	Fatmata Seye Silla	WSS Gender Caucus	n/a	CH-V
20.09.04	Khaled Fattal	MINC	n/a	CH-V
20.09.04	Mahidine Ouhaïf	Algeria	n/a	CH-V
20.09.04	Miguel Alcaine	El Salvador	n/a	CH-V
20.09.04	Peiman Seadat	Iran	n/a	CH-V
20.09.04	Sam Patrledge	OECD	n/a	CH-V
20.09.04	Sarband Khan	UNICTF	n/a	CH-V
20.09.04	Shaakat Umer	Pakistan	n/a	CH-V
20.09.04	Stuart Goodl	CECI	n/a	CH-V
20.09.04	Trevor Clarke	Barbados	n/a	CH-V
20.09.04	Zhao Houlin	ITU	n/a	CH-V
20.09.04	Milton Mueller	IGP	narrow definition of IG	By staying close to a technical conception, this definition of the Internet makes it possible to draw clearer boundaries around Internet governance.
20.09.04	Ayesha Hassan	ICC	no rigid definition of IG	Second, we feel that insisting that the Working Group agree to a rigid definition before discussion of some issues could potentially a priori limit the discussion of key topics or unnecessarily dictate an agenda of topics for the WG that is broader than can be effectively addressed to help WISF 2005 progress this matter.
20.09.04	Benoit Tabaka	FDI	no separation technical/political	GTO mis en place par le secrétariat de l'Organisation des Nations Unies doit donc dépasser la simple réflexion portant sur une éventuelle réforme ou refonte de l'ICANN. A défaut, il opérera à un travail partiel et limité.

20.09.04	Phet Sawo	UNDP-ADPIP	no separation technical/political	Internet Governance is an ill-defined term, but can be taken to mean the collection of all activities and responsibilities relating to the development and use of the Internet. This includes not only the responsibilities and activities of those organisations listed above, but also the Internet-related activities of Governments in general, national and international law enforcement agencies, Development Agencies, and others.
20.09.04	Tarek Kamel	Egypt	no separation technical/political	Also there is an initial understanding, that Internet governance and resource management issues have intertwined technical and policy dimensions - Technical issues have political implications and Political issues have technical implications etc" and it's hard to draw the line.
20.09.04	Benoit Tabaka	FDI	OG exclusion	personnalités désignées par les acteurs ÀÀ entités économiques ÀÀ accrédités pour le SMSIA : 8 personnalités désignées par les acteurs ÀÀ Société civile ÀÀ accrédités pour le SMSIA : 8 personnalités désignées par les Gouvernements membres de l'Union internationale des télécommunications ÀÀ : U
20.09.04	Arturo Belgado	Venezuela	Optimize connectivity and access	maestricación y democratización del acceso
20.09.04	Ayeshia Hassan	ICC	Private sector leadership	. Approaches which allow market players and self-regulation to respond dynamically and effectively to address market needs with government creating enabling environments with intervention only to address market failures:
20.09.04	Elizabeth Longworth	UNESCO	Private sector leadership	Modifications must not result in the global Internet Governance system becoming subjected to governmental control, nor should they facilitate or permit censorship: the private sector have dealt mostly well with the complex issues and should continue their work, however complemented with the above high level international supporting actions.
20.09.04	Hans Falk Hoffmann	CERN	Private sector leadership	the flexible and generative environment that has been created mainly led by the private sector.
20.09.04	Masaki Sakamaki	Japan	Private sector leadership	the networks interconnected through the Internet protocols are owned and operated by autonomous organizations, mostly in the private sector. Most of the investment is small scale and private. Services and interconnection are coordinated primarily on a market, contractual basis.
20.09.04	Wilton Mueller	IGP	Private sector leadership	Supporting continued private sector leadership:
20.09.04	Richard Beard	USA	Private sector leadership	
20.09.04	Tarek Kamel	Egypt	Private sector leadership	the Internet should continue its growth as promoted by the industry, but matters of public policy should also have more international coordination and government involvement.
20.09.04	Hans Falk Hoffmann	CERN	Pro-competitive regulation	International lenders in a de-regulated environment and a maximum of local effort will provide for the best value for money.
20.09.04	Masaki Sakamaki	Japan	Pro-competitive regulation	which has been almost standard thanks to the vigorous competition at this field:
20.09.04	Richard Beard	USA	Pro-competitive regulation	Promoting an enabling environment through effective and efficient competition:
20.09.04	Fayyel Beji	IEEE/SOC	separation technical/political	In identifying the public policy issues that are relevant to Internet Governance:
20.09.04	Hans Falk Hoffmann	CERN	separation technical/political	More technical items such as name spaces, protocols, architecture, etc need ample opportunities for adaptation to the rapid pace of new developments and prior testing before implementation.
20.09.04	Lynn St-Amour	ISOC	separation technical/political	ISOC encourages WGIG in its input to the WISIS to prioritize those areas that are less developed and are crucially important to the net's deployment.
20.09.04	Mark Escheboom	EU	separation technical/political	The WGIG should firstly concentrate on these issues.
20.09.04	Wolfgang Kleinwachter	Aarhus University	separation technical/political	Basic Internet Governance" (BIG) on the lower level includes drafting Internet Protocols and allocating IP Addresses. On the higher level it includes primarily the management of the Domain Name System (DNS) with all its components like Root Servers, TLDs, Whois, Names Transfer, IDNs, Dispute Resolution etc. Basic Internet Governance deals mainly with enabling services. It is rather neutral, political and economic interests are more indirectly involved and it represents no real "content". It enables users to provide value - from eCommerce to eGovernment.
20.09.04	Benoit Tabaka	FDI	states as observers	ammon, en raison de cette fonction particulière, il est nécessaire dans cette phase de préparation de la norme, de réserver aux États une place particulière dès lors que ce seront eux qui in fine décideront de celle-ci. Il paraît souhaitable qu'ils siègent au sein du GIGI en qualité d'observateur, participant au débat mais ne prenant pas part officielle à un éventuel vote afin de pouvoir garder toute latitude dans leur prise de décision ultérieure.
20.09.04	Ayeshia Hassan	ICC	support of the status quo	Business worldwide strongly believes that these expert bodies should continue to be the focal points for further substantive discussions at the international level on issues within their sphere of expertise so as to avoid duplication, and to continue to build upon the successes of the Internet, and these bodies should evolve to address existing and new challenges, and extend the benefits to all people around the world.
20.09.04	Elizabeth Longworth	UNESCO	support of the status quo	not re-open the policy debates of yesterday:
20.09.04	Hans Falk Hoffmann	CERN	support of the status quo	Modifications to ICANN or new mechanisms should not inhibit interoperability, cause instability, nor should they slow down the continued technical development of the Internet: and ÀÀC Any global Internet management system or mechanism must be technically competent, transparent and non-partisan.
20.09.04	Lynn St-Amour	ISOC	support of the status quo	The present governing entities and
20.09.04	Mark Escheboom	EU	support of the status quo	And, today's Internet bodies
20.09.04	Pavan Duggal	Cyberlaws.net	support of the status quo	The starting point for work in the WGIG is the present structure of the Internet Governance. We need to build on this structure in order to reinforce the stability and growth potential of the Internet.
20.09.04	Raymond Przak	ARIN/NRO	support of the status quo	Internet Law and policy issues should not take U-turn for the worse.
20.09.04	Richard Beard	USA	support of the status quo	The RIRs through the NRO fully support the ICANN model.
20.09.04	Masaki Sakamaki	Japan	transparency	The United States believes that efforts should be made to enhance existing synergies and not duplicate the extensive body of work already underway in the global and regional bodies.
20.09.04	Raymond Przak	ARIN/NRO	transparency	To ensure the comprehensiveness and transparency of the discussion.
20.09.04	Mark Escheboom	EU	WGIG should focus on technical management	In regards to the Working Group, the NRO believes that it should be transparent.
21.09.04	Joseph Sarri	IGC	balanced representation	These issues, whilst not of lesser importance, are already dealt with to some extent by existing inter-governmental fora. As a rule, the WGIG should therefore not deal with issues that are already dealt with satisfactorily at the global level.
21.09.04	Vitorio Bertola	ICANN-ALAC	balanced representation	Governments, the private sector and civil society would be represented by an equal number of members.
21.09.04	Qheng Hu	China	broad definition of IG	Nous considérons qu'une participation égale des gouvernements, du secteur privé et de la société civile semble raisonnable. All three main stakeholder groups (governments, private sector and civil society) should offer the same number of members. As far as we are concerned, it is a better approach to define Internet governance in a broad comprehension

21.09.04	Cristiano Berbert	Brazil	creation of an intergovernmental forum	Brazil therefore proposed the creation of an intergovernmental forum, a meeting place where governments could discuss Internet-related issues. The objective is not to substitute or duplicate any existing organization or entity, but rather to fill a gap by providing countries with the opportunity to express their opinions and to coordinate with each other.
21.09.04	Qiheng Hu	China	creation of an intergovernmental forum	
21.09.04	Mikael Tiger	Canada	expertise	The appointees should be seen as neutral and, most importantly, as knowledgeable persons.
21.09.04	Cristiano Berbert	Brazil	governmental leadership in WGIG	Nevertheless, the level of governmental representation in Internet governance remains thoroughly insufficient. It is difficult to accept that governments should be limited to a mere advisory role in regard to decisions with clear public policy implications.
21.09.04	Cristiano Berbert	Brazil	governmental leadership in WGIG	The WSIS remains first and foremost an intergovernmental process.
21.09.04	Cristiano Berbert	Brazil	ICANN critique	The change of the nature of Internet demands the involvement of governments into the Internet governance.
21.09.04	Karen Banks	APC	ICANN critique	Unfortunately, ICANN has so far been unable to overcome the fact that it was constituted without prior consultation to other governments.
21.09.04	Qiheng Hu	China	ICANN critique	create an independent, distributed multi-stakeholder body which could eventually replace ICANN and perhaps play a monitoring and co-ordinating role with respect to a broader Internet governance framework as described below, though not necessarily having sole responsibility for all tasks
21.09.04	Wolfgang Kleinwaechter	Aarhus University	ICANN critique	the simple self-governance mechanism is not enough any more.
21.09.04	Wolfgang Kleinwaechter	Aarhus University	Internet as a global public resource	The Internet is a global public resource.
21.09.04	Wolfgang Kleinwaechter	Aarhus University	Internet exceptionalism	To be frank, I believe that it would not be helpful if we start our discussion with issues like "leadership", "control" or "new organisations". This is "old thinking" and would lead us back into the past. The Internet is about the future. We have to look forward. We need innovative creations. The Internet is a network of networks. We have many layers and many (rather different) players. And it is growing. Neither new "hierarchies" nor new "bureaucracies" will be helpful. What we need is a much better collaboration among all the old and new emerging networks so that the Internet as a whole can deliver its value to the real people. The providers and users of services on the ground.
21.09.04	Paul Verhoeef	ICANN	limited role for the WGIG	ICANN finds that there is a void for addressing issues that are outside of its responsibility, and is very encouraged to see that there is discussion for filling this void.
21.09.04	Cristiano Berbert	Brazil	MSISm	open to the participation of all stakeholders and subject to the control of society at large. Brazil continues to abide by these principles. Our challenge now is to ensure that the WGIG will ensure the balanced participation of all stakeholders whilst respecting the overarching need for democracy, transparency and multilateral decision-making.
21.09.04	Eelhin Alyev	Azerina	MSISm	All stakeholders from government, public and private sectors from different countries provide their vision in organizing effective work of WGIG based on democracy, transparency and openness.
21.09.04	Tim Shand	Youth Caucus	MSISm	the WGIG must have a multi-stakeholder, multi-disciplinary membership and conduct an inclusive consultation process.
21.09.04	Anthony Hill	South Centre	n/a	CH-I-V
21.09.04	JM Nogueira Viana	Brazil	n/a	CH-I-V
21.09.04	Jovan Kurbalija	Diplo Foundation	n/a	CH-I-V
21.09.04	Manuel Barrera	Chile	n/a	CH-I-V
21.09.04	Marcelo Valle-Fourouge	Argentina	n/a	CH-I-V
21.09.04	Oliver Nana Nzepe	Universit�e Yaounde	n/a	CH-I-V
21.09.04	Oscar Leon Gonzalez	Cuba	n/a	CH-I-V
21.09.04	Patrice Lyons	CNRI	n/a	CH-I-V
21.09.04	Robert Kramer	ComPTIA	n/a	CH-I-V
21.09.04	Robert Zachmann	ILO	n/a	CH-I-V
21.09.04	Saha Debabrata	India	n/a	CH-I-V
21.09.04	Sami Al-Basheer	Saudi Arabia	n/a	CH-I-V
21.09.04	Veni Markowski	ISOC Bulgaria	n/a	CH-I-V
21.09.04	Bhondranath Ashok Redhak	Mauritius	no rigid definition of IG	Instead of expecting that the working group will develop a working definition of internet governance within the time frame and under the constraints earlier raised, we suggest that agreement is reached on what are the elements which best reflect, for the time being, the notion of internet governance. can then articulate the process which the working group will adopt around this notion. It will then enable a classification exercise as to which matter can be addressed by specialists, ones by governments and other stakeholders.
21.09.04	Vitorio Bertola	ICANN-ALAC	no rigid definition of IG	We think that the scope of "Internet Governance" cannot be defined once for ever.
21.09.04	Cristiano Berbert	Brazil	no separation technical/political	Internet Governance is much more than just the management of domain names and IP addresses. Data protection, spam, cyber-security, multilingual and local content are Internet governance issues. Interconnection costs, the protection of IP and the digital divide are also Internet governance issues. In most of these areas, the main responsibility lies with governments. yet, they lack the means to coordinate effectively and promptly at the international level.
21.09.04	Karen Banks	APC	no separation technical/political	develop an internet governance framework that fully identifies the scope of internet policy issues and a method of allocating responsibility for such policies in the complex web of institutions, which are currently involved in managing the internet
21.09.04	Mikael Tiger	Canada	separation technical/political	e public policy issues relevant to Internet governance be identifiable
21.09.04	Paul Verhoeef	ICANN	separation technical/political	That is: ICANN's focus is on how the Internet works, our focus is not on how the Internet is used, and that focus is not on the entire working of the Internet, but solely on the Internet's unique identifier system.
21.09.04	Wolfgang Kleinwaechter	Aarhus University	technological determinism	Such a governance structure would reflect to a certain degree the technical architecture of the Internet:
21.09.04	Tim Shand	Youth Caucus	transparency	Aside from having closed-door meetings, the WGIG must ensure it utilizes open consultations, both online and physical, to harness the knowledge and expertise of a wider range of interested parties. Taking into account cost considerations, the WGIG must work to organize regional, sub-regional, thematic and sectoral meetings and consultations.
21.09.04	Karen Banks	APC	UN oversight of the ICANN	In the short term, the responsibilities in the MOU between the US Department of Commerce and ICANN should be transferred from the Department of Commerce to the UN Secretary General as a temporary step on the way to building a new multi-stakeholder body that must find broad based support from all stake-holders.
19.11.04	Talal Abu-Ghazaleh	TAGI	creation of an IGF	This may be achieved through the establishment of a Permanent Internet Forum where all stakeholders can continuously provide input in a transparent and inclusive setting.

19.11.04	Talal Abu-Ghazaleh	TRGI	non-binding institutions only	The proposed mechanism can serve the objective of beneficial governance only if operated on principles of non-binding soft-law cooperation of a network of governance bodies. Yet a broader theoretical framework is lacking, especially when it comes to the international aspects of Internet Governance.
23.11.04	Jovan Kurbalija	Diplo Foundation	broad definition of IG	
23.11.04	Anthony Hill	South Centre	expand participation	In each of these activities, the full involvement of developing country governments and their business, professional and non-governmental organisations must be ensured. Improvements to the institutional structures and working methods of intergovernmental or other international organizations that are already dealing with Internet governance issues, to bring them up to the governance standards set out in the WSIS Declaration
23.11.04	Don McLean	Maclean Consulting	expand participation	redefinición de las estructuras de los organismos administrativos ya existentes para hacer sus procesos más abiertos y representativos,
23.11.04	Isabel Padilla	Dominican Republic	expand participation	Global coordination capabilities like SPAM, etc
23.11.04	J.A. Novaes Bicalho	Brazil	expand participation	WGIG should be kept informed and developing countries should be associated with the transition to the 'International, multi-stakeholder' body that will replace the existing ICANN structure.
23.11.04	Anthony Hill	South Centre	ICANN critique	
23.11.04	Lynn St-Amour	ISOC	IG cannot exist	It is misleading to use the term 'Internet Governance', when the Internet is clearly not a single entity to govern. It is more useful to refer to 'Internet Coordination'. The multiple facets of the Internet require different types of coordination, each calling for specific competences and sensitivities to balance the needs of the Internet user community globally and locally.
23.11.04	Elizabeth Longworth	UNESCO	Internet as a global public resource	Internet es un bien público global,
23.11.04	Isabel Padilla	Dominican Republic	Internet as a global public resource	
23.11.04	Ang Peng Hwa	Nanyang Tech University	Internet regulation is possible	That is, they work less through punishment than through the threat of punishment. Does it work on the Internet? The evidence suggests it does.
23.11.04	J.A. Novaes Bicalho	Brazil	limited role for the WGIG	All these issues need some development perspective on capacity building, but these issues should be left out of the discussion about IG, otherwise this discussion will have to incorporate all the WSIS debate.
23.11.04	Yoshio Utsumi	ITU	limited role for the WGIG	Instead, we should focus on the core activity of the management of Internet resources by ICANN, in particular top-level domains, which is where important issues remain unresolved.
23.11.04	Anthony Hill	South Centre	Multilateral takeover of IG is a myth	The myth that developing countries are seeking to control the Internet through the traditional multilateral organisations must be removed as the red herring it is. Based on the definitions/hypotheses, policy analyses and the identification of the roles and responsibilities of the key Internet-actors, the special responsibility of governments working with the stakeholders in defining a regime or regimes for the Internet that maximises the strengths of all non-State participants, should be agreed.
23.11.04	Daniel Karrenberg	ISOC	narrow definition of IG	ChT-V
23.11.04	Yoshio Utsumi	ITU	no internationalized domain names	The Working Group, therefore, should strive to interpret the term "Internet Governance" in its most narrow context.
23.11.04	J.A. Novaes Bicalho	Brazil	no separation technical/political	This memo suggests that actually creating such names in the DNS is undesirable from both a user-interface and DNS management standpoint.
23.11.04	Isabel Padilla	Dominican Republic	separation technical/political	Even the more technical issues have some policy aspects that will need some decision mechanism where all the stakeholders should be able to participate.
23.11.04	Thomas Dale	Australia	separation technical/political	Cuestiones de Política Pública pertinentes para el Gobierno de Internet
23.11.04	Anthony Hill	South Centre	special role for the state in MSISm	Some of the most pressing issues under the heading of Internet governance & "security, fraud, privacy, commercial usage of content and applications, liability &c" have evolved over a long period of time as issues for treatment under national (and, gradually and imperfectly, international) legal and policy regimes. The nature of the Internet makes international cooperation particularly important, but the core issues remain the same.
23.11.04	J.A. Novaes Bicalho	Brazil	special role for the state in MSISm	The responsibility of the government, especially within its jurisdiction as guarantor of the State, can not be compromised by private discretionary action affecting public welfare. It is these thoughts I want to invite you to know the Internet Governance model implemented in Brazil, where an Internet Steering Committee, composed by all the sectors, including the government, work together to promote the development of the Internet on behalf of the Brazilian people.
23.11.04	Lynn St-Amour	ISOC	support of the status quo	Such governance shall be exercised primarily by States acting as national sovereigns. For issues requiring international collaboration and coordination, states should collaborate via intergovernmental organizations, assisted by the private sector, civil society and end-users.
23.11.04	Don McLean	Maclean Consulting	support of the status quo	Governance consists of the collective rules, procedures, processes, and related programs that shape social actors' shared expectations, practices, and interactions and result in practices and operations that are consistent with the sovereign rights of States and the social and market interests of end-users and operators. It includes agreements about standards, policies, rules, and enforcement and dispute resolution procedures.
23.11.04	Lynn St-Amour	ISOC	support of the status quo	o help set priorities, as part of this analysis a distinction could be made between issues that are being satisfactorily dealt with in existing international fora, and those that should be addressed as a matter of urgent priority but currently do not have a home.
23.11.04	Thomas Dale	Australia	support of the status quo	We urge WGIG to avoid plans to create new organizations to control Internet standards, to allocate domain names and IP addresses, set prices and policies for international Internet connections and peering, or to control what kind of content and applications are delivered over the Internet.
23.11.04	Ronda Hauben	Columbia University	expand participation	These organisations are a meeting point for bottom-up, consensual, industrial self-regulation by the groups and individuals that use their services and resources. There are some aspects of Internet deployment, such as voice over Internet protocol, ENUM and IPv6, which raise important policy issues such as investment in new infrastructure and appropriate charging and settlement regimes. However, these appear to be being appropriately dealt with through existing institutional arrangements including the ITU, ICANN and IETF, and through commercial processes.
23.11.04	Partrice Lyons	CNRI	no rigid definition of IG	ut will there be a means of welcoming the online community, the community of netizens into the WSIS process? Will there be a convergence of netizen participation and defense of the public essence of the Internet strong enough for the results of the Tunis summit to be significant?
24.11.04	Paul Wilson	APNIC	separation technical/political	Again, it may be asked, why this nuance is important. Instead of trying to "fix" the Internet at a moment in time with a definition that does not anticipate the integration of certain advanced and/or rapidly evolving technologies, a better approach would seem to be to broaden the definition as proposed herein so as to recognize the need for flexibility in implementation for the future.
24.11.04	Paul Wilson	APNIC	separation technical/political	All of these are undeniably aspects of the Internet, but presenting no problems, they are largely invisible to this process and therefore not proposed for inclusion in the work of the WGIG.

24.11.04	Izumi Aizu	IGTF	support of the status quo	However, we strongly believe that the conditions required for address management as mentioned above should not be constrained or limited by the interests of national sovereignties, but they should be kept in order to preserve the functions of Internet to be used among all the people of the world for their distribution of information and communication.
24.11.04	Paul Wilson	APNIC	support of the status quo	There are many, many critical aspects of the Internet that actually work very well at present. As aspects of the network, they seem to be good candidates for inclusion in the definition, but they are not suggested, simply because they present no visible problem right now. Examples may be:
11.02.05	Qiheng Hu	China	creation of an intergovernmental forum	WGIG's mission is to promote the equal participation rights of all the sovereign governments in the decision-making process regarding the Internet public policies.
11.02.05	Qiheng Hu	China	creation of an intergovernmental forum	WGIG should give the matter further thought, focusing on the issue of how to establish a coordination platform/mechanism on public policy matters under the UN framework, which is broadly participated (by all sovereign governments), authoritative, legitimate, and transparent.
11.02.05	Qiheng Hu	China	sovereignty	The administration of such resources is an important international public policy issue that involves the public interests, sovereign rights of each country.
13.02.05	Beatriz Busaniche	WGIG	broad definition of multilateralism	One commenter disagreed that the RSSAC and IETF were multilateral in its broadest sense. According to the online version of the Oxford Dictionary, the most common definition of "multilateral" is, "involving three or more governments, organizations, etc., esp. as parties to an agreement, summit, etc." Thus, since there appear to be no prohibitions to government representatives participating in the RSSAC and the IETF, both organizations would fall under this definition.
13.02.05	Beatriz Busaniche	Via Libre	expand participation	Two challenges remain, however, the level of participation by developing countries and the fragmented nature of decision making by different stakeholders in different entities.
13.02.05	Beatriz Busaniche	WGIG	expand participation	The failure to fully engage consumers and users, at the national and international levels, is the failure to successfully include many developing countries in the development of overall e-commerce governance initiatives, as well as in action on many of the specific issues that fall under the general umbrella.
13.02.05	Beatriz Busaniche	WGIG	expand participation	The need to complete a full internationalization of ICANN, with an increase of the internal diversity in terms of spoken languages, global participation, variety of participating stakeholders and organizations, and involvement of the general public.
13.02.05	Beatriz Busaniche	WGIG	expand participation	However, it is not evident that the interests of civil society are as yet adequately represented at either governance level. In addition, developing country stakeholders from government, the private sector and civil society have yet to be effectively engaged.
13.02.05	Beatriz Busaniche	WGIG	improve public/private balance in IG	However, the balance between the private and public involvement, as well as that between civil society and the private sector,
13.02.05	Beatriz Busaniche	Via Libre	Internet users are stakeholders	This paragraph flagrantly omits Internet users as relevant stakeholders. Individual users are vital to the Internet, and they ought to be recognized as such.
13.02.05	Beatriz Busaniche	Via Libre	IPR critique	There is no such thing as intellectual property theft. Some people incorrectly use this term to refer to different kinds of infringement (not theft) on certain state-granted monopolies such as copyrights, trademarks, patents, geographical denominations and others.
13.02.05	Beatriz Busaniche	Via Libre	IPR critique	the word piracy describes an act of violence at high seas, and has meant that since before there was electricity, let alone computers. In this context, the term is probably being used in a colloquial sense that draws an odd parallel between copyright infringement and piracy.
13.02.05	Georg Greve	FSF	IPR critique	Since the term is so ambiguous, using the term Intellectual Property or Intellectual Property Rights tends to bring about misleading and ambiguous results.
13.02.05	Georg Greve	WGIG	liberalisation does not provide universal access	It is true that the private sector has a vital role to play in the provision of ICTs and that the removal of restrictions in terms of provision of specific services will support the provision of affordable access to telecommunications. However, this argument does not provide the complete picture.
13.02.05	Kamel Tarek	Egypt	Multilingualism	Issue Paper on the Multilingualization of Internet Naming System
13.02.05	Kamel Tarek	Egypt	no separation technical/political	This paragraph sounds as if there is some technical limitation on the use of multilingual characters for TLDs, which is rather a policy issue that involves introduction of new TLDs.
13.02.05	Georg Greve	WGIG	non-binding institutions only	There is probably a need to indicate some kind of best practice as opposed to hard law. Such best practices would crystallize into a form of regulation. It would make it easier for content providers to operate.
13.02.05	Georg Greve	WGIG	Privacy as a human right	The first paradigm treats privacy as a human right.
13.02.05	Georg Greve	FSF	Problem of monopolies	These are good indications that the WGIG best only concern itself with the specific issues of limited monopolies that affect the Internet and its governance, such as prevention of software patents.
13.02.05	Georg Greve	WGIG	Pro-competitive regulation	This is particularly relevant to Internet connectivity. Today in many countries, high telecommunications prices are constraining the Internet market. The constrained market, in turn, makes it economically unfeasible for Tier 1 Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to establish an Internet Access Point (IAP) in the country, leading to even higher costs for the country's ISPs to reach the nearest IAP outside the country.
13.02.05	Georg Greve	WGIG	special role for the state in MSBm	However, other countries and stakeholders think that the role of the private sector should be tempered with adequate respect for the public interest, as defined by laws, governments and citizens. It must be ensured that efforts to survey the Internet and combat cybercrime are not bound to the private interests of specific groups or countries, but contemplate the rights of all peoples and of the global community of individual Internet users.
13.02.05	Georg Greve	WGIG	support of the single root	Thus, an open issue in the past has been whether the existence of alternative root server systems should be encouraged, accepted, subject to regulation, or allowed at all. At present, this discussion has been muted in favor of a single root.
13.02.05	Georg Greve	WGIG	support of the status quo	Its success in the domain names vs. trademarks can be the basis to be a test case, or have similar dispute resolution mechanisms that may be used for other important issues faced by the Internet users, like Spam.
13.02.05	Georg Greve	WGIG	support of the status quo	Collectively, it might be argued that they meet the criteria of being multilateral and embodying a multi-stakeholder approach.
13.02.05	Georg Greve	WGIG	support of the status quo	The ICANN system of private-public partnerships has so far been inclusive and flexible. This innovative flexibility is important for the fact that the Internet and its applications have evolved so rapidly. It is a well tested system that has evolved over the last 35 years of development of the Internet itself. The overall partnership seem to be well aware of the inherently global characteristics of the Internet and the overriding need for global interoperability (both horizontally between networks and vertically between networks and applications), and for security and stability of the entire Internet. Another advantage is that the partnership is built on the strength of each partner in their respective areas, and allows for all those interested in the various activities associated with the development of the standards and the relevant technical policies to be involved. The RIR System is also a successful self-regulation model.
13.02.05	Georg Greve	WGIG	support of the status quo	There is a great opportunity to correct those aspects of the current system that could be necessary to change, preserving the most important aspects of the ICANN model and taking advantage of the huge amount of energy and work dedicated by thousands of people from different countries, cultures and sectors, including a lot of governmental representatives, to create a system for coordinating many technical issues regarding Internet functioning.
13.02.05	Georg Greve	WGIG	support of the status quo	Taking into account that ICANN is a private non-profit corporation, its openness provides for a reasonably democratic organization.

13.02.05		WGIG	support of the status quo	The main strengths of the present regulatory system are the incentive for the creation and development of new industries based on intellectual production. These strengths ensure a reliable environment for investment in such enterprises, and creating wealth and job places in those countries where intellectual industries represent a significant part of the GDP.
13.02.05		WGIG	support of the status quo	The process leading to the decision to transition many Internet management functions, including administration of the root server system, to ICANN was open, transparent and consultative.
13.02.05		WGIG	support of the status quo	With the exception of the views of some governmental actors and possibly civil society actors involvement in ICANN, the above figures seem to indicate that the organizations involved with the current administration of the root server system are adequate with respect to the Principles outlined in the Declaration of Principles.
13.02.05		WGIG	support of the status quo	There is at present no unified global system to control spam, although international cooperative action has begun among governments on a bilateral and multilateral basis, and, separately, among network operators and active Internet users. At present, these activities are largely limited to the richest developed countries, many of which have spam control legislation and enforcement mechanisms in place. This could be considered a situation of strength since these countries account for well over half the spam produced in the world today.
13.02.05		WGIG	support of the status quo	Even though the ICANN process is international and multilateral, it lacks transparency as regards issues such as budgets and spending within ICANN. The lack of transparency also means that there is less accountability. Also, the informal culture of the ICANN community and the need to cope with the speed of internet changes sometimes make it hard for some stakeholders to participate or to understand what is happening; more care could be taken in making agendas and schedules reliable and known well in advance.
13.02.05		WGIG	UN oversight of the ICANN	As an alternative, they feel that some intergovernmental organization under the framework of the United Nations should have final authority.
13.02.05	Beatrix Busaniche	Via Libre	WGIG critique	As a comment on the process for accepting comments to WGIG papers, we must point out that just two weeks to review a large number of papers that were written over a period of several months are just not realistic.
13.02.05	Georg Greve	FSF	WGIG critique	we feel that given the amount of papers by the UN WGIG and the theoretical need to comment on almost all of them, the time given was unrealistically insufficient.
13.02.05	Georg Greve	FSF	WGIG critique	We find it deeply objectionable that a Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG) apparently considers the United Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) negotiable. Human Rights are inalienable and cannot be subjected to being 'balanced' with the interest of monopoly holders.
14.02.05	Sana Debabrata	India	creation of an intergovernmental forum	Not all stakeholders see privacy as a human right.
14.02.05	Ayesha Hassan	ICC	critique of privacy	For example the possible role of the ITU in IG
14.02.05	Sami Al-Bastheer	Saudi Arabia	enhance role of the ITU in IG	We believe it is important to note that some forums are open to all stakeholders in a manner of equal participation, while some forums are relatively closed. Most of the forums that have discussed cybersecurity in detail are relatively closed.
14.02.05	Gus Hosein	CS privacy caucus	exclusion of CS needs to be addressed	We would like to point out that the extent of participation from the developing parts of the world in the various internet governance mechanisms is still far from sufficient. This is especially true for civil society actors. We would like to suggest that the WGIG make appropriate recommendation to ensure the effective participation of ALL stakeholder groups from developing countries.
14.02.05	Adam Peake	IGC	expand participation	The paper does not give a fully balanced view of the current situation. Rather, it tends to portray it as being the ideal model.
14.02.05	Sami Al-Bastheer	Saudi Arabia	ICANN critique	Limited influence of Governments of various countries in ICANN and in particular with the purely advisory role of GAC.
14.02.05	Sana Debabrata	India	Improve GAC	Regional dispersion of root DNS will reduce the in fructuous international traffic
14.02.05	Sana Debabrata	India	Internationalise the root server system	In many ways, it may be argued that the internet has become a global public good, and that the task ahead for this working group is a pioneering exercise in global governance.
14.02.05	Thoralf Stenvoid	Norway	Internet as a global public resource	Ingapore's view is that two sets of issues, namely Internet Infrastructure Governance and Internet Use Issues should be the priority for future work
14.02.05	Valeria D'Costa	Singapore	limited role for the WGIG	We feel IDN requires a comprehensive policy, standard, regulation mechanism to be evolved at intergovernmental level.
14.02.05	Sana Debabrata	India	Multilingualism	Efforts like the one contemplated to create a central governing regime, will impede technical innovation, stifle competition, and will be severely challenged to remain abreast of market/industry needs and technical developments.
14.02.05	Ayesha Hassan	ICC	no coordination of straddledisation bodies	Privacy is an essential human right.
14.02.05	Gus Hosein	CS privacy caucus	Privacy as a human right	The important role that the private sector plays in bringing ICTs to the world so that they can be used as tools for economic and social development should be included more clearly in this paper.
14.02.05	Ayesha Hassan	ICC	Private sector leadership	A dynamic and private sector led development of the internet, based on sound market economy policies.
14.02.05	Thoralf Stenvoid	Norway	Private sector leadership	that are consistent with the sovereign rights of states
14.02.05	Sana Debabrata	India	sovereignty	Obviously it is important that government should play an important role at the policy level in the registration of TLDs.
14.02.05	Sana Debabrata	India	special role for the state in MSISm	Based on our discussion with the different stakeholders in the country, we clearly feel that Governments should play an appropriate role in Internet Governance at National and International Level, while leaving operational issues &c" in particular those issues with commercial implication to private sector.
14.02.05	Sana Debabrata	India	special role for the state in MSISm	We support the approach that the existing system should be improved rather than replaced.
14.02.05	Ayesha Hassan	ICC	special role for the state in MSISm	Singapore is of the opinion that ICANN has been a sound public-private sector collaborative effort in many respects.
14.02.05	Valeria D'Costa	Singapore	support of the status quo	Alternative governance mechanisms for root servers systems were not considered.
14.02.05	Valeria D'Costa	Singapore	support of the status quo	A better title would make the final word of the title a plural. Operational experience has shown that there can be more than one DNS root. There have been statements by the IAB and ICANN to the contrary but those statements seem more an expression of a yearning for a single catholic name space rather than a well-articulated technical proof. (And, if it were true that the existence of other DNS systems could harm the net then would that not indicate a vulnerability and weakness that ought to be repaired?)
14.02.05	Sami Al-Bastheer	Saudi Arabia	WGIG critique	The top of the hierarchy is known as the "root" and the set of internationally distributed root servers mirror the root and provide redundancy and robustness to the domain name system. Nowhere is it stated that the very existence of the top root is just one technical (or political) decision. The GSM also resolves names into network numbers without a top root. Handling mobile users is an order of magnitude more complex than in the internet.
15.02.05	Louis Poulin	EuroInlc	critique of the single root	It seems reasonable and prudent to consider a broader outreach to governments and other stakeholders &c" giving them the chance to be informed on the current state of affairs.
15.02.05	Bill Manning	EP.NET	discussion beyond WG	As we move towards Next Generation Networks, some considered that traditional internet organizations such as ICANN will become less important than intergovernmental bodies such as the ITU where standards for these networks are developed and the major
15.02.05	Shahid Akhtar	UNDP-ADPIP	enhance role of the ITU in IG	



15.02.05	Suresh Ramasubramanian	ARCA/UCF	Implement an anti-spam policy	nd a viable definition or plan of action on spam is sadly absent.
15.02.05	Du Yuejin	Internet Society of China	Improve GAC	Secondly, reinforce cooperation of governments on management of Internet names and numbers resources.
15.02.05	Du Yuejin	Internet Society of China	Internationalise the root server system	Firstly, internationalise management of Internet names and numbers resources.
15.02.05	Milton Mueller	IGP	Internet users are stakeholders	The role of individuals and end users within ICANN
15.02.05	Julia Hahn	IVF	IPR protection	The draft issue paper does not provide an accurate picture of the current situation and we strongly regret its apparent anti-copyright bias (including a disproportionate focus on criticisms of the IPR system and an inaccurate implication that diverse voices and the public interest have not been taken into account in the development of that system).
15.02.05	Rob Borthwick	Yodafone	limited role for the WGIG	The list of issues which appear in the inventory of public Policy issues and Priorities is very broad in scope and risks distracting policy maker attention away from key topics where this initiative should focus in order to provide value. It is not clear to Yodafone how the many issues have actually been (or are to be) prioritized in the policy formation process.
15.02.05	Milton Mueller	IGP	Multilingualism	Internationalized domain names
15.02.05	James Seng	IEFT	Private sector leadership	More often, industry self-regulation is far more cost effective than government intervention.
15.02.05	Milton Mueller	IGP	question the US oversight of ICANN	Role of the US Government in supervising ICANN
15.02.05	Karl Auerbach	CAVEBAER.com	support of the status quo	This seems to be a case of selective amnesia: in effect, the WIPO treaties negotiated over several decades took a long time precisely because of the concern of WIPO and Member states to ensure that international treaties would build in the necessary balance between the need to incentivise creators of content, on the one hand, and the need to ensure access to IP works on fair terms by citizens, on the other.
15.02.05	Karl Auerbach	CAVEBAER.com	WGIG critique	I wish there had been more time to digest them between the date of their publication and the date that comments are due.
15.02.05	Karl Auerbach	CAVEBAER.com	WGIG critique	Unquestioning acceptance of the technological status quo as if it were a limitation of what could be in the future.
15.02.05	Louis Pouzin	EuroInlc	WGIG critique	On a broader scale the papers suffer from a more foundational weakness &e "they do not adequately articulate underlying principles and assumptions.
15.02.05	Louis Pouzin	EuroInlc	WGIG critique	The shocking imbalance between v4 addresses allocated to USA organizations and the rest of the world is not even acknowledged.
15.02.05	Louis Pouzin	EuroInlc	WGIG critique	The document is rich in ICANN rhetoric and mite on basic issues such as: -the justification for a unique authoritative root controlled by the USA. - the use of the DNS to monitor and potentially alter user traffic. - the ability to shut off a cTLD. - the existence of autonomous Internets.
15.02.05	Milton Mueller	IGP	WGIG critique	While I appreciate the effort put into it, it appears to this reader that the key policy and institutional controversies have not been identified, nor have the merits of the different ideas been discussed. Instead, the paper concentrates on fairly basic descriptive material. Such material is available in much better form from existing reports and books. What the WGIG needs to present is a much more focused discussion of the key points of controversy and proposals for change.
15.02.05	Milton Mueller	IGP	WGIG critique	Whatever the merits or demerits of ICANN (and I am favourable to many aspects of ICANN), I would urge the WGIG to achieve more objectivity and judgment in its discussion. Phrases such as "bottom up", "broad representation", "public-private partnership" may represent ICANN's view of itself but may be contested by others. Unless the WGIG has carefully considered this issue and really considers ICANN a nearly perfect model of bottom up governance, I would urge it to use more circumspect language in its description. n attempt to ban competing DNS roots might also outlaw self-provision of root naming service. Nor would it be wise to attempt to prohibit efforts to bypass DNS altogether with a radical new naming or addressing technology. It a critical mass of the world's internet users decide to migrate to a radical new system, they should be allowed to do so. For example, even ITU-T has volunteered to play such a coordinating role. Such coordination bodies derive their legitimacy not by fiat but by community support and recognition.
16.02.05	Tran Tin Wee	National University of Singapore	enhance role of the ITU in IG	The International Telecommunication Union seems to be the most suitable body to develop the appropriate technical regulation for the internet.
16.02.05	Izumi Aizu	UNESCO - I-PAP	enhance role of the ITU in IG	Civil society will act as an effective counter force against dominant commercial interest, or the danger of excessive and top-down interventions of government to achieve more harmonious and effective coordination and cooperation as a whole.
16.02.05	Izumi Aizu	IGTF	exclusion of CS needs to be addressed	This is reflected in the lack of representation of women's concerns in a substantive way in most of the documents.
16.02.05	Sophia Huyer	Women in Global Science	gender issues must be addressed	I am involved in international naming since 1978 / supervised from 1980 to1985. It is only recently I discovered that someone (ICANN) claimed rights on my own name, my imagination and my culture and asked me \$ 25,000 to only discuss of the creation of a TLD.
16.02.05	JFC Martin	INLINET	ICANN critique	I hope WGIG can present more specific coordination mechanism or governance mechanism of global cTLDs in a timely manner before the current Memorandum of Understanding between ICANN and US government is expired.
16.02.05	V.J. Park	IGC	ICANN critique	There is no Internet Governance as such.
16.02.05	JFC Martin	INLINET	IG cannot exist	Recognizing the internet as a global public good.
16.02.05	Izumi Aizu	UNESCO - I-PAP	Internet as a global public resource	I hope WGIG will take more serious look at the role of users and citizens in this new and exciting challenge of finding the right balance for new global governance mechanisms.
16.02.05	Izumi Aizu	IGTF	Internet users are stakeholders	Those standards that seem to be the best for producers may not be so good for their users including governments, enterprises and consumers. It may lead to mistakes and problems. Even in these cases, it is not always allowed to change the published standards, in the name of stability of standards.
16.02.05	Shiro Harada	Tokyo University	Internet users are stakeholders	Differences in extent making internet copying different from former acts of piracy, hence a different environment
16.02.05	Chris Zielinski	IAIA	IPR critique	As a general point, we do not believe that the issue paper provides an accurate picture of the current situation and strongly regret its apparent anti-copyright bias (including a disproportionate focus on criticisms of the IPR system and an inaccurate implication that diverse voices and the public interest have not been taken into account in the development of that system). We also regret that the issue paper does not refer to the international IPR Framework developed and agreed in the context of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), including the two 1996 Internet Treaties and makes no attempt to inventory its positive effects on cultural and economic development.
16.02.05	Allen Dixon	IFPI	IPR protection	As a general point, we do not believe that the issue paper provides an accurate picture of the current situation and strongly regret its apparent anti-copyright bias (including a disproportionate focus on criticisms of the IPR system and an inaccurate implication that diverse voices and the public interest have not been taken into account in the development of that system).
16.02.05	Laurence Djolokan	MPA	IPR protection	I feel WGIG is exercising much more multi-stakeholder approach, inclusive to both the civil society and our friends from the developing countries participation, thanks to the UN and its member states who agreed this very innovative framework.
16.02.05	Izumi Aizu	IGTF	MISm	Multilingualization of internet naming systems
16.02.05	Abdulaziz Al-Zoman	SaudiNIC	Multilingualism	With regard to the latter, the GAC has consistently urged ICANN to both support and further advance the realization of internationalized domain names.
16.02.05	Mohamed Sharif Tarmizi	ICANN-GAC	Multilingualism	

16.02.05	UNESCO - I-PAP	no separation technical/political	pay special attention for researching the social impact of the Internet Governance issues.
16.02.05	Philip Mason Australia	Pro-competitive regulation	The importance and efficacy of open market arrangements and competition in delivering infrastructure and service outcomes and ongoing innovation.
16.02.05	Izumi Azu IGTF	support of the single root	The fourth paragraph of page 4 does not fully deny the existence of alternative root server systems, but they are crucial threat to the interoperability of the Internet, hence should never be allowed. This paragraph should be rewritten in this regard.
16.02.05	Anthony Holmes ETNO	support of the status quo	ETNO believes that the current system based on RIRs, as part of the ICANN and in accordance with ICANN principles of transparency, bottom-up approach and geographic representation, must be maintained
16.02.05	Axel Pawlik NNO	support of the status quo	It is important to note here that the current Regional Internet Registry (RIR) system is a successful model of industry self-regulation that predates the establishment of ICANN by more than seven years and has developed independently from ICANN.
16.02.05	Bill Darre ARIN	support of the status quo	criticism of the perspective offered in that document is the inference that there is too little outreach to get substantive involvement from stakeholders with the current ICANN/RIRs model of IP address administration.
16.02.05	Bill Darre ARIN	support of the status quo	My Comment: What weakness exists? The administration and policy making in this area is open to all. What balance beyond equitable access and participation do you wish? My Comment: In order to ensure that there is technical coordination to ensure effective and sustained operation of the Internet, some entity must coordinate.
16.02.05	Bill Darre ARIN	support of the status quo	On the one hand ICANN has been far more open to direct user participation than many existing international, intergovernmental or private-sector led bodies from the very beginning. I mean ITU or IETF. It offers a very good model for multi-stakeholder participation. It also offers some good lessons to learn about the pros and cons of user participation mechanisms. I would not to consume too much details of what happened around ICANN.
16.02.05	Izumi Azu IGTF	support of the status quo	Recognise that existing arrangements that are working effectively should continue, acknowledging that existing organisations must be willing to continue to improve their governance arrangements (accountability and transparency are both important).
16.02.05	Philip Mason Australia	support of the status quo	It is finally very regrettable that the draft which is intended to present the current situation for RIRs in the digital environment does not refer properly to digital privacy and its negative impact on the content sector, consumers and society as a whole.
16.02.05	Allen Dixon FPI	WGIG critique	I am curious how the 20 topics are chosen? What process was used to determine this 20 topic and how would these go back to the original goal of 'developed a working definition of Internet Governance?' (which incidently, do not have a working draft)
16.02.05	James Seng IETF	WGIG critique	The stakeholders present during this WSIS process have been, in the main, economically privileged and predominately male. We would like the WGIG to make appropriate recommendations to ensure the effective participation of ALL people from all regions of the world.
23.02.05	Hans Falk Hoffmann IGC	expand participation	
23.02.05	Rikke Frank Joergensen HR caucus	Internet as a global public resource	One of the results of the World Summit of the Information Society in Geneva was a growing acceptance of the Internet as a global commons.
23.02.05	Hans Falk Hoffmann IGC	Internet users are stakeholders	decisions by individual users
23.02.05	Hans Falk Hoffmann IGC	Privacy as a human right	Privacy is an essential human right
23.02.05	Hans Falk Hoffmann IGC	question the US oversight of ICANN	Unilateral control of the root zone file and its effects for the name space. The crucial role of technical standards in the preservation of an interoperable global Internet.
23.02.05	Rikke Frank Joergensen HR caucus	WGIG critique	In addition, the current forum for domain name management is a private party, dominated by a limited number of countries and based on a contract with a single government. While we support WGIG's efforts to establish consensus on various issues, the report should go beyond consensual matters and find ways to reflect diversity.
24.02.05	Houlin Zhao ITU	enhance role of the ITU in IG	As a specialized agency of the UN dealing with telecommunications and therefore more broadly, ICT issues, ITU is very well positioned and willing to work with others to consider the many technical and policy aspects of Internet governance issues.
24.02.05	Mogens Schmidt UNESCO	expand participation	Necessary changes in Internet governance mechanisms to enhance inclusiveness should be contributing to enable greater use of the Internet in the developing countries and by citizens with diverse linguistic and cultural backgrounds and should not jeopardize the stability of the Internet.
24.02.05	Sha Zukang China	ICANN critique	My delegation is of the view, that, it is of crucial importance to conduct research on establishing a multilateral governance mechanism that is more rational and just and more conducive to the Internet development in a direction of stable, secure and responsible functioning and more conducive to the continuous technological innovation.
24.02.05	Thoralf Stenvoid Norway	Internet as a global public resource	In many ways, it may be argued that the Internet has become a global public good, and that the task ahead for this working group is a pioneering exercise in global governance.
24.02.05	Bill Graham Canada	limited role for the WGIG	Canada is pleased to see the Working Group on Internet Governance sticking closely to the terms of reference
24.02.05		Optimize connectivity and access	We strongly believe therefore that attention should be given to the cost of Internet access and use so that all countries, and not just a limited number of countries, can receive the benefits of competitive rates.
24.02.05	Thoralf Stenvoid Norway	Private sector leadership	A dynamic and private sector led development of the internet, based on sound market economy policies.
24.02.05	Sha Zukang China	Problem of monopolies	The situation in which Internet governance is monopolized by one state, one cooperation or a handful of private organizations, and while fully recognizing such governance has played its historical role, it neither facilitates further growth of the Internet, nor fully embodies the principle of equity and full representation.
24.02.05	Sha Zukang China	separation technical/political	What ICANN does is only a very small, technical portion of the coordination in the addressing and protocol parameter areas as well as those for DNS (including root servers).
24.02.05	Sha Zukang China	sovereignty	Since the responsibility for Internet-related public policy issues lies with the sovereign States, governments should play a leading role in the decision-making process.
24.02.05	Marilyn Cade ICC	support of the status quo	And therefore before starting to argue the question about ICANN and the current status quo, we must be sure about what will happen after it's changed ultimately make.
24.02.05		support of the status quo	And, as an overall point, CCBI recommends that the Working Group adopt an "evolutionary" rather than a "revolutionary" approach in any recommendations that they may ultimately make.
24.02.05		WGIG should focus on technical management	The organisation and administration of naming and numbering, including the operation of the root server system: The internationalisation of Internet Governance, taking into account public interest concerns and participation of developing countries in the governance structures: The stability, dependability and robustness of the Internet, including the impact of spam.
25.02.05	Lynn St-Amour ISOC	IG cannot exist	ISOC would also encourage WGIG to examine the collaborative Internet model and evaluate whether a term other than Internet Governance would be more accurate and potentially less misleading.

31.03.05	Klaus Grewlich	UNICTF	creation of an IGF	ch an open, global, and inclusive multi-stakeholder platform should become not only a high level "think tank" for cross-sectoral policy debate. The platform should in addition to its role as a think tank become an innovative way for fostering and monitoring progress on governance objectives of common interest and concern, - promoting a people-centred and development-oriented information society at international policy level. The envisaged entity should not be established as quasi-international organisation and only be supported by light and flexible but well equipped unit, building on existing organisations, networks and processes. It should not have prescriptive tasks but it could issue recommendations. The entity could identify suitable institutions/organisations to deal with the respective issues that are related to internet governance. It could possibly even recommend assignment of roles to various stakeholders ensuring as wide participation as possible. It could collect and make available knowledge and identify existing gaps but also best practices. Possibly the multi-stakeholder entity might even label sources of excellence.
05.04.05		WGIG	Pro-competitive regulation	Policies and regulations favouring privatization, liberalization and competition have progressively extended these conditions to other regions, and helped support the growth of the Internet on a world-wide basis
08.04.05		WGIG	IPR critique	On this view, while appearing to maintain a carefully-achieved balance between the rights of creators and the rights of users to the greatest overall benefit of all, the application of existing rules in the new context of the global information society may inadvertently disadvantage both sides of this equation &eac - i.e. damage the interests of creators, because of the cost and difficulty of enforcing traditional-style IPR, and at the same time damage the interests of users, particularly in developing countries, because access remains largely unaffordable in terms both of the direct costs of complying with IPR, and the indirect costs of not respecting them.
11.04.05	Tim McGinnis		support of the status quo	The general process of the Allocation and Assignment of IP addresses is rather transparent in that address blocks are listed in public RIR WHOIS Databases. Allocation and assignment policies are made in an open, multistakeholder, democratic way. IP addresses are allocated on the basis of confidential requests for documented needs made by members to the RIRs. There are no limitations on membership of RIRs.
15.04.05	Milton Mueller	IGP	ICANN critique	A slow, highly restrictive, conservative approach of the sort we can expect from the current ICANN system disadvantages new players outside the West relative to established, dominant players today. The report should take note of specific procedures that have been proposed to facilitate new TLD introduction, including the OECD report, my own co-authored report, and other reports by economists calling for auctions of new TLDs.
15.04.05	Milton Mueller	IGP	ICANN critique	The user-based elections have been replaced by mechanisms of self-selection that privilege vested interests and make it difficult if not impossible for change-agents to get on the Board. It is also unrealistic to expect the broad internet user community to invest the time and resources required to build and sustain ICANN's elaborate input and policy development mechanisms. Just give them a vote.
15.04.05	Jens Bammel	IPA	IPR protection	IPA urges you to review the current draft document in the light of the comments received from the rights-holder community and to create a document that truly reflects a consensus between the different stakeholders.
15.04.05	Milton Mueller	IGP	IPR protection	"In the area of copyright, in addition to dealing with significant issues related to the management of IPR in the internet world, there are also profound questions about whether the greatest overall economic and social benefit will be achieved by extending, without more, the IPR rules developed for the off-line world into the very different 'space' created by the Internet. Similarly, it is not yet clear to what extent modifications in the way that IP rights have traditionally been exercised may be appropriate or necessary in order to maximize the benefits of the global information society."
15.04.05	Milton Mueller	IGP	Misism	Static, backward-looking assertions of national sovereignty will not get us anywhere
15.04.05	Milton Mueller	IGP	Private sector leadership	this is precisely the sort of governmental interference with the technical administration of the domain name system that many in the internet community fear. It is an example of why many people supported, and continue to support, exclusion of national governments from a governance role in DNS. If governments want to present themselves as "representing the interests of the people" then they need to cease reaching for this kind of power. When they act in such a fashion, they indicate that they are not representatives of the general public, but just another special interest seeking advantage from governance of the domain name system.
15.04.05	Milton Mueller	IGP	Problem of monopolies	is an obvious fallacy to equate "governance by a private sector corporation" with "governance by the market," particularly when the corporation doing the governance has an unbreakable monopoly on entry into the business. I hope in their future comments the ICC will think more deeply about how markets work, and how different governance arrangements do or do not facilitate end user choice.
15.04.05	Geoff Huston	APNIC	support of the status quo	In the case of the Internet, addressing lies at the very heart of the network. Without a framework of stable, unique and ubiquitous addresses there is no single cohesive network. Without a continuing stable supply of addresses further growth of the network simply cannot be sustained. Without absolute confidence in the continuing stability in this supply chain the communications industry will inevitably be forced to look elsewhere for a suitable technology platform for the needs of networked data communications. If the industry is pushed into such an uncomfortable position of turning its attention elsewhere simply because the Internet is incapable of operating its infrastructure in a stable and cost effective manner, this would be a most unfortunate unintended outcome for the Internet and its billions of current and future users of this uniquely valuable common resource.
15.04.05	Milton Mueller	IGP	UN oversight of the ICANN	IGP has also asserted that once proper inter-governmental oversight is established, ICANN's GAC should be abolished.
15.04.05	Jens Bammel	IPA	WGIG critique	We remain extremely concerned by the approach to IPRs seemingly adopted by the WGIG as the latest draft working paper on IPR brings only limited progress vis-à-vis the previous issue paper issued in February. We regret that most of the comments we had sent in February were not taken into account. May we kindly remind you that these comments were shared by a great number of organisations.
18.04.05	Don McLean	WGIG	broad definition of IG	SO I THINK WE ARE WORKING OUR WAY TOWARDS A BROAD DEFINITION OF THE SCOPE OF INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND THE SORTS OF MECHANISMS THAT WOULD COME INTO PLAY.
18.04.05	Anita Gurumurthy	CS Gender Caucus	creation of a policy-making institution	All issues of Internet Governance must essentially be decided at the level of this new body.
18.04.05		India	creation of a policy-making institution	We envisage the following functions should come under the oversight of the new Body. 1. Framing collective rules, procedures, processes, and related programs that incorporates all stake holder's expectations, practices & interactions resulting in practices and operations that are consistent with the sovereign rights of States and the social and market interests of end-users and operators including international agreements about standards, policies, rules, and enforcement and dispute resolution procedures.
18.04.05	Anita Gurumurthy	CS Gender Caucus	creation of an IGF	here "is no existing forum in which the global community as a whole can address broad public policy issues or emerging issues that are cross-cutting or multidimensional and affect more than one institution". Internet Governance has become too important a global issue, affecting practically everyone in important ways, and its governance cannot simply remain distributed among only "technical organizations" despite their claims of legitimacy and representativeness. While these organizations may continue to have important activities to manage, an appropriate global public organization, with sufficient access to and equal representation of all people, communities and groups, including women, must take up the overall Internet Governance function.

18.04.05	Ian Peter	Mark 2	creation of an IGF	Is there need for an additional arrangement or body? YES If the answer to question 1 is yes: 2. What functions should it exercise? (a) Create a space for a multi-stakeholder discussion forum? YES (b) Give policy direction? YES (c) Any other function? Possibly provide high level policy for root zone edit function to replace current unilateral control by US government.
18.04.05		ICC	creation of an IGF	Nonetheless, there may be a "need" for a "forum function" that could offer a discussion body so that the public policy issues and concerns of any stakeholder can be heard, discussed openly, and responded to as appropriate by the responsible entity or entities. Thus, ICC members have responded with a conditional 'yes' to the need for a discussion forum function. This may not require an additional body.
18.04.05		India	creation of an IGF	YES
18.04.05	William Drake	WGIG	creation of an IGF	I WONDER IF WE CAN HEAR FROM THOSE DELEGATES HOW THAT ARRANGEMENT WOULD PROMOTE THE CAPACITY OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE GLOBAL SOUTH TO ENGAGE EFFECTIVELY IN INTERNET GOVERNANCE DECISION-MAKING RELATIVE TO ANOTHER POSSIBLE CONFIGURATION IN WHICH IT IS NOT GROUNDED IN AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL FRAMEWORK. PER SE, BUT, RATHER, A TRULY TRIPARTITE AND MULTISTAKEHOLDER MECHANISM.
18.04.05	Wolfgang Kleinwachter	WGIG	creation of an IGF	BUT IF IT COMES TO, LET'S SAY, BROADER ISSUES, THEN YOU HAVE NO NEED FOR A DECISION-MAKING CAPACITY BUT THEN YOU HAVE TO HAVE A BROAD BODY WITHOUT ANY DECISION-MAKING CAPACITY WHICH HAS AN OVERVIEW AND I COULD IMAGINE THAT AT THE END OF THE DAY WE HAVE SOMETHING LIKE A BROAD MULTISTAKEHOLDER BODY, I PERSONALLY CALL IT THE UNITED NATIONS INTERNET GOVERNANCE COMMUNICATION GROUP, WHICH WOULD HAVE THE OVERVIEW ABOUT ALL THE 50 PLUS ISSUES
18.04.05		India	creation of an intergovernmental forum	I HOPE THAT THIS TASK WILL BE TAKEN UP BY AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION RATHER THAN A PRIVATE COMPANY.
18.04.05	Lyndall Shope-Mafole	WGIG	creation of an intergovernmental forum	WE REITERATE THE NEED TO EVOLVE AN OVERARCHING MECHANISM WHICH WILL AT ONCE BE INCLUSIVE, TRANSPARENT, DEMOCRATIC AND ACCOUNTABLE. SUCH A MECHANISM WILL NEED TO BE MULTISTAKEHOLDER, MULTILATERAL, AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL IN ITS CHARACTER AND WORKING. SUCH A MECHANISM ALONE CAN IMPART INTERNET THE CREDIBILITY OF TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ALL THE STAKEHOLDERS' CONCERNS.
18.04.05		China	creation of an intergovernmental forum	BUT I THINK THAT FOR IT TO BE LEGITIMATE, IT HAS TO BE ROOTED IN SOME INTERGOVERNMENTAL MECHANISM.
18.04.05		India	creation of an intergovernmental forum	TO THIS END, CHINA PROPOSES AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION UNDER THE U.N. FRAMEWORK SHOULD BE ENTRUSTED TO MAKE INTERNET RESOURCES MANAGEMENT POLICIES AND AUTHORIZE CONCRETE POLICY IMPLEMENTATION TO VARIOUS OPERATION BODIES.
18.04.05		India	creation of an intergovernmental forum	AND THEREFORE WE SHOULD NOT FEAR THE ROLE OF GOVERNMENTS AT THE MULTILATERAL LEVEL IN THESE ISSUES, BECAUSE THEY WILL NOT BE ADDRESSING IT ON A DAY-TO-DAY BASIS. THEY WOULD BE ADDRESSING IT EXCEPTIONALLY, ONLY IF THE ISSUE FAILS TO BE RESOLVED AT THE TECHNICAL LEVEL, WHICH, AGAIN, WOULD FUNCTION WITHIN THE OVERALL FRAMEWORK, PERHAPS, OF AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL BODY.
18.04.05	Qiheng Hu	WGIG	creation of an intergovernmental forum	THE AUTHORIZATION TO THE BODY WHO IS TAKING CARE ABOUT THE CORE RESOURCES OF THE INTERNET SHOULD BE LEGALLY AUTHORIZED BY A MULTILATERAL PROCESS, BY A MULTILATERAL THAT IS -- HOW TO SAY THAT? -- THE SOVEREIGN STATES, THAT IS THE RIGHT OF THE SOVEREIGN STATES TO SELECT OR TO DELEGATE THE RIGHT TO A BODY, NOT -- SAY, ICANN OR SOMETHING LIKE THAT, TO TAKE CARE ABOUT THE STRATEGIC RESOURCES OF THE INTERNET FOR THEM.
18.04.05		India	creation of an intergovernmental forum	The role of policy development and oversight should be internationalised under an intergovernmental body with involvement of other stakeholders.
18.04.05		India	critique of Internet exceptionalism	SO IN SHORT, MR. CHAIRMAN, WHAT WE ARE SAYING IS THAT THERE IS NOTHING UNIQUELY DIFFERENT ABOUT THE INTERNET THAT DICTATES A COMPLETELY DIFFERENT OVERSIGHT MECHANISM AT THE GLOBAL LEVEL COMPARED TO VARIOUS OTHER FIELDS OF HUMAN ACTIVITY, AND THEREFORE IT IS SOMEHOW NOT A SATISFACTORY ARGUMENT TO MAKE THAT LEAVE THE INTERNET ALONE, THAT IT CAN BE MANAGED BY THE PRIVATE SECTOR ACTING WITH A SORT OF LOOSE SUPERVISION OF ONE COUNTRY AND THAT THE REST OF THE WORLD, THE GOVERNMENTS OF OTHER COUNTRIES NEED NOT BE DIRECTLY INVOLVED IN THE FINAL GOVERNANCE OF THE INTERNET.
18.04.05		Syria	enhance role of the ITU in IG	WE THINK THE ITU, WITH ITS EXISTING MECHANISMS WHICH INVOLVE THE PRIVATE SECTOR, SHOULD BE MORE THAN ADEQUATE TO ADDRESS THAT -- THOSE REQUIREMENTS. MOST OF THE ISSUES WE'RE DEALING WITH FALL UNDER TELECOMMUNICATIONS.
18.04.05	Lyndall Shope-Mafole	WGIG	enhance role of the ITU in IG	IF YOU TALK ABOUT THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURES, MAYBE TALK ABOUT THE ITU, WHICH I THINK I KNOW FAIRLY WELL, IT HAS NOT BEEN ABLE TO LIVE UP TO THE EXPECTATIONS OF THE ICT COMMUNITY AS A WHOLE WITH RESPECT TO ITS REFORM, WITH RESPECT TO THE ISSUES THAT IT DEALS WITH, WITH RESPECT TO THE SPEED WITH WHICH IT TAKES DECISION, ET CETERA.
18.04.05		Syria	enhance role of the ITU in IG	ITU, UNESCO and WIPO will cover all issues.
18.04.05	Marilyn Cade	ICC	expand participation	Yes, ITU, as a coordinator.
18.04.05		ICC	expand participation	THE ADEQUACY OF EACH OF THOSE ENTITIES IN FULLY MEETING THE NEED FOR TRANSPARENCY, BROAD PARTICIPATION IN THE OTHER PRINCIPLES THAT WE ALL BELIEVE IN OF COURSE IS NOT UP TO WHAT WE WANT IT TO BE, AND THAT SHOULD NOT BE A SURPRISE.
18.04.05	Antia Gurumurthy	CS Gender Caucus	gender issues must be addressed	BUT THEY DO ACTUALLY EXTEND THE PARTICIPATION MORE BROADLY OF THE STAKEHOLDERS IN THE POLICY-MAKING IN THE GNSO.
18.04.05		Syria	ICANN critique	Interests of groups like women (UNIFEM) so that internet governance is managed not only from a governmental and market interest point of view but for the rights of people, including the right to development, the plurality of cultures and the protection of the interest of disadvantaged sections including women
18.04.05		ICC	Improve GAC	WE ARE NOT IN FAVOR OF THE CURRENT STATE OF THINGS, AND ASI SAID EARLIER, PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN MADE. THERE WILL SOON BE A MEETING TO DEAL WITH THE DEFINITION OF THE INTERNET AND A PROPOSAL WILL BE PUT FORWARD.
18.04.05		India	Internationalise the root server system	Perhaps, with some strengthening of the GAC's mandate/misison/scope, within the ICANN structure, and improved member participation, it could perform a more robust audit role within ICANN decision-making processes.
18.04.05		India	Internationalise the root server system	Currently there are thirteen root servers, out of which ten are located in USA, two in Europe and one in Japan. This may not be the optimal in the interest of utilization of internet resources including the Domain Name resolution. To obviate these shortcomings, it is strongly recommended that root servers should be placed region wise rather than concentrated in one region. Regional dispersion of root DNS will reduce the in fructuous international traffic International Domain Name (IDN, Multi-lingual Domain Name)
18.04.05		India	Internationalise the root server system	AMONG THESE, THE QUESTION OF INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE MANAGEMENT OF THE INTERNET'S CORE RESOURCES NAMELY THE DOMAIN NAMES SYSTEMS, IP ADDRESSES, AND THE ROOT SERVER SYSTEM, APPEARS AS ONE OF THE MAIN ISSUES IN THIS DEBATE.
18.04.05		India	Internationalise the root server system	THE INTERNATIONALIZED DOMAIN NAME:

18.04.05	Nitin Desai	WGIG	Internet exceptionalism	I THINK WE SHOULD ALSO RECOGNIZE HERE SOMETHING WHICH WAS MENTIONED, THE FACT THAT IN THE CASE OF THE INTERNET, WE ARE LOOKING AT A CASE WHICH IS A LITTLE DIFFERENT FROM SOME OF THE OTHER CASES THAT WE HAVE BEEN TALKING ABOUT. MOST OF THE TIME WHEN WE TALK OF INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT, WE REALLY ARE TALKING ABOUT COORDINATING NATIONAL MANAGEMENT. MOST OF THE TIME WHAT WE ARE TALKING OF IS THAT IT'S GOVERNMENTS AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL WHO REALLY DO THE LEGISLATION AND THE MANAGEMENT. EVEN OF TELECOM. TELECOM REGULATION IS BASICALLY A NATIONAL ACTIVITY. AND WHAT WE DO AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL IS COORDINATING WHAT GOVERNMENTS ARE GOING TO DO AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL.
18.04.05	Alejandro Peñaray	WGIG	Internet exceptionalism	THE INTERNET POSES A QUITE DIFFERENT CHALLENGE IN THAT IT DOES NOT -- IT CANNOT BE REDUCED TO TELECOMMUNICATIONS. THE INTERNET IS NOT POINT-TO-POINT. IT'S NOT BROADCAST. IT THEREFORE MOVES IN A REGIME THAT IS DIFFERENT FROM THE TWO PREVIOUS ONES
18.04.05	Jovan Kurbalija	WGIG	Internet exceptionalism	AND THE CLASSICAL APPROACH OR GOOD, NOT BAD, US AND THEM, USUALLY CANNOT BE APPLIED IN THE FIELD OF INTERNET GOVERNANCE. WE would like to stress again that WIPO, the specialized agency within the UN, is the appropriate body to engage in further debates on IPRs. We strongly disagree with the critics pertaining to the outreach, the decision-making process or even the mandate of this organization. WIPO is responsible on IPRs because it has the necessary expertise to deal with the issue. It also has the necessary outreach capacity. It involves many non-governmental actors. It has been working in particular to assist developing countries on development issues related to IPRs. Furthermore, although the draft working paper constantly refers to IPRs in the digital environment, it fails to underline the essential character and positive effects of the 1996 WIPO Treaties which crucially contribute to the creation of an appropriate international framework for the protection and distribution of works in the digital environment.
18.04.05	Laurence Doljakian	MPA	IPR protection	WGIG members should consider handing back part of the mandate. I do not know enough about the WSIS to suggest which areas the group should focus on: surely those more intimately involved with the WSIS will be able to make helpful suggestions.
18.04.05	Daniel Karrenberg	RIFE	limited role for the WGIG	MR. CHAIRMAN, DESPITE THE IMPORTANCE OF THE WORK CARRIED OUT BY THE TEAM AND THE GROUP IN RECENT PHASES WE KNOW THAT THE UPCOMING PHASE IS THE MOST IMPORTANT. AND SO WE HOPE THAT THE WORKING GROUP WILL FOCUS ITS EFFORTS ON THE MOST IMPORTANT ISSUES, INCLUDING INTERNET GOVERNANCE RATHER THAN SUPERFLUOUS DETAILS WHICH COULD BE OF LITTLE HELP IN THIS PHASE.
18.04.05		Saudi Arabia	limited role for the WGIG	We are of the opinion that for the citizens to access information through ubiquitous way through internet, domain name in Roman script is a big impediment and we therefore feel a strong need for the Multilingual Domain Name registration.
18.04.05	Pierre Quecraego	India	Multilingualism	THE QUESTION OF MULTILINGUALISM IS VERY IMPORTANT FOR US, FOR FRANCOPHONE, AND WE SUPPORT THIS AND WE COMMENT THE VARIOUS DELEGATIONS WHO HAVE SPOKEN TO CONCUR WITH US.
18.04.05	Izumi Aizu	OIF	Multilingualism	GTFI (Internet Governance Task Force of Japan)
18.04.05		IGTF	n/a	The regional survey on Internet governance is part of UNDP Asia-Pacific Development Information Programme's (UNDP-ADPIP) efforts to carry out an Open Regional Dialogue on Internet Governance (ORDIG)
18.04.05		UNDP-ADPIP	n/a	BUT TO SAY THAT, REALLY, THE FOCUS AND THE MAIN REASON FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THIS GROUP AND FOR ASKING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE U.N. TO ESTABLISH THIS GROUP IS BECAUSE THE ISSUE IS NOT TECHNICAL. I THINK THE ISSUE IS POLITICAL.
18.04.05	Lyndall Shope-Matfiole	WGIG	no separation technical/political	STILL, IF NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS HAVE THE EXCLUSIVE RESPONSIBILITY OF DEFINING THE NATIONAL PUBLIC INTEREST, NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS ARE NOT PARTICULARLY, IN THE PRESENT STAGE OF THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS, ACCOUNTABLE TO CITIZENS OF OTHER COUNTRIES.
18.04.05	Bertrand de la Chappelle	WSIS-Online	no special role for the state	A multi-stakeholder forum could put forth summaries for the discussions to assist either particular organizations or fora in taking the issue to the next level. This may give policy direction, though it would not have decision-making authority or operational responsibility.
18.04.05		ICC	non-binding institutions only	No. The role of the GAC needs to be revisited and perhaps a reformed GAC could provide the necessary diversification of governmental input to ICANN as detailed in response to question 3
18.04.05		ICC	OG exclusion	However, we have seen that industry self-regulation is often as effective and incorporates incentives to deal with new challenges on a going-forward basis. It would therefore be worth adding a discussion of how other mechanisms than treaties impact behaviour. For instance, if companies choose not to abide by commonly-accepted standards they could very well lose market share. If they ignore generally-accepted business practices they risk loud and sustained criticism from trade organizations, NGOs, the Internet technical community, and others--which could affect the company's reputation and even hurt its share price and the willingness of customers and partners to work with them.
18.04.05		ICC	Private sector leadership	CHINA BELIEVES THE CURRENT INTERNET GOVERNANCE SITUATION IS DOMINATED BY THE PRIVATE SECTOR AND A SINGLE COUNTRY.
18.04.05		China	Problem of monopolies	Private sector competition and innovation enabled by liberalising markets
18.04.05	Ian Peter	OECD	Pro-competitive regulation	There is an urgent need for a body to undertake the function of control of root zone policy to replace the current system of unilateral control.
18.04.05		Mark 2	question the US oversight of ICANN	We understand that the MOU is to expire in September 2006. ICANN's incorporation in the USA implicitly means it will always be subject to USA law. It is believed that this shall introduce an asymmetric role of the USA Government vis a vis other governments. Today ICANN is the only visible body which exercises any kind of oversight in relation to the Internet with a few supporting organisation being responsible for some of its critical components e.g. such as voluntary root servers, regional Internet Address Registries, the Domain Name registries. Most of them have contractual relations with ICANN. At the international level, there is no single international (inter-government or private) organisation that coordinates all the issues related to the Internet and IP based services.
18.04.05		India	question the US oversight of ICANN	AND WE SEE THAT THERE ARE REFERENCES IN THAT TO U.S. GOVERNMENT ATTITUDES. AND WE UNDERSTAND THAT IF THE QUESTION OF INTERNET GOVERNANCE IS TO BE ADDRESSED SATISFACTORILY, WE WOULD NEED TO HAVE THE U.S. GOVERNMENT CLEARLY SIGN ON TO THAT PROCESS. BUT WE ARE AT THIS POINT OF TIME EMBARKED IN THAT PROCESS OF TRYING TO BROADEN THE GOVERNMENTAL ROLE WHICH CURRENTLY IS EXERCISED BY ONLY ONE GOVERNMENT.
18.04.05		India	question the US oversight of ICANN	AND IT MEANS BOTH MODIFICATIONS, DELETIONS, AND ADDITIONS TO THE ZONE FILE. THIS IS REGULATED IN A BILATERAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN ICANN AND THE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE SO FAR. AND I THINK WE HAVE IDENTIFIED THIS AS A PROBLEMATIC ISSUE.
18.04.05	Wolfgang Kleinwaechter	WGIG	question the US oversight of ICANN	AND IT'S REALLY, YOU KNOW -- THESE ARE REALLY EXCEPTIONAL CASES -- WHERE A PUBLIC-POLICY ELEMENT IS INVOLVED.
18.04.05	Wolfgang Kleinwaechter	WGIG	separation technical/political	NORMALLY WHEN WE DISCUSS THIS, WE TALK ABOUT THE CONTROL OF THE INTERNET, BUT IT'S -- IF YOU GO DEEPER INTO THE ISSUE, YOU DISCOVER IT'S NOT A QUESTION OF CONTROL. IT'S A QUESTION OF PROTECTION OF THE INTERNET, SO THAT THE INTERNET CAN FUNCTION IN A PROPER WAY. AND SO FAR, IT WOULD BE PROBABLY HELPFUL TO TURN THIS, YOU KNOW, TERMINOLOGY FROM CONTROL TO PROTECTION.
18.04.05	Wolfgang Kleinwaechter	WGIG	separation technical/political	I WANT TO ADD THAT THE 95% OF THIS THING IS TECHNICAL AND PROCEDURAL, ROUTINE THINGS, WHICH THE AUTHORITIES OF THE SOVEREIGN STATES OR THE MAJOR STAKEHOLDERS MAY NOT NEED TO INTERFERE INTO THE THINGS. THE DETAILS.
18.04.05	Qiheng Hu	WGIG	separation technical/political	

18.04.05	Izumi Aizu	GTF	separation technical/political	BUT WE BELIEVE THAT MAKING CLEAR DISTINCTION BETWEEN WHAT REALLY CONSTITUTES PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES AND WHAT CAN BE IDENTIFIED AS TECHNICAL MATTERS WILL BENEFIT THE WHOLE DEBATE WE ARE TASKED.
18.04.05		Saudi Arabia	sovereignty	WE HOPE THAT GOVERNMENTS WILL PLAY AN APPROPRIATE ROLE IN TERMS OF DEVELOPING POLICIES RELATED TO INTERNET GOVERNANCE.
18.04.05		China	sovereignty	WE BELIEVE THAT THE POLICY-MAKING SHOULD NOT SURPASS INTERNATIONAL LAW AND NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY, AS POINTED OUT IN ARTICLE 49 OF THE DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES.
18.04.05		Saudi Arabia	sovereignty	Based on the WSIS principles, public policy authority for internet related issues is the sovereign right of states.
18.04.05		Syria	sovereignty	Work on all these international public issues shall observe national sovereign rights of each State to organize the use of the Internet nationally.
18.04.05		EU	special role for the state in MSISm	THE E.U. BELIEVES THAT GOVERNMENTS DO HAVE A SPECIFIC MISSION AND RESPONSIBILITY VIS-A-VIS THEIR CITIZENS AND THEIR ROLE WITHIN THIS NEW CORPORATION MODEL SHOULD BE MAINLY FOCUSED ON ISSUES OF PUBLIC POLICY EXCLUDING ANY INVOLVEMENT IN THE DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONS.
18.04.05		India	special role for the state in MSISm	OVERALL, WE THINK THAT FOR THE INTERNET TO HAVE A TRULY LEGITIMATE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE, IT MUST INVOLVE ALL STAKEHOLDERS, INCLUDING, AND IN PARTICULAR, GOVERNMENTS. SO WE MUST BEAR THIS IN MIND WHEN THE WORKING GROUP CONTINUES WITH ITS VERY IMPORTANT TASK.
18.04.05		Syria	special role for the state in MSISm	WE'VE NOT ASKED FOR AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION. WE REFERRED TO PAST EXPERIENCE. WE HAVE THE EXAMPLE OF THE ITU. THE ITU IS OPEN TO ALL PARTICIPANTS.
18.04.05		India	special role for the state in MSISm	GOVERNMENTS AND GOVERNMENTS ALONE CAN CLAIM TO SPEAK ON BEHALF OF THE PUBLIC. ESPECIALLY IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES, WHERE A PUBLIC CONCERN IS INVOLVED, THE GOVERNMENT CAN LEGITIMATELY CLAIM TO ACT AND SPEAK ON BEHALF OF THE PUBLIC. SO WHILE WE SEE THE GOVERNANCE, THE LARGER GOVERNANCE, AS ONE THAT INVOLVES A WHOLE SET OF ACTORS, ALL OF WHOM HAVE A REAL LEGITIMATE STAKE IN THE INTERNET, THERE WOULD BE ISSUES THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE DECIDED COLLECTIVELY BY GOVERNMENTS.
18.04.05	Lyndall Shope-Mafole	WIGIG	special role for the state in MSISm	ON THE ONE HAND, YOU HAVE GOVERNMENTS THAT ARE ELECTED THAT HAVE PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY IN THEIR COUNTRIES.
18.04.05		China	special role for the state in MSISm	THE SO-CALLED TRILATERALISM HAS NO FOUNDATION IN THE REPORT SINCE IT DEVIATES THE PRINCIPLE FROM ARTICLE 49, MIXING THE ROLES OF ALL THE STAKEHOLDERS, DENYING THE DUE RESPONSIBILITY AND ROLE OF GOVERNMENTS IN INTERNET POLICY-MAKING.
18.04.05		India	special role for the state in MSISm	AND THE GOVERNMENT ALONE CAN SPEAK ON -- IN THE NAME OF THE PUBLIC.
18.04.05	Yukaio Li	Internet Society of China	special role for the state in MSISm	But without the government's attendance, legislation and policy support, we cannot solve spam problem completely. We can get a conclusion from anti-spam practice in the world that it is an integrated solution including legislation, management, technology, self-discipline and international cooperation to deal with spam.
18.04.05	Aljandro Peany	WIGIG	support of the single root	THESE LEAD TO POSSIBLE CONFLICTS, BECAUSE DIFFERENT NAMES COULD BE GIVEN IN -- THE SAME NAME COULD BE GIVEN IN DIFFERENT ROOTS AND POINT TO DIFFERENT RESOURCES. AND THIS, IN THE END, CAN BECOME EXTREMELY PROBLEMATIC.
18.04.05	Paul Wilson	APNIC	support of the single root	Of particular importance is the existence of a single common addressing and routing scheme, which allows new networks to connect into the Internet and immediately share traffic with all others. It must be understood, however, that this essential characteristic is not an assured outcome of the Internet itself: rather it is the result of administrative and operational systems that work specifically to preserve it.
18.04.05	Daniel Karrenberg	RIFE	support of the status quo	The WIGIG fails to recognise that the most important elements of this process are the regional policy fora and not the relatively small parts that ensure global co-ordination: consequently it fails to recognise that these processes are completely open for governments and civil society to participate and that they always have been open for anyone with a genuine interest in the matter. The comment period is too short to enumerate all instances of descriptions of the status-quo that are factually wrong or blatantly ignore widely available data in favour of hear-say and rumours.
18.04.05	Ian Peter	Mark 2	support of the status quo	Rather than a replacement for existing structures, we would see this as an overlay in relationship to existing organisations.
18.04.05		ICC	support of the status quo	There are a variety of existing organizations addressing issues related to the evolution of the Internet which are responsive to its dynamic needs and its applications. All institutions need to constantly seek to improve, and those associated with the Internet are no exception. Each has processes in place toward this objective. The Internet was designed to be managed/coordinated in a decentralized fashion without any need for "centralized" control. Certainly, it has worked that way for many years and today is the foundation of many business models in the commercial world. The WIGIG has recognized and ICC members agree the Internet itself has been functioning well. Given its history and its stability to date, it is not clear that there is a "need" for an additional arrangement or body.
18.04.05		ICC	support of the status quo	ICC questions the need for any new oversight function. While some of the existing mechanisms/organizations that deal with issues related to the Internet could be improved in line with the Geneva principles, oversight of them is not needed, rather discussion and information exchange between and among these organizations should be promoted.
18.04.05		ICC	support of the status quo	At the bottom of page 5, the first sentence about ICANN should not be a negative criticism that ICANN is not consistent with the idea of national sovereignty. It is not clear which WSIS criteria regarding national sovereignty ICANN contradicts. An opening sentence that acknowledges that ICANN represents a new and successful attempt to quickly develop an open, global self-regulatory mechanism for coordinating some of the key technical issues that must be addressed to ensure the smooth functioning of the Internet. It attempts to do this in a way that maximizes flexibility and fosters innovation, should be included.
18.04.05		OECD	support of the status quo	The technological development and administration of the Internet is involved in ensuring that the network is interoperable, functional, stable, secure, efficient, as well as scalable in the long run. No single person, organisation or country manages the Internet. Instead, the Internet's technological management is handled by many entities which work within a coordinated and overall open framework. Today, the Internet enables new competition which was previously impossible due to the limited resources of other communications media or to the way they were managed. Indeed, convergence entails a need to rethink and adapt regulatory frameworks.
18.04.05		EU	support of the status quo	IT SHOULD NOT REPLACE EXISTING MECHANISM OR INSTITUTIONS, BUT SHOULD BUILD ON THE EXISTING STRUCTURES OF INTERNET GOVERNANCE, WITH A SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON THE COMPLEMENTARITY BETWEEN ALL THE ACTORS IN THIS PROCESS. GOVERNMENTS, AND, RECOGNIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES AND ROLES, SECOND THE NEW PUBLIC/PRIVATE COOPERATION MODEL SHOULD CONTRIBUTE TO THE SUSTAINABLE STABILITY AND ROBUSTNESS OF THE INTERNET BY ADDRESSING APPROPRIATELY PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES RELATED TO KEY ELEMENTS OF INTERNET GOVERNANCE.
18.04.05		USA	support of the status quo	I WOULD JUST SAY TO EVERYONE THAT THIS MAY BE THE SITUATION NOW BECAUSE IT'S THE WAY THE INTERNET DEVELOPED IN THE PAST, AND IT IS A MATTER OF HISTORY RATHER THAN DUE TO ANY KIND OF CONSPIRACY.
18.04.05	Marilyn Cade	ICC	support of the status quo	AND I ALSO NOTE THE IMPORTANCE OF, AT THIS STAGE, OUR HONESTLY AND FACTUALLY CONSIDERING THE ADEQUACY OF THE PRESENT MECHANISMS THAT TODAY ARE IDENTIFIED AS BEING INVOLVED IN INTERNET GOVERNANCE.

18.04.05	Izumi Azzu	IGTF	support of the status quo	WE BELIEVE THE FACT IS THAT THE OPEN POLICY FORUM HOSTED BY RIRs ARE ALL OPEN TO ANYONE INTERESTED IN THE POLICY DEVELOPMENT FOR IP ADDRESS MANAGEMENT.
18.04.05	Theresa Swinehart	ICANN	support of the status quo	WE FIND THAT THE RECOMMENDATIONS PUT FORWARD IN PARTICULAR ON THE PAPER ON DOMAIN NAME MANAGEMENT ARE ACTUALLY VERY CONSISTENT WITH SOME OF THE ORGANIZATION'S CURRENT EVOLUTION AND SOME OF THAT THINKING CAN BE FOUND IN ICANN'S STRATEGIC PLAN, WHICH INCLUDES SOME COMMUNITY INPUT, AND IN OUR WORK TOWARDS THE COMPLETION OF THE MOU WITH THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE. THE LATEST REPORT ON THE COMPLETION OF THAT PROGRESS CAN BE FOUND ON ICANN'S WEBSITE.
18.04.05	Mirjam Kuhne	ISOC	support of the status quo	WE ARE CONCERNED, THOUGH, THAT MANY OF WIGG'S PREMISES SEEM TO START WITH AN ASSUMPTION THAT THE INTERNET NEEDS HIERARCHICAL TOP-DOWN GOVERNANCE MODEL IMPLYING ONE ORGANIZATION AND THEREBY IGNORING THE DECENTRALIZED STRUCTURE ON WHICH THE INTERNET WAS SO SUCCESSFULLY BUILT. NOT ONLY DOES THIS GOVERNANCE HIERARCHY MODEL AS IT WAS CALLED IN SOME OF THE PAPERS PREVENT AN ACCURATE UNDERSTANDING OF THE INTERNET'S INFRASTRUCTURE AND ITS DEVELOPMENT AND FORGING KEY ORGANIZATIONS TO BE CLASSIFIED IN PRESCRIBED CATEGORIES THAT DO NOT FIT WITH THE REALITY OF THEIR ACTIONS OR THEIR ROLE IN DEVELOPING AND SUPPORTING THE INTERNET, BUT IT ALSO WILL VERY LIKELY LEAD TO CONCLUSIONS THAT WILL HARM THE INTERNET'S DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH. THE INTERNET SOCIETY BELIEVES THAT THE BEST WAY TO SUPPORT THE WSIS PLAN OF ACTION AND THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND TO EXTEND THE REACH OF THE INTERNET IS TO BUILD ON THOSE ASPECTS THAT HAVE WORKED WELL: NAMELY, THE LONG ESTABLISHED OPEN, DISTRIBUTED, AND CONSENSUS-BASED PROCESSES AND MANY REGIONAL FORUMS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE INTERNET INFRASTRUCTURE.
18.04.05	Oscar Robles	NIC-Mexico	support of the status quo	THIS PARAGRAPH IS, IN THE BEST SCENARIO, INCONSISTENT IN ITSELF. GOVERNMENTS DO HAVE THEIR SOVEREIGN RIGHT TO DETERMINE PUBLIC POLICY. CNSO POLICY DEVELOPMENT PROCESS TAKES THIS INTO ACCOUNT.
18.04.05	Paul Wilson	APNIC	support of the status quo	THE GREAT DANGER OF AN EXPLOSION IN ROUTING TABLE SIZES, PARTICULARLY IF ALLOCATION MECHANISMS ARE INTRODUCED WHICH CONFLICT WITH TODAY'S MEASURES FOR THE CONTROL OF TABLE SIZES. THE ITU PROPOSAL FOR NATIONAL ALLOCATIONS
18.04.05	Antia Gurumurthy	CS Gender Caucas	UN oversight of the ICANN	IT SHOULD BE RESPONSIBLE TO THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY THROUGH THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL HAVE OVERSIGHT RESPONSIBILITY FOR FAIR DISTRIBUTION OF INTERNET RESOURCES.
18.04.05	Daniel Karrenberg	RIFE	WIGG critique	THE RECENTLY PUBLISHED WORK OF THE WIGG IS VERY DISAPPOINTING AND DOES NOT CREATE CONFIDENCE THAT THE GROUP WILL PRODUCE HELPFUL RESULTS ACCORDING TO ITS MANDATE. UNLESS THE GROUP FOCUSES ON ACHIEVABLE RESULTS IT WILL FAIL.
18.04.05	Daniel Karrenberg	RIFE	WIGG critique	MAKING RECOMMENDATIONS WITHOUT GIVING A RATIONALE AND PROPOSING PROCESSES WITHOUT A DESCRIPTION OF THEIR GOALS DOES NOT INDICATE THAT RECOMMENDATIONS ARE THE RESULT OF A RATIONAL DISCOURSE WITHIN WIGG AND MUCH LESS A CONSENSUS AMONG WIGG MEMBERS. THIS DOES NOT MAKE THE WORK VERY USEFUL AS A BASIS FOR DEVELOPING AGREEMENT AMONG THE MUCH LARGER AND MORE DIVERSE GROUP OF PARTICIPANTS IN THE WSIS. WIGG SHOULD FOCUS
18.04.05	Daniel Karrenberg	RIFE	WIGG critique	TO SUM UP THE PAPER PRESENTS THE WHOLE GAMBIT OF GOVERNANCE IN AN ACADEMIC MANNER TO EDUCATE ALL THE READERS ABOUT THE VARIOUS OPTIONS AND THEIR RELATIVE SUITABILITY TO MEET THE WSIS CRITERIA. HOWEVER, NO SPECIFIC CONCLUSION OR RECOMMENDATION HAS BEEN PRESENTED TO MOVE FORWARD.
18.04.05	Izumi Azzu	IGTF	WIGG critique	WE WOULD LIKE TO STATE HOWEVER, THAT THE TIME ALLOCATED FOR US TO PREPARE OUR COMMENT IS FAR LESS THAN ONE CAN REASONABLY AFFORD. WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE WIGG MEMBERS DEVOTED A LOT OF TIME WITHIN A SHORT PERIOD, SACRIFICING YOUR DAY-TO-DAY WORKS. BUT IN ORDER TO REACH A GLOBAL CONSENSUS, ESPECIALLY FOR MULTI-LINGUAL ACTORS, WE LIKE TO REQUEST TO HAVE A MINIMUM OF THREE TO FOUR WEEKS FROM THE PUBLICATIONS OF THE PAPERS FOR THE COMMENT PERIOD.
18.04.05	Laurence Diolakan	MPA	WIGG critique	WE REMAIN EXTREMELY CONCERNED BY THE APPROACH TO IPRS SEEMINGLY ADOPTED BY THE WIGG AS THIS LATEST DRAFT "WORKING PAPER" REFLECTS ONLY VERY PARTIALLY, IF AT ALL, ANY IMPROVEMENT COMPARED TO THE "ISSUE PAPER" POSTED IN FEBRUARY. WE REGRET THAT MOST OF THE COMMENTS WE PROVIDED IN FEBRUARY WERE NOT TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION, ALTHOUGH THESE COMMENTS WERE SHARED BY A LARGE POOL OF ORGANIZATIONS. IN OUR VIEW, THE DRAFT WORKING PAPER STILL INCLUDES DISPROPORTIONATELY NEGATIVE COMMENTS OF THE CURRENT IPR SYSTEM REFLECTING AN ANTI-COPYRIGHT BIAS, AND FAILS TO REFLECT THE CURRENT SITUATION ACCURATELY. IN PARTICULAR:
18.04.05	Yoshio Utsurni	ITU	WIGG critique	SO THE WORKING DEFINITION OF THE INTERNET GOVERNANCE IS NOT AN ACADEMIC WORKING DEFINITION, BUT TO FACILITATE THE DISCUSSION OF THE PREFCOM.
18.04.05		Syria	WIGG critique	AND AS A DEVELOPING COUNTRY, IT'S VERY DIFFICULT FOR US TO STUDY DOCUMENTS IN SUCH A SHORT PERIOD.
18.04.05		IPA	WIGG critique	GENERALLY SPEAKING, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THE LATEST WORKING PAPER ON IPR PROVIDES AN ACCURATE PICTURE OF THE CURRENT SITUATION, AND VERY MUCH REGRET ITS APPARENT ANTI-COPYRIGHT BIAS.
18.04.05	Izumi Azzu	IGTF	WIGG critique	FIRST, I HAVE A QUESTION, WAS THERE ANY DISCUSSION IN THE WIGG ABOUT THE OPEN AND/OR FREE SOFTWARE IN RELATION TO THE USE OF THE INTERNET? BECAUSE THERE'S NO MENTION ABOUT THEM AT ALL IN THIS PAPER.
18.04.05		IIFP	WIGG critique	JUST ONE MORE THING: I ALSO THINK IT'S VERY SURPRISING TO SEE NO REFERENCE TO THE ESSENTIAL PROBLEM OF PIRACY, WHICH ENDANGERS THE CONTENT SECTOR. I HAVEN'T SEEN ANY ATTEMPTS TO ANALYZE THIS IN THE PAPERS, AND WE WOULD HAVE LIKED TO SEE THAT AS WELL.
18.04.05		Australia	WIGG critique	THIS LEADS TO A SECOND QUESTION, I SUPPOSE, WHICH I'D LIKE TO RAISE, WHICH IS I HAVE A SENSE IN WHICH PARTICULARLY THE PAPERS AS WE MOVE AWAY FROM THE MOST CONTENTIOUS AND GENERAL ISSUE THAT WE HAVE, THAT'S WHERE WE FIND THE PAPERS ARE STRUGGLING MORE AND MORE TO DEVELOP A MORE DETAILED ANALYSIS, BUT WE'D LIKE TO STATE, HOWEVER, THAT THE TIME ALLOCATED FOR US TO PREPARE OUR COMMENT IS FAR LESS THAN WE CAN REASONABLY AFFORD.
18.04.05	Izumi Azzu	IGTF	WIGG critique	IF SOMEONE AS COMPETENT AS THE DELEGATE FROM JAPAN NEEDS SEVERAL WEEKS TO COMMENT ON ALL THESE DOCUMENTS, WHAT CAN WE SAY AS REGARDS TO THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES WHO MIGHT BE OVERWHELMED BY ALL OF THIS USEFUL INFORMATION?
18.04.05		Syria	WIGG critique	WE HAVEN'T EVEN SERIOUSLY STARTED DEFINING INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND WE'RE ALREADY GOING INTO WHAT TYPE OF ORGANIZATION SHOULD BE SET UP. I THINK THIS IS TOTALLY OUT OF LINE.
18.04.05	Mirjam Kuhne	ISOC	WIGG critique	UNFORTUNATELY, AN INORDINATE AMOUNT OF TIME HAS BEEN SPENT FOCUSING ON REVIEWING CURRENT STRUCTURES, THOSE THAT BROUGHT US THE INTERNET AND ITS RAPID, STABLE GROWTH, RATHER THAN LOOKING FORWARD TO THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF EXTENDED COOPERATION WITH AND BASED ON THE PROVEN SUCCESS OF EXISTING MODELS AND STRUCTURES.
18.04.05	Oscar Robles	NIC-Mexico	WIGG critique	FIRST OF ALL, PUBLISHING A DOCUMENT THREE DAYS BEFORE YOU CLOSE THE PERIOD FOR PUBLIC COMMENTS REPRESENTS HUGE PROBLEM TO YOUR OWN PROCESS OF OPENNESS AND PARTICIPATION. THEN, MODIFY THAT PAPERS JUST TWO DAYS BEFORE YOUR DEADLINE, IS DEFINITELY NOT SERIOUS.

18.04.05	Oscar Robles	NIC-Mexico	WGIG critique	This document is not a neutral vision of the DNS management but a slanted one to the author wishes, showing only one side of the coin <sup>1</sup> , why it doesn't say that there is another emerging view, where no government involvement? So, for the sake of neutrality, you should refrain from making suggestions in factual documents, otherwise we could interpret it as someone already decided what to do with the DNS governance, and you are just being the messengers.
18.04.05	Oscar Robles	NIC-Mexico	WGIG critique	You just were established as the 'court of justice' for the Internet future and one of your main pledges is openness and wider participation. If this is the way you know how to aim it, I think we've seen enough and your endeavor is over. You are sending the wrong message. We look forward to see real improvements on the way you allow not only public comments to working drafts, but actual participation of private sector, civil society and current players to your discussions and your decisions.
18.04.05		Syria	WGIG critique	However, Syria notes that the current papers do not fully reflect either the balance of views, or the work currently done in the ITU and would expect this to be rectified in the future.
19.04.05	Peter Godwin	ISOC	Internet exceptionalism	In the spirit of meeting the international development goals highlighted by WSIS, any review of today's Internet model or structures must be carried out in the context of how well they have worked in the past, how well they meet the needs of the people who depend upon them today, and how well they will adapt to changing requirements in the future: and not simply focus on a comparison to other historical telecommunications or governance models. These historical models have not been demonstrated to be well suited to the Internet.
19.04.05	Peter Godwin	ISOC	separation technical/political	However, much of WGIG's focus has been on Internet infrastructure, thereby missing an opportunity to focus on those aspects of the Internet's development that are less developed and that could benefit from improved, lightweight mechanisms facilitating an exchange of information between policymakers and the Internet community. Examples here are issues concerning inappropriate usage of the Internet - cybercrime and spam being just two examples.
19.04.05	Peter Godwin	ISOC	support of the status quo	The Internet Society believes that the best way to extend the reach of the Internet is to build on those aspects that have worked well - e.g. the long established open, distributed, consensus-based processes and many regional forums for the development and administration of the Internet infrastructure.
19.04.05	Peter Godwin	ISOC	WGIG critique	The Internet has a huge potential as an enabler bringing these benefits to people everywhere and we remain excited about the WSIS mission. However, it is not clear how WGIG's actions to date have helped support achieving such goals.
19.04.05	Peter Godwin	ISOC	WGIG critique	Also, many of WGIG's premises seem to start with an assumption that the Internet needs a hierarchical top-down governance model, thereby ignoring the decentralised, distributed structure on which the Internet was so successfully built. Not only does this 'governance hierarchy' model prevent an accurate understanding of the Internet's infrastructure and development (forcing key organisations to be classed in prescribed categories that do not fit with the reality of their actions or their role in developing and supporting the Internet) but it also will very likely lead to conclusions that will harm the Internet's development and growth.
21.04.05	Jordan Carter	APTTD	n/a	his response paper is an effort to provide the WGIG with APTD's perspective of the ccTLD-related issues being discussed in this forum.
22.04.05		UNESCO -IFPAP	special role for the state in MSISm	Participants to the round table recognize that alongside the obvious benefits of wider access to cyberspace only in the competence of the States the opportunity to create a legal basis for protection of the population against the harmful contents lies by granting public access to the Internet.
22.04.05		UNESCO -IFPAP	support of the status quo	Participants of the round table note that the existing state of affairs in the field of an infrastructural issues and the management of critical Internet resources as a whole does not cause any essential fears or problems. In this regard, participants to the round table believe it reasonable to maintain the status quo in the given area.
24.04.05		Centr	expand participation	CENTR believes that transparency and democracy should be the milestones of any coordination process at the Internet Governance level. We would like to see an increased dialogue amongst all Internet stakeholders and organisations such as ICANN.
24.04.05		Centr	support of the status quo	The continued growth of the Internet can only be supported by emphasising knowledge and innovation, by improving synergies between the relevant economic, political and social dimensions, and by remaining true to the "free spirit" of the Internet which nurtured its growth to today.
28.04.05	Divina Frau-Weigs	CS Education TF	Internet users are stakeholders	Every citizen is a potential netizen and he/she should rightly understand how the Internet works since it is generating our knowledge environment.
28.04.05	Mary Rundle	NetDialogue	narrow definition of IG	A decision for a consultative process should encourage a narrow definition of the Internet, if the process is to treat other topics as well (e.g., intellectual property rights), its mandate should set this scope out clearly (e.g., indicating that the scope includes uses of the Internet, etc.). In other words, the mandate should be clear in its terminology, distinguishing between uses of the Internet and "the Internet" per se.
13.05.05		Australia	improve GAC	That does not mean governments may not want a mechanism by which ICANN was further required to take account of countries' views (eg. the GAC or something else).
13.05.05	Emily Taylor	Nominet UK	MISm excludes intergovernmentalism	Whilst we welcome this assurance, we recall Mr Allen Miller's analysis that on a strict interpretation "multilateral" and "multistakeholder" are mutually exclusive. We understand that in the context of an intergovernmental organization a "multilateral agreement" means an agreement by governments. However, in the WSIS declaration, we take "multilateral[ic] management" of the Internet10 to mean "participated in by three or more parties". We understand the WSIS wording to be wide enough to encompass models such as ICANN or the IETF.
13.05.05	Emily Taylor	Nominet UK	Private sector leadership	We welcome the comment that "the overwhelming majority of the private sector actors have demonstrated their capability to fulfill their tasks and to make their contribution to the functioning of the Internet. With regard to the practical management there is no specific weakness in the system"
13.05.05		Australia	support of the status quo	In our view, ICANN, following reform, should play an important role in this regard. 1. This distinction is noted to accommodate entities which may be fully or partially government-owned but nevertheless operate on a commercial basis at arms length from Government.
13.05.05	Emily Taylor	Nominet UK	support of the status quo	In our view, one of the key strengths of the Internet to date is its distributed, decentralized nature. In this context, we believe that a "hierarchical top-down governance model" <sup>2</sup> would be inappropriate, and in all probability, ineffective.
15.05.05	Francis Muguet	WGICT	consider UNMSP	We would like to bring to the attention of the WGIG, the UNMSP proposal ( see <a href="http://www.unmsp.org">http://www.unmsp.org</a> ) under the high patronage of H.E Adama Samassekou, that would allow the flexible creation of Multistakeholder partnerships that would be equitable, transparent, inclusive and accountable before the United Nations. In particular, considering the governance of the DOI, and its relevance to Scientific information, the funding institutions, the learned societies and the Open Access advocacy Groups should be included as stakeholders.
15.05.05	Francis Muguet	WGSI	consider UNMSP	the exceptionally successful development of the Internet and particularly the Domain Name System (DNS) to date has been made possible not by top down (intergovernmental) regulation but by bottom up coordination and private initiative. 1
15.05.05		DENIC	Private sector leadership	



15.05.05		DENIC	support of the status quo	It is of paramount importance to stay aware of this elementary insight as the considerations on Internet governance continue and focus shifts to details. In light of this, DENIC is pleased with and wholeheartedly agrees to the WGIG's statements that internet "governance" does not only and not necessarily at all means "government activities" but implies a new kind of steering by multiple stakeholders, encompassing both, the private and the public sector.
16.05.05	Daniel Dardaller	W3C	separation technical/political	National governments and the United Nations should do whatever they can to help narrow the gap between the haves and the have-nots for information access. Just as for clean water and health care, governments should play an important role as sponsors and users of the Internet technologies, but not as network architects. On the other hand, policy makers worldwide should be aware of the ongoing evolution of open decentralized information networks.
16.05.05	Daniel Dardaller	W3C	support of the status quo	National and international regulatory structures supporting the use of Internet and Web technologies must be sensitive to the potential impact of changes on the ongoing evolution of open decentralized information networks. If poorly implemented, such regulatory changes could stop or significantly slow these unusually productive worldwide technical innovations. Proposed Layer model
26.05.05		Israel	IPR critique	Another issue mentioned in the paper, is that intellectual property rights can affect not only content, but the internet's infrastructure, both through the proliferation of proprietary software, and through private party's rights in various relevant standards.
26.05.05		Israel	Private sector leadership	In fact, the internet owes its robustness not to institutional governance, but the wisdom of those with the power to "govern" to allow the internet to develop with a minimum of outside intervention.
26.05.05		Israel	support of the status quo	For example, "The Paper comments on ICANN that "the very nature of this legal set up is the reason why some hold the view that ICANN is in contradiction with the WSIS criterion that recognizes policy authority for internet-related public policy issues as the sovereign right of States." Such a statement can only be made in disregard of an assessment of ICANN in accordance with the terms of reference of the last sentence of Article 48 as well as in disregard of the conclusion of the relevant Assessment Report on ICANN.
31.05.05	Axel Isal	Sociedad Informatica del N	enhance role of the ITU in IG	el GOBIERNO DE INTERNET deberia sistematizar el intercambio en un trabajo conjunto de la UIT, que basa su trabajo en el principio de la cooperacion entre gobiernos y sector privado.
01.06.05		WGIG	creation of an intergovernmental forum	This forum is envisaged as operating broadly according to the WSIS criteria of transparency, democracy and with the full participation of all stakeholders. The nature of this forum, as envisaged by different WGIG members, does not emerge fully in answers to this question alone so that this brief summary also draws on the overall questionnaire responses, in particular those in response to the questions relating to 1 of 10 the oversight function and the need to coordinate activities between existing institutions. There is no common view of what the nature of the proposed forum should be and there is a wide spectrum of opinions, ranging from a very loosely structured discussion forum to a formally appointed 'council' with a very wide range of functions and oversight responsibilities, with some preferring to see a "two tier" combination of both. There is a range of views concerning the possible functions of the forum as follows.
01.06.05		WGIG	creation of an IGF	a two level structure with an intergovernmental Council having executive authority and including representation from other stakeholders and key organizations to provide policy direction and oversight, and a multi-stakeholder committee to undertake coordination and make recommendations to the Council
01.06.05		WGIG	improve GAC	A number of responses envisage oversight functions being carried out by a reformed or 'evolved' Government Advisory Committee of ICANN (GAC),
01.06.05		WGIG	non-binding institutions only	one see a possible role as being to provide non-directive advice on best practice, similar to that played by the OECD for its members.
01.06.05		WGIG	UN oversight of the ICANN	Some responses envisage a multilateral group which would take over the role of the US Department of Commerce (DOC) in relation to ICANN.
07.06.05	Ronda Hauben		ICANN critique	the private organization that the U.S. Government is asking to be formed is the opposite of protecting the internet. It is encouraging the take over by a private, non accountable corporate entity of the key internet functions and of this international public resource.
08.06.05		African Group	creation of a policy-making institution	There was unanimity on the need for an additional body which would not only serve as a multi-stakeholder discussion forum, but would also proffer policy advice albeit in a participatory manner. Indeed, according to the participants the world needed a more democratic representativeness at the level of the Internet Governance.
08.06.05	Emily Taylor	Nominet UK	creation of an IGF	If an additional body or arrangement were created, it should be a very loosely structured discussion forum, with an open and inclusive membership, in which multi-stakeholders can participate on an equal footing.
08.06.05	Emily Taylor	Nominet UK	improve GAC	No. However, like the IC, we would encourage participation in the GAC by more governments, and with higher-level participation.
08.06.05	Harris Miller	ITAA	non-binding institutions only	At the same time, the GAC today is in an evolutionary process. Given its relatively short period of existence, it may not yet be operating at its full potential. Participation by governments must continue to develop. It is not always the same individuals participating from meeting to meeting, yet it must be recognized that the GAC continues to grow. It appears that the GAC will further strengthen its role and involvement in ICANN through continued outreach and encouragement for participation from more countries coupled with increasing attendance by more senior government officials. ITAA supports these trends.
08.06.05	Emily Taylor	Nominet UK	question the US oversight of ICANN	If an additional body or arrangement were created, it should give non-directive advice on best practice.
08.06.05	Emily Taylor	Nominet UK	support of the status quo	The general consensus was that the proposed new body should not only take over the Governmental oversight functions of the DNS and root server system administration, but all other areas of activity under the oversight of the USG. This oversight function through this new body should not only be applicable to ICANN, after the termination of the MoU in 2006, but also post 2006.
08.06.05	Harris Miller	ITAA	support of the status quo	No. We do not believe that such a body is necessary. The internet is distributed and decentralized in nature, and is not amenable to centralized control. Moreover, we believe that the existing institutions which variously carry out internet governance functions are sufficient, albeit that no institution is perfect, and all could benefit from improvement.
09.06.05	Izumi Arzu	IGTF	question the US oversight of ICANN	n summary, ITAA opposes the creation of a new body. There has been no fact-based case made for its need, and considering the conclusion of the CTO report, it would likely fail to achieve its objective. Instead, efforts should be made to improve existing organizations. The resources that would have been spent in participating in yet another organization should be put to more meaningful use implementing the recommendations of the numerous organizations already involved with the internet.
09.06.05	Izumi Arzu	IGTF	support of the status quo	ICANN's daily operation.
14.06.05	Anthony Hill	South Centre	broad definition of IG	No, in principle there isn't need for an additional arrangement nor body. As recognised, governance of the DNS (The Domain Name System) is but one part of internet Governance. It is not all-encompassing of internet Governance. The question arises whether ICANN's role should then be more narrowly defined to deal with the Names and Naming System and the navigation over the internet through The DNS Technical System?

14.06.05		Brazil	broad definition of IG	THE GOVERNANCE ISSUE INVOLVES CHALLENGES THAT GO BEYOND ICANN'S MANDATE. SEVERAL TOPICS ARE NOT TREATED BY IT, NOT CONTEMPLATED IN ANY OTHER EXISTING FORUM.
14.06.05		Brazil	creation of a policy-making institution	This structure should include an exclusively governmental decision-making instance.
14.06.05		Brazil	creation of a policy-making institution	THIS STRUCTURE SHOULD INCLUDE AN EXCLUSIVELY GOVERNMENTAL DECISION-MAKING INSTANCE TO DEAL WITH ISSUES PERTAINING TO THE NATIONS' SOVEREIGNTY. HOWEVER, IN DECISION-MAKING, EACH STATE SHOULD HAVE ONE VOTE. PRIVATE SECTOR AND THE CIVIL SOCIETY AND OTHER
14.06.05		China	creation of a policy-making institution	UT NUMBER ONE, REGARDING FORUM FUNCTION, THERE WAS UNANIMITY FOR THE NEED FOR AN ADDITIONAL BODY WHICH WOULD NOT ONLY SERVE AS A MULTISTAKEHOLDER DISCUSSION FORUM BUT ALSO PROFFER POLICY ADVICE IN A PARTICIPATORY MANNER. ACCORDING TO THE PARTICIPANTS, THE WORLD NEEDED A MORE DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATIVENESS AT THE LEVEL OF THE INTERNET GOVERNANCE.
14.06.05		Ghana	creation of a policy-making institution	THIS NEW BODY CAN BE CHARGED WITH THE MANAGEMENT OF PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES RELATED TO INTERNET GOVERNANCE. MANAGEMENT OF INTERNET ADDRESS SPACE IS ONLY ONE SUCH ISSUE. WHAT NEEDS TO BE EMPHASIZED IS THAT THE DELIBERATIONS OF SUCH A BODY ARE NOT ONLY TRANSPARENT, INCLUSIVE, AND DEMOCRATIC, BUT ARE ALSO SEEN AND PERCEIVED AS SUCH, AND THEY ARE BASED ON FULL INVOLVEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT, PRIVATE SECTOR, CIVIL SOCIETY, AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS.
14.06.05		India	creation of a policy-making institution	FOUR, HAVE A DECISION-MAKING MECHANISM THAT COULD BE ACTIVATED WHEN NECESSARY. BASED ON THE MATERIAL POSTED ON THE WIGW WEB SITE, WE RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF A WIDE RANGE OF VIEWS ON WHETHER AND HOW THE NEW BODY FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE SHOULD BE SET UP.
14.06.05		Pakistan	creation of a policy-making institution	SO MY DELEGATION BELIEVES THAT WE SHOULD WORK TOWARDS AGREEMENTS WHICH WOULD ENABLE EQUITABLE GEOGRAPHICAL PARTICIPATION, BOTH IN THE GOVERNING BODY AND IN A COMMITTEE WHICH WOULD UNDERTAKE MONITORING FUNCTIONS FOR ICANN.
14.06.05	El Salvador		creation of a policy-making institution	onetheless, there may, in some cases, be benefits from a "forum function" that could be offered by a discussion forum where public policy issues and concerns of any stakeholder could be heard and discussed openly.
14.06.05	Mt Reilly	ICC	creation of an IGF	A Global Internet Governance Coordination Forum ought to be created. This Forum should be autonomous independent and based on an international treaty that guarantees the required legitimacy, and established in conformity with the principles of multilateralism, democracy, transparency, and multistakeholder.
14.06.05		Brazil	creation of an IGF	Views are different within and between the various stakeholder groups. It seems therefore reasonable to us that a continued discussion platform directed to the full range of issues is useful.
14.06.05	Paul Twomey	ICANN	creation of an IGF	In short, the Working Group could propel transparency and multi-stakeholder input by creating a forum through which intergovernmental organizations would consolidate information and harness public input.
14.06.05	Mary Rundle	NetDialogue	creation of an IGF	A GLOBAL INTERNET GOVERNANCE COORDINATION FORUM OUGHT TO BE CREATED. THIS FORUM SHOULD BE AUTONOMOUS, INDEPENDENT, AND BASED ON AN INTERNATIONAL TREATY THAT GUARANTEES THE REQUIRED LEGITIMACY AND ESTABLISHED IN CONFORMANCE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF MULTILATERALISM, DEMOCRACY, TRANSPARENCY, AND MULTISTAKEHOLDER. BASIC ASSUMPTIONS FOR THE CREATION OF THE FORUM.
14.06.05		Brazil	creation of an IGF	THERE MAY BE, IN SOME CASES, BENEFITS FROM A FORUM FUNCTION THAT COULD BE OFFERED BY A DISCUSSION FORUM WHERE PUBLIC-POLICY ISSUES AND CONCERNS OF ANY STAKEHOLDER COULD BE HEARD AND DISCUSSED OPENLY. THUS, THE ICC MEMBERS HAVE RESPONDED WITH A CONDITIONAL YES TO THE NEED FOR A DISCUSSION FORUM FUNCTION.
14.06.05	Mt Reilly	ICC	creation of an IGF	IN SHORT, THE WORKING GROUP COULD PROPEL TRANSPARENCY AND MULTISTAKEHOLDER INPUT BY CREATING A FORUM THROUGH WHICH INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS WOULD CONSOLIDATE INFORMATION AND HARNESS PUBLIC INPUT.
14.06.05	Marilyn Cade	NetDialogue	creation of an IGF	ONE IS THAT IN SUCH PUBLIC POLICY AREAS WHERE THERE IS NO INTERGOVERNMENTAL MANAGEMENT -- INTERGOVERNMENTAL AGENCY MANDATE -- FOR INSTANCE, SPAM, NETWORK SECURITY, AND CYBERSPACE -- WE SHOULD LOOK FOR AN APPROPRIATE SPECIALIZED AGENCY OF THE UNITED NATIONS AS A COMPETENT BODY.
14.06.05		China	creation of an intergovernmental forum	IT BECAME QUITE CLEAR IN THE FIRST PHASE THAT THERE IS AN ABSOLUTE NEED TO SOLVE SOME PROBLEMS AND DEAL WITH THEM AT THE LEVEL OF GOVERNMENTS, WITHOUT HAMPERING FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT OF INFORMATION AND WITHOUT PREJUDICE TO THE RIGHT OF EVERY INDIVIDUAL TO HAVE ACCESS TO INFORMATION AT THE LEAST COST.
14.06.05		Syria	creation of an intergovernmental forum	THIS AGENCY COULD BE PROVIDED BY THE EXISTING SUBSIDIARY BODIES OF THE UNITED NATIONS. FOR INSTANCE, ITU
14.06.05		China	enhance role of the ITU in IG	THE CONFERENCE FELT THE ITU SHOULD PLAY A GLOBAL COORDINATING ROLE IN INTERNET GOVERNANCE ISSUES.
14.06.05		UNESCAP	enhance role of the ITU in IG	THAT IS 130 YEARS AGO. WE CAN SEE THAT THE PRIVATE SECTOR, WITH ALL ITS COMPONENTS, WORKS AT THE ITU PARTICIPATES AT THE ITU, AND HAS CLEAR RIGHTS. AND THESE RIGHTS ARE CONTAINED IN THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ITU.
14.06.05		Syria	enhance role of the ITU in IG	WE ALSO APPRECIATE WHAT WAS SAID BY THE REPRESENTATIVE OF GHANA ON BEHALF OF THE AFRICAN GROUP WHO SAID THAT THE ITU HAS A ROLE TO PLAY. WE CONSIDER THAT THE CONSTITUTION OF THE ITU, THE CONVENTION ALSO OF THE ITU, INCLUDE THE NECESSARY TEXT AND PROVISIONS TO ALLOW FOR THE ITU -- TO ALLOW THE ITU TO PLAY A MAJOR ROLE THAT WOULD BE COMPLEMENTED BY THE UNESCO AS CONCERNS THE CONTENT AND THE DEFENSE OF CULTURAL RIGHTS AND LANGUAGE RIGHTS AND THE RIGHTS OF ALL TO ACCESS INFORMATION, AS WELL AS THE THIRD ORGANIZATION, WHICH IS WIPO, WHICH WOULD RESOLVE ALL PROBLEMS RESULTING FROM THE USE OF THE INTERNET.
14.06.05		Syria	enhance role of the ITU in IG	THAT IS THE CLARIFICATION OF THE ROLE OF NATIONAL GOVERNANCE IN THE POLICIES FOR THE ALLOCATION OF IP ADDRESSES. IT IS FAIR TO SAY THAT SOME GOVERNMENTS AND CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS FEEL INSUFFICIENTLY INVOLVED IN THE PROCESS OF DEVELOPING POLICIES FOR INTERNET ADDRESSING, AND FOR WHATEVER REASON, GENERALLY DON'T PARTICIPATE IN THE EXISTING PROCESSES.
14.06.05	Lee Howard	ICANN-ASO	expand participation	EACH OF THE INDIVIDUAL FIRMS DO ACCORDING TO THE PUBLIC POLICIES. PERHAPS MORE THAN ANY OTHER STRUCTURE THE FIRMS EMBODY DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES, ALLOWING PARTICIPATION BY ANVONE.
14.06.05	Lee Howard	ICANN-ASO	expand participation	ADDITIONALLY, DEVELOPING COUNTRY PARTICIPATION FROM GOVERNMENTS TO PRIVATE SECTOR AND CIVIL SOCIETY IS OF GREAT IMPORTANCE. THE IMPORTANCE OF PARTICIPATION BY ALL REGIONS OF THE WORLD IS NOT ONLY AN ISSUE FOR ICANN BUT FOR ANY ISSUE OF INTERNATIONAL IMPORTANCE.
14.06.05	Paul Twomey	ICANN	expand participation	Finally, meaningful participation from developing countries in Internet Governance must be developed. This is a complex challenge requiring both development of capacity to participate in these countries, and a reform of
14.06.05		UNDP-ADPIP	expand participation	

14.06.05	Alejandro Peñarty	WGIG	Fragmentation of governance	IS THAT MORE THAN A PROVEN NEED FOR A SINGLE ALL-ENCOMPASSING FORUM, WHAT APPEARS IN THE LANDSCAPE IN THE FUTURE IS THE NEED FOR SPECIFIC FORUMS FOR ISSUE-SPECIFIC DEVELOPMENT. I WON'T SAY EVEN MECHANISMS OR ORGANIZATIONS BUT WAYS OF DEALING WITH SPAM, WAYS OF DEALING WITH CYBERCRIME, WAYS OF DEALING WITH THE MANY OTHER PUBLIC POLICY RELATED ISSUES THAT WE HAVE ALREADY LOOKED AT IN THE GROUP.
14.06.05		WIS Gender Caucus	gender issues must be addressed	We further request that the WGIG consider gender balance as a fundamental issue in its ongoing assessment of Internet Governance mechanisms (current and future), with the aim of equal representation of women and men at all levels in any and all governance mechanisms proposed by the WGIG.
14.06.05		Brazil	ICANN critique	WHAT I'M TRYING TO SAY, MR. CHAIRMAN, IS THAT THERE IS A LACK OF LEGITIMACY IN THE SYSTEM.
14.06.05		India	ICANN critique	THE SECOND ISSUE, SIR, WAS THE ISSUE OF LEGITIMACY, AS I MENTIONED IN THE MORNING AND OUR COLLEAGUE FROM BRAZIL EXPLICITLY INDICATED ANY MECHANISM, HOWEVER GOOD, IF LACKING LEGITIMACY, OR I WILL SAY POSSIBLE LEGITIMACY, I WILL NOT EVEN SAY LEGITIMACY PER SE, BECAUSE THAT ALSO IS A CONCEPT DIFFERENT TO DIFFERENT PEOPLE. PROBABLY IS -- COULD BE CONSIDERED TO BE SUPPLANTED WITH THE CONCEPT OF A FORUM OR A BODY OR A MECHANISM WHICH IS PRESUMED TO BE LEGITIMATE.
14.06.05		Brazil	ICANN critique	AND QUOTING, ON JUNE THE 1ST, THE INTERNET CORPORATION FOR ASSIGNED NAMES AND NUMBERS, ICANN, THE PRIVATE SECTOR GROUP THAT MANAGES THE DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM APPROVED A TRIPLE X AS A WEB SERVICE. AFTER ICANN AGREES ON CONTRACT TERMS WITH ICM REGISTRY, AN AMERICAN COMPANY, THAT WE RENDER THE BACK-END REGISTRATION, TRIPLE X SITE WILL SPROUT ON THE GLOBAL INTERNET. THE IDEA IS CONTROVERSIAL, IT WAS MADE WITH LITTLE PUBLIC DISCUSSION, LEAVING SOME TO WONDER ABOUT THE WAY ICANN DOES OUT NAMES. END OF QUOTE.
14.06.05	Carlos Alonso	WGIG	ICANN critique	THIS IS A POINT I MUST KINDLY ASK THE ICANN-RELATED PEOPLE TO KEEP THIS IN MIND WHEN CONFRONTING THEIR WORKING WELL, DON'T FIX IT ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE OVERWHELMING, FAR BROADER AND COMPLEX REALITY OF THE INTERNET IN THE CONTEXT OF REAL LIFE. THANK YOU, MR. CHAIRMAN.
14.06.05		China	IGF not sufficient	AT PRESENT, WGIG ASSUMES SUCH A ROLE TO A CERTAIN EXTENT. HOWEVER, WE VIEW THAT MERELY A FORUM IS NOT SUFFICIENT.
14.06.05	Paul Twomey	ICANN	Improve GAC	IT IS IMPORTANT TO NOTE THAT ICANN BOARD DECISIONS ARE MADE AFTER FULL CONSULTATION PROCESSES WITH ALL ITS STAKEHOLDERS, INCLUDING THE -- ESPECIALLY THE GAC. SIGNIFICANT PROCESSES OFTEN TAKE OVER 18 MONTHS FOR FULLY TRANSPARENT CONSULTATIONS IN WHICH ALL PARTIES HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO PARTICIPATE, INCLUDING GOVERNMENTS.
14.06.05	Aviel Pawlik	NNO	Improve GAC	TWO, PUBLIC-SECTOR PARTICIPATION, ICANN, PARTICULARLY, HAS EXPRESSED FOR THE GOVERNMENTAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE HAS CLEARLY NOT OPERATED TO THE SATISFACTION OF ALL PARTIES.
14.06.05		UNESCO	Internet as a global public resource	THE INTERNET HAS BECOME A PUBLIC GOOD
14.06.05		Oxford Internet Institute	Internet exceptionalism	AT THE SAME TIME, ANY NEW GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK HAS TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THAT THE INTERNET ITSELF IS CONSTANTLY CHANGING. FLEXIBILITY IS THUS IMPERATIVE IN BOTH DIMENSIONS. IT WOULD BE 'UN-INTERNET- LIKE' IF ONE WERE TO PRESUME THAT THE GOVERNANCE SYSTEM THAT WORKED WELL FOR THE NETWORK AT ONE STAGE SHOULD REMAIN CONSTANT DESPITE DIFFERENCES IN USES, NUMBER OF USERS AND IMPORTANCE OF THE NETWORK. LIKEWISE, ANY FRAMEWORK FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE MUST NOT HINDER EXPERIMENTATION AND INNOVATION, SO THAT THE NETWORK CAN EVOLVE IN THE UNPREDICTABLE WAYS THAT USERS WILL ULTIMATELY TAKE IT.
14.06.05	Viktorio Bertola	WGIG	Internet exceptionalism	AND SO WE BELIEVE THAT TO TRY TO DISTINGUISH TOO SHARPLY TECHNICAL FROM POLICY WOULD DENUDE THE DIRECTION OF THE INTERNET AND THE IMPORTANCE THAT IT HAS FOR PUBLICS ACROSS THE WORLD
14.06.05	Raul Echebarria	WGIG	Internet exceptionalism	BUT UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK AND I THINK IT'S QUITE EXTRAORDINARY THAT WE'RE TOGETHER WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF ALL COUNTRIES TAKING THE FLOOR, REPLYING, LISTENING, SPEAKING, WE'RE HEARING EACH OTHER'S OPINIONS, WE HAVE SIMULTANEOUS INTERPRETATION WITH THE SCRIPT ON THE SCREEN AS WELL, AND FOR MANY OF US WORKING ON THE INTERNET, THESE ARE NORMAL THINGS, QUITE CUSTOMARY. THIS PUBLIC COMMENTARY ON INTERNET IS -- THIS IS A FINAL REFLECTION I'M MAKING NOW. THIS PROCESS IS TEACHING US A LOT, ALL OF US, AND GOVERNMENTS SHOULD ALSO LEARN THROUGH THIS TO MOVE FORWARD WHILE DEEPENING THE MULTI-ACTOR WORK THAT THEY'RE CARRYING OUT.
14.06.05	Wolfgang Kleinwaechter	WGIG	Internet exceptionalism	THE RESOURCE FOR THE INFORMATION AGE IS DIFFERENT. IF IT WORKS FOR YOU, IT WORKS FOR ME. IF IT DOESN'T WORK FOR YOU, IT DOESN'T WORK FOR ME. THAT MEANS IF I USE AN I.P. ADDRESS, YOU CAN USE AN I.P. ADDRESS. IF I USE A DOMAIN NAME, YOU CAN USE A DOMAIN NAME. THAT IT MEANS THIS IS NOT A ZERO-SUM GAME. IT IS A WIN-WIN SITUATION.
14.06.05	Wolfgang Kleinwaechter	WGIG	Internet exceptionalism	AND IF IT COMES DOWN TO A VERY CONCRETE QUESTION, FOR INSTANCE, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF A NATION STATE, I THINK GOVERNMENTS HAVE TO UNDERSTAND ALTHOUGH THAT IN THE CYBERSPACE, THEY HAVE TO SHARE THE SOVEREIGNTY WITH OTHERS, WHILE NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY WILL REMAIN A BASIC PRINCIPLE FOR THE NEXT 100 YEARS IN THE MAJORITY OF THE ISSUES OF THE DAY-TO-DAY POLICY, I THINK IN CYBERSPACE, WE HAVE TO GO BEYOND THE TRADITIONAL UNDERSTANDING OF NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY, BECAUSE THIS IS NOT A ZERO-SUM GAME.
14.06.05		Brazil	MSISm	These points to the need to create an international structure for internet's global governance that involves adequate representation from governments and other segments of civil society, such as the third sector [1], the private sector, and the academic community.
14.06.05	Isabelle Falque-Pierrotin	Forum des Droits sur Internet	MSISm	In conclusion, a subject not yet tackled should be studied. We think that collaboration between public and private international organizations working on internet issues should be encouraged. For this reason, we make the following proposal. An office (a "liaison secretary") should be created at the international level that would be a link between all these organizations (WIPO, ITU, WTO, etc.) on the internet related issues. This A-go-between A> would favour two main principles: coordination between the numerous institutions and genuinely plural participation.
14.06.05	Raul Echebarria	WGIG	MSISm	THIS POINTS TO THE NEED TO CREATE AN INTERNATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR INTERNET GLOBAL GOVERNANCE THAT INVOLVES ADEQUATE REPRESENTATION FROM GOVERNMENTS AND OTHER SEGMENTS OF THE CIVIL SOCIETY, SUCH AS THE THIRD SECTOR, THE PRIVATE SECTOR, THE ACADEMIC COMMUNITY.
14.06.05		WGIG	MSISm	WHAT I WOULD LIKE TO HIGHLIGHT IS WHAT I SEE IS VERY STRONG SUPPORT BY THE LATIN AMERICAN AND CARIBBEAN REGION TO A SUPPORT FOR A MULTISTAKEHOLDER SYSTEM.
14.06.05		UNDP-ADPIP	MSISm	Third, Internet Governance mechanisms should include all affected stakeholders in the processes of decision-making as well as implementation. While the definition of who is a "stakeholder" varies, from our report it must at least include actors from the private sector, government and civil society.
14.06.05	Alejandro Peñarty	WGIG	no IGF	SO THIS IS TO EXPLAIN THAT THERE IS NOT ONLY A VERY WELL-EXPRESSED RESISTANCE TO AN ALL-ENCOMPASSING NEW FORUM COMING FROM ORGANIZATIONS THAT WANT TO CONSERVE THEIR SPACE OR COMING FROM ORGANIZATIONS THAT DON'T WANT TO SEE MORE CHANGE BECAUSE THEY ARE AT THE FOREFRONT OF CHANGE, BUT OF THINKING CLEARLY THAT THE ALL-ENCOMPASSING FORUM IS NOT BOUND TO BE AS USEFUL AS MORE FOCUSED SPECIFIC MECHANISMS.
14.06.05	Brian Carpenter	IGF	no IGF	I FEEL STRONGLY THAT WGIG SHOULD AVOID RECOMMENDING CREATION OF NEW, INDEPENDENT GROUPS WHO WILL JUST DISCUSS THE INTERNET.

14.06.05	Anthony Hill	South Centre	no separation technical/political	the sharp distinction between technical and policy issues does not reflect what the Questionnaire considers to be - Politically and financially realistic proposals. The technical systems, of which the DNS is one, and the Institutional Framework of Organizations, of which ICANN is one, works together in complementary ways. The Institutional Framework and policies are engaged continuously to enable the technical systems to be constructed, operated, controlled, regulated, and improved and this is true for both the private and public sectors. Thus we believe that to try to distinguish too sharply technical from policy matters denudes the direction of the Internet and the importance that is has for Public across the world.
14.06.05	Anthony Hill	South Centre	no separation technical/political	THE SHARP DISTINCTION BETWEEN TECHNICAL AND POLICY ISSUES DOES NOT REFLECT WHAT THE QUESTIONNAIRE CONSIDERS TO BE -- AND I QUOTE -- POLITICALLY AND FINANCIALLY REALISTIC PROPOSALS. UNQUOTE
14.06.05	Izumi Azu	IGTF	no special role for the state	I DO REALLY RECOGNIZE THE IMPORTANT ROLE OF THE GOVERNMENTS. BUT WHEN IT COMES TO THE INTERNET GOVERNANCE, WE UNDERSTOOD IN TEHRAN THAT OTHER STAKEHOLDERS SHOULD HAVE THEIR ROLES. JE NOT, SAY, STRICTLY EQUAL, BUT ACCORDING TO THEIR ROLES THAT WE SHOULD PLAY.
14.06.05	Heather Shaw	ICC	non-binding institutions only	SUCH DISCUSSION WILL NATURALLY AID IN THE COORDINATION OF EXISTING INSTITUTIONS AND HELP TO AVOID DUPLICATION OF EFFORTS. IN THIS REGARD, ICC RESPONDED WITH A CONDITIONAL YES TO THE NEED FOR DISCUSSION FORUM. WE BELIEVE THAT THIS NEED IS DISTING FROM THE NEED FOR OVERSIGHT AND SHOULD BE CONSIDERED SEPARATELY BY THE WORKING GROUP. AS SHOULD BE EACH OF THE OTHER QUESTIONS.
14.06.05	Lee Howard	ICANN-ASO	non-binding institutions only	WHERE THIS FORUM IS CONCERNED AS HAVING OVERSIGHT AUTHORITY IS TOO MUCH, HOWEVER.
14.06.05	Anthony Hill	South Centre	Optimize connectivity and access	FOR THESE REASONS, THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF WGIG SHOULD ADDRESS THESE KEY ISSUES. THE CONSULTATIONS TO DATE IN THE OPEN SESSION PERHAPS HAVE NOT GIVEN SUFFICIENT ATTENTION TO INTERCONNECTION CHARGES AND BROADBAND CONNECTIVITY AND THE KEY ROLES OF INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS.
14.06.05	Lynn St. Amour	ISOC	Participation form developing countries is sat	FINALLY, IT IS WORTH RESTATEING HERE THAT THE PROCESSES THAT SUPPORT THE DEVELOPMENT AND OPERATION OF THE INTERNET ARE TRULY OPEN TO ALL AND ARE ALREADY MULTI-STAKEHOLDER.
14.06.05		Nominet UK	Participation form developing countries is sat	AND I THINK IT'S ALSO STRIKING THAT PARTICIPANTS FROM DEVELOPING NATIONS ARE ABLE TO SUCCESSFULLY ENGAGE IN THOSE PROCESSES AT PRESENT.
14.06.05		Japan	Private sector leadership	TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE MARKET COMPETITION-LED DEVELOPMENT WHICH HAS BROUGHT THE CURRENT SUCCESS.
14.06.05	Izumi Azu	IGTF	question the US oversight of ICANN	WE THINK IT IS VERY IMPORTANT TO REVIEW THE EXISTING OVERSIGHT ARRANGEMENTS WHEN WE EVALUATE THE NEED FOR NEW OVERSIGHT FUNCTION. AT PRESENT, THE OVERSIGHT IS DONE BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT ON THE ICANN MODELS. THE ARRANGEMENTS ARE ESSENTIALLY ONE, TO MANDATE ICANN TO SUBMIT ANNUAL REPORTS, AND TWO, TO EXAMINE AND APPROVE CHANGES TO THE IANA DATABASE REQUESTED BY ICANN.
14.06.05	Brian Carpenter	IEFTF	separation technical/political	BUT IT'S IMPORTANT THAT WGIG FOCUS ON RESULTS AND SOLVING REAL PROBLEMS, PERSONALLY. DURING THE DEBATE OVER INTERNET GOVERNANCE, I FEEL THERE'S BEEN TOO MUCH TIME SPENT ON DOMAIN NAMES, I.P. ADDRESSES, AND ROOT SERVERS. THESE ARE LARGELY TECHNICAL MATTERS FOR THE TECHNICAL COMMUNITY.
14.06.05		China	sovereignty	SECONDLY, AS THE INTERNET RESOURCE IS VERY SIGNIFICANT TO THE INTERNET DEVELOPMENT AND SECURITY, AND IT CONCERNS THE SOVEREIGNTY AND PUBLIC INTEREST OF ALL STATES, WHICH SOLVED THE PROBLEM OF DEFICIENCY OF A COMPETENT BODY OF INTERNET MANAGEMENT, WHICH IS AUTHORITY AND LEGITIMATE AND RECOGNIZED BY THE GOVERNMENTS.
14.06.05		China	sovereignty	SUCH STATE SOVEREIGNTY, INTERNET SECURITY, AND ISSUES THAT CONCERN PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE PUBLIC POLICES OF INTERNET SHOULD BE SOLVED BY INTERGOVERNMENTAL MECHANISM AND SHOULD BE MANDATORY.
14.06.05		Brazil	special role for the state in MSsm	o deal with issues pertaining to the nations' sovereignty.
14.06.05		Brazil	special role for the state in MSsm	IT SHOULD INCLUDE AN INTERGOVERNMENTAL MECHANISM IN WHICH GOVERNMENTS EXERT THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES THROUGH A SPECIFIC SET OF PUBLIC-POLICY ISSUES.
14.06.05		China	special role for the state in MSsm	AT DIFFERENT LEVELS AT GOVERNANCE, STAKEHOLDERS PLAY DIFFERENT ROLES. AT SOME DIMENSION, THE GOVERNMENT SHOULD PLAY A LEADING ROLE.
14.06.05		UNESCAP	special role for the state in MSsm	AND THE GOVERNMENTS HAVE THE RESPONSIBILITY TO MAKE INTERNET USEFUL TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATION.
14.06.05		UNDP-ADPIP	special role for the state in MSsm	Second, governments have a vital role in ensuring the sustainability of critical infrastructure in the region. Their capacity to enable the development of the Internet is probably under-utilised at present.
14.06.05	Art Reilly	ICC	support of the status quo	The ICC would concede that all institutions need to constantly seek to improve, and those associated with the Internet are no exception. However, each organization working to evolve the Internet has processes in place toward this objective. Brian Carpenter spoke earlier on some of the outreach and other efforts of the IEFTF. Furthermore, the Internet was designed to be managed/coordinated in a decentralized fashion without any need for "centralized" control.
14.06.05	Brian Carpenter	IEFTF	support of the status quo	I feel strongly that the WGIG should avoid recommending the creation of new independent groups that will merely discuss Internet. We already have enough of those. Nor should WGIG recommend a new group to duplicate the work already being done elsewhere, or to look into technical matters such as the infeasibility of geographic addressing without deep expertise on the technical issues involved. Your working group will not be a success if its main recommendation is the creation of another working group. I hope we can reduce the number of meetings that we all have to attend. Let's instead find ways to build on the institutions that have served the Internet and the Internet community so well.
14.06.05	Axel Pawlik	NRO	support of the status quo	The NRO has also supported ICANN in its efforts to embrace these principles and characteristics, and has supported the continuing evolution of ICANN's structure in order to better fulfil its role. Further change is required for ICANN to meet the evolving global agenda of the Internet, particularly as it relates to the various aspects of the information society. The NRO believes that the continuing evolution of the Internet coordination function should include consideration of the following topics.
14.06.05		Nominet UK	support of the status quo	LIKE OTHERS WHO HAVE SPOKEN THIS MORNING, WE DO NOT FEEL CONVINCED OF THE NEED FOR A NEW INSTITUTION.
14.06.05		Nominet UK	support of the status quo	EXISTING INSTITUTIONS SUCH AS ICANN OR THE IEFTF ALLOW FOR A MULTISTAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION ON AN EQUAL FOOTING, AND I THINK WE ALL ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THAT IS VERY IMPORTANT.
14.06.05	Alejandro Pisanty	WGIG	support of the status quo	FOR EXAMPLE, AND IN THE PAPERS THAT ARE PUBLISHED AS AN ADVANCE OF THE REPORT, OF THE WGIG, HOW DEEP THE SCRUTINY CAN BE, FOR EXAMPLE, OF ICANN, WHICH COMES OUT IN OUR VIEW, IN LARGE SCALE, A FULFILLMENT OF THESE VALUES.
14.06.05	Alejandro Pisanty	WGIG	support of the status quo	WHAT IS CALLED IN THESE DISCUSSIONS THE PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS OR EVEN THE STATUS QUO IS ACTUALLY ONE STEP IN AN EVOLUTION PROCESS IN WHICH NEW GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS ARE BEING MADE, EXPLORED, EXPERIMENTED WITH, AND CONTINUOUSLY CORRECTED ACCORDING TO THE NEEDS AND PRINCIPLES OF THE PARTICIPANTS. AMONG OTHER MEMBERS OF THE WORKING GROUP, PROFESSOR KLEINWACHTER, HAS BEEN VERY INSISTENT IN AN EXCELLENT AND BRIEF ARTICLE IN GERMAN ON THE FACT THAT THE EVOLUTION OF GOVERNANCE IN THIS FORM WILL BE A MEASURE OF HOW MUCH PEOPLE AND ORGANIZATIONS ARE REALLY ADAPTING THEIR GOVERNANCE TO THE 21ST CENTURY.

14.06.05	Raul Echebarria	WGIG	support of the status quo	SIMPLY WE SHOULD BE COMMITTED TO TECHNOLOGY AND SCIENCE AND HAVE AN INNOVATORY PROFILE. WORKING WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF GOVERNANCE IN THAT SPIRIT. BUT CERTAINLY WE SHOULD NOT DESTROY WHAT EXISTS AND WHAT IS SHOWN AS BENEFITS ALREADY. SIMPLY, I REPEAT, WE SHOULD IMPROVE. WE SHOULD ADD ASPECTS THAT PROVIDE ADDED VALUE. BUT IDENTIFYING CLEARLY THE PROBLEMS THAT NEED TO BE SOLVED NOW.
14.06.05	Brian Carpenter	IEF	support of the status quo	LET'S INSTEAD FIND WAYS TO BUILD ON THE INSTITUTIONS THAT HAVE SERVED THE INTERNET COMMUNITY SO WELL.
14.06.05	Lee Howard	ICANN-ASO	support of the status quo	WE INVITE AND WELCOME PROPOSALS AND SUGGEST THAT UNLESS THE CURRENT PROCESS IS BROKEN, IT SHOULD NOT BE FIXED. THE ASAC DOES NOT OBJECT TO THE FORMATION OF A FORUM OF SOME KIND WITH THE PURPOSE OF DISCUSSING PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES AMONG GOVERNMENTS AND CIVIL SOCIETY.
14.06.05	Art Reilly	ICC	support of the status quo	BUT LET ME JUST MAKE A GENERAL STATEMENT WITH REGARD TO OUR PERSPECTIVES. THE ICE MEMBERS STRESS THE NEED FOR THE WORKING GROUP ON INTERNET GOVERNANCE IN FINALIZING ITS REPORT TO BE PRAGMATIC AND TO REFLECT THE FACT THAT THE INTERNET HAS BEEN FUNCTIONING WELL AND THIS SHOULD NOT BE IN ANY WAY INTERRUPTED.
14.06.05	Paul Twomey	ICANN	support of the status quo	ICANN IS A TRULY MULTISTAKEHOLDER MODEL WHICH CONTINUES TO EVOLVE. INDEED, A STRIKING ASPECT OF ITS BYLAWS IS THAT THEY REQUIRE VERY REGULAR REVIEW OF ITS INTERNAL STRUCTURES TO ENSURE THAT THEY CONTINUE TO BE RELEVANT TO THE NEEDS OF AN EVOLVING INTERNET COMMUNITY. THE WISS PROCESS AND THE WORK OF THE WORKING GROUP HAS PROVIDED US WITH AN OPPORTUNITY TO SHARE OUR EXPERIENCES AS WELL AS TO LISTEN TO WHERE ICANN, AS ONE OF THE ORGANIZATIONS ACTIVE IN THE INTERNET, COULD IMPROVE.
14.06.05	Paul Twomey	ISOC	support of the status quo	WE STRONGLY URGE THE WGIG TO BUILD UPON THESE MODELS AND WORK WITH THESE ORGANIZATIONS RATHER THAN CREATING A NEW BODY.
14.06.05	Paul Twomey	ISOC	support of the status quo	HOSE OF YOU THAT HAVE TAKEN THE TIME TO STUDY HOW THE INTERNET'S CURRENT PROCESSES AND GROUPS FUNCTION WILL HAVE FOUND AN EXCELLENT EXAMPLE OF SUCH COOPERATION IN THE WAY GROUPS SUCH AS THE IETF, THE REGIONAL INTERNET REGISTRIES, AND ICANN, ET CETERA, ALL WORK TOGETHER.
14.06.05	Aviel Pawlik	ISOC	support of the status quo	THE NRO HAS BEEN SUPPORTIVE OF THE ICANN MODEL AS THE MOST APPROPRIATE ONE TO SUPPORT THE FURTHER GROWTH AND EVOLUTION OF THE INTERNET.
14.06.05	Aviel Pawlik	NRO	support of the status quo	WE, HOWEVER, ARGUE WHETHER IT IS NECESSARY TO FORM A NEW AGENCY IN DEALING WITH INTERNET-RELATED POLICY ISSUES AND COORDINATION OF PUBLIC POLICIES. THERE ARE ALREADY A NUMBER OF RESPONSIBLE INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS FUNCTIONING WELL, AND THERE IS A RISK THAT THE ADDITIONAL ORGANIZATION COULD CONSTITUTE A GREATER COST THAN MAKING THE WHOLE PROCESS MORE EFFICIENT.
14.06.05	Aviel Pawlik	Japan	support of the status quo	WE BELIEVE THAT IN THE ORGANIZATION THAT IS NEW AND ADDITIVE, REGARDLESS OF HOW LEAN ITS SECRETARIAT OR ITS ACTIVITIES, WOULD ENTAIL EXPENSES AND COMMITMENTS OF TIME AND ENERGY THAT WE BELIEVE COULD BE PUT TO BETTER USE.
14.06.05	Aviel Pawlik	ITAA	support of the status quo	SO NEW ORGANIZATIONS WILL DUPLICATE WORK OR PERHAPS COMPETE WITH WORK THAT MUST BE DONE. WE BELIEVE THERE IS A MORE RESPONSIBLE APPROACH, AND THAT IS TO STRENGTHEN THE EXISTING ORGANIZATIONS TO IMPROVE THEIR PERFORMANCE, PROVIDE FOR BETTER AND BROADER TRANSPARENCY, PROVIDE FOR GREATER AND MORE OPEN MULTISTAKEHOLDER PARTICIPATION IN CONSULTATION. STRIVE TO IMPROVE AND INCREASED PARTICIPATION AND IMPROVE THE OPPORTUNITY FOR PARTICIPATION BY DEVELOPING COMMUNITY REPRESENTATIVES IN THE EXISTING BODIES. SO IN SUMMARY WE OPPOSE THE CREATION OF A NEW BODY.
14.06.05	Aviel Pawlik	ITAA	support of the status quo	FOR THE FIRST QUESTION, THE NEED FOR ADDITIONAL ARRANGEMENT OF BODY. WE DO NOT THINK THERE IS NEED FOR AN ADDITIONAL ARRANGEMENT OF BODY. WHENEVER WE HAD ISSUES REGARDING THE INTERNET, INDIVIDUALS OR ORGANIZATIONS THAT THINK IT NECESSARY TO ADDRESS THOSE ISSUES HAVE BEEN ABLE TO DO SO VOLUNTARILY AND COOPERATIVELY. TO DATE, COLLECTIVELY WE HAVE BEEN ABLE TO SOLVE THOSE ISSUES.
14.06.05	Izumi Aizu	IGTF	support of the status quo	FIRST, one cannot change history; the internet research started and was developed largely in the United States.
14.06.05	Paul Twomey	ICANN	support of the US oversight	AS TO WHAT WILL BE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE AND ICANN AFTER THE COMPLETION OF THE MOU, LET ME BE CLEAR THAT ICANN DOES NOT SPEAK ON BEHALF OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT. THAT SAID, THE ROLES OF ALL GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING THAT OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, ARE IMPORTANT AS THEY SHARE THE SAME INTEREST AS ALL ICANN STAKEHOLDERS, NAMELY, A STABLE AND SECURE INTERNET.
14.06.05	Paul Twomey	ICANN	support of the US oversight	I AM NOT AWARE OF ONE INSTANCE WHERE THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT CAN BE SEEN TO HAVE ABUSED ITS ROLE AND REJECTED A CHANGE TO THE ZONE FILE FOR POLITICAL REASONS.
14.06.05	Vittorio Bertola	WGIG	technological determinism	. I THINK THAT THIS IS REALLY AN HISTORICAL OPPORTUNITY OF BREAKING NEW GROUNDS IN TERMS OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE. THE INTERNET IS - WELL, IT IS AMAZING. I GUESS EVERYONE BY NOW HAS GOT TO KNOW ALL THE CHANGES THAT THE INTERNET HAS BROUGHT IN OUR LIVES. AND IT'S REALLY MAKING THE WORLD UNITED IN PEACE. I THINK THIS IS AN HISTORICAL ADVANCEMENT IN THE HISTORY OF MAKING, MAYBE.
14.06.05	Vittorio Bertola	Brazil	UN oversight of the ICANN	IT SHOULD COORDINATE THE DIVERSE EXISTING ORGANIZATIONS, INSTEAD OF REPLACING THEM.
14.06.05	Vittorio Bertola	China	UN oversight of the ICANN	SECONDLY, THE SUPERVISION AND AUTHORIZATION BY ICANN SHOULD BE TRANSFERRED TO THIS AGENCY. THE SPECIFIC OPERATION OF INTERNET RESOURCES, IN PRINCIPLE, COULD BE MANDATED TO ICANN. HOWEVER, ICANN SHOULD BE SUPERVISED AND MANAGED BY THE AGENCY UNDER THE UNITED NATIONS. THE RELEVANT PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THIS AGENCY.
14.06.05	Vittorio Bertola	Ghana	UN oversight of the ICANN	THE OVERSIGHT FUNCTION COULD INCLUDE ISSUES SUCH AS POLICY ADVICE, ARBITRATION, MONITORING, AUDIT AND COMMUNICATION. THE GENERAL CONSENSUS WAS THAT THE PROPOSED NEW BODY SHOULD NOT ONLY TAKE OVER THE GOVERNMENTAL OVERSIGHT FUNCTIONS OF THE DNS AND ROOT SERVER SYSTEM ADMINISTRATION BUT ALSO OTHER AREAS OF ACTIVITY UNDER THE OVERSIGHT OF THE USG. THIS OVERSIGHT FUNCTION THROUGH THIS NEW BODY SHOULD NOT ONLY BE APPLICABLE TO ICANN AFTER THE TERMINATION OF THE MOU IN 2006 BUT ALSO POST 2006.
14.06.05	Abdullah Al-Darrah	WGIG	WGIG critique	WHEN HE SPOKE, TRULY, SIR, I WAS NOT AWARE WHETHER HE WAS SPEAKING IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY AS A MEMBER OF THE GROUP OR WAS HE SPEAKING AS ONE OF THE MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF THE ICANN OR HIS VICE-CHAIRMAN OR ON BEHALF OF MEXICO. I WAS A LITTLE BIT CONFUSED IN THIS RESPECT. AND THEREFORE, SIR, I WOULD LIKE TO RETRIBUTE TO EVERYBODY ONCE AGAIN HERE THAT THE WORKING GROUP DOES NOT HAVE FOR A MISSION TO DEFEND ONE CIRCLE OR ONE ORGAN OR THE OTHER.
14.06.05	Abdullah Al-Darrah	Syria	WGIG critique	THANK YOU, CHAIRMAN, FOR GIVING ME THE FLOOR AGAIN. CHAIRMAN, I WAS ABOUT TO STATE SOMETHING IN GENERAL WHEN I HEARD THE LAST SPEAKER SPEAKING ABOUT WIN-WIN SITUATION.
14.06.05	Izumi Aizu	IGTF	WGIG critique	SIMILARLY, WE WERE DISCUSSING YESTERDAY AMONGST THE CIVIL SOCIETY CAUCUS MEMBERS AND OTHERS THAT IT MIGHT BE VERY HELPFUL IF THE WGIG BEING THE MEMBER AND THE SECRETARIAT COULD KINDLY MAKE SOME EXTRA EFFORTS TO INCLUDE CERTAIN, SAY, DESCRIPTION OR COMMENTARIES TO THE 8,000 E-MAILS OR 10,000 PAGE INPUTS HOW YOU RECEIVED THESE AND HOW YOU SORT OF INCORPORATED OR NOT INCLUDED WITH SOME, YOU KNOW, VERY CONCISE LANGUAGE THAT MIGHT BE VERY HELPFUL SO THAT WE CAN DIGEST THEM IN A BETTER SORT OF PRODUCTIVE, OPEN, TRANSPARENT MANNER.

14.06.05	WSIS Gender Caucus	WGIG critique	The silence of the WGIG on this most fundamental issue of gender rights is astounding, given that the WGIG has some very strong women in the group, some of whom are well-known in their dedication to the issue of gender balance and representation in the Information Society.
20.06.05	Francoise Massit-Follia Vox Internet	question the US oversight of ICANN	The management of technical resources cannot remain as it has been passed down through the history of the Internet: the end of the exclusive MoU between ICANN and the U.S. Government, planned for May 2006, is the real deadline.
20.06.05	Paschal Preston Dublin University	question the US oversight of ICANN	ICANN increasingly criticised and/or perceived as 'flawed entity' in terms of its processes, structures and international legitimacy ICANN has been much criticised for failing to deliver on its original promises and expectations. As the Internet has diffused internationally, ICANN's legitimacy, and its status as an organisation that is subject to oversight and control of a single government, has been increasingly called into question.