

The Bayesian-Laplacian brain

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Abstract

We outline what we believe could be an improvement in future discussions of the brain acting as a Bayesian-Laplacian system. We do so by distinguishing between two broad classes of priors on which the brain's inferential systems operate: in one category are biological priors (β priors) and in the other artefactual ones (α priors). We argue that β priors, of which colour categories and faces are good examples, are inherited or acquired very rapidly after birth, are highly or relatively resistant to change through experience, and are common to all humans. The consequence is that the probability of posteriors generated from β priors having universal assent and agreement is high. By contrast, α priors, of which man-made objects are examples, are acquired post-natally and modified at various stages throughout post-natal life; they are much more accommodating of, and hospitable to, new experiences. Consequently, posteriors generated from them are less likely to find universal assent. Taken together, in addition to the more limited capacity of experiment and experience to alter the β priors compared with α priors, another cardinal distinction between the two is that the probability of posteriors generated from β priors having universal agreement is greater than that for α priors. The two categories are distinct at the extremes; there is, however, a middle range where they merge into one another to varying extents, resulting in posteriors that draw upon both categories.

KEYWORDS

aesthetic experiences, artefactual priors, Bayesian brain operations, biological priors, colour vision

*When, during silent sessions devoted to brain thought,
We summon up formulations from endeavours past,
And sigh the lack of many a principle that we sought,
Because those principles were, in our mind, miscast,*

*Lo, for all priors should not be tied in a single Bayesian knot
For biological and artefactual priors each have separate slots*

A (posterior) Bayesian adaptation from Shakespeare's Sonnet 30

Abbreviations: B-L, stands for Bayesian-Laplacian; OS, cells stands for orientation selective cells.

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1 | INTRODUCTION

We outline below a general approach to the Bayesian-Laplacian (B-L) system, which distinguishes between two major types of prior information as applied to brain studies. Our hope is that it may constitute a useful contribution to efforts in neuroscience that address the extent to which the brain uses what may be called B-L inferential operations. While we refer to the more commonly used term “Bayesian” system in the rest of this article, our title acknowledges the largely un-acknowledged contribution that Pierre-Simon Laplace (1749-1827) made in his treatise entitled *Théorie analytique des probabilités* (Laplace, 1820) to the formulations in Bayes’ posthumously published paper entitled *An essay towards solving a Problem in the Doctrine of Chances* (Bayes,

1763). By speaking only of the Bayesian hypothesis, one, by implication, fails to credit Laplace with the very considerable contribution that he made in establishing the generality of the hypothesis originally formulated by Thomas Bayes.

The Bayesian approach summarizes a fundamental inferential principle, in which probabilities of occurrence of events are based on *priors* which have beliefs attached to them; through experience and experimentation, these priors lead to *posteriors*, which in turn modify inference and behaviour, thus leading to further priors with new beliefs attached to them and from which yet further posteriors may be generated (see Figures 1 and 2). The Bayesian approach is instrumental in neurobiological enquiries into how the brain's predictive system operates, by combining prior knowledge about a phenomenon and modifying it through experience. Although we locate our interest in Bayesian operations within a broad context, namely that of the brain as a knowledge-acquiring system, we restrict ourselves here largely to addressing two questions: the extent to which experiences, in both the sensory and cognitive worlds, can update previous beliefs and lead to new ones and the extent (in terms of probability) to which the experiencing individual can assume that others, having the same experience, will update their beliefs in the same direction. The central point we try to emphasize here is that the knowledge-acquiring system of the brain and the predictions that result from it differ according to the kind of knowledge being considered. We illustrate this by referring to experiences that are significantly different, from that of colour to that of beauty, our aim being to show that the distinction we make operates at both the sensory, perceptual, level as well as at highly cognitive and emotional levels.

Fundamental to Bayesian operations is *belief*, which is intimately linked to priors. The brain must continually update the hypotheses that it entertains about the world, in terms of future probabilities, in light of information reaching it and against its current beliefs. Our approach leads us to enquire into different categories of Bayesian priors, the beliefs that they are based on and that they give rise to, and the role that these priors and the beliefs attached to them play in shaping the brain's inferential systems. Our discussion is not exhaustive; rather, we hope that it lays down a basic framework for an alternative approach through which to consider the operations of the brain in a Bayesian context. The major departure in our approach is a distinction between two kinds of priors, Biological (β *priors*) and Artefactual (α *priors*). This distinction leads us to propose further that the beliefs and probabilities attached to the two categories of priors must also be distinguished according to category.

The two categories are:

1. Inherited (biological) or β *priors* are the result of (brain) concepts that we are born with; they are resistant to

change even with extensive experience; the probability that the posteriors which they lead have general agreement among all humans is high.

2. Acquired (artefactual) or α *priors* depend upon concepts which are formulated and acquired post-natally; they are modifiable, and are modified, by experience throughout life. They are less constrained than biological concepts and the probability that their posteriors have general agreement among all humans is low, compared with β *priors*.

Although the two priors are distinct at the extremes, there are conditions, which we discuss below, in which posteriors are derived from both kinds of priors.

1.1 | Definition of concepts

We will be using certain terms like “beliefs,” “concepts” and “mechanisms” in a particular way in this treatment. Concept refers to an abstract or generic idea which can be either inherited or acquired. In the case of colour vision, we write of an inherited concept, that of ratio-taking, which is applied to incoming chromatic visual signals and through which the brain obtains ratios for the wavelength-energy composition of light reflected from a viewed object or surface and from surrounding surfaces. These ratios never change, in spite of wide-ranging fluctuations in the wavelength-energy composition of the light reflected from a patch and from its surrounds (Land, 1983). The ratio-taking mechanism results in the generation of stable biological priors (β *priors*) which, in the case of colour, amounts to generating stable colour categorizations¹ (see below). Such a mechanism could equally well be referred to as a brain programme or an algorithm for generating priors, as is commonly done. We adhere, though with diffidence, to the term *concept* partly because it has a long tradition dating back to Immanuel Kant who believed that all experiences (outside of space and time) must be interfaced through, or based on, concepts. We do so as well because there are other, more cognitive and emotional, concepts that are also inherited, that regulate behaviour and that have beliefs attached to them, an example being that of “unity-in-love” (Zeki, 2009); the term *concept*, when used to describe “unity-in-love”, can be accommodated within the Kantian tradition while the term *algorithm* seems currently unsuited and has, indeed, never been used to describe it (such concepts are not discussed further in this article).

We refer to the priors generated from such inherited biological operations as the *initial priors*, from which

¹In our discussion of colour, we use the verb “categorization” and the noun “categories” interchangeably, to denote the grouping or classification by human subjects of a perceived colour into defined colour categories without the use of language.




FIGURE 1 An illustration of the basic difference between artefactual (α) and biological (β) priors. In brief, if prior beliefs have greater precision (*i.e.*, have low variability, as in colour vision for β priors), they will attract posterior beliefs which are not readily modifiable by experience and experimentation. Conversely, if priors are held with less confidence and precision, as α priors are, then experience and experimentation will modify the prior to produce a new posterior. This is illustrated in terms of probability distributions in different colours in the figure. This ubiquitous aspect of Bayesian belief updating underlies our basic thesis; namely, that there are two different sorts of priors. Artefactual or α priors are acquired and therefore are hospitable to modification with learning and experience and are therefore adaptable. Conversely, biological or β priors are specified innately (possibly genetically) over evolutionary time scales. In consequence, they are much more resistant to belief updating, thereby providing a certain “stability” for inferring the sensorium. Priors are represented in yellow, observed data (experience) in blue, and the posterior produced from observation in green. Size of circles indicates the extent of variability. For comparison purposes, the observed data (blue dots) in (i), (iii) and (iv) are simulated using the same (multivariate Gaussian) distribution. (i) When the prior distribution (indicated by the yellow dots (see figure (ii) for a zoomed-in snapshot) has very small variability (*i.e.*, high precision), the posterior distribution is derived mainly from the prior, and not much from the observed data. This constitutes the concept of a biological prior. (ii) shows that, with biological priors, the centre of the posterior distribution is very close to that of the prior distribution. (iii) shows that when the prior distribution (yellow dots) has a very large variability, the posterior distribution (indicated by the green squares) is modified mainly by the observed data (blue dots). This constitutes the concept of an artefactual prior. Note that the centre of the posterior distribution in (iii) is very close to the centre of the observed data (blue), under an artefactual prior. (iv) when the prior distribution (yellow) has moderate variability, the posterior distribution is derived from both the prior and the observed data; the centre of the posterior distribution is between the prior distribution (yellow circle) and the distribution of the data (blue)

posteriors are generated through experience and experimentation; these then act as further priors for generating further posteriors.

We use the term “belief” in the Bayesian context; it is adapted from its ordinary dictionary definition, namely “a feeling of being sure that someone or something exists or that something is true” (*Webster’s Dictionary*), or “confidence in the truth or existence of something not immediately

susceptible to rigorous proof” (*Dictionary.com*) or that “the experience [of colour] will always be true,” even when we are not remotely aware of the operations that lead to the experience. Such a belief, in the Bayesian context, may be readily updated through new experience or may be resistant to such updating, as it is in colour vision. We can therefore refer to β beliefs attached to biological priors and α beliefs attached to acquired artefactual priors. We




FIGURE 2 A schematic representation of the relationship of the ratio-taking process to the generation of the experience of colour. (i) It is customary to consider the brain's ratio-taking system for colour to involve three separate processes occurring simultaneously; these are related to the ratios of the intensities of long, medium, and short wavelengths reflected from a patch being viewed and from its surrounds (the example given here is the green patch of a multi-coloured Mondrian display that is highlighted while the entire display is illuminated by three projectors, one passing long-, another middle- and the third short-wave light). This ratio-taking process generates an initial prior (as illustrated in (ii)) with an initial hue attached to it. Denote the three parameters (for long, medium, and short wavelengths) as a vector μ , which follows a probability distribution (for simplicity, we assume it is a multivariate Gaussian distribution with mean and covariance μ_0 and Σ_0 , respectively.) (ii) Given n experiments (of viewing a patch), one observes n sets of data (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_n) , each x_i (where $i = 1, 2, \dots, n$) being a three dimensional vector containing the ratios of long, medium, and short wavelengths reflected from the centre and the surrounds in each experiment i . The observed data also has a distribution (for simplicity, we assume it is a multivariate Gaussian distribution with mean and covariance μ and Σ , respectively. (iii) Given the prior and the observed data, the brain generates a posterior, which follows a multivariate Gaussian distribution with mean and covariance μ_n and Σ_n , where $\mu_n = \Sigma_0(\Sigma_0 + \frac{1}{n}\Sigma)^{-1} \left(\frac{1}{n} \sum_{i=1}^n x_i \right) + \frac{1}{n}\Sigma(\Sigma_0 + \frac{1}{n}\Sigma)^{-1} \mu_0$ and $\Sigma_n = \Sigma_0(\Sigma_0 + \frac{1}{n}\Sigma)^{-1} \frac{1}{n}\Sigma$. Clearly, the posterior depends both on the prior and the observed data (or likelihood in the Bayes theorem). What we argue in this article is that there exist biological priors (β priors) whose posterior is largely dependent upon the priors and independent of the observed data. Other priors fall into the category of artifactual priors (α priors), or both, where posteriors do depend upon the observed data. (iv) With new experience and experimentation, the posterior becomes the updated prior, from which further posteriors can be generated (indicated by the bottom arrow)

will be assuming that beliefs are updated in the sense of Helmholtz's “unconscious inference” (*i.e.*, a technical form of qualitative experience). There is a probability attached to the belief and, through experimentation, there may be an updated (posterior) probability distribution attached to the same belief (see Figure 2).

A key conclusion from the distinction between α priors and β priors is that the latter are acquired over an evolutionary timescale. This means, by definition, that they are not the product of belief updating in any one individual. In turn, this necessarily implies that β priors encode something that

is conserved in our shared environment—a conservation that could be likened to a “Platonic” form.

Hence, in the Bayesian context, β priors are much more precise and intransigent to change than α priors, even though both can lead to almost limitless posteriors. There is good reason to suppose that the inherited, biological, β priors and the beliefs attached to them, which make Bayesian sense of the sensory inputs into our brains, are broadly similar between humans belonging to different ethnic groups, are less modifiable through experience and learning than α priors and are less dependent upon culture and learning than the

acquired ones. Hence one cardinal distinction between the two sets of priors is that an individual can reasonably suppose that a biological *prior*, such as a colour category or the aesthetic judgment of faces or bodies as very beautiful, has universal assent, that is to say that the experiencing individual shares the judgment with the great majority of other individuals, regardless of race or culture, a characteristic not shared by the artefactual priors (*e.g.*, appreciation of sushi, or a particular make of car). Specifically, the scope of experience to modify is more limited for β priors and the beliefs attached to them than for α priors. Consequently, the beliefs attached to the β priors and the inferences drawn from them are also more biologically constrained than the ones attached to α priors. In simpler terms, artefactual priors depend upon experience and experiment but biological priors do not do so or are much less dependent upon experience and learning. Hence, we extend the classic Bayesian formula to one that properly acknowledges the distinction between very precise priors and empirical priors that are subject to belief updating and experience-dependent revision.

The supreme example of an initial β prior is in colour vision, where the biologically inherited concept, applied to incoming chromatic visual signals, results in a *colour categorization* which constitutes the initial biological prior for colour vision (see Figure 2). “Colour [categorization]” in the words of Edwin Land, “is always a consequence, never a cause” (Land, 1985), meaning that it is the result of a brain operation performed on incoming chromatic signals. We devote more space to colour vision for two reasons: on the one hand, we are generally clearer about the kind of inherited concept or algorithm that the brain may use to generate stable priors in colour vision and, on the other, its example can be used as a baseline against which we can discuss other categories of prior to make our point clearer.

An artefactual concept, for example that of a house or car or a game of tennis, conforms more closely to the dictionary definition of “a generic idea generalized from particular instances” (*Merriam-Webster Dictionary*). We are not born with the idea of a house or a definitive neural programme that is dedicated to the generation of houses perceptually, comparable to the ratio-taking programme that generates given colour categories. Rather, the idea of a “house” is abstract and generated from viewing many houses through a neural mechanism that remains obscure. Moreover, the brain’s acquired concept of houses continues to grow with new experiences of houses. This is significantly different from colour vision, where the ratio-taking mechanism that underwrites perceptual inference in terms of constant colour categories does not change with experience and learning. It is also more difficult to define what the initial prior is in the artefactual arena. This is because, unlike the inherited concept applied in colour vision, artefactual concepts are likely to change with the acquisition of experience. We argue below that certain

experiences, for example that of architectural beauty, may be regulated by both acquired and inherited concepts.

Although such a distinction may seem reminiscent of the contrast between “nature and nurture” or between “innateness and non-innateness,” there is nevertheless an important distinction to be drawn between these categories and the biological and artefactual categories that we propose. Probabilistic arguments and conclusions can be made in the case of our priors but such probabilistic arguments are not usually made with respect to the nature vs nurture distinction, a classification that may seem solid but is questionable in its more rigid form. A useful current guide to its pitfalls is to be found in (Mameli & Bateson, 2011), who think of the concept of innateness as a “cluster” of properties; a given attribute that may be considered to be “innate” should have some, but not necessarily all, of several properties. Of the properties enumerated as defining innateness, the ratio-taking mechanism of the brain’s colour system and the consequence of its operation, which we take to be innate, would have the following properties defined in Mameli and Bateson (2011): “...that of being not learned, of not being the outcome of a mechanism of adaptive plasticity, of being genetically encoded...in the sense of being a genetically selected Darwinian adaptation, ...of having high broad heritability...of having a flat norm of reaction, [as well] as the property of being universal within a species (or within a biologically significant segment of the species)...of being developmentally modular ...[and] of being the developmental outcome of a functionally specialized acquisition device” (our ellipsis). Mameli and Bateson (2011) caution that the use of the cluster of innateness may, “... lead scientists to infer incorrectly that the presence of one of the properties in a trait implies the presence of the other properties as well”; they might have added that some of the properties are present in a less rigid form. In fact, we shall see below that there are other biological categories that also have these characteristics but perhaps some are in a less rigid form than to be found in colour vision (see for example birdsongs, discussed below). We add one further qualification to the list of (Mameli & Bateson, 2011): the characteristic of not being learned does not, or should not, imply that there should be no exposure to the natural environment. This is illustrated by the example of the property of orientation selectivity in cells of the visual cortex and their role in form vision, which we discuss below; that property appears to be inherited and present at birth but the animal must be exposed to a natural visual environment for it to be consolidated.

2 | THE NEED FOR DISTINGUISHING DIFFERENT CATEGORIES OF PRIOR

The fundamental basis for our classification is the belief that all incoming signals into the brain are interfaced through

[brain] concepts. The classification of priors into the broad categories proposed here is based in part on the Kantian system and in part upon our modification of it (Zeki, 2009). Kant wrote in *The Critique of Pure Reason* (Kant, 1781/1996; -A51/B75) that, “intuitions [perceptions] without concepts are blind,” arguing that all inputs into the mind (in our case the brain) must be somehow organized by being based on, or interfaced through, concepts. In *The Critique of Judgment* (Kant, 1790/1987) he nevertheless proposed that some sensory inputs, among them those ultimately experienced as beautiful (those that are “purposive without a purpose”) are either not based on concepts, or only based on what he somewhat vaguely termed “indeterminate” concepts; the consequence was that the perceiver usually supposed (believed), and was justified in supposing, that what one had judged to be beautiful would also be judged to be beautiful by others; the judgment would therefore have universal assent. This was to be distinguished from signals from objects that are utilitarian; the latter, Kant believed, are interfaced through “determinate” concepts and the perceiver could not assume universal assent for the judgment that the object is beautiful on the basis of the “determinate” concept. There is here a logical inconsistency or even contradiction, because it is hard to see how an “indeterminate” concept can lead to an aesthetic judgment that has universal validity; surely, only a determinate concept can do so. In our system, contrary to that of Kant, it is the utilitarian, artefactual, concepts that could more easily be classified as “indeterminate” since, being dependent upon individual experience, the judgment derived therefrom cannot be assumed (in the case of the artefactual category) to have universal validity (Zeki, 2009). Thus our formulation is the reverse of Kant's; we also differ from Kant in supposing, unlike him, that *all* percepts, even those pertaining to beauty, are interfaced through, or based on, determinate concepts. This distinction, we believe, creates a more hospitable background for understanding the limits and capacities of how the putative Bayesian system of the brain may operate.

When considered within the framework of the brain acting as a knowledge-acquiring system, there is a further reason to emphasize a distinction between our two kinds of prior. To obtain knowledge about constant and unchanging properties of objects and situations in a world that is never the same from moment to moment, the brain must stabilize the world as best it can, that is to maintain an unfluctuating experience where the incoming signals are fluctuating continuously. This process of stabilization is well illustrated in colour vision, where the continual changes in the wavelength-energy composition of the light reaching the brain from objects and surfaces do not, within very wide limits, modify the colour category to which these surfaces belong (see below). But this also entails having a stable prior, which codes a constant feature. If the prior belonging to

the biological category were to change continually through experience and experimentation, then the capacity to stabilize the world would itself be lost because the capacity to code for a constant feature will be lost. Moreover, it is imperative for purposes of communication that the same algorithm or concept be applied in different brains to produce the same β priors, which can then be said to have universal assent. This also amounts to stabilizing the world, but this time doing so in terms of communication and common understanding.

The distinction between biological and non-biological (artefactual) priors that we propose in terms of Bayesian operations has not been made before and there is therefore no general agreement as to what disambiguates biological and artefactual priors. There are probably other attributes, besides the ones that we consider here (namely colour, faces, bodies) that fall into the biological category, for example that of landscapes and of visual motion, but we do not discuss these extensively (see, for example, Seriès & Seitz, 2013). Rather, we give examples of what most would agree fall into different categories—colour and faces for biological categories and artefacts such as cars or planes for the acquired ones. Other beliefs, distinct from those relating to objects, also fall into the artefactual category; for example, the supposition that a government with a hardline policy on health may, if elected, lead to a rapid change in the value of companies producing medicines; these can be subsumed under artefactual priors and we do not discuss them further in any detail here. Much of the distinction that we make is based on common human experience.

Our hope is that the differentiation we make will be a stimulus for further discussion on how the brain handles different categories of knowledge. We address the distinction between the proposed priors largely in terms of visual perception, about which relatively more is known and with which we are better acquainted.

3 | THE BAYESIAN FRAMEWORK

The *Bayesian* framework provides analytically and biologically plausible approaches to describing how the brain operates in an uncertain world, where everything is changing from moment to moment. Central to the Bayesian framework is Bayes' theorem, namely

$$P(h|D) = \frac{P(D|h)P(h)}{P(D)} \propto P(D|h)P(h)$$

where P denotes probability, h indicates an hypothesis and D represents observed data. Specifically, $P(h)$ is the prior probability of the hypothesis being true, representing our initial belief about the hypothesis before new data becomes available; thus $P(h)$ is called the *prior probability* (or prior in short). $P(D|h)$ denotes the probability of observing data

\mathcal{D} if the hypothesis h is true; it is commonly called the *likelihood function* (or likelihood in short). $P(h|\mathcal{D})$ represents the probability of the hypothesis being true after observing data \mathcal{D} ; it is called the *posterior probability* (or posterior in short). In the denominator, $P(\mathcal{D})$ serves as a normalization constant (that ensures the posterior distribution is a proper probability distribution) and is independent of the hypothesis h (and thus not useful for making a posterior inference about h). Thus the Bayes theorem, or $P(h|\mathcal{D}) \propto P(\mathcal{D}|h)P(h)$, means that the posterior depends on the observed data (through $P(h|\mathcal{D})$ as well as the prior $P(h)$). Examples using Bayesian theorem in brain studies can be found in (Körding & Wolpert, 2004; Murphy, 2012).

In theory, one could consider all priors under a single category which, subject to experiments or experience, will produce posteriors, as in fact previous discussions of the Bayesian brain have done (Botvinick & Toussaint, 2012; Clark, 2013; Dayan, Hinton, Neal, & Zemel, 1995; Friston, 2012; Friston, Mattout, & Kilner, 2011; Friston et al., 2015; Kersten, Mamassian, & Yuille, 2004; Knill & Pouget, 2004; Lee & Mumford, 2003; Pouget, Beck, Ma, & Latham, 2013; Rao & Ballard, 1999; Yuille & Kersten, 2006). The distinction we make here is, we believe, significant enough for experience to operate on the two categories in different ways. We therefore propose that the classic Bayesian formula needs to be finessed to take account of the fact that β priors have very small variance between humans whereas the variance is large for α priors. Quantitatively, if one were to model the process within a probability framework, the variance-covariance for the prior distribution is small for β priors and large for α priors.

3.1 | Colour category as a β prior that results from the application of an inherited brain concept, that of ratio-taking

For colour, the Bayesian theorem would state that there exists a ratio-taking mechanism or algorithm (Land, 1974; Land & McCann, 1971; Zeki, 1984) which is very largely independent of culture, learning and experience, and is therefore identical (*i.e.*, with very little variance) in all humans. This algorithm generates an initial prior which is the colour category, to which an initial hue is attached. From this, posteriors are generated through experimentation, for example by viewing a patch belonging to a given colour category (say, green) under different illuminants or with different surrounds. This can be illustrated by the following example: if the initial (green) rectangle in Figure 2 is viewed under a different illuminant, its hue will change, although its colour category will remain the same. Hence the colour category is relatively immune to experience and experimentation while the initial hue is much less so. Hence, too, by illuminating the patch with lights of different

wavelength composition or by modifying the colour of the patches that surround it, many posteriors in terms of hue can be generated from this initial prior. With each new experience and experimentation, the posterior becomes the updated *prior*, from which further *posteriors* can be generated (see Figure 2).

These considerations lead us to propose the following *Bayesian Brain Theorem* that summarizes the above example theoretically; it also applies to the generation of other biological priors (see Appendix S1 for mathematical details): The β prior (*e.g.*, the *constant colour category* generated from the ratio-taking operation detailed above) has attached to it another β prior, which is the hue (H). Let us refer to this as H_G^0 , where the subscript G refers to the green colour category, and the superscript to its initial hue. The experiment conducted (for example, varying the wavelength-energy composition of the illuminant in a colour experiment or surrounding the green patch with a patch of a single colour, say red) will lead to a posterior hue which, though still belonging to the colour category of green, will differ in its shade of green (and hence hue) from H_G^0 . We will refer to this as H_G^1 . In the example of the green rectangle given in Figure 2, as one experiences different shades of green (different hues) when one views the same scene in different illuminants or, in the example of the green patch above, changes its surrounds under the same illuminant and notes the nature of the changes in the illuminant and/or the surrounds of the green patch being studied, so any number of different shades (hues) of green can be generated and experienced. These posteriors (H_G^i , where $i = 0, 1, 2, \dots$) can be updated continuously and iteratively in one's life; knowing more about the illuminant or the spatial configuration of a stimulus, one can therefore make inferences with a high degree of accuracy and reliability (see the iterative process in Figure 2).

Colour categories represent perhaps the most extreme form of a β prior which is the result of an inherited brain concept applied indifferently to received chromatic signals to generate constant colour categories (see below). It is more usual, in the psychological literature, to speak of colour constancy; we prefer to speak of the *constancy of colour categories* (see Zeki, Cheadle, Pepper, & Mylonas, 2017) or of constant colour categorization (Zeki, Javier, & Mylonas, 2019); we do so because the precise hue (shade of colour) within a (constant) colour category varies with changes in the wavelength composition of the illuminant, but the colour category itself does not; hence it is more accurate to speak of a constant colour category (see Zeki et al., 2017, 2019). It is worth noting that colours, categorized through language, may not correspond precisely to colours categorized perceptually through matching without the use of language (Zeki et al., 2019); use of language may indeed impose departures from perceptual matching, as in the celebrated example of the indigenous Nambikwara people of Brazil, whose language is

indifferent to nuances of blue which is often categorized with green or even black (Lévi-Strauss, 1955/2008).

To summarize, colour, or more precisely a colour category, is an experience; the initial experience generated from a ratio-taking mechanism is that of a colour category to which a given hue is attached. Through different experimentations, further hues (shades of colour) may be generated; these further hues, though belonging to the same colour category, differ in appearance (in shade of colour) from the initial hue, depending upon factors such as the wavelength composition of the light reflected from, say, a green surface and the colours surrounding it (see Figure 1). These further hues thus become *posteriors* which then act as new *priors* from which yet further hues (*posteriors*) can be generated through experiments and experience (see the iterative process in Figure 1). In brief, the constant colour category (green) with an initial hue attached to it together constitute the primal experience of colour (β *prior*). While the colour category itself remains largely resistant to change through experience and hence its posteriors are little modifiable despite varying experimentations, further posteriors of the hue can depart from the initial hue attached to the colour category; the direction in which the posterior (hue) changes can be predicted with high accuracy through experience (see below); it is indeed this knowledge gained through experience and experimentation that artists use constantly. In this context, we note that the cortical response to colour in pre-linguistic infants (5–7 months) measured by near infra-red spectroscopy indicates that there is a significant increase in activity in occipito-temporal regions (presumably including area V4) with between-category (colour category) alterations but not with within-category (hue) alterations (Yang, Kanazawa, Yamaguchi, & Kuriki, 2016); similar results have been reported in other studies comparing infants and monkeys (Bornstein, Kessen, & Weiskopf, 1976), consistent with the view expressed here, that constant colour categories are the *priors* to which the initial hue is attached, and from which further hues (*posteriors*) may be generated.

Constant colour categories and the hues attached to them are biological signalling mechanisms allowing the rapid identification of objects. If the colour category of an object or surface were to change with every change in the illuminant in which it is viewed, then colour would no longer be a useful biological signalling mechanism, because the object can no longer be identified by its colour alone. To make of colours an autonomous identifying mechanism, they must be stabilized and be immune, as far as possible, from the de-stabilizing effect of a change when the wavelength composition of the illuminant in which objects and surfaces are viewed changes. This fulfils one of the important requirements when considering the brain as a knowledge acquiring system, to which is coupled the need to stabilize the world. We also presume, as stated above, that the same processes operate in different brains to generate the same constant colour categorizations,

making it easy for an individual to assume that their experience of a constant colour category has universal assent, thus fortifying another reason for having priors with small variance or precise β *priors*, which eases the process of communication between individuals (Zeki et al., 2019).

Evidence shows that there are specific brain pathways and a specific visual area, area V4 and the associated V4 α , that are crucial for colour perception (Brewer, Liu, Wade, & Wandell, 2005; Brouwer & Heeger, 2013; Lafer-Sousa, Conway, & Kanwisher, 2016; Zeki, Watson, & Lueck, 1991), damage to which leads to the syndrome of cerebral achromatopsia (Meadows, 1974; Zeki, 1990). It is important to emphasize that the cells of V4 not only respond specifically to categories of colour but also to hues, or shades of colour (Brouwer & Heeger, 2013; Stoughton & Conway, 2008; Zeki, 1980) and that the representation of colour within V4 can be independent of form (Lafer-Sousa et al., 2016; Zeki, 1983). It is therefore likely that area V4 is pivotal to these operations (Bartels & Zeki, 2000), which is not to say that it acts in isolation; it does so in co-operation with the areas it receives signals from and projects to, together with the reciprocal connections between these areas.

3.2 | The brain's ratio-taking system for generating constant colour categories and the constants in nature

Colour (and the category that it belongs to) is a brain construct (Zeki, 1984); it is generated through an operation based on an inherited concept (algorithm or programme), that of ratio-taking, described above. Many different ways of implementing this have been proposed (for a review, see Foster, 2011) but they all share a common feature, namely a comparison of the wavelength composition of light reflected from different surfaces. This is what we, too, emphasize here although we rely more on the classical approach of Land and his colleagues without implying that it is the final word on the implementation. Using the arguments presented here and the mathematical explanation given in the Appendix S1, we suggest that *this process is independent of any experiment or experience and that a colour category (as opposed to a shade of colour or a hue) is only dependent upon the ratio-taking operation of the brain (see Figure 2)*. It is useful to discuss briefly here why this should be so in the context of what the constants in nature are and how these constants generate constant colour categories.

The unvarying property of surfaces in terms of colour vision is their reflectance, namely the amount of light of any given waveband—in percentage terms—that a surface reflects in relation to the light incident on it. For a given surface, this percentage never changes. Hence, one finds that the ratio of light of any waveband reflected from a given surface and from its surrounding surfaces also has little variability,

regardless of the variation in the intensity of light of that waveband reflected from it; if the intensity of light of any given waveband reflected is increased, the intensity of light of the same waveband coming from the viewed surface and its surrounds also increases, and the ratio continues to remain the same. By extension, the ratios of light of all wavebands reflected from a surface and from its surrounds also have little variability. For a more detailed (and quantitative) explanation see Appendix S1.

Take as an example a green surface which forms part of multicoloured (natural) scene, as in Land's colour Mondrians; it is surrounded by many patches of other colours (see Figure 2). Let us suppose that the green patch (g) reflects x per cent of the long-wave (red) light, l , incident on it, y per cent of the middle wave (green) light, m , and z per cent of the short-wave (blue) light, s . The surrounds, having on average a higher efficiency for reflecting long-wave light, will always reflect more and there will be a constant ratio in the amount of red light reflected from the green surface and from its surrounds. Let us call this ratio g^l . The surrounds will have a lower efficiency for reflecting green light and hence there will be another ratio for the amount of green light (g^m) reflected from it and from the surrounds, and a third ratio for the amount of blue light g^s .² When the same natural scene is viewed in light of a different wavelength composition, the amount of light of different wavelengths reflected from a surface and from its surrounds will change, often significantly (as, for example, when a scene is viewed successively in tungsten light, in fluorescent light, or in sunlight) but the ratios in the amount of light of different wavebands reflected from the centre and from the surrounds remain the same.

Formally, let us consider the green patch viewed under two different illuminants, where the first one has g^{l_1} , g^{m_1} , and g^{s_1} amounts of long, middle and short wave light reflected from the green patch, and the second one has g^{l_2} , g^{m_2} , and g^{s_2} reflected from it. The first illuminant results in (g^{l_1} , g^{m_1} , and g^{s_1}) and the second in (g^{l_2} , g^{m_2} , and g^{s_2}) ratios of long-, middle- and short- wave light reflected from the green patch and from its surrounds respectively. Then, we have:

$$\text{Ratio}_{\text{long}} = \frac{g^{l_1}}{g^{l_2}} \sim \frac{g^{l_3}}{g^{l_4}};$$

$$\text{Ratio}_{\text{medium}} = \frac{g^{m_1}}{g^{m_2}} \sim \frac{g^{m_3}}{g^{m_4}};$$

$$\text{Ratio}_{\text{short}} = \frac{g^{s_1}}{g^{s_2}} \sim \frac{g^{s_3}}{g^{s_4}}$$

²For brevity, we restrict ourselves to long, middle and short-wave light, without giving the peak values along the spectrum; in practice, and under natural viewing conditions, a surface will reflect light of many wavelengths, but there will be a (constant) ratio for light of any wavelength reflected from the centre and surrounds.

where \sim means that the long, medium and short ratios differ little (have very small variance) in different experimental settings (namely, regardless of the precise wavelength-energy composition of the light reflected from the green patch and from its surrounds). More concretely, let $\mu = (\text{Ratio}_{\text{long}}, \text{Ratio}_{\text{medium}}, \text{Ratio}_{\text{short}})$ and denote every individual i 's ratio-taking mechanism at time t as μ_{it} , which is sampled from a probabilistic distribution; we argue here that the distribution of μ_{it} has a very small variance in time and between humans. Suppose μ_{it} is generated from a multivariate Gaussian distribution with mean and covariance μ_0 and Σ_0 , respectively. Then, that there exists a β prior for colour is equivalent to saying that the entries of Σ_0 are very small (see Appendix S1 for details). In other words, the ratio-taking mechanism varies little from individual to individual, and from time to time.

It is through such a ratio-taking mechanism that the brain builds *constant colour categories*. We have no knowledge of the detailed neural mechanisms by which the brain implements this but there is no physical law that dictates that such ratios should be taken or comparisons made; it is instead *an inherited brain law* and, given the widespread use of constant colour categories in the animal kingdom, we make the assumption that similar mechanisms, or very nearly so, are used in species as far apart as the goldfish (Ingle, 1985) and the human (Land, 1974), reflecting the likewise (essentially) similar use of other cognitive mechanisms in widely separated species (Sovrano, Bisazza, & Vallortigara, 2002). With colour, these constant colour categories constitute the β *priors*. This generation of constant colour categories, or the constant colour categorization by humans, is a classic example of Kant's statement in his *Prolegomena to any future metaphysics* (Kant, 1783/1953) that "The Mind [brain] does not derive its laws (*a priori*) from nature but prescribes them to her."

No amount of visual experience can modify the colour categories (β *priors*); in fact they often cannot even be modified by higher cognitive knowledge (but see also below). For example, green leaves may reflect more green than red light at noon and more red light than green at dawn and at dusk, but they are always perceived as green, even in the face of knowledge that they are reflecting more red light under certain conditions, provided the leaves are being viewed in a natural context. Technically, colour categories are therefore endowed with precision. Priors exert a more constrained effect over posteriors when they are more precise, as in biological priors. We use the term precision here in a technical fashion, to denote the confidence afforded to priors; precision is the inverse dispersion or uncertainty encoded by a probability distribution (*e.g.*, the variance of a Gaussian distribution) and hence precision can be defined here as the inverse of variance. In normal colour vision, given the β *prior*, the variance is very close to 0 and the precision therefore approaches an infinite value; in other words β *priors* have a high precision, while alpha priors

are less precise and are amenable to experience-dependent updating. Hence the β priors in colour are extremely stable and un-modifiable with experience. It goes without saying that (language apart), an individual experiencing a given colour category C is entitled to suppose that his or her perceptual experience of colour is universal, in that all other (normal) individuals will experience the same colour category under the same conditions of illumination. This can be readily established by matching the colours perceived with Munsell chips, without the use of language (Zeki et al., 2019). Hence the belief is universal. This is an instance of an experience generated through an inherited ratio-taking operation, which can be considered to be a determinate inherited concept operating without regard to race, culture and upbringing, and executed by the brain to stabilize the world in terms of colour categories (Zeki et al., 2019). We leave out of account here the vexed and unsolved problem of qualia, of whether the quality of green that one person experiences is identical to that perceived by another.

In summary, what we are proposing here is, on the one hand, that there are biological mechanisms that are inherited and not dependent upon experience and, on the other, that the colour categorizations that they generate are not modifiable by experience. Such an experience-independent generation of priors may extend to other cognitive functions, which suggests that they are evolutionary adaptations that do not necessarily require experience or learning and are not related in any straightforward way to brain complexity or phylogenetic distance from humans (Kelly, Spetch, & Donald, 1998; Sovrano et al., 2002; Vallortigara, Zanforlin, & Pasti, 1990); it is particularly interesting to note that isolated indigenous Amazonians, in the absence of all schooling and experience, use geometric concepts similar to other humans (Dehaene, Izard, & Spelke, 2006), implying that such concepts are also inherited and have an evolutionary basis.

We have gone into colour in some detail, because it is relatively simple and useful, to illustrate the more general issue of how the brain can stabilize the world by calling upon β priors without the need to experiment or acquire experience.

3.3 | The ‘belief’ with respect to colours

A definition of “belief” with respect to colours might be adapted from its ordinary dictionary definition, namely “a feeling of being sure that someone or something exists or that something is true” (*Webster’s Dictionary*), or “confidence in the truth or existence of something not immediately susceptible to rigorous proof” (*Dictionary.com*) or that “the experience [of colour] will always be true,” even when we are not remotely aware of the operations that lead to the experience. The belief with respect to colours is subtle. Both Hermann von Helmholtz and Ewald Hering tried to account for colour constancy by invoking higher cognitive factors. von

Helmholtz (1911) invoked judgment and *a priori* knowledge, believing that the viewer assigned a constant colour through an adjustment due to the vaguely defined process of the “unconscious inference”; Hering (1877/1964), on the other hand, supposed that memory was essential. While memory and learning may play a role and modify the experience of colour for objects about which one has knowledge, this is, significantly, not true for colours that are detached from definitive objects (Vandenbroucke, Fahrenfort, Meuwese, Scholte, & Lamme, 2016) or colours attached to “nonsense” objects such as arbitrarily arranged squares and rectangles, of which Land’s experiments constitute a classic example; this is why we concentrate on these experiments here. The role of memory colours has in any case been controversial (Connolly, 2019); we agree with Connolly that, (a) where it exists, it enhances perceptual learning by making it easier to differentiate objects from their backgrounds especially in low lighting conditions and, (b) it cannot be a mechanism for generating colour constancy as sometimes supposed (*e.g.*, Hansen, Olkkonen, Walter, & Gegenfurtner, 2006; Olkkonen, Hansen, & Gegenfurtner, 2012), for the simple reason that the universality with which constant colour categorizations are generated in all humans makes it inconsistent with the supposition that memory colours enable such categorization. In fact, even such knowledge as may be acquired through learning and experience may be over-ridden by the brain’s computational process to generate constant colour categories, as Land’s two colour projection experiments show; in these, the identical picture of a multi-coloured natural scene is taken through different filters (say a long-wave and a middle-wave filter). The (black and white) pictures produced are then projected in perfect alignment on a screen, one through a projector with white light and the other through a long- or middle-wave filter. When so projected, a normal viewer will see a variety of colours. The colour of the objects with which the viewer is familiar is not determined by *a priori* knowledge but rather by the filter used, in combination with white light, to project the image; lips, for example, may appear blue even in spite of knowledge that they are not normally so (Land, 1959). Helmholtz qualified his “unconscious inference” in a way from which we depart, for he supposed that judgment and learning enter into that inference. Along with Land, we prefer to think of a computational process that is independent of such cognitive factors and that only requires a comparison of the reflectance properties of surfaces. If learning, judgment, memory and experience are relevant here, as claimed by both Helmholtz and Hering, it is only with respect to the precise hue or shade. A viewer “knows unconsciously” that the green patch will look green if it reflects more green light than its surrounds, regardless of the actual amount of green light reflected from it and regardless of whether one is acquainted with the object or not, thus precluding judgment and learning. Anyone armed with such technical knowledge

(though of course few are) can predict the colour of a surface, even before seeing it. Thus, a red surface is one that will reflect more red light than its surrounds and a blue surface is one that will reflect more blue light than its surrounds. A white surface will reflect more light of all wavebands than its surrounds while a black one will reflect less light of all wavebands than its surrounds, regardless of the actual amount of light reflected from it. This belief system is quite rigid and not easy to manipulate.

4 | FACES—ANOTHER CATEGORY OF B PRIORS

We argue below that faces (along with human bodies) also belong to the category of β *priors*. But if reflectance is the constant in colour perception, the constants in face perception are more difficult to determine and define. We may say that there are certain elements such as the nose, mouth, eyes and so on (not all of which have to be present at once) that must be present in a harmonious and proportionate relationship to each other; these constitute an essential arrangement of parts which we refer to as a “significant configuration” (Zeki, 2013) and which leads to the instant recognition of a face as a face. The elements constituting that arrangement, together with their proportions and harmonious relations, have been discussed extensively, especially in articles on cosmetic surgery. The description we give below applies equally for human bodies, for which there is also a (different) significant configuration that, again, consists of different elements that are arranged together in precise relationships.

It is generally agreed that faces have a privileged representation in the brain, with at least three areas and possibly more devoted, in part or in whole, to faces. It is also generally agreed that the capacity to recognize a certain “significant configuration” as constituting a face is either inherited or very rapidly acquired, within hours after birth (Goren, Sarty, & Wu, 1975; Johnson, Dziurawiec, Ellis, & Morton, 1991), although there has been much discussion as to what it is in the configuration that is instantly recognizable [see discussion in (Zeki & Ishizu, 2013)]. It has been reported that monkeys reared without exposure to faces for periods of 6 to 24 months can still recognize monkey and human faces after the period of deprivation (Sugita 2008). There are also cortical areas that are critical for the perception of human bodies (de Gelder, 2006; Peelen & Downing, 2007; Schwarzlose, Baker, & Kanwisher, 2005).

The significant configuration that defines a stimulus as being a face (or a body) constitutes the initial experience and therefore the initial β *prior* from which posteriors are formed, although, unlike colour vision, we have no knowledge of what kind of brain programme generative model (and accompanying recognition algorithm) is responsible for

determining proportions, harmonies and relationships to specify that the significant configuration that is being viewed is that of a face. Any individual, regardless of racial or cultural grouping, may assume, with a very high probability, that a significant configuration that s/he experiences as a face will also be experienced as a face by all members of the human race and therefore that his or her experience has universal validity. Any departures, even minor ones, from the significant configuration that constitutes the biologically inherited or possibly rapidly acquired³ and accepted concept of a face or body is rejected and never incorporated into the concept of a normal face. Indeed, the cortical response to faces is very exigent in terms of the significant configuration that is accepted as normal and to which there is an optimal cortical response; mis-aligning the two halves of an upright face, for example, delays and increases the typical N170 negative deflection obtained following facial stimulation, as do inverted faces (Ishizu, Ayabe, & Kojima, 2008) or bodies (Minnebusch, Suchan, & Daum, 2009; Stekelenburg & de Gelder, 2004); the latter are immediately classified as having an abnormal configuration, and thus not belonging to the biological category of faces (or bodies). It is also worthwhile to note that the prolonged (1 month) viewing of abnormal or deformed faces does not make them acceptable as normal faces; the viewing of stimuli in which inherited concepts of face (and space) are deformed and violated leads to significant activation in fronto-parietal cortex, whereas the viewing of “deformed” or unusual configurations of common objects such as cars or planes for equivalent periods does not (Chen & Zeki, 2011). This suggests that such biological concepts are not easily disrupted, a finding that is consistent with our proposed subdivisions of priors into the biological and artefactual categories. Here, it is interesting to note that the painter Francis Bacon, whose self-declared aim was to give a “visual shock,” used deformed faces and bodies to deliver that shock to the spectator; he rarely if ever deformed objects (which fall into the artefactual category) (Zeki & Ishizu, 2013).

Hence, like with colour categories, an individual can make the reasonable assumption that what they perceive or experience as a face will also be experienced as a face by others and therefore the individual's experience will have universal validity. Equally, any deformation of a face will be universally experienced as a departure from the significant configuration characterising a normal face. This kind of evidence leads us to suppose that it is very difficult to produce a biologically viable *posterior*, and a belief attached to it, from an inverted face (unlike buildings—or other artefacts—see below) or a deformed face; even if produced, it is unlikely to be durable.

³Note that the term “rapidly acquired” also signifies some inherited element, since the acquisition spoken of here enjoys a privilege over other concepts, such as those of buildings, which are not as rapidly acquired.

4.1 | Concept as applied to faces

Our definition of concept as applied to faces is similar to the one given above for colour, that is, an inherited operation or programme applied to incoming signals to define them as constituting a face and hence to generate a biological prior from them. Faces and colours share another similarity, namely that they both depend upon ratio-taking, though the kind of ratio that is determinant differs between the two. For faces, what must be determined are harmonious relations and constant ratios between its constituents, that is within the face rather than between a face and its surrounds. Hence, we can say that the inherited ratios for faces constitutes a certain significant configuration (Zeki, 2013) in which the various elements (nose, eyes, ears, mouth, eyebrows, *etc.*) bear a constant and pre-determined relationship to one another, a relationship that signifies a face. As the famous Cycladic sculptures testify, it is not necessary that all the elements given above be present at once, but a minimal number is mandatory. For example, a minimalist (Cycladic) configuration such as can be seen at <https://www.hellenic-art.com/head-of-amorgos.html> is sufficient to qualify it as a face. Such a significant configuration then constitutes the inherited initial β prior for faces which, as with colour categories, also constitutes the initial experience from which posteriors are formed.

The minimum critical relationships of constituents that determine that a given configuration is that of a face are not known; hence we cannot specify the relationships with the mathematical precision that we can for colour categories. It is nevertheless true that the *posterior* that results from this (face) β prior through experience is similarly circumscribed as in colour perception; a significant configuration that constitutes a face cannot be interpreted otherwise, while any departure (as produced by inversions, for example) would mean that the brain will either not classify it as a normal face, or that it will only be temporarily classified as a face, or that it will be classified as an abnormal face, without leaving a permanent posterior.

4.2 | The posteriors generated from the β prior (significant configuration) for a face

The posteriors generated from a colour category are somewhat confined in scope; for example, those generated from the category green can belong to different shades of green, but do not, in normal circumstances, transmute into another colour category, even if the green surface of, for example, a leaf is reflecting more long-wave (red) light, as it commonly does at dawn and dusk. The posteriors acquired from the β prior that constitutes a face are more nuanced. Thus, the posterior can be a face belonging to a particular racial or ethnic group or belong to the category of beautiful or ugly faces

(see below). These posteriors depend upon experiencing different faces and therefore upon experimentation. The brain's Bayesian formula for faces, different from computational facial recognition (Schroff, Kalenichenko, & Philbin, 2015; Sun, Liang, Wang, & Tang, 2015; Taigman, Yang, Ranzato, & Wolf, 2014), is thus similar to that of colours. To signify that one is now dealing with faces instead of colours, what would be needed is to modify the notation from three-dimensional (as in colours) to a higher-dimensional case, where the parameter of each dimension would model a specific biological feature, such as the number of eyes, the angle between nose and mouth, the location of the ear, *etc.*

More problematic is whether expressions which convey specific emotions are biologically inherited and hence constitute β priors, and whether an individual experiencing a given emotion—for example that of distress—through a particular pattern of facial muscle contractions may reasonably assume that others belonging to the same or a different cultural or ethnic group will experience the same emotion with the same pattern of muscular contraction. A facial configuration such as upturned lips, which in fact is universally recognized as a smile, may be significantly dependent upon an inherited template—thus constituting the β prior for that expression—and hence not dependent, or only marginally dependent, upon learning and experience. The question may be more complex, however, since the expression of emotion facilitates social bonding and probably has a long evolutionary history. Darwin (1872) believed that such expressions, involving in each case the interplay of particular groups of facial muscles, are universal and inherited. There has been some controversy in the past over this, but current evidence indicates that there is agreement between different cultures, even those that have not come in contact with each other, about the basic emotions underlying given facial expressions, while there may be some differences regarding the intensity of the emotion conveyed by a given facial expression (Ekman, 1989; Ekman et al., 1987; Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002). Evidence suggests that a seven-month-old infant has the capacity to recognize facial expressions; given the universality of the recognition, it must be presumed that there is an early interplay here which generates β priors according to inherited concepts, possibly augmented by experience and learning, including interacting with family members and others (Nelson & De Haan, 1996; Safar & Moulson, 2017). This capacity to categorize faces in particular ways—provided they have the significant configuration that constitutes a β prior for a face—may thus be compared to the example of colour given above. The colour category generated from a β prior comes with an initial hue from which further posteriors are generated; similarly, the β prior for a face comes when the incoming signals correspond to the brain concept—in the form of a (face) template—that signifies a face. To this may be attached an initial particular expression, corresponding to the initial hue in colour vision.

The issue here is whether there is a period after birth during which the precise expression is learned, comparable to learning that the hue belonging to a colour category can lead to a new posterior through experience. If so, evidence suggests that that post-natal period is relatively brief and that, by seven months, both Eastern and Western infants can discriminate the basic emotions conveyed by facial expressions, although the pattern of eye movements executed to make the discrimination may differ between races (Geangu et al., 2016).

In summary, conforming to the definition of a β prior, an individual who experiences a given significant configuration as that of a face is entitled to assume that others, whether belonging to the same ethnic and cultural grouping or not, will also experience that significant configuration as that of a face. Moreover, an individual experiencing a significant configuration as that of a smiling face or distressed face may also assume that others will also experience that significant configuration in the same way.

4.3 | Face perception and brain physiology

It is generally agreed that there are special areas of the brain that are necessary for the perception of faces, including an area located in the fusiform gyrus known as the fusiform face area (FFA) (Kanwisher, McDermott, & Chun, 1997; Sergent, Ohta, & MacDonald, 1992), damage to which leads to the syndrome of prosopagnosia. We note that the FFA is active when faces are viewed from different angles, hence implying a certain degree of *face constancy* (Pourtois, Schwartz, Seghier, Lazeyras, & Vuilleumier, 2005). Another area critical for faces is located in the inferior occipital cortex, known as the occipital face area (OFA) (Peelen & Downing, 2007; Pitcher, 2014) while a third area, located in the superior temporal sulcus, appears to be important for the recognition of changing facial expressions (Haxby, Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2000). These may not be the only areas that are important for face perception. It has been argued that the recognition of faces engages a much more widely distributed system (Ishai, Schmidt, & Boesiger, 2005) and that cortical areas classically recognized as face areas may not represent only faces since cells responsive to common objects, in addition to faces, can be found in an area such as FFA (Haxby et al., 2001). Whatever the merits of these contrasting views, they do not much affect our argument, given the heightened susceptibility of faces to distortion and inversion and the relative resistance of objects to similar treatment; this would argue in favour of our general supposition that β priors must be separated from α priors, whether the representation of objects and faces occurs in the same or in different brain areas (for a general review, Zeki & Ishizu, 2013).

Hence the biologically based initial belief attached to normal faces must revolve around a configuration that must contain a certain number of features such as eyes, nose, mouth

etc., set out within certain proportions and harmonious and symmetrical relations to each other which, together, correspond to an inherited or rapidly acquired brain template indicative of faces. Extensive experience with distorted faces does not appear to modify the perception of normal faces (Chen & Zeki, 2011), thus showing again that β priors are resistant to change through experience.

5 | B PRIORS AND THE “CORE KNOWLEDGE” SYSTEM

Before proceeding to discuss artefactual priors, it is interesting to refer to the “core knowledge” system, some aspects of which may bear a superficial resemblance to our discussion of Bayesian operations. The “core knowledge” system is hypothesized to consist of five broad categories dealing with object representation, agent representation, a universal number system, a system for environmental geometry and one for reasoning about partners and social groups (Spelke & Kinzler, 2007); these systems are thought to have a long evolutionary history, to be cross cultural and therefore to have universal validity. To that extent the “core knowledge” system has an obvious resemblance to our β priors; it is also similar to the β priors in that it promotes the capacity of the new-born to integrate into its environment. But the hypothesized core system also differs significantly from the one we hypothesize here, in three basic ways:

First, the categories in the “core knowledge” system are very broad and the possibility that there may be a modular system for different kinds of knowledge is expressly denied, since “the human mind does not appear to be massively modular...[but] appears to be built on a small number of core systems” (Spelke & Kinzler, 2007). We do not deny that there may be strong unifying bases in, for example, object recognition, but we believe in a strongly modular system in which different kinds of knowledge, even within the biological category, are processed separately (Zeki, 1978a; Zeki et al., 1991) and perceived asynchronously, at least in the short time scale after exposure to the stimuli (< 100 ms). It is known, for example, that we perceive colour before form (orientation) and before visual motion (Aymoz & Viviani, 2004; Moutoussis & Zeki, 1997; Viviani & Aymoz, 2001). The temporal difference for the perception of these different attributes is almost certainly dictated by differences in processing time (Clifford, Arnold, & Pearson, 2003; Lo & Zeki, 2014; Žarić, Yazdanbakhsh, Nishina, De Weerd, & Watanabe, 2015). Moreover, in our system biological forms such as human faces or bodies are regulated by distinctly different mechanisms from those regulating the perception of other objects (Grill-Spector, Kourtzi, & Kanwisher, 2001; Kanwisher et al., 1997); this difference is also reflected temporally, since there are temporal differences in the detection of biological

and non-biological objects (Aymoz & Viviani, 2004). This spatial and temporal modularity makes sense since there are instances where the relationships between parts are critical (as in faces and bodies) and other instances in which they are not (as in many objects of everyday design or indeed in abstract paintings or in colour vision).

The second major difference is in the supposition of the core knowledge system that, “Although core conceptions are resilient, they can be overcome. The history of science and mathematics provides numerous examples of fundamental conceptual changes that occurred as thinkers became aware of the mismatches between the principles governing their reasoning and the world of phenomena they sought to understand.” As the example of colour vision, discussed above, shows, this is not a principle that has general validity in our system even if it has validity in some more abstract and intellectual spheres such as physics. In colour vision, no amount of intellectual knowledge that a surface is reflecting light of a waveband that is not associated with its colour (for example red) can lead a normal human subject to categorize a green leaf as red. This is equally true of faces; repetitive daily exposure to disfigured faces does not appear to lead subjects to accept them as normal, though deformed objects can become accepted as normal through repeated exposure (Chen & Zeki, 2011).

This ushers in the third difference between the core knowledge system and ours, as it applies to our biological priors. As we understand it, the core knowledge system, while facilitating the new-born infant's exploration of its environment, depends significantly upon the experience acquired after birth during an infant's exploratory behaviour. We do not deny that this may play a role in modifying percepts that belong to the biological category but believe that such perceptual experiences are often severely limited by inherited concepts, as in the examples of ratio-taking in colour vision and exact proportions and relations between parts in the case of face and body representation.

6 | ARTEFACTUAL (A) PRIORS

By artefactual priors, we refer to the many constructs—from shoes, kitchen utensils, tools of varying complexity to cars and aeroplanes—in brief to man-made products. Unlike colour categories and faces, there is no evidence of a universal, inherited, brain concept, since different cultures have developed different tools and have significantly different architectures. Instead, the brain acquires a concept of these objects through experience and consequent updating of priors, which are strongly culture-dependent. In medieval times, people had no concept of a car or a plane; since their introduction, there have been many modifications of them, and the concepts attached to them have changed accordingly. The

concept of a plane that someone living in the 1930s had, for example, did not include jumbo jets equipped with jet engines or variable geometry swing-wing planes; these have been added to the overall concept of a plane since. There are, of course many other examples one could give, including the use of knives and forks and chop-sticks, which differ between cultures and times. Hence one can say that there is no initial, biologically determined, prior. Rather, a prior is enabled through post-natal concept formation, which is modified with new experiences.

Crucially, acquired or empirical priors emerge *de novo* and are driven by experiences that are unique to any individual in any given lifetime, although there may be, and usually are, population-level similarities. They therefore are necessarily less precise and more accommodating than biological priors. This follows because they are designed to be modified by experience. The general Bayesian formula for artefactual priors is therefore the classical formulation (see under Bayesian equation) given above, where the priors have a large variance (also see Figure 1).

It is now generally accepted that there is a complex of areas, known as the lateral occipital complex (LOC), which is critical for object recognition (Cichy & Haynes, 2011; Eger, Ashburner, Haynes, Dolan, & Rees, 2008; Grill-Spector, 2003; Malach et al., 1995). Even though it has been argued that the so-called face areas may not be as specific to faces as originally supposed (Gauthier, Skudlarski, Gore, & Anderson, 2000), and that cells in them may encode objects as well, including ones which we would classify under artefactual categories, the differential response to faces and objects when inverted suggests that they are processed differently (see under faces). Moreover, neural sensitivity to faces increases with age in face-selective but not object-selective areas of the brain, and the perceptual discriminability of faces correlates with neural sensitivity to face identity in face selective regions, whereas it does not correlate with a heightened amplitude in object selective areas (Natu et al., 2016).

7 | A BIOLOGICAL PRIOR THAT MAKES ARTEFACTUAL PRIORS POSSIBLE?

We have emphasized above the need to separate biological from artefactual *priors* in considering Bayesian operations. Here, it is worth asking whether, at the earliest recorded stages after birth, one can postulate the presence of a *general biological prior* that leads to artefactual priors, which then assume an autonomy of their own (see also Serié & Seitz, 2013). For the perception of visual forms, the common view is that there is one category of cell in the visual brain, the orientation selective (OS) cell (Hubel & Wiesel, 1962), which is the physiological “building block” of all

forms. This is a plausible argument entertained by both physiologists as well as artists like Piet Mondrian, who defined form as “the plurality of straight lines in rectangular opposition” (see Zeki, 1999). There is an extensive literature on OS cells from birth to adulthood; we do not review this here but summarise the evidence by saying that, while the OS cells, and hence the presumed machinery for constructing forms, must be present at birth, they require nourishment in the early stages after birth to mature. Depriving the animal (cat or monkey) at a critical period after birth blights their visual capacities for considerable periods, perhaps even permanently, thereafter. On the other hand, depriving adult animals of vision for equivalent periods in adulthood has little or no effect (Hubel & Wiesel, 1977). Observations in humans deprived of vision at birth through congenital cataracts, with vision restored later in life after successful operations, confirms that visual nourishment during an early “critical” period is necessary for a normal visual life (for a review, see (Zeki, 1993)), including for expertise in recognizing faces (Le Grand, Mondloch, Maurer, & Brent, 2001).

By contrast, a normally nourished visual brain can subsequently recognize and categorize many different shapes or forms, even those that have not been seen before (Freedman, Riesenhuber, Poggio, & Miller, 2001; Logothetis, Pauls, & Poggio, 1995). Hence, one could consider that OS cells are the given biological *priors*. In accepting the common supposition that OS cells constitute the physiological “building blocks” from which all categories of objects and forms (including faces) are constructed, one must nevertheless acknowledge that (a) OS cells are widely distributed in different, specialized, visual areas of the brain (Zeki, 1978b); (b) that the OS cells of V1 may not be the sole source for the neural construction of forms and objects, especially since OS cells in visual areas outside V1 survive the destruction of V1, which suggests that their properties may not be wholly dependent upon input from V1 (Schmid, Panagiotaropoulos, Augath, Logothetis, & Smirnakis, 2009); (c) OS cells in different visual areas may contribute to form construction in different ways (Shigihara & Zeki, 2013, 2014a). Moreover, unlike what is commonly posited, V1 is not the sole source of the “feed-forward” visual input to the rest of the visual brain; the specialized visual areas, including areas with high concentration of OS cells as well as areas specialized for face and object perception, receive two further “feed-forward” inputs, from the lateral geniculate nucleus and the pulvinar (Benevento & Rezak, 1976; Cragg, 1969; Fries, 1981; Yukie & Iwai, 1981) and are activated with the same latencies, post stimulus presentation, as V1 (Shigihara & Zeki, 2013, 2014a,b). Hence a strictly hierarchical organization for form based on a single feed-forward system from the lateral geniculate nucleus through V1 (as is almost universally supposed),

and in which cells within the brain's form system acquire increasingly more complex properties, enabling them to respond to complex objects and faces, is probably unlikely. Rather, there appears to be multiple hierarchical systems, which operate in parallel—with recurrent message passing for belief updating and which are time and context dependent (Zeki, 2016). Hence, if the OS cells constitute the biological prior from which forms and objects are constructed in the brain, one must entertain the possibility that there may be several different kinds of OS cells, embedded in different visual areas, each of which may constitute a biological or β *prior* for generating different kinds of posteriors, some of them artefactual. The question has not been addressed experimentally.

There is another difficulty in considering OS as being the sole universal biological *priors*. One cannot build a definitive and exclusive posterior from a single, or from multiple, oriented lines. If faced with either a single or multiple oriented lines, what would the posterior be? This is quite unlike colour, where certain ratios of wavelength composition of light reflected from a patch with given physical properties (reflectance) and from its surrounds lead, *ineluctably*, to a given universal biological *prior* in the form of a certain constant colour category, from which certain posteriors, in the form of hues belonging within that colour category, can be elaborated (Land, 1986). We are, we believe, therefore justified in supposing that orientation selectivity, and its manifestation in the OS cells of V1, cannot be the biological *prior* for all forms, as most suppose. Rather, OS cells in different areas may be used to construct different forms or different categories of form, which then act as distinct priors from which posteriors can be generated. But a line need not be a means toward a more complex form; it can exist on its own and in its own right, as artists have so frequently demonstrated. Moreover, there is no belief that can be attached to single oriented lines, except in the narrow sense that they can constitute, either singly or in arbitrary combination, forms in themselves. This is what Alexander Rodchenko argued when he wrote “I introduced and proclaimed the line as an element of construction and as an independent form in painting”. He added, “...the line can be expressed in its own right, as the design of a hypothetical construction [and can have] a status independent of what is actually taking place, and becomes an abstraction” (Rodchenko, 1921/2009) (our ellipsis). Many artists since then have emphasized the primacy of the line in their work, if not in their writings, and the single line or separated single lines are characteristic of the work of many artists, including Alexander Rodchenko, Kazimir Malevich, Olga Rozanova, Barnett Newman, among others.

Hence, there is no universal belief that is attached to how single oriented lines can be combined. There is also no universal belief attached to what significant configuration of straight lines constitutes a given category of object.

The configuration of houses, as places of habitation, differs widely in different cultures—from igloos to huts to skyscrapers and even to inverted pyramidal buildings (for example the *Katimavik* of Rod Robbie or the Slovak Radio Building of Štefan Svetko in Bratislava). One cannot assume that huts are the universal mode of habitation or that inverted buildings depart from the concept of habitation. Rather, the latter are absorbed into the concept (*i.e.*, generative models) of habitation through experience (but see below). There may in fact be some Euclidean geometric system which is part of universal human intuition, based on an evolutionarily ancient system; this system may be developed by children, as they experience different forms in their environment, into the construction of “new forms of geometric representation” (Spelke, Sang, & Izard, 2010). We believe that the construction of new forms, while perhaps dependent upon some inherited geometric template approximating the Euclidean system, nevertheless can be divided into two categories, biological and non-biological. Of these, the former is strictly regulated by the brain's inherited template and can vary but little with experience (see the discussion on faces given above).

8 | BIOLOGICAL PRIORS THAT ENABLE ARTEFACTUAL PRIORS IN BIRDSONG

It is interesting to compare the biological priors that enable artefactual priors in the visual brain's form system to very similar general characteristics regulating birdsongs. All songbird species have the same neural apparatus for producing song (β priors in the world of birds) and all birdsongs consist of a trill (a universal, inherited, feature, just like colour categorizations) with varying syllables (Konishi, 1985). The most commonly studied bird is the zebra finch, a species that uses only one stereotyped conspecific song, to which the birds must be exposed during a critical period post-hatching (Brenowitz & Beecher, 2005), reminiscent of the critical period for the development of orientation selectivity in cats and primates and suggesting that it is programmed through an inherited mechanism. This suggests that biological priors regulate the characteristics of birdsong in the zebra finch. Other species may take several stages of learning but again do so during specific periods post-hatching, suggesting a variability in the post-hatching critical period for learning songs. In general, each bird species has a unique song or songs, and a specific species of bird is genetically pre-disposed to learn the song of its own species. But different aspects of song may be used by different species of bird for species recognition (for reviews, see Konishi (1985 and Williams (2004)). In fact, unlike the zebra finch, the repertoire of song in other birds is greater. Marsh warblers can produce, for example, many of the songs that they hear and brown thrashers can learn over 1000 songs.

Birdsongs can even have, or develop, different “dialects.” Hence, in spite of the ability of birds such as warblers and mockingbirds to acquire a relatively large repertoire of song, the birdsong system is either entirely inhospitable to change through experience (as in the zebra finch) or relatively so as in marsh warblers. This suggests that in at least some species of bird, the song repertoire is significantly culture dependent and hence belongs as well to the acquired, artefactual category. Translated into the schema we propose here, some bird-songs belong uniquely in the category of biological priors whereas in others the biological priors enable artefactual priors to be acquired.

9 | BIOLOGICAL PRIORS IN THE EXPERIENCE OF BEAUTY

Here, we sail into more treacherous waters and ask whether there are any β priors in one of the most fundamental and universal of human experiences, namely that of beauty. We do so to emphasize the huge range over which β priors may operate. We suggest that beauty itself must be divided into biological beauty (in which we include mathematical beauty) and artefactual beauty (see Zeki, Chén, & Romaya, 2018; Zeki, Romaya, Benincasa, & Atiyah, 2014). It is likely that one will find greater agreement among individuals of different cultures and races within the category of biological beauty (including mathematical beauty) than within artefactual beauty. The question of beauty imposes itself naturally from one of the main questions addressed in this paper, namely the extent to which individuals can assume that their experience and judgment has universal assent. This question is especially important in the context of beauty, widely considered to be a subjective experience, unique to individuals, a belief encapsulated in the old Roman proverb that “*De gustibus et coloribus non est disputandum*” (which incidentally includes colour in the subjective category although, as we have argued above, there is little that is subjective in the experience of colour categories, given its uniformity; see also Zeki et al., 2019). Yet a reasonable inference to be read into Kant's speculations about the experience of beauty in his *Critique of Judgment* (Kant, 1790/1987) is that anyone judging a face, for example, to be beautiful may assume that others will also make the same judgment of the same face. If so, one can also assume that the scope of experience in modifying one's belief about what constitutes beauty in, for example, a face or a body is also limited though perhaps not quite as limited as for colour categorization.

Contrary to Kant, who believed that some experiences are interfaced through determinate concepts and others through indeterminate ones (see above), we assume that all experiences, including that of beauty, are interfaced through determinate concepts; indeed we do not make a distinction

between determinate and indeterminate concepts. But we divide beauty into two categories, though ones that differ from those proposed by Kant. In particular, we posit that the concepts or programmes mediating biological beauty are inherited and, just like colour categories, are resistant to change; those mediating artefactual beauty are acquired post-natally and are therefore hospitable to change. But there is, or there can be, a continuum between the two; this leads us to suggest that some aesthetic experiences may be interfaced through both biological and artefactual concepts, when the experiencing individual can assume universal consent to their experience on a variable scale (see below).

10 | B PRIORS IN THE EXPERIENCE OF BIOLOGICAL BEAUTY

We begin by addressing the question of whether there are any biological priors in the experience of beauty. This is an important, if enormously difficult, subject to tackle. Here, we ask whether there are any universals in beauty that enables an individual from one cultural or ethnic group to assume that what one experiences as beautiful will have universal assent, which is to say that individuals from other ethnic or cultural groups will experience the same thing as beautiful.

It is perhaps best to begin by stating clearly what, in the biological realm, cannot be experienced as beautiful. Faces and bodies are good examples. Starting with what we have stated above, namely that there is a significant configuration which, when it appears in a stimulus, ineluctably leads an individual to identify that object as a face, one can go one step further and say that no face that has two eyes that are placed asymmetrically and in non-harmonious relations with each other (for example, are greatly displaced from one another) can be universally experienced as beautiful (here, we are distinguishing between real human faces as opposed to their depictions in sculpture or painting). An individual can assume with high probability that a human face thus traduced (which implies traducing the inherited brain template for what a face should look like) will not be judged as beautiful by others, and that what one individual perceives therefore has universal assent.

On the other hand, individuals judging a face to be very beautiful can also assume with reasonably high probability that their judgment has universal agreement. Indeed, it has been shown many times that, broadly, faces regarded as beautiful in one culture are also so regarded as beautiful in other cultures (Cunningham, Roberts, Barbee, Druen, & Wu, 1995; Fink, 2005; Langlois, Ritter, Roggman, & Vaughan, 1991; Langlois & Roggman, 1990). Moreover, even infants tend to orient more towards beautiful faces (Langlois, Roggman, Casey, & Ritter, 1997) regardless of race (Langlois et al.,

1991). This leads one to suppose that there is a β prior for some categories of beauty, in this instance for facial beauty. What is more difficult to determine is what the precise characteristics determining facial beauty are, beyond the generally accepted proposition that they involve the symmetrical disposition and harmonious relations of constituent parts. It is perhaps easier to define what does not constitute facial beauty; in general terms, it involves the subversion of the inherited template for a significant configuration for faces—a fact well recognized by the painter Francis Bacon (see above).

Hence, we propose that there is a basic significant configuration which constitutes the initial β prior for a face and, at the same time, the initial β prior for beauty on a face, the precise characteristic of the latter being ill-defined but universally recognized in terms of the judgment and experience of beauty. The parallel to this in colour vision is the β prior that determines both the colour category and the initial hue attached to that category. From these biological priors posteriors can be generated through experience, as indeed they seem to be over months post-natally, when infants become more familiar with faces (Lee, Quinn, & Pascalis, 2017). But what confers on a normal face the inestimable quality of beauty is much more difficult to define. In his *Kanon*, the Greek sculptor Polykleitos suggested that the perfect human body (such as his *Dorypheros*) can be sculpted using a body part such as a phalanx and treating it as one side of a square; when rotated the square's diagonal gives a ratio of 1: $\sqrt{2}$ which can be applied, by multiplication, for creating the next phalanx and then repeating the procedure until the whole forearm is sculpted; in the final product, the different and contiguous parts bear a definitive mathematical relationship to each other. While agreeing, in his *Vier Bucher von menschlicher Proportion*, that a canon of mathematical proportions must be applied to the geometrically constructed human face and figure, Albrecht Dürer believed somewhat more realistically that the beauty of form was relative and not absolute. Similarly, Leon Battista Alberti believed in averages or means when constructing the perfect human figure, as when he states in *De Statua* that, “I proceeded accordingly to measure and record in writing, not simply the beauty found in this or that body, but, as far as possible, the perfect beauty distributed in Nature, as it were in fixed proportions, among many bodies” (Aiken, 1980), a supposition that finds some support in infants' preference for the averageness in faces (Aharon et al., 2001; Anzures, Mondloch, & Lackner, 2009; Loffler, Yourganov, Wilkinson, & Wilson, 2005). Hence, while proportion and harmony are generally agreed to be pillars of beauty in the human figure and face, there is no agreement or even knowledge of absolute values but rather a tendency towards average or mean values. Whether there are absolute or mean values, the general point we are making is that, for a face to be immediately recognized, first as a face and next as a normal face and finally as a beautiful face (see also below),

not only must at least some of its constituents be present but they must be there in certain, fairly precisely defined, mathematical relationship to one another.

11 | THE EXPERIENCE OF ARTEFACTUAL BEAUTY

There are many examples of artefactual beauty, which include all man-made objects; such objects are interfaced through brain concepts which are acquired post-natally and continually updated, thus making them more hospital to Bayesian analyses. It is likely, for example, that those brought up in Oriental cultures will find greater beauty in the noble temples of the East and those nourished in Western culture in the great cathedrals and abbeys of the West. Yet, when it comes to artefactual beauty, it is also interesting to question whether the experience of artefacts such as buildings are not also interfaced through biological concepts, in addition to acquired, artefactual ones. This can be illustrated by reference to architecture and architectural beauty in general (Zeki, 2019). It would be surprising if the new-born has a concept of a house or some building that serves a given purpose. The concept of a building is acquired post-natally as are concepts of different kinds of buildings, for example a habitation, an industrial building or a temple or church. The question becomes more difficult when one enquires whether there is any determining concept regarding beauty in architecture, which amounts to asking whether architectural beauty belongs to the biological or artefactual category, or to both. The answer may not be quite straightforward.

12 | THE CATEGORIZATION OF ARCHITECTURAL BEAUTY

Although we have included in the artefactual category human artefacts such as cars, utensils and buildings, the separation between biological and artefactual priors can be more nuanced. It is interesting to ask whether there is any determinate concept regarding beauty in architecture; an ancillary question is to ask to what extent an individual belonging to a certain ethnic or cultural group can reasonably assume that what one judges to be a beautiful architectural design will have universal assent, in the sense that others will also judge that architectural design as beautiful?

The architect as well as the viewer of buildings would have already looked at nature and something of that (biological) experience would have surely seeped into the experience of both. The Roman architect Vitruvius (for whom beauty or *Venustas* constituted one of the three pillars or Triads of architecture) emphasized that beauty in architecture is derived at least in part from contemplating the beauty of nature, and

especially the beauty of the human body, the experience of which, just like the experience of human faces, is interfaced through inherited brain concepts (see above). Like Vitruvius, Leonardo Da Vinci also believed strongly in copying nature when trying to represent objects and their beauty. In his *Vitruvian Man (Canon of Proportions)* he worked in the reverse direction from Vitruvius: he adapted mathematical architectural principles, derived from the Vitruvian architectural principles, to produce the perfect human body, which represented for him, in miniature form, the harmonies and proportions present in nature and the Universe, and which he therefore considered to be a “*cosmografia del minor mondo.*” Hence, if architectural principles, derived from inherited universal laws of deductive, inductive and analogic logic that are at the basis of mathematics (Zeki et al., 2014, 2018), are used (consciously or unconsciously) in the creation of perfect human bodies for an artist like Leonardo, these same principles can also act in the reverse direction too—in influencing architectural design. Indeed, one is tempted to read into the principle of *pareidolia* the desire of the architect to instil, unconsciously, properties derived from more biological percepts such as those of faces or bodies or landscapes into architectural design. It is indeed common to find architectural designs that are inspired by, and resemble, human bodies or body parts.

It is therefore reasonable to suppose that there is a heavy dose of biological beauty, dependent upon inherited brain concepts, that regulates architectural design, provided it is not subject to other requirements, as detailed above. We therefore imagine, though we cannot be sure, that, if forced to do the experiment, an outside observer would find that, even though the unanimity is not nearly as great as those found in colour categorization, there is greater unanimity in classifying buildings as beautiful than is commonly supposed; hence that, even in the domain of architecture, beauty is not quite as subjective as may seem at first. Although there are many considerations that go into architectural design, what universality architectural beauty may possess probably lies in satisfying inherited brain concepts of proportion, harmony and geometric relationships that are more formally expressed in mathematical beauty.

13 | CONCLUSION

We have here given a general account of what we believe is an important distinction to be made when considering the brain as a Bayesian-Laplacian system. For simplicity, we have concentrated on extreme examples, ones which we have better knowledge of, namely that of colours and faces for the β priors and of common artefacts such as cars and common utensils for the α priors. This naturally leaves out of account a territory in which both priors may

be involved; the distinction we make here may, therefore, presage further distinctions within each category which will no doubt be made in the future. Laplace himself delved into questions of average mortality and the average duration of marriages. The list can be extended to include social interactions as well as economic activity in which the unfortunately un-studied β prior of greed may play a crucial role, in addition to α priors. An example of the latter, which plays a role in economic calculations, is the recognition of political decisions that influence monetary values, which would fall into the artefactual, α , category. In these, and many other human activities that involve making inferences based on a set of beliefs, the distinction between the two categories of priors is, we believe, important. Finally, the distinction between biological and artefactual priors can also be extended to aesthetics, since aesthetics pertaining to biological entities such as faces or bodies, are similarly constrained by the inherited brain mechanisms regulating their perception (Zeki, 2009, 2013).

We have restricted ourselves here largely to the visual brain, but hope to deal with other brain processes that are subject to Bayesian-Laplacian operations in future papers.

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AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS

S.Z. wrote the paper; O.Y.C. provided all the mathematical formulations.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

Authors have no competing interests to declare.

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