Online Appendix

Likeminded? Congruence Between Political Elites and their Voters Regarding Policy Choices in Swiss-EU Relations

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1. European integration issues

In the article, I investigate the congruence of voter and candidate opinions on four specific European integration questions: 1) the trade-off between maintaining the bilateral agreements and limiting immigration, 2) the cohesion billion, 3) the trade-off between the institutional framework agreement and the accompanying measures, and 4) EU membership. The four issues are listed in an ascending order ranging from the least to the greatest possible European integration. Whereas a preference for limits on immigration as opposed to the current status-quo, i.e., the existing bilateral treaties, can be considered as a statement in favour of the *least* possible European integration, a Swiss membership in the EU would mean the *greatest* possible European integration. In the following, I present these four issues concerning the Swiss-EU relations in detail.

1.1. Trade-off between the bilateral agreements and limiting immigration

Since a majority of voters and cantons rejected a Swiss accession to the EEA in 1992, Switzerland has pursued the bilateral approach of a mutual relationship with the EU. To date, Switzerland and the EU have concluded 20 main and around 100 other bilateral agreements that govern various areas of cooperation. Swiss citizens have approved of the bilateral way on several occasions. In 2000, two out of three voters accepted the "bilateral treaties I", a first set of bilateral agreements that included the treaty on the free movement of persons (FMP). The FMP entered into force in 2002 and has since been an integral part of the Swiss-EU relationship. A second set of bilateral agreements extended the cooperation between Switzerland and the EU beyond economic affairs to political areas including internal security, asylum, the environment, and cultural affairs. Although seven out of the nine agreements from this second set were subject to an optional referendum, only one referendum was held, namely on the Schengen/Dublin Association Agreement. This agreement was approved by 55% of Swiss voters in June 2005. In September 2005 and February 2009, clear majorities of voters and cantons backed the FMP and even voted in favour of its extension to new EU member states.

This bilateral approach has allowed Switzerland to walk the line between increasing its economic integration with Europe and maintaining a great share of national autonomy at the same time. In 2014, however, voters had to decide on the "Mass Immigration Initiative" launched by the Swiss People's Party (SVP), a populist right-wing party that holds the most seats in Parliament. The initiative was accepted by a slim majority of voters (50.3%) and 17 out of 26 cantons. The acceptance of the "Mass Immigration Initiative" somehow dampened the bilateral approach which had thus far been politically viable and economically successful. The initiative namely envisaged immigration quotas and a preferential treatment for Swiss residents on the job market. However, the EU has always insisted that the FMP is an integral part of its single market policy and constitutes a non-negotiable condition for maintaining the bilateral agreements. In December 2016, the Swiss Parliament implemented the accepted "Mass Immigration Initiative" by passing the amended Foreign Nationals Act. In doing so, it introduced a system in which employers are obliged to report job vacancies to public job centres when the profession specific unemployment rate exceeds a certain threshold. Against the will of the SVP, the Parliament abstained from introducing immigration quotas. Were the Parliament to implement the initiative literally by means of quotas it would have infringed the treaty on the FMP with the EU and thereby put the continuation of all other bilateral agreements from the first set into danger.[1]

Unsurprisingly, the (non-)implementation of the "Mass Immigration Initiative" did not settle the political conflict over the FMP in Switzerland. On the contrary: The Campaign for an Independent and Neutral Switzerland (AUNS) and the SVP succeeded in collecting enough signatures for a new popular

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[1] The link between the FMP and the "bilateral treaties I" is due to the so-called "guillotine clause", which refers to the following mechanism: If either the EU or Switzerland terminates one of the seven bilateral agreements, the remaining six agreements are also null and void after six months.

initiative, the "Limitation Initiative". This initiative specifically demanded that the FMP treaty between Switzerland and the EU be terminated. However, when the "Limitation Initiative" was put to the popular vote in September 2020, it neither found a majority among voters (62% no votes) nor among cantons (22 out of 26 rejected the initiative).

After the votes in 2000, 2005 and 2009, the FMP was thus backed by Swiss voters in 2020 for a fourth time. The recurring debate around the FMP underlines the fact that Switzerland is in a trade-off situation in which it can only reach one political goal: either reduce immigration by introducing quotas or foster its economic integration with the EU, i.e., keep the FMP together with the other bilateral treaties I.

1.2. Cohesion billion

Another issue that is often debated concerns Switzerland's financial contributions to selected EU member states. These contributions are better known as the "cohesion billion" or "enlargement contribution" which aims at reducing economic and social disparities within the EU. Although the EU recognises the cohesion billion as an independent contribution (i.e., a "goodwill payment") by Switzerland acting out of solidarity, the financial contribution is nevertheless often regarded as the "price to pay" for Switzerland's privileged access to the EU single market.

After a first financial contribution was accepted by 53% of Swiss voters in 2006, the Federal Council decided in favour of a second cohesion billion in 2017. This decision was backed by the Parliament in 2019. However, the Parliament included a sine qua non: Switzerland only pays the second cohesion billion if the EU renounces any discriminatory measures. In the eyes of Switzerland, such discriminatory measures currently exist: In 2019, the European Commission did not extend the so-called equivalence recognition of the Swiss legal framework applicable to stock exchanges. This was mainly a retaliatory measure because back then, Switzerland had not yet ratified the institutional framework agreement concluded in 2018 (see next section). In 2021, however, the Parliament made a political turnaround by deleting the passus on discriminatory measures and deblocked the second cohesion billion in order to appease the EU after the Federal Council's unilateral decision not to sign the institutional framework agreement.[2]

1.3. Trade-off between the institutional framework agreement and the accompanying measures

The institutional framework agreement was at the forefront of Swiss-EU relations for quite some time. After more than four years of negotiations, Switzerland and the EU concluded the agreement in December 2018. In the view of the EU, this agreement had become necessary to ensure a consistent application of the current (and future) bilateral treaties. It aimed at solving several questions regarding the mutual relationship, for example, what procedures to employ in case legal disputes between Switzerland and the EU arise. Concerning this question, the role of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) was politically highly contested in Switzerland. The dispute settlement procedure developed in the scope of the institutional agreement foresaw an arbitration panel consisting of members of both parties. In some cases, this arbitration panel would have referred the dispute to the CJEU. The interpretation of this court would then have been binding for the arbitration panel.

Another highly salient point of the institutional agreement regarded the dynamic adoption of EU law developments in the field of five bilateral treaties (FMP, overland transport, air transport, technical barriers to trade / mutual recognition, and agriculture). Because of the role the CJEU was supposed to play in the dispute settlement procedure and the dynamic adoption of EU law developments envisaged

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[2] Note that the non-EU members Norway, Island and Liechtenstein – which are, however, part of the EEA – do also pay a cohesion sum. Moreover, these three countries do not only pay – proportionally speaking – significantly more but they have also already reached the third cohesion tranche.

by the institutional framework agreement, the political Right feared a substantial loss of sovereignty and thus fiercely opposed the institutional agreement.

The political Left and, in particular, the trade unions opposed the institutional framework agreement out of another reason. When introducing the FMP back in 2002, the Federal Council insisted on protecting Swiss wage levels. It therefore put wage protection arrangements in place, which are better known as "accompanying measures". The EU has always argued that some of these accompanying measures are not in conformity with the FMP treaty. The institutional agreement would have brought about a certain diminution of the accompanying measures. The political Left and the trade unions strongly opposed any such weakening of the accompanying measures and wished to maintain (all of) the social protection measures on the Swiss labour market. Due to the strong domestic opposition to the institutional agreement form the Right and the Left, the Federal Council decided in May 2021 not to sign the agreement. Because of this decision, Switzerland now risks a gradual erosion of the existing bilateral agreements as the EU has made clear that it is unwilling to update any existing or conclude any new bilateral agreement without the institutional questions being solved. As Lauener et al. (2022) argue, this political conflict represents a new trade-off situation that emerged in the scope of the institutional framework agreement: a trade-off between international integration and social protection. Switzerland cannot sign the institutional agreement (at least not its 2018 version) and maintain all of its accompanying measures at the same time.

1.4. EU membership

The final European integration question the article investigates – and the most "integrationist" one – is EU membership. It is noteworthy, that since the 1992 rejection of accessing the EEA, the public debate has largely shifted away from the question whether Switzerland should become a member of the EU. Back in 1992, the result was quite narrow with 49.7% wishing to join the EEA. Almost ten years later, the verdict of Swiss voters on joining the EU was, however, unambiguous: In a 2001 vote on a popular initiative that aimed at (re-)starting negotiations about a Swiss EU membership, only 23.2% of voters shared this endeavour. In 2016, the Swiss government officially withdrew its request to join the EEA dating from 1992. Switzerland as a member of the European Union remains politically unthinkable in the near future: In recent years, the rejection by Swiss citizens to join the EU has levelled off at around 80% (Sarrasin et al., 2018). Nevertheless, the topic has recently experienced a cautious upswing, with EU membership becoming a valid option for some political forces on the Left in the light of the failed institutional framework agreement and the resulting uncertainty regarding the future of the bilateral agreements.

1.5. Question wordings

Table B1 reports the exact question wordings of the above-explained four European integration issues that were asked in the Selects Panel Survey (voters) and the Candidate Survey (political elites).

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Table B1: Question Wordings

European integration issue	Panel Survey (voters)		Candidate Survey (candidates)	
	Question	Answer categories	Question	Answer categories
Trade-off bilateral agreements vs. limits on immigration	If Switzerland had to choose between restricting immigration and maintaining the bilateral agreements, what would you choose?	1 = restrict immigration 2 = rather restrict immigration 3 = rather maintain bilateral agreements 4 = maintain bilateral agreements	Is limiting immigration more important to you than maintaining the bilateral agreements with the EU?	1 = no 2 = rather no 3 = rather yes 4 = yes
Cohesion billion	In order to maintain good bilateral relations between the EU and Switzerland, the Federal Council decided in 2017, as in previous years, to support selected, less developed EU member states over ten years with a total of CHF 1.3 billion (the so-called «cohesion billion»). Are you in favour of or against this cohesion billion?	1 = in favour of cohesion billion 2 = rather in favour of cohesion billion 3 = rather against cohesion billion 4 = against cohesion billion	Are you in favour of or against the payment of the cohesion billion in support of less developed, Eastern European EU member states?	1 = in favour of cohesion billion 2 = rather in favour of cohesion billion 3 = rather against cohesion billion 4 = against cohesion billion
Trade-off institutional agreement vs. accompanying measures	If Switzerland had to choose between the institutional agreement and the accompanying measures for wage protection, what would you choose?	1 = accept institutional agreement 2 = rather accept institutional agreement 3 = rather maintain accompanying measures for wage protection 4 = maintain accompanying measures for wage protection	If Switzerland had to choose between the institutional agreement and the accompanying measures for wage protection, what would you choose?	1 = accept institutional agreement 2 = rather accept institutional agreement 3 = rather maintain accompanying measures for wage protection 4 = maintain accompanying measures for wage protection
EU membership	Are you in favour of Switzerland joining the EU or staying out?	1 = very much in favour of EU accession 2 = rather in favour of EU accession 3 = neither nor 4 = rather in favour of staying out 5 = very much in favour of staying out	Should Switzerland start negotiations on joining the EU?	1 = no 2 = rather no 3 = rather yes 4 = yes

While the questions asked in the Panel Survey and the Candidate Survey are often quite similar or even identical, there are some formulations that deviate to some extent between the two surveys (see Table B1). Importantly, the question on the trade-off between the bilateral agreements and limits on immigration and the question on EU membership are not identical. For the former, citizens could choose between the bilateral agreements or limits on immigration, while candidates were asked whether limiting immigration is more important to them than maintaining the bilateral agreements. Indeed, one can argue

that the candidates who answer "(rather) no" could either mean that the bilateral agreements with the EU are more important or that limiting immigration and the bilateral agreements are both equally important. This political conflict has been around in Swiss politics for quite long now (see above). I would thus argue that the political elites should be aware of the trade-off situation that exists in real politics (or at least they are probably more aware of it than ordinary citizens).

For the question on EU membership, the formulation for candidates ("start negotiations") is a more technical one than for voters ("join EU"). Although starting negotiations is not yet a decision in favour of or against accession, there is no reason to believe that candidates who would like to start negotiations do not want to join the EU (and vice versa), even more so in an electoral campaign context and for such a fundamental question. While it is unfortunate that, in these cases, the questions were not asked in the exact same way, I would still argue that the voter and candidate questions in essence measure the same dimension and are thus useful for the congruence analyses.

2. Detailed information about the Selects Panel Survey

2.1. Short description

The Panel Survey is a conducted among a representative sample of Swiss citizens and studies the dynamics of opinion formation and vote intention/choice during the different phases of the election cycle. As in previous election years, three waves were conducted in 2019: the first wave before the start of the main campaign period, the second wave during the election campaign, and the third wave after the federal elections.

2.2. Design and sampling

Selects is considered a research project of national importance. Therefore, respondents were randomly drawn from the sampling register (SRPH, Stichprobenrahmen für Personen- und Haushaltserhebungen) of the Swiss Federal Statistical Office (FSO), in accordance with the Ordinance on the Execution of Federal Statistical Surveys (with Art. 13c, para. 2, lett. d).[3] 25'575 Swiss citizens with the right to vote, aged 18 and above (no upper age limit) and living in private households in Switzerland were part of the random sample. The sample frame not only contained the name and address to contact people, but also information such as birthdate, sex, marital status or country of birth of all sample members and all household members.

The Selects Panel Survey was a self-administered online survey. The questionnaire was available in three languages (German, French, Italian). The fieldwork was carried out by the FORS "Data Collection and Analysis" team. In wave 1, all sample members received a pre-notification letter, informing them that they would be invited in the following week to participate in a three-wave panel survey. The letter also contained an information sheet presenting the aims of Selects and illustrating selected results from the previous election study. The invitation letter included a personal login to the survey and an incentive (postal check of CHF 10). The letter also contained a free hotline number, an email address to get in contact with FORS as well as a link to a webpage with practical information (Q&A) for participants (www.selects.ch/info). The invitation letter was followed by up to two reminders. At the end of the wave 1 questionnaire, respondents were asked to indicate an email address for contact in subsequent waves. About 90 percent of all respondents provided a valid email address. In the subsequent waves, respondents from wave 1 were thus contacted with a mix of letters and emails. In each subsequent wave, they received an invitation with a personal login as well as up to three reminders.

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[3] See https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/cc/1993/2100_2100_2100/de (in German).

2.3. Fieldwork and response rates

Wave 1:
- Data collection (first/last interview): 20.5.2019 – 8.7.2019
- Sample members received a pre-notification letter, an invitation letter with a personalized login and an unconditional incentive (postal check of 10 CHF), and up to two reminders.
- Initial sample size: 25'575 addresses from FSO sampling frame
- Valid interviews: 7'939
- Median duration of interviews: 25 min

Wave 2:
- Data collection: 2.9.2019 – 17.10.2019
- Respondents from wave 1 received an invitation letter, and up to two reminders (by email or letter)
- Valid interviews: 5'577
- Median duration of interviews: 14 min

Wave 3:
- Data collection: 21.10.2019 – 9.12.2019
- Respondents from wave 1 received an invitation letter, and up to three reminders (by email)
- Valid interviews: 5'125
- Respondents who participated in all three waves could win one of five iPads.
- At the end of the wave 3 questionnaire, respondents were asked if they agreed to be contacted for yearly follow-up surveys. In total, 3'030 respondents gave consent.
- Median duration of interviews: 16 min

Table B2: Response rates, Selects Panel Survey 2019

	Wave 1	In %	Wave 2	In %	Wave 3	In %
Total sample / invitations	25'575	100.0	8147	100.0	8079	100.0
Interviews	*8569*	*33.5*	*5855*	*71.9*	*5449*	*67.4*
Valid questionnaire (>80% completed)	7852	30.7	5525	67.8	5094	63.1
Valid partial questionnaire (50%-80% completed)	87	0.4	52	0.6	31	0.4
Invalid questionnaire (< 50% completed and/or in less than a third of the median duration)	393	1.5	262	3.2	144	1.8
Substitution (other person completed questionnaire)*	237	0.9	16	0.2	180	2.2
Informed non answers	*1317*	*5.2*	*68*	*0.8*	*126*	*1.6*
Active refusal (no interest, language problem, etc.)	912	3.6	54	*0.7*	76	0.9
Health problem, age	148	0.6	7	0.1	1	0.0
Deceased respondent	24	0.1	3	0.0	7	0.1
Address not traceable	233	0.9	5	0.1	42	0.5
Nonresponse (no information)	*15'689*	*61.3*	*2224*	*27.3*	*2504*	*31.0*
Response rate (AAPOR 2)		**31.0**		**68.4**		**64.9**

*reported age and/or sex did not correspond to the sampling frame

2.4. Weighting

Given that a national random sampling was used, there are no design weights in the dataset. However, for all analyses that refer to the overall group of voters, I used the weight *weight_p* included in the dataset to adjust the party vote shares reported in the sample to the official election results. This weight

is calculated as the quotient of the actual party vote share according to the Federal Statistical Office and the reported party vote shares in the sample. Respondents who did not participate in the elections were excluded from the congruence analyses. Table B3 reports the calculated weights.

Table B3: Party weight (weight_p) based on the official party shares according to the Federal Statistical Office and the party shares reported in the sample (waves 2 and 3 combined, in %)

Party	Official	Sample	weight_p
Swiss People's Party (SVP)	25.6	16.9	1.51
Liberals (FDP)	15.1	16.3	0.93
Christian-Democratic Party (CVP)	11.4	9.1	1.26
Green Liberal Party (GLP)	7.8	11.0	0.71
Social-Democratic Party (SP)	16.8	19.3	0.87
Green Party (GPS)	13.2	18.2	0.73
Other party	10.1	9.3	1.08

2.5. Distributions

Tables B4-B7 contain the four European integration questions used for the congruence analyses in the article. They show the distributions of the answers across the main six parties' electorates as well as in total with the weighted total (using the weight *weight_p*) in the last column.

Table B4: Trade-off bilateral agreements vs. limits on immigration (voters)

	SVP	FDP	CVP	GLP	SP	GPS	Others	Total	Overall (weighted)
restrict immigration	276	45	28	23	21	28	44	465	598
	40.89	6.93	7.78	5.31	2.73	3.88	12.02	11.70	15.06
rather restrict immigration	229	113	79	57	58	79	83	698	793
	33.93	17.41	21.94	13.16	7.54	10.96	22.68	17.57	19.97
rather maintain bilateral agreements	131	301	173	177	350	326	149	1607	1523
	19.41	46.38	48.06	40.88	45.51	45.21	40.71	40.45	38.35
maintain bilateral agreements	39	190	80	176	340	288	90	1203	1058
	5.78	29.28	22.22	40.65	44.21	39.94	24.59	30.28	26.63
Total	675	649	360	433	769	721	366	3973	3973
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table B5: Cohesion billion (voters)

	SVP	FDP	CVP	GLP	SP	GPS	Others	Total	Overall (weighted)
against cohesion billion	307	82	24	37	41	44	80	615	752
	45.68	12.87	6.76	8.49	5.35	6.13	21.92	15.57	19.04
rather against	241	206	112	105	125	132	95	1016	1082
	35.86	32.34	31.55	24.08	16.30	18.38	26.03	25.72	27.39
rather in favour	112	245	165	191	345	332	139	1529	1435
	16.67	38.46	46.48	43.81	44.98	46.24	38.08	38.71	36.32
in favour of cohesion billion	12	104	54	103	256	210	51	790	681
	1.79	16.33	15.21	23.62	33.38	29.25	13.97	20.00	17.24
Total	672	637	355	436	767	718	365	3950	3950
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table B6: Trade-off institutional agreement vs. accompanying measures (voters)

	SVP	FDP	CVP	GLP	SP	GPS	Others	Total	Overall (weighted)
accept institutional agreement	18	113	28	68	86	73	23	409	367
	2.73	17.94	8.05	15.85	11.36	10.35	6.46	10.53	9.46
rather accept institutional agreement	91	212	128	192	220	214	75	1132	1063
	13.79	33.65	36.78	44.76	29.06	30.35	21.07	29.14	27.35
rather maintain accompanying measures	356	243	152	140	327	318	193	1729	1783
	53.94	38.57	43.68	32.63	43.20	45.11	54.21	44.50	45.90
maintain accompanying measures	195	62	40	29	124	100	65	615	672
	29.55	9.84	11.49	6.76	16.38	14.18	18.26	15.83	17.29
Total	660	630	348	429	757	705	356	3885	3885
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table B7: EU membership (voters)

	SVP	FDP	CVP	GLP	SP	GPS	Others	Total	Overall (weighted)
very much in favour of EU accession	1	16	12	26	77	48	11	191	159
	0.15	2.45	3.31	5.91	9.97	6.58	2.95	4.76	3.97
rather in favour of EU accession	12	70	40	72	251	174	41	660	562
	1.77	10.74	11.02	16.36	32.51	23.84	10.99	16.46	14.02
neither nor	43	128	63	102	186	177	85	784	719
	6.33	19.63	17.36	23.18	24.09	24.25	22.79	19.56	17.93
rather in favour of staying out	209	255	162	166	192	238	121	1343	1357
	30.78	39.11	44.63	37.73	24.87	32.60	32.44	33.50	33.85
very much in favour of staying out	414	183	86	74	66	93	115	1031	1212
	60.97	28.07	23.69	16.82	8.55	12.74	30.83	25.72	30.23
Total	679	652	363	440	772	730	373	4009	4009
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

3. Detailed information about the Selects Candidate Survey

3.1. Short description

The Candidate Survey is conducted among all candidates that run for the parliamentary elections, i.e., the National Council (Lower House) and the Council of States (Upper House). It studies topics like candidates' career paths, political attitudes, and campaign activities as well as factors of electoral success.

3.2. Design and sampling

For the Candidate Survey, the population is defined and not random, since it includes all the candidates who stood for the election to the National Council and the Council of States.

The survey was conducted by means of an online questionnaire and by sending a written questionnaire as part of the third reminder to those who had not participated online or whose online questionnaire was incomplete. The fieldwork was carried out by Politools.net on behalf of Selects in cooperation with smartvote and the University of Bern. Of the total of 4,736 candidates for the National Council and Council of States, 2,158 took part in the survey, 87 per cent of whom did so online and 13 per cent by

sending back the paper questionnaire.

3.3. Fieldwork and response rate

- Data collection (first/last interview): 21.10.2019 – 1.2.2020
- Candidates received a pre-notification letter, an invitation letter with a personalized login and up to three reminders.
- Population size: All 4'736 candidates for the National Council and/or Council of States
- Valid interviews: 2'158
- Median duration of interviews (online questionnaires: 30 min)

Table B8: Response rate, Selects Candidates Survey 2019

	Number	In %
Total population / invitations	4736	100.0
Interviews	*2325*	*49.1*
Valid questionnaire (>80% completed)	2115	44.7
Valid partial questionnaire (50%-80% completed)	43	0.9
Invalid questionnaire (< 50% completed)	167	3.5
Informed non answers	*202*	*4.3*
Unknown address (no contact)	103	2.2
Letters undeliverable	75	1.6
Active refusal (no interest, language problem, etc.)	24	0.5
Nonresponse (no information)	*2209*	*46.6*
Response rate (AAPOR 2)		**46.6**
Online questionnaire	1'881	87.2
Paper questionnaire	277	12.8

3.4. Weighting

For all analyses that refer to the overall group of candidates, I used the weight *T16* included in the dataset, which is the combined weight of *T14* (cantonal weight) and *T15* (party weight). In the Candidate Survey data, there are these three weights to correct biases regarding the canton and party affiliation of the candidates. Table B9 displays the calculations for the cantonal weight (*T14*).

Table B9: Cantonal weight (T14) based on the cantonal distribution of the whole population of candidates and the respondents in the sample (in %), National Council only

Canton	Population	Sample	T14
Zurich	20.7	19.6	1.06
Bern	14.0	13.9	1.00
Lucerne	5.4	5.7	0.95
Uri	0.1	0.1	0.69
Schwyz	1.8	1.8	1.01
Obwald	0.1	0.1	0.76
Nidwald	0.0	0.0	0.91
Glarus	0.0	0.0	0.91
Zug	1.6	1.1	1.14
Fribourg	3.3	3.9	0.84
Solothurn	3.6	3.5	1.01
Basle-City	2.9	2.4	1.17
Basle-Country	2.9	3.1	0.93
Schaffhausen	0.6	0.9	0.70
Appenzell Outer-Rhodes	0.0	0.0	0.91
Appenzell Inner-Rhodes	0.1	0.1	0.91
St. Gall	5.5	5.5	0.99
Grisons	2.1	1.8	1.20
Aargau	10.6	10.4	1.03
Thurgau	2.9	3.3	0.87
Ticino	3.2	3.6	0.88
Vaud	8.0	7.6	1.06
Valais	5.1	5.4	0.93
Neuchâtel	1.0	1.3	0.75
Geneva	3.8	3.3	1.15
Jura	0.7	1.0	0.74

Regarding the political parties, candidates of the SVP and FDP were a little bit underrepresented in the survey, while candidates of the CVP, GLP, SP and GPS were a little bit overrepresented. Table B10 displays the calculations for the party weight (*T15*).

Table B10: Party weight (T15) based on the distribution of party affiliations in the whole population of candidates and among the respondents in the sample (in %)

Party	Population	Sample	T15
Swiss People's Party (SVP)	12.3	9.6	1.29
Liberals (FDP)	11.3	10.0	1.13
Christian-Democratic Party (CVP)	15.1	16.8	0.90
Green Liberal Party (GLP)	10.2	11.5	0.89
Social-Democratic Party (SP)	12.8	14.8	0.87
Green Party (GPS)	9.8	12.4	0.79
Other party	28.4	24.9	1.14

3.5. Distributions

Tables B11-B14 contain the four European integration questions used for the congruence analyses in the article. They show the distributions of the candidates' answers across the main six parties as well as in total with the weighted total (using the weight *T16*) in the last column.

Table B11: Trade-off bilateral agreements vs. limits on immigration (candidates)

	SVP	FDP	CVP	GLP	SP	GPS	Others	Total	Overall (weighted)
limiting immigration more important than bilateral agreements	125	5	4	2	0	3	68	207	250
	71.43	2.34	1.23	0.84	0.00	1.17	13.68	10.30	12.44
rather more important	39	7	18	6	1	2	35	108	123
	22.29	3.27	5.52	2.52	0.33	0.78	7.04	5.37	6.10
rather not more important	8	42	75	18	15	19	74	251	254
	4.57	19.63	23.01	7.56	4.93	7.42	14.89	12.49	12.64
not more important	3	160	229	212	288	232	320	1444	1383
	1.71	74.77	70.25	89.08	94.74	90.63	64.39	71.84	68.82
Total	175	214	326	238	304	256	497	2010	2010
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table B12: Cohesion billion (candidates)

	SVP	FDP	CVP	GLP	SP	GPS	Others	Total	Overall (weighted)
against cohesion billion	165	23	33	8	4	1	120	354	413
	80.88	10.75	9.32	3.35	1.30	0.39	23.76	17.00	19.04
rather against	36	64	88	34	14	15	96	347	366
	17.65	29.91	24.86	14.23	4.55	5.81	19.01	16.67	27.39
rather in favour	3	85	166	85	89	90	173	691	668
	1.47	39.72	46.89	35.56	28.90	34.88	34.26	33.19	36.32
in favour of cohesion billion	0	42	67	112	201	152	116	690	635
	0.00	19.63	18.93	46.86	65.26	58.91	22.97	33.14	17.24
Total	204	214	354	239	308	258	505	2082	2082
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table B13: Trade-off institutional agreement vs. accompanying measures (candidates)

	SVP	FDP	CVP	GLP	SP	GPS	Others	Total	Overall (weighted)
accept institutional agreement	2	88	52	134	21	14	59	370	370
	1.00	42.31	14.73	56.30	6.77	5.56	11.90	17.99	18.00
rather accept institutional agreement	3	82	127	73	47	53	125	510	502
	1.50	39.42	35.98	30.67	15.16	21.03	25.20	24.79	24.43
rather maintain accompanying measures	52	28	128	24	119	121	164	636	619
	26.00	13.46	36.26	10.08	38.39	48.02	33.06	30.92	30.09
maintain accompanying measures	143	10	46	7	123	64	148	541	565
	71.50	4.81	13.03	2.94	39.68	25.40	29.84	26.30	27.49
Total	200	208	353	238	310	252	496	2057	2057
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

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Table B14: EU membership (candidates)

	SVP	FDP	CVP	GLP	SP	GPS	Others	Total	Overall (weighted)
Start negotiations on joining the EU	0	2	3	16	64	38	18	141	126
	0.00	0.93	0.92	6.72	21.05	14.90	3.62	7.02	6.29
rather start negotiations	0	3	18	35	113	78	43	290	258
	0.00	1.40	5.52	14.71	37.17	30.59	8.65	14.44	12.84
rather not start negotiations	0	16	46	72	75	78	83	370	344
	0.00	7.48	14.11	30.25	24.67	30.59	16.70	18.42	17.13
not start negotiations	175	193	259	115	52	61	353	1208	1281
	100.00	90.19	79.45	48.32	17.11	23.92	71.03	60.13	63.74
Total	175	214	326	238	304	255	497	2009	2009
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

4. Ideological positioning of the main six Swiss parties

Table B15: Ideological positioning of the main six Swiss parties

	Left-right	Economic left-right	GAL – TAN	European integration
Swiss People's Party (SVP)	8.7	8.2	9.4	1.0
Liberals (FDP)	7.0	8.1	5.0	4.4
Christian-Democratic Party (CVP)	5.3	5.3	5.7	4.1
Green Liberal Party (GLP)	4.9	6.1	2.4	5.5
Social-Democratic Party (SP)	1.4	1.6	1.4	5.0
Green Party (GPS)	1.1	1.5	0.7	5.3

Source: 2019 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) (Bakker et al., 2020)

Explanations:

- Left-right: Position of the party in 2019 in terms of its overall ideological stance. (0 = Extreme left, …, 5 = Center, …, 10 = Extreme right)

- Economic left-right: Position of the party in 2019 in terms of its ideological stance on economic issues. Parties are classified in terms of their stance on economic issues such as privatization, taxes, regulation, government spending, and the welfare state. Parties on the economic left want government to play an active role in the economy. Parties on the economic right want a reduced role for government. (0 = Extreme left, …, 5 = Center, …, 10 = Extreme right)

- GAL-TAN: Position of the party in 2019 in terms of their views on social and cultural values. "Libertarian" or "postmaterialist" parties favor expanded personal freedoms, for example, abortion rights, divorce, and same-sex marriage. "Traditional" or "authoritarian" parties reject these ideas in favor of order, tradition, and stability, believing that the government should be a firm moral authority on social and cultural issues. (0 = Libertarian/Postmaterialist, …, 5 = Center, …, 10 = Traditional/Authoritarian)

- European integration: overall orientation of the party leadership towards European integration in 2019. (1 = Strongly opposed, 2 = Opposed, 3 = Somewhat opposed, 4 = Neutral, 5 = Somewhat in favor, 6 = In favor, 7 = Strongly in favor)

5. Descriptive statistics

Legend:

- issue:
  - bil = trade-off between maintaining bilateral agreements and limiting immigration
  - cohesion = cohesion billion
  - insta = trade-off between institutional framework agreement and accompanying measures
  - member = EU membership
- candidate: 0 = voters; 1 = candidates

5.1. Hypothesis 1

Table B16: Descriptive statistics for H1

	issue	candi-date	N	mean posi-tion	min	max	stand. error	stand. devia-tion	95% CI lower	95% CI upper	two-sample *t*-test Difference	Standard error difference	95% CI lower difference	95% CI upper difference	t-statistic	p-value	level of significance	H1
Overall	bil	1	2010	1.19	-2	2	0.03	1.42	1.13	1.26								
	bil	0	3973	0.42	-2	2	0.02	1.44	0.37	0.46	0.78	0.04	0.70	0.85	19.81	0.00	***	yes
	cohesion	1	2082	0.36	-2	2	0.03	1.54	0.29	0.42								
	cohesion	0	3950	0.05	-2	2	0.02	1.44	0.01	0.10	0.30	0.04	0.23	0.38	7.59	0.00	***	yes
	insta	1	2057	-0.25	-2	2	0.03	1.52	-0.31	-0.18								
	insta	0	3885	-0.34	-2	2	0.02	1.30	-0.38	-0.30	0.10	0.04	0.02	0.17	2.54	0.01	*	yes
	member	1	2009	-1.19	-2	2	0.03	1.30	-1.25	-1.14								
	member	0	4009	-0.72	-2	2	0.02	1.15	-0.76	-0.69	-0.47	0.03	-0.53	-0.40	-14.26	0.00	***	vice versa

	issue	candi-date	N	mean posi-tion	min	max	stand. error	stand. devia-tion	95% CI lower	95% CI upper	two-sample *t*-test Difference	Standard error difference	95% CI lower difference	95% CI upper difference	t-statistic	p-value	level of significance	H1
SVP	bil	1	175	-1.57	-2	2	0.06	0.85	-1.70	-1.44								
	bil	0	675	-0.85	-2	2	0.05	1.30	-0.95	-0.75	-0.72	0.10	-0.93	-0.52	-7.00	0.00	***	vice versa
	cohesion	1	204	-1.78	-2	1	0.04	0.51	-1.85	-1.71								
	cohesion	0	672	-1.07	-2	2	0.04	1.13	-1.16	-0.98	-0.71	0.08	-0.87	-0.55	-8.68	0.00	***	vice versa
	insta	1	200	-1.66	-2	2	0.05	0.66	-1.75	-1.56								
	insta	0	660	-0.94	-2	2	0.04	1.04	-1.02	-0.86	-0.72	0.08	-0.87	-0.56	-9.17	0.00	***	vice versa
	member	1	175	-2.00	-2	-2	0.00	0.00	-2.00	-2.00								
	member	0	679	-1.51	-2	2	0.03	0.71	-1.56	-1.45	-0.49	0.05	-0.60	-0.39	-9.22	0.00	***	vice versa
FDP	bil	1	214	1.61	-2	2	0.06	0.85	1.50	1.73								
	bil	0	649	0.74	-2	2	0.05	1.24	0.64	0.83	0.88	0.09	0.70	1.05	9.59	0.00	***	yes
	cohesion	1	214	0.28	-2	2	0.09	1.36	0.09	0.46								
	cohesion	0	637	0.13	-2	2	0.05	1.36	0.02	0.24	0.15	0.11	-0.07	0.36	1.35	0.18		no
	insta	1	208	1.01	-2	2	0.08	1.18	0.85	1.17								
	insta	0	630	0.11	-2	2	0.05	1.35	0.01	0.22	0.90	0.10	0.69	1.10	8.55	0.00	***	yes
	member	1	214	-1.85	-2	2	0.04	0.57	-1.92	-1.77								
	member	0	652	-0.80	-2	2	0.04	1.04	-0.88	-0.72	-1.05	0.07	-1.20	-0.90	-14.04	0.00	***	vice versa
CVP	bil	1	326	1.56	-2	2	0.05	0.85	1.46	1.65								
	bil	0	360	0.55	-2	2	0.07	1.27	0.42	0.68	1.01	0.08	0.84	1.17	12.07	0.00	***	yes
	cohesion	1	354	0.41	-2	2	0.07	1.30	0.28	0.55								
	cohesion	0	355	0.32	-2	2	0.07	1.25	0.19	0.45	0.09	0.10	-0.09	0.28	0.98	0.33		no
	insta	1	353	0.03	-2	2	0.07	1.36	-0.11	0.17								
	insta	0	348	-0.14	-2	2	0.07	1.25	-0.27	-0.01	0.17	0.10	-0.02	0.36	1.71	0.09	(+)	yes tendency
	member	1	326	-1.66	-2	2	0.05	0.82	-1.75	-1.57								
	member	0	363	-0.74	-2	2	0.05	1.04	-0.85	-0.64	-0.91	0.07	-1.05	-0.77	-12.69	0.00	***	vice versa

	issue	candi-date	N	mean posi-tion	min	max	stand. error	stand. devia-tion	95% CI lower	95% CI upper	two-sample *t*-test Difference	Standard error difference	95% CI lower difference	95% CI upper difference	t-statistic	p-value	level of significance	H1
GLP	bil	1	238	1.82	-2	2	0.04	0.64	1.73	1.90								
	bil	0	433	0.98	-2	2	0.06	1.19	0.87	1.10	0.83	0.08	0.67	0.99	10.02	0.00	***	yes
	cohesion	1	239	1.08	-2	2	0.07	1.16	0.94	1.23								
	cohesion	0	436	0.50	-2	2	0.06	1.31	0.38	0.62	0.58	0.10	0.38	0.78	5.76	0.00	***	yes
	insta	1	238	1.27	-2	2	0.07	1.08	1.14	1.41								
	insta	0	429	0.30	-2	2	0.06	1.26	0.18	0.42	0.97	0.10	0.78	1.16	10.01	0.00	***	yes
	member	1	238	-0.99	-2	2	0.08	1.30	-1.15	-0.82								
	member	0	440	-0.43	-2	2	0.05	1.13	-0.54	-0.33	-0.56	0.10	-0.74	-0.37	-5.81	0.00	***	vice versa
SP	bil	1	304	1.94	-1	2	0.02	0.28	1.91	1.97								
	bil	0	769	1.21	-2	2	0.04	0.97	1.14	1.28	0.73	0.06	0.62	0.84	12.90	0.00	***	yes
	cohesion	1	308	1.52	-2	2	0.05	0.82	1.43	1.62								
	cohesion	0	767	0.85	-2	2	0.04	1.20	0.76	0.93	0.68	0.07	0.53	0.82	9.04	0.00	***	yes
	insta	1	310	-0.89	-2	2	0.07	1.27	-1.03	-0.75								
	insta	0	757	-0.24	-2	2	0.05	1.33	-0.34	-0.15	-0.65	0.09	-0.82	-0.47	-7.32	0.00	***	vice versa
	member	1	304	0.20	-2	2	0.08	1.45	0.04	0.37								
	member	0	772	0.10	-2	2	0.04	1.14	0.02	0.19	0.10	0.08	-0.07	0.26	1.18	0.24		no
GPS	bil	1	256	1.86	-2	2	0.03	0.56	1.79	1.92								
	bil	0	721	1.06	-2	2	0.04	1.09	0.98	1.14	0.79	0.07	0.65	0.93	11.13	0.00	***	yes
	cohesion	1	258	1.46	-2	2	0.05	0.80	1.36	1.56								
	cohesion	0	718	0.74	-2	2	0.05	1.23	0.65	0.83	0.72	0.08	0.56	0.88	8.75	0.00	***	yes
	insta	1	252	-0.67	-2	2	0.08	1.22	-0.82	-0.52								
	insta	0	705	-0.22	-2	2	0.05	1.30	-0.32	-0.13	-0.44	0.09	-0.63	-0.26	-4.71	0.00	***	vice versa
	member	1	255	-0.18	-2	2	0.09	1.46	-0.36	0.00								
	member	0	730	-0.21	-2	2	0.04	1.14	-0.29	-0.13	0.03	0.09	-0.15	0.21	0.34	0.73		no

5.2. Hypothesis 2

Table B17: Descriptive statistics for H2

	issue	candi-date	N	mean dist-ance to 0	min	max	stand. error	stand. devia-tion	95% CI lower	95% CI upper	two-sample *t*-test Difference	Standard error difference	95% CI lower difference	95% CI upper difference	t-statistic	p-value	level of significance	H2
Overall	bil	1	2010	1.81	1	2	0.01	0.39	1.80	1.83								
	bil	0	3973	1.42	1	2	0.01	0.49	1.40	1.43	0.40	0.01	0.37	0.42	31.35	0.00	***	yes
	cohesion	1	2082	1.50	1	2	0.01	0.50	1.48	1.52								
	cohesion	0	3950	1.36	1	2	0.01	0.48	1.35	1.38	0.14	0.01	0.11	0.17	10.64	0.00	***	yes
	insta	1	2057	1.45	1	2	0.01	0.50	1.43	1.48								
	insta	0	3885	1.27	1	2	0.01	0.44	1.25	1.28	0.19	0.01	0.16	0.21	14.86	0.00	***	yes
	member	1	2009	1.70	1	2	0.01	0.46	1.68	1.72								
	member	0	4009	1.16	0	2	0.01	0.70	1.14	1.18	0.54	0.02	0.50	0.57	31.11	0.00	***	yes
SVP	bil	1	175	1.73	1	2	0.03	0.44	1.67	1.80								
	bil	0	675	1.47	1	2	0.02	0.50	1.43	1.50	0.26	0.04	0.18	0.35	6.39	0.00	***	yes
	cohesion	1	204	1.81	1	2	0.03	0.39	1.75	1.86								
	cohesion	0	672	1.47	1	2	0.02	0.50	1.44	1.51	0.33	0.04	0.26	0.41	8.76	0.00	***	yes
	insta	1	200	1.73	1	2	0.03	0.45	1.66	1.79								
	insta	0	660	1.32	1	2	0.02	0.47	1.29	1.36	0.40	0.04	0.33	0.48	10.76	0.00	***	yes
	member	1	175	2.00	2	2	0.00	0.00	2.00	2.00								
	member	0	679	1.55	0	2	0.02	0.61	1.50	1.59	0.45	0.05	0.36	0.54	9.76	0.00	***	yes

	issue	candidate	N	mean distance to 0	min	max	stand. error	stand. deviation	95% CI lower	95% CI upper	two-sample *t*-test							H2
											Difference	Standard error difference	95% CI lower difference	95% CI upper difference	t-statistic	p-value	level of significance	
FDP	bil	1	214	1.77	1	2	0.03	0.42	1.71	1.83								
	bil	0	649	1.36	1	2	0.02	0.48	1.33	1.40	0.41	0.04	0.34	0.48	11.11	0.00	***	yes
	cohesion	1	214	1.30	1	2	0.03	0.46	1.24	1.37								
	cohesion	0	637	1.29	1	2	0.02	0.46	1.26	1.33	0.01	0.04	-0.06	0.08	0.33	0.74		no
	insta	1	208	1.47	1	2	0.03	0.50	1.40	1.54								
	insta	0	630	1.28	1	2	0.02	0.45	1.24	1.31	0.19	0.04	0.12	0.27	5.24	0.00	***	yes
	member	1	214	1.91	1	2	0.02	0.29	1.87	1.95								
	member	0	652	1.11	0	2	0.03	0.70	1.06	1.16	0.80	0.05	0.71	0.90	16.32	0.00	***	yes
CVP	bil	1	326	1.71	1	2	0.03	0.45	1.67	1.76								
	bil	0	360	1.30	1	2	0.02	0.46	1.25	1.35	0.41	0.03	0.35	0.48	11.90	0.00	***	yes
	cohesion	1	354	1.28	1	2	0.02	0.45	1.24	1.33								
	cohesion	0	355	1.22	1	2	0.02	0.41	1.18	1.26	0.06	0.03	0.00	0.13	1.93	0.05	(+)	yes tendency
	insta	1	353	1.28	1	2	0.02	0.45	1.23	1.32								
	insta	0	348	1.20	1	2	0.02	0.40	1.15	1.24	0.08	0.03	0.02	0.15	2.57	0.01	*	yes
	member	1	326	1.80	1	2	0.02	0.40	1.76	1.85								
	member	0	363	1.10	0	2	0.03	0.66	1.03	1.16	0.71	0.04	0.62	0.79	16.80	0.00	***	yes
GLP	bil	1	238	1.90	1	2	0.02	0.30	1.86	1.94								
	bil	0	433	1.46	1	2	0.02	0.50	1.41	1.51	0.44	0.04	0.37	0.51	12.40	0.00	***	yes
	cohesion	1	239	1.50	1	2	0.03	0.50	1.44	1.57								
	cohesion	0	436	1.32	1	2	0.02	0.47	1.28	1.37	0.18	0.04	0.11	0.26	4.69	0.00	***	yes
	insta	1	238	1.59	1	2	0.03	0.49	1.53	1.66								
	insta	0	429	1.23	1	2	0.02	0.42	1.19	1.27	0.37	0.04	0.30	0.44	10.15	0.00	***	yes
	member	1	238	1.55	1	2	0.03	0.50	1.49	1.61								
	member	0	440	1.00	0	2	0.03	0.68	0.93	1.06	0.55	0.05	0.46	0.65	11.10	0.00	***	yes

|	issue	candi-date	N	mean dist-ance to 0	min	max	stand. error	stand. devia-tion	95% CI lower	95% CI upper	two-sample *t*-test Difference	Standard error difference	95% CI lower difference	95% CI upper difference	t-statistic	p-value	level of significance	H2
SP	bil	1	304	1.95	1	2	0.01	0.22	1.92	1.97								
	bil	0	769	1.47	1	2	0.02	0.50	1.43	1.50	0.48	0.03	0.42	0.54	16.06	0.00	***	yes
	cohesion	1	308	1.67	1	2	0.03	0.47	1.61	1.72								
	cohesion	0	767	1.39	1	2	0.02	0.49	1.35	1.42	0.28	0.03	0.21	0.34	8.54	0.00	***	yes
	insta	1	310	1.46	1	2	0.03	0.50	1.41	1.52								
	insta	0	757	1.28	1	2	0.02	0.45	1.25	1.31	0.19	0.03	0.13	0.25	5.99	0.00	***	yes
	member	1	304	1.38	1	2	0.03	0.49	1.33	1.44								
	member	0	772	0.94	0	2	0.02	0.65	0.90	0.99	0.44	0.04	0.36	0.52	10.60	0.00	***	yes
GPS	bil	1	256	1.92	1	2	0.02	0.27	1.88	1.95								
	bil	0	721	1.44	1	2	0.02	0.50	1.40	1.47	0.48	0.03	0.42	0.54	14.68	0.00	***	yes
	cohesion	1	258	1.59	1	2	0.03	0.49	1.53	1.65								
	cohesion	0	718	1.35	1	2	0.02	0.48	1.32	1.39	0.24	0.03	0.17	0.31	6.84	0.00	***	yes
	insta	1	252	1.31	1	2	0.03	0.46	1.25	1.37								
	insta	0	705	1.25	1	2	0.02	0.43	1.21	1.28	0.06	0.03	0.00	0.13	1.99	0.05	*	yes
	member	1	255	1.39	1	2	0.03	0.49	1.33	1.45								
	member	0	730	0.95	0	2	0.02	0.66	0.90	1.00	0.44	0.05	0.35	0.53	9.72	0.00	***	yes

5.3. Hypothesis 3

Figure B1: Histograms and cumulative distribution functions for the question on the trade-off between bilateral agreements and limiting immigration (voters and candidates)

CVP

GLP

SP

GPS

Figure B2: Histograms and cumulative distribution functions for the question on the cohesion billion (voters and candidates)

Figure B3: Histograms and cumulative distribution functions for the question on the trade-off between the institutional framework agreement and the accompanying measures (voters and candidates)

*Figure B4: Histograms and cumulative distribution functions for the question on EU membership (voters and candidates)*

Graphs by candidate

6. On the relationship between political knowledge/interest and congruence

While it is not the main focus of the article, political knowledge and political interest play an important role for congruence between the political elites and voters: Several studies have found a positive impact of political knowledge and political interest on the level of congruence (e.g., Costello, 2021; Walczak & van der Brug, 2013; Walgrave & Lefevere, 2013).

In order to see whether political knowledge and political interest also lead to higher voter-candidate congruence (i.e., many-to-many congruence levels), I distinguished two groups of voters: "Politically sophisticated" vs. "Politically less sophisticated" voters. These groups were created combining a political knowledge score with respondents' level of political interest. The political knowledge score was constructed on the basis of four knowledge questions from Wave 2 of the Selects Panel Survey:

- The number of parties represented in the Swiss Government (Federal Council) (correct answer: four parties)

- The party with the most seats in the National Council (correct answer: SVP)

- The number of accepted popular initiatives (correct answer: one in ten)

- Who elects the members of the Swiss Government (Federal Council) (correct answer: United Federal Assembly – National Council and the Council of States together)

Respondents could thus score between 0 and 4 points on the knowledge questions. This score was combined with respondents' level of political interest which ranged from 1 (not interested at all) to 4 (very interested). Respondents were defined as "politically sophisticated" in case they got at least three knowledge questions right and stated that they were rather or very interested in politics. In total, 1731 respondents were coded in this category (46.8%), while the other 1965 respondents were coded "politically less sophisticated" (53.2%). The many-to-many congruence values for these two groups (as well as the one for the group of all voters) are reported in Table B18.

Table B18: Comparison of many-to-many congruence between all voters, the group of politically sophisticated voters and the group of politically less sophisticated voters

Overall	All voters	Politically sophisticated voters	Politically less sophisticated voters
Bilateral agreements vs. limits on immigration	0.67	0.48	0.80
Cohesion billion	0.25	0.09	0.37
Institutional agreement vs. accompanying measures	0.02	0.08	0.04
EU membership	0.29	0.38	0.22
N voters	*3885-4009*	*1704-1730*	*1880-1958-*
N candidates	*2009-2082*		

	Swiss People's Party (SVP)			Liberals (FDP)			Christian-Democratic Party (CVP)		
	All voters	Politically sophisticated voters	Politically less sophisticated voters	All voters	Politically sophisticated voters	Politically less sophisticated voters	All voters	Politically sophisticated voters	Politically less sophisticated voters
Bilateral agreements vs. limits on immigration	0.37	0.39	0.39	0.74	0.60	0.85	0.82	0.64	0.94
Cohesion billion	0.65	0.67	0.63	0.10	0.01	0.20	0.08	0.05	0.19
Institutional agreement vs. accompanying measures	0.64	0.53	0.71	0.49	0.37	0.60	0.07	0.03	0.11
EU membership	0.70	0.64	0.74	0.74	0.75	0.74	0.62	0.69	0.57
N voters	*660-679*	*250-256*	*353-365*	*630-652*	*303-308*	*279-290*	*348-363*	*139-143*	*175-185*
N candidates	*175-204*			*208-214*			*326-354*		

	Green Liberal Party (GLP)			Social-Democratic Party (SP)			Green Party (GPS)		
Bilateral agreements vs. limits on immigration	0.73	0.54	0.93	0.72	0.56	0.87	0.73	0.51	0.90
Cohesion billion	0.45	0.20	0.69	0.55	0.36	0.73	0.56	0.38	0.71
Institutional agreement vs. accompanying measures	0.49	0.36	0.62	0.49	0.57	0.40	0.30	0.37	0.24
EU membership	0.31	0.45	0.16	0.10	0.05	0.23	0.09	0.03	0.18
N voters	*429-440*	*203-205*	*190-199*	*757-772*	*371-374*	*339-348*	*705-730*	*296-302*	*359-375*
N candidates	*238-239*			*304-310*			*252-258*		

Notes: Many-to-many congruence values: The lower the value, the greater the congruence between candidates and voters.

In most cases, the many-to-many congruence values for the politically sophisticated voters are lower as compared to the politically less sophisticated group, i.e., congruence between voters and candidates is higher for the former group (see Table B18). I conducted a two-sample *t*-test to check whether the difference in congruence between the two groups is statistically significant. As Table B19 shows, this difference is significant on a α=0.05% level, which means that the politically sophisticated voters are indeed more congruent with the political elites than less sophisticated voters. The two-sample *t*-test was across all groups (overall and the main six Swiss parties) and all European integration issues, which results in 7 x 4 = 28 observations with two conditions (politically sophisticated vs. less sophisticated voters).

Table B19: Mean levels of many-to-many congruence between voters and candidates (politically sophisticated voters vs. politically less sophisticated voters)

	Politically sophisticated voters	Politically less sophisticated voters	Difference	T-statistic	P-value	Politically more sophisticated voters more congruent with elite opinions?
Mean Congruence (Many-to-Many)	0.39 (0.04)	0.53 (0.05)	-0.14	-2.0353	0.0467[*]	Yes
Observations (Groups X Issues)	28	28				

Notes: Lower many-to-many congruence values stand for greater voter-candidate congruence. Standard errors are reported in parentheses.

7. References

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