

COLLECTION
DÉBATS ET DOCUMENTS
FÉVRIER 2020

14

EUROPE IN THE WORLD

L'EUROPE DANS LE MONDE

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FONDATION
JEAN MONNET
POUR L'EUROPE

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Cet ouvrage est le fruit d'un colloque organisé les 28 et 29 mars 2019 par la Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe en partenariat avec



Nous tenons à remercier ici tous les contributeurs à cet ouvrage, ainsi que les institutions suivantes, qui nous ont apporté leur soutien.



Référence bibliographique

Gilles Grin, Françoise Nicod, Eva Paul (eds.): *Europe in the World – L'Europe dans le monde*, Lausanne, Jean Monnet Foundation for Europe, Debates and Documents Collection, issue 14, February 2020

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L'Union européenne dans un monde en profonde mutation

par Gilles Grin *

Le présent texte de synthèse a été publié initialement par l'Association suisse de politique étrangère. Référence : Gilles Grin, **L'Europe dans le monde**, *Schweizerische Gesellschaft für Aussenpolitik – Association suisse de politique étrangère, Kolumne*, mai 2019. Internet : <https://www.sga-aspe.ch/leurope-dans-le-monde/>

Un monde en profonde mutation

L'ordre international change et la *Pax Americana* remontant à 1945 est remise en question. La fin de la guerre froide a retiré à l'Europe sa centralité pour les États-Unis, dont la politique a été recentrée en direction de l'Asie. Une mêlée pour le pouvoir global a pris le relai d'une forme d'hégémonie américaine. On assiste à un certain repli des USA, or l'histoire montre qu'il est difficile de gérer d'une façon ordonnée le repli d'une grande puissance. Pour autant, les USA ne sont pas en déclin et ne se coupent pas des autres. On assiste en fait à une forme de transformation de leur rapport au monde vers davantage de polarisation. La guerre d'Irak et la crise financière ont remis en question le rapport américain à l'exceptionnalisme. Tant le président Barack Obama que son successeur Donald Trump ont souhaité relativiser l'usage de la puissance américaine. Les États-Unis exigent de leurs alliés européens un meilleur partage des coûts de défense. Des disputes commerciales ont éclaté récemment et le protectionnisme se développe. Le multilatéralisme est remis en question. Le progrès technologique se poursuit avec ses profonds effets polarisants au sein des sociétés.

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On assiste aussi à un grand défi environnemental et à une crise de la gouvernance globale. Un peu partout, l'ère du temps est au choc entre les forces de l'ouverture et celles du repli.

La compétition entre grandes puissances est de retour, en particulier entre les États-Unis, la Chine et la Russie. Le nationalisme prospère et une insécurité globale se développe. La Chine et la Russie présentent des modèles plus autoritaires que ceux de l'Occident. La Chine a acquis une force de frappe énorme en termes d'investissements, comme son initiative des nouvelles routes de la soie le montre bien. L'Asie est le continent de la géopolitique où beaucoup de tensions règnent. On assiste aussi à une résurgence du nationalisme russe. L'Ouest est vu comme décadent dans le pays aux onze fuseaux horaires et un sentiment de grande déception envers l'Union européenne s'y est développé depuis un peu plus d'une dizaine d'années. Une nouvelle course aux armements nucléaires menace entre les deux superpuissances de la guerre froide. La relation européenne avec le Proche-Orient et l'Afrique du Nord est dégradée en comparaison avec les espoirs exprimés au moment du lancement du processus de Barcelone en 1995. De dures crises et beaucoup de désillusions ont touché cette région limitrophe de l'Europe.

Les limites de l'Union européenne comme acteur global

La monnaie unique lancée il y a 20 ans représente un lien symbolique fort entre Européens et le possible passage vers une véritable union politique. L'euro est un facteur de stabilité ayant permis à l'Union européenne de mieux traverser la grave crise de 2008 née outre-Atlantique. Il représente un gage qui contribue à l'indépendance politique de l'Union. Cette dernière a développé depuis 25 ans une politique étrangère et de sécurité commune dans le sillon du traité de Maastricht. Dans certains domaines, les Européens parlent d'une voix. À titre d'exemples, ils ont établi un régime de sanctions envers la Russie suite à l'annexion de la Crimée en 2014 et ils ont grandement contribué à la négociation d'un accord

nucléaire avec l'Iran en 2015. L'UE a développé une nouvelle architecture institutionnelle avec un statut rehaussé de son Haut représentant en 2009 et la création l'année suivante du Service européen pour l'action extérieure. Dans le cadre de la politique de sécurité et de défense commune, l'UE a lancé à partir de 2003 une trentaine de missions de sécurité extérieure, contribuant à la stabilisation de son voisinage. Avec le traité de Lisbonne, l'UE s'est dotée de clauses d'assistance mutuelle et de solidarité entre ses membres. Les dépenses de défense des États membres de l'Union placent cette dernière au deuxième rang mondial, derrière les États-Unis mais devant la Chine.

Le problème cependant est le fractionnement des dépenses et les duplications entre pays. Les visions et les valeurs partagées des Européens sont limitées. Il reste des traces mentales de la division du continent durant la guerre froide et la mémoire partagée fait défaut. Des perspectives antagonistes sur la dimension nucléaire militaire sont notoires. Le manque de culture stratégique commune et d'autonomie stratégique européenne est criant. Les diverses crises internes récentes ont conduit à une forme d'introspection et de renfermement. Les principaux États membres de l'UE sont, pour des raisons diverses, en situation de faiblesse. On ignore encore le statut futur du Royaume-Uni vis-à-vis de l'UE. La souveraineté européenne est bloquée par les sensibilités des États membres et la PESC reste d'essence intergouvernementale. Les tendances nationalistes et populistes constituent un frein supplémentaire à l'émergence d'une Europe unie dans le monde. Le risque existe clairement que l'UE soit victime des tentatives de division (« divide and rule ») des autres puissances avec une dépendance énergétique envers la Russie, une dépendance économique (incluant les investissements) envers la Chine et une dépendance sécuritaire envers les États-Unis.

Le continent africain devrait voir sa population doubler d'ici 2050. Mais ses pays seront-ils en mesure d'offrir un avenir décent à leur jeunesse? De cela dépendra dans une importante mesure le degré de pression migratoire sur l'Europe. L'expérience des dernières années montre à quel point les États européens sont touchés

à des degrés variables par cette pression qui remet en cause leur cohésion. Notre continent est aussi touché par le vieillissement démographique qui rend nécessaire l'arrivée de forces nouvelles. Le besoin toutefois ne garantit pas l'acceptabilité sociale.

Vers une nouvelle dynamique européenne ?

Dans un monde en profonde mutation et au vu de ses propres limites comme acteur global, l'Union européenne se trouve à la croisée des chemins et à un carrefour stratégique. Selon les sondages, le soutien populaire à l'Union atteint un niveau record. Beaucoup d'Européens pensent que l'UE doit développer sa politique étrangère et de sécurité commune pour parler d'une même voix sur la scène internationale. Une coopération structurée permanente en matière de défense a été établie en 2017 à vingt-cinq (sans le Royaume-Uni, le Danemark et Malte). De nouveaux instruments sont développés, comme un Fonds européen de la défense. L'UE doit consolider la zone euro et se faire entendre dans les enceintes financières internationales. Une culture stratégique commune doit être développée et l'UE doit disposer d'une capacité d'intervention propre. Le défi cependant est de savoir comment créer une cohésion européenne au vu des différences entre États et des différences de sensibilité nationale. Les Européens doivent entreprendre le voyage collectif leur permettant de relever le défi de leur autonomie stratégique. Il existe une conscience croissante de cette nécessité sur le continent et le débat a été amorcé au sein de l'UE. L'application de la méthode communautaire, déjà prônée par Jean Monnet il y a plus de 50 ans, peut être vue comme un gage de succès, mais des réticences nationales, parfois fortes, demeurent. L'Union doit aussi faire émerger une culture démocratique encore plus forte avec une société civile transnationale mieux structurée.

Une vision stratégique à long terme doit être développée. L'Europe a besoin de plans de contingence. Les divers instruments d'action, de type économique et politique, requièrent une utilisation synergique. L'UE doit mieux utiliser son pouvoir commercial et

économique ainsi que ses moyens financiers. Les valeurs naturellement, mais aussi les intérêts partagés, sont importants pour guider les Européens qui ont besoin de connaître leurs capacités et de les exploiter à leur plein potentiel. En fonction des évolutions sécuritaires des États-Unis et de la place que ces derniers entendront conserver à l'OTAN, l'UE aura la tâche d'éviter l'installation d'un vide sécuritaire en Europe. Le défi de la concurrence systémique de la Chine doit être relevé. Il convient de collaborer avec l'Empire du Milieu lorsqu'il existe des intérêts partagés comme c'est le cas en matière de climat ou au sein de l'Organisation mondiale du commerce. L'attitude à adopter face à une Russie disruptive est particulièrement complexe : comment ne pas transiger sur les grands principes et proposer des voies d'avenir ?

Historical perspectives
Perspectives historiques

L'Europe dans le monde : la perspective des trois citoyens d'honneur de l'Europe

Gilles Grin

INTRODUCTION

Le Conseil européen, institution de l'Union européenne rassemblant les chefs d'État ou de gouvernement des États membres, a décidé par résolution d'attribuer à trois reprises la distinction de « citoyen d'honneur de l'Europe » à des personnalités dont l'apport à la construction européenne a été jugé exceptionnel. À ce jour, Jean Monnet, Helmut Kohl et Jacques Delors ont ainsi été distingués.

Jean Monnet, concepteur de la première Communauté européenne, premier président de la Haute Autorité de la CECA et président fondateur du Comité d'action pour les États-Unis d'Europe, est devenu le premier citoyen d'honneur de l'Europe en 1976. Il a été suivi en 1998 par Helmut Kohl, qui venait de quitter le poste de chancelier fédéral de la République fédérale d'Allemagne qu'il avait occupé durant 16 ans. Père de la réunification allemande, Helmut Kohl avait inlassablement œuvré à la construction de l'Europe. En 2015, c'est Jacques Delors qui devenait le troisième citoyen d'honneur de l'Europe. Il avait été président de la Commission durant dix ans, de 1985 à 1995. Son engagement avait puissamment contribué à une relance et à un approfondissement de la construction européenne.

Cette contribution a pour objectif de présenter la façon dont les trois citoyens d'honneur ont perçu la place de l'Europe unie dans le monde. Nous allons présenter successivement leur perspective

individuelle en commençant par Jean Monnet, puis Helmut Kohl et Jacques Delors suivront. Un essai de perspective comparative conclura cette étude.

JEAN MONNET

Jean Monnet œuvre au cœur de l'effort de guerre des pays alliés durant les deux conflits mondiaux et prend part, entre 1919 et 1923, aux premières années de l'expérience de la Société des Nations en qualité de secrétaire général adjoint. Il y découvre les limites de la pratique intergouvernementale entre États où chacun d'eux peut bloquer une décision par le simple exercice d'un droit de veto. En août 1943, en pleine Seconde Guerre mondiale, il rédige sa note de réflexion d'Alger où il s'interroge sur l'avenir, identifiant les excès du nationalisme, le protectionnisme et le réarmement comme de lourdes menaces. Pour lui, il faut offrir une paix digne aux vaincus et ne pas reproduire les erreurs qui ont suivi la fin de la Première Guerre mondiale.

En 1950, Jean Monnet est l'inspirateur du projet de première Communauté européenne, qui vise à mettre en commun les secteurs stratégiques du charbon et de l'acier qui se trouvaient au cœur de l'effort de guerre des pays. La Communauté européenne du charbon et de l'acier (CECA) est conçue comme la première étape d'une Fédération européenne. Il s'agit d'une conception fédérale et sectorielle de l'intégration. Le projet est éminemment politique avec la création d'institutions supranationales nouvelles. La France et l'Allemagne, qui ont été historiquement des ennemies séculaires, sont visées au premier chef par la démarche, mais celle-ci est ouverte aux autres pays européens démocratiques qui le souhaiteraient. Les grands objectifs poursuivis par Monnet sont la paix, la prospérité et la liberté.

Le projet de Jean Monnet est conçu dans un contexte international spécifique, où la guerre froide s'est développée au cours des années précédentes. L'Europe est devenue largement dominée par l'Union soviétique à l'Est et par les États-Unis à l'Ouest. Ces

dominations sont de nature complètement différente. L'URSS a imposé par la coercition et les purges son ordre politique, économique et social. Elle a créé un glacis sécuritaire en gardant le contrôle des territoires occupés au cours de la Seconde Guerre mondiale. L'influence américaine à l'Ouest est quant à elle appelée de leurs vœux par des pays européens qui craignent dorénavant la menace soviétique. Les États-Unis sont un hégémon bienveillant. Ils contribuent puissamment à la reconstruction économique de l'Europe occidentale et encouragent les premiers efforts d'intégration régionale.

Jean Monnet possède une vision politique et stratégique de la place de l'Europe occidentale d'alors dans le monde. Au printemps 1950, lorsqu'il développe son projet de première Communauté européenne, il craint un troisième conflit mondial, cette fois entre les États-Unis et leurs alliés d'une part, et l'URSS et les siens de l'autre. Jean Monnet est conscient de la place fondamentale qu'occupe l'Allemagne divisée au cœur du continent européen. Il œuvre à rapprocher son pays, la France, de l'Allemagne fédérale. Pour lui, il convient de tendre la main à l'ennemi d'hier pour tourner la page des conflits sanglants du passé. Il conçoit un projet de paix fédérative européenne sans précédent. En vain dans un premier temps, il fait tout le possible pour associer les Britanniques au projet, persuadé de la force de leur tradition démocratique et du fait qu'une construction européenne sans eux serait incomplète. Jean Monnet possède des réseaux extraordinaires aux États-Unis. Il contribue à convaincre les Américains de soutenir le projet de CECA malgré des craintes de discrimination économique, s'évertuant à leur montrer que ce projet n'a pas pour objectif d'aboutir à la création d'un cartel au niveau international. Il leur montre la dimension profondément politique et morale du projet naissant.

Dès 1950, Jean Monnet travaille non seulement sur le projet de Communauté européenne du charbon et de l'acier, qui voit le jour en 1952 et dont il devient le premier président de son exécutif. Face à la situation internationale qui s'est encore dégradée après le commencement de la guerre de Corée en juin 1950, Jean Monnet est amené à travailler sur le concept d'une Communauté européenne

de défense. La CED doit être supranationale et implique une union politique à développer dans un projet de Communauté politique européenne. La CED et la CPE, si elles avaient vu le jour, auraient pu changer l'histoire du continent européen. Elles auraient fait naître presque dès le début du processus un projet politique abouti avec des institutions supranationales, une politique étrangère et une défense communes. L'Europe n'aurait alors pas eu besoin de pratiquer une forme de « fédéralisme à l'envers » qui promouvait l'intégration économique et repoussait sans cesse le choix de la forme finale d'union politique. Jean Monnet tient à ce que l'Europe puisse s'unir et devenir progressivement le partenaire sur pied d'égalité des États-Unis. Il juge que, sans union, il sera impossible aux Européens de s'affirmer sur la scène mondiale.

Avant la création de son Comité d'action en 1955, Jean Monnet a déjà développé une vision globale associant l'Europe au monde, au centre de laquelle se trouve l'importance cardinale de la paix. Comme il le proclame en 1953, « faire l'Europe, c'est faire la paix ». Il souhaite que le système européen et le système international évoluent vers des formes nouvelles d'organisation où la recherche de l'intérêt commun serait mise au centre et où des institutions et des règles communes y contribueraient. Jean Monnet est le principal architecte de la méthode communautaire que l'on peut concevoir comme une forme atténuée de fédéralisme, autrement dit l'ambition combinée à l'art du possible. L'approche de Jean Monnet permet de marier une vision d'ensemble d'essence fédérale à une approche tactique dite des petits pas où des réalisations concrètes renforcent les solidarités de fait. La résilience des souverainetés nationales en Europe occidentale après la Seconde Guerre mondiale rend en effet impossible la création *ex nihilo* d'une union fédérale d'ensemble.

Jean Monnet est conscient de l'importance du progrès technique et de l'émergence accélérée de nouveaux pôles de puissance mondiaux. Pour lui, ce n'est qu'unis que les Européens pourront faire face aux nouveaux défis globaux.

Cette recherche d'une vision d'ensemble va être magnifiée durant la deuxième partie des années 1950 et la première partie des années 1960 sous l'égide des travaux du Comité d'action créé et présidé par Jean Monnet, dont les membres sont les principaux partis politiques et syndicats ouvriers des Six. La paix reste l'objectif ultime.

Au niveau de l'organisation européenne, le Comité plaide pour l'approfondissement de l'intégration, l'adhésion du Royaume-Uni aux Communautés et l'ouverture aux pays européens démocratiques souhaitant y adhérer, dans la mesure où ils sont prêts à reprendre l'acquis existant. Il prend aussi position en faveur de la réunion des Allemands, c'est-à-dire la réunification allemande, dans la Communauté européenne.

Le Comité prend les positions suivantes en relation avec la place du continent dans le monde. Premièrement, l'Europe devrait avoir une seule voix dans les affaires internationales. À cette fin, il conviendrait de créer une politique étrangère et de défense commune appliquant la méthode communautaire. Le Comité acte donc le fait que, selon lui, il n'est pas possible d'unir les domaines stratégiques de la politique étrangère et de la défense dans un cadre purement intergouvernemental. Dans le contexte international des années 1963 à 1965, le Comité promeut sans succès le développement d'une politique européenne collective dans les questions nucléaires militaires. Deuxièmement, l'Europe unie et les États-Unis devraient établir des relations de partenaires sur pied d'égalité et assurer la cohésion de l'Ouest. En troisième lieu, l'Est et l'Ouest devraient dialoguer et coopérer ainsi que promouvoir la coexistence pacifique, le désarmement et l'équilibre mondial. Enfin, quatrièmement, l'Europe devrait aider les pays en développement.

La question de savoir si le modèle européen en voie d'élaboration pourrait servir de base à la définition d'une nouvelle gouvernance mondiale est régulièrement présente dans les notes de réflexion de Jean Monnet. Pendant longtemps, il semble répondre par l'affirmative, pensant que les notions de recherche de l'intérêt commun,

de développement d'un cadre institutionnel et juridique propice à cela et de renforcement des solidarités de fait pourraient être répliquées. À la fin de sa vie toutefois, ses conclusions apparaissent plus ambivalentes. Il semble douter de la possibilité de transposer à l'échelle globale l'expérience développée en Europe occidentale dans un contexte spécifique.¹

¹ Cette section consacrée à Jean Monnet s'appuie sur les références suivantes : Grin Gilles, « Jean Monnet et le Comité d'action pour les États-Unis d'Europe : une vision de la paix et de la sécurité », in : *Une dynamique européenne : le Comité d'action pour les États-Unis d'Europe. Actes du colloque organisé par la Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe, Lausanne, 11 et 12 septembre 2009*, Lausanne, Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe, Paris, Economica, 2011, pp. 239-278. Grin Gilles, « Le chemin de l'intégration européenne selon Jean Monnet », in : Bossuat Gérard (dir.), *Jean Monnet et l'économie*, Bruxelles, Berne, Peter Lang, coll. « Euroclio », 2018, pp. 161-188. Les études précitées sont basées sur les archives de Jean Monnet conservées à la Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe à Lausanne. Voir aussi l'étude de référence consacrée au Comité d'action : Fontaine Pascal, *Le Comité d'action pour les États-Unis d'Europe de Jean Monnet*, Lausanne, Centre de recherches européennes, 1974, 242 p.

HELMUT KOHL

Comme le politologue britannique William E. Paterson le relève très justement, le discours d'Helmut Kohl s'appuie fortement sur la mémoire historique et la conviction qu'il existe des leçons de l'histoire montrant combien les rivalités nationales peuvent être dangereuses si elles ne sont pas canalisées dans un cadre supranational.² Helmut Kohl explique qu'un État national allemand traditionnel n'a existé que durant trois quarts de siècle, entre 1871 et 1945, c'est-à-dire durant une période beaucoup plus limitée que dans les autres pays comparables. L'Allemagne fédérale d'après-guerre a voulu s'arrimer à l'Ouest afin de garantir la paix, la liberté et la démocratie. Elle est devenue un membre fondateur des Communautés européennes. Le chancelier affirme clairement que la recherche d'une solution nationale à la question allemande signifie ne pas avoir compris les leçons de l'histoire du XX^e siècle.³

La filiation avec Konrad Adenauer, le premier chancelier fédéral de la RFA, est évidente et revendiquée par Helmut Kohl lui-même. Pour ce dernier, il n'y a pas de troisième voie entre la liberté et l'absence de liberté. Il fait sien la vision d'Adenauer pour qui la seule place au monde pour l'Allemagne se trouve du côté des peuples libres.⁴ L'historien Joseph Rovin écrit : « Adenauer et Kohl appliquent à une société et à un univers de plus en plus complexes des convictions à la

² Paterson William E., « Helmut Kohl, 'The Vision Thing' and Escaping the Semi-Sovereignty Trap », in : Clemens Clay, Paterson William E. (ed.), *The Kohl Chancellorship*, London, Portland, Frank Cass, 1998, p. 27.

³ Discours prononcé par Helmut Kohl le 2 mai 1984 à Oxford. Titre : « La politique extérieure allemande d'aujourd'hui, Héritage de Konrad Adenauer ». Discours publié dans : Kohl Helmut, *L'Europe est notre destin. Discours actuels*, Paris, Éditions de Fallois, 1990, pp. 77-78. Kohl Helmut, *Erinnerungen 1982-1990*, München, Droemer, 2005, p. 696. Kohl Helmut, *Erinnerungen 1990-1994*, München, Droemer, 2007, p. 24. Kohl Helmut, *Aus Sorge um Europa. Ein Appell*, München, Droemer, 2014, pp. 13-15.

⁴ Discours prononcé par Helmut Kohl le 2 mai 1984 à Oxford. Titre : « La politique extérieure allemande d'aujourd'hui, Héritage de Konrad Adenauer ». Discours publié dans : Kohl H., *L'Europe est notre destin. Discours actuels, op. cit.*, p. 77. Kohl Helmut, *Erinnerungen 1930-1982*, München, Droemer, 2004, pp. 512-513, 697. Kohl H., *Aus Sorge um Europa, op. cit.*, p. 41.

fois rigoureuses, peu nombreuses et inébranlables, qui ont pour effet de ramener la multiplicité contradictoire des esprits et des choses à un ordre simple où tout a sa place assignée depuis toujours, où le changement ne laisse, malgré les apparences, les cris et les fureurs de l'histoire, que des empreintes superficielles.»⁵ Joseph Rován caractérise ainsi Helmut Kohl: «homme de la démocratie, homme de l'Alliance atlantique, homme de l'Europe unie basée sur l'union franco-allemande, homme de l'Économie sociale de Marché, interprétée à la lumière de la doctrine sociale de l'Église, homme de la morale, de la famille et des vertus traditionnelles.»⁶

Helmut Kohl ne dévie pas de sa conviction que la question de l'unification européenne décidera en fin de compte de la guerre et de la paix au XXI^e siècle. Pour lui, l'unité allemande et la construction européenne sont les deux faces de la même médaille. L'unité européenne a créé les conditions pour l'unité allemande. La réunification allemande dans la paix et la liberté, la seule envisageable pour Kohl, ne pouvait avoir lieu que dans le cadre d'un ordre de paix paneuropéen. Au cœur du projet européen se trouve la communauté de destin entre la France et l'Allemagne. L'Union européenne a une mission et une responsabilité paneuropéennes, d'où l'importance des élargissements géographiques vers l'Est. Pour Helmut Kohl qui se déclare globalement satisfait des résultats obtenus à Maastricht en décembre 1991, il convient de créer une union politique de l'Europe qui prendrait en compte la politique étrangère, la politique de sécurité et, à long terme, la défense. Il juge qu'il est nécessaire pour les Européens de disposer d'instruments pour mieux défendre leurs intérêts communs dans le monde.⁷

⁵ Rován Joseph, «Le sixième Chancelier», in: Kohl H., *L'Europe est notre destin. Discours actuels*, op. cit., p. 42.

⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁷ Kohl H., *Erinnerungen 1982-1990*, op. cit., pp. 158, 170-171, 519, 696-698, 994. Kohl H., *Erinnerungen 1990-1994*, op. cit., pp. 283-284, 332, 385, 388, 409, 463, 505, 647. Kohl Helmut, *Vom Mauerfall zur Wiedervereinigung. Meine Erinnerungen*, München, Droemer, 2009, pp. 154-155. Kohl H., *Aus Sorge um Europa. Ein Appell*, op. cit., pp. 15-16, 41. Delors Jacques, *Mémoires*, Paris, Plon, 2004, p. 369. Paterson W. E., «Helmut Kohl, 'The Vision Thing' and Escaping the Semi-Sovereignty Trap», in: Clemens C., Paterson W. E. (ed.), op. cit., p. 28.

Dans son livre de 2014 *Aus Sorge um Europa*, Helmut Kohl reconnaît combien le monde a changé dramatiquement depuis 1990. Ce nouveau monde multipolaire est devenu plus complexe et plus difficile à appréhender. L'ancien chancelier rappelle que l'unification européenne représente la meilleure assurance contre un retour du nationalisme et qu'elle offre la chance de la paix et de la liberté. En outre, elle peut permettre au continent d'assumer sa responsabilité internationale dans un monde en profond changement, elle peut lui donner un poids dans le monde et elle peut lui permettre de tenir bon dans la concurrence globale entre grands espaces économiques.⁸

On peut affirmer qu'Helmut Kohl a fait sien les quatre objectifs principaux établis par son parti, la CDU, pour une politique étrangère de la RFA avant la réunification allemande: 1) intégration économique et politique de l'Europe; 2) maintien de l'Alliance atlantique et de l'amitié avec les États-Unis; 3) politique de compréhension avec l'Union soviétique et les pays de l'Europe de l'Est et du Sud; 4) coresponsabilité pour le destin des pays du tiers-monde.⁹

Helmut Kohl soutient le triptyque reliant la question allemande à l'unification européenne et à l'importance du lien transatlantique. Lors de sa première déclaration gouvernementale prononcée le 13 octobre 1982, il affirme que l'Alliance atlantique représente le pilier garantissant les valeurs fondamentales de la RFA, son ordre économique et sa sécurité.¹⁰ Pour lui, il existe une communauté de valeurs et de sécurité entre l'Europe et les États-Unis. La demande américaine que les Européens contribuent davantage aux charges communes est fondée selon lui. Il affirme qu'il aurait refusé une réunification allemande qui aurait conduit l'Allemagne à devoir quitter l'OTAN. Il estime que,

⁸ Kohl H., *Aus Sorge um Europa. Ein Appell*, op. cit., pp. 53-54, 96, 103.

⁹ Kohl H., *Erinnerungen 1982-1990*, op. cit., pp. 698-699.

¹⁰ Discours prononcé par Helmut Kohl le 2 mai 1984 à Oxford. Titre: «La politique extérieure allemande d'aujourd'hui, Héritage de Konrad Adenauer». Discours publié dans: Kohl H., *L'Europe est notre destin. Discours actuels*, op. cit., p. 76.

sans l'Allemagne, l'OTAN aurait été détruite. Les Américains se seraient retirés d'Europe. Les Britanniques et les Français, détenteurs d'armes atomiques, auraient dû travailler plus étroitement ensemble, mais sans pouvoir donner une garantie de sécurité au reste du continent. Cela aurait signifié la fin de l'intégration européenne. Pour Helmut Kohl cependant, l'importance du lien transatlantique n'est pas incompatible avec le fait que l'Union européenne développe une identité en matière de sécurité et, à plus long terme, de défense, celle-ci devant être liée à l'OTAN.¹¹

Dans l'ordre de la guerre froide, le chancelier reconnaît l'importance de l'Union soviétique et de son glacis. Il est important d'avoir de bonnes relations avec ces pays sans toutefois taire les problèmes comme ceux liés aux droits de l'homme. Après l'arrivée au pouvoir à Moscou de Mikhaïl Gorbatchev, Helmut Kohl répond positivement à l'offre d'ouvrir un nouveau chapitre dans les relations entre les deux pays. Il soutient une importante aide à l'URSS en tant que facteur de stabilité et de paix en Europe.¹² Vers la fin de sa vie, il juge toujours que l'implication de la Russie est essentielle pour créer un ordre de sécurité européen stable. La Russie est en effet le plus grand pays d'Europe, le partenaire le plus important et le voisin le plus puissant à l'Est. Ce qui s'y passe influence le reste du monde.¹³

Comme chef du gouvernement d'un grand État européen, Helmut Kohl affirme un intérêt pour le monde entier. Il déclare : « l'existence économique de notre population dépend par conséquent, dans une large mesure, de développements qui ont lieu à

¹¹ Discours prononcé par Helmut Kohl le 17 novembre 1988 devant la session plénière de l'Assemblée de l'Atlantique Nord à Hambourg. Titre : « L'alliance c'est la paix ». Discours publié dans : Kohl H., *L'Europe est notre destin. Discours actuels*, op. cit., p. 171. Kohl H., *Erinnerungen 1982-1990*, op. cit., pp. 287, 654, 696, 994, 1007. Kohl H., *Erinnerungen 1990-1994*, op. cit., pp. 463. Kohl H., *Aus Sorge um Europa. Ein Appell*, op. cit., pp. 15, 40, 100-101. Delors J., op. cit., p. 369.

¹² Kohl H., *Erinnerungen 1982-1990*, op. cit., pp. 652, 654-655, 696. Kohl H., *Erinnerungen 1990-1994*, op. cit., pp. 286, 288.

¹³ Kohl H., *Aus Sorge um Europa. Ein Appell*, op. cit., pp. 103-106.

l'extérieur de nos frontières. C'est pourquoi rien de ce qui se passe, même dans les régions les plus éloignées de notre globe terrestre, ne saurait nous laisser indifférents. La stabilité dans le monde correspond donc à nos intérêts propres les plus évidents; la stabilité politique aussi bien qu'économique et sociale. Notre intérêt nous commande d'entretenir des relations dépourvues de tensions avec tous les États, et des voies de communication ouvertes et sûres tout autour de la terre. Je rappelle cet aspect de notre sécurité car je suis d'avis qu'en dépit de progrès récents dans quelques régions critiques, les rapports Nord-Sud exigeront à l'avenir une attention encore plus soutenue.»¹⁴ Helmut Kohl plaide pour l'importance de l'aide aux pays en voie de développement.¹⁵

Le chancelier marque un intérêt particulier pour la Chine, qui est selon lui un pays de grande histoire, de culture unique et de tradition, l'un des trois ou quatre États qui auront le plus grand rôle dans la politique internationale au cours du XXI^e siècle. Helmut Kohl est aussi touché par le fait que les Chinois croient à l'existence d'une seule Allemagne. Il les juge dignes de confiance. Malgré des systèmes de société différents, de nombreux intérêts et buts communs peuvent être identifiés. Le but du gouvernement Kohl est d'accroître encore les liens politiques, économiques et culturels avec la Chine populaire. Il parle à Pékin des droits de l'homme même s'il estime qu'il faut être prudent envers les autorités chinoises lorsque l'on évoque des vœux de réforme. Une diplomatie non-publique en matière de promotion des droits de l'homme est jugée plus efficace par le chancelier.¹⁶

¹⁴ Discours prononcé par Helmut Kohl le 17 novembre 1988 devant la session plénière de l'Assemblée de l'Atlantique Nord à Hambourg. Titre : « L'alliance c'est la paix ». Discours publié dans : Kohl H., *L'Europe est notre destin. Discours actuels*, op. cit., p. 169.

¹⁵ Kohl H., *Erinnerungen 1990-1994*, op. cit., pp. 289, 424. Kohl H., *Aus Sorge um Europa. Ein Appell*, op. cit., p. 103.

¹⁶ Kohl H., *Erinnerungen 1982-1990*, op. cit., pp. 611, 615. Kohl H., *Erinnerungen 1990-1994*, op. cit., p. 625. J'aimerais adresser mes remerciements à M^{me} Thays Deprati, étudiante à l'Université de Lausanne, pour son aide à la recherche concernant Helmut Kohl.

JACQUES DELORS

Jacques Delors possède une conscience aigüe des bouleversements mondiaux. Son biographe George Ross parle d'un homme d'État aspirant à une compréhension large du monde et qui se veut en même temps pédagogue et éducateur.¹⁷ Au moment où la guerre froide vient de prendre fin, Jacques Delors emploie le terme de « village-planète »¹⁸ et l'expression « la terre est une ». ¹⁹ Il est conscient des nouvelles réalités du monde : les frontières y sont relativisées, le commerce international croît plus vite que la production mondiale, les services et les capitaux se mondialisent, une nouvelle révolution industrielle voit le jour, les transports et les télécommunications se développent à une vitesse fulgurante, de larges mouvements de population ont lieu, l'interdépendance devient mondiale et personne n'est plus en mesure de se tenir à l'écart.²⁰ Jacques Delors se réfère constamment à l'expression postulant que « l'Europe n'a d'autre choix qu'entre la survie et le déclin ». ²¹ Il observe : « nous ne représentons que 4 % de la population mondiale et bénéficions de 25 % des richesses mondiales. Est-ce que le monde est assez gentil ou indolent pour tolérer longtemps cette situation ? »²² Pour lui, les États européens ne sont plus en mesure d'agir isolément dans le monde contemporain.²³ Le corollaire de l'interdépendance globale est le besoin de solidarité.²⁴

¹⁷ Ross George, *Jacques Delors and European Integration*, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1995, p. 230.

¹⁸ Archives de Jacques Delors, consultées à la Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe à Lausanne (ci-après JD), JD-1295 : intervention de Jacques Delors à Washington dans le cadre de la conférence de l'IMDI, 18-19 mars 1993.

¹⁹ JD-1181 : intervention de Jacques Delors à l'Assemblée nationale du Sénégal, Dakar, 2 mai 1991.

²⁰ *Ibidem*.

²¹ Delors J., *op. cit.*, pp. 197, 471.

²² Ces propos sont tenus en 1993. JD-1289, p. 9.

²³ JD-1143 : discours de Jacques Delors à la conférence de l'IISS, Bruxelles, 10 septembre 1993.

²⁴ JD-1181 : intervention de Jacques Delors à l'Assemblée nationale du Sénégal, Dakar, 2 mai 1991.

Jacques Delors développe une perspective globale et une vision de l'organisation internationale. L'Union européenne est à ses yeux le modèle de la coopération régionale dans le monde.²⁵ Il critique le G7 pour son manque de résultats et l'impression qu'il donne d'être le directoire de la planète.²⁶ Il prône une réforme progressive des structures de gouvernance globale afin de maîtriser la mondialisation. Il promeut en particulier la création d'un Conseil de sécurité économique véritablement universel qui réunirait les États-Unis, l'Union européenne, la Chine, la Russie, le Japon et les pays présidant les organisations économiques régionales d'Afrique, d'Amérique latine, d'Asie et du Pacifique.²⁷

La stratégie européenne de Jacques Delors se base sur le fait que les outils nationaux sont dévalués par la globalisation. Seule une action au niveau européen peut permettre de pérenniser le modèle de société du continent. Delors reconnaît le besoin d'une vraie libéralisation économique que la création d'un grand marché européen dynamique permet. En même temps, il plaide avec véhémence pour l'organisation de ce marché par la régulation, des politiques monétaires et économiques unifiées, la fourniture de biens publics, une politique sociale ambitieuse et des instruments de solidarité entre régions européennes.²⁸ Pour le président de la Commission, l'Union européenne devrait être « le point d'ancrage pour assurer la stabilité de tout le continent ». ²⁹ À l'échelle mondiale, l'Europe se devrait d'être un partenaire qui assume ses

²⁵ JD-1295 : intervention de Jacques Delors à Washington dans le cadre de la conférence de l'IMDI, 18-19 mars 1993.

²⁶ Delors J., *op. cit.*, p. 449.

²⁷ JD-1181 : intervention de Jacques Delors à l'Assemblée nationale du Sénégal, Dakar, 2 mai 1991. JD-1295 : intervention de Jacques Delors à Washington dans le cadre de la conférence de l'IMDI, 18-19 mars 1993. JD-1143 : discours de Jacques Delors à la conférence de l'IISS, Bruxelles, 10 septembre 1993. Delors J., *op. cit.*, pp. 304, 450-452 et 485.

²⁸ Ross G., *op. cit.*, p. 243.

²⁹ JD-1143 : discours de Jacques Delors à la conférence de l'IISS, Bruxelles, 10 septembre 1993. Voir aussi : Delors J., *op. cit.*, pp. 276-285.

responsabilités et non pas une « forteresse ». ³⁰ Le marché européen devrait être ouvert davantage – mais pas totalement – par intérêt propre et par devoir de solidarité. ³¹ Toutefois, avertit Delors, cela présuppose de renforcer la légitimité démocratique de l'Union et de construire une Europe proche des citoyens. ³²

Le lien entre politique agricole et libéralisation globale des échanges est rarement aussi intense que durant les dernières années de négociation du l'Uruguay Round dans le cadre du GATT. Les négociations avec les partenaires de l'Union sont très difficiles tandis que les tensions internes se révèlent aussi vives. Pour maintenir la collégialité interne de la Commission, Jacques Delors doit consentir à des concessions vers davantage de libéralisation. En même temps, il œuvre aussi pour que la France soit en mesure d'accepter l'accord. ³³

La conciliation entre politique de concurrence et politique industrielle s'avère aussi assez ardue. Jacques Delors se bat en faveur de l'organisation d'un espace industriel européen et contre ce qu'il considère être les excès en matière de politique de concurrence. Pour lui, il est nécessaire de créer des ensembles industriels européens qui puissent rivaliser avec leurs concurrents internationaux. ³⁴

Jacques Delors est très sensible au désordre monétaire international et se déclare en faveur d'une coopération en la matière. Il critique la politique de déficits américaine qualifiée d'égoïste et d'unilatéraliste, le manque d'ouverture des marchés au Japon et la crise de l'endettement touchant les pays pauvres. La dimension

³⁰ JD-93 : intervention de Jacques Delors à la réunion du World Economic Forum, Davos, 28 janvier 1989.

³¹ *Ibidem*. JD-1181 : intervention de Jacques Delors à l'Assemblée nationale du Sénégal, Dakar, 2 mai 1991. JD-1295 : intervention de Jacques Delors à Washington dans le cadre de la conférence de l'IMDI, 18-19 mars 1993. Ross G., *op. cit.*, p. 4.

³² JD-1295 : intervention de Jacques Delors à Washington dans le cadre de la conférence de l'IMDI, 18-19 mars 1993.

³³ *Ibidem*. Delors J., *op. cit.*, pp. 287, 391-394.

³⁴ Delors J., *op. cit.*, pp. 473-474. Ross G., *op. cit.*, p. 176.

mondiale représente à ses yeux l'une des motivations justifiant la création d'une monnaie unique européenne. Grâce à cette dernière, l'Europe pourra contribuer à un ordre monétaire mondial meilleur, contrer plus efficacement la spéculation grandissante et mieux absorber les chocs externes grâce à l'immunisation du commerce intra-communautaire contre les risques de change. ³⁵

Jacques Delors exprime sa déception quant au résultat obtenu à Maastricht en matière de création d'une politique étrangère et de sécurité commune. Il est conscient que ces domaines régaliens par excellence se trouvent au cœur de la souveraineté nationale et que les États membres ne disposent pas d'une volonté politique commune pour aller très loin. Pour lui, il aurait fallu agir de façon plus modeste mais plus réaliste sans créer des effets d'annonce qui ne seraient pas suivis des effets promis. Il reproche aux gouvernements nationaux d'avoir « préféré l'illusion des mots », ³⁶ ce qui va créer de la déception ou de l'indifférence chez les citoyens. ³⁷

Le président Delors relève la force des liens transatlantiques en termes de valeurs communes et d'idéaux, ainsi que d'attachement partagé à la paix, à la démocratie et aux libertés fondamentales. Faisant écho au président américain George H.W. Bush, il juge que ces liens ne devraient pas être mis en danger par des disputes commerciales. Il avertit cependant : l'interdépendance entre les deux rives de l'Atlantique ne devrait pas signifier que l'une des parties tente d'imposer à l'autre son système politique ou économique. La notion d'un nécessaire partage

³⁵ JD-1181 : intervention de Jacques Delors à l'Assemblée nationale du Sénégal, Dakar, 2 mai 1991. Delors J., *op. cit.*, pp. 304-306. Grin Gilles, « La création de l'euro : motivations politiques et économiques », in : Grin Gilles, Nicod Françoise, Altermatt Bernhard (dir.), *Formes d'Europe : Union européenne et autres organisations / Forms of Europe : European Union and other organisations*, Lausanne, Fondation Jean Monnet pour l'Europe, Paris, Economica, coll. « Cahiers rouges », 2018, pp. 74-76.

³⁶ Delors J., *op. cit.*, p. 361.

³⁷ JD-1143 : discours de Jacques Delors à la conférence de l'IJSS, Bruxelles, 10 septembre 1993. Delors J., *op. cit.*, pp. 208, 354-361, 387. Ross G., *op. cit.*, pp. 92, 205, 237.

transatlantique des charges est très présente chez le président de la Commission, pour qui l'Union devrait notamment assumer une plus grande part du fardeau de la sécurité européenne. Il reconnaît toute l'utilité de l'OTAN qui lie l'Amérique du Nord à l'Europe et contribue puissamment à la sécurité de cette dernière. Il souhaite que l'Union européenne puisse un jour « agir comme une entité politique unique dans le cadre de l'Alliance atlantique ». ³⁸

L'attitude de Delors envers le Japon apparaît assez critique. Il juge insuffisante l'ouverture du marché nippon, considère comme élevés les risques pour l'Europe d'une dépendance technologique et industrielle envers l'Empire du soleil levant et pense que ce pays devrait prendre une part plus active dans la gestion de l'économie mondiale. ³⁹

Jacques Delors souligne l'importance des relations Nord-Sud et la nécessité pour le Nord de mieux soutenir les pays en développement par toute une panoplie d'instruments dont l'ouverture des marchés, l'aide technique, des mécanismes de soutien aux prix des matières premières, des mécanismes d'aide à l'ajustement structurel, des annulations de dette et des transferts financiers. ⁴⁰

³⁸ Source de la citation : JD-1143 : discours de Jacques Delors à la conférence de l'IISS, Bruxelles, 10 septembre 1993. Références du paragraphe : JD-121 : allocution de Jacques Delors à Harvard University le 22 septembre 1989. JD-1295 : intervention de Jacques Delors à Washington dans le cadre de la conférence de l'IMDI, 18-19 mars 1993. JD-1143 : discours de Jacques Delors à la conférence de l'IISS, Bruxelles, 10 septembre 1993. Grin Gilles, *The Battle of the Single European Market: Achievements and Economic Thought, 1985-2000*, London, New York, Kegan Paul, 2003, pp. 135-138.

³⁹ JD-242 : allocution de Jacques Delors à la European business community, Tokyo, 23 mai 1991.

⁴⁰ JD-93 : intervention de Jacques Delors à la réunion du World Economic Forum, Davos, 28 janvier 1989. JD-1181 : intervention de Jacques Delors à l'Assemblée nationale du Sénégal, Dakar, 2 mai 1991. Delors J., *op. cit.*, p. 198.

PERSPECTIVE COMPARATIVE

En guise de conclusion, intéressons-nous à établir une perspective comparative entre la façon dont les trois citoyens d'honneur appréhendent la place de l'Europe unie dans le monde. En fin de compte, c'est la grande proximité globale dans la philosophie politique de Jean Monnet, d'Helmut Kohl et de Jacques Delors qui nous frappe. Chaque fois, l'intégration européenne est conçue comme un projet de civilisation, en faveur de la paix, de la liberté et de la prospérité. Les trois personnalités plaident pour une action en faveur d'une Europe ouverte sur le monde. Ils souhaitent une Europe forte, pour assumer ses responsabilités et contribuer au bien commun dans le monde, non pas pour dominer les autres. L'influence de la guerre personnellement vécue et de ses cicatrices est toujours présente chez les trois hommes d'État. Elle est un moule commun à leur engagement politique.

Certaines différences dans la façon qu'ont les citoyens d'honneur de l'Europe d'appréhender et de faire état des grands enjeux relatifs à la place du continent dans le monde sont naturelles et ne devraient pas nous surprendre. Trois facteurs explicatifs peuvent entrer ici en ligne de compte. Premièrement, chacun possède un parcours de vie propre et a exercé des fonctions spécifiques. La réflexion de Jean Monnet se développe le plus à l'époque du Comité d'action pour les États-Unis d'Europe qu'il a fondé et qu'il préside; celle de Jacques Delors comme président de la Commission européenne. Dans les deux cas, il s'agit d'une fonction au niveau européen, tandis qu'Helmut Kohl œuvre comme chancelier fédéral de la RFA avec une perspective à la fois nationale et européenne. Deuxième facteur explicatif des différences entre les citoyens d'honneur: ceux-ci sont originaires de pays différents. Monnet et Delors sont Français tandis que Kohl est Allemand. Troisième facteur enfin: les différences de période dans leur activité expliquent sans doute beaucoup. Jean Monnet s'intéresse particulièrement à la place de l'Europe dans le monde au cours des années 1950 et 1960 tandis que Jacques Delors et Helmut Kohl le font particulièrement durant les années 1980 et 1990. Même si

Jean Monnet n'a pu que penser à des éléments d'un ordre d'après-guerre froide, il a tout de même eu le grand mérite de le faire et de contribuer à préparer les consciences. Jacques Delors et plus encore Helmut Kohl ont dû quant à eux y faire face concrètement en exerçant des responsabilités politiques à une période charnière de l'histoire ayant vu la fin de la domination soviétique en Europe centrale et orientale, la réunification allemande, la disparition de l'URSS et des conflits armés dans les Balkans. Les compétences de politique étrangère demeurant largement l'apanage des États membres, il est normal que le chancelier allemand exerce une plus grande influence que le président de la Commission européenne.

L'importance pour l'Europe de nouer un partenariat privilégié avec les États-Unis est présente chez les trois citoyens d'honneur. Elle semble l'être toutefois encore plus chez Jean Monnet et Helmut Kohl pour lesquels la prise en compte de la dimension transatlantique est inscrite dans leurs ressorts les plus profonds. La nécessité de développer une vision et une action au-delà de l'Europe et de l'espace atlantique se retrouve chez les trois, mais elle apparaît la plus développée chez Helmut Kohl et Jacques Delors, sans doute du fait de la période historique.

Une citation du grand universitaire de Harvard Stanley Hoffmann, remontant à 1964 et reprise par Jacques Delors, sera notre mot de la fin : "One of the choices Europe still has to make concerns its future role in the world. For in this respect also, there is freedom of choice, but it has not yet been fully used."⁴¹ Plus d'un demi-siècle après avoir été écrite, cette phrase reste d'une grande actualité. Le contexte global dans lequel l'Europe peut se déployer en cette fin de deuxième décennie du XXI^e siècle n'est pas aisé. Le monde est devenu plus multipolaire mais moins multilatéral. La puissance américaine est devenue moins bienveillante, voire carrément hostile, envers l'Europe unie. La Russie non plus ne soutient

⁴¹ La traduction de cette phrase est la suivante : « L'un des choix que l'Europe doit encore faire concerne son rôle futur dans le monde. Aussi à cet égard, il y a une liberté de choix, mais elle n'a pas encore été pleinement utilisée. » Source : JD-121 : allocution de Jacques Delors à Harvard University le 22 septembre 1989.

pas le projet européen. L'Union est secouée par une critique féroce des élites nationales et européennes. Les leçons de l'histoire pourront-elles être transmises aux générations montantes ? Si l'Europe devait s'affirmer sur la scène globale, ce qui n'est de loin pas acquis, serait-ce le résultat d'un nouveau darwinisme social entre grands ensembles continentaux ? Les grands enjeux communs à l'humanité, comme la lutte contre le réchauffement climatique ou la réduction de la biodiversité, pourront-ils fédérer le genre humain ? Les réponses à toutes ces questions apparaissent encore incertaines, mais l'humanité se trouve sans doute à une croisée des chemins.

European Integration as a Model for Global Governance

Francesco Velo*

The milestones of the European integration process show that, since its beginning, this path has been characterized, in all its phases, by two elements:

- the processes undertaken were supported by a broad consensus;
- the same processes were strongly opposed.

Europe certainly deserves credit for having always played the role of a laboratory, where innovative solutions can be tested and developed. The greatest innovation is in the method: in order not to transmit the seed of nationalism to the entire continent, it was necessary to look for solutions that did not generate a gap between the “internal”, European, and external interests.

Europe’s solutions for Europe had to be placed at the service of a higher level objective. That is why the path of European integration is now able to offer solutions to meet the challenges facing us at a global level.

The first major innovation in post-war Europe was achieved through an initiative

- inspired by universal values;
- able to solicit the commitment of the political sphere;
- thanks to the opportunity created by an economic initiative.

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With the birth of the ECSC, Europe demonstrated that it was possible to create a supranational unity, with peace rather than war. The project for the industrial conversion and reconstruction of the steel sector required to support not only investments but also to promote institutional innovation. The ECSC project, promoted by Monnet, identified the closure and backwardness of national markets as one of the obstacles to the conversion of the European steel sector.

The creation of a larger, continental, integrated market, in the wake of the experience promoted two decades earlier by Roosevelt in the United States, required tackling the problem of the government of that market, of the institutions capable of exercising, at supranational level, the powers of direction, control and sanction. In the United States, the solution coincided with the strengthening of the Federal Government. A similar solution, in Europe, could not be pursued, at least in the short term. The solution designed by Monnet is unprecedented. And it leads to the birth of a supranational authority, a Court of Justice, a Council of Ministers, a Common Assembly, the first embryo of the European Parliament.

The fact that the ECSC’s internal relevance, the European dimension, was mainly highlighted has perhaps overshadowed what is becoming clearer and clearer today.

The “Monnet” method was introducing elements of discontinuity, which would be progressively understood. These elements of discontinuity gave rise to a new concept of sovereignty and citizenship.

Therefore, two alternative paths were confronting one against the other. On one side, we could promote sovereign states (or creation, of a bigger Sovereign State, at a higher level), whose choices are primarily aimed at internal support, and which seek to achieve the conditions through which national companies can expand their influence at the international level, and the state itself extend its political weight.

On the other side, an alternative model, which did not aim at the creation of a “super-state” but which, in order to be realized, required to reflect on which indispensable innovations had to be introduced, by putting in system, the

- institutional sphere,
- economic-social sphere,
- political sphere.

The description of this model is offered by Art. 3 of the Treaty on European Union, which allows us to grasp the profound nature of the European project.

Article 3

1. The Union’s aim is to promote peace, its values and the well-being of its peoples.
2. The Union shall offer its citizens an area of freedom, security and justice without internal frontiers, in which the free movement of persons is ensured in conjunction with appropriate measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention and combating of crime.
3. The Union shall establish an internal market. It shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment. It shall promote scientific and technological advance. It shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality between women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child. It shall promote economic, social and

territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States. It shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and shall ensure that Europe’s cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced.

4. The Union shall establish an economic and monetary union whose currency is the euro.

5. In its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests and contribute to the protection of its citizens. It shall contribute to peace, security, the sustainable development of the Earth, solidarity and mutual respect among peoples, free and fair trade, eradication of poverty and the protection of human rights, in particular the rights of the child, as well as to the strict observance and the development of international law, including respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter.

6. The Union shall pursue its objectives by appropriate means commensurate with the competences which are conferred upon it in the Treaties.

The model of Union designed by Monnet has brought to maturity an advanced political and social space, perhaps the most advanced in the world. It has created a strong, stable and, above all, institutional infrastructure that does not weaken with the passage of time.

There is one more aspect that could be emphasised. This model is an alternative to models that in literature are defined as “liquid models” (where the action of institutions as the search for balance, suspended between two “parallel” horizons, not necessarily coincident. The State and its reasons, on the one hand; the market, and its logics, on the other). The European model brings with it the overcoming of the need to make a sort of alternative choice between state and market: precisely because it is the market itself that is governed and regulated by the institutions, which are superordinate to it. The adoption of this model is a challenge

and places a great responsibility on organisations, on all public and private institutions, and on businesses. Reorient its strategy, develop awareness of the change underway.

This explains why the European model is a possible reference model for global governance. A change in the perspective from which we look at the problems helps us to understand how good and strong the European model is today, and what change we are being asked to make.

The first awareness to be developed is that what we are seeing today is a reversal of the factors: it is the institutional infrastructure, built with rules and principles, supported by a new form of sovereignty and legitimised by a new form of citizenship, which constitutes innovation and promotes change.

It is not the European infrastructure which is in crisis: it is what has come to the end of a cycle within it, which cannot find a place in the new economic and social model under construction, and which therefore tries to resist change.

The violence with which this resistance manifests itself (in the political, economic and social spheres) depends on frustration. The challenges that the third millennium poses to businesses and economic systems seem unresolvable when faced with the scheme of the national states of the twentieth century.

In this context, it is precisely the European institutional model that offers itself as a guide, promoting the social market economy and a new humanism. So, it is a model that first of all requires to make our own and stand for its values.

By challenging public and private institutions to become a “soft infrastructure”, it becomes the widespread infrastructure whose essential task is to give content and substance to the long-term strategy, taking on the task of promoting and guiding innovation and development.

At the European level, this model is emerging thanks to the creation and strengthening of the Authorities. At a decentralised level, universities, research centres and businesses are the natural pivots of economic and social development.

The European model entrusts them with a very important role: to be the nerve centre of a system of generation of knowledge and innovation which, starting from the sharing of a common long-term objective, of the definition of a new relationship between public and private based on adherence to the same scheme of rules and values - sustainability, equity, solidarity, subsidiarity - identifies the greatest possibilities in terms of economic and social progress.

Adherence to this model requires improving the capacity of public and private institutions to enter into partnerships with other entities based on these principles, to make them become networks between public and private, real centres of generation of skills and innovation, industrial, economic and social. If taken up, the challenge offered by the European integration process can represent a great source of competitive advantage for universities, as well as for businesses.

The validity of the solutions that will be adopted will emerge, in the medium and long term, precisely from the ability to develop a wide-ranging continental strategy at the territorial level, promoting the emergence of formal and informal networks of relationships that will involve, in different ways, public and private stakeholders, universities and businesses, supporting them and at the same time renewing their role as promoters of innovation and economic and social development.

European Integration as a Model for Global Governance

Dario Velo*

1. Spinelli, Monnet and the new sovereign trends

In the States governed by the rule of law, a distinction is made between constitutional provisions which tend to be valid in the long term and provisions which are more fluidly applicable in the short to medium term. Constitutional provisions act as dams and as guidelines.

This consolidated vision is the basis of the vision of Altiero Spinelli who, in the process of European unification, identified the “constituent moment” as the place where the European model could and should have been defined. A model which would have been clarified and concretised in subsequent times. The Constitution would have set out the firm points, the European model in the final analysis, that the unification process would have to respect as it developed.

A symmetrically opposed option, while respecting homogeneous values and converging objectives in the long term, was instead supported by Monnet, who was convinced that a constitutional charter could be written at the end of a long phase of progress of the integration process among European countries. According to Monnet, the relationship between the integration process and the definition of the European model is a relation of interdependence.

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The contrast between the approach developed by Spinelli and those who adhered to his vision, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, Monnet’s approach needs to be clarified both politically and historically.

The changes currently under discussion in Europe, concerning the future organisation of the European Union, require a further interpretative paradigm, absent in the Spinellian approach and present only implicitly in the Monnet approach. Sovereigns question the European model and develop a political struggle characterised by a short-term vision, fuelled primarily by the will to manage the power already transferred to the European level.

It is a question of better understanding how this vision is placed with respect to the dialectic between the visions of Spinelli and Monnet, questioning the very meaning of the European model as it has traditionally been understood.

The experience of the United States can be useful to orient the thought, in order to better understand the implications of the new trends that are emerging in Europe.

2. Continuity and discontinuity in the constitutional evolution of the United States. An interpretative key to possible changes in the European framework

For Spinelli, the federalist vision was fuelled by the careful study of *The Federalist*, which brings together the debate developed by Hamilton, Jay and Madison for the approval of the American Constitution at the end of the eighteenth century¹. The *Ventotene Manifesto*², written by Spinelli and Rossi with the dialectical contribution of Colorni in the period spent in the confinement on the island of Ventotene, cannot be understood without *The Federalist*. The *Ventotene Manifesto* can be considered the updating of the work of Hamilton, Jay and Madison with reference to Europe, called upon to give itself a new order at the end, then imminent, of the tragedy of the Second World War.

Spinelli's whole life has confirmed his loyalty to the Hamiltonian vision. Spinelli's commitment to European unification has always been based on the experience of the founding fathers of the American federation³. Those who have embraced Spinelli's vision have never called into question the conviction that the strategy for unifying Europe should go back to this experience⁴. The decisive moment has always been identified by the Spinellians in the initial constituent phase.

This has led to an underestimation of the importance of the moment of discontinuity in the American constitutional history matured at the beginning of the 20th century, when the American model of federation began to redefine itself. This moment of discontinuity can contribute to a better understanding of the new phase of European unification currently under discussion.

¹ Hamilton, A., Madison, J., Jay, J., *The Federalist*, McLean, New York, 1788

² Spinelli, A., *Il Manifesto di Ventotene*, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1991

³ Spinelli, A., *Il progetto europeo*, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1985

⁴ Albertini, M., *Tutti gli scritti*, Il Mulino, Bologna, various years

In the early 1900s, the United States witnessed a sudden and accelerated concentration of power that led the federal authorities in Washington to increasingly control the economic and social system.

The most well-known measure of greater impact assumed in this phase is the anti-trust law promoted by Theodore Roosevelt. Economic development had placed some capitalists in the possibility of controlling their own sector of activity, reaching positions of monopoly or collusive oligopoly. The power of this economic elite was even and in some cases exceeded that of the federal government.

With the antitrust law, T. Roosevelt puts the federal institutions in a position to control sectors where this concentration was higher and thereby protect market freedom⁵. In this way, a neo-liberal order begins to emerge which will be defined more completely and clearly with the New Deal of Franklin Delano Roosevelt⁶.

Many laws were passed in that period that were able to design in a more complete way the centralising turning point imprinted by T. Roosevelt. In 1914 the federal programme of aid to agriculture was launched. In 1916 it was the turn of the federal programme for the construction of roads of interstate interest. The vocational training programme was launched in 1917. In 1918, the health sector took its first centralised turn.

The development of these programmes was made possible by the approval of the 16th amendment, which recognised Washington's right to tax citizens' income directly. In this way, a process has been initiated to support over the years the financing of a growing federal public expenditure, changing the balance of powers between the Member States and the federal government.

⁵ The concepts of liberism and liberalism have been clarified by Croce, B., Einaudi, L., *Liberismo e liberalismo*, Ricciardi, Milano, 1957

⁶ Kindleberger, A.P., *The World in Depression, 1929-1939*, Allen Lane, London, 1973

Initially, centralisation resulted in a limited increase in the federal budget. The process that had been initiated was destined to develop continuously until it reached its present size⁷.

It is significant that the federal programmes launched at the beginning of the 20th century focused on the same economic and social sectors in which the federal initiative would have been since then concentrated, all along the century and to this day. In this sense, the turning point that took place at the beginning of the 20th century can be considered a break with the American model of federalism designed by the founding fathers. This turning point also marks the beginning of a phenomenon of fundamental importance for understanding the history of the United States.

The powers transferred to Washington fuel the political clash over the control of these powers. The confrontation between Democrats and Republicans is changing. The Democratic Party becomes a supporter of growing centralism, while the Republican Party supports the reaffirmation of the traditional autonomy of the Member States. The Democratic Party will be the main promoter of the development of federal social policies, while the Republican Party will accept an increasing level of monetary and financial centralisation to finance defence and to finance Member States.

The US federalist model will therefore be increasingly influenced by the outcome of the elections. The role of guarantee is weakening, in parallel with the possibility for the party that won the electoral competition to call into question the constitutional order in force in significant respects⁸.

It must be assessed whether, and to what extent, the sovereign policies that are developing in Europe have points of contact with the experience of the US Republican Party.

⁷ Inman, R.P., Fitts, M.A., "Political Institutions and Fiscal Policy: Evidence from the U.S. Historical Record", *Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation*, 6/90

⁸ Boggetti, G., *Lo spirito del costituzionalismo americano*, Giappichelli, Torino, 1988

3. United States subsidiarity versus European subsidiarity

The US constitutional evolution shifts away from the original design of the founding fathers also for other reasons; this refers to the particular ways in which subsidiarity is organised in the US. The comparison with the European experience allows us to grasp the constituent process with which subsidiarity has taken shape in the two federal experiences.

Subsidiarity is a key principle in every federation. It regulates the distribution of power between the federal level, the Member States and local communities. The essential qualification of subsidiarity is that the entirety of power is in the hands of the institutions linked to the territory, with the exception of the powers transferred by them to the higher level up to the federation. This guarantees a better management of public affairs⁹. This is the principle affirmed by vertical subsidiarity. The term "vertical" was coined when "horizontal" subsidiarity began to develop. The latter describes the possibility that a function attributed to a level of vertical subsidiarity can be carried out by different subjects: public, private, public-private, profit, non-profit¹⁰. Horizontal subsidiarity has assumed increasing importance in parallel with the development of new State-market, public-private relations¹¹.

In the European experience, it is easy to understand how the horizontal subsidiarity has developed in connection with the affirmation of the social market economy¹². In Europe, the market has assumed different shapes over time, at continental level

⁹ Quadrio Curzio, A., *Sussidiarietà e sviluppo. Paradigmi per l'Europa e per l'Italia*, Vita e Pensiero, Milano, 2003

¹⁰ Felice, F., *L'economia sociale di mercato*, Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli, 2008

¹¹ Pernice, I., "Multilevel Constitutionalism and the Treaty of Amsterdam. European Constitution Making Revisited", *Common Market Law Review*, 36/99

¹² Hasse, R.H., Schneider, H., Weigelt, K. (eds), *Social Market Economy. History, Principles and Implementation*, Schoeningh, Paderborn, 2008

and in Member States individually considered. The same applies to the forms taken by statehood. These dynamics have made the State-market relationship complex and articulated, while both terms of the relationship were subject to a changing process. The changes that have taken place have not, however, marked a breaking point, but a change in continuity. Vertical subsidiarity has been enriched by horizontal subsidiarity, and has not been contradicted by it.

In the United States, subsidiarity has seen three actors operate: the federal government, the intermediate institutions (Member States and local communities) and organised capitalism. The role assumed by the two major American parties in the constituent process, both material and formal, created the space that capitalism was ready to occupy.

The role of organised capitalism in the United States has resulted in the ability to influence elections and the work of federal and member governments. The role assumed by organised capitalism goes beyond these manifestations; it constitutes a third political force with very particular characters, but certainly capable of modifying the material American constitution. No other country has experienced a phenomenon of this magnitude; this may be the reason for its inadequate understanding. Organised capitalism has fuelled cultural change; it has supported the affirmation of new ways of conceiving the American model and, with globalisation, it has assumed the responsibility of influencing the destiny of the world.

The US subsidiarity is therefore different from what was designed in the original constitution. We must acknowledge the American constitution the ability to design a way to balance powers that hindered the undisputed affirmation of one of the three forces in the field.

US organised capitalism has certainly helped to define in a more articulate way the very concept of subsidiarity. The traditional definition of subsidiarity corresponds to the transfer of powers from the Member States to the Federation, where necessary. In addition

to this definition, in the US experience, there is the transfer of powers from the market to the Member States and the Federation, where necessary. In this way, the market is not only recognised as the place of freedom as dictated by liberal doctrine, but also as the place where the system's ability to govern is formed¹³. The competition between the three fundamental powers thus becomes more complex and articulated according to a model of democracy which is different from the European social market economy¹⁴.

The influence of organised capitalism has strengthened the capacity of the market to give continuity to the economic-social order, counteracting possible excesses in the centralist tendencies or, vice versa, in the tendencies in favour of the sovereignty of the Member States. The construction of a single US market has and still requires a balance in the relationship between federal and state authorities. By projecting these observations at world level, the role of the international market can be affirmed to counter excesses in the centralisation which is in the hands of the leading States.

4. Possible changes in the European model: the role of political parties

Spinelli always believed that relations between Europe and the United States were crucial in the current historical phase¹⁵. This vision stemmed from his firm belief that Europe should repeat the American experience, first and foremost by initiating a constitutional process that would adopt the constitutional model designed by Hamilton and the other Founding Fathers. The solid basis on which set the foundations of the collaboration between Europe and the United States would thus have been the homogeneity of the constitutions of both federations.

¹³ Einaudi, L., "Il mio piano non è quello di Keynes", *La riforma sociale*, 2/33

¹⁴ Derycke, P.H., Gilbert, G., *Économie publique locale*, Economica, Paris, 1988; Ratheau, W., *L'economia nuova*, It. Ed. Einaudi, Torino, 1976

¹⁵ Paolini, E., *Altiero Spinelli. Appunti per una biografia*, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1988

This vision led Spinelli to underestimate the change that took place in the United States at the beginning of the 20th century. The centralisation then initiated was not considered so significant by Spinelli as to impose a review of the convictions that had been formed in Ventotene, while studying *The Federalist*¹⁶.

A possible interpretation of this difficulty in changing his point of view can be identified in the fact that Spinelli has always referred to the formal constitution, not taking into account the impact of changes in the material constitution, whether or not they were able to fuel subsequent changes in the formal constitution. The history of the United States has seen significant changes in the material constitution. The process of European unification has developed with decisive advances in the material constitution¹⁷.

There is a significant difference between the US and European experiences. The political struggle between Democrats and Republicans took the modern forms that still characterise it at the beginning of the 20th century, coinciding with the development of centralism by Democrats. Since the beginning of the process, the debate was focused on the wide range of powers that were the object of the reforming plan of T. Roosevelt.

In Europe, the European Parliament was characterised by the search for unity among the political forces, as the object of the dispute was mainly the definition of the constitutional rules, which require to be supported by a broad consensus. The first transfer of power of fundamental importance was the creation of the European Central Bank. Consequently, the sovereigns, whose initiative has points of contact with the policy that the Republican Party has traditionally carried out in America, must concentrate their

¹⁶ A volume edited by Luca Meldolesi that reconstructs the cultural climate within which Spinelli's reflection in Ventotene developed has been recently published. Colorni, E., Spinelli, A., (Meldolesi, L. editor), *I dialoghi di Ventotene*, Rubbettino, Soveria Mannelli, 2018

¹⁷ Monnet, J., *Mémoires*, Fayard, Paris, 1976

initiative mainly on a single point, the management of money. Welfare is to a large extent the responsibility of Washington in the U.S.A., while in the EU it is the responsibility of the Member States.

This interpretation must be verified: the transformations, especially in the initial phase, have a fluidity that the experience is destined to consolidate or modify¹⁸.

In a nutshell, the process of European unification faces two fundamental alternatives. The first one is to replicate the US model; in this context, it is to be expected that two political groups will form in Europe, corresponding to the US Democratic Party and the US Republican Party. This scenario is not unrealistic; however, we assess it.

Every time a constitutional progress has been made in the European unification process, a unity of all European political parties was created. This might not necessarily be repeated in the future.

The second fundamental alternative that the process of European unification can go through is the search for its own interpretative model, designed in an increasingly coherent way. The way in which the European Monetary Union has been constituted is an example of the content that this second alternative puts into play.

5. A currency not subservient to the power of the "Prince": the revolutionary novelty of the European model

It is easy to oppose centralism when the federal authorities do not have significant powers. Reality itself takes on the responsibility of taking out the option of centralisation.

¹⁸ Maillet, P., "Un modèle de gouvernance européen favorable à l'apparition d'une politique diversifiée et coordonnée", *The European Union Review*, 1-2/01

This scenario in Europe was no longer true when one of the two fundamental powers, the currency and the army, became a competence of the European Union. The crucial problem that arose when the Monetary Union became a realistic option was how to reconcile the transfer of monetary power with the maintenance of a subsidiary federal state structure, preventing the EU authorities from taking control of the ECB¹⁹. Money has always been subservient to the power of the “Prince”. The fact that also the currency could comply with the principle of subsidiarity had no precedent²⁰.

It was at this stage in history that the revolutionary significance of the European model emerged. Its innovative character was underestimated until Monetary Union dramatically questioned whether to stick to the European model pursued until then or to reorient itself in favour of centralisation. A limited awareness of this fact erroneously leads to qualify Jean Monnet, the founding father of the European model in its revolutionary aspects, as a functionalist²¹.

Issuing a currency has always been a power controlled by the Prince, with the aim of strengthen centralism. This happened both at national level and international level, as a national currency became reserve currency²².

Europe faced a new problem: to have a currency that was not a power in the hands of the European Commission but that respected constitutional rules consistent with the social market economy, and above all with subsidiarity.

¹⁹ Padoa Schioppa, T., *Europa forza gentile*, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2001

²⁰ Jozzo, A., Velo, D., “L'autonomia della Banca centrale in Italia e in Europa”, *Moneta e credito*, 134/81

²¹ The role of Müller-Armack in parallel with Monnet in the establishment of the social market economy should be recalled. Müller-Armack, A., *Religion und Wirtschaft*, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 1959

²² Triffin, R., *Gold and the dollar crisis*, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1960

In the hands of the executive power, the issue of money can assume a fiscal role. At the national level, inflation drains resources from the population with less bargaining power in favour of central power. At an international level, the use of a national currency as a reserve and payment currency drains resources in favour of the country issuing the currency itself. Treasury control over the central bank makes it possible to use monetary policy as a source of financing for central government expenditure²³. Centralism increases in parallel with the imbalance in the accounts, in order to maximise the drainage of resources to government bodies.

The EU has rejected this tradition and for the first time in history has designed a “democratic currency”, respectful of the rule of law.

The ECB's Statute is a revolutionary innovation, as it changes the very nature of the currency. The good governance of the currency and the protection of the stability of its value, guaranteed by the ECB, limit the possibility of using monetary and financial policies to drain resources to central authorities, both domestically and internationally. Money, which is taken from the Prince's power, cannot be used for fiscal purposes or to support an aggressive foreign policy.

With the birth of the euro on the basis of rules faithful to subsidiarity, the European model consolidates and takes on the value of a historicised example of a new statehood. Innovation is therefore twofold: it acts both internally within the Union, designing a new model for sharing sovereignty, and externally, proposing an alternative model for managing international relations, proposing a currency that, for the first time, is neither conditioned nor at the service of a “national interest”, or reason of State. The novelty is of such importance that it is not immediately understood: the most difficult thing is to change the interpretative paradigms and to renounce the certainties carried on by ideas of the past.

²³ Velo, D., *La crisi economica internazionale e l'alternativa europea*, Giuffrè, Milano, 1976

6. Monetary Union and the European model into becoming

The EU has structured its own model of statehood through a series of stages, which have fed first a material constituent process, then a formal constituent process²⁴. Monnet's approach has made this process possible: each stage has written a chapter of the future final constitution, with a degree of flexibility and innovativeness allowed by the lack of rigid predefined constitutional dams. This has created the space to renew the role of the jurists who have been able to give life to a new "common law", based on the principles and therefore perfectly compatible with the model of continental European law. This model is completely different from the Anglo-Saxon one, which is based on reason of State and practice.

The definition of the characteristics of the Monetary Union has been of fundamental importance. The new model of European statehood has managed to pass the test, confirming its validity also to manage the power to mint money.

The fundamental aspect that unites the process of unification as a whole, and the process of monetary unification within it, is that the gradual transfer of powers happened when consensus emerged for such a transfer. A transfer then considered necessary to manage the problems that have matured. The powers transferred at European level have always been limited to the need to manage every single phase of the integration process, not to support the evolution of unification with solutions with a high degree of stability over time²⁵.

The Member States, when giving up monetary sovereignty, wanted to protect themselves from possible negative effects, protecting their powers against the risk of centralisation at European level.

²⁴ Mailet, P., Velo, D. (a cura di), *L'Europe à géométrie variable*, L'Harmattan, Paris, 1994

²⁵ Vv.Aa., *La cooperazione rafforzata e l'Unione economica*, Giuffrè, Milano, 2007

In the monetary field, in order to achieve this objective, a statute was drawn up for the ECB, which drastically restricted its discretion, specifically by limiting the possibility of draining resources from the citizens of the Member States to the benefit of European authorities by means of seigniorage. At the same time, respect for the principle of subsidiarity required that the ECB should not directly finance the public institutions of the Member States.

The ECB has been recognised as an independent institution, protected and at the same time limited in its activity by a strictly federal statute. The ECB's Statute is intended to protect the value of money and prohibit the financing of public authorities at all levels. The European Commission has been precluded from intervening in the management of the ECB, and thus has been precluded from making the ECB directly or indirectly a means of increasing its capacity to govern. If this capacity had been recognised, it would have made the European monetary order evolve towards forms tested by the tradition of the centralised nation states²⁶.

The understanding of the fundamental aspects that qualify the European Monetary Union is the key to interpreting the monetary problems in other federations and, in the future, more and more clearly, for the world's monetary institutions²⁷. The European model has shaped the European Monetary Union and the latter in turn has strengthened the European model. The future will see if the European model is confirmed by the Economic Union, which is currently being defined.

7. The European model in the test of Economic Union

The process of European unification was based on the respect of the principle of subsidiarity. It is a question of understanding the

²⁶ Padoa Schioppa, T., *La lunga via per l'euro*, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2004

²⁷ Velo, D., *Quale Europa. Il modello europeo nella storia contemporanea*, Cacucci, Bari, 2018

implications of building the Economic Union on the basis of the principle of subsidiarity. In other words, it is a question of understanding if the Economic Union will be accomplished according to the European economic model in the same way as the Monetary Union. Fiscal unification, a crucial aspect of Economic Union, is certainly more difficult than monetary unification²⁸.

The key point is the constitutional dimension of monetary and fiscal choices. The general problem is how the governance of the economy will change when statehood assumes a federal form. In the monetary field, the EU's response to this problem has been to neutralise monetary policy. With the Economic Union, the first problem to be addressed will be how to translate this principle, that shaped monetary policy, into economic and fiscal policy as well.

The Maastricht Treaty provides that the affirmation of fiscal federalism requires the affirmation of the rule of budgetary balance. Budgetary equilibrium pursues the objective of stability and the distribution of resources at the various institutional levels according to their powers. The size and configuration of public expenditure pursue the objectives of development and solidarity. These objectives are not contradictory; under certain conditions they are complementary.

The balance of public expenditure is a constitutional problem, as we have already seen. The same applies to the distribution of competences and resources at the various institutional levels. Constitutional scope has the dimension of public expenditure, first of all because it raises the question of the relationship between the State and the market. The resources allocated to solidarity are called upon to implement the fundamental principles contained in the preamble to the European Constitution, drafted as the Lisbon

²⁸ Molle, W., "Cohesion and Fiscal Federalism: the European Experience", *The European Union Review*, 2/97

Treaty: also this fact has a clear constitutional relevance. The governance of the economy, in a federal state, is first a problem of rules and then economic.

To understand the European model, at this stage of the unification process, the problem is to evaluate, with a sufficient degree of approximation, the meaning itself of an economic order in which the possibility of creating inflation, new debt, deficit spending, redefinition of taxation, State-market relations and solidarity are brought back to a constitutional dimension.

The current European model creates a form of democracy in which the rules also guarantee future generations. It is to be expected that this aspect will remain when defining European Economic Union. But the European model goes beyond the European dimension. It can be used to outline the model of governance that will be adopted by the evolved federal systems and international institutions.

8. Europe at a crossroads

The analysis developed leads to a conclusion that can be summarised as follows. The US federation model has undergone a process of centralisation that has changed some important aspects of it. Aspects that had previously characterised the experience of centralised bureaucratic national States have been received, with modifications, by the American Federation.

The European model has always projected itself in its evolution towards innovative solutions not supported by the experiences already experimented. Europe is reflecting today on which of the two is the current model. Europe can reorient itself by following the example of the United States. Or it can continue to develop its own autonomous model, continuing and innovating the experience acquired so far. If, on a party level, we will see Europe

repeating the American model, with the opposition between Democrats and Republicans, we will have to change the perspective used to assess the relationship between rules and policies.

In the United States, Democrats and Republicans have not questioned, since the civil war, whether or not to maintain the federation; they have questioned “which federalism?”.

The choice that Europe must make is not exclusively in the European interest but concerns all the players, on a global scale. If these are the fundamental alternatives that the process of European unification can go through, it is clear that it is difficult to make long-term choices relying solely on an abstract culture. This is a great lesson from the Founding Fathers of European unification. It is up to each of us to assess which Europe deserves our consensus.

The Holy See and the Idea of European Integration before the Establishment of European Communities

Jan Tombiński *

While speaking about the relation between the Holy See and European institutions, the focus is usually on big speeches of the consecutive Popes after the European Communities have been established, following the signature of so-called Rome Treaties on 25th of March 1957. Most memorable are the interventions of John Paul II on the European Act from Santiago de Compostela (9.11.1982), his speech at the European Parliament or his metaphor of two lungs of Europe, which are quoted, together with the solemn act of Paul VI to name Saint Benedict the Main Patron of Europe, or important comments by Pope Francis about the role and vocation of the European Union in the modern world.

Though the idea of European integration has been closely followed by all Popes since WWI, it is always interesting to situate public statements and decisions that followed on the larger background, the famous *structures de la longue durée* after Fernand Braudel.

1. For its universal vocation, and also for its political role, the Catholic Church has been the first plan actor in shaping Europe for centuries. Numerous were the attempts by popes to create political structures in Europe, as numerous were the attempts by rulers of states to use Christianity as a tool to implement their political ideas. In some cases, direct threats against the European territory forced countries to unite and to create ad-hoc leagues to defend commonly Europe. Confronted with the direct invasion

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of Moslems or of the Turkish Empire into the heart of Europe, not only kings joint forces, but Pontifical power engaged to call upon all Christian kings to merge efforts in defending Christianity – Saint Leagues were established and the Holy See engaged to compensate military efforts financially or by other gratifications.

2. The WWI, fought mostly between European Christians, resulted in the collapsing of four Empires that dominated largely the European continent and in reshaping the political map of the continent in an unprecedented way. The Austrian Empire, considered as the Catholic Empire, disintegrated and gave space to several national states in Central Europe and in the Balkans. The German Empire, the Protestant one, transformed into the Republic, though without significant territorial losses, but with the feeling of a humiliating defeat. The Orthodox Russian Empire had been so terribly shaken by the war that two consecutive revolutions in 1917 overturned the Tsar and subsequently the quasi democratic government was then changed into a communist empire, opposed to everything that had religious content and with the ambition of launching an all-European communist revolution against established norms and rules. The Ottoman Empire, the bridgehead of Islam in Europe, succumbed the own laic revolution.

The remaining European Empire, the British one, turned to its colonies and to the US and stayed rather distant from deeply unstable European affairs, until the development on the Continent hit British interests directly.

On the edge between former Empires, newly emerged states struggled to build state institutions, to define borders or to cope with complex ethnical, confessional and linguistic mosaic of the region. This happened often at the cost of new wars that historians call “European Pygmies wars”, in contrast to the precedent confrontations between Empires. In sum, forces that existed before the war and would have eventually been able to impose a new European order, disappeared and the new Bolshevik threat with its ambition of reigniting the universal revolution, overshadowed Europe and notably Christianity.

3. The Holy See’s ability to act as actor and pivotal co-shaper of Europe at the time of WWI was limited since Rome had been conquered by Italy in 1870 and the Pontiffs had become “prisoners of the Vatican”. However, faced with the drama of WWI – that several commentators have called the European Civil War – the Popes didn’t remain silent and indifferent to the question of how to recover from self-inflicted European tragedy.

4. Pope Benedict XV was elected in October 1914, at the outbreak of the Great War. He had observed the world through the lenses of Vatican’s diplomacy and through messages arriving from local churches. His ability to maintain contacts with the diplomatic community in Rome was affected by the decision of several countries to withdraw diplomatic missions from Rome, following the decision of Italy to join the war in 1915. The secret archives of the Vatican for that period are not yet accessible for consultations, therefore public documents and radio messages serve as main source for reconstructing the Pope’s thinking, including with regard to the organisation of the European continent.

5. During the war, the Holy See applied the policy of strict neutrality, without compromising on the main principle of the Pontifical action, which was “a lasting peace, honourable for all”, as the Pope stressed in his radio intervention on the occasion of his Christmas wishes in 1915. Benedict XV formulated his wish to return to the *status quo ante* and to end the conflict without victors and defeated.

The Pope had wished that the Holy See could participate in the post-war talks about the order in Europe. However, after learning of the secret clause included into the British-Italian pact on Italy joining the war from 1915 that precluded upfront – on the demand of Italy – the participation of the Holy See at the future peace talks, the Pope decided to make his ideas about post-war order public and issued on 1st of August 1917 the Apostolic Exhortation “*dès le début*”.

Being the supreme authority, above states, and not participating in the conflict, the Pope proposed to submit all the material forces of the armies to the international law and to start with progressive disarmament to the level required for the maintenance of the internal public order. Contentious situation should be dealt with by international arbitrage with sanction regime for countries that didn't accept verdicts of arbitration. The free access for all states to the seas should boost the trade, thus helping the economic activity and eliminating poverty. The Pope didn't opt for the general compensation of war damage, but hoped for the beneficial result of disarmament and use of state means for the economic development. Pacification of the situation would imply evacuation of occupied territories, including colonies.

Status quo ante was the objective of the Holy See at that time. However, aspiration of several nations – Benedict made direct reference to Armenia, peoples of the Balkans and former Kingdom of Poland – should be resolved by political dialogue within state entities that have existed until then. With these measures the Pope had hoped to establish lasting peace in Europe.

In sum, in August 1917 Benedict XV had formulated ideas that subsequently have become part of the European thinking and his call to establish a supranational control of resources for armaments could be considered as a precursor for the idea of a European Steel and Coal Community after WWII. Obviously, other people were working on this same idea, but it is striking that the Holy See had addressed this issue as one of key messages to the states.

The Pope's appeal wasn't considered by belligerent parties, but from the historical point of view it is worth highlighting the principles of his Exhortation, as several of the ideas contained in it have been integrated into the famous fourteen points of President Woodrow Wilson in January 1918.

6. Pope Benedict XV welcomed the Armistice of 11th of November 1918. "True, peace has not yet in solemn fashion brought to an end the great war, but to peace the road has been opened happily with the Armistice which has, meanwhile, suspended slaughter and devastation by land, sea and air", reads his address from December 1, 1918. "Soon the delegates of the various nations will meet in solemn congress to give the world a just and lasting peace; no human assembly has ever had before it such serious and complex determinations as they will have to take" – wrote the Pope and exhorted Catholics all over the world to support the work of the Congress by their prayers. Benedict XV declared his determination to "exert all the influence of Our Apostolic Ministry that the decisions which are to be taken to ensure for ever in the world the tranquillity of order and concord be willingly accepted and faithfully carried out by Catholics everywhere".

The words of the Pope reflected his thoughts shaped during the war, but he was visibly unaware of the feelings and aspirations of many nations and within some states. The collapse of the Habsburg Empire and the chaos on the territory of former Romanov's reign has paved the way to the emergence of several new states on the political map, from the Baltic to the Adriatic Seas. These new developments have forced the Holy See to invest in a better understanding of the complexity of a big part of the continent.

7. The Holy See wasn't admitted to the work of the Peace Conference in Paris, so the Pope used his pastoral role to warn about the consequences of a peace based on the principle of victors and defeated. "[...] peace, which was for more than four years implored by the ardent wishes of all good peoples, by the prayers of pious souls and the tears of mothers, begins at last to shine upon the nations" writes the Pope in his address for the Pentecost in May 1920, but formulates immediately a warning: "if in most places peace is in some sort established and treaties signed, the germs of former enmities remain; and you well know [...] that there can be no stable peace or lasting treaties [...] unless there be a return of mutual charity to appease hate and banish enmity".

The Church, in its universal vision, had never abandoned the idea of a united Europe inspired by the Christian values. In the same message from May 1920, Benedict XV formulated this wish without any ambiguity: “It is the teaching of history that when the Church pervaded with her spirit the ancient and barbarous nations of Europe, little by little the many and varied differences that divided them were diminished and their quarrels extinguished; in time they formed a homogeneous society from which sprang Christian Europe which, under the guidance and auspices of the Church, whilst preserving a diversity of nations, tended to a unity that favoured its prosperity and glory”.

8. However, the main forces of the European integration during the period between the two world wars had other than just Christian roots – Paneuropa of Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi, pacifistic movements and liberal politicians were shaping the road for the integration of the continent more than Christian circles. The Catholic Church was busy with the establishment of relations and diplomatic missions with a number of countries and was gaining first experience with signing of concordats with several countries, struggling for the regulation of relations with Italian state, and – last but not least – very much preoccupied by the situation of Christians under communist regimes.

The Bolshevik Revolution that on the territory of Russia practised policy of persecution of religions and clergy, destruction of churches, confiscation of properties, didn't hide ambition to export the revolution to the other parts of Europe. Pius XI, successor of Benedict XV, elected in February 1922, has previously served as Pontifical envoy to Poland – with a formal title of envoy for Catholics on the territory of Russia as well – disposed of first-hand experience with the practical consequences of communist regime and its impact on the life of the churches.

9. Pius XI continued the same position with regard to the peace treaties as his predecessor: “Peace indeed was signed in solemn conclave between the belligerents of the late War. This peace, however, was only written into treaties. It was not received into the

hearts of men, who still cherish the desire to fight one another and to continue to menace in a most serious manner the quiet and stability of civil society. [...] Nor has this illusory peace, written only on paper, served as yet to reawaken similar noble sentiments in the souls of men. On the contrary, there has been born a spirit of violence and of hatred which, because it has been indulged in for so long, has become almost a second nature in many men” (December 1922, Encyclical *Ubi Arcano Dei Consilio*). For the Pope, lack of reconciliation and instrumental use of past sufferings were potential sources for the new European conflict.

In the available sources for the Pontificate of Pius XI, there are no direct references to the organisation of the European continent. He mostly concentrated on the issues pertaining to the functioning of the Catholic Church, occasionally intervened in questions of public life in Italy, especially in order to promote the Catholic Action, often accused for being opponent to the Fascists.

In that context, it is worth noting that Italian representatives of the Catholic Action have been involved in the discussions about the European integration from the first years after the WWI. Catholic debates in San Sebastian in Spain, *Nouvelles équipes internationales* in Switzerland, *Pax Christi* movement – were all debating about the role of Catholics in shaping the new order and in fostering peace, in line with the teaching of the Holy See. Ideas of Jacques Maritain and Etienne Gilson, who have called for the new Christian humanism, inspired many activists from Christian circles in Europe, not only Catholics. After the WWII they all converged in the European movement in 1948 and were on the forefront of campaigning for the acceptance of Monnet's and Schuman's concept for Europe.

10. Pius XI died in February 1939 and his successor, Eugenio Pacelli, Pius XII led the Catholic Church for the following twenty years, the most turbulent period in the modern history of Europe.

11. It is difficult to document for the period of the war, what the Pope's opinion was about the future organisation of the European

continent, as the secret archives of the Vatican for his Pontificate should be opened only in 2020. Since the end of the war, Pius XII engaged more than any other of his predecessors into promoting the integration of Europe, namely of its western part, not under the Soviet occupation.

As his two predecessors did, Pius XII has warned against dividing Europe into victors and defeated – the lessons from the period after the WWI were visible in his teaching. As testifies a telegram of J. Maritain, who became the French Ambassador to the Holy See in 1945, Pius XII advocated in favour of maintenance of united Germany “in the higher interest of Catholicism” (12.10.1945) and against attributing to Germans the collective responsibility for the atrocities of the war. Such position of the Pope has been heavily criticized by victims of the war for understandable reasons. The Pope has called on the Europeans to draw on the lessons of the Church, especially on some of its exemplary representatives as Saint Benedict.

The role and influence of Jacques Maritain reached far beyond his role as French Ambassador to the Holy See. Together with Etienne Gilson he has shaped many leading politicians of Christian orientation through the ability to reconcile traditional Christian values with demands of the modern time. During his Aquinas lectures in 1947, E. Gilson spoke about “new Christianity, identical with the antique one by spirit, but in new corps” and its universal vocation. New approach called on laic people to engage and not to let the Christianity be only understood as clergy’s and Church’s case. Under the impact of these ideas Christian-democratic parties from different countries of Europe have joint forces and, by the way, fundamentals for the cooperation of so-called parties were laid down in Lausanne in 1947. Konrad Adenauer, Alcide De Gasperi, Robert Schuman, all having German as a common language, took inspiration from Maritain and Gilson.

Pius XII has praised the contribution of the Benedictine Order in shaping the European civilisation “from the Baltic Sea to the Mediterranean, from the Atlantic Ocean to the plains of Poland”

(homily in September 1947) and called Saint Benedict the “Father of Europe”, just paving the way for future decision of Paul VI to declare S. Benedict “the Main Patron of Europe”.

12. With Pius XII, the active work of the Holy See in favour of the European integration had a more solid and clearer vision. An envoy of the Pope had been sent to the European Congress in den Haag in May 1948 and the Pope in his interventions in following months had saluted the work of the Congress and addressed the need to rebuild “Europe, shaken until its foundations and to make out the (integration) movement the road of peace and advocate of general ‘*détente*’ on the Earth” (June 1948).

In numerous interventions, Pius XII had used the term of the “European union” or “European unity”, contrary to the term “communities”. Although he didn’t propose clear institutional or legal solutions for the European integration, he had shown his direct support to all the efforts to overcome the fatalities of wars and nationalistic disputes by reconciling nations and creating joint institutions, at least for one part of the continent.

When receiving at audiences representatives of various political movements or professional groups, Pius XII spoke about European integration in surprisingly clear and practical terms.

To the Congress of European Federalists in November 1948, the Pope advised the delegation to accept the idea of the European unity as a matter of urgency:

«Que l'établissement d'une union européenne offre de sérieuses difficultés, personne n'en disconvient. De prime abord on pourrait faire valoir le besoin, pour la rendre psychologiquement supportable à tous les peuples de l'Europe, d'un certain recul qui éloigne d'eux le souvenir des événements de la dernière guerre. Cependant, il n'y a pas de temps à perdre. Et si l'on tient à ce que cette union atteigne son but, si l'on veut qu'elle serve utilement la cause de la liberté et de la concorde européenne, la cause de la paix économique et

*politique intercontinentale, il est grand temps qu'elle se fasse.
Certains se demandent même s'il n'est pas déjà trop tard»
(11.11.1948)*

13. The Holy See didn't participate directly in the intergovernmental works on the institutionalisation of the European integration, so the only way to express support was the Pope's public messages. Pius XII had encouraged Catholics to actively contribute to the project. Movements as "Pax Christi" should help to create the "atmosphere needed for efforts aiming at unifying Europe economically and politically". In all cases, where politicians "work for the unification of Europe, for its peace and for the peace in the world, the Church must not stay indifferent for their efforts. It will support these endeavours with all the force of its sacrifice and with the prayer" – were his words to the delegation of the Pax Christi movement in September 1952. For the Pope, the engagement for European unification was the best method to implement in practice the social teaching of the Church, based on principles of justice, mutual respect and trust. The reconciliation within every nation and between nations and refraining from attribution of sins of past generations to the new ones was for the Pope the first obligation of Christians.

For the Pope, the Christianity was the glue of the European civilisation that has shaped the vision of the person and its role in the society. United Europe should be considered as a mission to promote and defend the spiritual values, with the Christian faith as a base of its civilisation and culture, within the continent but as well beyond it (allocution to the Professors of College of Bruges, March 1953). Should Europe renounce on Christian values, it will lack internal force to resist external pressure and risk to lose its material and even territorial independence, warned prophetically the Pope.

Encouraged by the first decisions about the institutional advancement of the integration, Pius XII has dedicated a big part of his broadcasted Christmas message in 1953 to the European unification. He considered the process as the necessity, very much awaited

by the people. The time seemed to be mature to put the process in motion and called on Christian politicians not to spare forces to make united Europe a reality. "And who looks for full insurance upfront of the success of the work, should get the answer that it is about something unknown, but necessary, an unknown but adapted to the current possibilities, an reasonable unknown" stated Pope Pius and added; "Who demands absolute certainty, doesn't show good will for Europe".

14. When receiving representatives of the association of European producers of cement he dwelt on the importance of big European roads for boosting trade exchange, but as well to promote Europe civilisation and Christianity, as the roads of ancient Rome did. He was also supportive to the cooperation between European cities as centres of civilisation, economic development and social integration. "If one wishes to create a European spirit, it would be necessary to count on relations between communities from country to country, more than between groups too restraint or national organs. We are thinking that direct exchanges between cities and communities offer to the European idea fertile ground, rich with different traditions, more ancient than the emergence of modern states" – stated Pius XII to the delegation of the International Congress of cities and local Authorities (September 1956). In the decision to create the European network of national TV broadcasters, Eurovision, the Pope had seen a new tool to bring the unification of Europe further through better promotion of universal values of the European civilisation, and Christianity as well (June 1954).

Special attention was paid to the youth "less bound by prejudices and barriers from the past" and who "wish to prepare jointly Europe more united and brotherly", as Pius XII addressed a delegation of European Company of Youth (November 1956).

15. Pope's words about the unification of Europe were addressed to the Western countries and nations. Eastern and Central parts were suffering under the communist regimes and the Holy See was alarmed by news about persecution of Christians in various countries. The imprisonment and the process of Cardinal Jozsef

Mindszenty in Hungary in 1948, confirmed the worst predictions and fears about the fate of Catholics under Soviet regime. He had focused almost entirely on the Western countries and he had never included the Central and Eastern Europe in his vision of “united Europe”. The Iron Curtain had suddenly created the barrier between two parts of Europe, even passing across countries or nations, and it is still striking how easy it had been to achieve the effect of mental distance. We may observe the consequences of that divide even now, despite thirty years have passed since the Iron Curtain has been lifted.

16. Against that background, and in the context of the important and growing influence of communist parties in Western Europe, especially in Italy and France, the Holy See multiplied its interventions aiming at protecting Christian values in Europe and consolidating peace and cooperation. The Pope regretted the failure of the European Defence Community and didn't refrain from meetings with representatives of newly created NATO. The Holy See had warned against the use of weapons of mass destruction, without however negating the necessity to defend the European civilisation from danger of atheist communism.

17. It was with big satisfaction that Pius XII received the news about the signing of Treaties of Rome in March 1957. He called *the signing* the second biggest event in the city's history since its foundation. The audience given to the participants of the European Congress convened in Rome in June 1957 offered the Pope the ability to formulate his wishes for the to-be created European Communities. He retraced the development of the European project for past years, underlining how closely all these works had been followed by the Holy See. With the signing of the Treaties of Euratom and on the Single Market the eyes had been turned to the future and the Pope wished to empower even more the common institutions, on the example of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, in order to avoid clashes and quarrels between national interests.

Pius XII had seen in the Rome Treaties the germ for more political unity of Europe and for its future external engagement, despite existing difference in foreign policies. Integrated Europe should in future reach out to Africa and become a main partner of African development.

18. From the Holy See's perspective “for Europe the message of Christianity was like the leaven in dough, always working and causing the whole mass to rise...”. Therefore, the Christian values of fundamental liberties of the human person should remain at the centre of interest for the institutions of European Communities. If one looks at the interventions and comments of Popes, who have accompanied the European Communities/Union since its establishment in 1958, it is surprising how consistent the European message of the Holy See was with regard to the values and principles to follow.

19. The biggest change in political approach to European integration came under the Pontificate of John Paul II, with his openness for Central Europe and the call for “two lungs” Eastern and Western, Latin and Orthodox that were indispensable for the unity of European nations. Thanks to his teaching and political action, the Cold War and the artificial division of Europe through the Iron Curtain ended and with them ended the direct consequences of WWII. And yet, a lot of work is still outstanding in order to reconcile the various European sensibilities and perspectives.

Pope Francis, a first non-European Pope, brings another regard on Europe, focusing rather on its vocation and obligations towards other parts of the world. It is to be noted that Pope Francis has already dedicated four big speeches to the European integration issue only, but commenting on them is beyond the subject of this paper.

Key challenges
Grands enjeux

Europe in the World: an Outlook

Pat Cox*

Europe in the world like so many similar themes begs the question at the outset as to what is one referring when speaking of Europe. Geographically, Europe extends from the Atlantic to the Urals and from the Arctic to the Mediterranean. Geopolitically it does not. I am conscious that we meet in Switzerland militarily non-aligned, a non-member of the EU and yet evidently quintessentially European. We meet on a continent where a positive partnership with Russia would make sense but not at the price of turning a blind eye to creeping authoritarianism, revanchism, aggression and a self-enriching elite's power vertical. We meet on the eve of what will be a very contested European Parliament election in May 2019 where identity politics will play a significant role.

Europe's role in the world will be fashioned to a large extent by the degree of shared European vision and values in Europe itself. In a recent short paper¹, I observed that 'the multiple and consecutive economic and migration crises of the past decade have left their electoral mark across the face of the continent. They have produced

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¹ *A European Parliament Election of Consequence*, Pat Cox, Jean Monnet Foundation for Europe, Debates and Documents Collection, December 2018.

greater inter-state tensions and policy cleavages and have led to more contested, more fragmented and more nationalistic tendencies in politics. Striking a balance during the economic crisis between fiscal rigour and fiscal rigidity has proved elusive. The immigration crisis has been contained but the radioactive political half-life of its consequences has not'. 'The fundamental values of liberal democracy, truths and many thoughts we held to be eternal, are stress-tested too often for comfort inside our Union'. To this can be added the first act of post-war disintegration in the form of Brexit with its confounding catalogue of complexity which is dominating politics in the UK to the virtual exclusion of all else and is casting its long and distracting shadow over EU affairs.

What is undeniable is that the world is changing, and consequently locating Europe's place in it is a timely exercise. Pax Americana is transforming into Crux Americana, posing questions about the durability of the US-led rules based international order that has served Europe and the wider world so well since the end of the Second World War. Old certainties are strained by a new wave of transactional politics in transatlantic relations and international affairs. There is evidence of rising geopolitical tensions in a new era of great power competition. Trade disputes and a rise in protectionism are resulting in a slowdown in global growth. The world stands at the threshold of the Fourth Industrial Revolution heralding unparalleled technological advancement but accompanied by deep-seated individual and societal insecurities. There is less inequality between states but rising inequalities within states. Increased social polarisation is resulting in challenges to political systems and the governability of many countries. We are, in the words of the Chief Executive of the World Wildlife Fund, the first generation to know we are destroying the planet and the last generation to be able to do anything about it. Just when the world needs to act cohesively like never before to fight climate change, its institutional capacity for cohesion is fracturing. The world as we have known it is undergoing profound change and Europe, however defined, needs to understand this and respond accordingly.

Populism of the left and right in Europe has been steadily on the rise for the past two decades. Its support base has risen from one vote in twelve at the turn of the new millennium to more than one in four votes today. This is a pan-European phenomenon evident in EU and non-EU states alike. Of more than one hundred such parties identified in thirty-nine European countries, three in four are right wing and one in four are left wing populists. They are strongest in Central and Eastern Europe but by no means confined to there. There is an unbroken chain of populist governments, with majority or significant minority populist party participation, stretching from the Baltic to the Adriatic, from Poland to Italy, from Stettin to Trieste, to echo Churchill's famous speech at Fulton, Missouri in March 1946, when he spoke of an Iron Curtain being drawn across the face of our continent. The growing scale and extent of this trend suggests that for the foreseeable future it is here to stay. The question is not whether this will influence the shaping of policy, in particular at EU level, but rather the extent to which it will succeed in doing so.

The dividing lines are less about left versus right in politics today and more about open versus closed. Last year sharing a platform with Marine Le Pen at her party's annual congress, Steve Bannon boasted 'history is on our side'. He said to loud applause and stamping feet 'let them call you a racist, let them call you xenophobes, let them call you nativists. Wear it like a badge of honour because everyday we are getting stronger, and they are getting weaker'.

At an extreme end of this spectrum is the worrying emergence of white supremacist terrorism, as witnessed recently in Christchurch New Zealand that left fifty dead in its wake and its earlier manifestation in Norway in 2011 where sixty-nine young people were murdered at a summer camp and eight were killed in downtown Oslo as a result of a car bomb. White supremacists will now add a whole new universe to terrorist watch lists already populated with large numbers of radicalised Islamists. The EU's cyber vigilance and intelligence sharing have improved but afford no room for complacency.

The Munich Security Conference has established itself as Europe's primary annual moment of reflection on the state of the international order. A friend of mine who always attends this event described this year's meeting as the Munich Insecurity Conference. It was marked by a pervasive sense of the simultaneous emergence of great power competition, especially between the USA and China, and a visible leadership vacuum in the liberal international order. Five years ago when President Putin annexed Crimea and underwrote the bloody conflict in Eastern Ukraine, he was considered to be the major cause of global destabilisation. Today, as he questions free trade, NATO and the Western values that prevailed since World War Two, as he describes the EU as a 'foe', attacks allies, supports Brexit and comforts autocrats the indispensable underwriter of all that went before, the USA under President Trump has become the great disruptor. This prompted Wolfgang Ischinger, the convenor of the Munich conference, to talk of 'an epochal shift; an era is ending, and the rough outlines of a new political age are only beginning to emerge.'

In part this is an issue of leadership. Who is there to lead and sustain the liberal order of the past seven decades if not the USA? The EU could be such a leader but a look at its four largest states suggests otherwise. Chancellor Merkel's four term period of office is approaching its end. The dis-United Kingdom struggles to define its own role let alone that of the wider global order. It does so at the most inopportune time in decades. President Macron has the instinct to lead but is distracted by matters of governability at home with the *Gilets Jaunes* and the hard core of anarchistic '*Casseurs*'. Italy is setting course in a different direction. In principle a shared EU sovereignty could offer such leadership but its emergence is curtailed by the foreign policy sovereignty sensitivities of its member states.

In part also this epochal shift flows from the evolving strategic interests of key players. The West gambled that opening the WTO to China would increase Chinese integration into the global economy, which happened, and that economic liberalism might fuel a rise in democratic liberalism in the Middle Kingdom, which

did not. China is proud of its model of a market economy with Chinese characteristics. It's 'Made in China 2025' policy is a state-driven deep dive into an ambitious strategic programme of future technological advance and leadership capable not just of advancing China but in principle of leading the world. The stresses in China-US relations are fuelled, for the moment, less by traditional defence-related security concerns and more by insecurities arising from this high-tech challenge. In this scenario Moscow is not a geopolitical challenger but a spoiler. Russia is a disruptive force in Ukraine most recently on the Kerch Straits, in the multiple frozen conflicts in its near abroad, by its willingness to meddle in the electoral process of other states, in its re-entry to the Middle East through Syria, through poisoning its enemies on foreign soil and by its propensity for cyber-attacks. While demographic or financial fragilities could emerge to slow down or stifle the rise of China, it is and will remain dominant among emerging superpowers and in time may become the dominant global power. What China and Russia share is a desire 'to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model' in the words of the US Secretary of Defence, General Mattis, when he resigned. That resignation together with those of the Head of the National Security Council, the Secretary of State and the US ambassador to the United Nations marked a personnel transition in the administration to a more accommodating Trump-friendly group of senior officials.

In truth the risk to the international order probably is threatened more by populism at home in the USA than the rise of powers abroad. President Trump's instinct for playing to the electoral base which propelled him to power has increased, not diminished, since he took office. He appears to be in a state of permanent campaigning punctuated when necessary by the demands of office. He shows scant regard for the alliances carefully built and nurtured over time by the USA. These were a source of invaluable asymmetric soft power influence whose currency is being devalued and undermined. The USA announced their intention to withdraw from the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty earlier this year, blaming Russia for alleged breaches. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty may follow suit in 2021. Stepping

away from these bipolar accords of the Cold War era negotiated with Russia will make the world a more dangerous place as it heralds the prospect of a new arms race, which in future will include China in the hunt for total spectrum dominance. The unravelling bipolar accords are happening in a context where no multilateral alternative is in place to contain their most negative consequences. America's European allies stand in the front line of potential vulnerability but were not consulted. This unilateralism was replicated by troop withdrawal or reduction announcements in Syria and Afghanistan and the freezing of joint military exercises in South Korea, not to mention non-military unilateral equivalents such as questioning the WTO, resigning from the Paris Climate Accord or switching the US embassy to Jerusalem. All this has prompted the conclusion at Munich that the USA era of benign hegemony is over.

The European Union is the world's most advanced and integrated regional polity. Its bilateral and multilateral relations are built on a dense network of Treaties and agreements. As a regulatory superpower the EU has relied on and profited from the open and liberal post-war global order. As a soft power construct, its interests lie in the preservation of that order to the greatest extent possible. The EU is in the process of recalibrating relations with China that are 'more realistic, assertive and multi-faceted'. China recently was described by the Commission in its review of EU-China relations as a cooperation partner, an economic competitor and a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance. This strategic distillation of EU interests is complicated by the fact that already, and one may expect increasingly so in the future, EU member states and businesses will find themselves squeezed between Washington DC and Beijing as these more aggressively pursue their respective economic, commercial and political interests. The Trump administration has threatened to scale back intelligence sharing with Germany if it opts for Huawei 5G Chinese technology. This is a first. Likewise, the UK has been cautioned by Washington DC that the use of Huawei technology could jeopardise its national security. Meanwhile, Canada found several of its citizens arrested in China within days of arresting Meng Wanzhou,

the CFO of Huawei, on the foot of a US extradition warrant. When South Korea deployed a US anti-missile system, Chinese tourists were re-directed from there by way of retaliation. Italy's recent decision to become the first EU founding member state to sign a Memorandum of Understanding with China on its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was met with explicit concern by the White House which argues that the BRI is 'made in China for China'.

China is active in its pursuit of European BRI partnerships and has institutionalised this through a series of so-called 16+1 meetings hosted by EU member states and their political leaders. This consists of all eight Central and Eastern European Countries that joined the EU in 2004 together with Romania and Bulgaria and the states of the Western Balkans. In Piraeus in Greece, COSCO, the state-owned Chinese Ocean Shipping Company, started by buying 35-year franchises to two of the port's container terminals in 2008. As a by-product of the Greek economic crisis in 2016, COSCO bought a 67% stake in the port authority becoming the primary operator. It is now the second largest container port in the Mediterranean with Chinese investment plans to make it the largest such port in the coming years. China now has stakes in 13 EU ports accounting today for around 10% of the EU's shipping container capacity.

The EU imports two-thirds of its energy and counts on Russia as one of its major suppliers of gas and oil. In Europe about 40% of EU member states' natural gas imports are delivered through Nord Stream. Russia supplies almost half of Germany's supply of natural gas. That dependency rises to almost 100% in some EU member states. More than one third of crude oil imports by European states in the OECD come from Russia. With the economic recovery EU energy demand and Russian supply both increased. A dense network of bilateral deals between Russia and individual member states through its energy proxies such as Gazprom and Rosneft is the norm. The EU remains a second order player and will do so for as long as member states choose bilateral deals with Russia over multilateral deals through the EU. The economic benefits of this supply chain for both sides, purchasers and

sellers, has overridden political factors and has not been disrupted by the deterioration in relations since the annexation of Crimea. It has been a case of business as usual.

Where national capitals choose to privilege their bilateral relations with China on investment, or Russia on energy or the USA on security *ipso facto* they impinge on the capacity of the EU to develop a coherent and consistent foreign policy posture. Encouraging disagreement among those who might oppose you is the classic definition of divide and rule. At times this practice seems to leave EU foreign policy aspirations filled with as many holes as a mature Swiss Emmental cheese. For example, Romania has recently announced its intention to follow the US lead in moving its embassy to Jerusalem, while Hungary proposes to open an office there with 'diplomatic status.' These are not random events. When the EU acts and speaks with one voice it can exert real leverage. In the matter of Brexit member states, the Council, the Parliament and the Commission have acted with a high and consistent degree of policy alignment frustrating any and all British attempts to divide and rule. The same is true so far for EU sanctions against Russia since the annexation of Crimea, although this appears to rest on a more fragile member state political consensus.

Asylum and immigration policy has been the most divisive issue in recent years within the EU. Internally this has led to cleavages between member states and in particular between Central European states and the European Commission. It has resulted in the temporary reintroduction of border control in the Schengen area. Traditional boundaries between internal and external security and between home affairs and foreign affairs are increasingly blurred. Perhaps the most visible consequence has been in the conduct of EU foreign policy which has exhibited a capacity for realpolitik in its willingness to cooperate with authoritarian rulers in return for assistance with migration control. The EU moved outside its comfort zone when in March 2016 it concluded a €6 billion deal with Turkey on migration. Two years ago, with Italian backing, a deal was done to spend tens of millions on funding the Libyan coastguard. Tensions flared at a subsequent EU-Africa

Summit over a proposal to forcibly return migrants and its associated EU funding. In February 2019, the EU's first summit with the Arab League was held in Egypt and hosted and co-chaired by President Sisi. This exercise in realpolitik stands in sharp contrast to the more elevated aspirations of the Barcelona Process of 1995 and the Union for the Mediterranean of 2008 with their emphasis on promoting human and sustainable development.

The dire conditions of migrants, the abuse of their human rights and their exposure to human slavery and trafficking have been criticised by human rights organisations. The desire to quell internal political dissent inside the EU has prevailed over these sensitivities in the pursuit of short term mechanisms to stem the flow of migrants into the EU. To the extent this may work it is a sticking plaster solution. The tributaries of the migrant flow need to be addressed at source. With a population expected to double by 2050 from 1.2 to around 2.5 billion and predominantly composed of young people, the African continent will need to foster job creation and sustainable economic growth on an unprecedented scale. EU-Africa relations are moving away from the donor-based model towards long term cooperation built on a stronger, deeper and more political partnership. The EU is one of many players in this new political and diplomatic scramble for Africa but one whose political and territorial exposure to failed states and Africa's expected demographic explosion make it especially vulnerable to the consequences of failure or breakdown.

Late 2017 saw the emergence of the EU's Permanent Structured Cooperation, PESCO, having lain dormant in the Lisbon Treaty since 2009. Twenty-five of the current twenty-eight member states are participating, the exceptions being the UK which is scheduled to withdraw from the EU, or not, Denmark which has an opt out and Malta which opted out. Together with the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), the European Defence Fund and the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC) it forms a new comprehensive defence package for the EU. As regards NATO, only one quarter of its members meet the target spend of 2 % of GDP on defence. More than half of its twenty-nine

member states spend less than 1.5 % of GDP, including Germany, Italy and Spain. The German spend is a particularly contentious political issue between Berlin and Washington DC in the current political climate. This climate as seen by President Macron is not 'an interlude in history' but in effect a new normal.

This begs the question of what the European Union should do and how far it could or should go in building strategic autonomy. President Macron favours 'building a truly sovereign Europe and building a strong European Union on this sovereignty'. He has talked of the need for 'a real European army' to protect ourselves. Ursula von der Leyen, then German defence minister, has spoken instead of an army of Europeans. This echoes part of the wider debate on the future of the EU with the French President's rallying call for a European renaissance responded to by Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, the leader of the CDU in Germany, emphasising 'getting Europe right' and the need to avoid excessive European centralism. Both agree on establishing a European Security Council. Where there is unity on aspirations, this is not always accompanied by unity on detail. Some commentators have described the current state of play as between wanting more Europe and wanting more of the same, suggesting that the Franco-German engine, if and when it operates, is likely to do so in a low gear. Time will tell.

The European Union is unique in human history. As Europeans, we cannot choose for others. We cannot control what others do. We can choose for ourselves, making collective choices in our own interest consistent with our needs and values and the needs of the wider world around us. The European Union is less perfect than many might wish for and less imperfect than the caricature presented by its most strident critics. For it to be perfected, to adapt and reform first it must be preserved. Forty years ago in June 1979 the European Parliament was elected for the first time. Forty years earlier in June 1939 who could have known that the world, starting in Europe, was about to experience a conflict that would result in the death of 55 million human beings. Working together to solve problems and differences has been the cornerstone of European

peace and unity since then. It was a lesson expensively learned and one not to be forgotten or cast aside through apathy or hostility. Support for the European Union is at a record high in opinion polls. That needs to be transformed now into support at the ballot box. Europe more than ever needs her European.

Le rôle international de l'euro

José María Gil-Robles*

L'euro est le gage de l'indépendance de l'Union européenne. Telle est la thèse que je tiens à formuler d'entrée et qui sous-tend mes réflexions sur le rôle international de l'euro.

Les monnaies ont des rôles multiples. Elles sont entre autres une arme de défense dans la lutte pour le pouvoir au niveau mondial. La scène internationale est très agitée. Le temps de la domination des États-Unis et de l'Union soviétique est révolu. Avec la dissolution de l'URSS, la Russie peine à conserver un rôle de puissance de premier plan. Quant aux États-Unis, ils connaissent, malgré le sursaut de la présidence Trump, une phase de repli, et Rostow prévenait, en 1964 déjà, que rien n'est plus difficile qu'un repli bien ordonné.

Dans ce scénario troublé, où puissances déclinantes et puissances émergentes jouent des coudes pour s'assurer une part du pouvoir, il appartient à l'Union européenne de trouver sa place, et l'euro est à cet égard un atout essentiel. Car l'euro est sans doute le lien le plus fort entre les Européens qui l'ont adopté.

Comme président du Parlement européen, il m'est arrivé d'évoquer ce sujet à de multiples reprises, pas moins d'une vingtaine de fois, au cours des années 1991, 1998 et 1999. Il est intéressant, vingt ans plus tard, de rappeler ces principales positions et d'examiner ce qu'il est advenu depuis.

« L'introduction d'une monnaie commune marquera une date historique dans l'intégration européenne. L'euro sera

pour les citoyens un symbole clair de leur appartenance à une Europe unie. Avec l'euro dans la poche, les citoyens pourront se sentir un peu plus européens ».

Je ne saurais affirmer aujourd'hui que les citoyens de la zone euro se sentent plus ou moins européens, mais j'ai le sentiment très net qu'ils se sentent, dans ces temps agités, davantage rassurés. Je parle des gens de ma génération, qui font encore de temps à autre le calcul de l'équivalence entre l'euro et leur ancienne monnaie nationale. Le problème ne se pose même pas pour mes petits-enfants : l'euro est la seule monnaie qu'ils connaissent. Pour mes petits-enfants et les enfants de mes amis, ce n'est pas l'euro qui les perturbe, mais bien la nécessité d'emmener d'autres monnaies lorsqu'on se rend hors de la zone euro.

Sans craindre de se tromper, on peut dire qu'Helmut Kohl a agi en grand homme d'État lorsqu'il a forcé l'adoption de l'euro comme monnaie commune par un ensemble d'États qui était en train de prendre une dimension continentale.

L'euro a permis à l'Union de devenir un pôle de stabilité dans le monde dans un contexte de prospérité et de résister à la crise. Mais au Conseil européen de Pörtlach, le 24 octobre 1998, j'ai tenu des propos qui conservent toute leur actualité :

« Les carences du nouvel ordre mondial et, plus particulièrement, les crises qui ont secoué les marchés financiers ont souligné la nécessité pour l'Union de jouer un rôle politique plus important dans le cadre international, en rapport avec sa dimension économique, commerciale et monétaire. La mise en circulation de l'euro ne fera qu'accroître cette situation. Il ne s'agit pas d'altruisme, mais une économie ouverte ne peut pas maintenir sa croissance si le reste du monde est en récession ».

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« Le statut de puissance mondiale n'est pas seulement le résultat de quelques chiffres macro-économiques, ou d'un état des comptes. Il faut en outre être disposé et préparé à assumer les responsabilités liées à une telle position.

L'Union doit parler d'une seule voix dans les instances financières et économiques internationales pour que le poids de la monnaie unique se fasse véritablement sentir.

Seul le modèle communautaire qui donne au Conseil la responsabilité de définir les politiques et à la Commission celle de les exécuter offre les garanties de succès nécessaires si nous voulons vraiment utiliser le poids économique et commercial de l'Union dans les forums internationaux au moment de l'adoption de décisions qui nous touchent directement ».

Ce ne sont ni une présidence du Conseil, fût-elle brillante, ni un directoire intergouvernemental, qui pourront se substituer à cette voix unique, avec l'indispensable continuité, à un moment crucial pour notre avenir, où l'ordre financier et économique mondial va devoir subir le pénible et difficile exercice d'être remodelé.

Très récemment, Michel Aglietta¹ se demandait quelle est l'importance de l'euro dans le Système monétaire international et rapelaient les indicateurs suivants :

« En 2014, la part de l'euro était de 24 % contre 61 % pour le dollar. Le yen et la livre sterling comptaient pour 4 % chacun. L'euro est certainement le « brillant second ». Mais il ne progresse pas, au contraire. En 2010, sa part était de 26 % à l'orée de la crise de la zone euro ».

¹ Michel Aglietta : Comment accroître le rayonnement international de l'euro, 6 février 2019. Lire sur <http://confrontations.org/la-revue/comment-accroitre-le-rayonnement-international-de-leuro/>

« 26 monnaies sont ancrées sur l'euro, contre 72 sur le dollar ».

« 20 % des prêts bancaires internationaux sont libellés en euros contre 57 % en dollars ».

« Dans les transactions entre devises sur les marchés de change, [...] l'euro est contrepartie dans 33 % des devises entrant dans les transactions contre 87 % pour le dollar ».

Pour conclure :

« Le développement de l'euro dans l'économie mondiale requiert une intégration bien plus complète de la zone euro ».

Je partage totalement cet avis. Non seulement la zone euro, mais toute l'Union européenne, ont besoin d'une intégration bien plus complète. Et je suis persuadé que cette intégration aura lieu lors de la prochaine législature, lorsque le Brexit sera surmonté et malgré la résistance à outrance des populismes de droite et de gauche. La crise a beaucoup contribué à faire pénétrer cette conviction dans les esprits.

Mais n'oublions pas que l'objectif n'est pas de faire de l'euro la première monnaie mondiale, ni la devise clé du Système monétaire international, mais bien de renforcer encore la confiance dans un euro stable et solide. C'est l'euro qui est au service de l'Europe, et non l'Europe qui est au service de l'euro.

Les temps qui viennent ne seront pas faciles du tout. Il est grand temps de laisser de côté l'éthique du jeu et de la facilité et de mettre à sa place l'éthique du travail, de l'épargne et de l'effort.

What's Next for Europe?

Annika Brack*

Jean Monnet once said that there is no future for the people of Europe other than in union. At this critical time, his words have never been wiser. The European Union faces multiple challenges, both internally and externally. It will be stronger if member states act in unison towards a prosperous and peaceful future.

Economically, the storm may have passed without great damage; but politically and emotionally, Europeans have not weathered the euro crisis. Multiple fractures have emerged among and within European societies. The time-consuming Brexit chaos is also taking its toll on the region's political cohesion. Many voters feel disenfranchised, perceiving that political leaders are too busy with domestic squabbles to respond effectively to the challenges that lie ahead.

Despite these and other challenges, which I will describe in more detail below, I will argue that 2019 is actually a year of opportunity for Europe. With a change of leadership at all key institutions, a newly elected European Parliament and a new college of Commissioners taking office in November, Europe can redefine its political agenda and focus on solving issues that are particularly important to its citizens. Economically, European leaders should explore how the region can best capitalise on its outstanding industrial assets in the Fourth Industrial Revolution.

Today, Europe is a continent of opportunity and promise, with a level of peace and economic prosperity that many countries and regions try to emulate. There is a reason that Europe is a major destination for migrants from around the world, and that business continues to thrive here: its long tradition of democracy, peace, and rule

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of law. In a changing geopolitical environment, however, with instability causing great perils, it is increasingly becoming Europe's role to advocate and defend a multilateral, rules-based world order. With former allies becoming economic foes, this is not just an opportunity for the continent, but an increasingly profound responsibility.

1. A changing world order: what's Europe's place?

We have grown used to thinking of the transatlantic partnership as a community of shared values and beliefs, but that has changed with an American leadership letting national interests increasingly overrule international collaboration.¹ Europe remains one of the strongest embodiments of a multilateral, rules-based, value-driven, and collaborative world order, but it finds itself increasingly isolated in this role.

After the end of the Cold War, many people hopefully believed that the world would eventually converge towards liberal democracy and free markets – a belief best expressed by Francis Fukuyama in *The End of History*. Yet some of today's key international players – such as Donald Trump, Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping and Recep Tayyip Erdogan – show that the world has instead become not only more multipolar but also more multi-conceptual.² Samuel Huntington's *Clash of Civilizations*, a competing vision of post-Cold War dynamics, now appears more prescient.

This new world order, in which geopolitical competition has returned and regional powers seek to assert themselves, is bringing uncertainty and instability. Europe bears a special responsibility to advocate for the great achievements of the post-World War order – multilateralism and international collaboration, aiming at peace and stability – and explain why they are both pre-conditions for socio-economic development and prosperity.

¹ Reflections on the Future of Europe, White Paper of the World Economic Forum's Global Future Council on Europe, January 2019

² John Gray, How we entered the age of the strongman, *New Statesman*, May 2018

Unfortunately, Europe is busy with itself.³ Instead of thinking forward and addressing these external challenges, it has turned inwards and is preoccupied with internal issues – from Brexit to immigration and political rifts among member states.

In this context, it is not enough merely to express an internationalist world view.⁴ Europe needs to assert its international leadership role more strategically and pragmatically, recognising that – in the face of rising regional powers – even the largest member states will, on their own, have less and less leverage at the global level. As Europeans realise that the future may not be peaceful, and Europe can no longer rely on US hard power, member states need to work together to develop a robust security policy – in both words and actions. While populist and nationalist forces may make political integration more difficult, there are nonetheless clear popular expectations that the EU will drive economic growth and provide security.⁵ These common concerns offer a platform on which to build common policies.

Political influence is conferred not only by a more unified external-facing voice, but also by economic weight. It is therefore important that the region also tackles the economic challenges brought by globalisation and rapid technological change.

2. A changing economic order: what is Europe's place in the Fourth Industrial Revolution?

The Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) is the term coined by the World Economic Forum's founder, Klaus Schwab, to capture the

³ Beatrice Weder di Mauro and Jeroen Dijsselbloem in "Reflections...", Jan. 2019

⁴ Peter Seidel in "Reflections...", Jan. 2019, echoing "We're not facing our problems. We've got Prozac politics" – interview with John Gray in *The Independent* from April 2009. Read on <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/politics/philosopher-john-gray-were-not-facing-our-problems-weve-got-prozac-politics-1666033.html>

⁵ Eurobarometer, February 2019

rapid technological change that is profoundly transforming the global economy, affecting the way we live, work and relate to each other⁶.

In contrast to the first three industrial revolutions, the 4IR is characterized by a fusion of technologies creating exponential rather than linear change, and disrupting almost every industry. While the 4IR is creating enormous economic opportunity, it is also bringing change that challenges post-war governance models, broad-based prosperity and the social fabric.

So far in the 4IR, Europe has not been able to leverage its outstanding industrial assets as effectively as the US and China. It seems to be losing the battle over economic leadership: on current trends, Europe's share of global GDP will have fallen from around 30% in 1995 to less than half of that by 2030.⁷ Europe has far fewer unicorns than the US and China. It has not created any of the world's leading platform companies. Looking to the future, European countries are investing less than the US and China in enabling technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI). Europe's overall share of researchers and patents is in rapid decline, compared to China in particular. These numbers show how the region is struggling to harness its world-leading research and knowledge for market advantage.

Europe needs to act urgently. The single market remains a key challenge: entrepreneurs, business leaders and investors in Europe still face a day-to-day reality of fragmented legal frameworks, geographically focused access to finance, cultural barriers, and lack of talent mobility.⁸ Despite their geographic and cultural proximity, less than 19% of start-up employees come from another European country, and only about 16% of European founders have started

⁶ Klaus Schwab, *The Fourth Industrial Revolution*, January 2017

⁷ IMF World Economic Outlook 2017

⁸ Declaration for a Pan-European Ecosystem for Innovation and Entrepreneurship, World Economic Forum Digital Leaders, January 2018 and Innovate Europe - Competing for Global Innovation Leadership, January 2019

a business outside their home country.⁹ Faced with obstacles to scaling their operations within Europe, they focus either locally or on expanding to markets outside Europe.

Europe has many vibrant innovation ecosystems, but if the continent is to compete globally, they must complement rather than compete with each other. Mindsets are slowly shifting, but the region's single market policies require an institutional push – which the new European Commission, taking office in November, could provide.

With the rise of China, the centre of economic gravity is shifting eastwards. Transatlantic trade will become relatively less important for both the US and Europe.¹⁰ China's Belt and Road Initiative will arguably help its tech giants to expand globally. French tech investor Nicolas Colin fears that China and the US will eventually divide up the European digital market between themselves¹¹ if Europe is unable to compete at their level.

This prospect demonstrates that the 4IR also has a political dimension: will the leading companies of the future be rooted in a democratic and liberal world order or be tools of authoritarian control and expansion? We are observing a fight for leadership in the 4IR that is far from being only economic.¹²

In 2019, European leaders have the critical task of operationalizing an ambition to achieve global innovation leadership, and to strengthen Europe's clout in a changing economic world order.

⁹ European Startup Monitor 2016

¹⁰ Mikkel Barlund, Daniel Gros, Europe's Place in the Global Economy - What Does the Last Half Century Suggest for the Future?, *Intereconomics*, Vol. 51, Jan./Feb. 2016, Nb. 1, pp. 5-11

¹¹ Nicolas Colin, Hedge, 2018

¹² China's 16+1 initiative aimed at intensifying and expanding cooperation with 11 EU Member States and 5 Balkan countries is another expression of this development.

3. Uncertainty within societies in transition

Equally critical is the task of healing Europe's fractured societies: as Chatham House's director Robin Niblett puts it, European societies are under stress.¹³ Two major fractures can be observed:

First, among EU members: The sovereign debt crisis ruined relationships between southern eurozone countries – where there is resentment about soaring youth unemployment and fiscal retrenchment – and northern eurozone countries, where there is growing irritation about large-scale transfers to the south. The migration crisis has added an east-west dimension to the already strained relationship between the north and the south.

Second, among citizens: As the 4IR and globalization disrupt industries, individuals feel that rising economic insecurity is breaking the post-war era's implicit promise of ever greater prosperity and stability. Inequality is rising within societies, and a rift is growing between those with the flexibility to adapt to change and those who feel left behind. As the Brexiters' slogan "take back control" showed, there is a feeling that politics has become ineffective in responding to these challenges.

Together, these fractures help to explain the surge of populist and nationalist parties: the more complex and interconnected the world becomes, the more attractive simple answers seem – including the idea of being able to retreat from globalization and regional integration. Populism and nationalism may be seen as symptoms of political leaders' inability to respond effectively to the key concerns of European people – notably migration and terrorism – as institutions struggle to adapt to changing times.

¹³ Reflections on the Future of Europe, White Paper of the World Economic Forum's Global Future Council on Europe, January 2019.

Conclusion

In 2019, European leaders face the key task of addressing the fractures affecting European societies and working hard to rebuild trust in the effectiveness of democratic governance. There are signs of encouragement. Despite great pessimism at the beginning of the year, the European elections did not see populists significantly expand their influence in Brussels. The elections instead turned out to be the first truly European ballot, with the highest voter turnout in two decades. The vote showed that people still care about the European project: they see more good than bad in integration.¹⁴

Europe's leaders now need be positive in their assessments of what is possible. They need to focus less on dystopian scenarios about future technological development, and more on formulating new ambitions for key industries. It is time to reassure Europeans of the region's strengths and refocus its policy agenda on catalysts for change including education, access to data, and cross-sectoral industry initiatives.¹⁵

As geopolitical and economic tensions rise, it is more important than ever for Europeans to collaborate to regain leadership in the world.

¹⁴ Eurobarometer 2019

¹⁵ Innovate Europe : Competing for Global Innovation Leadership, January 2019

Cross-referenced views
Regards croisés

États-Unis – Europe

Benjamin Haddad*

La plupart des réflexions qui sous-tendent les quelques pistes que je me propose de présenter sont le fruit de presque quatre ans et demi passés aux États-Unis, à Washington, entre deux think tanks, et que je me propose de rassembler dans un livre intitulé « *Le paradis perdu : l'Amérique de Trump et la fin des illusions européennes* ».

La question fondamentale pour les Européens, et d'ailleurs pour les Américains aussi, est de savoir si Donald Trump est une parenthèse, un accident de l'histoire, une sorte d'aberration passagère, un cauchemar dont on se réveillera miraculeusement en 2020 ou peut-être en 2024, ou au contraire, ce que je pense, un symptôme, un accélérateur, le marqueur d'un passage vers un changement dans le rapport que les Américains ont à eux-mêmes, à leur propre puissance et dans les rapports à l'ordre international et à l'Europe.

Il n'est pas nécessaire de préciser qu'évidemment, Donald Trump a ses spécificités. Il est le premier président de l'histoire des États-Unis à ne jamais avoir eu ni expérience militaire ni expérience politique avant d'être élu président. Il y a aussi l'usage des tweets, la rhétorique, les scandales, et des idées qui lui sont tout à fait propres. Mais je pense qu'il faut prendre un peu de recul et nous intéresser à ce qu'il représente et aux formes de continuité qui

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peuvent exister avec l'administration Obama – même si ça peut paraître paradoxal – si nous voulons nous informer sur ce qui viendra après.

Il est inexact de décrire Trump comme quelqu'un d'imprévisible ou n'ayant aucune vision, ni colonne vertébrale. Il y a des sujets sur lesquels il n'a pas beaucoup de convictions et sur lesquels il s'est positionné pour des raisons de pur opportunisme électoral. Dans le domaine de la politique étrangère, l'accord nucléaire iranien en est un exemple. Il y a d'autres sujets sur lesquels il s'exprime depuis 30 ans. En 1987, il achète pour 100'000 dollars une page entière dans le *New York Times* pour expliquer que les alliés des États-Unis sont des passagers clandestins et que les Américains sont bernés par leurs partenaires commerciaux. Il cible à l'époque l'Allemagne et le Japon, qu'il suffit aujourd'hui de remplacer par la Chine, et vous avez à peu près la même vision.

Sans l'élaborer de façon très sophistiquée, il s'agit d'une remise en cause de l'ordre libéral international, du système sur lequel s'appuient les États-Unis depuis un demi-siècle. Ce système d'alliances et d'accords de libre-échange qui, pour le consensus des élites et des think-tanks à Washington, démocrates comme républicains, représentaient une force et le principal vecteur de projection de la puissance américaine, représente pour Trump un fardeau. Un fardeau qui limite, qui impose des tabous, et qui fait que les partenaires peuvent profiter du parapluie militaire des États-Unis pour pouvoir y exporter des biens à peu de frais. Il convient donc de s'en débarrasser. Et de là découle effectivement un certain nombre de décisions sur les accords internationaux, comme le climat, des prises de position vis-à-vis de l'Europe, ou un discours très dur vis-à-vis de l'OTAN et de l'Union européenne, qui entraînent certaines démarches qu'on ne retrouvera pas chez un autre président. Pensons par exemple à la guerre commerciale, à cette vision très mercantiliste de jeu à somme nulle qu'il a à la fois des alliances et des désaccords commerciaux. On ne verra pas a priori un autre président républicain ou démocrate imposer des tarifs douaniers

ou menacer l'Union européenne de guerre commerciale. Il est plus important de remettre Trump dans le contexte du questionnement que les États-Unis ont aujourd'hui par rapport à leur puissance.

La fin de la guerre froide a ouvert une sorte de période d'optimisme sur l'avènement et le triomphe des démocraties libérales. Le meilleur exemple a été le livre de Fukuyama¹, qui écrivait que le monde est arrivé à la fin des grandes contradictions idéologiques, et que toutes les puissances non-libérales allaient se retrouver sur la défensive. On a vu à ce moment-là, dans les années 90, le ministre français des affaires étrangères, Hubert Védrine, qualifier les États-Unis d'hyperpuissance, et parler d'un monde unipolaire. Ces ambitions, ces illusions, se sont fracassées sur l'échec de la guerre en Irak et sur la crise financière qui ont remis en question le rapport des Américains à leur exceptionnalisme. Ce que j'appelle l'exceptionnalisme, c'est non seulement d'avoir une expérience politique originale, qu'il faut préserver, mais aussi l'idée plus récente, qui date des années 1940-1950, de l'avènement des États-Unis sur la scène internationale, selon laquelle les intérêts des États-Unis convergent fondamentalement avec ceux du monde. Le discours de George Bush en était presque une caricature. Ce discours de sa deuxième investiture en 2005 souligne que la liberté des États-Unis dépend de la liberté à travers le monde. Cette idée était déjà profondément remise en question par Barack Obama, et il est d'ailleurs très intéressant de voir certaines formes de symétries ou de correspondances entre le langage d'Obama et celui de Trump.

Quand on demande à Barack Obama s'il croit à l'exceptionnalisme américain, il répond: «Oui je crois à l'exceptionnalisme américain de la même façon que les Grecs croient à l'exceptionnalisme grec et les Britanniques croient à l'exceptionnalisme britannique». Quand on pose la question à Donald Trump, il rétorque à un journaliste de Fox News qui l'interroge sur Vladimir Poutine

¹ Fukuyama, Francis, *La fin de l'histoire et le dernier homme*, Flammarion, Paris, 1992

pendant la campagne: «Oui d'accord, Poutine assassine des journalistes, mais est-ce que nous on est si innocent?». Et cette idée revient assez souvent: «On n'est pas là pour vous donner des leçons de morale, on n'est pas là pour imposer notre modèle à travers le monde». Il y a eu chez les deux une forme de relativisme par rapport à la puissance américaine, qui se caractérise par des comportements très différents. Dans le cas d'Obama, il faut limiter et encadrer la puissance américaine par les traités, les diplomaties, le multilatéralisme. Dans le cas de Trump, il faut au contraire s'en débarrasser et devenir un pays normal qui n'a plus de tabou. Mais sur certains sujets, il y a de véritables lignes de continuité, notamment sur les interventions militaires.

Obama comme Trump sont sceptiques sur les interventions militaires, notamment au Moyen-Orient. Après avoir hésité un peu au début, Trump s'est opposé à la guerre en Irak, comme l'avait fait Obama. Ce qu'ils ont d'ailleurs en commun, c'est qu'ils ont tous deux battu Hillary Clinton, qui était le chantre de la vision interventionniste, internationaliste, libérale au parti démocrate, et qui avait soutenu à l'époque, quand elle était sénatrice, la guerre en Irak. On voit, notamment sur la non-intervention en Syrie, une vraie ligne de continuité entre les deux, avec les conséquences que cela revêt pour l'Europe. Une crise qui a été existentielle pour les institutions de l'Union européenne, avec des conséquences sur l'émergence de Daech, sur la crise des réfugiés et sur la crise migratoire en Europe. Trump comme Obama ont traité la crise syrienne, premièrement, avec comme objectif de ne pas se laisser entraîner dans un nouveau conflit au Moyen-Orient, ce qu'un chercheur français avait appelé sous Obama «la stratégie de l'évitement», et deuxièmement, sous un angle exclusivement sécuritaire, visant la destruction de Daech, la lutte contre le terrorisme, mais absolument sans aucune volonté d'avoir une véritable influence politique sur le conflit.

Les Européens ont été des acteurs assez passifs de cette crise, limités par leurs moyens et, le plus souvent, – cela a été le cas notamment de la France – se contentant avant tout de se tourner avec frustration vers les États-Unis en espérant une forme d'intervention.

Non-interventionnisme dans une certaine mesure, ce que les Américains appellent aussi «nation building at home», c'est-à-dire de considérer que les priorités des États-Unis sont aujourd'hui sur le plan intérieur: l'infrastructure, la santé, les inégalités. Là aussi, Trump et Obama ont des priorités différentes, mais on entend ce même discours: plutôt que d'aller reconstruire l'Irak ou l'Afghanistan, on devrait peut-être se concentrer sur le Michigan, le Wisconsin ou l'Ohio, la crise des opioïdes qui tue soixante-dix mille personnes par an aux États-Unis, les inégalités, la pauvreté, etc. C'est un deuxième point, où l'on voit une vraie continuité qui va durer.

Le pivot vers l'Asie constitue évidemment un autre point. Si aujourd'hui les Américains arrivent à se mettre d'accord sur un objectif de politique étrangère, ce sera la priorité de la question chinoise. Là encore, Trump a ses façons idiosyncrasiques de traiter la question des relations avec la Chine ou la guerre commerciale. Mais quand il pointe la question des subventions déguisées, des vols de technologie, le fait que la relation avec la Chine doit devenir l'intérêt primordial des États-Unis, il partage l'avis d'une grande partie de l'élite américaine.

Barack Obama avait anoré le virage vers l'Asie, ce que George W. Bush avait déjà fait de loin dans son second mandat. À l'époque, ce virage était surtout vu comme un déplacement du Moyen-Orient vers l'Asie. En étant de moins en moins dépendants sur le plan énergétique, la présence au Moyen-Orient est une perte de temps qui incite à se concentrer sur l'Asie. Cela a des conséquences considérables sur la relation avec l'Europe, qui est beaucoup moins centrale dans la pensée des stratèges américains qu'elle ne l'était pendant la guerre froide. Et c'est absolument fondamental.

Avec la fin de la guerre froide, l'Europe n'est plus au centre de la vision du monde des Américains. La vision de l'administration Trump s'inscrit dans cette continuité, bien que de manière plus «confrontationnelle». À ce propos, un des discours les plus importants de l'administration Trump est celui du vice-président Mike Pence sur la Chine, tenu l'an dernier au Hudson Institute, dans

lequel il dresse une liste de critiques qu'il adresse à Beijing, ce qui montre bien la centralité de ce sujet. Si les Européens veulent peser dans ce débat et reconstruire la relation transatlantique, ce sera en faisant comprendre aux Américains que l'Union européenne est un partenaire évident et primordial en ce qui concerne la dimension économique, les normes, l'intelligence artificielle, la vie privée, etc. Mais cela demandera une administration plus ouverte au multilatéralisme, aux alliés, au fait par exemple de collaborer ensemble dans le cadre de l'OMC.

De là découle une autre ligne de continuité entre Obama et Trump : la question du «burden sharing», du partage du fardeau entre alliés. Là encore Donald Trump a une façon brutale et caricaturale de l'exprimer, mais on entendait déjà des critiques sur le sujet dans l'administration Obama. Bob Gates, le premier secrétaire à la défense, lors de son départ à la retraite en 2011, tient un discours très dur vis-à-vis des Européens, dans lequel il dit : «les Américains en ont assez de payer pour votre propre défense avec leurs impôts»; un type de discours qu'on pourrait largement entendre dans l'administration actuelle. Barack Obama lui-même, dans une interview qu'il donne à Jeffrey Goldberg pour «The Atlantic» dans un article intitulé «The Obama doctrine» qui résume sa vision du monde, est très dur vis-à-vis des Européens; il parle là aussi de passagers clandestins. Quand Goldberg demande à Obama quelle est sa principale erreur de politique étrangère, il ne répond pas «la non-intervention en Syrie», mais «l'intervention en Libye avec les Européens, à cause des Européens». Parce que la France et la Grande-Bretagne auraient dû assurer le service après-vente en Libye, et ne l'ont pas fait, ce qui a conduit au chaos politique dans le pays. Un exemple de coopération transatlantique dans la périphérie de l'Union européenne était donc vu comme la principale erreur de politique étrangère de Barack Obama.

Il est important de reprendre ce contexte-là et de voir que Donald Trump a mis le doigt sur une forme de rejet, de scepticisme des Américains, qui étaient nombreux à questionner les interventions, l'engagement des États-Unis dans le commerce international, les bénéfices de cet ordre libéral international pour l'Américain

moyen. Quelles sont les conséquences dans le Michigan, au Wisconsin, ou encore dans l'Ohio, tous ces Etats traditionnellement démocrates qui ont voté pour Donald Trump? Elles sont fondamentales. Le rapport Mueller, même si l'intégralité n'en est pas disponible, démontre une fois de plus dans ses conclusions que la question de la Russie a été assez marginale pour expliquer l'élection de Donald Trump. Il s'agissait avant tout d'un phénomène endogène : ce sont les Américains qui ont voté pour Donald Trump.

Aujourd'hui, on entre déjà dans la primaire démocrate pour 2020 pour les démocrates; un nouveau cycle électoral commence déjà à Washington D.C. Il est très intéressant de constater que, quel que soit le candidat démocrate en 2020, ceux qui tiennent le haut du pavé sur le plan idéologique et qui sont en train de façonner le débat à gauche, sont ceux de la gauche dure, l'aile de Bernie Sanders, comme Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez - la plus jeune députée de la Chambre des représentants élue de New York, extrêmement populaire et visible sur le plan médiatique. Et sur l'OTAN, sur l'interventionnisme, sur le rapport à l'ordre libéral international, il y a une très forte ligne de continuité avec Donald Trump. Bien sûr, si le prochain président est démocrate, ce qui n'est pas sûr, il prendra des premières mesures qui plairont tout de suite aux Européens, comme réintégrer les accords de Paris et peut-être même proposer une initiative plus ambitieuse sur le réchauffement climatique, éventuellement réintégrer l'accord nucléaire iranien, qui n'a jamais été très populaire aux États-Unis². Mais au-delà de cela, il serait dangereux pour les Européens de penser que si Donald Trump est battu en 2020, la situation reviendrait à la normale «whatever that means». D'abord, parce qu'il laissera des traces, mais surtout parce qu'il révèle des symptômes plus profonds.

Il existe aujourd'hui plusieurs asymétries qui définissent la relation transatlantique, qui sont structurelles et dont il faut sortir. La première asymétrie est que les États-Unis comptent beaucoup

² Barack Obama avait dû le faire passer par ordre exécutif plutôt que de passer par le Congrès, raison pour laquelle Donald Trump a pu en sortir d'un trait de stylo.

plus pour les Européens que l'Europe ne compte aujourd'hui pour les États-Unis. On passe malheureusement beaucoup plus de temps en Europe à parler et à commenter les États-Unis, qu'à Washington à parler de l'Europe. Les Américains parlent surtout d'eux-mêmes et de Trump, et effectivement ils parlent de la Chine, encore du Moyen-Orient, mais ils parlent moins de l'Europe. Ce qui, encore une fois, est structurel et largement lié à la fin de la guerre froide.

Le deuxième facteur structurel est l'asymétrie puissance. Il y a deux manières de voir les choses. On peut dire: « Donald Trump est très méchant, vivement qu'on ait un président qui soit plus en phase avec la vision du monde des Européens ». Mais Barack Obama avait lui aussi utilisé les sanctions extraterritoriales contre l'Iran; ça a été toute la politique de l'administration américaine, qui agissait alors en coopération avec les Européens et de façon plus multilatérale. La question est donc bien davantage cette asymétrie qui rend les Européens dépendants vis-à-vis des États-Unis.

La conclusion qu'il faut tirer, c'est que les Européens doivent commencer à penser à leur autonomie stratégique. Ces débats sont en cours en Europe. « Autonomie stratégique » est un terme incompris aux États-Unis avec un certain mélange de conservatisme et de mauvaise foi, parfois alimenté par certaines déclarations de la part des Européens. Il ne s'agit pas là d'un contrepoids ou d'une opposition aux États-Unis; mais plutôt de l'idée que les Européens ont leurs propres intérêts stratégiques, notamment dans leur périphérie, et qu'ils doivent pouvoir se donner les moyens d'avoir leur culture stratégique, leur capacité d'intervention lorsque les Américains ne veulent pas intervenir, et leur capacité à conduire leur propre politique étrangère.

Il est intéressant de noter que sur l'OTAN notamment, le pessimisme des Atlantistes n'était pas justifié. Même sous Donald Trump, l'organisation a au contraire réaffirmé son utilité, renforcée depuis 2014 avec l'annexion de la Crimée, puis la guerre dans le Donbass. Les Américains ont renforcé leur présence dans le cadre de l'OTAN sous Obama comme sous Trump en Europe de l'Est,

en Pologne et dans les pays baltes. Sous l'administration Trump, le budget pour la « European Defense Initiative » a été augmenté et la présence américaine dans la région intensifiée. Il y a donc encore une forme de convergence entre Européens et Américains dans la compétition entre grandes puissances, en ce qui concerne les grands sujets stratégiques. En revanche, pour tout ce qui ne relève pas de l'article 5 de défense collective de l'OTAN, tout ce qu'on désignerait en anglais par « below the article 5 threshold », il faut que les Européens réalisent qu'ils doivent agir de façon autonome. L'Europe doit se réveiller comme acteur stratégique.

Russia – Europe

André Liebich*

Let me state my argument at the outset: Vladimir Putin is the best safeguard today against growing nationalism in Russia. The policy recommendation that follows from this is that Europe should do its best to reapproach Russia and it should begin by removing the sanctions that currently weigh on Russia. My paper is divided in two parts: dealing first with the rise of nationalism in Russia and, second, with Vladimir Putin's worldview and his preferences.

Let me begin with some remarks about Russian nationalism. The phenomenon has been observed by many commentators, from the fall of the Soviet Union to the present day. The loss of super power status, the disintegration of a giant empire (though Russia still remains the biggest country in the world in terms of size), the disappearance of a "Soviet model of development" as a source of inspiration to the so-called third world, although that model had been severely contested before 1991, all this heightened feeling in the population and might be termed nationalistic. Certainly, this is the impression one gets on reading the Nobel prize winning author Svetlana Alexievitch.

Of course, one should not confuse nostalgia with nationalism. But it is a disturbing fact that in Russia, as in some other post-communist countries, it is the young who, as the Levada Centre put it "are most invested in a return to Russia's global greatness." Perhaps most indicative of the current mood in Russia is the fact that the seizure of the Crimea in 2014, considered by many in the West as a proof of Russian perfidy, is seen by most Russians (with the exception of a small sliver of the intelligentsia) as a glorious accomplishment, bringing back to the Russian Mother land

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several million Russian-speaking compatriots and righting a historical wrong. Putin's personal popularity reached unprecedented heights after the annexation of Crimea. In the recent presidential elections, only one candidate put opposition to annexation into her program. She received slightly over 1 % of the vote. Even Aleksei Navalny, the posterchild of contemporary Russian dissidence, has spoken out against the return of Crimea to Ukraine.

Who are the agents of this Russian nationalism? Virtually all political parties in Russia, including the revived Communist Party, have gone in the nationalist direction. One of the most powerful agents of Russian nationalism, however, is the Russian Orthodox Church. The Church has immensely strengthened its position since the fall of the Soviet Union and, in many ways, it now "calls the shots in Russia". This much has been evident in the state persecution of Pussy Riot or the Church-inspired denigration of the film *Matilda*, partly funded by the Russian state but not defended by it.

Let me now turn to Vladimir Putin, whose name has been pronounced with loathing and fear in the West, almost as much as the name of Donald Trump. In fact, one of the chief accusations hurled against Trump is that he is chummy with Vladimir Putin. Apparently, connections between Putin and Trump are more toxic than the fact that Trump is a sleazy businessman who has done almost irreparable harm to US domestic and foreign policy.

One of the epithets that rarely fail to be tacked on to the name of Putin is that he is a former KGB agent. It is more rarely mentioned that the late George H. W. Bush, one of the most respected former US presidents, was at one-time head of the equivalent American spy agency. Nor is it often recalled that the longtime head of the KGB, Iurii Andropov, although an unsavory character in many ways, is credited with having taken the first steps to undermining the Soviet order. Above all, one should acknowledge that KGB agents, such as Vladimir Putin, were among the few Soviets who had full and easy access to the outside world. They knew foreign languages, they read Western newspapers, they travelled abroad.

As even critics of the KGB acknowledge, its agents were chosen not only for their loyalty but for their competence. They were smart and alert. All these qualities apply to Putin as well.

Putin's instincts are those of what Russians call a "Westernizer." After the fall of the Soviet Union he worked with the most liberal mayor that St Petersburg has known, Anatolii Sobchak. On becoming president, Putin sought to create a "special relationship" with the American president, George W. Bush. Putin was the first foreign leader to phone Bush after the 9/11 attacks in New York to offer help and to express condolences. He authorized the use of Russian bases to support the American war in Afghanistan. Putin even spoke, jokingly perhaps, of Russia joining the NATO alliance.

The joke was not well received in NATO circles. Soon after 9/11 Washington decided to withdraw from the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty that had been signed at the height of the Cold War in 1972. The Jackson-Vanik amendment of 1974 which restricted trade relations with, first, the Soviet Union and then Russia, as punishment for not allowing free emigration remained in force until 2012, long after it had outlived its original intention. It was instantly succeeded by the Magnitsky law, formally known as the Russia and Moldova Jackson Vanik Repeal and Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act, intended to punish Russian officials in what Russian public opinion overwhelmingly considered an unfair way.

Putin briefly put his hopes in the European opposition to the 2003 American invasion of Iraq. Photos show a delighted Putin alongside German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, and French President Jacques Chirac leading popular opposition to the American initiative. Soon, however, the entire European Union reverted to its traditional pro-American stance. Putin gave full vent to his frustration at the Munich Security Conference in 2007 speaking out against hegemonic power and calling for a world with several centers of power, Russia obviously being one of them.

Since 2007, relations between Russia and the West have gone from bad to worse. The UN has been unable to impose sanctions on Russia because of the Russian veto in the Security Council. US and EU sanctions, however, have become ever more stringent, especially since Russian annexation of the Crimea in 2014. Russia has been deprived of its voting rights in the Council of Europe and it is probable that it will be obliged to leave the Council of Europe by the middle of this year. This will also entail Russian abandonment of the European Court of Human Rights which has ruled numerous times against the Russian state for its abuse of human rights.

In the face of worsening relations with the West, Putin has shown anger and disappointment with those whom he still sometimes refers to as his "partners." In doing so he has moved ever closer to the nationalist camp. This has entailed disdain for Western sensibilities, whether in human rights cases or in cultural issues. In fact, Putin seems to have abandoned the project of tearing the EU away from the American embrace and he has rather sought to divide the EU. Contrasting Western decadence as evidenced, for instance, in widespread Western acceptance of same-sex marriage with Russia's adherence to traditional Christian values he has pleased both conservative Europeans and the Russian Orthodox Church. Gloating over the woes of the European Union has replaced the hope of bringing it about to the side of Russia.

There is considerable debate about the effect of Western sanctions on Russia. Accounts which claim that sanctions have allowed Russia to become self-sufficient in many areas and have therefore, in fact, reinforced Russian strength are not terribly credible. Similarly, those who maintain that sanctions are bringing Russia to its knees, obliging it eventually to halt its support for Ukrainian rebels in the East of Ukraine and even to renounce its annexation of Crimea are threading on thin ice. What is certain is that anti-Western sentiment in Russia is growing with the increasing isolation of the country. Sanctions are used by the Putin regime to justify increased repression and even further isolation. The standard of living has fallen in the last few years but it is still well above

what it was in the past. Constant referral to the tribulations of the country during the Second World War serves to remind Russians that they have previously suffered at the hands of the West, and yet triumphed. This is a message that resonates among Russians as they “circle the wagons” in the face of outside hostility.

Putin will remain in power at least until 2024. It is much too early to say who will succeed him as president. It is clear, however, that if present trends continue, Putin’s successor will play the nationalist card to the hilt, much more than Putin has done in the past. The “Atlanticists” or pro-Western forces, led by former president and present Prime Minister Dmitrii Medvedev have been substantially weakened. Weakened in part by the rather clumsy “rochade” in 2011 to which Medvedev allowed himself to be a party. He then accepted the post of president in order to help Putin sidestep the constitutional prohibition on a third consecutive term: Medvedev has also been weakened by Aleksei Navalny’s revelations of Medvedev’s widespread corruption. This has broken any prospects of an alliance between the “Atlanticists” and the opposition. Russian capital that has flown abundantly and freely out of Russia in the last few years now finds itself threatened abroad. The rule of law may not reign in Russia, but Russian capitalists may decide to take their chances at home rather than face an increasingly hostile and dangerous mood abroad.

Let me conclude by pointing out that one of the markers of growing nationalism is the tendency, noticed in Putin himself as well as in others, to use less the civic designation “rossiiskii” and to replace it with the ethnic term “russkii.” Russia is the “Rossiiskaya federatsiia” meaning that it is the home of all its peoples, Russians as well as others, including such non ethnic Russians as Muslims for example. Non ethnic Russians are less numerous than they have been in the past, numbering only some 20% of the population but they have served to legitimate Russia’s image of itself, and Putin’s image of his country, as a multinational entity. Advocates of ethnic Russianness, such as the late Nobel-Prize winner, Aleksander Solzhenitsyn, have long pleaded for a purely Russian entity, even at the cost of restricting Russia’s boundaries. His voice

has grown louder as Islamophobia and tensions with Central Asian migrants in Russia have come to the fore. All this is grist to the mill of Russian nationalism and, whatever his own preferences, Putin has been swept away in the tide. It is unlikely that his successor will swim against the tide.

We should make peace with Russia while we have the chance to do so, with Russia as it is not as we would like it to be, and our best chance to come to terms with Russia is while Putin, notwithstanding his many faults and crimes, is in power.

The EU's Engagement in the Asia-Pacific Region

Michael Reiterer*

When tensions on the Korean Peninsula rose in 2017, the threat of a military or even nuclear conflict drove the message home to a European public, that the developments thought to be far away can impact directly on the life, health and well-being of European citizens.

Latent tensions due to territorial or maritime disputes, or the status of Taiwan appear only occasionally on front pages but are potential sources of crises. This fact was recognised in the 2016 EU Global Strategy (EUGS), which recognises that the Union has no option but to expand and deepen its international engagement. The Global Strategy highlighted the fact that there is a direct connection between European prosperity and Asian security. In light of the economic weight that Asia represents for the EU – and vice versa – peace and stability in Asia are a prerequisite for our prosperity.

Based on the EU's experience of voluntary regional governance, under the Strategy, the EU seeks to support cooperative regional orders worldwide, including in the most divided areas' (EUGS 2016, 32) – the latter an indirect reference to the Korean peninsula.

The European Union is a very important economic actor in Asia

The EU is China's biggest trading partner, the second largest for ASEAN, the third largest for Japan and the third most important

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export destination for the Republic of Korea. ASEAN as a whole is the EU's 3rd largest trading partner outside Europe (after the US and China) with more than € 227.3 billion of trade in goods in 2017.

In turn, the EU is ASEAN's second largest trading partner after China, accounting for around 13 % of ASEAN trade. The EU is the largest investor in most Asian countries. China, Japan, the Republic of Korea and India stand for one quarter of total EU external trade (2016). The EU is by far the largest investor in ASEAN countries; in 2016 EU Foreign Direct Investment stocks into ASEAN accounted for € 263 billion. Recently ASEAN investment in Europe has also been growing steadily and reached over € 116 billion in 2016.

It is therefore only natural that the EUGS highlights that European prosperity and Asian peace and stability are closely intertwined. The nexus between economy and security as well as between development and security brings the EU closer to the Asia Pacific than public opinion either in Europe or Asia has so far recognized.

The developments on the Korean peninsula in 2017 pushed the EU out of its comfort zone: simply following other major players by rapidly implementing UN Security Council and autonomous sanctions at a new found speed will not be enough to be part of the political process.

The EU's commitment to prevent a second Korean War means that there is an urgent need to work towards a consensus among Member States on how to get the engagement strand of the EU policy of 'Critical Engagement' (Council Conclusions 2017) off the ground. The EU can play a constructive role, especially in assisting in setting up and accompanying negotiating processes, which by their nature are prone to fall into crisis and need experienced long-term management. The progress seen in summits diplomacy with the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in 2018 has slowed after

the failure to reach an agreement in Hanoi. This demonstrates the need for a resilient negotiating process that can stand inevitable ups and downs.

Political challenges and crisis areas in East Asia

With the Republic of Korea gravitating between an uncertain US as a security provider and China, the country's largest economic partner, an opportunity exists for the EU to demonstrate how its comprehensive approach to security could help build peace in the region. Helping to keep the main-protagonists, the DPRK and the US at the negotiating table could be a task for the EU. The EU's experience from the Balkans, Aceh, and Mindanao in facilitating the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran are best practice examples to draw on.

The crisis on the Korean peninsula is not the only issue bringing Asian security issues onto European front pages and the desks of policymakers. In addition, there are concerns about the security situation in the South China Sea (Declaration HR 2016; 2016b), like piracy problems in Asia around the Horn of Africa.

Since 2009, the EU-led crisis management, Operation ATALANTA¹ has been alleviating the threat of piracy in that area with the occasional participation of units from China, Japan and the Republic of Korea.

The engagement of the EU in Myanmar is longstanding and predates the EUGS 2016. After the change of leadership in Myanmar, the EU set up the EU-Myanmar Task Force in 2013 'to bring together all political and economic tools (development aid, peace process support, investments) – available to the EU' in support of peace and democracy (EEAS 2013). This was a novel and for a long period, a successful approach.

¹ <https://eunavfor.eu/>

Cooperation with ASEAN on security issues also has a long history. The EU has long been a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) (March 2016). The EU seeks to intensify its security engagement with ASEAN and with the ASEAN centered mechanisms, like the East Asia Summit (EAS). This engagement is based on the conviction that '[a] strong, cohesive and self-confident ASEAN proceeding with its own integration is good for regional stability, prosperity and security and creates new opportunities for cooperation on regional and global challenges' (Joint Communication 2015).

In 2017 the EU Council President Tusk participated for the first time as the guest of the chair at the EAS in Manila which also marked the 40th anniversary of the EU-ASEAN relationship. This participation as well as the agreement on the Second EU ASEAN Plan of Action (2018-2022) were stepping stones to join the EAS as well as related meetings, such as the ADMM+, the enlarged meeting of the ASEAN defence ministers.

The EU-ASEAN Leaders Meeting at the occasion of the ASEM Summit in Brussels (18-19 October 2018) was another one, followed in turn by an EU-ASEAN Foreign Ministers meeting in Brussels (21 January 2019) which, in recognising "the significant role played by ASEAN and the European Union in shaping the political, socio-economic, and security agenda for both regions and globally" agreed "in principle to upgrade EU-ASEAN relations to a Strategic Partnership".

The power of the EU rests on its economic strength

Trade and economics are part of the great power competition in the East Asian region. As the largest market in the world, the EU is strongly involved in competition with China, Japan and the US. In the Asian region the European Union is a late-comer to free trade talks having banked on the WTO and the completion of the Doha Round longer than others. However, the EU has had to change gears: While a region-to-region EU-ASEAN free trade agreement

(FTA) has had to be put on a temporary hold, work on it resumed in 2017 and Ministers reaffirmed in 2019 their “commitment to a future EU-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement and to intensify work towards this end, and in this regard”.

The EU has concluded FTAs with Singapore and Vietnam and is negotiating with Indonesia and the Philippines in the ASEAN context, as well as with Australia and New Zealand². A comprehensive FTA with the Republic of Korea is in its eighth year of implementation, the ratification of the 2018 Economic Partnership Agreement with Japan has been achieved speedily creating a free trade area for 635 mio. people. Negotiations are also under way with India. FTAs are complemented by political cooperation/framework or strategic partnership agreements as a reflection of the EU's comprehensive approach to foreign policy.

Thus, the conclusion of the Economic Partnership and a Strategic Partnership Agreement with Japan has a strong economic and security element. It also underlines the attachment of the EU and Japan to the multilateral trading system and liberal order which is itself an important policy statement. The same applies to the inclusion of a specific commitment to the Paris Agreement on climate action. Similarly, the EU stands by the Republic of Korea and the eight-year-old FTA which has increased trade in both directions; a facelift would bring the FTA up to speed in-line with newer and more comprehensive agreements, like the ones concluded with Canada and Japan.

China and the EU have agreed to negotiate a bilateral investment agreement. The EU has a vital interest in ensuring the compatibility of an emerging network of bi-, pluri- and inter-regional agreements with international trade rules and to work with all partners

² Negotiations with Malaysia are on a halt until the new government reassess the situation after a stock-taking exercise; negotiations with Thailand were initiated in 2013 and need new political impetus of Thailand returning to democracy.

to assure open regionalism. Further engaging with China to keep it within its professed attachment to the liberal order has become a major policy challenge.

The **Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)** is a tool to strengthen China's grip on the Eurasian continent in re-establishing and modernising traditional trade routes. This served not only economic, but also political purposes. It challenges on the one hand Russia which regards former Soviet republics in Central Asia still as being in its sphere of influence. On the other hand, this is a challenge for the EU, not only in terms of Central Asia but also in terms of candidate and member states which are part of BRI.

The EUGS 2016 proposed to strengthen Europe's relations with a ‘connected Asia’. The 2018 “**Connecting Europe and Asia - Building blocks for an EU Strategy**” fulfils this pledge. It takes a broad view on connectivity – transport infrastructure and services by land, sea and air, digital and energy links, as well as people-to-people contacts. Unlike China, the objective will be to enhance the governance of Euro-Asian connectivity and help meet the sizeable financing gap, while ensuring the sustainability of the projects and a level playing field for EU businesses.

There is also a strong political and security component, the need to maintain EU solidarity in terms of infrastructure in general and transport and energy in particular. Strings attached to financing BRI projects or the threat of being excluded from the scheme have already had an impact on the attitude of some Member States and affected their domestic politics. There are also strong voices advocating the vetting of Chinese investment in the EU beyond infrastructure, including from a national security angle – investment in the solar industry or gaining large shares in the European automotive industry are just two examples of many (EPRS 2018).

Italy signing a Memorandum of Understanding with China on its participation in the BRI at the occasion of the state visit of President Xi right before the EU-China Summit in Brussels in April

2019, despite warnings from other Member States³, brought China another trophy after the establishment of the 16+1 process with Middle and Central European countries, although the latter is losing some steam.

The 2019 EU policy paper on China, called “**EU-China – A strategic outlook**”⁴, in conjunction with the ‘Connectivity Strategy’ and the vetting process of investment to Europe therefore is a much needed and expected answer to China’s policy, outlined in its second 2018 policy paper on the EU⁵.

Classifying China in the run-up to the 2019 bilateral summit for the first time as “**systemic rival**”⁶ and clearly recognising the competitive element in the relationship while underlining not only the potential but also the need for functional cooperation, set a new and more realistic tone in the bilateral relationship.

The new policy paper proposes that the EU should pursue three objectives:

- deepening of the EU’s engagement with China to promote common interests at global level;
- achieving more balanced and reciprocal conditions governing the economic relationship;
- the homework aspect: strengthening the EU’s domestic policies and industrial base in order to maintain its prosperity, values and social model over the long term.

³ <https://www.euractiv.com/section/economy-jobs/news/dont-be-naive-with-china-eu-leaders-tell-italy/>

⁴ https://ec.europa.eu/commission/publications/eu-china-strategic-outlook-commission-contribution-european-council-21-22-march-2019_en

⁵ <http://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201812/18/WS5c1897a0a3107d4c3a001758.html>

⁶ http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-19-1605_en.htm

President Tusk outlined that the EU’s objective is to achieve a balanced relationship with China, which ensures fair competition and equal market access, notably the inclusion of industrial subsidies as a crucial element of the WTO reform.”⁷

Economic strength needs translation into political influence

In working towards establishing a ‘strategic partnership’ with ASEAN (Joint Communication 2015) the EU supports another expression of multilateralism and a rules based approach to international relations: As a longstanding member of the Asian Regional Forum, the EU participates in the only security forum in Asia.

This volatility in Asia is further enhanced by the uncertainty about the future distribution of power between the US and an aspiring China (Thucydides trap). The legacy of the past is nourishing competitive nationalism in China, Japan and the Republic of Korea. The lack of a viable regional security architecture, as evidenced by the various maritime disputes, the uncertainty caused by the largely non-transparent rise of Chinese military expenditure, the US-answer to China’s rise in abandoning Obama’s pivot as well as its economic leg, the Trans-Pacific Partnership are all contributing to uncertainty. The eleven parties abandoned by the US, continued talks and succeeded in signing the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) (Goodman 2018), taking their economic and political interests in their hands and hedging against China.

Developing existing strategic partnerships for cooperation not only in the region but also beyond in other continents like Africa and the Middle East could provide shared experiences leading to

⁷ <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/03/22/remarks-by-president-donald-tusk-after-the-european-council-meetings-on-21-and-22-march-2019/>

trust building with Asian partners, which in turn could feed back positively into regional cooperation. A regional rules based framework, in particular in Northeast Asia, would be a stabilising factor much needed in the present circumstances. Drawing on the EU's recognised experience and success as an economic power and its extensive experience in non-traditional security could contribute to the stability of the region, but also beyond, as topics like cyber security, water, arable land, climate change, counter-terrorism or implementing the EU Maritime Security Strategy and its Work Plan to name just a few examples that could have an impact beyond the region.

Recognising the important roles played by the military in some countries, like the People's Liberation Army in China, and increasing spending on armament, the EU needs to develop quickly military-to-military (M2M) contacts with Asia-Pacific partners.

The Permanent Structured Cooperation (PeSco) was agreed in 2017 'against the magnitude of the security challenges Europe is confronted with now' (Fiott, Missiroli and Tardy 2017, 53) 'PeSco... can generate common public goods also well beyond Europe' (ibid) which includes Asia. On 6 March 2018 the Council already met for the first time in the PeSco format (Foreign Affairs Council 2018).

Sharing the Eurasian continent and the improved connectivity that might come about through the improved infrastructure envisaged by the Reserve Bank of India demands a rethinking and a holistic approach of the EU Neighbourhood Policy, Central Asia Strategy and the relationship with Russia.

Realists thinking in zones of influence could re-erect the fences of the past which disappeared thirty years ago. As the US and China are in the process of re-evaluating their relationship, Russia is trying to come back to the international scene in cooperating with China where their interests merge. India is cosyng up to the US while trying to establish itself as a regional power.

The EU needs to do the same, including with middle powers like the Republic of Korea, Japan and Australia. The EU has to recognise that relative power has shifted. The influence of Europe has diminished while the influence of Asia in global governance has increased.

China is the Asian permanent member in the UN-Security Council; India and Japan have ambitions for a permanent seat; the EU will lose a seat with Brexit. Asian membership in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) has increased. It is the same in the G20: while Japan was the sole Asian representative in the G7, China, India, the Republic of Korea and Indonesia joined Japan in the G20.

The previously rather strained EU relationship with India got back on track with a successful and substantive EU-India Summit in October 2017, followed by a dedicated 2018 India Strategy, breathing life into the 2004 strategic partnership along the lines of the EUGS.

The HRVP has highlighted the need to pursue multilateralism in her recent intervention in the United Nations Security Council⁸ which was further developed in a programmatic speech at Princeton University⁹. Multilateralism has to remain the guiding principle of the international order. This needs a more active engagement of the EU based on a common policy – in addition to the other multilateral institutions like the WTO, World Bank and IMF.

⁸ Speech by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini at the United Nations' Security Council, New York, 12 March 2019 at https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/59506/speech-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-united-nations%E2%80%99-security-council_en

⁹ Federica Mogherini (2019). "The EU as a global actor: Challenges and opportunities in an evolving multilateral system", Princeton, 11 March 2019; at https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/59498/speech-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-%E2%80%9Ceu-global-actor-challenges-and_en

Reforming these institutions to make them more resilient, while including new ones like the Asian Infrastructure Development Bank to strengthen its multilateral character are in line with the policy of reforming the liberal order on which the present system is built and, important to recall, has allowed aspiring powers to emerge.

Part of this policy has to be the lending of support to regional initiatives such as trilateral cooperation among China, Republic of Korea and Japan, a weak plant requiring sunlight; processes like Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Initiative (Reiterer 2017b, 11) and its successor model the '2018 Northeast Asia Peace and Cooperation Forum' and the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue for trust building; as well as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and other organisations in South Asia. Offering to share best practices with partners is the best way for the EU of keeping its foot in the door of regional developments.

As host of the 2018 Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) Summit, the EU undertook a diplomatic offensive to revitalize the potential of this 22-year-old meeting with its 53 participants in a comprehensive, bi-continental dialogue forum. Security and connectivity were two topical issues for discussion in this unique Asia-Europe set-up, as reflected in a substantive and for the first time relative succinct outcome document (Global Partners for Global Challenges - ASEM 12 Chair's statement).

Summary conclusions

The EU has engaged in a dynamic process of consolidating its relations with Asia and the Pacific in recent years. It sees no need for another pivot, but seeks to raise its visibility and adopt a comprehensive approach to the region that goes beyond trade and economics.

The latter is crucial: "Trade-only" is no longer an option; and would miss today's reality. The perspectives and options for EU

engagement in the region would be limited if its allies and partners see it as primarily an economic competitor. While the EU remains Asia's largest trading partner and economic interdependence between the two regions has reached unprecedented levels, which are the basis for the inter-regional relationship, the EU and its Member States share substantial political and security interests with countries in the region.

Uncontrolled conflict or crisis in the region would have a global impact. Therefore, the EU has a profound interest in seeing that Asia and the Pacific follow a path of economic development, democratisation, regional cooperation and peace. As with any international actor, the EU's focus in its foreign policy is on its immediate neighbourhood. However, in implementing the EUGS a clearer profile is developing for the areas and partners beyond this neighbourhood.

While this is due to the effects of political and economic globalization, including the interconnectivity of production networks, it also reflects the need to be more active or even proactive in those areas which get less attention. This is not only supporting vital interests, but also values.

Unilateralism based on nationalism endangers the liberal rules-based international order and its institutions, the basis on which today's wealth is built. While reforms are necessary to reflect changed circumstances and power relationships, they can only be achieved through negotiations and not through unilateral pressure and power play in violation of international law and standards.

Conceptually, the EU is better equipped to develop policies against protectionism, nationalism, isolationism, disrespect for international law and governance. Striving to maintain a rules-based system, fostering the rule of law, multilateralism and the UN system and stemming the pressures arising from nationalism and authoritarianism are challenges that potentially will bring tensions with friends and allies. However, mature relationships must bear the brunt of criticism.

Given the budgetary and physical constraints and the importance to deal like any other major power with its own neighbourhood, the setting of priorities, the attribution of sufficient time and means to them are necessary.

Implementing a few priorities (Reiterer 2016b) on the global level enriched by bilateral ones will bring results and credibility as opposed to trying to do everything and to comment on everything.

Intensifying engagement in assisting the building of more resilient structures in East Asia on best practices of the liberal order appears necessary in order to avoid the appearance of a parallel order with its own concepts, values and rules, not in line with the interests and values for which the EU and its Member States stand for.

The plant of regionalization to provide a framework for cooperation and dispute management if needed is still fragile in the region. The standing power of multilateral arrangements, as evidenced by the agreement with Iran on nuclear issues, is stronger. A multilateral approach will also be needed to implicate all the interested parties on and around the Korean Peninsula. Similarly, a multilateral solution is required in the South China Sea where the interests of several actors are at stake at the intersection of sovereignty and United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) as evidenced by the decision of the Arbitration Tribunal.

ASEAN continues its path on closer cooperation although not always at the envisioned depth and speed but is genuinely interested to adapt best practices and lessons learnt – the EU remains the only multilateral partner to engage and work with – a responsibility to shoulder.

In sum, since 2012 the EU has clearly shown stronger engagement and interest in Asia, based on economic interdependence, growth prospects for Asia and most importantly the indivisibility of security.

The nuclear threat posed by North Korea and the consequences of the America First policy have driven this message home to Europe: There is a need for more unity and an urgent need to develop the defence and security component of the EU as part of the EU's role as a comprehensive security provider. In this new age, where answers to traditional and non-traditional as well hybrid security challenges are necessary, cooperation between Asia and EU is more important than ever.

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The Foundation was created in 1978 by Jean Monnet, the designer of the first European Community and the first honorary citizen of Europe. He entrusted all his archives to the Foundation. An independent institution serving the public interest, a non-partisan and a non-militant structure, the Foundation receives support from the State of Vaud, the Swiss Confederation and the City of Lausanne. It operates out of the Dorigny Farm, located in the heart of the campus of the University of Lausanne, its main partner.

Today the Foundation houses and exhibits many other private archives, notably those of Robert Marjolin and the European papers of Robert Schuman and Jacques Delors, as well as iconographic and audio-visual documents. It includes a specialized library and a European documentation centre. The Foundation collects testimony from key actors and witnesses as a part of its filmed interview programme. It thus provides users, and especially researchers, with a coherent corpus of documentary resources on the origins and development of European construction and on Switzerland-Europe relations. Every year, the Foundation awards its Henri Rieben Scholarship to several advanced PhD students.

Thanks to the internationally recognised importance of these collections and to the collaboration between Jean Monnet and Professor Henri Rieben, who chaired the Foundation until 2005, the Foundation has become a European intellectual crossroads and an essential venue for meetings, debates, and reflection about major current European issues. It regularly organises conferences, European dialogues, and international symposia, forming partnerships with prestigious institutions. It periodically awards its Gold Medal to prominent political figures who have worked for the common interest of Europeans; among the laureates are José Manuel Barroso, Emilio Colombo, Mario Draghi, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, Jean-Claude Juncker, Helmut Kohl, Romano Prodi, Helmut Schmidt, Martin Schulz, Javier Solana, and Herman Van Rompuy. The Foundation also welcomes many visitors and researchers, who are given assistance in their work, in addition to contributing to the training of students. Thanks to support from the State of Vaud, the Foundation created a new activity in 2016, a "think tank" made up of a group of experts, currently working on sustainable mobility in Europe.

An editorial mission supplements the range of the Foundation's activities. The Red Books Collection, which was created by Henri Rieben in 1957, has been co-published with *Economica* since 2007 and now comprises 218 titles. A new series of shorter publications, the Debates and Documents Collection, was launched in 2014. These publications tend to highlight the Foundation's documentary collections, its public events, or the expertise of its members and partners.

Every year, the General Assembly of the Council of the Foundation - consisting of about 550 members from all walks of life - is held, as well as the Scientific Committee. Pat Cox, former president of the European Parliament and the European Movement International, has been the president of the Foundation since 1st January 2015. His predecessors are José María Gil-Robles (2009-2014), former president of the European Parliament and the European Movement International; Bronisław Geremek (2006-2008), member of the European Parliament and former minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland; and Henri Rieben (1978-2005), professor at the University of Lausanne. Since 2012, the director of the Foundation has been Gilles Grin, doctor in international relations and lecturer at the University of Lausanne.

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Avec les contributions de Annika Brack, Pat Cox, José María Gil-Robles,
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Dario Velo et Francesco Velo.



Cover: alain kissling / atelierk.org
Inner Layout: atelier Kinkin

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ISSN 2296-7710



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