

## Online Appendix for Research Note

# Torn Between International Cooperation and National Sovereignty: Voter Attitudes in Trade-Off Situations in Switzerland

Lukas Lauener, Patrick Emmenegger, Silja Häusermann and Stefanie Walter

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Table B1: Control-Cooperation Trade-Off by Party (in Percent) Using an Alternative Measure for the “International Cooperation Dimension” (Attitudes Towards Additional Bilateral Agreements With the EU) (*Robustness Check for Table 1 in Research Note*)

Party	Potentially Cross-Pressured	Nationalists	Internationalists	Alternatively Cross-Pressured	Neutrals	N
SVP	32.1	38.8	0.8	2.9	25.4	1333
FDP	44.0	9.0	11.8	1.4	33.8	1332
CVP	35.2	12.1	11.8	2.4	38.5	593
GLP	29.9	4.6	23.7	1.3	40.5	776
SP	17.1	3.7	35.6	2.6	41.0	1366
GP	16.6	3.4	36.3	3.1	40.6	964
Other/None	25.0	15.4	10.0	2.8	46.7	1376
Total	28.3	13.4	18.0	2.4	37.8	7740

Table B2: Protection-Cooperation Trade-Off by Party (in Percent) Using an Alternative Measure for the “International Cooperation Dimension” (Attitudes Towards Additional Bilateral Agreements With the EU) (*Robustness Check for Table 2 in Research Note*)

Party	Potentially Cross-Pressured	Protectionists	Internationalists	Alternatively Cross-Pressured	Neutrals	N
SVP	7.8	10.8	9.9	12.4	59.1	1310
FDP	16.0	3.0	21.8	4.2	55.0	1314
CVP	20.7	6.2	9.3	2.8	61.1	581
GLP	24.6	2.2	12.4	1.8	58.9	767
SP	48.6	4.2	2.0	0.6	44.6	1360
GP	43.8	5.6	2.5	0.2	48.0	955
Other/None	17.0	6.5	7.0	4.6	64.9	1343
Total	25.3	5.7	9.3	4.2	55.6	7630

Table B3: Preferences of Potentially Cross-Pressured and Neutral Voters When Facing the Trade-Offs (in Percent) Using an Alternative Measure for the “International Cooperation Dimension” (Attitudes Towards Additional Bilateral Agreements With the EU) (*Robustness Check for Table 3 in Research Note*)

	Control-Cooperation Trade-Off Preference to Maintain Bilateral Treaties Over Restricting Immigration		Protection-Cooperation Trade-Off Preference to Accept Institutional Framework Agreement Over Maintaining “Flanking Measures”	
	Potentially Cross- Pressured	Neutrals	Potentially Cross- Pressured	Neutrals
Overall	59.5	66.8	42.5	33.7
By Party:				
SVP	32.3	21.2	16.5	18.2
FDP	67.9	70.1	43.4	43.6
CVP	65.7	69.9	42.7	39.1
GLP	71.4	85.0	53.3	49.1
SP	68.4	83.7	44.9	37.3
GP	66.0	81.1	46.8	35.7
Other/None	58.0	54.7	29.2	24.7

Table B4: Control-Cooperation Trade-Off by Party (in Percent) Using Different Cut-Off Points (Only Respondents with “Very Strong Views” in Positive and Negative Category for Each Dimension) (*Robustness Check for Table 1 in Research Note*)

Party	Potentially Cross- Pressured	Nationalists	Internationa- lists	Alternatively Cross- Pressured	Neutrals	N
SVP	1.3	9.9	0.0	0.3	88.5	1305
FDP	2.1	0.8	1.2	0.0	95.9	1306
CVP	1.4	2.1	0.7	0.5	95.4	586
GLP	0.5	0.9	2.6	0.1	95.8	765
SP	0.4	0.8	3.6	0.2	95.1	1346
GP	0.4	1.3	2.5	0.1	95.7	947
Other/None	0.5	4.8	0.4	0.5	93.9	1347
Total	0.9	3.3	1.5	0.2	94.1	7602

Table B5: Protection-Cooperation Trade-Off by Party (in Percent) Using Different Cut-Off Points (Only Respondents with “Very Strong Views” in Positive and Negative Category for Each Dimension) (*Robustness Check for Table 2 in Research Note*)

Party	Potentially Cross-Pressured	Protectionists	Internationalists	Alternatively Cross-Pressured	Neutrals	N
SVP	0.0	1.2	0.2	1.6	97.1	1293
FDP	0.2	0.2	1.8	0.5	97.3	1301
CVP	1.2	0.4	0.4	0.2	97.9	577
GLP	1.1	0.0	0.5	0.3	98.2	761
SP	4.6	1.0	0.0	0.0	94.4	1348
GP	2.4	1.6	0.0	0.0	96.0	942
Other/None	0.7	2.0	0.0	0.3	97.0	1330
Total	1.5	1.0	0.4	0.4	96.7	7552

Table B6: Protection-Cooperation Trade-Off by Party (in Percent) Using an Alternative Measure for the “Social Protection Dimension” (Attitudes Towards Social Spending) (*Robustness Check for Table 2 in Research Note*)

Party	Potentially Cross-Pressured	Protectionists	Internationalists	Alternatively Cross-Pressured	Neutrals	N
SVP	2.5	6.0	11.3	18.5	61.7	1312
FDP	9.6	3.9	17.8	7.1	61.7	1318
CVP	16.2	7.1	9.9	5.3	61.6	588
GLP	18.3	6.0	10.1	2.2	63.5	766
SP	36.2	9.4	2.7	1.6	50.2	1352
GP	30.7	9.4	2.5	2.4	55.0	952
Other/None	11.3	10.8	4.6	6.8	66.6	1358
Total	17.4	7.6	8.4	6.8	59.9	7646

Table B7: Preferences of Potentially Cross-Pressured and Neutral Voters When Facing the Protection-Cooperation Trade-Off (in Percent) Using an Alternative Measure for the “Social Protection Dimension” (Attitudes Towards Social Spending) (*Robustness Check for Table 3 in Research Note*)

	Protection-Cooperation Trade-Off Preference to Accept Institutional Framework Agreement Over Maintaining “Flanking Measures”	
	Potentially Cross-Pressured	Neutrals
Overall	49.9	34.3
By Party:		
SVP	18.8	17.0
FDP	52.4	44.5
CVP	52.1	36.2
GLP	62.7	50.4
SP	50.2	38.7
GP	49.7	37.5
Other/None	40.5	25.4

Table B8: Determinants of Being Potentially Cross-Pressured in the Control-Cooperation Trade-Off (See Last Column) Using a Multinomial Logistic Regression Model (Base Outcome: Neutral Voters)

	Nationalist	Internationalist	Alternatively Cross-Pressured	Potentially Cross-Pressured
Male respondent	0.22** (0.07)	0.16* (0.08)	0.02 (0.16)	0.34*** (0.07)
Age (in years)	0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01*** (0.00)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.01*** (0.00)
Education level	-0.01 (0.01)	0.09*** (0.01)	0.03 (0.03)	-0.01 (0.01)
Gross monthly household income	-0.03*** (0.01)	0.04*** (0.01)	-0.02 (0.02)	0.00 (0.01)
Unemployed respondent	0.69** (0.26)	-0.26 (0.40)	1.02* (0.43)	-0.29 (0.39)
Retired respondent	-0.58*** (0.12)	0.05 (0.13)	-0.37 (0.30)	0.15 (0.11)
Political interest	-0.11* (0.06)	0.55*** (0.06)	0.16 (0.12)	0.28*** (0.05)
Regular political participation	0.14 (0.12)	0.35* (0.16)	-0.18 (0.27)	-0.08 (0.13)
potential SVP voter	0.79*** (0.10)	-1.89*** (0.31)	-0.55+ (0.33)	0.69*** (0.12)
potential FDP voter	0.01 (0.12)	0.13 (0.15)	-0.66* (0.34)	0.92*** (0.12)
potential CVP voter	-0.04 (0.14)	0.11 (0.19)	-0.22 (0.37)	0.69*** (0.14)
potential GLP voter	-0.53*** (0.15)	0.61*** (0.15)	-0.31 (0.34)	0.46*** (0.14)
potential SP voter	-0.77*** (0.13)	1.13*** (0.13)	0.60* (0.23)	-0.17 (0.13)
potential GP voter	-0.83*** (0.15)	1.01*** (0.14)	0.58* (0.25)	-0.19 (0.15)
Constant	-1.14*** (0.19)	-4.29*** (0.23)	-3.10*** (0.40)	-3.11*** (0.20)
Observations	7,254	7,254	7,254	7,254
Pseudo R2	0.0895	0.0895	0.0895	0.0895
Log pseudolikelihood	-8546	-8546	-8546	-8546

Standard errors in parentheses \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1

Table B9: Determinants of Being Potentially Cross-Pressured in the Protection-Cooperation Trade-Off (See Last Column) Using a Multinomial Logistic Regression Model (Base Outcome: Neutral Voters)

	Protectionist	Internationalist	Alternatively Cross-Pressured	Potentially Cross-Pressured
Male respondent	0.12 (0.12)	0.36** (0.14)	0.17 (0.17)	0.00 (0.09)
Age (in years)	0.00 (0.00)	-0.00 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.00)
Education level	0.01 (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)	-0.00 (0.03)	0.04** (0.01)
Gross monthly household income	-0.05** (0.02)	0.07*** (0.02)	-0.00 (0.02)	-0.01 (0.01)
Unemployed respondent	0.98** (0.34)	-14.73 (828.71)	0.07 (0.75)	-0.49 (0.44)
Retired respondent	-0.27 (0.19)	0.03 (0.20)	-0.40 (0.28)	-0.08 (0.13)
Political interest	-0.07 (0.09)	0.28** (0.10)	-0.04 (0.13)	0.62*** (0.07)
Regular political participation	-0.01 (0.21)	0.01 (0.25)	0.40 (0.30)	0.09 (0.18)
potential SVP voter	0.04 (0.18)	0.21 (0.23)	1.02*** (0.23)	-0.69*** (0.21)
potential FDP voter	-0.82*** (0.22)	0.88*** (0.20)	0.02 (0.27)	-0.33+ (0.18)
potential CVP voter	-0.29 (0.24)	0.14 (0.27)	-0.37 (0.38)	0.12 (0.20)
potential GLP voter	-0.81** (0.25)	0.07 (0.24)	-0.73* (0.37)	0.26 (0.17)
potential SP voter	0.09 (0.18)	-1.31*** (0.35)	-1.61** (0.49)	1.23*** (0.15)
potential GP voter	-0.03 (0.19)	-1.28*** (0.36)	-1.22** (0.43)	0.92*** (0.15)
Trade union involvement	0.67*** (0.14)	-0.66** (0.25)	-0.70* (0.34)	0.18 (0.11)
Constant	-1.61*** (0.31)	-4.22*** (0.39)	-2.39*** (0.46)	-3.97*** (0.27)
Observations	4,641	4,641	4,641	4,641
Pseudo R2	0.0976	0.0976	0.0976	0.0976
Log pseudolikelihood	-4699	-4699	-4699	-4699

Standard errors in parentheses \*\*\* p<0.001, \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1