

# A Typology of Ideological Attitudes Towards Social Solidarity and Social Control

TIINA LIKKI\* and CHRISTIAN STAERKLÉ

*Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland*

## ABSTRACT

Research on ideological attitudes has identified two main dimensions that refer to two fundamental features of group organization: social solidarity and social control. In response to prior research that has studied their relationship mainly from a correlational perspective, this paper introduces a social reality model based on psychological functionality of ideological attitudes. Social position variables (education, income and material vulnerability) and insecurity variables (fear of crime and distrust) are used to predict the interplay between ideological attitudes towards social solidarity and social control. Using *K*-means cluster analysis, a typology with four patterns of support for solidarity and control ('socials', 'repressives', 'minimalists' and 'social-repressives') was created, on the basis of representative survey data for the UK, France and Germany ( $N = 7034$ ). Results from logistic regression analyses show that the proposed social reality model explains membership in typology categories, with similar results across the three countries. Overall, the model underscores the social origins of ideological attitudes as functional responses to perceived social reality. The paper illustrates how the social psychological study of ideological attitudes may be enriched by a typological approach that examines patterns of attitudes rather than single dimensions. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

*Key words:* political attitudes; ideology; status; social order; insecurity; typology; inequality; policy attitudes; welfare state

Political attitudes have long been analysed as a function of a single left–right or liberal–conservative dimension (e.g. Comrey & Newmeyer, 1965; Downs, 1957; Jacoby, 1991). There is, however, substantial evidence suggesting that a one-dimensional model of ideology rarely provides a satisfying account of how people take up a stance towards political issues (Kerlinger, 1984; Kinder, 1998). Research on the structure of political attitudes has indeed consistently obtained at least two relatively independent dimensions of ideological beliefs (see Saucier, 2000), opposing for example social conservatism and economic conservatism (Hughes, 1975), freedom and equality (Rokeach, 1973) and, more recently, conservation

---

\*Correspondence to: Tiina Likki and Christian Staerklé, Institute of Social Sciences, University of Lausanne, CH-1015 Lausanne, Switzerland.  
E-mail: tiina.likki@unil.ch; christian.staerкле@unil.ch

and self-transcendence (Schwartz, 1992) and right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation (Duckitt, 2001; Saucier, 2000).

In the present paper, we analyse two sets of ideological attitudes that we believe capture the central aspects of any organized and coordinated social group, namely social solidarity and social control. These two basic dimensions are seen to subsume much of the ideological content of earlier dual conceptualizations of political attitudes. We argue that two key issues have not been addressed satisfactorily in prior research: first, the varying strengths of the relationship between solidarity and control at the individual level and, second, the social origins of such beliefs that may explain why certain individuals are more likely to endorse them.

## SOCIAL SOLIDARITY AND SOCIAL CONTROL: TOWARDS A TYPOLOGY

Social solidarity and social control are two basic modes of regulation of social groups that aim at a stable, effective and morally justifiable group organization. *Social solidarity* refers to forms of reciprocity and collective responsibility among group members that allow taking care of the more vulnerable members of the group, such as the old or the sick. In most modern societies, such solidarity is implemented by various programmes of the welfare state that ensure that adequate basic needs are met. *Social control*, in turn, refers to a 'collection of mechanisms to induce compliance to norms' (Meier, 1982, p. 43). The purported aim of social control is the maintenance of social stability through law enforcement as well as formal and informal sanctions of norm transgressions. Large differences exist between societies as to the relative importance of these two modes of group regulation. The United States, for example, emphasizes control over solidarity, with zero tolerance policies and low levels of redistribution, whereas Scandinavian countries prioritize solidarity over control.

Considering the necessary interrelatedness of social solidarity and social control as basic strategies of social regulation within groups, the lack of work analysing the relationship between these two sets of ideological attitudes seems surprising. The research that is most relevant to this issue has examined the correlation between social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism (Dallago, Cima, Roccato, Ricolfi, & Mirisola, 2008; Duckitt, 2001; Duriez, Van Hiel, & Kossowska, 2005; Mirisola, Sibley, Boca, & Duckitt, 2007; Roccato & Ricolfi, 2005). However, these studies were mostly concerned with the analysis of the linear relationship between the two dimensions, suggesting that higher social dominance orientation scores (comparable with low social solidarity) should be related to higher levels of right-wing authoritarianism (comparable with high social control). This positive relationship has also been shown to be stronger among individuals with higher levels of ideological consistency (Duckitt, 2001; Duriez et al., 2005), reflecting a greater tendency to constrain one's attitudes on societal issues along a left–right dimension (Converse, 1964; Zaller, 1992). Such consistency is said to result from political socialization as well as from political interest and identification (Duriez et al., 2005; Mirisola et al., 2007).

We question the view that only certain combinations of ideological attitudes are sophisticated or meaningful by arguing that even less 'consistent' combinations of ideological attitudes—such as low social dominance orientation combined with high right-wing authoritarianism—can be meaningful and reasonable responses to material and social circumstances. We suggest that in order to fully account for the relationship between the two

dimensions, it is necessary to go beyond the usual linear approach often used for studying the relationship between social dominance orientation and right-wing authoritarianism. Instead, we put forward a typological approach that examines different constellations of mean levels of attitudes such as high support for social solidarity coupled with high support for social control.

The main benefit of a typological approach is that it allows predicting different combinations of attitudes and examining the factors that lead individuals to adopt each pattern. Typological approaches, although rarely used in social psychology, have been used to uncover and predict cognitive and behavioural patterns that were earlier ignored or considered to be inconsistent. Examples include John Berry's (1997) framework of acculturation strategies (low vs high on dimensions of cultural maintenance and contact) and Susan Fiske's stereotype content model (low vs high on dimensions of warmth and competence) (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). Similar to Fiske et al. (2002), we argue that mixed combinations of solidarity and control are frequent because they are psychologically functional rather than inconsistent.

Our typology of ideological attitudes builds on the work by Rokeach (1973) and Braithwaite (1994) on human values. These authors stressed the need to analyse different combinations of ideological values, suggesting that the two value dimensions are independent and not mutually exclusive. Rokeach (1973) proposed that major modern ideologies are defined by the differing priorities given to the values of freedom (cf. social control) and equality (cf. social solidarity). The high versus low priorities placed on the two values yield four cells, each corresponding to an ideology: socialism (high equality and high freedom), capitalism (low equality and high freedom), fascism (low equality and low freedom) and communism (high equality and low freedom). We take from Rokeach the insight that ideological dimensions may coexist and apply it to attitudes on the individual level. Whereas Rokeach's typology classifies political ideologies, we construct an analogous typology of individual ideological attitudes with four patterns of attitudes that we term *social positioning* (high solidarity and low control), *repressive positioning* (low solidarity and high control), *minimalist positioning* (low solidarity and low control), and *social-repressive positioning* (high solidarity and high control) (Figure 1). The aim of this paper is to account for individuals' position in one of the four categories as a function of perceived social reality.




Figure 1. Typology of ideological positioning.

## SOCIAL REALITY MODEL

The proposed social reality model is based on the assumption that ideological attitudes are psychologically functional responses to perceived social reality. It thereby emphasizes the importance of both objective and subjective social reality individuals face in their day-to-day lives as a basis of their ideological attitudes.

### *Social position*

A central aspect of perceived social reality is one's position in the social hierarchy. People belonging to groups that differ in terms of social status are likely to have different views of social reality that subsequently lead to different social motivations and ideological positioning. We distinguish between material and cultural forms of social position (Bourdieu, 1979/1984) and argue that they differentially predict ideological attitudes. In terms of material position, assessed objectively by income and subjectively by perceived material vulnerability, members of high-status groups are likely to be motivated to maintain their privileged status, whereas members of low-status groups will strive to improve their status—a logic in line with collective self-interest (Bobo & Hutchings, 1996). Consistent with this reasoning, both survey and experimental research on social dominance orientation has confirmed that one's position in the social structure has an effect on preference for hierarchy, with members of dominant groups displaying higher social dominance orientation scores (Guimond, Dambrun, Michinov, & Duarte, 2003; Schmitt, Branscombe, & Kappen, 2003; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Following a similar logic, individuals with high material status can be expected to support stricter repressive and authoritarian policies as a way to maintain hierarchical status relations and their advantage over subordinate groups (Jackman, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999, Chapter 8).

The relationship between education—the cultural dimension of social status—and support for social solidarity is less straightforward. If used as a measure of social position without controlling for material status, education tends to be related to less social solidarity (e.g. Staerklé, Likki, & Scheidegger, 2012). According to the enlightenment hypothesis, however, individuals integrate central values of Western societies during education, including the value of equality (Robinson & Bell, 1978). Furthermore, exposure to information about the degree of inequality in society during education is expected to increase support for inequality reduction policies (Lewin-Epstein, Kaplan, & Levanon, 2003).

With respect to support for social control, it is firmly established since Lipset (1959) that more authoritarian attitudes are associated with lower levels of education. Such effects may reflect identity management strategies: Demands for more law and order and punitive derogation of out-groups can serve the purpose of self-affirmation by members of low-status groups (Gibbons & Gerrard, 1991; Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

### *Insecurity*

In addition to one's location in the social structure, perceived social reality consists of an experiential dimension related to lived or perceived insecurity (Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Hammer, Widmer, & Robert, 2009; Jackson, 2009). We differentiate between physical and social insecurity. In physical insecurity, such as fear of crime, the environment is perceived as physically threatening and dangerous. Such perceptions lead to calls for

protection, a hypothesis in line with authoritarianism research that has shown that perceived threat, fear and uncertainty increase authoritarian responses (Doty, Peterson, & Winter, 1991; Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Feldman & Stenner, 1997). Yet, fear of crime is not only an individual perception of a dangerous social environment but also a collective response strategically enhanced by political elites to orient attention away from social inequalities to a purported safety problem (Bauman, 1999; Garland, 2001). Illustrating this more ideological reading of fear of crime, recent research has begun exploring the relationship between fear of crime and social insecurity (Vieno, Roccato, & Russo, 2013). Fear of crime may, then, lead either to a rejection of solidarity if social control is perceived as the primary solution to physical insecurity or to demands for solidarity if fear of crime is recognized as a reflection of economic inequality.

Social insecurity, in turn, refers to a lack of trust, defined as a general belief in the benign and trustworthy nature of others (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). As many authors have argued, trust is a central element of social order and essential for harmonious and efficient everyday relations (Barber, 1983; Hardin, 1995; Luhmann, 1979). High trust in fellow citizens maintains a sense of cooperation and fairness within groups and, hence, decreases fear (De Cremer, Snyder, & Dewitte, 2001). Because trust counteracts fears of free riding and strengthens the expectation of reciprocity, distrust should lead to a lower willingness to support social solidarity. At the same time, distrust may fuel fear and support for social control, for example in the form of punitive policies.

## HYPOTHESES

The aim of the present paper is to show that a social reality approach can explain different patterns of support for social solidarity and social control. Specifically, controlling for age and gender, we predict the following:

- (a) *Social positioning* (high solidarity and low control) is related to the following: (1) lower levels of income; (2) higher material vulnerability; (3) higher education; and (4) lower physical and social insecurity. According to our predictions, individuals in this category feel secure, therefore rejecting social control that is perceived as unnecessary. They demand solidarity because higher education has instilled values of equality in them, or because they themselves are in need of material support.
- (b) *Repressive positioning* (low solidarity and high control) is related to the following: (1) higher levels of income; (2) lower material vulnerability; (3) lower education; and (4) higher physical and social insecurity. Individuals with a repressive profile should reject solidarity because they are financially secure but demand social control because they feel physically and socially insecure and because they have less cultural capital.
- (c) *Minimalist positioning* (low solidarity and low control) is related to the following: (1) higher levels of income; (2) lower material vulnerability; (3) higher education; and (4) lower physical and social insecurity. Individuals in this category are expected to reject both solidarity and control because they feel carefree and secure with regard to their material position as well as their physical and social environments.
- (d) *Social-repressive positioning* (high solidarity and high control) is related to the following: (1) lower levels of income; (2) higher material vulnerability; (3) lower education; and (4) higher physical and social insecurity. Individuals with a social-repressive profile are expected to demand both social solidarity and social control because they are materially and culturally disadvantaged and because they feel physically and socially insecure.

## METHOD

### *Participants and procedure*

The data used in the study come from the European Social Survey 2008, a large international survey on social and political attitudes. The countries chosen for the present analysis include the UK ( $n = 2303$ ), France ( $n = 2045$ ) and Germany ( $n = 2686$ ), with an overall  $N = 7034$ . The data are representative of the population aged 16 years and older. The number of missing values was low for all variables except for income that had 352 (15.3%) missing values in the UK, 207 (10.1%) in France and 465 (17.3%) in Germany. Instead of listwise deletion, we imputed missing values for income using the multiple imputation procedure in SPSS Statistics version 19.0. Pooled estimates using multiple imputation yielded results that were highly similar to results using the original dataset with listwise deletion for income.

We do not advance country-specific hypotheses as we expect the basic processes of ideological patterning to remain essentially identical across the three countries, despite differences in the institutional set-ups of solidarity and control. In terms of welfare state institutions, Germany and France represent so-called conservative-corporatist welfare regimes, characterized by preservation of class differentials and a strong role for family and community in benefit provision. Germany is largely based on individual insurance schemes and the principle of subsidiarity (private responsibility whenever possible), whereas the French system is more tax based. The UK, in turn, is a liberal welfare regime dominated by modest social insurance plans and strict entitlement rules (Esping-Andersen, 1990). The three countries also differ in terms of criminal justice systems and the severity of penal policies (e.g. Tonry, 2004).

### *Measures*

*Social solidarity.* Support for social solidarity was measured with four items asking participants to rate the extent to which governments should be responsible for ensuring the following rights: job for everyone, health care for the sick, standard of living for the old and standard of living for the unemployed. Responses ranged on an 11-point scale from 0 = *should not be government's responsibility at all* to 10 = *should be entirely government's responsibility*.<sup>1</sup> The four items were averaged to form a scale with adequate reliability (Cronbach's alphas ranged from .68 to .78 in the three countries). Table 1 presents means, standard deviations and alphas for all measures in each country. Overall, attitudes were clearly in favour of social solidarity with means ranging from 7.15 (France) to 7.53 (UK).

*Social control.* Support for social control was measured with four items relating to different aspects of social control. The first three items include 'People who break the law should be given much harsher sentences than they are these days', 'Schools must teach children to obey authority' and 'If a man is suspected of planning a terrorist attack, the

<sup>1</sup>We also created a measure of social solidarity that taps egalitarianism more generally. A three-item measure of egalitarianism including items such as 'Large differences in people's incomes are acceptable to properly reward differences in talents and efforts' revealed poor internal consistency: Cronbach's  $\alpha = .57$  (UK),  $\alpha = .56$  (France), and  $\alpha = .60$  (Germany). This was likely due to item formulations that could be interpreted as measuring concepts other than egalitarianism, such as meritocracy or support for the equity principle.



Table 1. Sample descriptive statistics

	UK			France			Germany			Range
	(n = 2303)			(n = 2045)			(n = 2686)			
	M	SD	$\alpha$	M	SD	$\alpha$	M	SD	$\alpha$	
Social solidarity	7.53	1.30	0.68	7.15	1.47	0.75	7.32	1.66	0.78	0–10
Social control	7.52	1.67	0.67	7.13	1.95	0.64	6.59	1.79	0.64	0–10
Education	3.34	1.36	—	3.05	1.55	—	3.66	1.11	—	0–6
Income	5.33	3.00	—	5.82	2.85	—	4.60	2.51	—	1–10
Material vulnerability	1.94	0.65	0.60	1.89	0.64	0.65	1.83	0.59	0.57	1–4
Fear of crime	2.08	0.68	0.64	2.03	0.71	0.67	1.82	0.60	0.63	1–4
Distrust	4.47	1.76	0.76	5.08	1.64	0.64	4.73	1.74	0.71	0–10

police should have the power to keep him in prison until they are satisfied he was not involved'. The response scale for these items ranged from 1 = *agree strongly* to 5 = *disagree strongly*. In order to increase scale reliability, a fourth item was taken from Schwartz's (2003) Human Values Scale that asked respondents to indicate perceived similarity with a fictitious person: 'It is important to him that the government ensures his safety against all threats. He wants the state to be strong so it can defend its citizens'; responses ranged from 1 = *very much like me* to 6 = *not like me at all*. Because this item had a different response scale, standardized scores were used to create the indicator, and responses to items were reverse coded so that higher scores indicate greater support for social control ( $\alpha = .64-.67$ ). There was fairly strong overall support for social control, with means ranging from 6.59 in Germany to 7.52 in the UK on a recoded scale ranging from 0 to 10.

*Cultural and material social position.* The first component of the social reality model assesses respondents' social status and their position in the social structure. *Level of education* was used as a measure of social status that reflects its cultural dimension. Values ranged from 0 = *not completed primary education* to 6 = *second stage of tertiary*. *Income* was used to assess the material dimension of social position. Participants' responses for household's total net income were recoded for comparability into 10 percentile categories by country. In addition to these two 'objective' measures of social position, a 'subjective' measure of *material vulnerability* was created from three items of perceived likelihood of life course events with negative material consequences occurring in the next 12 months: having less time for paid work than desired because of the care given to family members, not having enough money for household necessities and not receiving health care in case of illness ( $\alpha = .57-.65$ ). Responses ranged from 1 = *not at all likely* to 4 = *very likely*. We also controlled for the effects of age (measured in years) and gender.

*Physical and social insecurity.* The second component of the social reality model refers to experiential and perceived insecurity in relation to one's physical safety (physical insecurity) and to social distrust (social insecurity). To measure *physical insecurity*, we created an indicator of fear of crime consisting of three items: 'How safe do you feel walking alone in your local area after dark?' (1 = *very safe* to 4 = *very unsafe*), 'How often do you worry about your home being burgled?' and 'How often do you worry about becoming a victim of violent crime?' (1 = *all or most of the time* to 4 = *never*). Responses to items were recoded so that higher scores on the scale indicate greater physical insecurity

( $\alpha = .64-.67$ ). To measure social insecurity, we created an indicator of *distrust* consisting of three items: ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’, ‘Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?’, and ‘Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves?’ Responses ranged from 0 to 10 and were recode so that higher scores on the scale indicate greater distrust ( $\alpha = .64-.76$ ).

## RESULTS

Table 2 presents the correlations between all predictor variables in the overall sample of three countries. A cursory look at the findings shows that most correlations between predictor variables were between .10 and .20, suggesting that collinearity will not be an issue. The highest correlations were found between education and income (.33) and between income and material vulnerability (–.25). A weak positive overall correlation was found between social solidarity and social control (.14), indicating that individuals who support solidarity also tend to support control.

### *A typology of support for social solidarity and social control*

In order to analyse the combined patterns of social solidarity and social control, we created a typology of policy positioning using *K*-means clustering, a method adapted for grouping together similar cases in large samples (Aldenderfer & Blashfield, 1984; Everitt, Landau, Leese, & Stahl, 2011). This procedure classifies participants by maximizing dissimilarity between categories and similarity within categories. The number of categories was pre-defined to four as we theoretically expected to find the categories of socials (high solidarity and low control), repressives (low solidarity and high control), minimalists (low solidarity and low control), and social-repressives (high solidarity and high control) as a function of the dimensions of social solidarity and social control. Many authors have criticized the practice of choosing initial centroids (i.e. values of cluster means) randomly (e.g. Tan, Steinbach, & Kumar, 2005, Chapter 8), so we used as initial values the final cluster centres obtained from an analysis conducted on the pooled dataset including all three countries.

Mean values for the two dimensions of social solidarity and social control attitudes for each category are presented in Table 3. Regarding levels of social solidarity in the four

Table 2. Correlations in the global (three-country) sample

	1	2	3	4	5	6
1. Education	—					
2. Income	0.33	—				
3. Material vulnerability	–0.12	–0.25	—			
4. Fear of crime	–0.10	–0.06	0.19	—		
5. Distrust	–0.13	–0.11	0.21	0.20	—	
6. Social solidarity	–0.08	–0.14	0.11	0.07	0.02*	—
7. Social control	–0.29	–0.16	0.10	0.24	0.18	0.14

Note: All correlations are significant at the 0.01 level, two-tailed, unless noted otherwise.

\* $p > .05$ .



Table 3. Mean levels of social solidarity and social control in four positioning categories

Category	UK						France						Germany					
	Solidarity			Control			Solidarity			Control			Solidarity			Control		
	M	SD	%	M	SD	%	M	SD	%	M	SD	%	M	SD	%	M	SD	%
Socials	7.71 <sup>a</sup>	0.90	16.3	4.83 <sup>a</sup>	1.24	16.3	7.71 <sup>a</sup>	1.04	21.9	4.45 <sup>a</sup>	1.33	21.9	7.54 <sup>a</sup>	0.97	23.4	4.54 <sup>a</sup>	1.32	23.4
Repressives	6.86 <sup>b</sup>	0.66	40.4	8.19 <sup>b</sup>	0.98	40.4	6.70 <sup>b</sup>	0.72	37.8	8.22 <sup>b</sup>	1.00	37.8	6.91 <sup>b</sup>	0.64	25.5	7.72 <sup>b</sup>	0.87	25.5
Minimalists	5.16 <sup>c</sup>	0.94	8.1	6.48 <sup>c</sup>	1.21	8.1	5.08 <sup>c</sup>	0.96	16.4	6.47 <sup>c</sup>	1.42	16.4	5.04 <sup>c</sup>	1.06	20.3	5.82 <sup>c</sup>	1.34	20.3
Social-repressives	8.76 <sup>d</sup>	0.65	35.2	8.24 <sup>b</sup>	1.06	35.2	8.76 <sup>d</sup>	0.68	23.9	8.30 <sup>b</sup>	1.13	23.9	9.04 <sup>d</sup>	0.73	29.9	7.82 <sup>b</sup>	1.03	29.9

Note: Both scales range from 0 to 10. Means within a column sharing a common subscript are not statistically different according to the Games-Howell *post hoc* test (no equal variances assumed). Percentages refer to proportion of participants within each country that belong to a given category.

categories, one can observe, firstly, that minimalists are the only group not clearly in favour of social solidarity (means range from 5.04 in Germany to 5.16 in the UK on a scale from 0 to 10). This means that even repressives, theorized to score high only on social control, show relatively high levels of solidarity in our empirically based typology (from 6.70 in France to 6.90 in Germany). Secondly, *post hoc* tests (Games-Howell) show that levels of social solidarity are highest among social-repressives, whose mean level of solidarity is significantly higher not only than that of repressives and minimalists but also than that of socials ( $p < .05$ ). In other words, the group with highest solidarity is also the group that asks for most social control. Regarding support for social control, the only category clearly not in favour of repressive policies is the socials (means range from 4.44 in France to 4.83 in the UK). There is no difference in the level of social control between repressives and social-repressives. Overall, the patterns of means in the four categories are highly similar across the three countries, indicating cross-national validity of the obtained solution.

Regarding the distribution of participants in the four categories, the repressive category is largest of the four categories in the UK (40.4%) and France (37.9%), followed by social-repressives. In Germany, the order is reversed, with social-repressives (29.9 %) as the largest category and repressives (25.3%) as the second largest category. Socials occupy the third position in all countries, whereas minimalists are the smallest group in all countries.

#### *Predicting profiles of ideological attitudes: logistic regressions*

Binary logistic regressions were conducted separately for each of the four categories, predicting membership in each category (coded as 1) compared with membership in the rest of the sample (coded as 0). The regressions were conducted on the dataset including all three countries, and interactions were computed between each centred predictor variable and country dummy variables in order to test whether the effects of predictors differed across countries (on the basis of theory, we did not expect differences between the countries). Only significant interactions were retained for the final model, presented in Table 4. For reasons of space, we only present coefficients for the UK and do not show estimates for each Country  $\times$  Predictor interaction (these can be obtained from authors, as well as full models for each country as a reference category). Where country differences were found, these are mentioned in the text.

*Social positioning.* Membership in the category of socials (high solidarity and low control) was predicted by all variables except material vulnerability. *High* income and *high* education predicted social positioning, except for France where income had no effect. Clearly, high social status is related to a positioning that simultaneously supports social solidarity and rejects social control. This result goes against the self-interest hypothesis according to which members of higher-status groups would try to maintain their social position by opposing solidarity and increasing social control. With respect to education, the positive effect may indicate a more 'enlightened' stance due to democratic equality values and awareness about inequality acquired during education. Membership in the social positioning category was furthermore predicted by low fear of crime and low distrust, indicating that individuals who feel physically and socially secure tend to support institutional solidarity without demanding social control.

Table 4. Binary logistic regressions predicting social, repressive, minimalist and social-repressive positioning

	Model 1: social		Model 2: repressive		Model 3: minimalist		Model 4: social-repressive	
	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>
Constant	<b>-1.88***</b>	0.08	<b>-0.41***</b>	0.05	<b>-2.51***</b>	0.09	<b>-0.64***</b>	0.05
Gender (1 = female)	-0.11	0.06	0.07	0.05	0.15*	0.07	-0.07	0.06
Age	<b>-0.01**</b>	0.00	<b>0.00</b>	0.00	-0.00	0.00	0.01***	0.00
Education	0.34***	0.03	-0.09***	0.02	0.04	0.03	-0.17***	0.02
Income	<b>0.09***</b>	0.02	0.01	0.01	0.06***	0.02	<b>-0.05**</b>	0.02
Material vulnerability	0.08	0.06	-0.11*	0.04	<b>0.07</b>	0.12	0.16***	0.05
Fear of crime	-0.52***	0.06	<b>0.09</b>	0.06	-0.19**	0.06	0.20***	0.04
Distrust	<b>-0.26***</b>	0.04	0.08***	0.02	0.01	0.02	<b>0.01</b>	0.03
Cox and Nell $R^2$		0.10		0.04		0.03		0.06
Nagelkerke $R^2$		0.16		0.05		0.06		0.09

Note: Estimates are unstandardized coefficients for the UK. Estimates in bold differ across countries (see text). The table does not include estimates for the effects of country dummies and the interactions between country and predictor variables. These can be obtained from authors.

\* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

*Repressive positioning.* Membership in the category of repressives (low solidarity and high control) was associated with low levels of education and low material vulnerability, whereas income was unrelated to repressive positioning. As predicted by our social reality model, fear of crime and distrust predicted repressive positioning positively in most cases, following the idea that perceived insecurity gives rise to demands for protection and calls for restoring moral values.

*Minimalist positioning.* Minimalist positioning (low solidarity and low control) was predicted by high material status. Individuals with higher income (in all three countries) and lower subjective material vulnerability (in France and in Germany) were more likely to endorse a minimalist positioning, whereas education had no effect on minimalist positioning. Fear of crime, in turn, was negatively related to minimalist positioning whereas distrust had no effect. Overall, then, the minimalist positioning is related to a carefree and optimistic perception of social reality: Being financially secure and not feeling under threat lead to a libertarian attitude where institutional involvement is considered unnecessary. Such individuals do not require society to grant them either social protection or enforcement of normative compliance.

*Social-repressive positioning.* As predicted, social-repressive positioning (high solidarity and high control) was related to both low education and low income, and to strong feelings of material vulnerability. These findings suggest that the social-repressive pattern of ideological beliefs is most clearly related to low social status coupled with perceived risk and danger. In support of this interpretation, higher fear of crime (and in Germany higher distrust) was also related to social-repressive positioning. Overall, the results suggest that social reality, in terms of both low social position and perceived insecurity, is an important driving force behind social-repressive positioning.

*Predicting social solidarity and social control separately: linear regressions*

To verify the distinctiveness of our typological approach, we also ran linear regression models that separately predicted the dimensions of social solidarity and social control in each country (results available from the authors). These linear models reveal important differences in explanatory variables compared with the typological approach: *Low* income, for example, predicts support for social solidarity in the linear model, whereas *high* income predicts membership in the social positioning category in the typological analysis. A similar discrepancy can be found with respect to education level: A low level of education predicts support for social solidarity in the linear analysis, but a high level of education predicts membership in the social positioning category. Thus, predicting support for solidarity in relation to positionings toward social control yields a fuller and more precise picture than predicting either dimension separately.

**DISCUSSION**

This research examined the interplay of ideological attitudes towards social solidarity and towards social control in representative samples of three European populations: the UK, France and Germany. We have argued that both social solidarity and social control address fundamental issues of social order, namely the question of taking care of weaker members of the society and the question of law enforcement and compliance with group norms. We predicted that a functionalist social reality model consisting of social position variables and insecurity factors explains where individuals fall on the two dimensions of solidarity and control.

The results obtained were highly similar across the three contexts. We were able to show that variables in the social reality model powerfully and predictably accounted for different patterns of ideological positioning, lending support to the idea that combinations of solidarity and control are functionally consistent. Although inconsistent from a traditional left–right conceptualization of political attitudes, social-repressive positioning (high support for both social solidarity and social control) is explained with a sombre and pessimistic view of social reality, characteristic of low-status positions (Castel, 1995). Conversely, the minimalist rejection of both social solidarity and social control is understandable from the standpoint of a carefree individual with no material or security concerns, giving rise to a libertarian view of social reality typically found in high-status individuals (Staerklé, Delay, Gianettoni, & Roux, 2007). The social reality model, therefore, underscores the social origins of ideological attitudes that are seen as psychologically functional responses to perceived social reality (Scheidegger & Staerklé, 2011).

Our typological approach provides a novel and alternative way of examining relationships between ideological attitudes. Previous work has focused on correlations, explaining positive correlations between political attitudes such as right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation as the result of ideologically consistent belief systems (Duckitt, 2001; Duriez et al., 2005; Mirisola et al., 2007). Such correlations, however, do not allow distinguishing whether a negative or low correlation is due to low support for both dimensions (minimalist positioning) or high support for both dimensions (social-repressive positioning). As we have shown in the present study, minimalist positioning is predicted differently by social reality variables than social-repressive positioning, despite the fact that both patterns are characterized by a positive correlation between

social solidarity and social control. A typological approach, then, allows going beyond a view of ideological attitudes as politically and psychologically consistent or inconsistent. Furthermore, the comparison with the results from linear regressions predicting social solidarity and social control separately suggests that a typological approach provides different and sometimes surprising insights to ideological attitudes. Highly educated individuals are for example likely to fall in the social positioning category (typological analysis) but not support social solidarity (linear analysis).

Finally, the size of the four categories across the three countries invites a reflection on the strength and prevalence of the different solidarity–control attitude patterns in public opinion. Whereas in the UK and in France, the repressives make up the largest category, followed by social-repressives, in Germany, the four categories are roughly equally distributed. The socials are relatively strong in France and in Germany, whereas the minimalists are the minority category across all three countries. These findings suggest that repressive attitudes are widespread in all three contexts and that these repressive attitudes are frequently associated with calls for redistribution. Far from being an exception, the social-repressive attitude pattern (which is inconsistent from a traditional left–right perspective) makes up 30% of the total sample. One can expect that individuals holding this attitude pattern are particularly sensitive to populist right-wing parties that put forward a mixture of social-redistributive and repressive-authoritarian measures to attract a vulnerable and often precarious electorate.

## CONCLUSION

Our research suffers from a number of shortcomings. First, like in most comparative survey research, the available items were not ideal to assess the theoretical constructs. In particular, the internal consistency of the social control, material vulnerability and fear of crime measures was not fully satisfactory. The findings should therefore be interpreted with the necessary caution. Second, as in any cross-sectional, correlational study, it is not possible to ascertain causal relationships between variables. In order to do so, future research should use longitudinal rather than correlational data on ideological attitudes. Third, *K*-means clustering techniques may be criticized for the difficulty of choosing appropriate initial centroids and their impact on finding an optimal cluster structure. Nevertheless, we hope to have shown that clustering techniques are powerful tools for studying attitude patterns and as such provide a different perspective on ideological attitudes than the traditional linear analyses.

Notwithstanding these potential shortcomings, our research provides a social psychological analysis of social solidarity and social control that have become key themes in contemporary political debates. Examples of the contested nature of social solidarity include the debate over healthcare reform in the United States and the European welfare retrenchment debate where political discourse arguing for the necessity of cutbacks and greater conditionality of welfare benefits has gained ground in recent decades (e.g. Svallfors, 2012). At the same time, criminologists have argued that there is a tendency to replace social welfare programmes by harsher punitive policies (e.g. Wacquant, 2009; Young, 1999). In Europe, the emphasis is shifting from social solidarity to stricter social control with a ‘new punitiveness’ paradigm evidenced in increased prison population rates and harsher sentencing, and also in a more repressive political discourse (Garland, 2001; Snacken, 2010).

Our results suggest that the study of the various patterns associating social and punitive attitudes at the level of individual attitudes may provide important insights for the public legitimacy of emerging models of social order.

## REFERENCES

- Aldenderfer, M. S., & Blashfield, R. K. (1984). *Cluster analysis*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Barber, B. (1983). *The logic and limits of trust*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.
- Bauman, Z. (1999). *In search of politics*. Stanford University Press.
- Berry, J. W. (1997). Immigration, acculturation, and adaptation. *Applied Psychology: An International Review*, 46(1), 5–34. DOI:10.1111/j.1464-0597.1997.tb01087.x
- Bobo, L., & Hutchings, V. (1996). Perceptions of racial group competition: Extending Blumer's theory of group position to a multiracial social context. *American Sociological Review*, 61, 951–972. DOI:10.2307/2096302
- Bourdieu, P. (1979/1984). *Distinction: A social critique of the judgement of taste*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Braithwaite, V. (1994). Beyond Rokeach's equality-freedom model: Two-dimensional values in a one-dimensional world. *Journal of Social Issues*, 50, 67–94. DOI:10.1111/j.1540-4560.1994.tb01198.x
- Castel, R. (1995). *Les métamorphoses de la question sociale: Une chronique du salariat*. Paris: Fayard.
- Comrey, A. L., & Newmeyer, J. A. (1965). Measurement of radicalism-conservatism. *The Journal of Social Psychology*, 67(2), 357–369. DOI:10.1080/00224545.1965.9922287
- Converse, P. E. (1964). The nature of belief systems in mass publics. In D. E. Apter (Ed.), *Ideology and discontent* (pp. 206–226). New York: Free Press.
- Dallago, F., Cima, R., Roccato, M., Ricolfi, L., & Mirisola, A. (2008). The correlation between right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation: The moderating effects of political and religious identity. *Basic and Applied Social Psychology*, 30(4), 362–368. DOI:10.1080/01973530802502333
- De Cremer, D., Snyder, M., & Dewitte, S. (2001). 'The less I trust, the less I contribute (or not)?' The effects of trust, accountability and self-monitoring in social dilemmas. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 31(1), 93–107. DOI:10.1002/ejsp.34
- Doty, R. M., Peterson, B. E., & Winter, D. G. (1991). Threat and authoritarianism in the United States, 1978–1987. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 61, 629–640. DOI:10.1037/0022-3514.61.4.629
- Downs, A. (1957). *An economic theory of democracy*. New York: Harper and Row.
- Duckitt, J. (2001). A dual process cognitive-motivational theory of ideology and prejudice. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (pp. 41–113). San Diego, CA: Academic Press.
- Duckitt, J., & Fisher, K. (2003). The impact of social threat on worldview and ideological attitudes. *Political Psychology*, 24, 199–222. DOI:10.1111/0162-895X.00322
- Duriez, B., Van Hiel, A., & Kossowska, M. (2005). Authoritarianism and social dominance in Western and Eastern Europe: The importance of the sociopolitical context and of political interest and involvement. *Political Psychology*, 26(2), 299–320. DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9221.2005.00419.x
- Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). *The three worlds of welfare capitalism*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Everitt, B. S., Landau, S., Leese, M., & Stahl, D. (2011). *Cluster analysis* (Vol. 5th). Chichester: Wiley.
- Feldman, S., & Stenner, K. (1997). Perceived threat and authoritarianism. *Political Psychology*, 18, 741–770. DOI:10.1111/0162-895X.00077
- Fiske, S. T., Cuddy, A. J. C., Glick, P., & Xu, J. (2002). A model of (often mixed) stereotype content: Competence and warmth respectively follow from perceived status and competition. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 82(6), 878–902. DOI:10.1037/0022-3514.82.6.878
- Garland, D. (2001). *The culture of control: Crime and order in contemporary society*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.



- Gibbons, F. X., & Gerrard, M. (1991). Downward social comparison and coping with threat. In J. M. Suls, & T. A. Wills (Ed.), *Social comparison: Theory and research* (pp. 317–345). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
- Guimond, S., Dambrun, M., Michinov, N., & Duarte, S. (2003). Does social dominance generate prejudice? Integrating individual and contextual determinants of intergroup relations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84*, 697–721. DOI:10.1037/0022-3514.84.4.697
- Hammer, R., Widmer, E. D., & Robert, C.-N. (2009). Subjective proximity to crime or social representations? Explaining sentencing attitudes in Switzerland. *Social Justice Research, 22*, 351–368. DOI:10.1007/s11211-009-0094-3
- Hardin, R. (1995). *One for all*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Hughes, A. (1975). *Psychology and the political experience*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jackman, M. R. (1994). *The velvet glove: Paternalism and conflict in gender, class, and race relations*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Jackson, J. (2009). A psychological perspective on vulnerability in the fear of crime. *Psychology, Crime and Law, 15*, 365–390. DOI:10.1080/10683160802275797
- Jacoby, W. G. (1991). Ideological identification and issue attitudes. *American Journal of Political Science, 35*(1), 178–205. DOI:10.2307/2111443
- Kerlinger, F. N. (1984). *Liberalism and conservatism: The nature and structure of social attitudes*. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Kinder, D. R. (1998). Opinion and action in the realm of politics. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Ed.), *Handbook of social psychology* (pp. 778–867). New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lewin-Epstein, N., Kaplan, A., & Levanon, A. (2003). Distributive justice and attitudes toward the welfare state. *Social Justice Research, 16*, 1–27. DOI:10.1023/A:1022909726114
- Lipset, S. M. (1959). Democracy and working-class authoritarianism. *American Sociological Review, 24*, 482–501. DOI:10.2307/2089536
- Luhmann, N. (1979). *Trust and power*. New York: Wiley.
- Meier, R. F. (1982). Perspectives on the concept of social control. *Annual Review of Sociology, 8*, 35–55. DOI:10.2307/2945987
- Mirisola, A., Sibley, C. G., Boca, S., & Duckitt, J. (2007). On the ideological consistency between right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation. *Personality and Individual Differences, 43*(7), 1851–1862. DOI:10.1016/j.paid.2007.06.006
- Robinson, R. V., & Bell, W. (1978). Equality, success and social justice in England and the United States. *American Sociological Review, 43*, 125–143. DOI:10.2307/2094695
- Roccatò, M., & Ricolfi, L. (2005). On the correlation between right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation. *Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 27*(3), 187–200. DOI:10.1207/s15324834basps2703\_1
- Rokeach, M. (1973). *The nature of human values*. New York: The Free Press.
- Saucier, G. (2000). Isms and the structure of social attitudes. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 78*(2), 366–385. DOI:10.1037/0022-3514.78.2.366
- Scheidegger, R., & Staerklé, C. (2011). Political trust and distrust in Switzerland: A normative analysis. *Swiss Political Science Review, 17*, 164–187. DOI:10.1111/j.1662-6370.2011.02010.x
- Schmitt, M. T., Branscombe, N. R., & Kappen, D. M. (2003). Attitudes toward group-based inequality: Social dominance or social identity? *British Journal of Social Psychology, 42*, 161–186. DOI:10.1348/014466603322127166
- Schwartz, S. H. (1992). Universals in the content and structure of values: Theoretical advances and empirical tests in 20 countries. In M. Zanna (Ed.), *Advances in experimental social psychology* (pp. 1–65). New York: Academic Press.
- Schwartz, S. H. (2003). A proposal for measuring value orientations across nations. In *European Social Survey Core Questionnaire Development Report*.
- Sidanius, J., & Pratto, F. (1999). *Social dominance: An intergroup theory of social hierarchy and oppression*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Snacken, S. (2010). Resisting punitiveness in Europe? *Theoretical Criminology, 14*(3), 273–292. DOI:10.1177/1362480610370165
- Staerklé, C., Delay, C., Gianettoni, L., & Roux, P. (2007). *Qui a droit à quoi? Représentations et légitimation de l'ordre social [Who is entitled to what? Representations and legitimation of social order]*. Grenoble: Presses Universitaires de Grenoble.

- Staerklé, C., Likki, T., & Scheidegger, R. (2012). A normative approach to welfare attitudes. In S. Svallfors (Ed.), *Contested welfare states, welfare attitudes in Europe and beyond*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Svallfors, S. (Ed.) (2012). *Contested welfare states, welfare attitudes in Europe and beyond*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin, & S. Worchel (Eds.), *The social psychology of intergroup relations* (pp. 33–48). Monterey, CA: Brooks/Cole.
- Tan, P.-N., Steinbach, M., & Kumar, V. (2005). *Introduction to data mining*. Boston: Addison Wesley.
- Tonry, M. (2004). Why aren't German penal policies harsher and imprisonment rates higher? *German Law Journal*, 5, 1187–1206.
- Vieno, A., Roccato, M., & Russo, S. (2013). Is fear of crime mainly social and economic insecurity in disguise? A multilevel multinational analysis. *Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology* DOI:10.1002/casp.2150
- Wacquant, L. (2009). *Punishing the poor: The neoliberal government of social insecurity*. Durham: Duke University Press.
- Yamagishi, T., & Yamagishi, M. (1994). Trust and commitment in the United States and Japan. *Motivation and Emotion*, 18(2), 129–166. DOI:10.1007/BF02249397
- Young, J. (1999). *The exclusive society: Social exclusion, crime and difference in late modernity*. London: Sage.
- Zaller, J. R. (1992). *The nature and origins of mass opinion*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.