

No signs of check-list fatigue – Introducing the StOP? intra-operative briefing enhances the quality of an established pre-operative briefing in a pre-post intervention study

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15

16 **Abstract**

17 **Background** The team timeout (TTO) is a safety checklist to be performed by the surgical team prior
18 to incision. Exchange of critical information is, however, important not only before but also during
19 an operation and members of surgical teams frequently feel insufficiently informed by the operating
20 surgeon about the ongoing procedure.

21 To improve the exchange of critical information during surgery, the StOP?-protocol was developed:
22 At appropriate moments during the procedure, the leading surgeon briefly interrupts the operation
23 and informs the team about the current Status (St) and next steps / objectives (O) of the operation, as
24 well as possible Problems (P), and encourages questions of other team members (?).

25 The StOP?-protocol draws attention to the team. Anticipating the occurrence of StOP?-protocols may
26 support awareness of team processes and quality issues from the beginning and thus support other
27 interventions such as the TTO; however, it also may signal an additional demand and contribute to a
28 phenomenon akin to “checklist fatigue”. We investigated if, and how, the introduction of the StOP?-
29 protocol influenced TTO quality.

30 **Methods** This was a prospective intervention study employing a pre-post design. In the visceral
31 surgical departments of two university hospitals and one urban hospital the quality of 356 timeouts
32 (out of 371 included operation) was assessed by external observers before (154) and after (202) the
33 introduction of the StOP?-briefing. Timeout quality was rated in terms of timeout completeness
34 (number of checklist items mentioned) and timeout quality (engagement, pace, social atmosphere,
35 noise).

36 **Results** As compared to the baseline, after the implementation of the StOP?-protocol, observed
37 timeouts had higher completeness ratings ($F=8.69$, $p=0.003$) and were rated by observers as higher in
38 engagement ($F=13.48$, $p<0.001$), less rushed ($F=14.85$, $p<0.001$), in a better social atmosphere
39 ($F=5.83$, $p<0.016$) and less noisy ($F=5.35$, $p<0.022$).

40 **Conclusion** Aspects of TTO are affected by the anticipation of StOP?-protocols. However, rather
41 than harming the timeout goals by inducing “checklist fatigue”, it increases completeness and quality
42 of the team timeout.

43

44 **1 Introduction**

45 Besides technical and medical proficiency, teamwork and communication within surgical teams have
46 been identified as crucial factors that impact the surgical process and outcomes (Mazzocco et al.,
47 2009; Paterson-Brown et al., 2019; Sun et al., 2018). In operation rooms (OR), establishing good
48 teamwork is particularly challenging: During surgery, professionals with complementary roles must
49 collaborate. At the operating table, two or more surgeons have to cooperate very closely with each
50 other and with the scrub technician who provides instruments. Anesthesia providers ensure that the
51 patient remains under anesthesia and stable; they often work in parallel with the surgeons, sometimes
52 having to synchronize very closely with them. Circulators are responsible for taking and bringing
53 instruments to the operating table, while also performing administrative duties in parallel with the
54 operation. Because of the different tasks, roles, and perspectives of the team members during an
55 operation, maintaining a shared mental model and high situation awareness may be difficult (Afkari
56 et al., 2016; Graafland et al., 2015). Other challenges to good teamwork in the OR are the notoriously
57 high noise levels which may hamper communication (Keller et al., 2016; Leitsmann et al., 2021), low
58 team familiarity (Kurmann et al., 2014; Stucky et al., 2021) and strong hierarchies, which may
59 hamper psychological safety and diminish speaking up (Appelbaum et al., 2020).

60 Therefore, interventions have been introduced that aim at fostering better teamwork and
61 communication in the OR (McCulloch et al., 2017; Sun et al., 2018). The best known and nowadays
62 routinely followed intervention is the team-timeout which is part of the WHO surgical safety
63 checklists. The team timeout (TTO) is performed before the operative procedure starts. It has the
64 objective to ensure that OR team members are on the same page about the procedure to be performed
65 and contains checklist items to confirm important information (Haynes et al., 2009). In addition to
66 the team-timeout, other team-related interventions may be employed (McCulloch et al., 2017), such
67 as CRM training, (Sun et al., 2018), other checklists (Lyons & Popejoy, 2014), or the StOP?-protocol
68 intraoperative briefing (Tschan et al., 2022) used in the present study.

69 If multiple interventions are combined or an intervention is added to an existing practice, an
70 important question is whether interventions influence each other. Although there are indications that
71 different team-related interventions may be favorably combined (Buljac-Samardzic et al., 2010;
72 McCulloch et al., 2017) or positively influence one another (Okhuysen & Eisenhardt, 2002),
73 interferences between interventions may also be possible. An example is the tendency to become
74 complacent or even opposed to the use of multiple checklists or interventions, described as “checklist
75 fatigue” (Grigg, 2015).

76 However, it has rarely been investigated empirically if, and how, interventions influence each other
77 (Buljac-Samardzic et al., 2010). In this prospective observational study using a pre-post design, we
78 evaluate the impact of the introduction of an intraoperative briefing (the StOP?-protocol) on the
79 quality of an already existing briefing (the team-timeout) in surgical departments of three different
80 hospitals.

81 **1.1 The Team Timeout Checklist Intervention**

82 In 2008, the World Health Organization (WHO) recommended checklist-based team briefings as a
83 standard for surgical teams worldwide (Haynes et al., 2009). These briefings aim to reduce errors and
84 enhance communication and teamwork. One of the recommended briefings is the team timeout
85 (TTO), conducted at the time the patient is anesthetized and prepared, but just before incision. The
86 minimal standard of the TTO includes presentation of all team members, confirming patient identity,
87 surgical procedure, site of incision, and availability of critical images. Surgeons, anesthesia providers

88 and the nursing team inform about anticipated critical events, and the approximate surgery duration is
89 communicated.

90 In Switzerland, the TTO is not mandatory by law, but it has been adopted by most hospitals (Fridrich
91 et al., 2022; Mascherek et al., 2013); including in the three hospitals participating in this study.
92 Although the WHO suggests which aspects should be discussed during the TTO, it also recommends
93 that the procedure should be adapted for each hospital, indicating that differences between hospital
94 cultures may be important.

95 The surgical safety checklist (including the TTO) has been related to improved patient outcomes,
96 (Haugen et al., 2019), such as reduced negative events, morbidity, and mortality (Abbott et al., 2018;
97 Haynes et al., 2017; Lyons & Popejoy, 2014), and improved team outcomes, including better
98 coordination and communication (Kearns et al., 2011; Molina et al., 2016). Note that not all studies
99 found positive effects (Reames et al., 2015; Urbach et al., 2014).

100 However, the effectiveness of the TTO depend on its correct use and quality (van Klei et al., 2012).
101 Studies reported low adherence rate and a reluctant adoption of the procedure, particularly for
102 surgeons (Hurlbert & Garrett, 2009), incomplete TTO execution (Fridrich et al., 2022; van Klei et al.,
103 2012), and inattentiveness during the TTO (Biffl et al., 2015). These are not harmless omissions: If
104 boxes are ticked without paying attention, the risk of error detection failures increases (Cullati et al.,
105 2013), and a false sense of security may develop (S. J. Russ et al., 2015). Thus, active participation
106 and commitment by all team members is crucial (Hicks et al., 2014) and team members should not
107 engage in other tasks during the TTO (Vogts et al., 2011). Furthermore, TTO may create a sense of
108 time pressure. Although a typical TTO takes less than two minutes, some feel that it is taking too
109 long, and start to rush. This may result in omitting information (Conley et al., 2011; Vats et al., 2010)
110 and create a sense of urgency that may induce tensions. A tense atmosphere during the TTO has been
111 found to lead to dismissive communication later on (Vats et al., 2010) and to impair collaboration
112 throughout the surgery (Cullati et al., 2013; Whyte et al., 2008).

113 The importance of completeness and quality of the TTO points to the need to avoid additional
114 burdens that may threaten the quality of the TTO. It is thus important to consider if the StOP?-
115 protocol as an additional intervention influences the quality of the TTO.

116 **1.2 The StOP? – Intervention**

117 The TTO focuses on exchanging information to prevents omissions and errors, but it cannot cover all
118 necessary information for the whole operation. More specifically, it cannot deal with specific
119 developments that require adapted actions. Indeed, one of the main complaints of surgical team
120 members is feeling under-informed *during* the operation due to the lack of regular updates from
121 surgeons regarding the progress, specific strategic approaches and, intraoperative strategy changes
122 (Wauben et al., 2011). Such task-related information exchange during the operation is important
123 during surgeries, as more information exchange (Mazzocco et al., 2009) and particularly more case-
124 relevant communication have been associated with better patient outcomes (Tschan et al., 2015).

125 Surgeons are not simply unwilling to share information during the operation with the team.
126 Performing surgery demands high concentration, particularly on manual aspects of the task, and
127 surgeries can be quite stressful for the surgeon (Yamaguchi et al., 2011). Both aspects can impair
128 communication, and high concentration requirements on manual tasks may prevent the surgeon from
129 focusing on the team's information needs, which requires a change in attentional focus. Focusing on
130 the team constitutes a task in its own right (Fernandez et al., 2008). Stress can lead to team members

131 losing the team perspective (Driskell et al., 1999). If surgeons do communicate as they go, but
132 without a clear shift in attention, their communication may not be properly perceived by team
133 members remote from the table.

134 To facilitate intraoperative information flow and regular updates, particularly from the surgeons to
135 the team, we developed the StOP?-protocol. This protocol, led by the responsible surgeon, is an
136 intraoperative briefing aimed at exchanging task- and cooperation-related information (Keller et al.,
137 2022; Tschan et al., 2022). During the operation, the surgeon informs the team about the progress of
138 the operation (**St** = status of the surgery), upcoming steps and goals (**O** = objectives), anticipated
139 difficulties (**P** = problems), and encourages team members to ask questions and share observations (**?**
140 = Questions or remarks). Information about status, objectives and potential problems aim at updating
141 the team, asking for active participation aims at encouraging equal information exchange and
142 speaking up (Edmondson, 2003). The structure of the StOP?-intervention is similar to other briefing
143 interventions (Makary et al., 2006; Marks et al., 2000), except that it occurs during the operation at
144 natural breakpoints between subtasks. Between subtasks, concentration requirements for specific
145 aspects of the task are temporally reduced, and it is easier to switch attention to the team level.
146 Multiple StOP?-briefings can be conducted during an operation; surgeons announce when they intend
147 conducting a StOP?-briefing for a specific operation at the end of the TTO.

148 Research has shown that introducing the StOP?-protocol has positive effects on patient outcomes; it
149 is related to a reduced mortality rate, fewer unplanned reoperations and fewer prolonged hospital
150 stays (Tschan et al., 2022).

151 **1.3 Can one team-intervention influence another?**

152 Numerous patient safety interventions have been implemented in surgery over the years, often as a
153 combination of interventions (McCulloch et al., 2017; Storesund et al., 2020).

154 Both inhibiting and enhancing influences or interferences between different interventions seem
155 possible. For example, adding several checklists may lead to a sense of overregulation (Grigg, 2015)
156 and loss of autonomy and even the feeling of infantilization, particularly if checklists are not
157 perceived as well-suited to specific procedures (Dekker, 2018; Grigg, 2015). If checklists multiply,
158 they may be perceived as a hindrance to timely and efficient work (Hales & Pronovost, 2006). If
159 interventions target similar outcomes (as for the TTO and StOP?), people may perceive redundancy
160 (Fourcade et al., 2012). This can create a negative attitude, and medical professionals may develop
161 “checklist fatigue” (Grigg, 2015; Hales & Pronovost, 2006). This may lead to disengagement and
162 reduced adherence (Stock & Sundt, 2015). It is thus possible that anticipating the StOP?-briefing
163 induces aversion and reduces TTO quality.

164 However, interventions may also positively influence each other. The StOP?-protocol, for instance,
165 builds on and complements the information provided by the TTO during the operation. This may
166 render the information communicated during the TTO more meaningful and useful for the team.
167 Another type of enhancement may be that the introduction of the StOP?-protocol draws attention to
168 team cooperation. In a laboratory setting, Okhuysen and Eisenhardt (2002) explored how simple
169 interventions to foster cooperation improved knowledge integration in groups. One interesting
170 finding of their study was that each of three different interventions not only increased the specifically
171 instructed behavior but spilled over to increase the use of cooperative strategies that were not
172 explicitly instructed. The authors concluded that even simple interventions influence cooperation, as
173 they direct the attention to the team-level and create “windows of opportunity” to switch attention
174 from the task to the team level improving cooperative strategies. Indeed, one study found that

175 teamwork interventions (as compared to system interventions) improved TTO checklist performance
176 (McCulloch et al., 2017). Thus, the introduction of the StOP?-protocol may constitute such a window
177 of opportunity, direct attention to the team process, and thus improve TTO quality. Finally, the
178 introduction of single or combined interventions has been shown to positively influence safety
179 attitudes and the safety climate, which may in turn improve the quality of safety measures (Haynes et
180 al., 2011).

181 **1.4 Research Questions**

182 Because both negative and positive effects of the introduction of a new briefing on an existing
183 intervention are plausible, we do not formulate directed research questions.

184 The first research question thus was to compare the completeness and the quality of the TTO, as
185 assessed by trained observers, before and after the StOP?-protocol was introduced, to assess potential
186 effects of the additional intervention on the TTO.

187 A secondary research question was to evaluate differences between participating hospitals in
188 completeness and quality of TTO as well as in the effect of the StOP? intervention on the TTO.

189

190 2 Methods

191 2.1 Sample

192 The study was conducted in the general surgery departments of two large Swiss University Hospitals
193 and in the general and vascular department of a middle-sized urban hospital. These hospitals agreed
194 to participate in a larger study that aimed to investigate the effects of the StOP?-protocol on patient
195 outcomes, using a before-after design and comparing a nine-month baseline with nine-month
196 intervention period (Tschan et al., 2022).

197 For this smaller observational study, we strove to assess a mix of elective surgeries from the larger
198 study that was typical for each hospital. Criteria to include operations during the nine-month baseline
199 period were elective general or vascular surgeries with an expected duration of more than one hour,
200 and observers had to be available. Exclusion criteria were a preexisting surgical site infection (e.g.,
201 re-operation after the patient suffered an infection) or another surgery at the same site within the last
202 30 days. During the intervention period, case-mix and observer availability were once again limiting
203 factors, but we aimed to match the proportion of the different types of surgery observed during the
204 baseline period. In total, 371 operations were observed; and a TTO was performed in 366 of these
205 operations (98.7%). The sample size was determined by the eligibility criteria, and we did not
206 conduct a post-hoc power analysis in accordance with current recommendations (Dziak et al., 2020).
207 The characteristics of the operations are reported in the result section. Due to the typically unstable
208 composition of surgical teams, which can change even within an operation (Stucky & De Jong,
209 2021); and to assure confidentiality, we did not collect data on specific team members. All analyses
210 are on the team level.

211 2.2 Measures

212 2.2.1 Characteristics of operations

213 Operations performed were coded into eleven different categories as (1) Upper gastrointestinal (GI)
214 tract (e.g. small bowel) (2) Lower GI tract (e.g. hemicolectomy), (3) Liver (e.g. liver resection). (4)
215 Pancreas (e.g. Whipple procedure), (5) Hernia (e.g. inguinal hernia), (6) cholecystectomy, (7) Gastric
216 bypass/sleeve, (8) Kidney transplants, (9) Thoracoscopy (e.g. wedge resection), (10) vascular surgery
217 (e.g. vascular bypass), and (11) other procedures. Data for patient age and gender were collected for
218 each operation.

219 2.2.2 Intervention, Context

220 It was coded whether the operation took place during the baseline or during the intervention period
221 (0,1). To account for organizational differences, it was coded in which of the three hospitals (A, B,
222 C) the intervention took place, using a dummy code.

223 2.2.3 Team timeout completeness

224 The goal of the TTO is to assure that all mandatory checklist items are checked before incision. Team
225 timeout completeness (i.e. discussing each item on the list) therefore is an important quality measure
226 (Cullati et al., 2013; Fridrich et al., 2022; Pickering et al., 2013). TTO completeness indicates
227 whether the items on the checklist are referred to. However, hospitals are encouraged to adapt the
228 TTO checklist to their specific circumstances and needs (Weiser et al., 2010); therefore, the number
229 of items on the checklist, the number of mandatory items to discuss, as well as the specific way of
230 performing the TTO differed across hospitals. In Hospital A, the TTO had eleven items, all of them
231 mandatory. The TTO was initiated and led by the circulating nurse who read out aloud each of the

232 items. Responses were provided by the person responsible for the respective information (e.g., the
233 anesthesiologist for allergies, the surgeon for potential blood loss, the scrub nurse for instruments). In
234 Hospitals B and C, the TTO was initiated by the responsible surgeon and predominantly entailed
235 communication between the surgeon and anesthesiology providers. The TTO checklist of Hospital B
236 had six items, two were mandatory (patient identity and planned procedure); the TTO of Hospital C
237 had six items, three of them mandatory (patient identity, planned procedure, prophylactic antibiotics).
238 In hospital B and C, the non-mandatory items were only mentioned if considered relevant by the
239 surgeon or anesthesiologists. To assure comparability across hospitals, TTO completeness was calculated
240 as proportion of mandatory items communicated for each hospital. TTO completeness for Hospital A
241 was the proportion of the eleven mandatory items discussed. For Hospital B and C, we calculated two
242 completeness scores; one related to the mandatory items (B: 0, 0.5 or 1; C: 0, 0.33, 0.66 or 1), and
243 one expressed as proportion of all six items on the list (all items). If the communication during the
244 TTO was not audible enough to determine if an item was mentioned or not, the data was coded as
245 missing; scores were only calculated if there was data for every item. None of the hospitals had
246 established a formal sign-out procedure.

247 **2.2.4 Team timeout quality**

248 The TTO quality was assessed by trained observers (work psychologists) using an adapted version of
249 known TTO quality measures (Fourcade et al., 2012; Levy et al., 2012; Pickering et al., 2013; S.
250 Russ et al., 2015; Vogts et al., 2011). In addition to contextual aspects of the TTO (e.g., who was
251 present, who initiated it), which are not reported here, four components of TTO quality were
252 assessed: **Engagement** during TTO was assessed using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from *not*
253 *committed* (1) to *committed* (5); **Pace** of the TTO was assessed using a 5-point Likert scale ranging
254 from *rushed* (1) to *calm* (5); **Social climate** was assessed using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from
255 *irritated* (1) to *serene* (5); **Noisy conditions** was assessed using a 5-point Likert scale ranging from
256 *no noise* (1) to *very noisy* (5). The scales provided explicit categories for the extremes, and observers
257 were instructed to indicate the level of agreement based on the numerical values assigned to each
258 option. After reversing the noise item, the quality components were combined into a quality index,
259 which demonstrated good internal consistency (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.697$). About 9% (N=33) of the
260 observed TTO were assessed independently by two observers, and intra class correlation (ICC) was
261 calculated to assess inter-observer agreement, yielding good results (engagement: ICC=0.741; pace:
262 ICC=0.818; social climate: ICC=0.749; noise: ICC=0.854).

263 **2.3 Study design**

264 This was a prospective intervention study employing a pre-post design. The implementation
265 consisted of the introduction of the StOP?-protocol described in the introduction. During the baseline
266 period, the surgical team did not get any instruction related to their behavior or communication. To
267 prepare the intervention, surgeons were individually trained on how and when to perform the StOP?-
268 protocol. Scrub technicians and circulators as well as anesthesia providers were also informed about
269 the StOP?-protocol.

270 Observer-based assessment of TTO completeness and quality during the baseline period (9 months)
271 before the implementation of the StOP?-protocol was compared with observations during the
272 intervention period. All TTO were observed in vivo by observers present in the OR. Surgical team
273 members were aware of the presence of observers, but neither the members of the surgical team nor
274 the members of the observational team were aware of the specific research question.

275 The study was conducted in accordance with the principles outlined in the Helsinki protocol for
276 human subject research and was approved by the ethics committees (leading committee #161/2014).
277 Consent from the team members to be observed was based on an opt-out procedure; teams were
278 asked for permission to be observed before the operation, and each member of the team could at any
279 moment before and during the process ask the observers to leave. Patient consent for two hospitals
280 was based on general consent; in one hospital, the local ethical committee also approved inclusion of
281 operations for patients who did not refuse the use of their data.

282 **2.4 Statistics**

283 Descriptive statistics are reported as means and standard deviations, or counts and percentages for
284 categorical variables. To compare TTO quality before and after the intervention across the hospitals,
285 we conducted 2x3 factorial ANOVA's, with the StOP?-intervention (before, after) and the hospital
286 (Hospital A, Hospital B, Hospital C) as fixed factors. Pairwise comparisons (before and after the
287 intervention and between the hospitals) were assessed based on estimated marginal means and were
288 Bonferroni adjusted; differences between hospitals in the rate of change were assessed by an
289 intervention x hospital interaction effect; effect sizes are partial eta squared. Interobserver reliability
290 was assessed by intraclass correlation (ICC). P less than 0.05 was considered statistically significant.
291 We used SPSS 28 for all analyses (IBM, 2021).

292

293

294 **3 Results**

295 **3.1 Characteristics of operations**

296 A total of 371 operations were observed. Table 1 shows the mix of operations observed during the
297 baseline and intervention period for each hospital. Comparing the proportion of surgery types
298 observed before and after the intervention yielded no significant differences, indicating successful
299 matching.

300 **3.2 Team timeout completeness**

301 In 356 of the 366 operations with observed TTO, completeness of the time-out procedure could be
302 assessed. Descriptive statistics and ANOVA results of TTO completeness are displayed in Table 2.
303 Our analysis focuses on the mandatory items of the checklist; for results concerning all items (which
304 were very similar), see supplementary material TABLE S1. Analyses showed a positive effect of the
305 StOP? intervention on TTO completeness (TABLE 2, line “Intervention”). Regarding hospitals, TTO
306 completeness was significantly higher in Hospital A than in Hospitals B and C. Completeness was
307 somewhat higher in Hospital B as compared to Hospital C, but that difference was not significant.
308 These results indicate that the introduction of the StOP?-protocol did have positive effects on the
309 completeness of the TTO. There was no significant interaction effect (intervention x hospital).

310 **3.3 Team timeout quality**

311 Descriptive statistics and ANOVA results for the TTO quality index and for each of the components
312 of the quality index are displayed in TABLES 3 and 4. Analyses show a significant positive relation
313 between the StOP? intervention and the TTO quality index (TABLE 3, line “Intervention”), but also
314 for each component separately (TABLE 4, line “Intervention”, indicating that engagement, pace, and
315 social climate during the TTO improved during the StOP? intervention, whereas noise during TTO
316 decreased. Regarding the secondary research question, the analyses showed that TTO quality in
317 Hospital A was significantly higher than in Hospital B before, but also during the intervention, both
318 for the quality index and for the quality components (line “between hospitals” in TABLES 3 and 4).
319 For Hospital C, the intervention had no significant effects on the quality index nor on the components
320 engagement, pace and noise, and the component social climate in Hospital C was actually
321 significantly lower after the intervention; the interaction hospital x intervention was significant for
322 the quality index and the components engagement, social climate, and noise, but not for pace of the
323 TTO, indicating that the intervention had differential effects in different hospitals.

324

325 **4 Discussion**

326 **5 Discussion**

327 The introduction of the StOP?-protocol in surgical wards was associated with the improvement in the
328 quality of the TTO. These improvements encompassed completeness, engagement, pace, social
329 climate, and noise conditions. Thus, the additional briefing did not have a negative effect on the
330 already established briefing; rather, the intervention was related to a better TTO quality. Even in the
331 hospital where the TTO did not improve following the intervention, only one component, social
332 climate, declined significantly; the other components, did not change significantly.

333 These results are consistent with the findings by Okhuysen and Eisenhardt (2002) in a different field,
334 as well as with previous research investigating the effects of team training interventions on TTO
335 quality (McCulloch et al., 2017). One possible explanation for this effect is that an additional briefing
336 opens the opportunity for teams to focus their attention on the team level. This may positively
337 influence cooperative behavior beyond the specific target of the intervention. The effect could be due
338 to momentary effects, whereby the anticipation of the StOP?-briefing enhances the overall attention
339 of the team. However, it could also be a more general effect, resulting from the information and
340 training provided for the StOP? intervention, as well as the regular refresher training. These activities
341 may have served as reminders to team members about the importance of information exchange and
342 collaboration in the OR.

343 There were marked differences in TTO quality between the hospitals, as well as some significant
344 interaction effects, indicating differences in the impact of the intervention across hospitals. Notably,
345 although there was an overall positive association between the StOP?-protocol and TTO quality,
346 introducing the StOP?-protocol did not influence the quality of the TTO index or its components
347 engagement, pace, and noise conditions in Hospital C. This lack of impact may be due to a ceiling
348 effect, as the values in Hospital C were already close to the scale maximum before the intervention
349 and were higher compared to the other hospitals, leaving limited room for improvement. However,
350 the social climate during the TTO in Hospital C was significantly lower after the introduction of the
351 StOP?. Again, this outcome may be explained by a ceiling effect or a regression towards the mean
352 effect. Note that the social climate score before intervention was 4.7 (on a scale from 1 to 5) which
353 decreased to 4.44 after the intervention. Social climate was markedly higher in Hospital C than in the
354 other hospitals before the intervention but was similar and still high after the intervention.
355 Nevertheless, alternative explanations cannot be ruled out.

356 When comparing hospitals, the overall TTO quality in Hospital B was lower than in Hospital A, both
357 before and after the introduction of the StOP?-protocol. In general, hospital effects were larger than
358 the effects of the intervention, as indicated by the partial eta squared measure. This finding confirms
359 the presence of cultural differences between hospitals, a well-established fact (Körner et al., 2015;
360 Sexton et al., 2006).

361 There was concern regarding the potential of negative effects of the StOP-protocol on the TTO,
362 because it could lead to perceived redundancy and checklist fatigue (Grigg, 2015; Hales &
363 Pronovost, 2006). In healthcare, some level of redundancy is generally favored as it enhances safety
364 by reducing the risk of errors with multiple checks by different persons (Sivathanan et al., 2010).
365 However, too much redundancy can also lead people to skip information checking, as they feel the
366 information was already checked enough (Fourcade et al., 2012; Papaconstantinou et al., 2013). That
367 the StOP?-intervention evidently did not lead to perceived inappropriate redundancy during the TTO

368 and did not negatively impact the TTO quality suggests that the addition of a single briefing was not
369 enough to induce a sense of overload. Moreover, note that the StOP?-protocol addresses other kinds
370 of information than the TTO. Therefore, it may not be perceived as “just another checklist”, but
371 rather as the exchange of task- and cooperation-relevant information pertaining to the procedure and
372 to strategic changes. This argument is supported by the positive effects of the StOP?-protocol on
373 patient outcomes (Tschan et al., 2022), and team outcomes, such as perceived collaboration quality,
374 situation awareness, and ease of speaking up (Tschan et al., submitted). Additionally, the StOP?
375 protocol is not time-consuming to perform and easy to follow, and it facilitates communication
376 among the members of the team.

377 This study has several limitations. Firstly, the sample size is relatively low, as only surgeries could be
378 included for which observers were available which may also limit the representativeness of the
379 surgeries performed. In addition, all participating surgical departments are located in midsize and
380 large hospitals and predominantly specialize in general (visceral) and vascular surgery, thus limiting
381 the generalizability of the findings to other surgical specialties and smaller settings.
382 Another limitation is that random assignment was not feasible for this intervention, so a pre-post
383 design had to be employed. Furthermore, participants and observers were aware of the intervention,
384 as this could not be blinded. However, neither the surgical teams nor the observers were aware of the
385 specific research question investigated in this paper, mitigating some potential biases.

386 Also, we cannot entirely exclude the possibility that an item was not registered despite being
387 mentioned in the TTO because the observer simply did not hear (or understand) it. But even if we
388 account for this possibility, the increased TTO completeness remains noteworthy. Furthermore, the
389 TTO should be executed loud enough to be audible for the whole OR, even for someone at the other
390 side of the room. Lastly, like in any observational study, there is the limitation that other unmeasured
391 factors or variables could have influenced the results.

392 This study has practical implications, demonstrating that the already established TTO procedure
393 benefited from another briefing intervention overall in two out of the three hospitals. In addition,
394 even in the hospital that did not show improvement, results did not indicate an effect akin to
395 “checklist fatigue” or a negative impact on the TTO. While the TTO has been recognized for its
396 positive effects on team collaboration (Lingard et al., 2008), its scope and purpose are limited. This
397 study demonstrates that an additional intervention fostering information exchange during the
398 operation can be beneficial and even improve the quality of an already established briefing. However,
399 it is crucial to note that the effectiveness of each additional intervention cannot be assumed and needs
400 to be investigated individually.

401

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624

625 **7 Conflict of Interest**

626 *The authors declare that the research was conducted in the absence of any commercial or financial*
627 *relationships that could be construed as a potential conflict of interest.*

628 **8 Author Contributions**

629 Study conception ET, FT, SK, NK, GB, DC, ND, MW
630 Data collection (including conceptual aspects): ET, JZ, SAH
631 Data analysis ET, FT
632 Substantial contributions to manuscript ET, FT, SK, NKS, JZ, MH, MW, DC, ND, GB
633 All authors approve of the manuscript

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644 **11 Data Availability Statement**

645 The raw data are available upon request from the corresponding author to researchers eligible to work
646 with codified personal health care data under Swiss legislation. Eligibility will be determined by
647 Kantonale Ethikkommission Bern when needed. Requests to access the datasets should be directed
648 to guido.beldi@insel.ch.

649

650 12 Tables

651 TABLE 1: Operations observed during baseline and Intervention per hospital

		Hospital A		Hospital B		Hospital C	
		Baseline	Intervention	Baseline	Intervention	Baseline	Intervention
N		76	75	43	77	46	54
Patient Age		58.41	58.55	56.02	62.32	64.66	61.58
Sex	Male (56.6%)	43	49	25	41	25	27
	Female (43.4%)	33	26	18	36	21	27
Type of surgery							
	Upper GI tract	7	8	4	7	2	2
	Lower GI tract	11	12	9	16	5	11
	Liver	16	13	7	11	1	2
	Pancreas	16	14	7	10	3	3
	Hernia	4	4	1	7	12	11
	Cholecystectomy	4	4	4	12	7	8
	Gastric bypass/sleeve	6	5	6	6	4	4
	Kidney transplants	8	8		1		
	Thoracoscopic					5	6
	Vascular surgery					4	6
	Other	4	7	5	7	3	1
Chi2			1.46 (df=8, p=.99)		4.78 (df=8, p=.78)		3.57 (df=9, p=.94)

652 Note: Chi2 statistics refer to the difference between surgical type during baseline and intervention period, per hospital.

653 TABLE 2: Timeout Completeness before and after the StOP?-Intervention and between hospitals:
 654 Mandatory items

655

Completeness TTO (mandatory items)											
	Total		Baseline		Intervention						
	N	M(SD)	N	M(SD)	N	M(SD)	Difference** intervention – baseline (SE)	95% CI for difference	F	P	Partial eta squared
Model									6.75	<.001	
Interven- tion	356	0.95(0.14)	154	0.94(0.16)	202	0.97(0.12)	0.05(0.02)	0.002 to 0.08	8.69	0.003	0.024
Hospital A	149	0.99(0.04)	76	0.99(0.51)	73	1.00(0.10)					
Hospital B	116	0.94(0.20)	39	0.91(0.25)	77	0.96(0.16)					
Hospital C	91	0.90(0.16)	39	0.86(0.17)	52	0.94(0.15)					
Between Hospitals							Difference** between Hospitals	95% CI for difference	F	P	
Hospital A - B							0.06(0.02)	0.02 to 0.1			
Hospital A - C							0.09(0.02)	0.05 to 0.14			
Hospital B - C							0.04(0.02)	-0.01 to 0.08			
Intervention x Hospital									1.47	0.232	0.008

656 * Completeness scores are shown as proportions

657 ** Based on estimated marginal means;

658

659 TABLE 3. Quality Index TTO before and after the StOP?-intervention and between Hospitals

660

Quality index TTO*											
	Total		Baseline		Intervention		Difference** intervention – baseline (SE)	95% CI for difference	F	P	Partial eta squared
	N	M(SD)	N	M(SD)	N	M(SD)					
Model									31.87	<0.001	
Interven- tion	366	4.03(.72)	162	3.90(.75)	204	4.12(.68)	0.30(0.07)	0.17 to 0.43	21.53	<0.001	0.056
Hospital A	149	4.25(0.59)	76	4.08(0.59)	73	4.43(0.54)					
Hospital B	118	3.53(0.77)	41	3.13(0.68)	77	3.53(0.76)					
Hospital C	99	4.28(0.49)	45	4.31(0.54)	54	4.26(0.45)					
Between Hospitals							Difference** between Hospitals	95% CI for difference	F	P	
Hospital A - B							0.82(0.08)	0.64 to 1.01			
Hospital A - C							-0.03(0.08)	-0.22 to 0.16			
Hospital B - C							-0.85(0.08)	-1.05 to -0.65			
Intervention x Hospital									7.47	0.001	0.040

661 * The quality index is the mean of engagement, pace, social atmosphere and (reversed) noise, range from 1 to 5

662 ** Based on estimated marginal means.

663

664 TABLE 4. Quality of TTO for the quality components engagement, pace, social climate and noise
 665 before and after the StOP?-intervention and between Hospitals

Engagement during TTO											
	Total		Baseline		Intervention		Difference* intervention – baseline (SE)	95% CI for difference	F	P	Partial eta squared
	N	M(SD)	N	M(SD)	N	M(SD)					
Model									17.22	<0.001	
Interven- tion	366	3.93(0.97)	162	3.78 (1.01)	204	4.04 (0.93)	0.35 (0.10)	0.16-0.54	13.48	<0.001	0.036
Hospital A	149	4.14(0.74)	76	3.95 (0.73)	73	4.34 (0.63)					
Hospital B	118	3.39(1.15)	41	3.00 (1.18)	77	3.60 (1.08)					
Hospital C	99	4.25 (0.79)	45	4.22 (0.88)	54	4.28 (0.71)					
Between Hospitals							Difference* between Hospitals	95% CI for difference	F	P	
Hospital A - B							0.85(0.11)	0.58 to 1.12			
Hospital A - C							-0.11(0.12)	-0.38 to 0.17			
Hospital B - C							-0.95 (0.12)	-1.25 to -0.66			
Intervention x Hospital									2.47	0.09	0.014

Pace of TTO											
	Total		Baseline		Intervention		Difference* intervention – baseline (SE)	95% CI for difference	F	P	Partial eta squared
	N	M(SD)	N	M(SD)	N	M(SD)					
Model									8.93	<0.001	
Interven- tion	366	3.84(1.12)	162	3.64(1.18)	204	4.00(1.05)	0.44(0.12)	0.22 to 0.67	14.85	<0.001	0.040
Hospital A	149	4.07(1.01)	76	3.87(1.06)	73	4.29(0.92)					
Hospital B	118	3.43(1.14)	41	2.98(1.17)	77	3.68(1.15)					
Hospital C	99	3.98(1.04)	45	3.87(1.16)	54	4.07(.93)					
Between Hospitals							Difference* between Hospitals	95% CI for difference	F	P	
Hospital A - B							0.75(0.14)	0.43 to 1.08			
Hospital A - C							0.11(0.14)	-0.23 to 0.44			
Hospital B - C							-0.65(0.15)	-1.00 to -0.29			
Intervention x Hospital									1.39	0.25	0.008

666 cont on next page

667 TABLE 4 - cont.

Social climate TTO											
	Total		Baseline		Intervention						
	N	M(SD)	N	M(SD)	N	M(SD)	Difference* intervention – baseline (SE)	95% CI for difference	F	P	Partial eta squared
Model									9.03	<0.001	
Interven- tion	366	4.31(0.80)	162	4.22(0.82)	204	4.40(0.77)	.20(0.08)	0.04 to 0.36	5.83	.016	0.016
Hospital A	149	4.35(0.80)	76	4.21(0.81)	73	4.49(0.77)					
Hospital B	118	4.07(0.88)	41	4.03(0.84)	77	4.37(0.82)					
Hospital C	99	4.60(0.58)	45	4.70(0.51)	54	4.44(0.60)					
							Difference* between Hospitals	95% CI for difference	F	P	0.081
Between Hospitals									15.88	<0.001	
Hospital A - B							0.37(0.10)	0.14 to 0.60			
Hospital A - C							-0.22(0.10)	-0.45 to 0.02			
Hospital B - C							-0.58(0.11)	-0.84 to -0.33			
Intervention x Hospital									7.37	.001	0.039
Noise** during TTO											
	Total		Baseline		Intervention						
	N	M(SD)	N	M(SD)	N	M(SD)	Difference* intervention – baseline (SE)	95% CI for difference	F	P	Partial eta squared
Model									32.47	<0.001	
Interven- tion	366	1.98(1.10)	162	2.03(1.08)	204	1.95(1.03)	-0.22(0.10)	-0.41 to -0.03	5.32	.022	0.015
Hospital A	149	1.56(0.78)	76	1.71(0.88)	73	1.40(0.64)					
Hospital B	118	2.79(1.11)	41	3.15(0.99)	77	2.60(1.13)					
Hospital C	99	1.67(0.77)	45	1.56(0.73)	54	1.76(0.80)					
							Difference* between Hospitals	95% CI for difference	F	P	
Between Hospitals									78.75	<0.001	0.304
Hospital A - B							-1.32(0.11)	-1.59 to -1.05			
Hospital A - C							-0.10(0.12)	-0.38 to 0.17			
Hospital B - C							1.21(0.12)	0.92 to 1.51			
Intervention x Hospital									4.88	.008	0.026

668 * Based on estimated marginal means;
669 **less noise indicates better quality