The Climatization of Global Politics

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ORIGINAL ARTICLE

The climatization of global politics: introduction to the special issue

Stefan C. Aykut[1] · **Lucile Maertens**[2]

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Abstract

Climate change now constitutes a major issue in world politics, intersecting with and shaping many other political domains, and wider patterns of social and economic life. Global climate governance is also no longer restricted to multilateral negotiations under the UN Climate Convention: it increasingly extends beyond the international climate regime to *climatize* other areas of global politics. This concept of climatization points to a powerful but uneven process of extension, translation, and social coordination, as climate change becomes the frame of reference through which other policy issues and forms of global activism are mediated and hierarchized. This special issue brings together contributions on both theoretical aspects and empirical cases of the climatization process. The introduction sets out a conceptual framework to systematize these observations and guide further research. First, we identify the preconditions for, and driving forces behind, climatization. We then sketch the contours of an emergent 'climate logic' that reshapes affected domains, and examine the wider implications of climatization for global politics. Beyond the climate case, we hope this will provide new ways to observe and understand contemporary transformations of global society and global governance.

Keywords Global climate governance · Paris agreement · Climatization · Securitization

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Introduction

Climate change now constitutes a major issue in world politics, intersecting with and shaping many other political domains, and profoundly affecting wider patterns of social and economic life (Dalby 2016; Vogler 2016). Consequently, global climate governance has become the focal point for a wide array of debates and conflicts around issues from development and global equity to energy policy, urban planning, security and migration. The annual conferences of the parties (COPs) held under the auspices of the United Nations climate convention (UNFCCC) are thus not only key moments in global climate politics, but also events of wider geopolitical significance. They attract ever more public attention and an increasingly diverse set of actors, while creating political momentum for climate-related issues beyond the climate arena (Kolleck et al. 2017). Climate governance actors and mechanisms thereby extend their sphere of influence by 'climatizing' other domains of global politics (Aykut et al. 2017).

The concept of *climatization* points to a powerful yet uneven social process in which climate change is increasingly becoming the frame of reference for the mediation and hierarchization of other global issues. This does not only, or even primarily, result from legal dispositions in climate treaties or formalized linkages between international organizations (van Asselt et al. 2005). Instead, it is often brought about by the work of a myriad of actors and organizations engaging in climate-related activism, building transnational networks, or refracting their issues and objects through a climate lens. These actors may enter the climate arena to lobby for the inclusion of their concerns in climate talks, or to gain access to the symbolic and economic capital associated with the climate regime. They may be driven to include climate concerns in their traditional mandate by political and normative convictions, or on pragmatic or strategic grounds. To encompass this wide array of situations and motives, we define climatization broadly as the process through which an issue, actor or institution is framed as related to anthropogenic climate change and relevant to climate politics. More specifically, this frequently leads to the extension of the jurisdiction of climate governance institutions, the inclusion of the climatized issues, actors or institutions in climate policy networks, and their treatment according to the dominant logics of the international climate regime.[1]

This special issue examines the process through which climate change is transforming global governance, as both an increasingly central issue on the international stage and an increasingly structured policy domain with its specific modes of governing, networks of actors, discourses, and knowledge practices. Collectively, the contributions aim to assess how and why climate change is becoming a dominant frame in international politics. In doing so, they also contribute to understanding the dynamics and drivers of climatization. Speaking to climate governance scholars and researchers in other areas of global politics, it addresses what, in our view, are two major blind spots in the literature. First, existing work on global climate governance

[1] This can be conceptualized as a sectorial expansion or 'globalization' of the climate problem (Foyer et al. 2017: 5).

has argued that a central objective of this governance since the adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015 has been to 'facilitate' (Hale 2016) global climate action and 'orchestrate' (Abbott 2018) a wider 'polycentric' landscape of transnational governance initiatives (Jordan et al. 2018). However, this literature ultimately has little to say on exactly how, where, and why such functionalist desiderata of social coordination might actually manifest in practice.[2] What social logics and mechanisms are involved? We believe that a focus on climatization *as a social process* can provide important insights here, by offering a perspective on decentralized coordination around the climate problem that complements functionalist accounts. Second, an important body of work has examined the political agenda-setting processes through which climate change became a politically relevant topic, and the framing contests in its construction as a (global) public problem (Hajer 1995; Trumbo 1996; Pettenger 2007). Scholars have assessed the role of wider political dynamics in the (de)politicization of climate change, and how broader discursive frames have shaped global climate governance (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2016). Building on this literature, the articles gathered in this special issue further explore these framing processes and their implications beyond climate politics as such. In other words, while previous work has mostly considered what politics is doing to climate change, this special issue examines what climate change is doing to (global) politics.

To do this, we believe that a wider focus is needed in terms of actors, arenas, and climate-related practices, as well as a more fine-grained understanding of the discursive and symbolic dimensions of global (climate) politics. We approach climate governance as a multi-actor, trans-scalar and nonlinear *process of social coordination*—enacted through diplomatic practices and performances (Schüssler et al. 2014), in networked relations between state and non-state actors (Bernstein et al. 2010; Betsill and Bulkeley 2004), and through global discourses with normalizing effects on the everyday (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2006; Paterson and Stripple 2010). This perspective foregrounds processes, practices, and discourses (rather than just regimes, international organizations, and legal rules). It examines the diversity of actors and scales involved (rather than just states and international negotiations). And it treats the boundaries of climate governance not as fixed, but as constantly negotiated and enacted by the actors involved. Combining perspectives rooted in international relations, international political sociology, political geography, political ethnography, and science and technology studies, the special issue seeks to contribute to building a stronger theoretical framework to study the extension of the climate realm and the resulting implications for global politics.

The articles in this issue make three main contributions to that project. First, they help to further *characterize and specify the process of climatization*. Focusing on a wide variety of actors, issue areas, and governance scales, they display the diversity of motivations and strategies that drive the climatization process, but also bring out

[2] Van Asselt and Zelli (2018: 36), for instance, note that 'whether and for how long the UNFCCC—the COP or the secretariat—has been an orchestrator is an open question', and go on to argue that while 'the international regime has exerted at least *some* influence' on transnational climate governance, it remains unclear 'how much' and 'through precisely what causal mechanisms' this may have happened.

shared patterns and mechanisms. One set of papers investigates the role and modes of coordination of non-state actors, with a focus on the climate justice movement (de Moor 2020), transnational indigenous grassroots movements (Dupuits 2020), and philanthropic foundations (Morena 2020). These studies show how civil society actors enter the climate arena by establishing transnational networks, how they reformulate their political aims and interests by relating them to climate concerns, and how they attempt, with variable success, to shape climate governance debates. Looking at these actors and their mobilizations and framings also sheds further light on the origins of some of the main characteristics of the Paris climate regime. These characteristics are further spelled out in Aykut et al. (2020) analysis of post-Paris climate politics. The authors show that symbolic elements and communicative techniques are central features of the new governance approach. Estève (2020) Jayaram (2020) supplement this panoramic overview of actors and policy arenas by focusing, respectively, on the French and Indian armed forces. They identify the drivers and mechanisms pushing for the climatization of the military in both countries, while also pointing to the very selective ways in which military actors frame and address climate change. Finally, Maertens (2021) examines the confrontation of another important international organization, the UN Security Council, with the power of attraction of the climate topic, and characterizes the overlapping dynamics through which the Security Council is progressively being climatized.

Second, the articles reveal the *ambiguities, frictions and resistances* that accompany both the diffusion of climate change into other global arenas and the incorporation of new issues into climate governance. Dupuits (2020) shows that climatization can be reversed when the outcomes of climatizing strategies do not meet the expectations of their initiators. In this case, a transnational grassroots network—the Mesoamerican Alliance of Peoples and Forests—pulled out of climate negotiations when it became clear that they would not be able to advance their agenda on territorial security within the UNFCCC. De Moor (2020) highlights resistances to climatization, which occur when a climate framing tends to homogenize very different grievances, complicating activists' efforts to define an alternative 'globality'. Similarly, Maertens (2021) shows that the UN Security Council cannot escape climate discussions despite fierce resistance by some member states. Frictions also appear in Estève's (2020) account of framing contests over the links between climate change and insecurity, which involve strategies of climatization, securitization, and riskification. Jayaram (2020) shows that—partly as a result of such differences in strategies—climatization can come in different forms and degrees, often appearing as purely symbolic or strategic, and less often as precautionary or even transformative. This kind of focus on symbolic action and communicative strategies can also be found at the very heart of global climate governance, with its 'performative' approach to global climate action (Aykut et al. 2020). Taken together, the contributions provide new conceptual resources to capture the current remodelling of world politics by climate change, drawing out the implications of climatization as a dominant framing and highlighting forms of resistance to it.

Third, the papers *link climatization processes to broader global trends and issues*. On the one hand, they draw attention to the multiple ways in which different domains of global politics connect, interact, and influence each other. The three

studies on the intersection between the fields of security and climate change, for example, demonstrate the need to go beyond an exclusive focus on the 'securitization' of climate change (McDonald 2013), using climatization as an alternative or complementary way of theorizing these interactions (Estève 2020, Jayaram 2020, Maertens 2021). On the other hand, the climatization lens also provides new ways to reflect on shifts in global power relations with the rise of soft (Abbott and Snidal 2000), private (Hall and Biersteker 2002), and hybrid (Andonova 2010; Graz 2006) forms of global governance. Morena (2020) shows that US philanthropic foundations played a key role in shaping the bottom-up, soft law approach of the Paris climate regime. Aykut et al. (2020) examine how the focus on private action and the importation of management tools into global governance changes how international agreements are implemented. Non-state actors are also central in de Moor's (2020) analysis of attempts by the climate justice movement to establish a global space of mobilization and conflict. More broadly, the articles seek to reflect on the central position of climate change in global politics without simply reproducing it. Instead, they shed new light on issues of power and domination resulting from unequal access to global arenas and governance scales. In doing so they contribute to a deeper understanding of current transformations not only of climate governance, but also of global politics more broadly.

In the light of the insights provided by the studies in this issue, we develop six theses: (1) Climatization is a process, not an end state; (2) Climatization is afforded by problem characteristics and rooted in past governance failures; (3) Climatization operates not only through strategic moves, but through a wide variety of practices; (4) Climatization is driven by motives of problem control, adaptation to change, and institutional expansion; (5) Domains affected by climatization reveal a climate logic in the making; (6) Climatization reveals, reproduces, and rearticulates power relations. In the conclusion, we advocate for further research on climatization and its interaction with other contemporary transformations of global governance.

(1) Climatization is a process, not an end state

Social science scholars have coined various terms which use the suffix '-ization' to draw attention to broad historical dynamics in which one social sphere becomes a dominant force of transformation in other spheres: 'judicialization' points to the increasing 'reliance on courts and judicial means for addressing core moral predicaments, public policy questions, and political controversies' (Hirschl 2008: 253); 'financialization' to the 'increasing role of financial motives, financial markets, financial actors and financial institutions in the operation of the domestic and international economies' (Epstein 2005: 3); and 'medicalization' to the numerous 'processes through which more and more social issues become framed as medical problems and are responded to through medical frameworks' (Elbe 2010: 15).

Conceiving climatization in such processual terms presents two decisive advantages over other notions, such as 'climate mainstreaming' or 'greenwashing'. First, the analytical focus is immediately placed on ongoing changes. The articles in this special issue take an interest in the perpetual renegotiations of the boundaries of the climate realm. Instead of assuming a fixed delimitation of climate politics, they empirically assess its expansion (and sometimes its shrinkage) in specific contexts. This echoes debates among securitization scholars, where the Copenhagen School's

fixed definition limiting the domain of 'security' to exceptional measures has been challenged (Trombetta 2008: 591). By analogy with this literature, we see climatization as unfolding through *climatizing moves*, understood as attempts to impose a climate frame on another object or issue and/or subject it to climate governance practices. Climatization, in this sense, is 'an always (situated and iterative) process of generating meaning' (Stritzel 2007: 366), which simultaneously affects both the climatized object and the climate problem itself. A focus on climatization hence helps us to recognize unstable (and even reversible) developments. Climatization in this sense is not an end state reached through past changes, but an ongoing process of transformation.

Second, the concept of climatization does not specify the form and intensity of such shifts, or the motivations behind them. It is broad enough to encompass superficial and largely symbolic changes as well as much deeper transformations. It neither presupposes specific intentions, like the concept of greenwashing, nor does it limit the focus to the strategic dissemination of policy frames, like the concept of climate mainstreaming (Methmann 2010). It covers observable transformations in both discourses and practices. Furthermore, we do not assume that climatization is in itself essentially good or bad. This contrasts with strands in securitization studies where scholars express normative concerns vis-à-vis securitizing moves. These authors draw attention to the risks of militarization, the reliance on undemocratic decision-making procedures, the (potentially unintended) consequences in terms of discrimination, and more broadly 'the signifying work' of the word 'security' (Huysmans 1998: 226). In her study of the securitization of the environment, Floyd challenges the normative assumptions underlying such warnings, suggesting that 'not all securitisations are morally equal' (Floyd 2010: 56). Likewise, our starting point in this special issue is that climatizing moves may respond to very different normative considerations, and that their effects should be assessed empirically, without presuming specific outcomes, positive or negative. Such normative (and analytical) openness, we believe, is needed to ensure the heuristic value of the concept of climatization and its ability to shed light on contemporary transformations in global politics.

(2) Climatization is afforded by problem characteristics and rooted in past governance failures

If climatization is a process, then what are its origins? Are there features of the climate problem that predispose it to expand, or explain its force of attraction? We believe that the answer to these questions lies in how climate change has been constructed as a scientific object and as a public problem. Climatization draws on, or is afforded by, scientific notions of the interconnectedness of the climate system and the transversal nature of the climate problem. To understand the climate, scientists need to take into account a potentially infinite set of other elements and processes, from water and carbon cycles to oceanic currents, ocean–atmosphere interactions, and ecosystem dynamics (Edwards 2010). Climate policy, too, is complex in its thematic scope, linking up to other policy domains and societal spheres. To really fight climate change and adapt to a warming climate, we may have to transform quite literally 'everything' (Klein 2014), from everyday habits and mobility practices to energy systems and management routines, as well as the regulation of global energy markets, trade, and finance. In other words, core

features of the climate problem and its social construction mean that its manifestations are ubiquitous across world society (Aykut 2020).

The climatization process is also rooted in past governance failures, which have exacerbated the urgency and increased the magnitude of the necessary changes. Past governance decisions did not prevent, halt, or even slow dangerous global warming. As a result, more and more aspects of global society are affected by the consequences, and decarbonization scenarios imply ever more drastic changes in global economic and social practices (Ripple et al. 2019). The contributions to this special issue show that climate change has direct effects on everyday practices and administrative routines in multiple domains (Estève 2020; Jayaram 2020; Maertens 2021), while affecting social movements and mobilizations (de Moor 2020; Dupuits 2020). Mainstreaming climate concerns in all sectors therefore increasingly appears as the only viable strategy to avoid major disruptions after more than 30 years of international negotiations with utterly insufficient outcomes (Moncel and van Asselt 2012; Hale 2016). And yet climatization is no panacea: it may well reproduce the same institutional mechanisms that have thus far failed to prevent dangerous climate change.

(3) Climatization operates not only through strategic moves, but through a wide variety of practices

The contributions to this special issue show that climatization is not necessarily intentional or strategic. It unfolds through a large variety of practices, understood here as socially meaningful patterns of action (Adler and Pouliot 2011). Each of the articles relies on different methodological tools to trace and analyse these practices, which range from everyday social routines to forms of administrative action and policy-making. As such, many of these practices are not climate-specific. Agenda-setting, lobbying, and the production of expertise, to name just a few, are a common feature across political domains. But taken together, the articles display a set of concrete ways in which actors turn a climate lens on an issue (Dupuits 2020; Maertens 2021), extend the realm of climate politics (Aykut et al. 2020; de Moor 2020), and integrate climate change considerations into other policy domains (Estève 2020; Jayaram 2020). Below, we distil a list of climatization practices from the different case studies (Table 1). We group them into categories: framing and communication; policymaking and governance; networking and mobilization; documenting and research; and financing and implementation. This list may, we hope, be expanded and refined by future research. By surveying the different ways in which climatization occurs empirically, it shows that to understand what climate change is 'doing to' (global) politics, we should pay close attention to such everyday practices and routines. It also stresses that despite the magnitude and urgency of the climate emergency, the transformation of global politics is not necessarily sudden or disruptive. Climatization also foregrounds various more incremental changes that, in combination, may deeply and durably transform the governance of global problems. Practice tracing methods (Pouliot 2014) and other qualitative research strategies, including participant observation and ethnographic methods (Campbell et al. 2014), are often needed to uncover the concrete ways in which climatization unfolds and affects global governance.

Table 1 Climatization Practices

Framing and Communication	Campaigning with climate arguments
	Climate-related reporting and storytelling
	Establishing responsibility in the climate crisis
	Linking climate change with other issues
	Climate-centred agenda-setting
Policymaking and Governance	Adopting climate policy measures
	Building climate task forces and organizations
	Climate-related lobbying
	Negotiating climate governance goals and treaties
Networking and Mobilization	Advocating for technical solutions
	Demonstrating for climate action
	Engaging in direct action against polluters or infrastructures
	Including climate actors in other policy arenas
	Sustaining climate networks and initiatives
Documenting and Research	Carbon disclosure and reporting
	Circulating and publicizing climate expertise
	Climate-related forecasting
	Creating metrics and standards to monitor climate action
	Producing climate risk analyses
Financing and Implementation	Climate proofing
	Disaster intervention
	Funding climate advocacy networks and think tanks
	Setting up and supporting adaptation/mitigation projects
	Strategic planning in public and private organizations

(4) Climatization is driven by motives of problem control, adaptation to change, and institutional expansion

The practices listed above respond to three broad motives. While these may often overlap in concrete empirical cases, distinguishing them helps to identify the main driving forces behind climatization. A motive of *problem control* underlies attempts to (re)define the problem and mitigate it by designing appropriate policy responses. It drives practices of agenda-setting in international organizations (Maertens 2021). It supports the negotiation and formulation of climate policy objectives, the mainstreaming of such objectives across governance arenas and levels, their translation into policy instruments, and their implementation in administrations and businesses. Post-Paris climate governance actively supports climatization in this sense through its polycentric and facilitative approach, which relies on communicative tools to spread climate concerns among private and public actors (Aykut et al. 2020). A motive of *problem control* also drives networking and agenda-setting activities by philanthropies and NGOs aimed at promoting new approaches in global climate governance (Morena 2020), as well as practices of issue-linking and campaigning by social movements striving to advance alternative problem frames (de Moor 2020).

A motive of *adaptation to change* is found in responses and strategies used to cope with and react to a changing environment. This can be seen, for example, in practices that local communities and administrations use in building adaptive capacities to respond to a warming climate, and in businesses' reactions to changes in market environments brought by climate policy interventions. The climate problem is increasingly becoming an inescapable reality for indigenous peoples who are directly affected by adaptation policies aiming either to restore strict conservation policies or to establish market-based conservation mechanisms (Dupuits 2020). This is also true for non-climate oriented international organizations, which are required to address climate change in their policy and programming (Hall 2015; Maertens 2021), and military organizations which are directed to integrate warming impacts into their strategic planning (Estève 2020; Jayaram 2020). In these cases, climatization is motivated by self-preservation in the face of warming impacts, or resistance to climate-related transformations and policies, and aims at building long-term resilience or ensuring institutional and organizational continuity in a changing world.

Finally, a motive of *institutional expansion* structures endeavours to use the climate topic to increase an organization's public profile, attract political or media attention, or tap into climate-related funding opportunities. Institutional expansion is widespread in global governance, where international bureaucracies commonly show 'mission creep' by engaging in 'a significant amount of activities into new policy areas' (Littoz-Monnet 2017: 584). In the case of climate change, this can be seen in international organizations (Maertens 2021), among non-state actors (de Moor 2020; Dupuits 2020; Morena 2020), and among professionals in a specific policy domain such as military affairs (Estève 2020; Jayaram 2020). This drive towards institutional expansion motivates practices aimed at benefiting from the symbolic and material capital conferred by UN climate summits and climate-related activities (e.g. adaptation programs delivered by IOs, advocacy work by NGOs, media attention, etc.), including attempts to refract issues through a climate lens in order to enter climate arenas. As climate change moves up the international agenda, it has come to exert an increasing force of attraction for actors seeking to attract funds, gain recognition, or reap other benefits (Dupuits 2020; Jayaram 2020; Maertens 2021). In return, by expanding their field of action to cover climate change, these actors drive climatization processes, potentially through alternative framing strategies—such as riskification and securitization (Estève 2020).

(5) Domains affected by climatization exhibit a climate logic in the making

Domains, issues, and objects affected by climatization often come to exhibit a set of common features as climate frames, experts, or policy instruments become dominant. As in the cases of securitization and judicialization, the homogenizing force of climatization processes can be described as a 'climate logic' imposed upon the climatized domain. The concept of a 'logic' refers to situations where 'actors, institutions or an entire policy field rely upon a specific way of reasoning, functioning and ordering things' (Louis and Maertens 2021: 14). But as the transformation of climate change into a distinct policy domain is a recent one, the study of climate logic is more exploratory than in the abovementioned cases. The practices, actors, and institutions that compose the field of climate politics are still comparatively heterogeneous, than, for instance, in the security field. We thus focus on drawing the

Table 2 A climate logic in the making

Characteristic	Continuum
Scientized	View from nowhere ⇔ Plural ways of knowing
Planetary perspective	Global gaze ⇔ Alternative globalities
Long-term temporality	Strategic planning ⇔ Participatory futuring
Solution-oriented	Carbon reductionism ⇔ Social transformations

contours of a climate logic in the making. Building on the contributions to this issue and on previous work,[3] we identify a set of four features that characterize the emergent 'climate logic'. To reflect its emergent and unstable nature, we also identify observable and plausible variations within each of these characteristics. These are presented in the form of continua (see Table 2). We hope that future work will build on, further specify, and possibly extend these features, and track the progressive stabilization of the emerging climate logic along each of these continua.

First, climate logic is *scientized*. Climatization leads to an emphasis on scientific tools and framings, and tends to foreground expert discourses. Climate debates heavily draw on results obtained through numerical modelling, from general circulation models that estimate warming impacts to integrated assessment models that simulate future scenarios and evaluate mitigation strategies (Edwards 2010). Highly complex modelling tools have thereby become an obligatory passage point when introducing new issues or forms of expertise into global climate governance (Dahan 2010). As a result, climate discourses frequently adopt a 'view from nowhere' (Borie et al. 2021) that depoliticizes climate conflicts, for example when risk management tools are applied to assess the likelihood of political and social unrest in climate hotspots (Estève 2020; Maertens 2021). However, we also find instances where the introduction of new actors into climate arenas leads to a pluralization of ways of knowing, as when indigenous peoples emphasize the necessity of considering local and traditional knowledge in mitigation and adaptation strategies (Dupuits 2020).

Second, climate logic takes a *planetary perspective*. Climatization favours a radically global point of view on natural and social phenomena and their interactions. This 'global gaze' (Litfin 1999; Fogel 2004) rests on the observation that the climate system is inextricably interconnected at a planetary scale. With this interconnectedness comes a need for political cooperation: because carbon dioxide emissions do not stop at national borders, the climate issue is said to require a multilateral response. Actors in climatized domains therefore have to formulate their issues in planetary terms and connect them to Earth system processes. In doing so they

[3] See, for instance, previous studies on the climatization of security practices (Oels 2012) and soil sciences (Kon Kam King et al. 2018). Closer to our categorization, Methmann (2010) identifies four discursive pillars of what he terms the 'global governmentality of climate protection': globalism, scientism, an ethics of growth, and efficiency. While we broadly agree on the first two characteristics, we depart from this framework on the latter two, by subsuming growth and efficiency under a new category (solution-oriented) and by adding a temporal dimension.

must adopt a paradoxical understanding of universality: in the face of the climate challenge, we are all in the same boat, even as some regions and populations are much more affected than others. While climate logic always involves a global reference point, such a planetary perspective falls on a continuum between the top-down approaches of global governance and Earth system management (Aykut et al. 2020), and the construction of alternative globalities in social movements and transnational actor networks (de Moor 2020; Dupuits 2020).

Third, climate logic introduces a *long-term temporality* into public debates, policy processes and administrative routines. Climate research and climate debates build on different long-term temporalities, such as the century-long horizons of equilibrium change and slow feedback cycles in Earth system processes and the multidecadal perspectives of decarbonization scenarios that form the political horizons of global climate governance national low-carbon transformations (Aykut et al. 2020). Politically, climatization thus tends to favour a return of the plan, the scenario and the long-term strategy in public administration and governance. However, in some places the rise of climate concerns has also been instrumental to the rise of alternative 'techniques of futuring' based on participatory and deliberative methods (Hajer and Pelzer 2018).

Fourth, climate logic is *solution-oriented*. Climate governance debates frequently place value on market- and technical fixes over problem-centred or justice frames. Actors who wish to enter climate governance arenas therefore often feel compelled to foreground possible solutions and adopt a pragmatic, 'positive' discourse. The capacity to propose technical and managerial fixes, market-based instruments, or institutional reforms trumps calls for radical economic or political changes (Swyngedouw 2010). This is particularly salient in post-Paris climate governance, where the ritualized invocation of the 'Paris spirit' in high-profile meetings, the staging of best practices and corporate success stories, serve to sustain the positive narrative of an ongoing transition to a decarbonized world economy (Aykut et al. 2020; Morena 2020). The focus on solutions thereby favours a 'carbon reductionism' (Méndez 2020) that firmly protects the status quo of a profoundly unequal global political economy (Jayaram 2020; Maertens 2021; Morena 2020). More recently however, calls for climate justice and debates on deep decarbonization have been instrumental in foregrounding societal transformations that have the potential to challenge existing power structures (de Moor 2020; Jayaram 2020; Maertens 2021).

Importantly, arguing that the emergent climate logic varies along these four dimensions does not mean that the outcome of climatization processes is entirely open. We do discern some general tendencies within each of the dimensions. For example, while there are ongoing struggles around the recognition of plural ways of knowing in climate debates, model-based approaches and scientized framings are generally favoured (Foyer and Dumoulin 2017). While a planetary perspective can accommodate polycentric and bottom-up ways of organizing, it tends to invisibilize local contexts and struggles in debates on climate futures. And while climate logic is not necessarily 'post-political' per se (Swyngedouw and Wilson 2014), climatization frequently results in a focus on incremental solutions and techno-fixes that conform to a growth-oriented liberal world order. With regard to temporality, the picture is perhaps less clear, as the long-term perspective brought by climate concerns often

contrasts with the short-term logics of contemporary capitalism and project-based governance (Boltanski and Chiapello 1999). It also sits uneasily with the urgency frequently invoked by activists and experts alike to characterize the climate crisis. Climate logic may therefore also foreground a different temporal register: a routinized invocation of urgency (Louis and Maertens 2021), in which it is always 'five minutes to midnight' (Geden 2018)… but never too late.

(6) Climatization reveals, reproduces, and rearticulates power relations

After this exploration of the motives and modes of climatization, we now look into the consequences of these transformations. We find that climatization reveals, reproduces, and rearticulates power relations. We know from other comparable cases of expanding and overlapping social spheres that these involve power struggles over the jurisdiction of social actors, logics, and practices of different fields. Hence, judicialization processes operate through an extension of the influence of judicial language and practice; securitization processes through the adoption of exceptional measures, the use of discourses of discrimination, and the extension of executive powers; and medicalization confers legitimacy upon health professionals and medical interventions into the medicalized field. Accordingly, the articles in this issue show that climatization tends to increase the sphere of influence of actors from the climate arena—climate scientists, climate policymakers, climate activists, (often self-proclaimed) climate victims, etc. At the same time, new actors enter climate arenas, and engage in struggles for recognition and influence. The question we pose here is therefore less about the effectiveness of climatization in terms of climate governance or carbon reductions, but rather about the ways in which climatizing moves unveil and affect global power dynamics. This means considering climatization not as a disincarnated dynamic, but as a social process in which actors advance their framings, build coalitions for specific solutions, or extend their sphere of action and legitimacy. Climatization thus becomes a useful lens to examine shifting power relations in global governance. The articles in this issue suggest three distinct ways to assess the outcomes and identify the winners and losers of climatization.

First, climatization *reproduces and rearticulates* power relations. Strategic climatizing moves can help powerful actors maintain their domination by incorporating and instrumentalizing climate change. U.S. philanthropic foundations mainstream their preferred political views (Morena 2020), armed forces expand their legitimacy to act on non-security issues including socio-ecological problems (Estève 2020; Jayaram 2020), and powerful states use climate change to demonstrate and consolidate their important role in multilateral fora (Maertens 2021). However, climatization also rearticulates power dynamics by expanding some actors' field of action and influence: not only climate experts, but also less powerful states and civil society. While grassroot movements seek to gain a legitimate voice during the COPs by climatizing their causes (Dupuits 2020), developing states that are vulnerable to warming impacts may use the political capital they acquire in the climate arena in other international venues. This is the case, for example, of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, the smallest state to secure a seat on the UN Security Council (Maertens 2021; see also the case of Bangladesh's 'weak power' in climate negotiations, Baillat 2018).

Second, climatization *shifts political responsibilities* in time and in space. Climatization unfolds through the attribution and recognition of political responsibility not only in causing, but also in solving the climate crisis (Maertens 2021). It brings a long-term perspective to both discussions of historical responsibility and debates on present policymaking. This can produce frictions, as when the long-term objectives of global climate governance and their translation into net-zero pledges target 2050 instead of near-term action (Aykut et al. 2020). Climatization can also displace local and national responsibilities by focusing attention on the global level, and erase alternative, situated framings in the name of a common planetary problem (de Moor 2020). Inevitably, such dynamics depend on the actors driving the climatization process. They also reveal a broader underlying tension between the politicization of climate change, through climatizing moves, and its depoliticization, when responsibility is diluted among numerous actors—if everyone is responsible, no one is (Louis and Maertens 2021).

Third, climatization accommodates dynamics of *inclusion and exclusion*. It is enacted through *and* works to justify the involvement of new actors (scientists, consultants, etc.) and the deployment of new approaches (scientized, globalized, etc.). For instance, debates on the security implications of climate change have opened the doors of the UN Security Council to the UN Environment Programme, the World Meteorological Organization, and think tanks specialized in climate security (Maertens 2021). Attempts to reform global climate governance and extend its reach have invited a broader participation of non-state actors in international regulation (Aykut et al. 2020). Yet the recognition of such dynamics of inclusion should not obscure processes of exclusion, especially when the preference for a specific approach—science-based, market-oriented, etc.—marginalizes other understandings of the climate crisis (Dupuits 2020; de Moor 2020). Climatization may well challenge established hierarchies by setting new priorities (e.g. when the 'climate emergency' is framed as the most important global problem), disrupt established routines in many settings and organizations, and empower new actors and their issues and solutions. Nevertheless, in most cases the emerging climate logic does not unsettle existing power relations or the core objectives of hegemonic actors.

Concluding remarks: climatization and the transformation of global governance

Climate change increasingly appears as the paradigmatic environmental problem of our times, and as one of the most pressing crises affecting global society. It dominates international discussions on the protection of the environment and beyond, imposing new framings on other (global) problems. Through climatization, new subjectivities emerge in the everyday (Paterson and Stripple 2010) as much as in global politics (Death 2011). But, as in comparable processes of financialization and judicialization, different degrees or intensities of climatization can be observed. Climatization may be seen both in small incremental changes and in deeper societal transformations. Each of the case studies assembled in this special issue helps to

delineate, characterize, and assess the contours of this social process and the extent of the changes it causes.

However, climatization is by no means the only macro-transformation affecting global society. It coincides or overlaps with, and is at times reinforced or moderated by, other social dynamics, which may in their turn reframe climate policy through the lens of another policy area or social sphere (e.g. by securitizing or financializing it). Further research is needed to obtain a more fine-grained understanding of such encounters, when two fields overlap or expand into each other's territory. Does one field and its logic typically dominate over the other? Under what conditions can we observe forms of hybridization wherein the framing, actors, and suggested policy action of separate policy domains merge? The outcome of climatizing moves is not always a clear power shift through the expansion of one domain over the other. Ongoing transformations can reinforce each other—as has been the case for the scientization of public policy, intensified through the rise of environmental issues (Beck 1986). Such evolutions might become more salient in the future, as climate policy instruments become increasingly financialized, or the management of climate impacts securitized. As more and more issues are framed as global problems deserving global action (Neveu and Surdez 2020), future research on the transformations of global governance should pay close attention to these processes, wherein actors compete to impose the logics of their respective domains on other domains. This also raises the question of the intermediaries of climatization, which we did not foreground here. What can be said about the actors that promote climatization, and notably about their sociopolitical backgrounds, interests and forms of organization? How are their strategies, and the outcomes of their climatizing moves, related to their positionalities within global politics?

Another avenue for future research concerns the outcomes of climatization processes, both in terms of equity and climate justice, and in catalyzing effective climate action. Our findings indicate that such outcomes vary across empirical cases. A positive contribution of climatization to climate governance can therefore not be presupposed. Climatizing moves can be largely symbolic and promote incremental solutions; they often foreground techno-fixes, but may also provide visibility to more transformative strategies of societal change. However, if we take seriously the transversality and complexity of the climate problem, some degree of climatization is almost certainly inevitable for a (more) effective treatment of the problem. Conversely, climatization often ushers new themes and issues into global, national, and subnational climate governance arenas. This may in turn lead to a need to establish new subsidiary or parallel governance processes, and thereby increase the complexity of policymaking and global governance.

As global warming progresses and efforts to mitigate and adapt intensify, living under a changing climate—or in a 'new climate regime' (Latour 2015)—increasingly appears as a central feature of 'our' new, and highly unequal, human condition in the Anthropocene. In other words, we firmly believe that climatization is here to stay. It is thus crucial to better understand this process, recognizing its problems and ambiguities, but also examining its transformative potential and identifying the conditions under which such potentials can be harnessed with a view to building a

more effective and equitable climate politics. We think that the contributions in this special issue contribute to this endeavour.

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ORIGINAL ARTICLE

'Incantatory' governance: global climate politics' performative turn and its wider significance for global politics

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Abstract

The 2015 Paris agreement represents a deep-rooted change in global climate governance. While existing scholarly assessments highlight central *institutional* features of the Paris shift, they tend to overlook its *symbolic and discursive* dimensions. Our analysis shows that the Paris architecture combines two core elements: an iterative pledge and review process to stimulate global climate action, and a 'performative' narrative aimed at aligning actors' expectations on the prospect of a low-carbon future. We therefore suggest calling it an *incantatory* system of governance. We then examine the origins of the new approach and find that the rise of 'soft law' approaches and communicative techniques in global climate governance are both indicative of a broader process: the entry of management culture in international organisations. Against this backdrop, we examine the prospects, limitations and caveats of the new approach and discuss its wider implications for global politics.

Keywords Global climate governance · Paris agreement · New public management · Narratives · Performativity

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Introduction

The Paris agreement adopted in December 2015 is widely considered as a major breakthrough in global climate governance, with the potential of becoming a blueprint for other governance arenas (Jordan et al. 2018). And yet, just 2 years after its adoption, it was already in jeopardy when US President Trump announced on 1 June 2017 his intention to withdraw from the treaty. The decision completely paralysed negotiations at the UN climate summit COP23 in Bonn in November of that same year. Interestingly, however, the atmosphere was very different at the 'Bonn Zone', an area dedicated to non-state and sub-state climate efforts and just a few hundred metres away from the official conference space. A highlight of the 'Bonn Zone' was the launch of the #WeAreStillIn coalition. Under the leadership of billionaire philanthropist, former New York City mayor and UN special envoy for climate action Michael Bloomberg, as well as California governor Jerry Brown, the coalition brought together American cities, states and businesses committed to fulfilling the US's national emission reduction commitments through bottom-up action. The mood was similarly upbeat at the One Planet Summit in Paris a month later. Convened by French President Emmanuel Macron to mark the COP21's second anniversary, the Summit provided business and NGO leaders, representatives from international organisations and national and multilateral development banks, heads of state and government, philanthropists and mayors with an opportunity to both reassert their commitment to the Paris agreement and to announce new measures for its implementation.

The 'Bonn Zone' and One Planet Summit are revealing of the current state of global climate governance. They are symptomatic of more deep-rooted shifts in its organisation, in the levels of engagement, in the actors involved, and the mechanisms through which it operates and produces effects. Global climate policy is now understood as a process that transcends the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and of which transnational initiatives and private governance schemes constitute an integral part (Moncel and van Asselt 2012). Furthermore, it is no longer aimed at the production and enforcement of binding reduction targets for states, but builds on a flexible 'pledge and review' system combining voluntary pledges by public *and* private actors alike, and binding reporting and transparency rules for states (Keohane and Oppenheimer 2016). Taken together, these changes have been described as a shift away from a 'regulatory' and towards a 'catalytic and facilitative model' of global governance (Hale 2016). While such assessments highlight central aspects of the Paris shift, they also contain significant blind spots. The bulk of stand-alone articles and special issues on post-Paris climate governance focusses on negotiation dynamics and outcomes,[1] the interpretation of the agreement's legal dispositions,[2] or institutional innovations in the post-Paris

[1] See, for instance, the special forum section 'Reflections on the Paris Agreement on Climate Change' in *Global environmental politics* (2017, Vol. 15, No. 3).

[2] E.g. the special issues in *Climate Law* (2016, Vol. 6, No. 1–2) and *Climate Policy* (2017, Vol. 17, No. 1).

process (Jordan et al. 2018). In doing so, such analyses tend to overlook an important feature of the new governance regime: its symbolic and discursive dimensions. As illustrated by the examples above, the post-Paris process conveys a central role to the emission of 'signals' and the creation of 'momentum' for climate action, through carefully orchestrated global moments such as the One Planet Summit and Climate Action Summits and highly publicised private initiatives like #WeReStillIn. In other words, in this new governance, performances, symbols and narratives appear to be just as important as the production of rules, institutions and instruments.

We therefore suggest calling the new approach an *incantatory system of governance*. On a general level, the notion of 'incantation' points to the ritualised and repetitive dimensions of global climate governance, with its annual meetings and recurring calls to urgency and action (Little 1995), as well as to the theatrical dramaturgy of climate summits and their filiation to the 'society of spectacle' (Death 2011). More specifically, it permits to capture what we believe constitutes a distinctive feature of the new approach: the fact that communicative and symbolic devices are explicitly recognised, by its architects and promoters, as *core instruments* in the agreement's implementation. A central element in this context is the grand narrative of an ongoing 'planetary transition' to a decarbonised world economy, which is crafted and circulated by key governance actors. By using the notion of incantation, we also wish to engage a discussion on the origins and wider significance of this governance shift. In an increasingly fragmented (Biermann et al. 2009), marketised (Newell and Paterson 2010) and privatised (Park et al. 2008) global governance landscape, 'soft law' approaches resting on voluntary commitments (Abbott and Snidal 2000), indicators and best practices (Merry 2011) have been on the rise over the last decades. The Paris shift fits within this broader set of transformations, inspired by the adoption of New Public Management (NPM) methods in international organisations. We suggest that these two dynamics—the weakening of legal and regulatory frameworks, and the inflationary use of communicative devices—can be understood as two sides of the same phenomenon: the importation of a business culture in global governance. Finally, the notion of incantation points to the need to renew the methods with which we study global climate governance. Our aim is not to present the new approach as ineffective per se, but to understand how it plays out *in practice*, and better appreciate its prospects, risks and caveats. This requires examining the role of rituals, symbols and discourses in global governance, analyse how they produce effects and study how they relate to, or combine with, more traditional governance methods—such as the negotiation of legal documents and the action of international organisations. In line with collaborative event ethnography (Campbell et al. 2014), our analysis is therefore based on repeated collective observations of different spaces of global climate governance, particularly during the 2015 Paris COP. There, we studied the circulation of people and documents, practices of text production and editing, the role of diplomatic rituals and political performances, as well as civil society mobilisations, scientific events and business happenings (Aykut et al. 2017). We also analysed how philanthropic foundations and think tanks shaped the 'road to Paris' and the discursive context surrounding COP21 (Morena 2016). In this paper, we connect the findings of these different lines of research. Drawing on discourse analysis (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2007),

we also reconstruct the narratives circulated by promoters of the new governance approach. That being said, the article's primary goal is to advance a broader conceptual argument. The empirical material serves to shed light on our argument rather than provide a comprehensive, rigorous analysis of *one* conference or *one* discourse.

Performative iterations: an anatomy of the Paris approach

The Paris approach introduces a series of institutional innovations. It marks a transition from a 'regulatory' approach to global climate governance, with detailed rules and obligations that apply to developed states, to a 'hybrid' system that both combines voluntary submissions and binding review cycles for all states and associates a wider range of stakeholders. However, in the eyes of its architects and main proponents, the new approach does not only rest on new institutions, it also centrally relies on new discursive and symbolic elements.

An iterative process to 'facilitate' and 'orchestrate' global climate action

Instead of legally binding reduction targets and sanctions for non-compliance, the governance framework laid out in the Paris agreement is based on the submission and review of freely determined policy pledges, or Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). However, the approach also differs significantly from purely voluntary systems. On the substantive side, it sets two long-term temperature goals: keeping global warming 'well below' 2 °C and 'pursuing efforts' to stay below 1.5 °C. The COP decision also sets out the figure of 100 billion USD per year towards developing countries' adaptation and emissions reduction efforts. Apart from the 1.5 °C target, these figures had already been laid out in the contested Copenhagen Accord in 2009. Accordingly, the Paris agreement's main innovations are procedural, rather than substantive (Oberthür and Bodle 2016). An 'enhanced transparency framework' is set up to ensure the publicity and comparability of NDCs;[3] a 'global stocktake' is scheduled every 5 years to collectively evaluate the adequacy of national efforts; based on this assessment, countries are expected to 'ratchet up' their pledges in line with the agreement's long-term goals. In sum, the Paris framework establishes legally binding obligations of *conduct*, but no obligations of *result* (Bodansky 2016). Its implementation has been described as a 'two level game' in which the capacity of domestic civil societies to exert pressure on their governments plays a decisive role (Keohane and Oppenheimer 2016). The Paris architecture is therefore understood by its proponents as an iterative process, in which 'the many interdependent parts […] interact in mutually facilitative ways' (Hale and Roger 2014: 535).

The agreement also broadens the scope of stakeholders that participate in global climate governance. In addition to developed countries, developing countries as

[3] The transparency framework is further spelled out in the 'Katowice Rulebook' adopted at COP24 in 2018.

well as private and subnational actors are encouraged to submit emission reduction pledges. In this respect, Paris not only marks a historic break with the North–South divide in global climate politics; it also confirms the rise of 'private authority' and corporate self-regulation in global governance (Pattberg 2005; Andonova 2010). From centrepiece of a unified and centralised climate regime, the UNFCCC is now considered as only one of many elements that collectively make up a broad landscape of 'transnational climate governance' (Betsill et al. 2015; Bulkeley et al. 2014). In the lead-up to the Paris conference, climate governance scholars reassessed the UNFCCC's role.[4] They encouraged it to take on an 'orchestrating' function for climate action by states, as well as businesses, cities, regions and federated states (Abbott and Snidal 2009; Moncel and van Asselt 2012; Hale and Roger 2014). Orchestration is thereby defined as an 'indirect mode of governance that relies on soft inducements', as the orchestrator 'works through like-minded intermediaries, catalysing their formation, encouraging and assisting them and steering their activities through support and other incentives' (Abbott 2018: 189). An oft-cited example is the UNFCCC's Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA), an online platform launched in 2014 'where actors from around the globe—countries, regions, cities, companies, investors and other organisations—can display their commitments to act on climate change.'[5] To further encourage transnational climate action and link it to the UN process, the UNFCCC also promoted 'High-Level Champions' for climate action. The 'Champions'—usually personalities from the business, political and cultural spheres—put their professional networks and celebrity in the service of climate action. In return, the UN arena provides social prestige and symbolic recognition to these individuals.

A mobilising narrative to align stakeholders' expectations

Initiatives such as NAZCA portal or the High-Level Champions are envisioned as more than mere appendages to national efforts. They are a constitutive 'fourth pillar' of global climate governance alongside mitigation, adaptation and climate finance, intended to 'galvanize' and 'catalyse' global climate action (Hale 2016). The underlying image is that of a virtuous cycle, in which experiences of past cooperation create trust and confidence among actors and alter their future preferences (Bang et al. 2016). The concept of 'catalytic cooperation' (Hale 2018) neatly captures this idea. It rests on the claim that global mitigation efforts have wrongly been portrayed as a classic case of a prisoner's dilemma. Instead, it is argued that climate action entails first mover benefits for pioneers and increasing returns as the number of followers increases. This may lead to normative change through 'norm cascades' and 'tipping points' that transform the incentive structure and hence the nature of the problem. Hence, 'the entire purpose of a catalytic regime' like the Paris agreement 'is to shift actors' preferences over time in favour of cooperation' (Hale 2018: 22). Given the

[4] For an overview, see Aykut (2016).

[5] https://climateaction.unfccc.int/views/about.html (accessed 9 September 2019).

importance of norms, trust and preferences in this governance setup, however, surprisingly little attention have been paid in the literature to global climate governance's symbolic and discursive dimensions. Indeed, the defining feature of contemporary climate governance is that signals, narratives and performative moments are *at its core*. This is explicitly recognised by key proponents of the new approach. Laurence Tubiana, special envoy of the French Presidency to the COP21 negotiations and one of the architects of the Paris agreement, presents the treaty as a 'self-fulfilling prophecy', whereby positive narratives 'by producing a convergence of rational anticipations […] contribute as much to change as the agreement itself.'[6] The main objective of post-Paris climate governance is no longer the production of new legal norms, but the alignment of state and non-state actors' expectations on the prospect of a low-carbon future. The 'signals' and 'momentum' generated by the governance process underpin the voluntary architecture of the agreement.

Fifty shades of soft: fostering a new institutional framework

While the origins of the bottom-up approach in global climate governance are often traced back to the 2009 Copenhagen climate conference (COP15), fully capturing how and why it came about, and what constitutes its specificities, requires us to go further back in time. Indeed, voluntary approaches have been part of the discussions since the beginning of climate talks in the 1990s. We also need to expand our horizons to other areas of global politics, as the approach adopted in Paris echoes a wider 'managerial turn' in global politics.

The ups and downs of voluntary approaches in climate negotiations

Prevailing accounts of the Paris shift tend to focus on dynamics *within* the climate regime. And indeed, the idea of a voluntary framework to coordinate the global mitigation effort historically emerged in the run-up to the 1992 Rio conference. At that time, the EU favoured a 'targets and timetables' approach based on binding reduction commitments for industrialised countries. The US administration criticised the proposal as overtly 'top-down' and 'rigid', arguing that climate governance should involve a more flexible 'bottom-up' approach (Bodansky 1993: 514). As a compromise solution, Japan suggested in July 1991 a pledge and review system combining voluntary country submissions and an international review process to track implementation. However, the targets and timetables approach ultimately won over in Kyoto in 1997 (Damian 2014). The voluntary approach resurfaced in the run-up to the Copenhagen conference, where countries negotiated on a successor treaty to the Kyoto protocol. Two years earlier, the so-called 'Bali Action Plan' had introduced the concept of 'Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions' as a means of getting developing countries to contribute to the mitigation effort. The idea was

[6] Cited in Losson, Christian, 'COP21: "L'accord doit être une prophétie autoréalisatrice"', *Libération*, 17.12.2015.

to encourage emerging economies to make voluntary pledges that would be subject to measurement, reporting and verification (MRV). This, it was hoped, would trigger an incremental process, whereby pledges would progressively be strengthened and ultimately be converted into binding commitments. In the midst of the Copenhagen collapse, however, the voluntary approach was ultimately extended to the global North as well. Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) were introduced as a compromise solution between 'Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions' and the quantified emissions reduction objectives that applied to developed states under the Kyoto protocol.[7] The origins of the voluntary approach can therefore be traced back to the early years of the climate regime. There are, however, important differences between the initial proposals and the Paris approach. These relate not only to the specific ways in which the Paris agreement combines binding and non-binding elements, but also to the broader global setting in which the new climate governance is embedded. This setting differs significantly from the early 1990s.

Management culture's incursion into global governance

In the post-Cold War context of the 1992 Rio conference, the widely held view was that global governance unfolds mainly through global institution building and the gradual strengthening of international law (Levy et al. 1995; Zangl and Zürn 2004). Advocates of pledge and review in the early climate negotiations could therefore frame such a system as a first, incremental step towards more substantial commitments later on (Bodansky 1993: 486). This argument appears less plausible today, as the voluntary turn in climate governance coincides with major transformations in global governance. The global diffusion of 'regulatory capitalism' (Lévi-Faur 2005) and the rise of 'private authority' (Hall and Biersteker 2002; Pattberg 2005) challenge the long-standing supremacy of states and international organisations in global affairs. In a multi-actor world (Kaul et al. 1999), global governance no longer unfolds through state-led multilateralism alone, but also through forms of 'transnational regulation', 'hybrid governance arrangements' (Graz 2006; Andonova 2010) and networks of corporate self-regulation (Müller and Cloiseau 2015; Short 2012).

These transformations had as a corollary the introduction of new governance methods, which originated in the business sector. In the 1970s, new management techniques such as Total Quality Management aimed to provide firms with 'remote control' over their increasingly transnational production chains, through a circular procedural sequence of goal-setting, reporting and auditing (Power 1999). These techniques inspired a range of national administration reforms during the 'managerial moment' of the 1980s and 1990s (Kroeze and Keulen 2014; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2011), before spreading to the global level. Corporate Social and Environmental

[7] As the Copenhagen Accord faced fierce resistance from a number of developing countries and failed to be formally adopted by the COP, it was only at the 2013 Warsaw summit that INDCs were officially adopted (https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2013/cop19/eng/10a01.pdf#page=3, accessed 9 September 2019).

Responsibility (CSER) schemes, which rely on a similar circular process of pledging, reporting and review, contributed to this dissemination (Zumbansen 2006; Crane et al. 2008). Through partnerships in such schemes, members of NGOs think tanks and international organisations were progressively 'acculturated' to business methods, practices and vocabulary (Conley and Williams 2008: 14, 15). The spread of CSER is also associated with a process of private 're-regulation' (Logsdon and Wood 2002; Conley and Williams 2011), whereby businesses became recognised sources of policy proposals at the international level (Müller 2013). International organisations followed suit over the next decades and increasingly adopted 'soft' and 'experimental' governance methods (Sabel and Zeitlin 2012; Eckert and Börzel 2012). The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), the UN Global Compact and the EU's Open Method of Coordination—three processes launched at the turn of the millennium—constitute paradigmatic examples for this trend. All three combine the definition of common goals, decentralised implementation methods and collective review and benchmarking mechanisms. In addition to coinciding with a broader 'managerial turn', international organisations' adoption of more flexible governance modes also signals their increasing difficulty to develop and enforce binding rules on states (Hale et al. 2013). Hence, the Open Method of Coordination was launched in response to critiques of the EU's overly centralised power structure (Regent 2003; Schout et al. 2010), while the MDGs came on the back of more than a decade of structural adjustment programmes that spurred growing resistance among developing countries (McArthur 2014; Shawki 2016). The direct consequence of these evolutions is a shift in the normative horizon of global governance. If international relations scholars could still claim in the 1990s that the 'main purpose' of international regimes was 'to harmonize national legislation or to establish rules that can be applied by and to states' (Zartman 1994: 6), this no longer pertains to this new type of governance arrangements. From a system organised around the production of legal documents to be transposed into national law, global governance shifted towards a system grounded on the definition of shared goals, voluntary commitments by state and non-state actors, and global review and monitoring processes.

Non-state actors as brokers for a bottom-up approach

While UN climate governance was somewhat of a latecomer in adopting the new governance modes, it had been affected by these broader trends well before the Copenhagen and Paris conferences. Since the turn of the millennium, a new 'transnational climate governance landscape' (Bulkeley et al. 2014) progressively took root through the emergence of Corporate Social Responsibility schemes (Bulkeley and Newell 2010: 119), transnational city networks (Betsill and Bulkeley 2004) and corporate carbon trading systems (Bernstein et al. 2010). In the climate diplomacy space, this evolution was closely scrutinised and promoted by a well-experienced and well-connected group of diplomats, NGO, foundation and business representatives, climate policy and communications experts in close contact with the UNFCCC Secretariat and key Parties to the Convention (Morena 2016). Bringing together individuals with a history of involvement in the international climate

diplomacy space—through initiatives like the Global Call for Climate Action (GCCA) or Project Catalyst, or informal networks such as the Croissant Conspiracy[8] or the Lionesses[9]—, the International Policies and Politics Initiative (IPPI) provides a telling example of how non-state actors strategically mobilised to orientate the international climate debate. Participants in the Initiative's mid-2013 'lake Tornow' meeting close to Berlin include representatives from foundations (ECF, CIFF, Vasuda), development NGOs (Oxfam, Care International), environmental NGOs (Greenpeace, WWF), campaign networks (CAN international, 350.org, Avaaz, GCCA), business networks (The Climate Group), think tanks (E3G, WRI, UCS, Ecofys, Track0, IDDRI, Germanwatch, Grantham LSE) and strategic communications (Climate Nexus) (Morena 2016: 118). Launched in April 2013, and building on a 2011 strategy document produced by the European Climate Foundation (ECF), IPPI's purpose was to deliver 'a strong climate regime' that '[fostered] bottom-up action [anchored] in top-down elements' (European Climate Foundation 2011: 3).

For participants in IPPI, the failure to reach an agreement in 2009 was a direct consequence of stakeholders' disregard for wider political and non-state actor dynamics and their influence. Experts from the think tank Third Generation Environmentalism (E3G, founded in 2004), for instance, suggested that the Copenhagen collapse had shown that 'climate diplomacy has shifted from a relatively narrow focus on the UNFCCC process, to a more complex and wider discipline that now engages new constituencies and embraces broader geopolitical discussions' (Mabey et al. 2013: 6). As Johannes Meier, CEO of the European Climate Foundation (ECF, founded in 2008) explains, experts and activists had failed to recognise that change happens 'in rather oblique and non-linear ways' and that there is a 'need to pay more attention to politics and even to the polity' (Meier 2015). In its 2011 strategy document, ECF further argues that 'the radical policy change that will be required' entails moving not only policy-makers, but 'society as a whole, from the progressive to the conservative, right to left, engaged and disinterested' (European Climate Foundation 2011: 4). The new priority in the lead-up to Paris was therefore to stimulate actions at multiple levels and locations, both within and beyond the UNFCCC, and involve a wide range of stakeholders, to create the conditions for a new type of global climate agreement. The idea was to deliver an agreement that combined a long-term goal that sends 'a clear signal to policy makers, businesses, investors and the public that the low-carbon climate-resilient economy is inevitable' (Morgan et al. 2014: 4), with 'bottom-up' commitments that are regularly updated and subject to robust transparency and accountability provisions. This, it was suggested, would enable climate diplomacy to use the 'groundswell' of 'nonstate action' to 'reinvigorate' global climate governance (Chan et al. 2015). Through these and similar proposals in the run-up to Paris, climate policy experts and representatives from think tanks, philanthropic foundations and environmental NGOs successfully positioned

[8] An informal GoogleGroup set up in the lead-up to Paris and that brings together key non-state actors involved in or around the UNFCCC process.

[9] https://www.climatechangenews.com/2019/09/16/net-zero-story-target-will-shape-future/, accessed 12 March 2020.

the pledge and review approach as a credible and pragmatic alternative to the legally binding, top-down system that had prevailed up to Copenhagen.

Parole, parole, parole: narratives and signals as tools of governance

Critical governance scholars and ethnographers of global institutions have long argued that discourses, narratives and symbols constitute key elements in the making of global orders and pointed to the importance of rituals and performances in global mega-events like UN climate summits. And indeed, beyond the 12-page treaty and accompanying 20-page COP decision, the Paris COP also gave birth to the mobilising narrative of an ongoing 'planetary transition' to a low-carbon economy. The making of this narrative can be traced back to the aftermath of COP15 in Copenhagen, when the production and dissemination of discursive frames became a central concern for climate governance actors. In the process, communication practices became a key strategic tool for the architects of the Paris approach.

Discourses, rituals and performances in global environmental governance

Making sense of the contemporary transformations of global climate governance requires an analytical vocabulary that adequately captures its discursive and symbolic dimensions. This points to at least two existing lines of research. First, research on discourses and norms highlights the constitutive power of language, knowledge and ideas in global environmental governance (Bernstein 2001; Oels 2005; Pettenger 2007; Hughes and Paterson 2017). Bäckstrand and Lövbrand (2006, 2016), for instance, show how three broad discursive formations—'ecological modernization', 'green governmentality' and 'civic environmentalism'—distinctly shaped global climate politics in the post-Kyoto and post-Copenhagen eras. Global climate discourses also extend beyond the realm of UN climate diplomacy. They have disciplining effects on the everyday and participate in the creation of subjectivities (Paterson and Stripple 2010). They provide 'discursive hooks' to actors seeking entry into the climate arena (Allan 2018) and enable strategies of 'climate bandwagoning' (Jinnah 2011). Moreover, their circulation contributes to a 'climatisation of global debates', whereby issues formerly unrelated to climate policy are increasingly scrutinised through a 'climatic lens' (Aykut et al. 2017; Oels 2012). UN summits, which attract new actors and issues into the climate arena, play an important role in this progressive extension of the thematic scope and symbolic reach of climate governance. This resonates with a second line of research which focuses on the symbolic and performative dimensions of global environmental summits (Blühdorn 2011; Campbell et al. 2014). Ethnographer Paul Little (1995) provides a fascinating account of the role of performances and rituals at the 1992 Rio conference. Analysing the endless litany of speeches by heads of state and government during the opening ceremony, he shows how these conveyed to the respective home audiences the idea that 'world leaders' were best suited to address global problems. Death (2011) makes a similar argument in a foucauldian study of 'theatrical techniques' at the

2002 Johannesburg and 2009 Copenhagen summits. 'Environmental summitry', he argues, has come to constitute a 'distinct technology of government'. Despite being unsuccessful in terms of negotiations, the two summits constituted attempts 'to inspire and conduct the self-optimisation of the watching global audience'. For these authors, global mega-conferences cannot be reduced to formal negotiation outcomes; they are also important loci for the production of meaning, through the emission of signals, frames and narratives.

Crafting and circulating the grand narrative of a 'planetary transition'

Such perspectives permit to shed new light on the discursive context of the pre-Paris process. Indeed, Copenhagen also marks the start of a new 'positive' narrative around climate change, which would come to form a core feature of the new climate governance. For the group of stakeholders mentioned above, Copenhagen had not only been a diplomatic fiasco, but also a failure in terms of communication. It had effectively failed to shape the overall narrative on climate change in a positive way (Morena 2017: 107, 108). Too little attention had been paid to the symbolic and discursive dimensions of climate diplomacy. To succeed, the Paris conference therefore had to send 'unambiguous signals that the world will shift its economic and social activity toward more climate-friendly and sustainable pathways' (Oberthür et al. 2015: 1). To do this, a range of individuals were mobilised and tools were created to ensure that stakeholders in the climate debate sent the right message to the right audience at the right time (Morena 2016). Communications efforts were orchestrated by discreet 'unbranded' initiatives such as the Global Strategic Communications Council (GSCC) or Climate Briefing Service (CBS) whose communications experts '[coordinated stakeholder] voices at the national and international levels to help shape the national offers as they are being drafted and the thinking around the international agreement'.[10] They focused their communications efforts on global and national climate-relevant 'moments' leading-up to the Paris conference; from G7 and G20 Summits, to the Rio + 20 conference (2012) and associated green growth/green economy agenda, to China's adoption of its new 5-year plan, to the launching of climate-related reports (IPCC reports, New Climate Economy report, UNEP Emissions Gap reports…). These communications efforts mobilised a wide range of stakeholders, from climate 'outsiders' active on the margins of the official negotiation process to climate 'insiders' working closely with parties to draft a new treaty (de Moor et al. 2017; Newell 2000). Christiana Figueres, UNFCCC Executive Secretary at the time, played a key role in these efforts. She provides a fascinating account of her intense lobbying work for a climate agreement in a recent *Nature* commentary. Her primary task, she contends, consisted in spreading optimism:

> I immediately realized that, before we could consider the political, technical and legal parameters of an eventual agreement, I had to dedicate myself to changing the mood: there could be no victory without optimism. I decided

[10] https://ciff.org/grant-portfolio/climate-briefing-service/ (accessed 9 September 2019).

> to set a clear intention: even if we did not know precisely how, a global deal would emerge, simply because it was necessary. It was that contagious frame of mind that led to effective decision-making, despite the enormous complexities under which we were operating. When the Paris agreement was achieved, the optimism that people felt about the future was palpable – but, in fact, optimism had been the primary input. (Figueres 2020)

Among the groups that actively promoted a new climate narrative were also progressive business interests like the We Mean Business coalition[11] launched at the 2014 NYC Climate Week (Benabou et al. 2017). In its first report *The Climate Has Changed*, the coalition argues that 'the transition to a low-carbon economy is already happening' (We Mean Business 2014: xiv) and attempts to demonstrate that 'ambitious climate action makes business sense' (*Ibid*.: viii). The transition is depicted as a dynamic, polycentric process where 'bold business action' and ambitious policy-making are mutually reinforcing (*Ibid*.: vii). A follow-up publication *Shaping a Catalytic Paris Agreement* contains a detailed proposal for a new climate treaty (We Mean Business 2015). According to the authors, such an agreement should combine voluntary and binding elements to '[create] an inclusive enabling environment for all stakeholders—including business' and fix an ambitious temperature target to 'send a political signal that long-term decarbonisation is inevitable' (*Ibid*.: 2). In other words, its purpose would be largely *symbolic*. By further substantiating the narrative of an ongoing and unavoidable low-carbon transition, the successful adoption of an 'ambitious' agreement would encourage low-carbon efforts by businesses, investors and citizens. This would in turn generate momentum for more ambitious national policies, thereby setting in motion a self-reinforcing process towards decarbonisation. As former US Secretary of State John Kerry explains in the *Rolling Stone*:

> If 150 nations are taking it seriously and setting targets, even if they don't make them, that will generate massive investment and a huge amount of private-sector activity […] And then you have to hope that somebody comes up with clean-energy technology, which makes it competitive with fossil fuel, and then, boom, you get your low-carbon economy.[12]

In the lead-up, during and on the back of COP21, the agreement's core architects set up an elaborate communications campaign whose purpose was to shape a new climate narrative centred on three elements: the low-carbon transition is already underway; it presents unprecedented economic opportunities, and its successful implementation rests on the cooperation of actors from all sections of society. This, it was believed, would generate 'momentum' around the 'Paris moment', and more generally the benefits of decisive climate action.

[11] We Mean Business unites numerous partners, including the World Business Council for Sustainable Development, Business for Social Responsibility, CDP Worldwide, The B-Team, The Climate Group, The Prince of Wales' Corporate Leaders Group and the Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies.

[12] Cited in Goodell, Jeff, 'Will the Paris Climate Deal Save the World?' *Rolling Stone*, no. 1253, 28.1.2016.

Upholding the 'Paris momentum'

For the architects of the Paris approach, narratives and signals were not only key to achieving a positive outcome at COP21; they are equally important in the implementation of the Paris agreement. For Laurence Tubiana, the post-Paris process '[is] all about momentum.'[13] Christiana Figueres (2020) urges all stakeholders 'to move firmly into a state of stubborn optimism' and to 'conceive of success and take immediate steps towards it'. Following the adoption of the Paris agreement and its subsequent ratification and entry into force, a priority for its main proponents was therefore to keep the 'Paris prophecy' alive in the hope that this would lead stakeholders to ramp up their levels of ambition in the lead-up to the next global stocktake in 2020. Forging the right narrative and controlling the discursive context of global climate governance thereby become key concerns. In the final chapter, 'A New Story' from their book, *The Future We Choose*, C. Figueres and Tom Rivett-Carnac describe this task as follows:

> Right now, the predominant stories we are telling ourselves about the climate crisis are not very inspiring. But a new story can reinvigorate our efforts. When the story changes, everything changes (Figueres and Rivett-Carnac 2020: 158).

The purpose of climate summits changes accordingly. In the post-Paris period, negotiations increasingly lose their pivotal role. Instead of focusing on the arduous and conflict-ridden process of political bargaining, rituals and performances occupy centre stage. 'The ideal COP would send a positive signal(s) to the international community, including investors, regarding the Parties' and other stakeholders' direction of travel' writes Susan Biniaz (2020: 11), lead climate lawyer for the U.S. State Department from 1989 to 2017 and another key actor in Paris. In a growing number of high-level and highly mediatised climate action summits, the UNFCCC now takes on the role of 'travelling salesman' for ambitious climate action. COPs or Climate Action Summits are essentially about communicating on the urgency of the climate crisis, highlighting the economic and social benefits of climate action and showcasing existing efforts—especially corporate climate action—to address the crisis (Aykut et al. 2020). Hence, while rituals, discourses, theatrical techniques and political performances have always played an important role in global politics more generally, the post-Paris climate governance stands out. Whereas in other governance arenas their role tends to be understated or played down, in the climate arena, communicative and symbolic elements are explicitly recognised as core instruments in the implementation of the Paris agreement.

[13] https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-02-26/behind-europe-s-green-deal-a-quiet-campaign-by-hidden-powerbrokers (accessed 7 March 2020).

Incantatory governance: prospects, risks and caveats of the new approach

We suggest the term 'incantatory governance' to characterise this new approach. In so doing, we aim to highlight both the iterative, cyclical process created by the Paris agreement's review mechanism and the central role of performative narratives and signals in the post-Paris setup. As pointed out earlier, our intention is not to dismiss the approach as 'merely' symbolic and therefore ineffective. Ethnographic research shows that incantatory rituals can produce real-world effects and fulfil important social functions. Claude Lévi-Strauss, for instance, famously investigated the 'pragmatic effectiveness of symbols' in shamanistic cure (Muniesa 2014: 21). The repetitive utterance of words and mobilisation of symbols, he writes, 'provoke[s] an experience', which can produce therapeutic effects (Lévi-Strauss 1949: 21). An increasing body of research shows that modern institutions also heavily rely on symbols, rituals and narratives: storytelling and drama constitute key features of contemporary management culture (Czarniawska 1997), while 'fictional expectations' shape the functioning of capitalist systems (Beckert 2016). Accordingly, Death (2011: 9–10) criticises what he terms the 'anti-theatrical prejudice' in social science scholarship. 'Symbolic aspects of summitry are not sideshops', he contends, 'but essential to the manner in which summits govern the conduct of global politics'. Instead of opposing 'symbolic' politics to a hypothetical 'real' politics, we should accept that symbols and narratives form part and parcel of contemporary liberal governmentality (Blühdorn 2007; Death 2011). The imminent conclusion of the regime building process therefore represents a critical juncture not only for UN climate governance, but also for social science research. What are the prospects, risks and caveats of the new approach? As the focus shifts from negotiation to implementation, a new chapter opens for the UNFCCC and its annual COPs. While a thorough assessment of the effectiveness of the new governance approach would be premature, developments since the Paris COP point towards two main issues with the new approach.

Governance as symbolic struggle, and the risk of 'virtuality'

President Donald Trump's decision in June 2017 to withdraw from the Paris agreement represented a severe test for the post-Paris process. Given the historical responsibility and political weight of the USA, the decision weakened the UNFCCC as the central forum of global climate governance. By sending a very negative signal, the US administration's retreat also threatened to undermine the 'Paris prophecy', which, as we have shown, forms a crucial part of the post-Paris climate governance framework. To uphold the momentum, it therefore became essential to show that the international community—state and non-state actors alike—was still committed to the goals laid out in the Paris agreement, with or without US federal support.

In response to Trump's decision, the international climate community coordinated a series of high-profile initiatives. Notable examples include the #WeAreStillIn and America's Pledge initiatives. In both cases, the idea was to reaffirm the fact

that despite Trump's decision, the USA, through the combined efforts of business leaders, university chancellors, mayors and state governors, would fulfil—and even surpass—its Paris commitments. In addition to mobilising non-state and sub-state actors, the priority was also to find a new 'climate champion' and saviour of multilateralism to fill in the gap created by the US exit. Despite his status as relative newcomer to the climate cause, French president Emmanuel Macron was rapidly elevated to the rank of 'champion of the earth'. The organisation of a press conference at the Elysée Palace the day after Trump's announcement in June 2017 and the hosting of the One Planet Summit in December 2017 were coordinated efforts to retain control of the overall climate narrative and through this, keep the 'Paris prophecy' alive. In our view, these and other concerted efforts to 'save' the Paris agreement and 'ramp up ambition', by being almost exclusively centred on the production of narratives and signals, pose the risk of further 'virtualising' global climate governance (Carrier and West 2009). Moreover, the Paris approach's 'performative' dimension complicates the task of publicly recognising that targets—such as the 1.5 °C target—are out of reach (Geden 2015a). Faced with the need to uphold a positive storyline, stakeholders of global climate governance are incentivised to 'move the goal posts' through 'creative accounting' or unproven techno-fixes, as exemplified by the massive amounts of 'negative emission technologies' included in global decarbonisation scenarios (Anderson 2015; Geden 2015b). By doing so, they risk delaying the necessary acknowledgement that current modes of development are inherently unsustainable.

Uneven political geographies of global regulation

In other words, there is a real danger of deepening the rift between an 'international community' seemingly committed to ambitious climate action and the reality of 'business as usual' in a rapidly warming world. This discrepancy is not unique to the current period. The last decades saw a growing disconnect, or 'schism' (Aykut and Dahan 2015; Aykut 2016), between, on the one hand, a slow and procedural UN arena focused on negotiating carbon emission reductions, and on the other hand, a staggering acceleration of a series of phenomena that are at the heart of the climate crisis but outside of climate governance's remit. Chief among these are the dynamics of economic and financial globalisation, the expansion of extractivist development models and the global spread of Western consumerist lifestyles. Indeed, 'climate policy' is an inherently crosscutting policy domain. It touches on a range of very different issues, from development and energy policy, to trade and financial regulation, as well as agriculture and urban planning. Yet, the governance of these issues follows very different logics.

The voluntary and soft-law approach to climate governance contrasts with the situation in other issue areas. Some of these are regulated through 'hard law', enforced by international organisations, while others are exempt from global regulation, and governed instead through global market dynamics and power relations (Kingsbury 2011). Each governance arrangement draws on specific tools and mechanisms to exert influence on relevant actors and practices. The shift in global climate

governance brought about through the Paris agreement has exacerbated these differences. Indeed, while it is very ambitious in terms of its global temperature targets, the Paris agreement is evasive when it comes to spelling out the changes that will be required to attain them. There is no mention, for instance, of phasing out fossil fuels or 'decarbonising' the global economy, nor, for that matter, of encouraging renewables or energy efficiency. Another important issue that is completely absent from the text is international trade regulation (Brandi et al. 2015). This links back to the 'fragmentation' of global governance, whereby the management of a problem falls upon diverse international organisations with potentially contradictory objectives (Biermann et al. 2009). These fragmentations owe nothing to chance but are rather the product of structural 'selectivities' that are rooted in the global order and protected by powerful interests (Brunnengräber 2013). Saudi Arabia and other fossil fuel interests, for instance, actively worked to prevent any discussion on energy questions within the Climate Convention, so as to thwart any international regulation in that domain (Aykut and Castro 2017; Depledge 2008). The same applies to trade, whose absence from the climate negotiations is due to the active efforts of a coalition of industrialised and emerging economies (Luterbacher and Norrlöf 2001). It is worth noting, however, that the similarities between the two cases stop there. Unlike energy, international trade is regulated through a fairly robust international organisation, the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and a number of legally binding bilateral treaties (Mattli and Woods 2009). From 'non-governed' issues where the strongest get their way (such as energy), to issues that are regulated through legally binding treaties (such as trade), to those managed through *soft law* (such as human rights and most environmental issues), we are in the midst of an increasingly complex global governance landscape. This landscape is not set in stone but is the product of political strategies and historical struggles that continue to act as barriers to an effective management of the climate crisis. The multi-dimensional nature of the problem calls for an in-depth rethinking of the established global order, beginning with the existing division of labour and hierarchy between international organisations, and the regulatory void when it comes to strategic domains such as fossil fuel production and trade.

Concluding remarks

Scholars of international relations generally agree that a central feature of international regimes is that actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations (Krasner 1983). While it has generally been thought that such convergence is best reached through binding regulations and the building of strong international organisations, this no longer holds for Paris-type governance arrangements. A growing body of scholarship therefore examines the Paris shift and considers its consequences. In this article, we argued for the need to broaden the perspective adopted in this literature along two broad lines. We first suggested to re-embed the voluntary turn in climate governance within broader transformations in the ways that global problems are governed. In the course of these transformations, neo-managerial tools and techniques are increasingly adopted by international organisations. Second, we

argued that the new climate governance is not only characterised by institutional innovations. It also builds on narratives and signals as central means of implementation, by aligning actors' expectations and coordinating their behaviour towards a low-carbon future. Based on these observations, we suggest the term *incantatory governance* to characterise the Paris framework. The term highlights the iterative nature of the new 'bottom-up' and voluntary governance process. It also points to the increasing prominence of communicative devices and marketing techniques in global climate governance. Our analysis suggests that both of these evolutions—the rise of 'soft law' approaches and the widespread deployment of communicative techniques—reflect a much broader process: the entry of management culture, techniques and actors into global environmental governance.

Having said this, we consider the analyses laid out in this article as no more than a starting point. We hope that they will inspire further research on the discursive and performative dimensions of the new climate governance, but also beyond. Indeed, given the climate arena's central position in global politics, one can expect other governance spaces to draw inspiration from it. This makes it all the more important to scrutinise the mechanisms of post-Paris climate governance, evaluate their effectiveness, signal potential drawbacks and understand the governance shift's wider implications. One final observation should be made relating to the challenges facing those who express more fundamental reservations about the brave new world of 'performative' or, as we have termed it, 'incantatory' governance. Critical perspectives are important in order to both problematise the selective and fractioned geographies of global regulation and highlight the shortcomings of a climate governance architecture that brushes aside issues that are key to solving the problem. And yet, there is little room for radical or fundamental critique under the current climate governance since such critique risks undermining the 'Paris prophecy' by sending negative 'signals'. How then can we avoid both complacent self-censorship and a sterile, and potentially destructive, critical stance? We can perhaps begin by recognising that in a fractured and divided world, and in the face of multiple and interrelated crises, the Paris agreement provides a snapshot of what can presently be expected from the UN system and the UNFCCC process. It therefore goes without saying that the climate problem cannot be solved within the UN system alone and that the Paris agreement only forms one piece of a much larger puzzle. Solving this puzzle will require actions at multiple levels and in a wide range of arenas. While this includes businesses, it also encompasses states and regulations, other international organisations, as well as collective mobilisations and social movements, which appear as key to shifting current power relations in favour of transformative change. It will also involve long and arduous efforts to re-politicise the climate debate and show the connections between climate change and other important issues that have traditionally been ignored in, or excluded from global climate governance. With their own rituals, heroes and discourses, recent and innovative climate protests, from 'Fridays for future' to Extinction Rebellion, can be interpreted as attempts to do just that.

Our concluding remark is inspired by the current situation of global confinement and lockdown in the struggle against the CoVid-19 virus. In many countries, and especially of the Global North, the measures imposed by governments to address this global health crisis are unprecedented since World War II. The

command-and-control approach combining quarantines, curfews and emergency laws stands at the antipodes of the managerial and 'incantatory' governance approach that we just analysed. It is too soon to say how this crisis and its political and economic consequences will affect the prospects of global decarbonisation. However, the contrast between these two governance models—one centred on transnational coordination through signals and narratives, the other on command-and-control and the sovereign power of nation-states—is striking. It could well be, therefore, that the CoVid-19 experience deeply affects and transforms, yet again, the discursive context of climate governance.

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ORIGINAL ARTICLE

The climate brokers: philanthropy and the shaping of a 'US-compatible' international climate regime

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Abstract

Philanthropic foundations are a mainstay of the international climate debate, and yet they are surprisingly absent from the mainstream academic literature. This article attempts to fill this gap by exploring how philanthropic foundations, through their grantmaking, field-building and convening efforts, sought to shape and orientate the international climate regime. In particular, we show how foundations have historically worked to incorporate US positions into the international climate process. While the foundations and strategies have changed over time, foundations have unfailingly worked to bridge the divide between the US and the international climate policy field.

Keywords Climate philanthropy · Non-state actors · Climate governance · Soft power · Philanthropry

Introduction

The billionaire philanthropist, former New York City mayor and UN Special Envoy for Climate Action, Michael Bloomberg's response to President Trump's decision to exit the Paris agreement is revealing of climate philanthropy's current function in the international climate debate. The day after Trump's announcement, Bloomberg played an active role in staging an impromptu press briefing at the Elysée Palace alongside French president, Emmanuel Macron, and Paris mayor, Anne Hidalgo (Randolph 2019: 348). In addition to its symbolic significance, the content of the press briefing provides important insights into Bloomberg's vision and objectives, and, more broadly, climate philanthropy's current role as 'stopgap' in the face of US federal disengagement. As he explains,

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> The fact of the matter is Americans don't need Washington to meet our Paris commitment. […] So today I want the world to know: the US will meet our Paris commitment. And through a partnership among cities, states and businesses, we will seek to remain part of the Paris Agreement process.[1]

As he goes on to state,

> My foundation, Bloomberg Philanthropies, will help coordinate the US effort which we are calling America's Pledge, and together we will submit a societal NDC [Nationally Determined Contribution], just as every other nation has done. Bloomberg Philanthropies is also committed to providing the 15 million dollars contribution that the UN Climate Secretariat will loose from Washington to ensure that there is no disruption in their work. We will also fulfil the Paris Agreement reporting requirements so the world can track our progress. Just as they can with any nation.[2]

On the back of the press conference, Bloomberg and other climate funders helped orchestrate a series of climate-related initiatives and events whose purpose was to both keep the Paris Agreement alive and preserve the US's status as key player in the international climate regime. In particular, this involved further shifting the emphasis away from the Party-led UNFCCC process, and towards a range of high-level initiatives where cities, businesses and states—and especially US cities, businesses and states—held centre stage.

A few weeks after the Paris press conference, Michael Bloomberg and California Governor Jerry Brown launched, in July 2017, the America's Pledge initiative, to 'aggregate and quantify the actions of states, cities and businesses and other non-national actors in the USA to drive down their greenhouse gas emissions consistent with the goals of the Paris Agreement.'[3] Four months later, and literally metres away from the official COP23 conference, at the 'Bonn Zone' climate action space, Bloomberg and Brown officially launched 'We Are Still In', a coalition of businesses, NGOs, and Democratic and Republican state and local government officials committed to meet—and even surpass—the US's Paris agreement commitments.[4]

Following on from Bonn, Bloomberg, through his foundation, Bloomberg Philanthropies, helped fund and organize—in partnership with the French presidency and the World Bank—the One Planet Summit in Paris on 12 December 2017 (European Climate Foundation 2018: 9). As Emmanuel Macron explained at a high-level dinner held on the eve of the Summit, 'without the very strong, active and rapid commitment of Mike Bloomberg, this kind of event would have been impossible.

[1] https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2017/06/02/point-presse-a-l-issue-de-l-entretien-avec-michael-bloomberg-envoye-special-des-nations-unies-pour-les-villes-et-le-changement-climatique-et-anne-hidalgo-marie-de-paris-2 (accessed 16/10/19).

[2] https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2017/06/02/point-presse-a-l-issue-de-l-entretien-avec-michael-bloomberg-envoye-special-des-nations-unies-pour-les-villes-et-le-changement-climatique-et-anne-hidalgo-marie-de-paris-2 (accessed 16/10/19).

[3] https://www.americaspledgeonclimate.com/about/ (accessed 16/10/19).

[4] https://www.wearestillin.com/ (accessed 16/10/19).

So thanks very much Mike for not just organizing the dinner but the full event.'[5] In addition to marking the agreement's second anniversary, the Summit's purpose was to reassert the international community's commitment to achieving the goals laid down in the Paris Agreement, in particular through the showcasing of non-state and sub-state efforts and commitments.

Philanthropic foundations were especially visible during the Summit. Alongside heads of state, business CEOs and other global 'leaders', the Summit was an opportunity for foundations to announce new climate-related initiatives and investments. Bill Gates, for example, announced that his foundation, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, would allocate 315 million USD between 2018 and 2020 on research to help the poorest farmers, especially in Africa, adapt to climate change. On the eve of the Summit, the Hewlett foundation announced that it would spend 600 million USD over 5 years (2018–2023) to combat climate change. In addition to individual announcements, the Summit also provided foundations with a platform on which to raise their public profile. On the morning of the Summit, a group of philanthropists and foundation representatives[6] met with President Macron at the Elysée Palace where participants agreed to launch a 'taskforce on philanthropic innovation' to 'establish a framework for partnership between government and philanthropy to leverage and magnify each side's financing' (Présidence de la République 2017).

Subsequent foundation-backed events, such as the Global Climate Action Summit (September 2018) in San Francisco, the second One Planet Summit (October 2018) and the UN Climate Action Summit (September 2019) in New York, are further examples of climate funders' efforts to keep the Paris agreement alive and to 'fill the void' created by Trump's announcement. The purpose of these well-orchestrated and choreographed events was to make sure that the international community—and especially other major emitters such as China—remained committed to the targets and roadmap laid out in a climate deal that 'meets all key demands of the US' (Dimitrov 2016, 8). For this to happen, and pending a return to a more favourable domestic political context, it was essential to nurture the idea (or illusion?) that the USA, through its businesses, investors, states, cities and, of course, philanthropists, were 'still in'.

These and other initiatives are the most recent and visible expression of 40 years of philanthropic efforts to deliver an international response to a global crisis. They also signal foundations' embeddedness within the international climate regime (Morena 2016). While the foundations and strategies have changed over time, foundations have unfailingly sought to bridge the divide between the USA, the 'single largest contributor of greenhouse emissions, on both a gross and a per capita basis' (Agrawala and Andresen 1999, 457), and the international climate policy space.

[5] https://www.elysee.fr/emmanuel-macron/2017/12/14/diner-a-loccasion-du-one-planet-summit-organise-par-bloomberg.

[6] Michael Bloomberg (Bloomberg Philanthropies), Stephen Brenninkmeijer (Willows Capital), Richard Branson (Virgin), Bill Gates (Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation), Eric Gimon (Hewlett Foundation), Christopher Hohn (CIFF), Caio Koch-Weser (ECF), Larry Kramer (Hewlett Foundation), John McCall MacBain (Pamoja Capital), Craig McCaw (Pendrell), Jean Oelwang (Virgin Unite), Kristian Parker (Oak), Laura Baxter-Simons (Renaissance, Sea Change), Nat Simons (Prelude Ventures, Sea Change).

This meant addressing Washington's 'guardedly cautious' approach to international action, especially when binding targets and timetables are concerned (Bakker and Francioni 2014, 4–5; Gupta 2014; Agrawala and Andresen 2001, 119), as well as factoring in US domestic politics, and the fact that, as George H.W. Bush explained, the 'American way of life is not up for negotiation'.[7] As we will show, this led foundations to develop, support and orchestrate a range of initiatives whose content and orientation were consistent with US domestic politics and the liberal environmentalist compromise that dominated US foreign policy responses to climate change until Trump's election (Bernstein 2002a, b).

Given their historic ties with US foreign policy circles, their longstanding commitment to 'the amicable adjustment of national differences', and their active role in forging an international climate regime and attendant 'civil society', US foundations were ideally positioned to mediate between US domestic and foreign policy interests, and the international climate policy space (Guilhot 2011, 141; Milkoreit 2019). The study of their involvement in the international climate debate provides important insights into how US domestic politics feeds into the international climate policy process and more specifically how the alignment of international negotiations on the US position helped deliver the Paris outcome (Milkoreit 2019; Agrawala and Andresen 1999, 2001).

Foundations as instruments of US soft power

Over the course of the twentieth century, and as partners and collaborators of Washington on the international stage, foundations 'allowed themselves to be used as private instruments of public policy' (Berghahn 1999, 386) in return for government sanctioned 'prestige and influence as they operated around the world' (Walker 2018, 158). As Parmar (2014: 256) explains, foundations like Rockefeller, Ford and Carnegie contributed to 'marginalize "isolationism" as a major force in US politics by

> [building] or [reforming] aspects of the US. State's foreign affairs capacities during World War II, [harnessing] their power to the American state during the Cold War, and [helping] to develop the key political and security concepts that guided American power through the period since the collapse of the Soviet bloc.

As instruments of soft power, they consolidated US command in international affairs, projected US cultural values and a 'liberal order […] composed of alliances such as NATO, multilateral organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the U.N., and trade agreements such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Walker 2018, 159; Parmar and Rietzler 2014; Jenkins 2007). In the process, they cultivated a form of 'American universalism' which Ludovic Tournès (2007: 173) describes as the deeply entrenched 'belief that what is good for the USA is also good for the rest of the world'.

[7] https://www.economist.com/leaders/2003/02/13/a-greener-bush (accessed 08/02/20).

As we will see, philanthropic strategies towards the international climate policy space evolved over time, reflecting broader fluctuations in the USA and international political and diplomatic landscapes. We can identify three broad periods of philanthropic engagement in the period leading up to the 2015 Paris COP. A first, spanning from the early 1980s to the late 1990s, was characterized by philanthropic efforts to establish an international climate regime, and to get Washington to commit to it—or at the very least not obstruct it. A second, spanning from the early 2000s to the Copenhagen COP (2009), was characterized by a marked shift in climate funder priorities. Instead of trying to change Washington's approach, foundations now acted to adjust, through targeted and joint efforts, the international policy architecture to the US position by getting key stakeholders to adopt a bottom-up, pledge and review approach to international climate action. Building on the Copenhagen experience, a third phase involved ensuring that not just states but 'society' as a whole was aligned with the US position. In particular, this involved shaping the overall climate narrative so as to strengthen and 'normalize' the bottom-up approach that would ultimately prevail in Paris.

Building an international climate regime

Over the course of the 1980s and 1990s, philanthropic foundations helped turn global warming into a legitimate political and social problem in the USA, as well as forge an international climate governance regime centred on new international institutions and processes—the IPCC and UNFCCC—and 'global civil society' on climate change (Hemphill 2013, 10). These efforts built on earlier philanthropic efforts begun in the 1970s and centred on supporting scientific research on climate in the USA and overseas. The Rockefeller Foundation, in particular, funded work on climate science. Noteworthy grantees included the University of East Anglia's Climatic Research Unit and the National Center for Atmospheric Research in Bolder, Colorado. Through its Conflict in International Relations (CIR) programme, it funded a series of international workshops and publications on the 'implications of climate modification for interstate conflict',[8] especially for 'the USA, as world power, and major food producer and technological innovator.'[9] While still very much focused on the climate science and the production of a shared understanding of the problem, the foundation also recognized that given 'the range, complexity and urgency of the issues raised', international regulation or agreements would be required.[10]

[8] From the minutes of the Rockefeller Foundation file entitled 'International Federation of Institutes for Advanced Studies'. 10/05/1973. Rockefeller Foundation Records, RG 1.8, Series 155, Box 1176, Folder 7949.

[9] From the first draft of report on climate change, food production and interstate conflict. Rockefeller Foundation Records, SG 1.3-1.8, Series 120, Box 662, Folder 4360.

[10] From the minutes of the Rockefeller Foundation file entitled 'International Federation of Institutes for Advanced Studies'. 10/05/1973. Rockefeller Foundation Records, RG 1.8, Series 155, Box 1176, Folder 7949. From the first draft of report on climate change, food production and interstate conflict. Rockefeller Foundation Records, SG 1.3-1.8, Series 120, Box 662, Folder 4360.

This fledgling interest in international policy responses to climate change coincided with growing 'international collaboration and the use of international organizations to promote [a] "new world order", which was to replace the realist international system of bipolarity and balance of power that had dominated the Cold War era' (Krahmann 2005, 532). In the environmental field, the 1972 Stockholm Conference marked a key milestone in this respect. It paved the way for a series of international environmental initiatives and processes, which directly and indirectly benefited from philanthropic support. Mirroring these developments, large US foundations launched 'global' environmental programmes 'to support work promoting the skills, attitudes, relationships and institutions necessary for environmentally sound international development' (Rockefeller Foundation 1990). Notable examples include the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation's 'World Environment and Resources' program, the Rockefeller Foundation's 'Global Environment' programme (1989) and the Rockefeller Brothers Fund's (RBF) 'One world: sustainable resource use' program (1983) (Kohler 2007, 179).

It was only in the early to mid-1980s that foundations actively began to support efforts to devise, agree to and implement a global policy response to the climate issue. The Rockefeller Brothers Fund (RBF) in particular played a leading role in the period surrounding the creation of the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC 1988), and during the negotiations phase leading up to the Second World Climate Conference (1990) and the establishment of the UNFCCC (1992). In 1985, and following a period of internal and external consultations, the Fund

> concluded that a carefully orchestrated series of international meetings and published analyses over the five-year period leading up to the conference could advance public understanding of the climate change issue to the point where the conference's discussions would focus on more than just atmospheric science.[11]

This involved supporting a small group of non-governmental organisations—most notably, the Beijer Institute (Stockholm), the Environmental Defense Fund (New York) and the Woods Hole Research Center (Massachusetts)—'that had agreed to work together to plan and sponsor the meetings and publications that were contemplated'.[12] Through its focus on a relatively small group of influential and well-respected non-governmental organisations, the Fund wished to exert outside pressure on governments, and in particular the US administration. As an RBF programme officer explains, 'given the glacial pace at which governments around the world appear to be moving towards coordinated action to address the problem', the Fund felt that there was 'an important behind-the-scenes role to be played by thoughtful and well-placed non-governmental organizations that are free from the

[11] From the agenda and docket for the RBF executive committee meeting. 04/09/1991. Rockefeller Brothers Fund Records, RG 3, Series 2, Box 1447, Folder 9055.

[12] From the agenda and docket for the RBF executive committee meeting. 04/09/1991. Rockefeller Brothers Fund Records, RG 3, Series 2, Box 1447, Folder 9055.

political considerations that are constraining government initiatives'.[13] From 1988 onwards, a particular concern was 'to prevent the IPCC process from being held hostage by those nations that either did not wish to acknowledge the problem or felt that coordinated policy responses to it were premature'.[14]

From a very early stage, the US government was singled out as 'an obstacle to discussions of forward-looking, remedial measures'. While no longer questioning the science—as had been the case less than a decade earlier—, it 'steadfastly refused to consider language setting quantitative targets to stabilize CO_2 emissions—much less reduce them' and opposed proposals for significant North–South transfers (Saunders Davenport 2006, 179). The US position was consistent with earlier positions in the environmental field, most notably in the lead-up to Stockholm (1972) and reflected a broader refusal to sign or ratify other major international agreements or conventions (Keating 2012). As one RBF programme officer wrote,

> while the American public's understanding of the climate issue is far greater than it was five years ago, there is an absence of political will at the national level to commit the US government to a leadership role in the international negotiations. In view of this circumstance, pressure applied from outside, most especially from Europe and ironically Japan, will be critical to the success of national efforts to address the problem in a coordinated fashion.[15]

Given that 'leadership at the governmental level on the issue of global warming is coming at present from Europe, not from the USA',[16] the Fund prioritized support to European climate NGOs and networks. Chief among these were the Beijer Institute (which would later become the Stockholm Environmental Institute), and the Climate Action Network Europe (CAN Europe), which was launched in large part through RBF and German Marshall Fund funding.

In addition to funding climate NGOs and networks, foundations also played a key convening role by hosting and facilitating climate-related events and meetings, contributing, in the process, to nurture a shared understanding of the climate issue among scientists, policy experts, NGO, business and government representatives from the global North and South. In 1987, for example, RBF, the Rockefeller Foundation and the W. Alton Jones Foundation co-sponsored two workshops in Villach (Austria), and in the Rockefeller-owned Bellagio centre in northern Italy, which led to the creation of the IPCC (Agrawala 1998). Bringing together 24 participants, the second workshop focused on future policy steps and the institutional arrangements required for their implementation. A third workshop in Woods Hole in 1988 laid the groundwork for the future climate convention. A further meeting 'of national

[13] From the agenda and docket for the RBF executive committee meeting. 27/06/1989. Rockefeller Brothers Fund Records, RG 3, Series 2, Box 1446, Folder 9048.

[14] From the agenda and docket for the RBF executive committee meeting. 04/09/1991. Rockefeller Brothers Fund Records, RG 3, Series 2, Box 1447, Folder 9055.

[15] From the agenda and docket for the RBF executive committee meeting. 04/09/1991. Rockefeller Brothers Fund Records, RG 3, Series 2, Box 1447, Folder 9055.

[16] From a memorandum drafted by William F. McCalpin to RBF Files. 01/06/1989. Rockefeller Brothers Fund Records, RG 3, Series 2, Box 1446, Folder 9048.

delegates from the global climate change negotiations, academicians, members of non-governmental organizations, and UN officials' was organized in Bellagio in 1992 in the run-up to the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio (Rockefeller Foundation 1993).

US focus

The establishment of the IPCC in 1988 and the prospect of an international climate convention encouraged foundations to extend their efforts to the US domestic level, especially in the light of the US's overall responsibility in the climate problem. By 1992, and from the moment that the UNFCCC was in place, the challenge for US foundations became of getting the executive branch to commit to an ambitious and legally binding international climate agreement. As Agrawal and Andresen explain, it was no longer about *whether* the USA should reduce its emissions but *how* and *by when* (Agrawala and Andresen 2001, 121). As before, the idea was to exert pressure on the US administration, in particular through support to Washington-based think tanks and pressure groups like the World Resources Institute, the Renew America Project, and the US Senate-based Environmental and Energy Study Institute (co-chaired by Senator Al Gore).[17] Foundation representatives also drew on their personal ties with US government officials—from the State Department, the Environment Protection Agency (EPA)—to both identify opportunities for action and test innovative ideas.

In parallel and in an attempt to generate momentum around the climate issue at the US domestic level, foundations also focused on a range of sub-national and non-state stakeholders, as well as the general public. A handful of well-endowed liberal foundations experimented new, innovative ways of influencing the domestic climate debate. Their efforts increasingly responded to those of an influential and highly effective 'climate change counter-movement' (CCCM) which, in addition to undermining the science also focused on the negative economic impacts of climate action (Brulle 2013; Mayer 2016). Given growing domestic interest and receptiveness towards energy-related issues among certain utility companies, state energy regulators, environmentalists and policy makers, the Rockefeller and MacArthur foundations, in partnership with the Pew Charitable Trusts, launched in 1991 a new 'pass-through' foundation dedicated to '[increasing] energy efficiency and renewable energy as a path towards a sustainable energy future': the Energy Foundation (Harvey 1999, 18).

By framing the climate issue through the very concrete energy lens, the three foundations wished to mobilize a wider public by emphasizing the tangible benefits for consumers and businesses—and counter the anti-climate rhetoric in the process. As Goldmark explains, 'no reasonable person, it seems to those of us who became converted to the cause of improved energy practices, can fail to appreciate the considerable opportunity that lies ahead'. As he goes on to write:

[17] Environmental and Energy Study Institute: Proposal for a project to prevent global climate change. December 1988. Rockefeller Brothers Fund Records, RG 3.4, Box 98, Folder 539.

> The opportunity can be seized upon for reasons of a cleaner, healthier environment, for reasons of economic competitiveness and growth, for reasons of strengthened international security, or for reasons of global citizenship. Whatever the preferred reason – and the foundations believe all four matter – it defies logic, common sense, and self-interest for the United States to persist in its wasteful energy practices and to drive into the next century as if fossil fuels are limitless and benign (Rockefeller Foundation 1991).

As a re-granting or 'pass-through' foundation, the Energy Foundation '[specialises] as a strategic intermediary, to get the money working in the field' (Energy Foundation 2001). To do so, its priority was to get policymakers and NGOs to create an environment that is conducive to corporate investments in energy efficiency and renewables. Through its sub-national efforts, the Energy Foundation contributed to shape and push through state standards in the areas of renewable energy and energy efficiency in utilities, appliances, vehicles and construction. By the late 1990s, the Energy Foundation was regularly referred to as a model to follow by liberal philanthropists involved in the climate debate. Many of them went on to become Energy Foundation funders—Mertz-Gilmore (1996), McKnight (1998), Packard (1999) and Hewlett (2001), among others. By 1998, contributions to the Energy Foundation were in excess of USD 100 million.

The launch of the Energy Foundation echoes a broader and growing interest within US philanthropic, environmentalist and policy circles for business-focused low-carbon strategies. Throughout the 1990s, a number of national 'big greens' proceeded, with foundation backing, to nurture close working relations with 'progressive' members of the US business community. Instead of calling for more stringent regulation, they enthusiastically embraced the idea that, given the right incentives and support, businesses and investors could play a leadership role in the low-carbon transition (Dowie 1996, 106). As Jay Hair of the National Wildlife Federation explained, 'our arguments must translate into profits, earnings, productivity and economic incentives for industry' (Dowie 1996, 107). This was perfectly in line with the Clinton/Gore administration's pro-business, 'new democrat' climate agenda; an agenda, as Agrawala and Andresen write when commenting on the 1993 Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP), 'that was more carrot than stick to curb greenhouse emissions' (Agrawala and Andresen 2001, 121). It also echoed a growing realization within corporate circles that 'there was a strong "business case" for action on climate change' (Newell and Paterson 2010, 36).

Shaping a US-compatible agreement

The Energy Foundation and other associated efforts inspired a new era of international philanthropic action in the lead-up to Copenhagen, especially in view of Washington's continued reluctance to commit to legally binding and ambitious emissions reduction targets. While the Clinton/Gore administration helped broker the Kyoto protocol, the Senate's passing' of the so-called Byrd–Hagel Resolution, and its subsequent refusal to ratify Kyoto on the grounds that it spared developing

countries from binding targets and timetables and threatened the international competitiveness of its domestic industries, signalled the need for a different approach to international climate politics. Al Gore's electoral defeat in the 2000 Presidential election, and the victory of George W. Bush, a strong advocate of voluntary, bottom-up action and opponent to the Kyoto protocol, further convinced foundations that a new, US-inspired and US-compatible 'strategic' approach to international climate philanthropy was the only viable option to deliver a global deal. In other words, rather than attempting to change the US position, the priority became of building an international climate policy architecture that was both ambitious in terms of its long-term shared objectives *and* acceptable by the US This involved downplaying the importance of legally binding emissions targets and finding ways of getting all countries, regardless of their differentiated historical responsibilities, to commit to reducing their emissions through nationally determined efforts.

The rise of philanthrocapitalism

Drawing on existing domestic initiatives, and in particular the Energy Foundation, a new brand of climate funders took the lead in developing and deploying this new approach to international climate diplomacy. Over the course of the 1990s and early 2000s, a number of new private foundations were registered, particularly in the San Francisco Bay area. Borne out of the dot-com and financial booms of the 1990s, many expressed an early interest in climate and energy. In a number of cases, this interest mirrored a broader corporate interest in renewable energies and other clean technologies (Newell and Paterson 2010). In addition to more well-established West Coast philanthropies like the Bill and Melinda Gates (2000), Hewlett (1966) and Packard (1964) foundations, noteworthy examples include the Sea Change foundation (launched in 2006 by the clean-tech investor Nathaniel Simons) and the Gordon and Betty Moore foundation (launched in 2000 by the co-founder of Intel).

While still broadly committed to the liberal environmentalist mantra, two main characteristics set this new brand of 'philanthrocapitalists' or 'venture philanthropists' apart from more established liberal foundations such as Ford or Rockefeller. First, they generally share the same 'basic assumption that business, rather than government or civic institutions, [is] the driving force behind all innovation, progress, and social well-being' (Miles 2002, 10). Second, they more openly acknowledge and even celebrate their philanthropy's self-serving nature. These 'successful entrepreneurs-turned-philanthropists' are convinced that given their personal life-stories they are best placed to use 'their business acumen, ambition and 'strategic' mindset' to solve the World's most 'wicked' problems, including climate change (Jenkins 2011, 756). Additionally, and as Linsey McGoey writes, for billionaire philanthropists like Bill Gates, 'not only is it no longer necessary to "disguise" or minimize self-interest, [but] self-interest is championed as the best rationale for helping others. It is seen not as coexisting in tension with altruism, but as a prerequisite for altruism' (McGoey 2015, 20).

This new breed of climate philanthropists explored innovative ways of engaging in the international climate policy space. This involved both highlighting the

potential for sub-national, sector-based climate action in developed *and* developing countries, and simultaneously reorienting the international climate regime in a way that both secures a global climate architecture and simultaneously accommodates the US administration's position. The outcome was a new tech- and venture capitalist infused foundation strategy and accompanying narrative that emphasized the economic benefits of the low-carbon transition and the leadership role of non-state and sub-state actors. Bottom-up voluntary actions, rather than top-down, command-and-control measures, were presented as key to a swift and comprehensive low-carbon transition.

Design to Win and the ClimateWorks network

The publication in 2007 of the Design to Win: Philanthropy's Role in the Fight Against Global Warming report marks a major turning point for international climate philanthropy (California Environmental Associates 2007). As Bartosiewicz and Miley (2013: 30) explain, the report, which was produced by California Environmental Associates (CEA) and commissioned by the Hewlett, Packard, Oak, Doris Duke, Joyce and Energy foundations, 'served as a catalyst for an unprecedented outpouring of funding on energy and climate issues'. In addition to highlighting foundations' comparative advantage, the report sets out a clear set of measurable targets and identifies a series of priority areas for philanthropic engagement. So as to prevent an extra 30-Gt of emissions by 2030, the report suggests concentrating philanthropic efforts on the sectors—power, industry, buildings/construction, transportation, forestry—and regions with the highest mitigation potential: the USA, the European Union, China and India (California Environmental Associates 2007, 6). In all regions, the authors call for the establishment of cap-and-trade systems, which, they believe, 'will help spark innovation and the clean technology markets needed to prevail in the long term' (California Environmental Associates 2007, 6). For these carefully selected sectors and regions, they recommend a 'three-part menu of investments': '[supporting] existing NGOs with deep knowledge of local conditions and needed strategies; cultivate new organizations where necessary'; '[creating] nation-specific expertise to facilitate grant making'; and '[building] International Best Practice Centers for critical "don't lose" sectors to accelerate the diffusion of knowledge and innovation, either by establishing new institutions or linking existing organizations in loose networks' (California Environmental Associates 2007, 8–9).

The Design to Win report directly inspired a group of large liberal foundations—the Hewlett, Packard and McKnight foundations—to launch a new re-granting or pass-through foundation in 2008: the ClimateWorks Foundation (CWF). With initial pledged funding of USD 515 million, CWF's function was to coordinate international philanthropic efforts to fulfil the targets laid out in the Design to Win report. CWF funded and helped coordinate a series of regional/national re-granting foundations—or Regional Climate Foundations (RCF)—and sector-specific 'best practice networks' (Spero 2010, 21). The initial network included the Energy Foundation (USA, the Energy Foundation China, the European Climate Foundation (ECF) and Shakti foundation in India. They acted as 'go-to' knowledge and expertise hubs on

climate and energy-related issues, and strategically channelled philanthropic dollars to carefully selected high impact initiatives and projects.

From its inception, and in keeping with US philanthropic tradition, CWF maintained close working relations with US government circles. The foundation's first board chair was William K. Reilly, former president of the World Wildlife Fund US (1985–1989) and head of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under President George W. Bush senior. He was also a key architect of the 1990 Clean Air bill and led the US delegation to the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio. Reilly also has close connections with the business world. He is a founding partner of Aqua International Partners, a San Francisco-based private equity funded dedicated to investing in companies in the water and renewable energy sectors. Reilly's successor, Susan Tierney, was former Assistant Secretary for Policy at the US Department of Energy in the Clinton Administration, and co-leader of the Department of Energy (DEO) Agency Transition Team as part of the Obama/Biden Presidential Transition Project in 2008. More recently, it is worth noting that the CWF board welcomed Christiana Figueres, former head of the UNFCCC, as well as John Podesta, Hillary Clinton campaign Chairman in 2016, Chair of the Center for American Progress (CAP) and former counsellor to President Barack Obama and chief of staff to President Bill Clinton.

Project Catalyst

In the lead-up to Copenhagen, ClimateWorks, RCFs and leading climate funders launched a two-tier effort that involved promoting emission reduction efforts in key regions and sectors, and simultaneously pushing for an international climate agreement centred on a shared long-term goal and mechanisms to evaluate progress. The approach developed by CWF and RCFs in the lead-up to Copenhagen was aligned to that of the US administration, and in particular its insistence on the need for developing nations, and especially the high-emitting ones, such as China, India, Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico or South Africa, to also commit to emissions reductions (Parker and Karlsson 2018; Obama 2007).

With support from the McKinsey and Co. consultancy firm, whose purpose was to provide key stakeholders in the international negotiation space with 'data, guidance and technical support to advance an international agreement at the Copenhagen meeting' (Project Catalyst 2009a, b), PC actively backed a 'US-friendly' agreement that included a shared, legally binding long-term objective and a mechanism whereby countries are 'strongly encouraged to ratchet up their mitigation commitments to close any gaps between committed actions and what is necessitated by a 2 °C pathway' (Project Catalyst 2009a, b, 6).

As part of the bottom-up or 'building blocks' approach, PC endorsed an international climate architecture that '[creates] the necessary incentives and mandates' to 'help sustain [climate] action and ratchet up ambition over time and through political cycles' (Project Catalyst 2009a, b, 7). For this to happen, they backed an agreement that includes six core elements: a long-term goal of limiting global emissions to 20 Gt (or less) by 2050; developed country commitments to reduce emissions to 25–40% below 1990 levels by 2020; developing country commitments to enact

'climate compatible growth plans'; technology innovation and deployment through various policy incentives; a dramatic scaling-up of the finance and the carbon market system in order to fund adaptation and mitigation efforts; and finally, an enduring yet flexible institutional architecture.

In the months leading up to Copenhagen, and in order to achieve the necessary buy-in from key stakeholders, the PC team set up and coordinated an informal network of approximately 150 climate negotiators, senior government officials, representatives from multilateral institutions, business executives and leading experts from over 30 countries. The overall idea was 'to provide a forum where key participants in the global discussions can informally interact, conduct analyses, jointly problem solve and contribute ideas and proposals to the formal UNFCCC process' (ClimateWorks 2009). In particular, this took the shape of a symposium held in Washington D.C. in March 2009, assembling representatives from governments,[18] think tanks and independent research organisations,[19] intergovernmental organisations (World Bank, OECD, UNEP), the UNFCCC secretariat, the business community,[20] the finance and banking sector,[21] academia,[22] large environmental NGOs and think tanks[23] and of course philanthropy[24] (Project Catalyst 2009a, b).

In addition to facilitating dialogue among key state and non-state actors, PC also produced and commissioned a series of sector- and country-specific analyses to assist countries—and most notably high-emitting developing countries—in their efforts to 'identify and estimate the costs of country-specific carbon abatement programs' (Hewlett Foundation 2009). In the lead-up to Copenhagen, PC, McKinsey and CWF assisted Brazil, China, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico and Papua New Guinea in setting up 'low-carbon growth plans' (LCGP). These included 'a strategic vision (long-term component) and specific actions (short- and medium-term component)' to usher in 'a low carbon and climate-resilient economy and sustainable development' (Metz 2010). Drawing extensively on McKinsey's highly controversial marginal abatement cost curve (Ackerman and Bueno 2011), the plans looked to demonstrate that efforts to reduce emissions would not be done at the expense of economic development, and in the process, get key developing countries to both commit to emissions reductions and warm up to a US-compatible universal agreement grounded on bottom-up efforts.

[18] Ghana, Brazil, Japan, Australia, Ireland, Denmark, Korea, Norway, Mexico, United Kingdom, Spain, Guyana, China, France, Poland, the European Commission, Russia, United States and Tanzania.

[19] The Brookings Institution, The Climate Group, Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research, Pew Center on Climate Change, Stockholm Environmental Institute, E3G and IIED.

[20] Toyota, SunEdison, Shell, Tata BP Solar, Rio Tinto, WBCSD and World Economic Forum.

[21] Deutsche Bank, C-Quest Capital, Merrill Lynch and International Finance Corporation.

[22] Renmin University, Cornell University, Tsinghua University and LSE.

[23] NRDC, WWF, The Nature Conservancy and WRI.

[24] ClimateWorks Foundation, European Climate Foundation, Hewlett Foundation, Packard Foundation, McKnight Foundation, Energy Foundation and Summit Foundation.

Shaping the climate narrative

On the back of Copenhagen, and following a period of intense consultations, CWF, associated funders and RCF came up with a revised strategy for delivering a new international climate agreement. The strategy updated and extended the PC approach while simultaneously '[engaging] new constituencies and [embracing] broader geopolitical discussions' (Mabey et al. 2013, 13). Through the combined efforts of PC and other key stakeholders, the Copenhagen COP, despite its ultimate failure, had laid the groundwork for a new, workable international agreement that was acceptable to the US and other major emitters. As one former PC member explained, it had 'generated a shared understanding of a core deal around mitigation and finance'[25] and 'the deep understanding that we could only get there if we got developing countries to carry the bulk of the mitigation challenge'. This was confirmed by the fact that 'most of its substantive provisions were expanded upon and formally adopted' at the next COP in Cancun in 2010, paving the way for the textual negotiations that began in 2011 (Milkoreit 2019, 1021).

Copenhagen's failure had less to do with its substance than its interpretation and the lack of buy-in within certain sections of the international climate community. By focusing almost exclusively on policy development and deployment and on a narrow group of 'change makers', PC and other key stakeholders had underestimated the impacts of broader political factors, as well as the media and non-state actors (Meier 2015). As ECF wrote in a 2011 strategy document,

> applying the lessons of the last three years, and indeed the previous decades, shows that our focus on the technicalities of good policy, the rational approach to problem solving, can lead us to underestimate the influence of politics, the ultimately human, and often irrational decisions made to address any given issue (European Climate Foundation 2011a, b, 4).

As the document goes on to explain,

> it is therefore vital to take into account the fact that to undertake the radical policy change that will be required […], society as a whole, from the progressive to the conservative, right to left, engaged and disinterested, will be required to move to allow for the policy shift towards the goal of a sustainable future (European Climate Foundation 2011a, b, 4).

For foundations, this involved not only pushing a bottom-up agreement but also shaping and imposing an attending narrative that presented such an agreement as the only viable solution—and, in a parallel move, preventing counter-narratives from taking hold. As Laurence Tubiana, current head of the European Climate Foundation, and former lead negotiator for France, would explain, 'we had to anticipate the interpretation of the agreement. Words contribute as much to change as the

[25] Interview with author.

agreement itself: it is what I call the convergence of rational anticipations'. As she adds, 'the agreement has to be a self-realizing prophecy' (Losson 2015).

The International Policies and Politics Initiative (IPPI)

Under the leadership of Jennifer Morgan (WRI), a well-respected and long-time actor of the UNFCCC process, foundations developed and implemented a three-part strategy involving a series of targeted interventions in national and international arenas to boost domestic climate actions, a well-orchestrated communications campaign to build up momentum in the lead-up to the Paris 'global moment', and the promotion of 'a strong climate regime with binding elements' (European Climate Foundation 2011a, b). Various foundation-backed and foundation-run initiatives were launched to implement this strategy. They were all directly or indirectly connected to the International Policies and Politics Initiative (IPPI), a loose platform for philanthropic cooperation 'designed to help philanthropy identify opportunities for international collaboration, develop joint strategies, and pool and align grant making to achieve greater overall impact' (European Climate Foundation 2014a, b).[26]

Through the work of the Agreement on Climate Transformation 2015 (ACT2015) consortium and in line with the PC approach, IPPI-affiliated actors promoted a bottom-up approach centred on nationally determined commitments rather than agreed and legally binding international targets. Launched in early 2014 and coordinated by the World Resources Institute (WRI), ACT2015 presents itself as

> a consortium of the world's top climate experts from developing and developed countries that has joined together to catalyse discussion and build momentum toward reaching a global climate agreement at the forthcoming UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) summit in December 2015.[27]

In particular, the ACT2015 consortium pushed for the inclusion of two long-term goals: one for mitigation and one for adaptation. Beyond committing countries, the long-term goal on mitigation '[sends] a clear signal to policy makers, businesses, investors, and the public that the low-carbon climate-resilient economy is inevitable' (Morgan et al. 2014, 2). In line with the bottom-up approach, the consortium called for the inclusion of a provision to regularly update commitments through 5-year improvement cycles in three policy areas: mitigation, adaptation and support (capacity building, finance, technology transfer and cooperation). And finally, they called for a set of robust transparency and accountability provisions 'so that governments, companies, and the public have a clear understanding of what countries are doing to shift their economies, build resilience, and, in the case of developed countries, provide support to poorer countries' (Morgan et al. 2014, 5). Through these provisions, the idea was to induce stakeholders to ratchet up their commitments over time.

[26] http://www.wwf-jugend.de/leben/praktika-und-jobs/gruenepraktika-und-jobs;6022 (accessed 04/10/2016).

[27] About ACT 2015.pdf.

Shaping the overall narrative

Beyond its involvement in the negotiations space, IPPI's uniqueness when compared to earlier philanthropic initiatives in the climate realm lay in its strategic channelling of philanthropic dollars to groups and initiatives that strengthened the US-endorsed bottom-up international climate architecture. In particular, this involved '[shaping] the "realm of discourse"' and getting stakeholders involved in the international climate process, the media and, more widely, the general public to rally behind the proposed agreement (Mabey 2014).

As an initiative backed by the most prominent climate funders, IPPI was able to exert tremendous influence—and even pressure—on non-state actors—NGOs, scientists, experts—active in and around the negotiations. It is worth mentioning that, in 2012, it was estimated that the combined spending of just five foundations—four of which funded IPPI—made up approximately 70 per cent of the estimated 350 to 450 million philanthropic dollars allocated to climate mitigation (Solomon et al. 2015).[28] As one environmental NGO representative explains, 'by monopolising the funding streams, IPPI makes it very difficult for those who have different ideas to get funding.'[29] For another NGO representative, IPPI 'sucked the aim out of NGOs and civil society.'[30]

For IPPI, its allies and the foundations that were behind it, 'climate idealists'—the 'mixture of state and non-state actors […] frustrated with the progress made to date […] in light of the necessary emissions reductions required'—were just as dangerous as 'climate deniers' when it came to sealing the deal (Climate Briefing Service 2015). By shedding light, through reports or actions, on the US's historic responsibilities and their lack of ambition, they threatened to derail the overall process (Vidal and Harvey 2013). This grouping together of 'climate idealists' and 'climate deniers' is suggestive of a significant shift in the international climate debate, encouraged and largely orchestrated by IPPI and its allies. Acknowledging the climate problem and devising ways of addressing it were no longer enough to be on the right side of History. It was also compulsory to abide by IPPI's US-sensitive, 'one size fits all' approach to international climate politics.

IPPI's efforts extended to a wide range of non-state actors, active both inside and outside the UNFCCC (de Moor et al. 2017; Newell 2005). So as to more efficiently coordinate the actions and messages of non-state actors, the IPPI team, in particular through the efforts of Jennifer Morgan and Liz Gallagher, launched the Climate Briefing Service (CBS) in late 2014. With support from CIFF, Climateworks, the Villum Foundation, the Hewlett Foundation, the Oak Foundation and Avaaz, the CBS's purpose was to provide real-time and ready-to-use information—in the form of regular briefs—to selected members of the climate community and '[coordinate] voices at national and international levels to help shape the national offers as they

[28] These foundations are the Oak, Hewlett, Packard, Sea Change, Rockefeller and Energy foundations.
[29] Interview with author.
[30] Interview with author.

are being drafted and the thinking around the international agreement'[31] CBS also acted as a global political and communications hub in support of the overall IPPI strategy, bringing together various representatives from the international climate community (environmental and development NGOs, climate networks, campaign groups, think tanks, research organisations, foundations). Members of this 'global team' regularly took part in conference calls, strategy sessions and workshops to share views, information and intelligence on policy-related issues, and collectively establish strategic priorities.

When it comes to communications around the climate science, IPPI-affiliated communications experts worked closely with the IPCC to produce 'digestible summaries', briefing notes, "rebuttal lines" and coordinated press interviews upon the release of the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) in 2014 (ECF 2015). The issue for the IPPI team was making sure that the scientific community not only highlighted the dangers of unmitigated climate change but also did not undermine their efforts to promote an optimistic discourse on the feasibility of a 1.5–2 °C target. During the Paris conference, one of the rare climate scientists to openly voice his concerns about the agreement and feasibility of a 1.5 °C target (given the current level of commitments) was Kevin Anderson, deputy director of the Tyndall Centre for Climate Change Research. Worried by the potential impact of his press conference intervention, attempts were made to dissuade the organizers from allowing him to speak. Looking back at the Paris Conference, Kevin Anderson gives us a sense of this outside pressure on the scientific community when he writes that:

> there was a real sense of unease among many scientists present. The almost euphoric atmosphere that accompanied the circulation of the various drafts could not be squared with their content. Desperate to maintain order, a club of senior figures and influential handlers briefed against those who dared to say so—just look at some of the Twitter discussions! (Anderson 2015a)

As he also wrote, there was, within the scientific community, a genuine 'fear of reprisals and reduced funding' (Anderson 2015a, b).

To generate momentum for a 'global moment' in Paris, members of the climate community affiliated with IPPI orchestrated an international communications strategy that consisted in simultaneously highlighting the dangers of unmitigated climate change—by drawing on the climate science—and emphasizing the economic benefits of immediate and decisive action. The idea was to 'shift the public narrative around the low-carbon transition from costs and barriers to challenges and opportunities' (European Climate Foundation 2014a, b, 30). To do so, communication experts organized collective and personalized media training sessions to assist various stakeholders in their media-related activities—and in the process align and coordinate their messages. Through a loose platform, the Global Strategic Communications Council (GSCC), communications specialists delivered key messages in the climate and energy fields at both the international and national levels. Given their

[31] https://ciff.org/grant-portfolio/climate-briefing-service (accessed September 9, 2015).

role in raising public awareness on the climate issue, carefully selected NGOs also benefited from IPPI support—either in kind or through strategic assistance.

Foundations, through IPPI, pushed through and co-funded a range of projects aimed at increasing the overall level of ambition. In particular, they promoted a 'green growth narrative' by advancing best practices and organizing stakeholder dialogues, as well as outreach and communication to 'business, economic and finance players in developed and emerging economies' (Bowen and Fankhauser 2011, European Climate Foundation 2011a, b). IPPI was involved in initiatives aimed at tracking and assessing national mitigation and finance actions, and building scenarios on what would be required to keep the global temperature increase below 2 °C. Their purpose was as much about evaluating current efforts and pledges as building up momentum, especially in developing countries, for action. It was about getting developing countries to commit to reducing their emissions and showing how, given the right policies, an ambitious long-term temperature target was still in reach. Examples of IPPI-backed projects include the Open Climate Network–Climate Action Tracker joint initiative whose purpose was to produce an actionable assessment of the post-2020 GHG targets of eight top-emitting countries (Brazil, China, EU, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico and the USA).

Concluding remarks

Commenting on the influence of these and related philanthropic efforts, Larry Kramer, President of the Hewlett Foundation, directly attributed the rising level of climate action to his and other foundations' efforts in the run-up to Paris. As he explained:

> In 2007, the globe was on track for say 5 to 6° warming by the end of this century which is civilization ending. We are now, between what's been done and pledged, on track for say 2.7 to 3.2. And when you think about the fact that the entire globe was running on fossil fuels, the entire world economy, that is unbelievable progress. We are one of the most successful philanthropic movements in history.[32]

More generally, and beyond philanthropy's actual role in bringing down emissions, our overview has sought to highlight foundations' historic function as brokers in the international climate space. As funders and field builders, and through their historic function as instruments of US soft power and guardians of the liberal environmentalist compromise, foundations were especially well poised to both identify the roadblocks to US commitment to an international agreement, and possible ways of working around them. Foundations further legitimized their 'bridge builder' status by reasserting their comparative advantage over politicians who 'are fixated on the next election' and CEOs who 'are focused on next quarters' numbers'. Philanthropic foundations, it was argued, were ideally equipped to address the climate

[32] https://www.climateone.org/events/donor-power-influence-climate-philanthropy (accessed 16/10/19).

challenge as they 'have longer time horizons and can tolerate more risk'. As George Polk, tech entrepreneur, former Senior Advisor at McKinsey and active player in the climate philanthropy field points out,

> one advantage foundations have in the policy arena is being shielded both from the political cycles that interrupt policy continuity and coherence and from the market barriers that get in the way of readily available solutions like energy efficiency upgrades in buildings. This means that foundations can often build bridges over tricky waters that governments and firms hesitate to cross (Polk and Heller 2009).

By stressing the importance of bottom-up action and extending climate governance beyond the UNFCCC process, the Paris agreement further raised climate philanthropy's profile and consolidated its position as key ally and go-to intermedy between government and 'civil society'.

Far from raising doubts on its role or the merits of their approach, Donald Trump's election and decision to exit the Paris Agreement further reinforced foundations' status in the international climate policy space. The fact that Bloomberg's and other philanthropies' responses to Trump's isolationist approach were greeted with unanimous applause is revealing of not only foundations' embeddedness in the climate regime, but their broader function as guardians of a U.S-inspired liberal international order.

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ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Reversing *climatisation*: transnational grassroots networks and territorial security discourse in a fragmented global climate governance

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Abstract
Created in 2010 during the international climate conference in Cancún, Mexico, the Mesoamerican alliance of peoples and forests (AMPB) lobbies for the recognition of territorial rights, which it frames as a fundamental safeguard in the global fight against climate change. On the one hand, it seeks to participate in global climate arenas, so as to capture the wide political and financial opportunities this context offers. On the other hand, it contests the "over-*climatisation*" of international debates, fearing that this would side-line the active historical role of local and indigenous communities in forest conservation and carbon storage. The paper examines the strategies mobilised by transnational grassroots networks ahead, during and beyond COP21 considered as a critical moment in global climate governance. One of the main results relates to the existence of a reversed *climatisation* process after the failed attempts to position territorial security issues in climate arenas.

Keywords Transnational grassroots networks · Territorial security · Fragmentation · Climatisation · Mesoamerica

Introduction

Since the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP15) on climate change held in Copenhagen, in 2009, the mobilisation of global civil society has considerably increased. This evolution is partly due to the various protests and advocacy actions led by civil society organisations aiming to raise their voice and denounce the domination of

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States, international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and experts over these arenas. Another major paradigm-shift was the extended collaboration between traditional INGOs and transnational grassroots movements[1] and civil society organisations. This evolution led to the emergence of a new generation of climate movements and networks, such as 350.org or the climate action network (CAN), which seek to influence international climate negotiations from the inside or through more radical protests (de Moor et al. 2017).

It has been argued that indigenous and grassroots organisations have significantly contributed to the democratisation of international climate arenas, in the context of the new political opportunities brought by forest issues (Claeys and Delgado 2017). For example, during COP13 held in Bali, in 2007, the program on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) has been created. The program aims to conserve the carbon contained in forests through financial incentives. This article argues that indigenous and community forestry organisations have used REDD+ as an opportunity to improve political and financial resources for the defence of territorial security as their main priority action. Moreover, the creation of the Green Climate Fund[2] in 2010 marks an opportunity for these actors to increase their financial resources and legitimacy to participate in decision-making processes.

The case study of the Mesoamerican alliance of peoples and forests (AMPB), presented in this article, illustrates the increasing mobilisation of *climatisation* framing strategies ahead and during the 2015 Paris climate conference (COP21). AMPB is composed of both indigenous and community forestry organisations of the Mesoamerican region. AMPB has progressively moved its strategies to defend territorial security towards international climate arenas in the context of the increased challenges and opportunities brought by the negotiation of the Paris Agreement during COP21. Moreover, AMPB's leaders have sought to take advantage of the previous advocacy actions led in international arenas by other transnational indigenous networks, especially the Coordinator of Indigenous Organisations of the Amazonian Basin (COICA), in order to strengthen territorial security issues at the national and local scales.

Over the last years, territorial security has converted into one of the main issues in international debates on climate change and forest conservation. Territorial security refers to the capacity of local actors to control the territory they own, to develop their basic livelihoods, and to decide of their own development path (Larson et al. 2012). Various grassroots movements have initially denounced the threats to territorial security brought by global mitigation programs such as REDD+. Indeed, REDD+ programs tend to disregard local tenure rights and to benefit more to private actors and governments (Schroeder and McDermott 2014). In contrast, in a recent study, the World Resources Institute (WRI) shows the links between securing

[1] The specificity of transnational grassroots movements relies on their self-management and self-membership as the constituent grassroots organisations are both providers and beneficiaries of a collective service (Batliwala 2002).

[2] See the Climate finance roadmap to 100 billion $: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/climate-finance-roadmap-to-us100-billion.

indigenous tenure rights and the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions.[3] Additionally, REDD+ progressively turned to be an opportunity for indigenous organisations to defend territorial rights in the context of the Warsaw Framework defining safeguards and participatory approaches to forest conservation (Savedoff 2018).

However, the climate regime-complex is highly fragmented and can constitute a barrier or a threat for grassroots movements in terms of competition, marginalisation or technicisation of the debates (Orsini 2013; Zelli 2015). The concept of regime-complex refers to the overlaps between several international regimes dealing with a common issue (Raustiala and Victor 2004). The international involvement of transnational grassroots networks also implies a risk of disconnection with their local members and a loss of legitimacy due to the wide resources and time needed to get involved into international arenas.

How do transnational grassroots networks position territorial security issues into international climate arenas? This paper aims to examine the strategies and frames mobilised by transnational grassroots networks in order to position the issue of territorial security in the context of the climate regime-complex fragmentation. Moreover, this paper aims to fill an existing gap in the literature which mainly focuses on INGOs instead of studying the active role of transnational grassroots movements in climate arenas. The analysis is based on qualitative data collected during a 3 years fieldwork in Mesoamerica between 2014 and 2016. It includes semi-structured interviews with the AMPB's main leaders and direct observations during COP20 in Lima, in 2014, and COP21 in Paris, in 2015.[4] Moreover, the paper is based on a critical discourse analysis intended to identify the main discourses on territorial security, the power relations at stake, the way they are mobilised by grassroots leaders as well as their evolution in the context of international climate arenas.

Drawing on the literature on transnational grassroots networks in global environmental governance, this article examines how AMPB frames territorial security as a "forum-linking" solution, indirectly contributing to respond to climate, biodiversity and indigenous rights regimes' overlaps. Going further, it shows how the definition by AMPB of a "post-2015 agenda" focused on biodiversity issues and regional arenas reveals a "forum-shifting" discursive strategy after the Paris Agreement. It finally suggests to what extent AMPB contributes to a wider process of reversed *climatisation* regarding territorial security issues.

[3] Stevens Caleb, Winterbottom Robert, Springer Jenny, Reytar Katie, "Asegurando Derechos, Luchando contra el Cambio Climático", RRI/WRI, 2014.

[4] The events observed during COP20 were the inauguration of the Indigenous Pavilion, a round table on "Territorial rights and community forestry governance for climate mitigation and adaptation" organised by AMPB, a round table on "Indigenous cultural mediators and climate change" organised by RIBCA, a round table on "the Biocultural protocol in Costa Rica" organised by IUCN, a round table on "Building new alliances for sustainability" organised by the Global Landscape Forum (GLF), and a round table on "the Fundamental role played by forests, peoples and communities in the discussions on climate policies and sustainable development", organised by AMPB; The events observed during COP21 were a round table on "Learning from a successful REDD+ project at the earth of the Maya Biosphere Reserve" organised by ACOFOP and AMPB, a side event on "Women from Mesoamerica" organised by AMPB, the Equator Prize Ceremony organised by UNDP, and a round table on "Rights and social participation in REDD+ processes: progress and challenges in Mesoamerica" organised by AMPB.

Transnational grassroots networks engaging in the forest and climate regime-complex

This section discusses what are the forest and climate regime-complex barriers identified in the literature in terms of fragmentation, as well as the resulting protests and strategies deployed by grassroots movements. It highlights how transnational grassroots movements, and especially indigenous movements, actively contributed to increase the centrality of territorial security issues in international climate arenas. It continues with the presentation of the theoretical framework used to identify the strategies mobilised by transnational grassroots networks in the context of the climate regime-complex fragmentation, ranging from forum-linking to forum-shifting strategies.

Territorial security as an increasing priority in international climate debates

Forest conservation issues were progressively included in international climate debates, especially after the creation in 2007 of the REDD mechanism, based on a payment for ecosystem services scheme aiming to conserve carbon contained in forests (Aguilar-Støen et al. 2015). In 2008, REDD was transformed into REDD+ with the objective to integrate conservation goals, sustainable forest management and enhancement of carbon stocks.

However, REDD+ was initially perceived as a top-down and centralised program, leading to conflicts with local and indigenous communities who criticise their lack of inclusion in decision-making processes (Cronkleton et al. 2011; Schroeder and McDermott 2014). Doherty and Schroeder (2011: 69) explain for example that "given the tradition of top-down governance and treaty making on environmental issues, the risk is that REDD+ will prioritize the global set of claims and values to the detriment of local actors". The authors analyse the existing gap between the global technical experts' expectations towards carbon sequestration and conservation, and local actors' expectations towards livelihoods and land titling.

Responding to these scalar mismatches, various initiatives emerged aiming to promote an alternative vision of REDD+. Since 2008, global indigenous leaders expressed their concern with the slogan "No rights, no REDD!" denouncing its carbon-market orientation, the lack of inclusion in decision-making and recognition of territorial rights, and the imprecision regarding who owns the rights on carbon (Claeys and Delgado 2017). When it was launched, one of the main opponents to REDD+ was the Coordinator of Indigenous Organisations of the Amazonian Basin (COICA), a transnational network created in 1984 in the context of regional struggles for indigenous communities' titling and integrated by nine national indigenous federations.[5] Nonetheless, COICA progressively moved from a radical to a proactive

[5] Asociación Interétnica de Desarrollo de la Selva Peruana, AIDESEP; Asociación de Pueblos Amerindios de Guyana, APA; Confederación de los Pueblos Indígenas de Bolivia, CIDOB; Coordinadora de las Organizaciones Indígenas de la Amazonía Brasileña, COIAB; Confederación de las Nacionalidades Indígenas de la Amazonía Ecuatoriana, CONFENIAE; Federación de Organizaciones Amerindias de Guyana Francesa, FOAG; Organización Regional de los Pueblos Indígenas de Amazonas, ORPIA; Organización

position with a perception of REDD+ as an opportunity to pursue its own agenda on territorial rights recognition (Espinoza and Feather 2011).

As a result of these advocacy actions, a right-based framework started to be applied to REDD+ programs after the Warsaw Framework adopted in 2013 during COP19. It highlights the need to secure tenure rights as a precondition to REDD+ implementation (Wallbott 2014). Kowler et al. (2015) identify tenure security as a major co-benefit of REDD+ programs, in the absence of monetary payments from carbon sequestration. Tenure security is a multi-dimensional concept as it not only relies on statutory titling but also on authority in decision-making processes at the local scale, and access and distribution of benefits on the ground (Larson 2010). According to Larson et al. (2012), forest tenure relates to access to and use of forest resources, and determines who owns, uses, manages and makes decisions about these resources. REDD+ and tenure security mutually influence each other in different ways. On the one hand, securing tenure rights facilitates the repartition of responsibilities and benefits, and limits the risks of land-grabbing (McDermott et al. 2012). On the other hand, some studies reveal the potentialities of REDD+ to address tenure security issues when a clear national legal framework exists (Larson et al. 2012).

Other transnational networks recently started to align with COICA's advocacy actions in order to catch the increasing international opportunities brought by the climate regime, especially in the context of COP21 negotiations. This is the case of the Mesoamerican alliance of peoples and forests (AMPB). The network represents ten national or sub-national organisations in Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama.[6] It is managed by an executive commission composed of five elected leaders, one from each country represented, and a general assembly held once a year. Moreover, the creation of AMPB responds to the need to increase the visibility of the Mesoamerican forests in comparison to the Amazon, the Congo Basin and Indonesia, catching most of the climate funds and resources until recently.

AMPB initially defined two distinct agendas in order to better position its claims into international arenas, respectively, the agenda on community forestry governance and the agenda on territorial rights. However, the increasing centrality of the climate regime influenced AMPB's leaders to concentrate their action on the territorial rights agenda. Indeed, the territorial security discourse has gained resonance and visibility in international climate arenas following the mobilisations of indigenous movements. This strategy is part of the symbolic and discursive process of *climatisation* of international arenas, occurring when "actors present particular issues

Footnote 5 (continued)
de los Pueblos Indígenas de Surinam, OIS; Organización de los Pueblos Indígenas de la Amazonía Colombiana, OPIAC.

[6] Association of Forest Communities of Petén (ACOFOP), National Alliance of Community Forest Organisations of Guatemala (ANOFCG), Honduran Federation of Agro-forestry Producers (FEPROAH), Mexican Network of Peasant Forestry Organisations (RED MOCAF), Miskitu Asla Takanka (MASTA) in Honduras, Mayangna Nation, Indigenous Peoples Organisation of the Autonomous Region of Nicaragua (YATAMA), Embera-Wounaan Comarca and Guna General Congress in Panama, and Bribri and Cabecar Indigenous Network (RIBCA) in Costa Rica.

that were formerly unrelated to the climate regime through a 'climatic lens'" (Foyer et al. 2017: 6). In this process, COP21 stands as a major shift in the mobilisation of transnational grassroots networks that needs to be further scrutinised.

Transnational grassroots networks' strategies in the context of the climate regime-complex fragmentation

Such mobilisation and coordination efforts take place in a context of institutional fragmentation, which affects access and opportunities offered to non-state actors (Zelli 2015). Biermann et al. (2009: 16) define institutional fragmentation as "a patchwork of international institutions that are different in their character (organizations, regimes, and implicit norms), their constituencies (public and private), their spatial scope (from bilateral to global), and their subject matter (from specific policy fields to universal concerns)". The authors specify that fragmentation varies depending on the degree of institutional integration or overlaps, the conflicts between norms, and the constellations of actors.

Institutional fragmentation relates to the concept of regime-complex, defined by Orsini et al. (2013: 29) as "a network of three or more international regimes that relate to a common subject matter; exhibit overlapping membership; and generate substantive, normative, or operative interactions recognised as potentially problematic whether or not they are managed effectively". Various authors applied the concept of regime-complex to the study of climate change (Keohane and Victor 2011), genetic resources (Raustiala and Victor 2004), biological diversity (Rosendal 2001), and food security (Margulis 2013).

Regarding forest issues, Giessen (2013) identified the existence of a regime-complex characterised by the diverging interests of States (Ongolo 2015), the division between North and South interests, the domination of a neoliberal approach based on market mechanisms (Cashore 2002), and the emerging power of non-state actors (Arts and Buizer 2009). Four main international regimes deal with forests issues, namely trade, climate change, biodiversity and indigenous rights. Regarding the trade regime, illegal logging is the central issue (Montouroy 2014). The climate regime includes forest issues mainly through mitigation programs such as REDD+ (Schroeder and McDermott 2014). The regime on biodiversity includes for example discussions on the risks of overlaps between biodiversity conservation and carbon storage (Harrison and Paoli 2012). Finally, the Cancun Agreements adopted in 2010 include a right-based framework[7] for REDD+ programs implementation (Wallbott 2014). In this study, we focus specifically on the links between forest, climate, biodiversity and indigenous rights regimes.

[7] According to Wallbott (2014: 1), "a rights-based approach to REDD+ including an emphasis on the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), which recognises IPs' inherent substantive rights, including the right to self-determination, collective rights to lands, territories and resources, and cultural rights, but also their procedural rights and the provision of Free, Prior, and Informed Consent (FPIC)".

The literature highlights the distinct effects of institutional fragmentation on non-state actors' mobilisations (Zelli 2015). On the one hand, fragmentation is analysed as an opportunity for civil society actors to improve their access to international arenas (Biermann et al. 2009; Orsini et al. 2013). On the other hand, fragmentation represents a constraint because of the multiplication of actors involved in international processes, and the resulting competition for the influence of decision-making arenas and exclusion of marginalised actors (Rosendal 2001; Arts and Buizer 2009; Andonova and Mitchell 2010). Several authors refer to the barriers facing non-state actors to access international arenas as the "negotiation burden" (Orsini 2017). Moreover, the international involvement of transnational grassroots networks in the context of fragmentation can produce inter-movements spill-over effects (Hadden 2014). Indeed, facing the costs of their international involvement, movements tend to reproduce other movements' tactics and discourses in order to increase their resonance and impact.

In the context of institutional fragmentation, civil society actors can deploy different strategies. The first strategy is referred to as "forum-shopping" (Raustiala and Victor 2004; Orsini 2013) meaning the capacity of actors to choose the arenas in which to focus their participation and advocacy depending on their receptivity and the goal pursued. Forum-shopping is a direct consequence of the increasing fragmentation of global environmental governance. The second strategy is called "forum-linking" and occurs when actors seek to connect previously conflictive or disconnected arenas in order to serve their own interests. The third strategy is called "forum-shifting" and occurs when actors seek to take advantage of the contradictions existing between different arenas by withdrawing from one regime in order to focus on another one more appropriate or offering more political opportunities.

These strategies to cope with fragmentation interact in different ways with the process of *climatisation*. Foyer and Dumoulin (2017) analyse for example the links between traditional knowledge and climate adaptation policies and programs. They identify the existence of an objectification process by showing how traditional knowledge is used by both international and indigenous actors as a political instrument to re-enchant the technocratic climate arenas and diffuse a positive discourse of indigenous peoples as empowered victim-heroes.

This analytical framework is intended to consider the role of transnational grassroots networks in influencing the international climate regime-complex and taking advantage of its fragmentation. Moreover, this framework facilitates the understanding of the changing strategies and frames deployed by transnational grassroots networks over time. COP21 represents a critical moment to analyse the adoption of *climatisation* strategies and discourses by transnational grassroots networks ahead, during and after the negotiations, but also their limitations and resistances. Referring to COP21, Foyer et al. (2017: 5) explain to what extent "the functions of environmental megaconferences extend beyond the legal documents that they produce: they set global agendas, connect problems, shape common principles, create spaces that allow for the emergence of global leadership, promote capacity building, and contribute to legitimise global institutions".

The increasing *climatisation* of the territorial security discourse until COP21

AMPB's leaders have mobilised territorial security issues as a forum-linking strategy in the perspective of the 2015 Paris climate conference (COP21) challenges, at the intersection between the climate, biodiversity and indigenous rights international regimes. Going further, this strategy reveals a process of *climatisation* implemented by AMPB's leaders who seek to catch the increasing political and financial opportunities emerging through REDD+ programs in the context of the climate regime-complex.

Mobilising territorial security as a forum-linking strategy

Since 2014, AMPB's strategies were increasingly oriented towards international advocacy, aiming to get prepared for COP21 perceived as a main opportunity to obtain recognition and resources for the defence of territorial rights. The AMPB's secretary declared that "one of the strategic actions for us relates to the international climate negotiations. The venue of COP21 in Paris will be the opportunity to position the issues of previous and informed consent and territorial climate funding to ensure that it reaches territorial authorities".[8]

Various AMPB's leaders participated in several parallel international summits intending to prepare their advocacy action to be further implemented in international climate conferences. The Climate Summit held in New-York in 2014, organised in parallel of the World Conference on Indigenous Peoples, was for example the opportunity for AMPB to define and launch a global agenda on territorial rights.[9] This agenda is articulated around four main demands: respect and reconstruction of the ancestral territoriality; territorial climate funding; free, informed and previous consent; and no criminalisation of environmental activists. This global agenda was designed by AMPB's main leaders in partnership with other indigenous and community forestry networks of tropical forests gathered into the Guardians of the Forest alliance. The objective behind this agenda was to reach political decision-makers and international experts who influence international climate arenas. The alliance is composed of AMPB in Mesoamerica, COICA in the Amazon Basin, the Network of Indigenous and Local Communities for the Sustainable Management of Forest Ecosystems in Central Africa (REPALEAC) in the Congo Basin, and the Indonesian Indigenous Peoples Alliance (AMAN).

In the framework of their participation in COP20 in Lima, Peru, AMPB co-created a cinema campaign called *If not us then who?,*[10] aiming to diffuse the global agenda on territorial rights. The campaign was intended to raise awareness of decision-makers and the wider public on the violations of indigenous and local

[8] Interview in Mexico DF, Mexico, 13/07/2014.

[9] "Desde los Pueblos-Territorios hacia un Acuerdo Climático Global", COICA, AIDESEP, Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara, REPALEAC, AMPB, 2014.

[10] International cinema campaign "If not us then who?", AMPB, 2014: http://ifnotusthenwho.me/films/.

communities' rights in tropical forests. One of the main images diffused through the campaign is representing indigenous peoples as tropical forests guardians. One of the videos shows for example the indigenous peoples of the Awas-Tingni territory struggle in Nicaragua threatened by "speculators" and "colons invading their territories". This particular struggle notably led to the creation of a judicial precedent under the Inter-American Human Rights Court (CIDH), "confirming that traditional occupation gives communal land rights to indigenous peoples even in the absence of an official property right".[11] Indigenous movements were instrumental in increasing the campaign's visibility by denouncing the murder a few days before COP20 of the emblematic Asheninka leader Edwin Chota for his environmental activism against illegal logging in the Peruvian Amazon.[12]

AMPB extended this communication strategy in the framework of COP21 through the media campaign *#PaddleToParis* as a metaphor of the indigenous peoples arriving in Paris paddling in the same global canoe. This campaign beneficiated from the support of communication professionals, such as Burness and Purpose, in order to increase the visibility of territorial and indigenous rights issues in international media. The AMPB's technical advisor talks about the complementarity between social media experts and grassroots leaders.[13] The campaign received a Shorty Award in 2016 aimed at rewarding the best actions on social media in favour of global change.[14] The symbolical action of this campaign consisted in crossing the Seine River in a boat bringing together various indigenous leaders and international media representatives. The second round of the campaign was launched during the signature of the Paris Agreement at the United Nations in New-York in April 22nd 2016, also celebrated each year as Earth Day.[15] Several leaders of Mesoamerica, the Amazon Basin, Indonesia and the First Nations of Canada and USA crossed the East River as an action to increase their visibility and unify their mobilisations and demands.

One strategy mobilised by AMPB to defend and promote territorial security issues in the context of its global advocacy is by denouncing the contradictions of the international regimes on climate, biodiversity and indigenous rights. To do so, AMPB highlights the existing gap between the historical role of indigenous peoples in the conservation of biodiversity and carbon sequestration in forests located on their territories and the lack of secured rights to keep fulfilling the international objectives defined. The president of the Mexican Network of Peasant Forestry Organisations (RED MOCAF), member of the AMPB's executive commission, mentioned during the International Panel on Safeguards, which took place in Mexico

[11] Inter-American Human Rights Court, *Mayagna People (Sumo) Awas Tingni c. Nicaragua*, decision of August, 31st, series C, no 79.

[12] Press conference for the official launch of the cinema campaign during COP20: http://ifnotusthenwho.me/conferencia-de-prensa-por-primera-vez-la-viuda-de-edwin-chota-y-otros-asheninkas-asesinados-en-la-selva-lunes-17-de-noviembre-las1400-h-2/.

[13] Interview in Paris, France, 01/12/2015.

[14] "PaddleToParis": http://shortyawards.com/1st-socialgood/paddle-to-paris.

[15] "Global Canoe": http://www.globalcanoe.org/.

in 2014, that "the global environmental agenda is highly focused on climate change mitigation whereas the main preoccupation on the territories is not carbon".[16]

By pointing out these contradictions, AMPB aims to frame territorial security as the only one solution to avoid overlaps and make progress on the distinct objectives defined into the three international regimes. Therefore, whereas territorial security was initially mobilised by AMPB's leaders in order to get support for local territories, it was indirectly converted into a forum-linking strategy. This argument led to the recognition at the global scale of the Cancun Agreements in 2010 defining safeguards to avoid the potential risks of REDD+ on biodiversity conservation.[17] In the same vein, AMPB aims to make territorial security recognised as a central safeguard in REDD+ programs implementation on the ground.

In order to strengthen the scientific relevance of this argument, AMPB's leaders participated in the co-production of several studies related to forest conservation and territorial rights. Ahead of COP21, AMPB co-produced a scientific study in partnership with the Woods Hole Research Centre and the Environmental Defence Fund (EDF) identifying the carbon reserves contained in indigenous territories.[18] The study reveals that 20.1% of the carbon contained in tropical forests is located on indigenous territories of the Guardians of the Forests alliance. Moreover, Mesoamerica holds the higher amount with around 49.3% of sequestrated carbon. AMPB also used a map produced by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) showing the links between indigenous territories, protected areas and ecosystem conservation.[19]

Finally, AMPB is clearly adopting a *climatisation* trajectory and a forum-linking strategy by positioning territorial security issues from indigenous rights arenas towards international climate arenas. The World Conference on Indigenous Peoples and the venue of COP20 in an Amazonian country represented an opportunity for AMPB to create and strengthen a global agenda on territorial rights. Afterwards, AMPB diffused this agenda in COP21 and the UN with the help of international actors, media campaigns and scientific studies focused on the role of indigenous peoples in conserving forests, biodiversity and carbon.

Making Mesoamerica great again: climate opportunism and spill-over

The focus made by AMPB's leaders on territorial security issues can be interpreted as a form of climate opportunism, meaning the strategical use of the increasing opportunities generated by REDD+ programs and other transnational indigenous networks active in climate arenas. From the 1980s, COICA was one of the first movements to make indigenous and territorial rights issues visible at the

[16] Observation of the International Panel on Safeguards, Mexico DF, Mexico, 17/07/2014.

[17] Murray Josil, Jones Julia, "Salvaguardar la biodiversidad en REDD+", CIFOR/CGIAR, 2014.

[18] "Las Reservas de Carbono Forestal Tropical en Territorios Indígenas: un Análisis Global", AMPB, COICA, REPALEAC, AMAN, Noviembre 2015.

[19] See the map here: https://www.iucn.org/es/content/nuevo-mapa-muestra-c%C3%B3mo-los-pueblos-ind%C3%ADgenas-de-centroam%C3%A9rica-ocupan-y-resguardan-gran.

international scale. COICA obtained various progresses related to indigenous rights, previous consent and effective participation in decision-making. COICA's international visibility tends to influence the alignment of AMPB on its claims and strategies. The president of RED MOCAF explains how their "partners of the Amazon are more consolidated on the project of indigenous and territorial climate funding. Therefore, we believe that if their project succeeds, other similar projects could emerge in other regions. The position and recognition of indigenous peoples has more impact nowadays".[20]

Regarding REDD+, COICA created in 2011 its own initiative called the Indigenous Amazonian REDD (RIA). It aims to support indigenous peoples' demands on 100 million hectares of forests in the Amazon, and the regularisation of indigenous communities awaiting recognition, titling or expansion of their land ownership (Espinoza and Feather 2011). A first objective is to integrate climate mitigation programs with national public policies and to make effective indigenous peoples participation. A second objective is to finance indigenous territories titling and securing process, and life plans elaboration or actualisation. A third objective is to design ecosystem services indicators beyond carbon sequestration, such as cultural practices, as the basis of payments for forest conservation. Until now, RIA initiative is still in the making at the international scale and in three pilot countries, namely Peru, Ecuador and Colombia.

AMPB started discussions on the possibility to create a Mesoamerican territorial fund in order to finance climate adaptation programs in the indigenous territories of the region even before its foundation in 2010. However, the increasing visibility of COICA's initiatives at the international scale, such as the "Indigenous Amazon Fund for Humanity"[21] (FIAVH) launched during COP20, motivated AMPB's leaders to accelerate the discussions. The Mesoamerican fund is estimated of an amount of 210 million dollars which could derive from the Green Climate Fund, among other funding sources. It is intended to be managed directly by indigenous and local communities. Some of the territorial experiences that could be financed through the proposal were presented during a regional workshop[22] organised by AMPB in San Salvador, El Salvador, in 2015. These territorial experiences are for example the Guatecarbon initiative developed by the Association of Forest Communities of Petén (ACOFOP) in Guatemala, the program of payment for ecosystem services (PSE) implemented by the Bribri Cabecar Network (RIBCA) in Costa Rica, and the design of an indigenous approach of previous consent, called *Balu Wala*, to be included in REDD+ programs developed by the Embera–Wounaan Congress in Panama.

The partnership established between AMPB and the other members of the Guardians of the Forests alliance is intended to better catch the international opportunities

[20] Interview in Paris, France, 02/12/2015.

[21] Espinoza Roberto, "Pabellón de los Pueblos Indígenas en la COP20-CMNUCC. Visiones y Propuestas Climáticas de los Pueblos Indígenas Los Pueblos-Territorios Indígenas frenan la crisis climática", 2014.

[22] Report of the regional workshop: "Fortaleciendo las capacidades y estructuras de gobernanza de autoridades territoriales para manejar financiamiento climático", 2016, San Salvador, El Salvador.

that were previously inclined towards more visible and priority regions. The AMPB's secretary explains that "one of the objectives is to increase our visibility because the Congo, South-East Asia and the Amazon are the regions receiving all the territorial climate funding. They represent the voice on forest issues in international arenas".[23] One of AMPB's strategic objectives is indeed to increase the visibility of the Mesoamerican region, perceived until now as a "garden" in comparison to other forest basins. According to ACOFOP's director, the objective is to say "we are also here Mesoamerica, there are million hectares of forests here, millions of indigenous, peasants and local communities who have conserved forests. We also exist in parallel of these three forest basins".[24] Whereas this strategy was initially conceived to influence national authorities of the Mesoamerican region aiming to secure territories, the venue of COP21 represented a critical moment for AMPB to implement this strategy.

However, these territorial funding proposals are more based on a political discourse produced to influence climate negotiations than on consolidated projects. The AMPB's secretary explains that "the issue of REDD is not important in itself for the alliance but is an instrument to seat at the international negotiations table along with governments in order to position your own interests".[25] The forests governance program regional coordinator at IUCN confirms this position: "if REDD+ gives them the opportunity to consolidate their territorial rights, so they are going to use REDD+".[26] Therefore, beyond their criticism of the "over-climatisation" and the fragmentation of international arenas, AMPB uses the political and financial opportunities generated by REDD+ and climate mitigation debates in order to defend territorial security issues. This can be interpreted as a process of *climatisation* that implies the strategical use of climate mechanisms to defend issues that were not previously associated to climate issues (Foyer et al. 2017). Nevertheless, the intensive international involvement during COP21 also revealed some limits influencing AMPB's leaders to define a "post-2015 agenda" intended to shift territorial security issues towards other arenas.

The "post-2015 agenda" discursive strategy towards regional arenas

This section discusses the critiques and failures that emerged after COP21 questioning the legitimacy and interest of AMPB to keep engaging at the international scale. The analysis focuses on the changing strategies adopted by AMPB that imply a forum-shifting process towards biodiversity and regional arenas and a reversed *climatisation* trajectory. It further shows to what extent the focus on regional arenas is linked to the new opportunities emerging from the venue of an international

[23] Interview in Mexico DF, Mexico, 13/07/2014.
[24] Interview in Santa Elena, Guatemala, 29/08/2014.
[25] Interview in Mexico DF, Mexico, 13/07/2014.
[26] Interview in San José, Costa Rica, 01/09/2014.

biodiversity conference in Mexico in 2016, as well as the pressures from grassroots members to obtain more direct benefits from the international climate action.

Learning from the climate negotiations failures and resistances

One of the main limits questioning AMPB's international involvement proceeds from the shortcomings of the final Paris Agreement adopted at the end of COP21 negotiations. Indeed, the agreement does not fully include the reference to indigenous and territorial rights. The mention to human rights, including indigenous rights, was removed from article 2 defining the agreement objectives. Some countries traditionally supporting indigenous rights during climate negotiations, such as Norway, have taken a step backward on this issue. For instance, Norway received the Fossil award attributed by the climate action network (CAN) each day of the negotiations to denounce the worst actors.[27] Moreover, a report from the World Resources Institute (WRI) points out the lack of engagement on the issue of securing territorial rights in the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) of the Amazonian countries.[28]

Nonetheless, indigenous peoples obtained some progress for example with the mention of traditional knowledge in the final agreement[29] (preamble and article 7.5). Moreover, the Paris Agreement paves the way for the creation of a UN Platform for indigenous and local communities' climate action. The modalities of the platform have been discussed during a multi-stakeholders dialogue during the Bonn Conference in 2017.[30]

One of the reasons explaining the failure regarding the effective inclusion of territorial rights in the final agreement is the lack of access and voice accorded to indigenous peoples in the official negotiation arenas, called the "blue zone". According to the general cacique of the Embera–Wounaan Congress of Panama, member of the AMPB's executive commission, "there is a big difference between having a space of discussion among indigenous peoples and having an active and full participation inside the negotiations, because the ones participating in the negotiations are governments. Various indigenous leaders are part of national delegations but only to participate in the forums, this is a problem to solve"[31]. This failure reveals

[27] «COP21: Résumé de la première semaine texte de l'Accord remis aux Ministres», *Médiaterre*, 07/12/2015: http://www.mediaterre.org/climat/actu,20151207124138,13.html.

[28] Ding Helen, Veit Peter, Blackman Allen, Gray Erin, Reytar Katie, Altamirano Juan Carlos, Hodgdon Benjamin, "Climate Benefits, Tenure Costs. The Economic Case For Securing Indigenous Land Rights in the Amazon", World Resources Institute, 2016.

[29] For a detailed analysis, see: Foyer Jean & Dumoulin David, "Objectifying traditional knowledge, re-enchanting the struggle against climate change", In Stefan C Aykut, Jean Foyer, Edouard Morena, *Globalising the Climate. COP21 and the climatisation of global debates*, Routledge, 2017.

[30] "New UN Platform for Indigenous and Local Community Climate Action": http://newsroom.unfccc.int/paris-agreement/new-un-platform-to-boost-indigenous-peoples-and-local-communities-climate-action/.

[31] Interview in Lima, Peru, 06/12/2014.

the limits of the *climatisation* process in strengthening voice and access in climate negotiations.

Another critique emerging from AMPB's international involvement during COP21 was the difficulty to link international advocacy and fund management with local demands from the grassroots. The AMPB's coordinator, also member of RIBCA in Costa Rica, explains how "promoting the dialogue and the consensus, arriving in arenas like COP21 in Paris with a territorial agenda, following this agenda and discussing it back again in territorial meetings is really difficult".[32] Moreover, AMPB was the object of critiques because of the lack of transparency and equity in managing international funds. For example, the regional cacique of the Embera Congress in Panama mentions "a supposed project with the Inter-Church Organisation for Development Cooperation (ICCO) on legal issues but we didn't receive nothing until now. It only served to organise workshops, nothing else. As authorities, we don't know how the resources have been used".[33] Beyond the international advocacy and fund management, some local members also demand more political support in case of national and local conflicts.

Finally, some critiques emerged from COICA's leaders denouncing the interference of international partners in the strategies and actions of transnational indigenous networks. Expressing this resistance, COICA made public a declaration on the construction of "global indigenous alliances".[34] In this declaration, COICA asked AMPB to not interfere in its internal political agenda and reminded the temporal character of their partnership during COP20 due to the geographical venue of the event. By this way, COICA asked AMPB to focus back on the Mesoamerican region as its representation area.[35] Few days after its publication, COICA removed the declaration from the public space owing to some private explanations. AMPB and COICA finally maintained their joint activities for the preparation of COP21, especially around communication strategies.[36] However, the incident contributed to exacerbate some internal tensions inside the AMPB's executive commission, revealing the risks of getting involved in *climatisation* strategies.

Shifting territorial security issues to the regional agenda

In order to respond to the failures and critiques previously exposed, the AMPB's executive commission strategically defined during its General Assembly a "post-2015 agenda" considering COP21 as the "end" of its international involvement.[37]

[32] Interview in Puebla, Mexico, 15/07/2014.

[33] Interview in Puebla, Mexico, 15/07/2014.

[34] For political sensitivity reasons and because the declaration has been removed from the public space, we do not cite directly its content.

[35] Interview in Lima, Peru, 13/10/2015.

[36] "Mesoamérica y la Amazonía construyen estrategia de comunicación indígena para la Cumbre de Cambio Climático": http://www.alianzamesoamericana.org/mesoamerica-y-la-amazonia-construyen-estrategia-de-comunicacion-indigena-para-la-cumbre-de-cambio-climatico/.

[37] Observation of the AMPB general assembly during the III Mesoamerican Congress of Community Forestry, Santa Elena, Guatemala, 18/11/2015.

This post-2015 agenda is mainly focused on the Mesoamerican region and the territorial struggles of AMPB's members at the national and local scales. It is also intended to focus on alternative arenas than the climate conferences, such as biodiversity conferences. This evolution can be considered as a forum-shifting strategy implying the move of territorial security issues from international climate arenas towards other arenas or more regional and local priorities. This change contributes to a reversal process of *climatisation* regarding international environmental arenas, and also suggests the strategical and cyclical use of *climatisation*.

The relative disengagement from climate arenas is observable with the weakest participation of AMPB during COP22 held in Marrakech, in 2016. AMPB participated to the conference but only through some of its youngest leaders, member of the newly created Mesoamerican network of social communicators. In continuity with the communication strategy led during the Paris climate conference, AMPB launched a new campaign for COP22 called *#SuenanLosTambores* as a metaphor of the voices resonating around the world on the role of indigenous peoples in forests, carbon and biodiversity conservation.[38]

On the one hand, the post-2015 agenda aims to identify priority territorial struggles and bring support to the AMPB's members when needed. As an illustration, the renewal of community concessions in the Petén forest in Guatemala was defined as a priority by AMPB's leaders. Indeed, ACOFOP and the forest concessions in Petén are considered as a model to follow for the other members. The AMPB's coordinator qualifies ACOFOP of a "community forestry bastion" which failure could entail a "domino effect" in the region. In order to support ACOFOP's struggle, AMPB decided to organise the Mesoamerican Meeting of Community Forestry in Petén, at the end of 2015. The objective was to expose ACOFOP's best practices in the region and to make advocacy towards regional and national governmental authorities.

On the other hand, the post-2015 agenda reveals a forum-shifting strategy towards other international arenas providing new opportunities. For example, the venue of the 13th Conference of the Parties (COP13) under the convention on biological diversity (CBD) held in Cancun, Mexico, was an opportunity for AMPB to extend its advocacy on territorial security issues. Indeed, the geographical proximity of the event provided more incentives for AMPB than engaging in COP22 in Marrakech. During the biodiversity conference, AMPB's leaders positioned the issue of territorial security and indigenous rights, by using the United Nations Special Rapporteur on indigenous rights report on the incidences of conservation and mitigation programs on indigenous rights.[39] The report makes the following relevant observation:

> "As the creation of protected areas and emerging conservation activities is further advanced by climate change initiatives, notably reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries, and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests, and enhancement of forest

[38] "Líderes indígenas y de comunidades forestales entregan el Tambor Global a Patricia Espinosa, líder de ONU en cambio climático": http://www.alianzamesoamericana.org/lideres-indigenas-y-de-comunidades-forestales-entregan-el-tambor-global-a-patricia-espinosa-lider-de-onu-en-cambio-climatico/.

[39] Report of the UN Special Rapporteur on indigenous rights, A/71/229, July 29th 2016.

carbon stocks in developing countries, the active participation of indigenous peoples in these processes is essential to their sustainable success".[40]

One manifestation of the shifting strategy implemented by AMPB is the extension of the media campaign on the global canoe towards the biodiversity conference in Cancun, in partnership with Greenpeace and COICA, intended to increase the visibility of its demands in the framework of the adoption of the Cancun Declaration.[41] Moreover, AMPB adapted the cinema campaign *If not us then who?* to the purpose of the conference. A short documentary was then produced on the Biological Reserve of the Monarca Butterfly, in the region of Michoacán, Mexico, in order to create a parallel event to the official biodiversity conference negotiations.

COP21 represents a critical moment in the strategies deployed by AMPB in order to position territorial rights issues and take advantage of the political and financial opportunities offered at the international scale. There is a move from the pre-COP21 position focused on climate arenas to the post-COP21 position focused on biodiversity arenas and territorial agendas in the Mesoamerican region. However, this shifting strategy is relative and sometimes more focused on discourses, considering the continuous involvement of AMPB's leaders in international climate conferences after COP21. The AMPB case study then reveals both the strategical dimension of the *climatisation* process, when it used to promote territorial security issues visibility at the international scale, and its reversible dimension facing the resistances and limitations of climate arenas involvement.

Discussion and conclusion

In this paper, we have analysed the strategies and frames mobilised by transnational grassroots networks in order to position territorial security issues in the context of the climate regime-complex fragmentation. We have identified in more details two major strategies of forum-linking and forum-shifting articulated around COP21 as a critical moment in the international involvement of these networks. One of the motivations behind this paper was to fill a gap in the literature showing the active role of transnational grassroots networks in dealing with fragmentation and strategically use *climatisation* dynamics for their own interests (Zelli 2015).

AMPB initially defined two separated agendas on community forestry governance on the one hand, and territorial rights on the other. Before the emerging *climatisation* process of international environmental arenas, AMPB adopted a

[40] See also the declarations of the Special Rapporteur on the issue of the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) construction in United States: http://www.ipsnews.net/2017/01/serious-retreats-in-indigenous-rights-protection-says-un-rapporteur/.

[41] "Indigenous peoples and local communities from Mexico, Central America and the Amazon join Greenpeace to demand the recognition of their role in the protection of biodiversity from leaders gathered at COP13": http://www.alianzamesoamericana.org/indigenous-peoples-and-local-communities-from-mexico-central-america-and-the-amazon-join-greenpeace-to-demand-the-recognition-of-their-role-in-the-protection-of-biodiversity-from-leaders-gathered-at/.

forum-shopping strategy by adapting its discourses and actions depending on the arenas and their focus on forest issues or indigenous and territorial rights. However, the increasing centrality of the climate regime, mainly due to the venue of COP21 in 2015 aiming to define new engagements to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, influenced AMPB to increasingly focus its action on climate arenas. Between 2014 and 2015, AMPB's leaders oriented their advocacy on COP21 adopting a forum-linking strategy. This strategy was essentially focused on territorial security issues framed as the only safeguard to deal with the possible negative overlaps between climate, biodiversity and indigenous rights regimes. Moreover, the territorial security frame was strategically used because of its resonance at the international scale and the previous actions led by other transnational indigenous networks such as COICA (Claeys and Delgado 2017).

After 2015, AMPB undertook a shift towards regional arenas partly because of the limits of the Paris agreement in including territorial security issues and the lack of direct benefits for local actors. On the one hand, the Paris agreement does not fully integrate the issue of territorial rights as demanded by the Guardians of the Forests alliance. On the other hand, AMPB has been the target of various critiques from the grassroots and other indigenous networks denouncing the lack of support to national and local territorial struggles. Therefore, AMPB's leaders created the "post-2015 agenda" in order to concentrate their efforts on regional arenas and take the opportunity of an international conference on biodiversity venue in Mexico.

Focusing on territorial security issues has facilitated the understanding of the strategies mobilised by AMPB to deal with and influence international fragmentation. Moreover, the iterative analysis over the years helps grasping the moves undertaken by transnational grassroots networks in their strategies to influence climate negotiations. The focus on the fragmented climate regime-complex illustrates the continuities and ruptures in the international mobilisation of these actors. The *climatisation* process can be interpreted as a response to the high fragmentation of international environmental arenas and discourses, and its limitations for transnational grassroots mobilisations (Foyer et al. 2017). Our analysis also demonstrates the cyclical dimension of *climatisation* and its limitations in responding to fragmentation. This can be seen through the weakening of *climatisation*, at least in discourses, with the progressive disengagement of transnational grassroots networks from climate negotiations towards more regionalised arenas and territorial struggles.

The *climatisation* process is occurring through different dynamics and produces distinct effects for transnational grassroots networks. On the one hand, AMPB has adopted an effective strategy by being selective on the inclusion of the territorial security frame in climate negotiations. Indeed, by putting aside community forestry governance issues, AMPB's leaders have aligned on the resonance and visibility of indigenous and territorial rights discourses in international arenas, and so increased their influence. On the other hand, the critiques and obstacles undertaken by AMPB have influenced its leaders to slow down, or even reverse the trend of the *climatisation* process by focusing back on regional and territorial priorities. However, this reversed *climatisation* is relative considering the continuous mobilisation of AMPB's leaders in international climate conferences after COP21. These observations reveal the multiple forms and intensities of the *climatisation* process. It also

confirms how *climatisation* comes with a price, as it imposes a specific framing, which is scientised, globalizing, carbon-centred and solution-oriented.

Finally, COP21 both represents a positive paradigm-shift in the participation of civil society organisations in international climate arenas but also a challenge and a risk for their involvement in territorial struggles. This balanced reality makes transnational grassroots leaders constantly adapting their strategies and frames over time and space. This echoes the trade-off identified by Foyer and Dumoulin (2017) between the indigenous peoples advocating for the recognition of traditional knowledge in climate arenas, and the resulting reframing in scientised and carbon-centred terms. Therefore, a successful *climatisation* strategy may be linked to the capacity to use it at the right moment, for example during a highly mediatised event as COP21, and to reverse it before losing ground on the initial claims and framings defined.

Compliance with ethical standards

Conflict of interest The authors declare that they have no conflict of interest.

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ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Alternative globalities? Climatization processes and the climate movement beyond COPs

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Abstract

To provide a global answer to a global problem, the climate change movement (CCM) has long organized itself around international organizations and summits. However, waning trust in a multilateral answer to climate change has motivated many in the CCM to abandon their traditional focus on UN climate summits (COPs) and to rely increasingly on decentralized actions and organizing. This fundamental transformation of the CCM has remained understudied. An important emerging question is what role global aspirations still play and how a 'global' CCM can be organized independent of the 'globality' provided by COPs. This article draws on interviews, observations and document analyses around and after the COP21 climate summit (Paris 2015) to offer an exploratory analysis of some of the main goals and efforts to construct alternative 'globalities'. The findings depict both strengths and limitations of these strategies, which inform suggestions for future research.

Keywords Climate change · Social movements · Globality · Strategy · Climate summits · Climatization

Introduction

Starting from an analysis of the climate movement's mobilization around the COP21 Climate Summit in 2015, and a review of several initiatives following from that, this article assesses how climate activists around the world are trying to become globally coordinated while becoming increasingly independent of the UN climate summits, such as through the development of more decentralized campaigns. Climate summits have traditionally provided the movement with its main 'convergence spaces' (Routledge 2003), but are increasingly seen as insignificant political spaces.

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While more institutionalized groups see growing opportunities within the UNFCCC (Bäckstrand et al. 2017), a growing number of activists see attending climate summits as a waste of resources (de Moor 2018). This article therefore aims to tackle a problem that goes to the heart of current-day climate activism, as well as transnational activism and the construction of a global civil society (Scholte 2007) more generally: how can a global problem, like climate change, be addressed at a global level when organizing movements at this scale is riddled with what I have called the 'efficacy dilemma'—meaning that spaces like summits, which enable global convergence, are increasingly associated with limited opportunities to have a meaningful impact (de Moor 2018)?

To address this question, I firstly draw on Bullard and Müller's (2012) notion of 'globality', which they define as 'political/power projects that constitute the global as a space of regulation and of conscious conflict between (organized) social forces'. Late modern globality has been dominated by international organizations, including the UN and its climate summits (COPs). Yet given its arguably withering importance, the climate change movement (CCM) must find new 'alternative globalities'—at least to the extent that it continues to pursue a global answer to the climate crisis and has experienced important shortcomings in previous attempts at developing alternative globalities, such as in the case of alternative summits like the World Social Forum (Buckley 2018).

In addressing questions of globality, this article is mainly concerned with the question of the global framing and coordination of the CCM. Following Ford (2003), 'global' here broadly refers to the notion that tackling climate change requires a common response by humanity—and thus also by social movements—because both the causes and effects of climate change are global in nature. Hence, the global should be understood 'as a causal category rather than a spatial term, thus avoiding the conflation of global with transnational or international' (Ford 2003, p. 121). To understand why organizing a global response by the CCM has proven such a difficult task, I draw on theories of social movements and the challenges of organizing collective action at the transnational and global level.

I then further zoom in on the particular way in which these challenges have materialized and have been addressed previously within the CCM, which has been defined as 'a loose, but nonetheless highly active umbrella structure which is supported, shaped, and used by a multiplicity of civil society actors who are active in climate politics' (Garrelts and Dietz 2014, p. 7). To be clear, the CCM can often not be seen as one movement, but rather as a network with internal cleavages (Hadden 2015; Author). Moreover, there are several transnational dynamics in the CCM, including networks, partnerships, and groups who target various actors across different scales (Tormos-Aponte and García-López 2018). Yet Tormos-Aponte and García-López argue that in this context, '[m]aintaining a unity in movements' diversity is a crucial but challenging task' (2018, p. 287). Put differently, it is currently unclear how a broadly desired (alternative) globality can be created or maintained in a movement that is increasingly 'polycentric'. In the empirical part of the article, I provide an exploratory discussion of why climate activists currently do or do not envision the need for global coordination, and I discuss several attempts to develop global coordination beyond summits, including two initiatives in particular: the

Break Free campaigns of 2016 and 2017, and the radical activist network Climate Justice Action. Both initiatives represent different types of organizing—the coalition and social movement modes of organizing, respectively (Diani and Bison 2004)—which enables an assessment of the potential of each. I conclude by developing several suggestions for future research about the prospects of global coordination in the climate movement.

Climatization and the problem of 'globality'

There is a common notion that 'global problems require global solutions'. For some, 'acting local while thinking global' is a sufficient answer to this, but for others, this notion has introduced the perceived need for a 'globality', or the constitution of a global space of regulation or conflict (Bullard and Müller 2012). With expanding political, economic, and cultural globalization, we have also witnessed an increasing recognition of the global nature of many of society's main problems and an accompanying rise of global or transnational social movements (TSMs) over the past decades (della Porta et al. 1999; della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Tarrow 2005; Reitan 2007). While some, like the Global Justice Movement, have challenged the neoliberal organization of global politics and economics, others, like the CCM, have organized to tackle problems with an important global dimension (Newell 2006; della Porta 2007; Hadden and Tarrow 2007; Flesher Fominaya 2014). Sometimes, the two merge, such as in the climate justice movement, which, among other things, seeks to counter injustices in global climate politics associated with the unequal distribution of responsibilities for, and burdens of, climate change (Hadden 2015).

It may seem obvious that the issue of globality is particularly salient for the CCM, but it is important to recognize that this is related to specific ways of framing the climate crisis and its global scale, and that it is therefore subject to negotiation. In other words, while this article focuses on the organizational challenges created by a perceived need for a (alternative) globality, this issue must be understood against the backdrop of a socially produced perception of the climate crisis and the potential contestation thereof. The point is not to question whether there is a global climate system with global consequences, but rather that this framing is socially produced and *does* certain things. Through processes of *climatization* 'actors present particular issues that were formerly unrelated to the climate regime through a "climatic lens". (…) This leads to the alignment of different topics on the climate problem, and to their treatment according to the dominant logics and practices of the climate regime'. (Aykut et al. 2017, p. 5). As discussed throughout this special issue, these 'logics' and 'practices' include a framing that emphasizes the global nature of the problem over its variations and inequalities; a scientized framing of the problem, focused on models and numbers; and an emphasis on carbon-centred solutions that are focused on positive discourses, technical fixes, and a belief in market solutions.

Several of these elements have been challenged by and within the CCM—especially by climate justice groups. Yet the idea of climatization is still useful for analysing the 'global' nature of the CCM. Firstly, it has important implications for the definition of its boundaries and purposes. Those struggles that self-defined climate

activists (typically from the Global North) define as 'climate struggles', such as deforestation or extractivism, are often experienced and framed rather differently by indigenous or 'frontline' communities (e.g. Tramel 2016; Curnow and Helferty 2018). For the latter, framing such struggles in terms of climate change can be a strategic move to put them on the global agenda or to attract what Keck and Sikkink (1998) have called a 'boomerang effect'. Yet, it can also have a depoliticizing effect as local grievances become absorbed in the homogenizing expression of global temperatures or 'parts per million', which can create an image of 'one planet, one problem' that downplays the conflicting interests at the heart of the problem (Swyngedouw 2009; Kenis and Lievens 2014). In other words, building a global climate movement involves a complex process by which various groups advance, shape, and resists the climatization of distinct struggles (Aykut et al. 2017). And such issues of 'diagnostic framing' (what is the problem?) in turn affect 'prognostic framing' (what needs to be done?) (Snow et al. 2014). In particular, it informs debates about the appropriate level of action: should the climate movement focus on producing a global or a local response, or some middle ground, polycentric and multilevel approach that mirrors that advanced in the Paris Accord (Hale 2016)?

It is against this background that the perceived need for an (alternative) globality needs to be understood. In part, it demands a sensitivity to the ways in which the global nature of the climate crisis and solutions to it are open to negotiation. Yet as some need for a global response by the CCM is widely agreed upon, globality raises the question how diverse movement actors located across the world can 'act at a global level', either around the globality provided by official global governance institutions (Ford 2003), or, as discussed below, around some 'alternative globality' (Bullard and Müller 2012). This question underlines two well-known challenges of social movement organizing.

Firstly, global or transnational movements face a number of amplified *organizational* challenges that already complicate building movements at the local or national level (Bandy and Smith 2005; Smith 2008). According to Tarrow, 'sustaining collective action across borders on the part of people who seldom see one another and who lack embedded relations of trust is difficult' (2005, p. 5). With the increase in geographic, organizational, strategic, and political diversity, it can be hard for social movements working at the transnational level to develop a necessary collective identity and degree of coordination (Reitan 2007; Fominaya 2010). People need to see each other on a regular basis and recognize each other as part of a politically relevant group to enable mobilization, and while social movement organizations (SMOs) can scale up such processes by bridging groups, they can typically only stretch social relations to a limited extent (Gould 1995). SMOs that want to collaborate transnationally consequently face a dilemma as to what 'mode of coordination' they will advance. Diani and Bison introduce a useful distinction: While the 'coalition mode of coordination' establishes typically short-lived instrumental exchanges of resources, social movement modes of coordination consist of 'dense inter-organizational networking, by actors linked by solidarities and shared identities that precede and survive any specific coalitions and campaigns' (2004, p. 283). The social movement mode of coordination may be more likely to yield the necessary sense of collective identity and trust, but as it puts greater requirements of unity it is

much more difficult to realize at a global level than a more superficial coalition. The trade-offs between these modes in the context of transnational climate activism will therefore be explored further in this article.

Secondly, even if working relations can be established, movements still need to find ways to 'converge' (Routledge 2003; Cumbers et al. 2008). They must find spaces—material or otherwise—around which to become organized at a global level to tackle global problems. Finding such spaces is a key element of constituting a 'globality', which has repercussions for the development of trust and collective identity. Yet this is challenging as global problems are often everywhere and nowhere at the same time, which makes targeting them notoriously difficult. Climate activists can raise the issue of climate change at an infinite number of sites where activities contribute to climate change, but therefore face the problem that climate change is caused everywhere and therefore cannot be solved from anywhere in particular. It is difficult to find targets that provide convergence spaces (Routledge 2003) to rally around, making it more difficult to become organized at a global level.

The need for globality: answers and limitations

Whenever movements are discussed in this way, internet and social media in particular, are pushed forward as solutions. Online tools have been important in raising the global visibility of certain movements, and by introducing new modes of communication they have allowed new constituencies to participate (Tarrow 2005; Bennett and Segerberg 2013). Yet the capacity of online tools to replace the more intensive work of organizing and coordinating collective action has been questioned (Van Laer and Van Aelst 2010; Kavada 2015). Especially, the development of strong ties within, and weak ties between, groups through the establishment of relations of trust and collective identity is widely considered to still depend on face-to-face contact (Gould 1995; Juris 2012), whereas social media rather function 'to broadcast and amplify the process of "identization" taking place face-to-face' (Kavada 2015, p. 884).

Traditionally, the above-mentioned problems have rather been overcome by mobilizing around the summits of international organizations, such as the WTO (Seattle 1999), IMF and World Bank (Washington 2002), European Council (Gothenburg 2001), G8 (Genoa 2001), and annual UN climate summits (Juris 2008)—in particular Copenhagen 2009 and Paris 2015 (Hadden 2015). Summits provide convergence spaces where otherwise illusive problems and governance structures become tangible and targetable (Chatterton et al. 2013). TSMs have historically either tried to block processes, as in the case of global justice mobilizations around the institutions of global capitalism, or to put pressure on organizations to produce desirable outcomes, such as climate policy in the case of the UNFCCC (della Porta 2007; de Moor 2018). As such, summits provide convenient sites for resistance, influence, and convergence (Routledge 2003). They are the spaces where movements can become transnationally organized by piggy-bagging on the globality that the international economic order has created for itself (Bullard and Müller 2012). Moreover, the media presence around summits provides opportunities to reach out to audiences

around the globe to alter public perceptions, discredit certain actors, and advance radical ideas (Eide and Kunelius 2010).

Yet for a long time, TSMs have also experienced key limitations of summit mobilizations. Firstly, as much as summits became sites of resistance, they also became sites of repression. While during the first summit mobilizations TSMs could still outmanoeuvre local police forces by relying on the newness of their tactics, authorities became increasingly skilled in responding to these tactics (Wahlström and de Moor 2017). Moreover, since 9/11, police forces in various countries have been able to draw more and more on anti-terrorist regulation and extended capacities to repress protest in the name of security (Hadden and Tarrow 2007; Wahlström and de Moor 2017). This development has made summit mobilizations increasingly risky, vulnerable, and therefore less attractive. Secondly, various TSMs have experienced that by mobilizing around summits, they end up responding to, and therefore dependening on, the agenda and actions of IGOs. Hence, they experienced that there was little room for their own agenda (Pleyers 2011). Thirdly, it has become increasingly unclear whether IGOs are truly the centres of power of global issues. Since the economic crisis of 2008 and the 'gridlock' in international organizations, this has been an emergent question regarding economic IGOs like the IMF and WTO, and after more than 20 years of climate negotiations the UN's capacity to get anything done has become questioned as well (Hale et al. 2013). According to Müller, the UNFCCC has proven itself so incapable that 'any attempt to use the UNFCCC's globality, its global institutional and discursive reach, to promote an agenda of climate justice and institutional change (…) is therefore also necessarily a failure' (2012, p. 78). Hence, if IGOs are no longer seen as capable of producing impactful outcomes, it becomes less and less obvious that targeting them to shape their outcomes is useful (Smith 2015).

In the words of Bullard and Müller (2012), the climate movement thus faces the challenge of finding or developing an alternative form of 'globality' that can replace the one shaped around international organizations. It implies that, rather than abandoning the globalized approach to the climate crisis, the movement maintains a preference to develop independent sites of convergence. Here, repression would be less severe, movements could set their own agenda, and success would no longer depend on the ability of IGOs to get things done (Pleyers 2011). Indeed, we have witnessed the development of several spaces like that, especially in the form of alternative or counter-summits. The World Social Forum has provided a global meeting space for social movements including the CCM since its first edition in Porto Alegre, Brazil, in 2001. However, for many activists, the WSFs have not provided satisfying answers to the question of globality, with some accusing it of being inactive, undemocratic, or unrepresentative (Kohler 2012). Other alternative spaces, such as the Klimaforum09 counter-summit to COP15 in Copenhagen (2009) and the People's Climate Summit in Cochabamba (2010), have provided opportunities for global voices in the climate justice movement to converge and to develop a radical analysis of the climate crisis. Yet they have fallen short of answering more strategic questions like 'Where is the Archimedean point where social movements that seem comparatively weak in the face of rather daunting odds can apply pressure in order to change the world?' (Bullard and Müller 2012, p. 58).

Therefore, after COP15 (Copenhagen 2009), Bullard and Müller (2012) concluded that the inability to find an alternative globality had severely weakened the climate justice movement, and the search for alternative models continued.

The climate movement's own globality?

The idea of developing an alternative, independent globality reclaimed centre stage around the 2015 UNFCCC Climate Summit in Paris, or COP21 (Tramel 2016; de Moor 2018). Already around the 2009 summit in Copenhagen, the radical wing of the climate movement had experienced the limitations of targeting climate negotiations and had advocated a focus on alternative political spaces (Fisher 2010; Chatterton et al. 2013). As a result of widespread disappointment with the collapsed climate negotiations, many more became convinced that the UNFCCC was essentially incapable of developing a meaningful answer to the climate crisis, and by extension, that it was therefore useless to try and influence this process (Hadden 2015; de Moor and Wahlström 2019). Those already advancing more radical agendas experienced large degrees of repression and felt that their ability to advance more radical climate politics around summits was severely restricted by limited mobilization capacity and police repression. This experience inspired statements about abandoning the COP process, but ultimately led to a revision of strategies for the mobilization around COP21, 6 years later (de Moor 2018). Here, a majority of organizations advocated strategies that would make use of the momentum generated around the COP, without trying to influence the official negotiations.

For some, this meant mobilizing at the end of the summit to condemn its expectedly insufficient outcome. For others, it meant trying to ignore the negotiations entirely, instead focusing on grassroots solutions to climate change, targeting corporations, and using the mobilization as a springboard for long-term mobilization after the COP. Yet organizers broadly experienced that it was nearly impossible to draw the media's, the public's, and participants' attention away from the official negotiations, ending up with a mobilization that ultimately focused rather strongly on the COP (de Moor 2018). The realization that mobilizing around the COP could not be done without focusing on the COP rekindled debates about the need to develop a global climate movement independent of the COP.

In the remainder of this article, I will therefore review why key climate movement organizers do or do not view global coordination a worthwhile endeavour and how they work towards achieving this. Notwithstanding that some CCM actors still mobilize around COPs, I will focus on some ongoing efforts towards global (or regional) coordination beyond COPs. I will focus in particular on two main developments that came out of the COP21 mobilization and its organizers' shared desire to become independent of the COP: the global Break Free campaign and its associated coordination efforts, and the Climate Justice Action (CJA) network. I draw on 2 years of ethnographic fieldwork and 37 interviews with key movement leaders representing large mainstream organizations, like Greenpeace, 350.org or Friends of the Earth, as well as smaller yet influential grassroots organizations like Reclaim the Power and Ende Gelände. By focusing on organizers involved in COP21, this study

emphasizes the viewpoints of those organizers who were self-selected or socialized into working for a globalized response to the climate crisis. Nonetheless, we will see that there is plenty of variation with regard to perceptions of the usefulness of that approach.

How efforts beyond COP21 materialized was beyond the main empirical focus of the ethnographic project. Instead, they were monitored online between 2016 and 2018 by reviewing movement documents, meeting minutes, mission statements, websites, social media, mailing lists, and conference calls. There have of course been more transnational dynamics in the field of climate justice activism than I could possibly cover in one article, including recent developments around the Fridays for Future and Extinction Rebellion campaigns. Furthermore, the empirical material presented focuses more strongly on groups and organizers based in the Global North than the Global South. Considering these limitations, the following discussion is a partial and provisional assessment of the current state of the field.

Why the climate movement needs an alternative globality (or not)

At COP21, three meetings were organized to discuss the possibility of a global climate movement beyond COPs. Inspired by a general sense of frustration about the limits of advancing an independent climate justice agenda at the COP, many movement leaders once more discussed the need and possibility of creating the movement's own globality. However, despite this almost universal desire, the meetings remained highly contentious, barely leading to any decision. The decision that was reached—to organize a global meeting to continue the discussion in Berlin in February 2016—only came about as a result of intense diplomacy by movement brokers, and was later revoked when it became clear that too little trust existed between, in particular, groups from the Global North and South. In line with above discussions about the shortcomings of previously developed 'alternative globalities', spaces like the WSF were explicitly considered at these meetings as well but not deemed viable either. Organizers involved in the 2016 WSF in Montreal indicated they could accommodate the next meeting, but this was largely ignored—even by prominent participants in the 'Climate Space', which has been organized as a dedicated space to discuss climate justice action since WSF 2013 and 2015 in Tunis (Buckley 2018). Throughout interviews about alternative globalities, the WSF and Climate Space were hardly ever mentioned, further indicating that they were no longer considered viable, but leaving the question why this was the case unaddressed. Based on previous research (Buckley 2018), however, several explanations for why this happened seem likely: The radical leanings of the space may not accommodate the more moderate side of the movement; it focused on discussion rather than organizing resistance; and the space has been depicted as relatively closed.

It thus became clear once more how difficult and therefore costly it is to build global movements, and so it is key to understand what may motivate organizers to still dedicate resources to this goal. By speaking with movement organizers, it became clear that it is not self-evident that building a global climate movement is anything that should be prioritized. One central organizer who has long been

central in the global coordination of the climate movement argued in an interview after the Berlin meeting was cancelled that:

> I'm really fine with there not being this global space right now because it does take a lot of energy and uses a lot of resources. You know, global meeting is really hard (…) to organise. There are many practical reasons why we don't have many global networks; they take crap loads of time to organise, a lot of energy and a lot of money, for very uncertain outputs. You know, at this point, I'd say I could do much better work for the climate by organising, you know, by being involved in European disobedient networks, than being at some global network, where I have to debate with somebody from Friends of the Earth Malawi about our respective positions on the CDM [Clean Development Mechanism] which is irrelevant. My position on CDM is irrelevant. Nobody gives a fuck about my position, but people may give a fuck about my position on Germany's coal phase out.

An organizer from 350.org, one of the largest global organizations specifically dedicated to tackling climate change, acknowledged the importance of global coordination, but said that even 350.org prioritized mobilizing participants over global coordination. The sentiment expressed by these interviewees thus resembles common arguments for a relocalization of global activism (cf. Ayres and Bosia 2011; Forno and Graziano 2014)—to think global but act local.

Still, many climate organizers, including those who do not necessarily wish to prioritize it, consider global movement building to be important for several reasons. My interviews and observations show firstly that many activists believe the scale of climate change requires a global response. Climate change cannot be tackled in just those countries where movements and politics happen to have a greater capacity to tackle the problem. And if fossil fuel extraction is shut down in one place, it may simply move to a place of less resistance. To prevent this, the climate movement must not only build capacity across the globe, it must also coordinate resistance to allow for orchestrated efforts to stop extractivism. We see here a clear example of the imperative to 'climatize' local issues into a global campaign.

A second main reason why global coordination is considered to be important, even by those who reject the notion otherwise, is redistributive issues that arise from questions of climate justice and ecological debt. The organizer quoted above admitted that:

> The thing where I think global coordination (…) is crucial (…), is ecological debt. Like that I think is a really big deal but that's honestly one issue where I don't have any fucking clue how that's going to work out. (…) That is the one question where I know we're kind of failing our Southern comrades.

The final main reason why coordination is considered to be vital is that given the magnitude of the movement's goals and opponents, organizers feel they cannot afford to be divided. Much like others involved in current efforts at global

coordination, an organizer from 350.org explained that 'there's a lot of value in having coordinated moments or particular efforts or projects where we're able to help ensure that the work that's happening across a lot of different places, adds up to something that's larger than the sum of its parts'.

In my interviews and observations, views on the need for global coordination did not become much more specific than that. In line with the notion of climatization, there is simply a sense that given the nature and the magnitude of the climate (justice) issue, the movement must unite its forces. There are more specific discussions about how formal, centralized or ongoing such efforts should be. Many interviewees stress the importance of informal contacts to establish the movement's internal coordination, which has already existed for a long time. This became clearly tangible around the COP21 mobilization, where every coordination meeting was a reunion of old acquaintances and sometimes friends. Not all these contacts are equally 'warm', but they do provide an important network that allows organizers to coordinate actions—often across cleavages.

While all value such informal contacts, views vary as to how much formal coordination should be added to it. Most agree there should not be one single, globally coordinated movement that meets regularly and makes joint decisions towards coordinated campaigns. Yet some recognize that by strictly relying on informal contacts, the movement can become rather exclusive, whereas they feel what may be needed is the inclusion of new allies. Others, including a global coordinator of Greenpeace, see the need for more permanent coordination spaces the movement can fall back to, for instance to provide 'rapid response teams' in cases that cannot wait for new alliances to be built.

Current examples of coordination beyond COPs

Several relevant examples of coordination structures were encountered in this study. Underlying them are similar informal networks as the ones that came together around COP21. For instance, the International Coal Network brings together news on actions against coal extraction in its *CoalWire* newsletter and offers online resources (mainly information) for campaigners. This function is also fulfilled by other groups, like Reclaim Power, which claims to have coordinated and linked 1000's of actions in 75 countries since 2013.[1] It has done so by calling global weeks or months of action during which local activists timed their campaigns to coincide with other actions around the world, thus allowing for the construction of an image of a global movement or wave of action.

I focus here on the examples of Break Free and Climate Justice Action (CJA). These examples are not necessarily the most important ones, but they are exemplary in illustrating the ongoing nature of the challenges of globalization for the climate movement, and the potential answers that distinct modes of organization [coalition and social movement, respectively (Diani and Bison 2004)] may provide.

[1] http://www.reclaimpower2017.net/about_us.

Fig. 1 Overview of Break Free 2016. https://breakfree2016.org/

Break free

One of the most significant efforts of global coordination since COP21 has been two global weeks of coordinated action under the banner of *Break Free*. In 2016, Break Free was mainly organized by 350.org. In 2017, Greenpeace took over. It thus differs from Reclaim Power in the sense that a single resourceful organization leads the coordination, rather than a more diverse network. Nevertheless, the online image that it generated is very similar: during a week or two, numerous local actions against extractive industry used similar framings, symbols and images, and were broadcasted online, on websites and through social media, as a coherent wave of action. For illustration, Fig. 1 shows an overview of Break Free 2016 on the campaign's website. Such a global wave of action is, moreover, a method to get global media to report on events that in isolation would be far less likely to attract such degrees of attention. In 2016, Break Free managed to get coverage by one of the climate movement's main media allies, *The Guardian*, but did not do so with its 2017 wave.[2]

Beyond bringing together individual actions into images of waves of action, these coalition-style coordinations do not seem to be clearly targeted. That is, they do not seem to take on one multinational corporation or chain of investment or production in multiple countries at the same time. Moreover, they are rather sporadic and have become largely inactive. At the time of researching this article, Greenpeace and 350.org were discussing ways in which they could turn Break Free into a more permanent coordination body, but more than 2 years after

[2] https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/may/16/break-free-protest-fossil-fuel.

COP21, this initiative has not yet been realized. One 350.org organizer described the limited success of global coordination as follows:

> We did this Break Free last year which tried to bring together a mix of NGOs and grassroots groups to take some form of escalated creative action. The network didn't last beyond that event because that's sometimes the way it works. (…) It's not always too easy coordinating and culturally, it can be difficult because the same dynamics that play out politically play out in movements. (…) I would argue [Break Free] became much more about each of the actions as opposed to the linkages between them. It was a weakness.

It appears indeed that Break Free does not deliver the aims of global coordination outlined above to any great extent. Initiatives have not led to a much more coordinated global strategy against extractivism, the redistributive principles of climate justice remain unaddressed, and the ability of 'waves of action' to turn climate activism into more than the sum of its parts is described as limited and sporadic. To be fair, the establishment of a more permanent coordination structure has (until recently) not been the main aim of Break Free. Still, it is one of the main recent global coordination efforts, which merits the question what explains its ability, or lack thereof, to bring together climate activists in a more or less permanent global configuration.

Climatization has been a key strategy for Break Free in this regard, as it brought in new allies who had previously not campaigned under the banner of the global climate campaign. As one Greenpeace organizer explained:

> We started thinking around the fact that we needed to perhaps broaden the scope a bit more and break issues silos because (…) we saw the need of a larger movement and more a cohesive movement (…). So, that's when we started reaching out to unlikely allies. So, people working with the indigenous communities rights (…) or people working on women's rights.

The organizer described this as a success and vital to the breadth of the Break Free campaigns, as well as to future plans to turn the Break Free campaign into a more permanent coordination network. Breaking 'issue silos' is a clear example of climatization, and it is depicted as a vital strategy to integrate and scale up the global climate movement. Using the strategy of climatization, movement leaders point out people's shared position in a network of social relations which depicts them as victims of a shared climate crime.

Reflecting the empirical focus of this article on those already within the climate movement, I did not witness direct resistance to climatization per se. However, the fact that climatization happened through a coalition mode of organization had clear limitations. In particular, while transnational movement organizations like 350.org or Greenpeace can increase the scale of interaction by 'establishing social contacts across the boundaries of everyday life', such efforts are always bound by the extent to which collectives remain grounded in face-to-face contact (Gould 1995, p. 203). Hence, relying on the climatization of struggles by aligning them in a coalition is an efficient way to orchestrate an image of

global action, yet the results appear to be short-lived and superficial. To foster more enduring relations of trust and collective identity requires physical meeting spaces and regular face-to-face contacts, as recognized by the involved organizers as well. A 350.org organizer therefore argued that 'perhaps it has to first happen at the regional level, and I do think that CJA [Climate Justice Action] has played a role in trying to bring some of the groups together'.

Such regional networks could in turn be coordinated into a global 'network of networks' (della Porta 2007). It therefore makes sense to contrast Break Free with the network that is described as an example of more successful coordination.

Climate justice action

CJA defines itself as 'a network of international (although mainly European) grassroots movements fighting for global climate justice'.[3] It emerged around the mobilization for COP21, as an alternative to, but in coordination with, the more institutionalized Coalition Climat 21. Its name is a direct reference to another CJA which organized radical action around COP15 in Copenhagen (cf. Fisher 2010; Hadden 2015). Inherent to CJA's COP21 mobilization was an internal discussion about the use of mobilizing around COP21, as many within CJA saw the COP as a useless vehicle of 'green capitalism' that should be ignored. It therefore aimed to use the momentum generated by COP21 to target mainly corporate actors. What it did too was to try and organize the COP as a spring board for mobilizations after the COP (cf. Tramel 2016).

After COP21, CJA maintained an active mailing list where members shared, on a near daily basis, information and calls for action and solidarity regarding ongoing actions, thus maintaining some of the momentum generated around COP21. The same can be said for some of the larger actions organized by its members, including a protest camp against the expansion of an Austrian airport, actions against the coal harbour of Amsterdam, and the 'Ende Gelände' blockades of German brown coal mines, which attracted participants from across Europe and beyond. While actions like these were mainly European, they sometimes were part of a global wave of actions, such as by being part of the global Break Free campaigns in 2016 and 2017. Much like COPs, these actions performed the function of, among other things, meeting spaces for organizers of groups represented in CJA.

Based on these ongoing interactions, as well as personal friendships, CJA has established an ongoing discussion about its function and the way in which it can advance transnational coordination of climate activism. In particular, it organized two multi-day meetings dedicated specifically to this aim, in Amsterdam in 2016 and 2018. At these meetings, many participants re-committed themselves to the aim of regional and/or global coordination of climate activism. At the first post-COP meeting in January 2016, four aims were defined for CJA to fulfil in the future, which clarify how it imagines its transnational organizational function: (1) to 'be a

[3] https://climatejusticeaction.net/en/.

space for the sharing of skills and experiences to empower local struggles'; (2) to 'have an external voice, amplifying and legitimizing radical actions and discourse'; (3) to 'be a space to have strategy discussions for the climate justice movement and work on a shared agenda'; and (4) to 'be an action network with shared moments'.[4] Thus, CJA intends to be an empowering network that links together local groups and actions across and beyond Europe, thereby advancing the abovementioned goals of developing a coordinated answer to a global problem. To realize this, it was identified that CJA would need 'common principles and a longer-term vision', 'a shared understanding of what CJA is and what we expect from it (in terms of scale, debt, openness, cohesion…)', to 'make CJA structure and its implications explicit, share skills, improve communication, and become more diverse'.

Yet in practice, realising these aims has proven difficult, as after several meetings, including the second dedicated CJA meeting in 2018, most of these issues remained unresolved. This can be ascribed to disagreement in more substantive discussions about what CJA should exactly try to achieve. Some activists have expressed clear hesitation towards the notion that CJA could provide strong regional—let alone global—coordination of climate activism. Instead, they emphasized the use of common symbols, such as the 'red lines' (de Moor 2018), to symbolically demonstrate the interrelatedness of decentralized activism and to engage in a common but uncoordinated struggle to tackle the main drivers of climate change. CJA would then provide mainly a meeting and discussion space. Others within CJA have been more confident that CJA can be a platform for the organization of internationally coordinated climate activism. During a climate camp in Vienna, some in CJA called 'the first meeting to plan a common long-term escalation strategy from now until 2020! Let's join for a huge mobilization for climate justice and system change, culminating in a massive international uprising in 2020—it's up to us to turn the tide!'

The mixed views about the purpose of CJA have certainly contributed to the network's limited output. However, while it is clear that CJA faces important challenges when it comes to actually organizing coordinated waves of action, it is, compared to Break Free, more successful in developing a space for the climate movement to converge continuously at a transnational level. What can explain this? Again, we have to firstly look at aims. While the aims of CJA are still debated, it is clear that they operate a more social movement-like mode of coordination (Diani 2015) which relies on informal, participatory resources to get things done, and so, in contrast to the more professional Break Free network which relies on a 'coalition mode of coordination', close collaboration is part and parcel of its modus operandi. The group also explicitly recognized the importance of collective identity and its active search for one might merit the definition of CJA as a transnational social movement. And it does seem to have found a rather clear sense of it. It finds common ground in a radical approach to climate politics, a justice-oriented approach, the clear definition of several 'enemies', the depiction of capitalism as the root problem underlying climate change, as well as an identification with the global justice movement, and the

[4] From official CJA meeting notes.

principles of People's Global Action in particular (cf. Reitan 2007). This means that its scope is also relatively narrow.

How it deals with some of the challenges outlined above seems vital in explaining its relative success as well. CJA relies on official and informal meeting spaces such as action camps and social centres where core organizers meet regularly and where relations of trust can be built. At CJA meetings that I participated in, comradery was clearly a driving force of this network. To establish a large and dense climate action network, climatization again plays an important, albeit mixed, role. During its official meeting in 2018, it became clear that many in CJA felt it, and the movement it represents, needed to grow a lot to be effective, and they felt that in order to accomplish that it needed to reach beyond the audiences and therefore issues it normally focused on—adding to its traditional focus on fossil fuel industry issues like agriculture, mineral extraction, and the rise of right-wing politics. Regarding the latter, some expressed confidence that the 'climate movement has a lot of legitimacy at the moment' which it might use 'to fight the right'. Again, such aims of absorbing issues under the banner of climate change to grow the movement can be seen as a clear example of climatization, yet in this case, it remains to be seen how effective this strategy—combined with a social movement mode of coordination—may turn out to be.

Conclusion

In sum, motivated by a disillusion with climate summit mobilizations, as well as with some of the previous alternatives developed to them, there has been a continuous and recently reignited search for a global climate movement *beyond summits* and an alternative globality that this could be built around. The exploratory review provided in this article demonstrates that there are several key goals and motivations underlying the pursuit of alternative globalities within the climate movement and that various initiatives have tried to realize these goals with mixed results.

Though not all movement organizers considered global coordination to be something that ought to be prioritized, three main motivations and goals seem widely shared within the movement. Firstly, organizers agreed that the global nature of climate change requires some global response. It is, for instance, insufficient to oppose fossil fuel only in those places that happen to have active climate movement groups. Secondly, they recognized that climate justice is fundamentally related to questions of global redistribution. Finally, recognizing the magnitude of the problem and the strength of opponents, there has been a general sense that the movement must be united into something that amounts to more than the sum of its parts.

In response, various CCM actors are trying to develop alternative globalities. Based on an analysis of two examples, Break Free and CJA, three strategies can be distinguished: firstly, through *climatization*, they try to unite diverse actors under a common banner of climate struggle. A diagnosis of the global nature of the climate problem legitimizes efforts to maintain global networks beyond COPs, as well as efforts to recruit new groups into the climate struggle. Secondly, through *visualization*, using online tools like social media and websites, as well as common symbols

like Red Lines, decentralized actions are presented as part of global campaigns. Doing so is intended to visualize a large, coordinated and therefore efficacious movement, which functions both to empower activists and to increase the visibility and potential impact of the movement. Thirdly, through *integration*, some organizers in these networks seek to establish more permanent networks that facilitate the sharing of resources and coordination of strategies and actions.

With regard to these strategies, we find mixed levels of success. Specifically, we find a trade-off between various modes of coordination (Diani and Bison 2004). While the 'coalition mode of coordination' represented by Break Free has been relatively efficient in realizing climatization and visualization, it has been superficial and short-lived, contributing little to enduring integration. By contrast, CJA's social movement mode of coordination reveals the importance of regular and dense (face-to-face) interactions that foster a sense of trust and collective identity that supports integration, but it has so far been limited in its effectiveness with regard to output (including climatization and the organization and by extension visualization of transnational campaigns) because of diverging views and a rejection of non-horizontal decision making. While very different, neither of these approaches thus represents a complete answer to the commonly identified need for alternative globalities to coordinate of climate activism.

Moreover, these cases indicate the enduring importance of physical convergence spaces, be that organized meeting spaces, or sites of collective action (Routledge 2003; Chatterton et al. 2013). Such convergence spaces have been much more readily available to CJA, which has further supported the development of its social movement mode of coordination. However, this has only been possible at a regional level, and it is unsurprising that for Break Free, which acts at a global level, this is much harder to get done, especially given the resources required and available. In this sense, the climate movement still has not been able to develop clear global convergence spaces around which alternative globalities can be created.

Given the benefits and limitations of the social movement mode of coordination and physical meeting spaces, there appears to be particular potential in a 'federated' approach to global coordination that is strongly embedded in regional networks through which regular face-to-face contact and joint actions remain possible, but that occasionally reaches out towards global campaign-oriented initiatives (cf. della Porta 2007). Future research that extends empirical emphasis to other ongoing efforts—especially in the Global South—is needed to assess this potential.

Compliance with ethical standards

Conflict of interest The corresponding author states that there is no conflict of interest.

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ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Preparing the French military to a warming world: climatization through riskification

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Abstract

This article studies the process of climatization of the French military initiated with the 21st Conference of the Parties in 2015 through an analysis of the discourses produced by military actors on climate change. I will argue that there are two ways in which the climatization of the military discourse operates. First, it leads to a reframing of existing security narratives such as migrations or armed conflicts through a climatic lens, which creates a sense of urgency and intensity. Second, the climatization of the military discourse is mediated by a riskification of climate change, through the adoption of a risk-based approach to prevent its security implications. It creates a sense of uncertainty and leads to the climatization of a growing number of security issues such as terrorism or illegal fisheries. Both processes contribute to legitimize military solutions in global climate governance and expand the scope of intervention of the armed forces.

Keywords Climate change · Military · France · Climatization · Riskification

Introduction

Over the last decade, both international and national actors have paid growing attention to the security implications of climate change. At the international level, in October 2018, the IPCC Special Report "Global Warming of 1.5°" established that 1.5° of global warming could lead to food security risks in some regions of the world. This report builds on a first report, published in 2014, which stated that "human security will be progressively threatened as the climate changes" and supplements the similar claims of other UN agencies such as the UN Environment or the UN Development Program. The UN Security Council issued similar statements during its debates on the security implications on climate change since 2007. Other influential international acknowledgments include a 2009

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report by the UN Secretary General, a 2015 report commissioned by the G7, and a 2018 note by the Council of the European Union. National security actors also intensify their concerns and their will to explore the connections between climate change and security. Answering the questions after his confirmation hearing in January 2018, US Secretary of Defense James Mattis stated that "climate change is impacting stability in areas of the world where our troops are operating today" despite a mostly climate-skeptic administration. Similar declarations have been uttered by military leaders worldwide, including Tom Middendorp, Chief of Defence of the Armed Forces of the Netherlands in 2016 or Florence Parly, French Ministry of the Armed Forces in February 2018.

This revived focus on climate change by military leaders can appear surprising if we look back at the tumultuous historical relationship between the defense sector and environmental issues. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, a growing literature highlighted the environmental consequences of war and the harmful effects of some weapons (Robinson 1979; Cecil 1986; Westing 1984, 1988). Simultaneously, scientists and environmentalist movements gathered to alert the public about the harmful effects of war on civilians and the natural environment (Zierler 2011). In the aftermath of the Vietnam war, some of these concerns found their way into international humanitarian law. The Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD) entered into force on October 5, 1978, and prohibited the use of weather warfare, geophysical modifications and herbicides. The Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993 banned the use of chemical weapons because of their harmful effects on civilians and their environment. At the global level, the United Nations Environment Program provides up to date inputs through reports on the environmental impact of contemporary armed conflicts, in order to help post-crisis countries to recover from environmental destructions and build peace (UN Environment 2007).

At the end of the Cold War, particularly in the USA, a debate also began to take place on the ecological cost of the nuclear proliferation and the arms race. Targeted activities included weapon manufacturing and testing, military training, the storage of munitions or the disposal of toxic waste (Shulman 1992). During the early 1990s, in a context of budget cuts and growing legal pressure, the US military began to be targeted by federal regulators and forced to comply with federal regulations and the Environmental Protection Agency's recommendations (Durant 2007). This led to a series of base-cleaning activities and new standards for military training, overviewed by a brand new "Environmental security" Office created in 1994 at the Department of Defense. The French Ministry of Defense (renamed Ministry of the Armed Forces in 2017) followed a similar path and the armed forces had to comply with many national, international and European environmental standards by the end of the 1990s (Boulanger 2010). In the mid-1990s, another discussion began in the security community on the relationship between environmental challenges such as resource scarcity with security issues. In the wake of the new approaches to international relations brought by the Copenhagen School, there was an emphasis on the environmental aspects of security and an attempt to move beyond the more traditional national security paradigm (Buzan et al. 1998).

Moreover, for the past 30 years, the seriousness of climate change and its entry in international politics, through the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Conferences of the Parties (COPs), has led governments to position themselves within the global debate on the issue (Aykut and Dahan 2015). Climate change durably entered the national political agenda: states and public administrations had to build new internal policies on climate change and further enforce environmental norms in order to limit the negative externalities of their activities on the planet. The growing importance of climate negotiations led to a globalization of the climate—climate governance incorporates new issues and actors—and a climatization of the world—more and more issues are framed as being part of the climate debate (Aykut et al. 2017). However, we still need to measure this centrality of climate change in global governance and grasp the main features of the ongoing climatization process in various areas of policymaking.

This article aims to understand what kinds of discourses are being produced by military actors on climate change and what they tell us about the climatization process of the defense sector as well as its implications for global governance. It shows that the process of climatization does not only consist of a reframing of the security narratives produced by military institutions through a climatic lens, but also leads the military to position itself as a legitimate actor in the management of the harmful consequences of climate change. Drawing from the work of Corry on riskification and the literature in critical security studies on the securitization of climate change (Trombetta 2008; Corry 2012), I argue that this comes from a process of riskification of climate change. While the logic of risk can operate as "securitization multiplier," meaning that it broadens security and extends its perimeter of action to new concerns (Corry 2012), it also acts as a climatization multiplier since the process of riskification of climate change creates more possibilities to climatize security narratives (climatization through riskification).

I define the concept of riskification as the reframing of security concerns in terms of risks, which comprises two dimensions: the production of expert knowledge on climate risks and the discursive use of risks by security actors. In a context where security actors tend to use a risk-based approach to security issues, I argue that security risks are different from security threats because they are presented as quantifiable or measurable. Consequently, they tend to legitimize the creation of scientific institutions and the voice of security experts. In France, in the case of the study of climate change, a long-term, complex and non-agent-based phenomenon, the evaluation of climate risks by the military is produced by a new institution: the Observatory of Climate Change Impacts on Defense and Security, created in 2016. As we will see, the Observatory's riskification of climate change allows for the climatization of an increasing number of security issues. Therefore, this article studies how the process of riskification impacts the discourse and the practices of military actors.

France is a singular case study in the American-dominated literature on the debate on climate security and on the perspective of military actors on climate change. If COP21 was a pivotal moment in the birth of climate-related practices and discourses within the military, it will be interesting to see whether climate change remains a legitimate issue for the defense sector in recent years. In a context of continuous involvement of France in climate governance as well as President's Macron

security-oriented discourses on climate change, this article aims at interrogating the position of the French military in this new framework.

From a methodological standpoint, this article relies on a qualitative content analysis of different sources. First, there are primary sources (doctrinal documents, reports, bulletins from the Observatory of Climate Change Impacts on Defense and Security). The primary sources regroup three types of documents even collected online or delivered by the actors themselves. First, there are doctrinal documents and more specifically the White Paper, which summarizes the main elements of France's military doctrine. It presents a synthesis of the main strategic trends in a given context. Second, there are the public reports of the "Defense and Climate" conference, as well as the reports produced by the Ministry regarding climate mitigation. They provide a useful synthesis of the debates of the actors and their climate narratives. Third, there are the studies published by the Observatory. In the second part of the article, a detailed analysis of these data will highlight the increased climatization of new security issues through the riskification of climate change. The documents are systematically screened to identify the various discursive connections between climate change and security risks.

Second, there are interviews with civil servants and military personnel from the French Ministry of Defence. I notably interviewed the organizers the "Defense and Climate" conference organized before the 21st Conference of the Parties in Paris in 2015 and the Observatory created after the event. The transcripts of the interviews are also systematically screened to grasp the discursive links between climate change and security risks. The article builds on 27 interviews conducted between January 2017 and May 2019 in the offices of both the Ministry of the Armed Forces and the Observatory in Paris. The analysis does not intend to present each discussion in detail or review all the elements of the Ministry of the Armies' positions. Instead, the article mentions selected abstracts representative of a specific discourse and presents illustrative examples that shed light on the process of climatization and riskification of military discourse and practices.

In the first part of the article, I will discuss the concept of climatization in light of previous studies and show how it points to overlooked elements on the environmentalization of security and the securitization of climate change. In the second part, I will show how the climatization of the French strategic discourse led to a reframing of traditional strategic concerns in climate terms. In the final part, we will show that the new strategic studies produced on climate change rely on a risk-based approach, which paves the way for an extension of the realm of security. It leads to a legitimation the military as a central actor in climate governance.

Climate change, security and the military: securitization, riskification and climatization

In political science and international relations, the study of the relationship between the armed forces and environmental issues follows different theoretical trends. A first approach comes from public policy studies and analyses how the defense sector elaborates environmental policy. Such work sheds light on the agitated debates

about the compliance of the military to environmental laws since the end of the Cold War and the political struggle that ensued between state regulators and military officials (Durant 2007). Some studies focus more specifically on the greening of the United States Department of Defense, exploring the compliance efforts of the military and the exemptions based on national security concerns (Shulman 1992; Dycus 1996; Durant 2007), while others explore the birth of environmental defense policies within European militaries (Boulanger 2010). These works show a continuous process of translation of environmental norms by military institutions, in order to ease the tension between environmental protection and military readiness. However, few of these studies directly address the social construction of an environmental discourse by military actors. In international relations, some scholars use the term "environmentalization" rather than "greening" to signify their emphasis on the incorporation of the environmental discourse by a given social group (Maertens 2015). In the case of security actors, the process of environmentalization shows the importance of the discursive aspects of security and the reframing of security concerns from an environmental perspective (Dalby 2013).

In critical security studies, the discursive aspects of climate security have mostly been analyzed through the lenses of the securitization of the environment and climate change. The Copenhagen School initiated this approach by stating that the social construction of an existential threat influences political decisions and security policies (Buzan et al. 1998: p. 25). Securitization is this process of transformation of a public problem into a security issue through a "speech act," a performative discourse, if we adopt the Copenhagen School's epistemology of security, considered as a set of discursive rules (Balzacq 2019). Recent works focused more specifically on the securitization of climate change by military actors (Floyd 2010; Floyd and Matthew 2013) and the emergence of new discourses on climate security in international politics (McDonald 2013). Some theorists identify this logic in other processes such as the routinized insecuritization of migrations (Huysmans 2006; Bigo 2014) or the medicalization of security in the case of the AIDS pandemics (Elbe 2009). Moreover, recent attempts to provide a definition of securitization insist on the intentions of the agent (Floyd 2011) or focus more on its characteristics in various social practices (Balzacq 2015).

Through the study of the securitization of climate change, some critical scholars provided another perspective by moving away from the emphasis on the construction of existential threats by paying more attention to preventive practices. Indeed, according to Trombetta (2008), the securitization of climate change focuses less on survival and exceptional measures and more on prevention. As such, it promotes different security practices such as risk management. As a global and long-term phenomenon, military actors hardly consider climate change as an existential and immediate threat (Briggs 2012). It is rather its various manifestations (extreme weather events, droughts, acidification of the oceans, melting of the permafrost in the Arctic) that can be connected to more traditional security phenomena (resource scarcity, migrations, piracy). Western militaries, including the United States' Department of Defense, use the expression "threat multiplier" to indicate that climate change can potentially fuel other crises (Department of Defense 2014). Therefore, we can identify two types of securitization. On one hand, there is a securitization of existential

and immediate threats, which trigger immediate and exceptional political measures. On the other hand, there is a securitization of potential threats, which fosters a risk-based approach. Therefore, in the case of environmental issues, "risk management and preventive approaches have become more relevant in security discussions climate change" (Trombetta 2008, p. 590). Von Lucke, Wellmann and Diez also show that securitization can either apply to the concept of security or the idea of risk (Von Lucke et al. 2014).

In this article, I propose a slightly different while complementary framework that insists on uncertainty as a key element in the framing of climate and security issues. Because of its emphasis on risks, the securitization of climate change presents a multiplication of potential crises in the world and triggers an extension of the understanding of security in military discourse. This is what Corry calls a "riskification" of climate change: the construction of climate risks and their addition to traditional security concerns brings more uncertainty and creates a threatening context (Corry 2012). The concept of riskification continues an ongoing discussion in the literature on the reflexive aspects of security. At the heart of this debate lies Ulrich Beck's work on reflexive modernity and risk society. According to Beck, our capitalist modern society produces new types of insecurities and, while political institutions are expected to mitigate them through new policies and regulations, it is impossible to fully secure the world. Therefore, our society tends to use risk as "a systematic way of dealing with hazards and insecurities" (Beck 1997, 21) but this rational indicator paradoxically creates even more insecurity. Indeed, our complex modernity produces new types of risks that cannot entirely be managed because of the limits of our knowledge.

In the realm of military security, risks are more and more at the core of the management of war, which is becoming less and less a pure matter of territorial and national security (Rasmussen 2006). The use of private contractors (Kateri 2010), the integration of management models from private companies into the management of war (Heng 2006) and the growing complexity of military peacekeeping operations (Zanotti 2010) show that the armed forces are changing their perspective on what an armed conflict is in the twenty-first century. Rasmussen uses the example of NATO to define "reflexive security" by three constitutive elements: "management," the "presence of the future" and the "boomerang effect." In the case of riskification, the "presence of the future" is particularly stimulating: it "describes how scenarios for the future guide politics, as modern causal temporality breaks down in the face of proliferating risks" (Rasmussen 2001, 286). One of the consequences of our risk society and its regulatory tendencies is to install a long-term precautionary governance where security actors become the adequate solution to global crises, including climate change (Corry 2012).

Therefore, the production of a "climate security" discourse tends to present a threatening picture of global climate change, which puts the military within the regulatory framework to mitigate them. Riskification scholars have noticed that a risk-based narrative could lead to a multiplication of the securitizing narratives, even when the risk is low (Rasmussen 2006). This becomes possible when the military positions itself as the only entity able to enforce the precautionary principle. This principle means that if a situation could cause harm to the public, even in the

absence of scientific consensus on the matter, it becomes possible to act in order to stop or limit the risk. With this principle, risk security becomes "oriented toward the conditions of possibility or *constitutive causes* of harm, a kind of "second order" security politics that promotes long-term precautionary governance (Corry 2012).

The concept of climatization provides important additional elements to the analytical discussion on both the environmentalization of security and the securitization–riskification of climate change. In line with the work on environmentalization, the study of climatization shows how climate change became a dominant topic in global politics and how it led to the reframing of other domains through a climatic lens (Aykut et al. 2017). Indeed, "the process of climatisation relies on the definition of a given issue as being relevant to climate policies" (Maertens and Baillat 2017, p. 117). Some security actors, including the United States Security Council, are part of this ongoing trend (Maertens 2019). It also complements the securitization–riskification theory: critical scholars show that there is a historical shift toward risk management through "contingency" that we could better grasp through the study of the climatization of defense, migration and development policy (Oels 2012, 2013). In our case, the study of the process of climatization shows that security actors are presenting themselves as legitimate institutions in the management of climate risks. Indeed, the new climate narratives produced by military institutions create a sense of intensity and urgency through the reframing of security concerns in climate terms, as well as a situation of uncertainty that leads to a solution-oriented discourse (toward military answers to climate change).

Creating intensity and urgency: the climatization of France's defense doctrine

The reframing of traditional security concerns in climate terms is the first element of this process of climatization of the military in France. We will focus on the highest documents of France's defense doctrine to show that many security issues are being linked to climate change. This definition of climate change as an indirect threat is not a specificity of France's defense doctrine. In the USA, the main document of the United States' military doctrine, the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), considers climate change as a "threat multiplier" in 2010. Even if the expression is already present in a UN Secretary General report in 2009 (United Nations Secretary General 2009) and has been part of the debates on climate change within the American security community since 2003 (Schwartz and Randall 2003), it acquires more legitimacy thanks to the QDR. According to the Review, climate change is a factor of instability: "while climate change alone does not cause conflict, it may act as an accelerant of instability or conflict, placing a burden to respond on civilian institutions and militaries around the world." This is in line with the reframing of the French military doctrine we observed earlier. Similarly, the 2014 edition of the QDR stresses the causal link between climate change and security crises: "The pressures caused by climate change will influence resource competition while placing additional burdens on economies, societies, and governance institutions around the world. These effects are threat multipliers that will aggravate stressors abroad such as poverty, environmental degradation, political instability, and social

tensions—conditions that can enable terrorist activity and other forms of violence" (Department of Defense 2014, p. 8).

In the French case, we can measure the evolution of the climatization of the defense doctrine before and after COP21. Indeed, before 2015, climate change entered France's defense doctrine in 2008. In the wake of the creation of the first environmental bureau at the Ministry of the Armed Forces, the "French White Paper on Defense and National Security," a report of France's priorities and strategy, began to use the expressions "global warming" and "climate change" for the first time. According to the coordinating team, the aim was to introduce once and for all climate change in military doctrine.[1] As a result, many traditional security issues were reformulated according to the new climate framing: "water scarcity," "environmental disasters," "food security," "epidemics." Moreover, these issues were all connected to an overarching security threat: human migrations. Through its focus on Africa, the White Paper indicates that climate change could indirectly trigger "strong migratory boosts" toward Europe and impact France's security and strategic interests, while there was no reference to climate change in the previous doctrinal documents dedicated to migrations. The 2008 White Paper highlights two characteristics of the process of climatization. First, there is an evolution of the temporality of the phenomenon: the document presents human migrations as a pressing issue and calls for immediate action. This is in line with other observations on how the climatization of security brings a sense of urgency (Maertens 2019). Second, the climatization of human migrations tends to modify the perception of the spatiality of the phenomenon. By stating that immigration toward France and Europe could potentially increase at the 2025 horizon due to the aggravation of climate change, the White Paper offers a national or regional perspective on what could be also framed as a global phenomenon. It shows that the military mostly studies migratory movements from the perspective of France's national interests, since the territories mentioned in the document are French territories or regions where French troops are deployed. Even of the document calls for more regional cooperation and a global action on climate change, there is already an attempt to reframe the issue in order to adapt it to the preoccupations of the military.

However, the reframing efforts disappear from the 2013 edition of the White Paper. While immigration is still presented as a salient security issue, climate change is cited only three times in the entire document (against 17 times in the 2008 edition). Also, when the document does mention climate change, it adopts a very cautious language and indicates that the security consequences of climate change in some regions of the world are "very uncertain." This rupture shows the fragility of the process and more specifically the difficulty of legitimizing climate change as a military issue inside the organization. It also highlights one potential side effect of the climatization of the security discourse: the dilution of climate change among other environmental matters such as sustainable development. Internal documents from the Ministry's environmental bureau show that climate change is less and less framed as a strategic issue but becomes more and more relevant to legitimize

[1] Personal interview conducted with a civil servant of the DGRIS in Paris (March 1, 2019).

energy conservation and environmental protection between 2010 and 2014. It is only in 2014 that the Ministry's Center for Doctrine, Concepts and Experimentations (CICDE) commissioned a first comprehensive strategic study on the "consequences of climate change for the Ministry of Defense" (Alex et al. 2014). The document particularly insisted on climate-induced migrations and the impact of climate change on armed conflicts, particularly in areas where France possesses strategic interests and could intervene (the Sahel region and South-East Asia). Even if it is difficult to see this document as an accurate depiction of the state of the climatizing process in the Ministry, it still played an important role in the revitalization of the climate security debate and in the strategic discourse before the organization of COP21.

Initially, although the Ministry of the Armies took part in the discussion on the organization of the Paris Conference with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Ecology, there was no planned involvement of the defense sector in the event. However, halfway through the year 2015, the Minister's cabinet charged the newly created Directorate General for International Relations and Strategy (DGRIS) to organize a special event that could "prove the [Ministry of Defense's] involvement on climate change," as stated by one of the organizers.[2] Consequently, the Ministry organized a conference named "The implications of climate change for defense" before the summit meeting, in October 14, 2015. The organizers invited mostly defense officials from Central and North African countries, but also senior officials from the African Union. In the constitution of the panels, the organizers used this opportunity to encourage a debate on the impact of climate change on human migrations. During the conference, Mr. Karidjo, Ministry of Defense of the Niger Republic, Mr. Loudyi, Ministry Delegate in charge of National Defense of Morocco, and Mr. Chergui, Commissioner for Peace and Security of the African union, mentioned climate change as a trigger for "migrations," "migratory flows" and "migratory movements" (Ministry of Defense 2015). France's Ministry of Defense Jean-Yves Le Drian integrated these concerns in his final remarks and underlined the "growing intensity of extreme climate events, and droughts or floods that endanger the food security of vulnerable populations, which are then forced to migrate in increasing number" (Ministry of Defense 2015).

Also, by integrating these Ministers within a panel dedicated to "Pressure on Natural Resources and Food Security" and another on "Extreme Climate Events and Climate Security," the French organizers orientated a substantial part of the conference toward a study of the influence of climate change on natural resources and, ultimately, on armed conflicts in Africa. General De Villiers, Chief of Defense Staff, underlined the "destabilizing impact" of global warming, and its responsibility in "international security crisis" (Ministry of Defense 2015). The final words by Jean Yves Le Drian, also mention this link: "while it has not been established yet that climate change is directly and solely responsible for triggering conflicts, it is evident that it contributes to exacerbating the economic, social and political situation in certain countries" (Ministry of Defense 2015). In line with the 2014 report commissioned by the CICDE, the conference seems to continue the climatization of armed

[2] Personal interview conducted with a civil servant of the DGRIS in Paris (July 3, 2018).

conflicts. This question also emerges in a context where French troops are present both in Central African Republic (Operation Sangaris) and in the Sahel region (Operation Bakhane). While the aim of the conference is officially to exchange with "the countries that are impacted the most by climate change,"[3] it is also a good opportunity to use the event as a cooperating platform, in a moment where France tries to foster more cooperation with its African allies. In that context, the reframing of security narratives appears as a call for more security resources in the region in order to face these urgent threats.

The "Defense and Climate" conference stopped the dilution of climate change in other environmental concerns in the Ministry and led to the creation of a climate team in the DGRIS, formed by the organizers of the event. This new team contributed to the incorporation of climate change in the 2017 Strategic Review of Defense and National Security (SRDNS) which replaced the White Papers as France's main doctrinal document. The 2017 Review dedicates three paragraphs to "climate imbalances" and represents a synthesis of the climatized narratives emerging from the strategic discourse since 2008 (Ministry of the Armed Forces 2017). One paragraph presents the "most fragile regions in the world," with a specific focus on the Sahelian region (Niger, Mauritania, Mali and Chad) and South-East Asia (Bangladesh), where extreme weather events are likely to have an impact on "migratory movements." This climatization of the narrative on migrations presents a remarkable continuity since the 2008 White Book and has been reinforced by the increased climatization of migrations in other areas of global climate governance (Maertens and Baillat 2017). Another paragraph highlights "the pressure generated by extreme weather events on the availability of critical resources (agriculture, see-fishing)," which "is likely to increase the international and local competition for their control," and uses the Arctic as an example of an area where this competition may potentially arise. The reframing of armed conflicts through a climatic lens represents here a continuity of the discussions at the conference, but also a reemergence of the concerns expressed in the American defense community regarding climate security throughout the 2000s.

However, there is an addition to these two narratives in the third paragraph, which warns against the impact of "extreme weather events" on France's territory. This climatization of weather events comes from the experience of hurricane Irma on the island of Saint Martin in 2017, where the French military had to intervene to shelter the local population and manage the logistics of the rescue operations. The previous doctrinal documents mentioned "natural disasters" (1994 and 2008 White Papers) among the security threats the armed forces have to face, but the 2017 SRDNS insists on the higher frequency and intensity of the phenomenon. This shows that the reframing of the strategic narrative has an impact on the construction of traditional natural threats by the armed forces.

Hence, the climatization of the strategic discourse in France consisted in the reframing of three security issues: migrations, armed conflicts, and natural disasters. These three frames found their way into France's military doctrine in recent years,

[3] Personal interview conducted with a civil servant of the DGRIS in Paris (November 23, 2018).

especially after the pivotal moment of COP 21 and the defense conference organized before the event. Through these three climatized issues, the article sheds light on the performative impact of the climatization process in the strategic discourse and how it influences the framing of climate change. Firstly, as in the case of natural disasters, it can create a sense of urgency. Against the idea that climate change is a long-term phenomenon, the strategic doctrine encourages immediate answers and calls for more readiness from the armed forces. Second, as in the case of migrations, it can create a sense of intensity and present a hyperbolic connection between climate change and security. Against the idea that climate change is a global and multi-dimensional phenomenon, it shows that there are important, observable and localized security implications of climate change. Third, as in the case of completion and armed conflict, it can create an image of chaos and call for more order in international relation. Against the idea that climate change can be regulated by traditional means, it shows that the military would be necessary to intervene and mitigate its most harmful consequences.

Facing uncertainty: the role of experts in the riskification of climate change

The climatization of the strategic discourse raises the question of the specificity of climate change in military doctrine. Climate change is a challenge to traditional military thinking because it is a long-term phenomenon with unknown consequences. Therefore, the climatization of security issues brings more uncertainty by two means: the question of agency and the temporality of the event. Traditional military threats imply the intervention of an agent, an entity that threatens the security of the state. The state centric and enemy-oriented approach has been at the core of the strategic studies approaches to international relations, following Schmitt's understanding of politics (Schmitt 1996). However, these studies cannot entirely grasp the threats raised by climate change (Lacy 2005). Climate change cannot be studied like an agent, which considerably undermines the ability of the military to anticipate it. The temporality of climate change is also a challenge from a military standpoint. First, it is a long-term phenomenon, while the military traditionally works on present or near future events. In military prospective, strategists usually tend to evaluate the evolution of security events in a near future while climate change will have more and more impact in the coming decades (Lacy 2005). Secondly, some of the consequences of climate change, such as extreme weather events or droughts, are contingent: it is difficult to anticipate and evaluate their emergence without precise scientific data.

In the USA, the regular production of reports by think tanks and analysts throughout the 2000s illustrates the central role of expert knowledge in the study of the security implications of climate change. The 2003 report released by Peter Schwartz and Doug Randall elaborated a dystopian scenario to see how an abrupt climate change could affect the US national security (Schwartz and Randall 2003). It identified multiple threats: the increased scarcity of some natural resources, the intensification of storms and a disrupted access to strategic minerals. In 2007, the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) issued a similar report, which insisted on the fact that climate

change could be a "threat multiplier" and cause instability in many regions in the world (The Center for Naval Analyses 2007). In 2008, the Arctic region became an important area of study and, in 2009, the US Navy issued an Arctic roadmap, which raised awareness within the military on the impact of global warming on the competition between states, especially between the USA and Russia (Department of the Navy 2009).

Therefore, the progressive climatization of security leads to a need, for the military, to adopt new methods and indicators. At the international level, the expertise on climate change represents one of the milestones of the climate regime. The first warnings on the evolution of the global climate came from the development of new methods by meteorologists and climate scientists throughout the 1970s. In 1988, the creation of the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) as the most important scientific authority on climate change constitutes an answer to the request of independent and unquestioned expertise. The evolution of the IPCC's reports and its recommendations to governments (especially the 2 degrees limit) are proofs that there is no clear separation between science and politics, but rather a hybrid coproduction of knowledge (Hulme and Mahony 2010). Yet, the request for independent knowledge remains important in order to prioritize one's actions on climate change. The military asks for more and more scientific reports in order to prevent and mitigate the security implications of climate change. Global and complex, climate change is also a long-term process and, even if the army is often preoccupied by short term-issues, it has always asked for prospective and strategic scenarios for the future. The armed forces also expect indicators and guidance, in order to organize their actions and prioritize certain issues.

The French Ministry of the Armed Forces lacked expertise on the security implications of climate change before COP21. Although the prediction of extreme weather events and natural disasters were a part of the daily work of military scientists, there was no identifiable epistemic authority on the matter in the Ministry. The discussions that took place during the "Defense and Climate" conference and the cautionary remarks of some of the participants shed light on the absence of scientific studies on the military aspects of the phenomenon in France. Consequently, in the aftermath of COP21, the DGRIS launched a call for projects to create an Observatory and investigate the implications of climate change for the armed forces. The winner of the call, a think-tank named IRIS (French Institute for International and Strategic Affairs), began a three-year contract in 2016. The organizers of the 2015 "Defense and Climate" conference before COP21, all civil servants from the DGRIS, were put in charge of the supervision of the Observatory, which gathers a team of civil researchers and organizes regular meetings with the other departments of the Ministry.

The Observatory's team is composed by social scientists, specialized in the analysis of climate migrations and environmental security. The leader of the team is also a member of the IPCC and collaborated to the discussions on the adaptation of human systems to climate change. The climatization of France's defense doctrine, as well as the organization of COP21, contributed to this first institutionalization of environmental expertise within the DGRIS. While the researchers are not civil servants of the Ministry, the regular supervision of the reports by defense officials, the DGRIS'

endorsement and the clear orientation of the research toward specific military issues lead us to consider the work of the Observatory as an example of coproduction of science. Indeed, the expertise it produces represents an accurate expression of the concerns and the agenda of the Ministry of the Armed Forces as well as its growing request for indicators. In order to confirm the existence of the process of riskification in the work of the Observatory, we will identify its two components: the production of expert knowledge on climate risks and the discursive use of risks by security actors

The production of expert knowledge on climate risks is a substantial part of the Observatory's mission. It produces three types of documents, which have different purposes and develop different approaches to the problem.[4] First, "Operational and Strategic Watch Bulletins" (OSWB) are published every 2 months. They are divided into three main categories: "strategic watch," "operational watch" and a newsletter. The first section it dedicated to the evolutions of the climate security debate around the world: meetings, events, reports, analysis. While, at the beginning, this section was very wide and regrouped many case studies, it is now divided into different geographical parts (African news, American news, international news) in order to adapt to the geographical organization of the DGRIS and therefore facilitate the reading of the report by military experts. The second section is dedicated more specifically to the implications of climate change for the military: vulnerability of military infrastructures, technical innovations aimed at improving military efficiency, evolution in the governance of climate change in other armed forces in the world. It is also now divided into two different parts: "military news" and "sanitary watch." It also shows an attempt to adapt to the preoccupations of the military, with a bigger emphasis on the impact of climate change on the health of the populations but also of the soldiers on the field. The third and final section is a newsletter that provides a synthesis of scientific calls for projects or important innovations that have implications for climate security. Its structure shows a remarkable continuity since the beginning of the Observatory.

The OSWBs represent an interesting attempt to summarize the main military approaches to climate change and integrate various events or innovations into the same document. This large synthesis tends to address many different issues and multiply the sources of concerns. Within the 13 reports published since December 2016, we can witness the emergence of new security risks that go beyond the climatized narratives elaborated before COP21 (natural disasters, armed conflicts, migrations), which are still present in the first and the second OSWB. The two main new climate risks identified by the Observatory are illegal fisheries and terrorism. According to the 3rd Bulletin, published in May 2017, Chinese fishers tend to come closer and closer to Djibouti because climate change has reduced coral reefs where fishes shelter, which causes tensions with the local authorities. Djibouti is one of France's most strategic allies in the Aden Gulf, and the French Navy has an operational base in the

[4] These data are based on the analysis of the Observatory's website (https://www.defense.gouv.fr/dgris/recherche-et-prospective/observatoires/observatoire-geopolitique-des-enjeux-des-changements-climatiques) and interviews conducted with its coordinators.

country. Also, the 11th Bulletin mentions the possible aggravation of the tensions between fishers and farmers in Mali because of the increased scarcity of resources caused by climate change, in a context where French troops are present in the country as part of the Barkhane operation since 2014. The fact that the French armed forces are currently involved in both countries to secure the local population is an indication of the will, for the Observatory, to address the most pressing risks against the current missions of the military. The same reasoning goes for terrorism. At the occasion of an extraordinary summit of the G5 Sahel, the 4th Bulletin mentions the necessity to study the implications of climate change in the Sahel region and build more development initiatives in order to prevent poverty, which could in turn lead to a reinforcement of terrorist groups. The 13th report also highlights the relationship between climate change and terrorism in the Sahel region, particularly in Mali and Burkina Faso. It also stresses the lack of long-term policies that could mitigate the impact of climate change on local farmers. The climatization of illegal fisheries and terrorism comes from this ability to present them as climate risks through the identification of a clear causal chain.

The second type of document produced by the Observatory is a research report. It is dedicated to a specific region of the world or a policy area which have implications for climate security in France. The first three reports were quite broad and gather scientific data from a large variety of institutions on the connections between climate change and security. Like the Bulletins, they particularly focused on the security issues already climatized in 2016: armed conflicts, migrations and extreme weather events. However, since the 3rd report dedicated to the Sahel region and published in September 2017, the Observatory has provided more regionalized approaches to climate security risks. They focus more particularly on North Africa, East Africa, the Sahel and the South Pacific region. The documents are divided in two parts: a regional analysis and a country-by-country study. They provide prospective studies on the evolution of the existing security issues in these countries to the year 2030. In the 4th report, a section is dedicated to Libya. It offers two types of scenarios: on the one hand, a "tendential" scenario based on "exceptional climate migrations" and a "reinforcement of Islamic terrorism" in 2030, because of the reduction of water supplies. According to the document, this has important implications for France: it would create a new center for terrorist groups and would probably imply a military intervention to enforce stability in the region. On the other hand, the "rupture" scenario considers the possibility of a unification of Libya in 2020 and more cooperation in the region. While the probability of the tendential scenario is considered as "moderated to elevated," the rupture scenario is considered as unlikely to happen. The Observatory conducted the same analysis on Niger, with the same conclusion on the strong probability of an armed intervention to stop terrorism, and on Central African Republic, where "chaos" may happen in the city of Bangui and where France will need to intervene to carry humanitarian help to local populations. Therefore, the research reports contribute to the legitimization of the French armed forces through the identification of present and future climate risks with clear security implications.

The Observatory produces a third type of document, a briefing note. They aim at giving the Ministry an expertise on a very specific topic, which may have important

implications for military actors. This document must be ordered by the services of the Ministry to the Observatory in order to better understand the implications of climate change on a specific issue. The first briefing note was released in March 2017 and focuses on the impact of climate change on high-sea fisheries in Vietnam. After a brief introduction and a paragraph on the impact of climate change in the region, an entire section describes the issues raised by this activity and several propositions to "mitigate the security risks." More specifically, in line with the OSWB reports, the briefing note identifies illegal fisheries as the main security challenge of the region and climate change as an important trigger. Among the solutions offered by the note are an increased maritime cooperation between the regional actors in order to stop the illegal fisheries through military means and an increased surveillance or the seas by "marine drones" possibly furnished by the Neo-Caledonian government (a French territory in the South Pacific). As we see, the note presents a continuity with the previous documents: the climatization of new security issues (illegal fisheries) and their management, at least partly, by the French armed forces.

The second component of the riskification process, the discursive use of risks by security actors, can be identified in the interviews conducted on military personnel and civil servants at the Ministry of Defense. Out of the 27 interviews carried out between 2017 and 2019, 10 were conducted with civil servants and military personnel of the DGRIS, where the Observatory is located. All these interviews specifically mention the necessity to study climate risks to address the security implications of climate change. Moreover, they also connect climate risks with a multiplicity of traditional and non-traditional security challenges: illegal fisheries,[5] migrations,[6] armed conflict,[7] terrorism.[8] Moreover, within the DGRIS, the specialists of the Asia–Pacific and Sahel regions, where the French military is currently involved, prove to be the most active during the meetings and exchanges with the Observatory.[9] Nevertheless, it would be wrong to assume that only members of the DGRIS mention the security risks raised by climate change. Interviews conducted at the General Staff showed the interest of France's high-ranked military officers for climate risks, especially extreme weather events.[10] The involvement of the military in the French territories of Saint Martin and Saint Barthelemy in the aftermath of the Irma hurricane is mentioned as a turning point from that perspective.[11]

If these interviews show the success of the riskification process on military discourse, recent practices also show an attempt, by the French military, to position itself as a legitimate institution for the management of climate risks. However, despite the organization of another "Defense and Climate" conference in Marrakech for COP22, the COPs ceased to be the main international forum partly because of

[5] Personal interview conducted with a civil servant of the DGRIS in Paris (July 3, 2018).
[6] Personal interview conducted with a military officer of the DGRIS in Paris (October 10, 2018).
[7] Personal interview conducted with a military officer of the DGRIS in Paris (September 28, 2018).
[8] Personal interview conducted with a civil servant of the DGRIS in Paris (July 8, 2018).
[9] Personal interview conducted with an expert of the Observatory in Paris (December 8, 2018).
[10] Personal interview conducted with a military officer of the General Staff (October 24, 2018).
[11] Personal interview conducted with a military officer of the General Staff (November 12, 2018).

its lack of military scope.[12] Therefore, a delegation of experts from the Observatory and members of the DGRIS got involved in two international forums on the anticipation of climate security risks. The first one is the South Pacific Defense Ministers Meeting (SPDMM), which gathers military officials from six South Pacific states (Australia, Chile, Fiji, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Tonga) and France, due to its presence in the region. On March 21, 2019, the Observatory presented a report on the implications of climate change for the security of the region to France's partners, which comprised on a risk assessment to the year 2030. To some regards, it is an addition to a larger existing military cooperation on climate risks in the Pacific: the "Tempest Express" exercise. Regularly, several countries in the Pacific Ocean organize this scenario-based simulation in order to work on the best procedures that will enable them to intervene aptly during extreme weather events triggered by climate change. This regional cooperation involves the military forces in the region, including the French Ministry of the Armed Forces through its Polynesian regiments.

The second international forum is the Planetary Security Initiative, which gathers think tanks and policymakers to discuss the security implications of climate change. During the 2019 Conference, on February 19, a DGRIS-Observatory delegation participated to the exchanges on the security risks in the Sahel region, where French troops are currently involved. The Conference gave birth to a new transnational military groups, the International Military Council on Climate Change (IMCCC), which gathers defense officials and experts from both sides of the Atlantic to discuss the risks raised by climate change for global security.

Therefore, the development of a risk-based approach to climate change represents, for the armed forces, a way to get involved in order to prevent not only existential threats but also many forms of dangers and vulnerabilities. Indeed, "whereas securitization theory suggests that emergency measures are the hallmark of security, risks by their very nature cannot be eradicated, only managed, and thus a politics of emergency and exceptionality is replaced with a politics of permanence and long-termism" (Corry 2012). A traditional role of the army has been to protect the territory and to intervene when natural catastrophes, such as fires or floods, occurred (Revet and Langumier 2015). Climate change could further reaffirm the utility of the army in global politics, even if it implies to reorient their mission toward civil security rather than fighting (against fires, floods, tempests). The recent hurricane Harvey in the USA is an example of the possible use of the military in the future, with interventions that could be more and more frequent because of climate change. It also implies that the military could be a tool to intervene in other countries, with the mission to protect the civilians from ecological disasters.

To this regard, the military is already positioning itself as the key actor in this new "politics of permanence," in order to be the main protagonist of the future climate-induced crisis in the world. By showing their ability to anticipate climate risks and to enforce the precautionary principle if a climate crisis happens, the Ministry of the Armed Forces and its Observatory are progressively elaborating a climate doctrine that could considerably enlarge its scope of intervention.

[12] Personal interview conducted with a civil servant of the DGRIS in Paris (July 3, 2018).

Conclusion

COP 21 represents a milestone in the climatization of security issues by the French Ministry of the Armed Forces. Even if the study of France's military doctrine shows that there was already a discussion on the security implications of climate change taking place in 2008, the organization of the "Defense and climate" conference as well as the creation of the Observatory stimulated the emergence of the issue within the Ministry. The focus on this specific case also sheds light on one of the manifestations of the broader process of climatization of world politics. It provides additional elements to the debates, in this special issue, on the core characteristics of the climatization process, its intensity in a given policy area as well as its consequences for the global governance of climate change.

More specifically, this article shows that we can understand the climatization of the military discourse in two complementary ways. First, there is a reframing of traditional security issues and strategic narratives through a climatic lens. This reframing can have two effects on the framing of the issues. It creates a sense of intensity, since there would be soon an aggravation of the effects of certain phenomena such as natural disasters or extreme weather episodes due to the increased impact of climate change. It also produces urgency, because it implies immediate action to cope with the reinforcement of contemporary security issues such as migrations caused by the acceleration of climate change.

Second, the climatization of the military discourse is mediated by a riskification of climate change, through the adoption of a risk-based approach to anticipate and prevent its security implications. However, this creates even more uncertainty because climate risks become pervasive, which leads to the multiplication of the climatization of security issues. Consequently, an increased number of security threats such as illegal fisheries or terrorism are included among climate risks in addition to the traditional climatized narratives (armed conflicts, migrations, natural catastrophes). Therefore, riskification operates as a "climatization multiplier," which in turn contributes to legitimize the use of military means in order to cope with the most harmful effects of climate change.

Compliance with ethical standards

Conflict of interest Author states that there is no conflict of interest.

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ORIGINAL ARTICLE

'Climatizing' military strategy? A case study of the Indian armed forces

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Abstract

Climate change is increasingly shaping security narratives, including military strategy. While considering climate change a security issue, the military's role in this discourse and praxis becomes critical as a security actor. However, the interrelationships between climate change, security and the military are conceived and approached by different states diversely. Within different states, this triangular relationship is guided by processes with varied practical/policy implications. While 'securitization' has generally been used to explain climate security, other processes such as 'climatization' have assumed significance, wherein security practices are climatized. The Indian military too has been engaging with security implications of climate change, but by using approaches distinct from Western states, which have been the usual focus in such analyses. In this paper, the framework of climatization is used to analyse the triangular relationship, using the case study of the Indian military—by categorizing climatizing moves as symbolic, strategic, precautionary and transformative.

Keywords Climatization · Securitization · Riskification · Indian military · Climate security

Introduction

Climate change is increasingly being recognized as an international security challenge that impinges on a nation state's military tactically, operationally and strategically. The involvement of militaries in environmental and climate security has been further bolstered through initiatives such as the International Military Council for Climate and Security (IMCCS), which was launched at the 2019 Planetary Security Conference in The Hague. The role of the military in environmental and climate

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tasks is facilitated through various frames and lenses. While 'greening defence' is a more popular rhetoric (particularly against the background of the military being one of the biggest polluters), framing of climate change as a 'threat multiplier', exacerbating security threats/risks, especially in conflict scenarios, is also gaining traction. Why militaries care or need to care about climate change has been enunciated by making a case for potential large-scale deployment of militaries for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR), humanitarian intervention in conflict-ridden areas and even the impacts of climate change on military assets and installations. Furthermore, the military, being self-sufficient and multifaceted, is viewed as an agency that could lead environmental stewardship in its own domain as well as in coordination with civil actors in other domains, thereby becoming a part of the solution.

However, the military–climate security interface is neither straightforwardly explained nor diversely represented. As the relationship between climate change and security itself is conceived and approached diversely by different states, the practical implications of involving the military in climate change-related issues are being debated in many contexts. Fears related to 'militarization' of climate change and 'green washing' in this context have not been adequately addressed. Most of the debates/discussions on this theme are driven by institutions and experts based in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)[1] countries. Among the countries in the developing world, while some (especially the most vulnerable ones) are proactive in pushing the climate security discourse, others are also moving towards recognizing climate change as a critical security challenge that militaries have to deal with, but to a much lesser degree. India's Joint Doctrine of the Indian Armed Forces (Headquarters 2017) released in 2017 is a case in point, but the military's role in dealing with climate security challenges is not yet operationalized in any codified form. India's case assumes further significance in the light of the differing positions; based on its developmental concerns, it has adopted in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) discussions on climate security.

The creation of epistemic networks such as the IMCCC could be considered an act of enhancing the legitimacy of military actors through their representation as agents of climate action, directed at achievement and maintenance of security, peace and stability. Herein, the framing of climate change as a security threat or a 'threat multiplier' assumes significance, thereby attempting to raise the urgency of the issue and placing the military as a central actor in global climate governance through securitization of climate change. Another angle that is more prominent in developing countries such as India is the gradual movement towards mainstreaming climate change into military strategy based on the military's perceptions of climate vulnerabilities as well as historically established concordance between civil and military actors on their respective roles. This can be termed as 'climatization'. Whether it is impacts of climate change on the military or the military's contribution to the national climate goals, climatizing moves are on the rise. For instance, the melting of Siachen glacier is reportedly forcing

[1] The web link to Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is: https://www.oecd.org/.

the Indian military to change its strategy in the region. While 'greening' efforts have been underway for decades, there is now greater focus on integration of climate concerns into military strategy. Climatization is also being driven by increasing involvement of the Indian military in HADR, 'in aid to civil authorities'. Nevertheless, the 'threat multiplier' narratives are largely restricted to the academic and grey literature, that too in a narrow sense, with a larger focus on nonmilitary measures.

In this context, this paper analyses the Indian military's engagement with climate issues—as a part of its security practices—using the framework of 'climatization'. It enunciates the drivers, processes and characteristics of 'climatization' of military strategy within the Indian armed forces. In this study, climatization is classified into four broad types (as 'climatizing' moves akin to securitizing moves), based on the motivations of the actor and nature cum intensity of the process: symbolic (including soft climatization and/or greenwashing), strategic (climate bandwagoning for acquiring funds), precautionary (climate mainstreaming for preparation) and transformative (deep climatization in the form of engagement with mitigation and adaptation-related actions). Since the existing literature mostly looks at securitization (or lack thereof) of climate change in the Indian context, this paper goes one step ahead to identify other processes, mainly climatization, that have manifested themselves in different ways within the Indian military, due to either organizational dependencies (in cooperation with civilian agencies) or autonomously developed procedures. The paper argues that the Indian military's engagement with climate change-related issues is best analysed through the framework of climatization, based on the four categories identified above. It also asserts that climatization is still nascent in the Indian context, thereby giving room for further exploration of the reasons for the gradual pace of integration of climate change into military strategy.

The paper draws mainly on official documents and interviews conducted by the researcher with military, policy and academic communities. It adopts a qualitative, interpretative, fundamental (linking theory to empirics) and inductive approach, and case study research design (India in this case) to develop research on climate security and the military from the point of view of climatization. In addition, it refers to academic and grey literature on securitization, climate security, riskification, climatization and climate security–military interface (in general). The study attempts to develop an analytical framework of climatization, based on the limited existing literature on it (as compared to securitization), divergences with the notions/processes of riskification and securitization and, more importantly, empirics of the actions of the Indian armed forces related to climate change-related issues. The paper, will therefore, help develop the discourse on climatization further, if not as an alternative and/or in parallel to the discourse on securitization, but in tandem with securitization and riskification.

From securitization and riskification of climate change to climatization in the military domain

The military's role in the climate change discourse can arguably be operationalized only through the securitization process, considering that the military is essentially a security actor (that too mostly expressed in traditional terms). However, there are

other processes such as 'riskification' (hinging on securitization) and 'climatization' (upturning securitization) that could also help analyse the military–climate change interface. These approaches emerged in the post-Cold War context, wherein traditional notions of security began to be challenged and rediscovered. Securitization theory (Copenhagen School) attempts to blend realist/neorealist notions of security based on 'survival in the face of existential threats' with a focus on widening the scope of security to go beyond state or military security.

Securitization theory has been criticized on several fronts, mostly in relation to its focus on exceptionalism—that supposedly involves breaking of 'normal political rules of the game' (such as democratic processes), and adoption of a logic of exclusion and urgency along with emergency/extraordinary measures (Buzan et al. 1998). The idea of security as a 'speech act' (based on social construction), according to the Copenhagen School, has also been criticized. For instance, the Paris School uses governmentality, as an approach to securitization, to explain how the state uses its bureaucratic institutions, agencies, instruments, programmes and techniques to implement a set of measures that later transform into norms. It moves away from the exceptionalism of the Copenhagen School and concentrates on 'everyday routine and technocratic practices' (Balzacq et al. 2010). Furthermore, Bilgin (2010) and Wilkinson (2007) challenge securitization theory's Eurocentricism in their works by questioning its application in non-West contexts.

Securitization theory has influenced the construction of environment as a security issue. On this front, the debates on whether to securitize or not to securitize, how to securitize and what constitutes a successful and/or positive securitization have occupied a prominent position in security studies (Dyer 2001; Floyd 2008; Trombetta 2011). Furthermore, critical security theorists use the concept of 'emancipation' (in construction of security)—'freedom from unacknowledged constraints, relations of domination, and conditions of distorted communication and understanding that deny humans the capacity to make their future through full will and consciousness'—in building linkages between security and environmental change (McDonald 2012).

When it comes to securitization of climate change from a military perspective, a section of the existing literature (mostly grey) places it in the context of environmental conflict, and hence loaded with traditional notions of military security (Campbell et al. 2007; Shwartz and Randall 2003; Smith and Vivekananda 2007). Homer-Dixon (1994), (2007) of the Toronto Group, famous for his works on intrastate conflict as a result of interaction between renewable resource scarcity and socio-economic dynamics, highlights the pressure that climate change could put on the military forces by creating unconventional challenges such as insurgencies. Floyd (2010) warns that climate security, as propounded by experts (with close ties with the military) in the USA, caters to the 'national security' discourse and 'military readiness', giving a 'shield' to those policy-makers who are opposed to adoption of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reduction targets. In other studies, the 'greening' activities of defence (to reduce ecological footprint) are seen as a means of legitimizing military spending (Chaturvedi and Doyle 2015).

Securitization of environmental and climate change is often correlated and/or conflated with militarization. While Barnett (2001) calls militarization the 'single biggest institutional risk to human beings', Dalby (1992) argues that this provides

the licence to the armed forces to unleash further environmental damage by securing the status of 'protected polluters'. Deudney (1991) goes a step ahead to assert that military organizations, being highly 'secretive', 'hierarchical' and 'centralized', are not suited to environmental protection since they are 'far removed from the experience of the civil society.' Similarly, Gilbert (2012) asserts that since the military takes a very narrow view of security, typically the traditionalist view—'based on nationalistic, defensive, territorial lines, viewed in statist terms' and 'a model of external threats, based on the idea of resource conflict'—involving the military in activities such as HADR leads to military 'encroachment' on the civilian role. Gilbert (2012) is also opposed to the idea of 'othering' the climate, a process that casts climate change as an enemy. Hence, the drivers of securitization, in these scholars' opinion, are mainly sustenance of military budget and perhaps, the existence of the military itself, owing to the apprehension about downsizing of the military in many countries in the post-Cold War era.

Riskification is another concept that is often used in the context of climate change. Although it primarily challenges the notions of securitization of climate change (in terms of the referent object, nature of the threat, and proposed response), it also tends to embrace a similar logic and acts as a securitization multiplier. Riskification can be referred to as the framing of climate change as a risk (rather than a threat) through 'a social process of constructing something politically in terms of risks', with a focus on 'conditions of possibility of harm'. It renders governance, preparation, anticipation, precaution, prevention and similar other tools more relevant than the securitization's preoccupation with defence, deterrence and fight/war against an external enemy. In this context, environmental logic of 'precautionary principle' and security logic of 'anticipatory defence' become two sides of risk policy (Corry 2012). Criticizing the logic of climate security linkages, built through the prisms of violent conflict triggered by resource stress/scarcity and/or inclusion/legitimization of military measures in nonmilitary sectors, the risk framing of climate change has been given preference in some literature (Trombetta 2008). However, a risk-based approach to securitization is also known to 'alter procedures' and 'play down other options' (with reference to changes in military sector), thus leading to 'less extreme but permanent and infinitive state of emergency' (Lucke et al. 2014).

Riskification or the risk logic is prominently used in many studies to establish the military–climate interface. For instance, Dabelko (2009) has provided the basis on which security communities like the military, with their 'habit of planning for all contingencies' are inclined to analyse 'a wide range of climate change's impacts through a security lens that includes, but extends far beyond, potential contributions to conflict'. Questioning the dependence of climate policy on palaeo-records and absolute certainty (about scientific evidence), Briggs (2012) uses the risk logic, without referring to it directly. He argues that the military, by default, practises 'contingency planning' and adopts the 'precautionary principle', and therefore, it is natural for it 'to reduce surprise when possible' and 'to prepare appropriate responses when novel conditions are encountered'. In this way, a broader view of security comes into effect, which would help tackle greater uncertainty and hence, greater risk.

In this case, the discourse moves away from the securitization approach, and even though, at the outset, the riskification approach seems to be the guiding process, there is also an inherent element of climatization, which manifests itself in the form of climate mainstreaming—integrating principles of environmental and climate risk assessment into military planning, operations and strategy. On the one hand, the military is presented as an agent of climate risk governance by providing tools and approaches to govern and manage risks associated with climate change that emerge often as 'triggering mechanisms for slow-onset threats and pressures'. On the other hand, the climate logic also comes into play in the opinion that climate change should not be regarded primarily as a military concern, but climate change concerns need to be addressed by the military in its own domain and through civil–military coordination (Briggs 2012).

Climatization, which forms the crux of this paper, is analysed and utilized in terms of how climate change has begun to dominate other domains of global and local politics and governance, and how the climate logic introduces new principles of action and practices in the security sector (Aykut et al. 2017). Climatization can be defined as—'existing security practices are applied to the issue of climate change and that new practices from the field of climate policy are introduced into the security field' (Oels 2012). According to Oels (2012), the defence sector is already on the path of climatization through a gradual process of restructuring. This is more evidenced by its greater involvement in Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) and similar operations—whether it is as 'Responsibility to Protect' or as a civil–military intervention in 'climate change hot spots', characterized by 'weak or failing states'. However, this line of thinking is 'exceptional' as it does not apply to all the countries that acknowledge climate change as a security issue within their national security thinking, policies or strategies.

'Environmentalization' is yet another thought process (closely associated with climatization) that has been used in the context of peacekeeping forces through integration of environmental norms/concerns into UN peacekeeping missions/operations/practices (for example, reducing the environmental/ecological impacts of the peacekeeping operations). Environmentalization in this context leads to not only framing of peacekeeping as a part of the 'environmental realm', but also 'securitization of the environment' (Maertens 2019). In any case, the advocates of both riskification and climatization argue that the logic adopted in linking climate change with security is not only that of security/securitization, and moreover, attempts to 'securitize' climate change have not resulted in 'extraordinary measures' being adopted internationally (Oels 2012; Corry 2012).

In another related argument, the logic of 'greening security' is also used to analyse the 'positive transformative role' of the military, 'given the enormous resource base of military establishments and continuing public investment in militaries worldwide' in the realm of environmental peacebuilding (Ali and Pincus 2018). This logic, on the one hand, challenges the climate-conflict nexus, and on the other hand, it attempts to reinvent the military's function as an instrument of peacebuilding through environmental means, which is closely related to environmentalization and climatization. Whether or not environmental and natural resources can serve as a source of cooperation, trust and confidence building, this logic is gaining momentum

even more with the UN's (particularly the UN Environment Programme) contributions to the existing literature (Conca and Wallace 2009).

Military-led discourses on climate change and security

Despite criticisms, there has been a huge swell in the amount of grey literature linking climate change to security from a military perspective, especially since the release of the report, titled, 'National Security and the Threat of Climate Change', by the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), in 2007. This report, collated by 11 retired military officers, is an exemplary case of the military acting as securitizing actors. It labels climate change a 'threat multiplier' and states that the US military would be forced to intervene in many parts of the world, 'either alone or with allies, to help provide stability before conditions worsen and are exploited by extremists.' It might also be expected to 'undertake stability and reconstruction efforts once a conflict has begun, to avert further disaster and reconstitute a stable environment.' While this discourse related to climate security—framing climate change as a threat—continues to remain a dominant one in the military circles, there are other military experts who use the frame of 'greening defence'.

'Greening defence' caters to the inversion of military's image as one of the biggest polluters or destroyers of the environment. It also exemplifies advocacy of the use of military resources for the purpose of environmental protection and climate action. In essence, this frame largely invokes the grammar of climatization, whereby military activities and assets are climatized in a 'symbolic' manner. At the same time, the 'whole-of-government approach' (based on 'diplomacy', 'development' and 'defence'), advocated primarily by sections of the US military and reflected in the official documents released by US government agencies (including Quadrennial Defence Reviews), is influenced by framing of climate change as a 'threat' to military and national security (Hartman et al. 2012) (Parsons 2011). This approach is presupposed on two factors—the expanding role of the military in climate change adaptation and HADR and the military being the 'best resourced of all federal agencies' (Butts 1999). It is therefore reflective of 'strategic' climatization in the form of climate change bandwagoning, by which institutional linkages are developed to incorporate military and security actors in climate change governance.

The frame of 'greening defence' has been used by multiple international organizations, including the UN and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Some studies view it as 'greenwashing' (or 'symbolic climatizing move) in the light of co-option of the 'language and imagery of environmentalism' that could 'assuage the concerns of an environmentally conscious public without having to actually clean up unsound practices', which is to shift attention from the environmentally destructive activities of the military (Harris 2015). However, it could also be viewed as weak or soft environmentalization and climatization as seen in the case of the NATO Green Defence Framework (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 2014). Under this initiative, 'green security challenges' are linked to 'green solutions' (targeted at environmental protection and energy efficiency) to advance the purposes of 'limiting detrimental impact, saving money, and optimizing operational effectiveness'. This

follows a risk-based approach and pathway of 'climate mainstreaming', by which incremental reforms are adopted within the military to facilitate military effectiveness as 'precautionary' moves.

The focus on the military's role in climate security has been further amplified by the formation of epistemic networks such as the Global Military Advisory Council on Climate Change[2] (GMACCC) in 2009 and the IMCCS in 2019, consisting mainly of serving and retired military personnel (in addition to think tanks). These networks also, in a way, perpetuate the security and risk logic based on a discursive approach, by presenting a case for discussing climate change through the security/risk lens. Strategically, they mostly emphasize the need for the security communities to prepare for the risks of climate change and use this as a tool to advance climate action and their own role in climate change governance (including in the UNSC). The IMCCS, for example, focuses on 'global and regional risk assessment', scenarioizing/games, gauging risk perceptions and so on, which fit into the category of 'precautionary' climatizing moves. At the same time, this has, in fact, given rise to alternative formulae such as 'responsibility to prepare'—instead of the commonly used 'responsibility to protect'—thereby incorporating security concerns associated with climate change in the national security assessments and strategies (Werrell et al. 2017). It must be, however, noted here that securitization and/or riskification in this context can be correlated with the climatization of security actors as it also complements 'precautionary' climatizing moves that could then act as securitization multipliers.

Perspectives on security and climate change in India

India is among the countries that have called for caution when it comes to 'securitization' of climate change, especially introduction of this topic in the UNSC (since 2007). It has maintained that 'a security approach to a critical challenge facing humanity may in fact hinder the global collective effort' and that 'thinking in security terms usually engenders overly militarized solutions to problems, which inherently require nonmilitary responses to resolve,' thus bringing the wrong actors to the table' (as observed by India's permanent representative at the UN in 2019). When the issue was brought up in the UNSC in 2019, India's representative asserted that while securitizing climate change could raise public awareness about climate change and perhaps lead to investment of greater amount of resources in tackling it, it could also pit countries 'in a competition when the most productive approach is cooperation' (United Nations 2019). Yet, the 'lexicon of security' is employed by state and non-state actors in India in order to highlight the impact of climate change on other entities that are expressed in security terms, policy-wise, such as food security, water security and energy security. The logic used in this case is different from the predominant security logic though. Instead of conflicts, disasters, instabilities

[2] More information regarding the Global Military Advisory Council on Climate Change can be found at: http://gmaccc.org/.

and other similar utterances, this logic is built upon developmental concerns, such as livelihoods, hunger, energy shortage, public health, poverty and water scarcity (Ramesh 2015).

Based on several indicators such as references to the 2008 National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC), government-sponsored Indian Network for Climate Change Assessment report, and statements made by several members of the administration, including that of Prime Minister's Council on Climate Change (PMCCC), Sahu (2017) concludes that climate change is securitized in the Indian context. They invoke both 'urgency' and 'complexity' in order to stress the 'existential' nature of the 'threat'. Barthwal-Datta (2012) uses the cases of 'scientific policy communities' to explore the role of non-state actors in securitizing climate change in India. Their proximity to the state actors and their visibly influential role in drafting the NAPCC—owing to their 'social capital' and 'expert authority'—further enunciates their function as 'securitizing actors'. The success of the securitizing move in this case is seen through the lens of its acceptance by the 'target audience'. One of the cases that is often used to highlight security implications of climate change for India is that of 'climate migration' or 'climate change refugees' from Bangladesh (Chowdhury 2009). This discourse is further accentuated by the narratives on India fencing the boundary with Bangladesh to stem the flow of illegal immigrants into its territory (Ranjan 2016), which Chaturvedi and Doyle (2015) consider 'underlying geopolitics of fear and boundary-reinforcing cartographic anxieties about climate change-induced displacements and migrations'.

However, the above-mentioned arguments can be countered on the basis that the practice of securitization can be considered successful only when the securitizing move leads to change in behaviour by the concerned agent or, in other words, adoption of certain policies by the government (Floyd 2011). At the same time, internationally, India has opposed the alarmist discourse on climate change-security nexus (such as climate migration), primarily guided by the postcolonial context in which the Western notions of climate security are seen as 'arrogant' and signs of 'interference'. In contrast, India invokes the human security aspects of climate security, including rural and urban development, or energy security that takes account of climate change concerns (Boas 2014). In short, it can be surmised that India has treated climate change as a security concern at the domestic level (in addition to its other framings), but only as a developmental concern at the international level.

The discourse on climate change and the Indian military

The literature concerning the role of the Indian military in the intersection between climate change and security mostly is contributed and propagated by ex and serving military officials, members of the administration (concerning national security, foreign policy and/or environmental policy) and occasionally by researchers based in think tanks (defence and strategic studies). On the one hand, this literature adopts both security and risk logic to reinforce the security implications of climate change for military security and, more broadly, national security. On the other hand, it also delineates elements of climatization that have been overlooked so far. Dasgupta

(2016), former PMCCC member and climate change negotiator, analyses threats posed by climate change to the Indian military as physical impacts on defence installations and infrastructure, and disaster management (including scaling up of efforts by the armed forces). Pai (2017), co-founder and director of an independent think tank in India, identifies glacial recession (in the Himalayas), rising sea levels (in the Indian Ocean Region), extreme weather events and changing river courses (shared by India and its neighbours) as major threat multipliers that could 'potentially' trigger civil wars, military invasion, migration and other similar scenarios. These scenarios could significantly alter the security environment of South Asia, in which the Indian armed forces operate, and therefore, he recommends that they develop science, intelligence and equipment/operational capabilities to be able to prepare effectively for various conflict scenarios in which climate-related variables are intrinsic, as well as address climate risks in general. In essence, both these perspectives add to the climatization narratives that draw upon precautionary moves.

Singh (2015), a former naval officer, uses a combination of security and risk logic to amplify the threats posed by climate-induced displacement and migration in the Indian Ocean Region. However, in this case too, a case for precautionary climatization is made, aimed at climate mainstreaming, as reflected in the actor motivations. He also throws light on the potential for maritime disputes in the region, especially due to conflicts over 'Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) and seabed resources' owing to the threat posed by rising sea levels to low-lying islands. Besides, he describes the implications of climate change for maritime operations—'navigation and pilotage to operational exercises, and maintenance of ships, engines and other equipment.'

Besides conflict scenarios, some works use the lexicon of climatization to reflect upon the impacts of environmental and climate change on the functioning and operability of the Indian military, and how it could adapt to the changing environment as well as reduce its environmental footprint. Kumar (2012), a serving air force officer, proposes that the Indian armed forces engage in adaptation and mitigation strategies such as resource management, phase-out of ozone-depleting substances (ODS), energy efficiency and conservation, waste management and environmental training. A case for military environmental leadership using four key drivers—'economic sense', 'operational spin-offs', 'safe environment' and 'socially responsible behaviour'—can be interpreted as both transformative and strategic.

Climatization of military strategy in India: a practical viewpoint

The Indian military is known to supplement a nation state's foreign policy and national security objectives by helping build 'bridges of friendship and strengthen international cooperation' in addition to deterring war or intervention by the adversaries, thus helping shape a favourable maritime environment for the promotion of national interests (Indian Navy). The military's function of engaging in 'Military Operations Other Than War' (MOOTW) and exercising soft power in the form of HADR diplomacy is being streamlined further through the climate logic. HADR is projected as an instrument to 'shape local political contexts', and since it operates in

a non-quid pro quo and/or nonzero sum game setting, the expectation is that countries would automatically grow closer to each other, and this in turn would help major powers like the USA to maintain its presence globally (Capie 2015). These are indicators of climatization as climate change increasingly becomes an intrinsic part of military planning and strategy, not just nationally but also regionally and internationally.

Unlike in some of the Western contexts, where climate change features as a prominent national and international security concern (for example, in the national security strategies), in India, this is not the case. In the absence of a codified national security doctrine or strategy, India's national security goals are usually identified and pursued by the National Security Council Secretariat (NSCS) in Prime Minister's Office (PMO), also assisted by the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB), which has been contributing to studies and analyses on India's national security (including the annual national security reviews). In the policy context, climate change is yet to find a constant position in the national security matrix due to various reasons, including the lack of scholarship on the linkages between climate change and security, as pointed out by Sameer Patil (2014, personal communication), a former member of NSCS. As a result, one could argue that the joint military strategy that derives from the national security policy and strategy also does not prioritize climate change. However, Jasjit Singh (2011, personal communication), a retired air force officer and former director of two defence think tanks based in New Delhi, asserts that the country's national security interests are primarily enshrined in the country's Constitution. He chooses to define national security as the preservation of the core values of a nation that are prescribed in the Preamble, that is, justice, liberty, equality and fraternity. It also entails the protection and promotion of the vital national interests, which include elements of environmental governance. As a corollary, the Indian military has a duty to protect these values.

Climatization of military strategy is happening at multiple levels in varying degrees across the three services of the Indian armed forces. The Indian military is following the process of 'climatization', mostly in tune with the local contexts, requirements and demands, but also partly borrowing ideas from the Western discourse on climate security. Climate change has found a place in the Joint Doctrine of the Indian Armed Forces (JDIAF), released in 2017. It lists climate change as a 'non-traditional security' issue, akin to its categorization by state and non-state actors in general in India, and states that fallouts of climate and environmental change such as migration and civil strife at times require security responses, including from the military. However, the primary focus is on HADR and to ensure that the 'readiness of the Armed Forces performing such missions' is 'optimum at all times'. Interestingly, it refers to defence diplomacy as a priority area, by which India's soft power could be promoted and the nation's 'reputation as a responsible power' could be enhanced. These efforts can be classified as both symbolic and precautionary climatizing moves, with both preparedness and national image projection at the centre of actor motivations.

In fact, HADR has been an indispensable part of India's joint military strategy for a long time, as a part of its mandate of 'in aid to civil authorities'. The 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami led to the introduction of policy guidance document on 'Armed

Forces Assistance for National Disasters' by India's Defence Crisis Management Group (DCMG) that tasked 'the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) to coordinate the relief effort with the Ministry of Defence [MoD], Ministry of Home Affairs [MHA], the Ministry of External Affairs [MEA] and other relevant departments and agencies' (Mukherjee et al. 2012).[3] Similarly, the National Policy on Disaster Management 2009 acknowledges that the 'Armed Forces are called upon to assist the civil administration only when the situation is beyond their [the latter's] coping capability'. It also reaffirms that 'on account of their vast potential to meet any adverse challenge, speed of operational response and the resources and capabilities at their disposal, the Armed Forces have historically played a major role in emergency support functions' (National Disaster Management Authority 2009).

In effect, the principle of 'in aid to civil authorities' forms a bedrock of the military's engagement with climate change-related issues. This applies to not only HADR, but also other activities such as afforestation/land restoration, as in the case of the Ecological Task Force (ETF), world's reportedly first ecological unit of the Territorial Army, raised in 1982. The first battalion was deployed in Uttarakhand (in the Shivalik Ranges of the Himalayas) to afforest severely degraded land (caused by indiscriminate and illegal limestone mining in the region) and eight more battalions (besides a battalion for cleaning the Ganges, the longest river within India) have been raised in various parts of the country since then (Territorial Army). The rationale behind raising the ETF has been that the civilian agencies such as the forest departments as well as non-state actors (non-governmental organizations) could not achieve what the ETFs could in limited time. These units could 'execute specific ecology-related projects with a military-like work culture and commitment' (Territorial Army). Since the military is known to operate in inhospitable, remote and ecologically vulnerable terrain as well as extreme weather conditions more than the civilian agencies, it is considered an asset in the country's environmental preservation agenda, especially in settings, where the civilian agencies can either not cope or need military assistance.

In HADR too, this logic comes into effect, which in turn enhances the role of the military in it. Their ability to provide relief supplies to inaccessible and vulnerable areas that are affected most by disasters is incomparable with the civilian agencies. The National Disaster Response Force (NDRF)—'a specialized disaster response force', consisting mainly of paramilitary personnel—was formed in 2006 under the MHA,[4] but it is constrained by many factors. Its presence in terms of strength and location is limited, which hampers their mobility, unlike the armed forces that are much bigger in numbers. The military's presence is nationwide and they are equipped with airlift capabilities that put them in a better position to tackle major disasters than the NDRF, which is dependent on the military for airlift and

[3] The role of the IDS is primarily to build "synergy and consensus through intra-service deliberations and ensuring optimisation of resources through rightful prioritisation for procurements, joint doctrines, joint training and common procedures." More information can be found in the press release of MoD: http://pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=105931.

[4] More information about the National Disaster Response Force can be found here: http://www.ndrf.gov.in/about-us.

is present only in 12 locations in the country (2014, personal communication with NDRF officials).

Increasingly, the argument that the Indian armed forces should contribute to nationwide efforts at climate change mitigation and adaptation is also strengthening with 'climate mainstreaming' gaining momentum in the armed forces. It stems from the point that India's Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) are ambitious and unless all the sectors of the country, including the military contribute, the goals would be difficult to achieve. Therefore, the military has, for instance, started to contribute to enhancement of renewable energy generation capacity by diverting defence lands to solar parks. The MoD has declared that 300 MW of solar projects (rooftop and utility-scale power projects) would be set up in different parts of the country by defence establishment, especially on vacant lands that are not being used by the three services, with indigenously manufactured modules and equipment (Mittal 2015). The ETFs could be a potential partner in the National Mission for a Green India (under the NAPCC), especially since the Indian Government has set a goal of creating 'an additional carbon sink of 2.5 to 3 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent through additional forest and tree cover by 2030' in its NDCs.[5] These moves are more transformative in nature than precautionary, as it goes beyond the military's primary responsibility.

Similarly, the Chief of the Naval Staff, while participating in the Indian Government's flagship, Swachh Bharat Abhiyan (Clean India Campaign) Awareness programme, in 2014, asserted: 'The naval community will aim to lead by example and continue to contribute in significant measure, to the nation's efforts, for a clean and green future' (Press Information Bureau 2014a). As a result, a Green Cell has been established at the Navy Headquarters (in 2016) that is tasked to coordinate and monitor implementation of the 'green initiatives' by all segments of the navy. Besides announcing its intent to convert India's largest naval base in Karwar (on the western coast in Karnataka) as a 'smart green naval base', it plans to 'incorporate concepts of energy efficiency from the ab initio stages' (in augmentation and acquisition of assets or infrastructure projects) and achieve 'zero carbon footprint' (Press Information Bureau 2014b). The navy has expressed its desire to support the Indian Government's 100 GW solar energy target by 2022 by having its own target of a 21 MW solar installation, dedicating 1.5 per cent of its works budget to renewable energy generation as well as deploying rooftop solar panels. It is also reportedly working towards developing warships that run on biofuels (Pubby 2016) and harnessing ocean thermal energy and wave energy after doing a comprehensive feasibility study with the help of civilian authorities like the Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE) (Press Information Bureau 2016).

Climatization, through incremental reforms at various levels of the military, is pushing it towards an institutionalized approach that can ensure 'co-benefits' (in this case, cost-cutting, adaptation of equipment, infrastructure and activities, safety and improvement of image/reputation). Among the co-benefits, 'winning the hearts and

[5] India's INDCs can be found at: https://www4.unfccc.int/sites/submissions/INDC/Published%20Documents/India/1/INDIA%20INDC%20TO%20UNFCCC.pdf.

minds' (apart from maintaining operational effectiveness) through a form of symbolic climatizing/environmentalizing move is also happening, particularly in regions that are conflict-ridden. For instance, Defence Institute of High Altitude Research (DIHAR) of Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) has established solar-based green houses in Ladakh, which is stricken by terrorism and interstate conflict, to ensure supply of fresh food to the soldiers in the harsh environment (cold desert).[6] Regular movement of vehicles to transport supplies has adverse impacts on the glaciers of the region. In addition to GHG emissions reduction, it also led to propagation of the practice of organic farming along with decentralization of food production and economy, in the larger interest of the public in the region (information gathered through personal communication with officials of Bombay Natural History Society) in 2014.

The growing literature on the potential impacts of climate change on the military, wherein risks, uncertainty and urgency associated with climate change are highlighted, reflects upon the necessity of enacting precautionary climatizing moves to secure the military. Examples such as the Car Nicobar Air Base, wrecked by the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami or that of the Eastern Naval Command at Vishakhapatnam, damaged by Cyclone Hudhud in 2014 are noteworthy (India Today 2014). While rebuilding the air base, since the coastlines were erased by the tsunami, the Air Force moved into the island's interior so that the base remained safe even if another similar disaster strikes in the future (Press Information Bureau, 2014c). Not just disasters, but also other effects such as glacial recession and temperature rise are also being assessed. For instance, temperature-controlled equipment including tanks, submarines and aircrafts—which are also known for their high consumption of halons (with high Global Warming Potential)—will have to be adapted to rising temperatures—to sustain their operational capabilities.

Since the military is deployed in some of the most ecologically fragile and politically volatile areas, the stakes for it are much higher. Climate change could also physically alter the battlefield, forcing the armed forces to change the game plan and adopt fresh strategies. For example, climate change is reportedly responsible for accelerated glacial retreat in the Hindu Kush Himalaya region, according to many scientific studies (Wester et al. 2019). The Siachen glacier, world's highest battleground where Indian and Pakistani soldiers are stationed on both sides of the contested border, is said to be melting at a fast pace, due to climate change and overwhelming presence of troops in the region that is putting pressure on the area's ecosystems. The number of ice avalanches has increased, leading to several deaths (of soldiers), prompting the army to 'rethink deployment procedures' and closely monitor the rate of climate change with the help of scientific research institutes (Peri 2016). As summed up by General Bikram Singh (2018), former Chief of the Army Staff:

[6] Information regarding Defence Institute of High Altitude Research and its activities can be found here: https://www.drdo.gov.in/drdo/labs1/DIHAR/English/indexnew.jsp?pg=achieve.jsp.

> 'In the Indian context, melting of glaciers, flash floods, encroaching seas, cyclones, rising temperatures in the deserts and plains, forest fires and higher water levels in the riverine terrain will necessitate a conscious re-examination of the ways we fulfil our constitutional obligations. Our military's peacetime locations, operational deployments, equipment profile, organizational structures, logistic sustenance, tactics, operational art and war fighting strategies will have to be revisited. Internal security management architecture, too, would require sprucing up. Since transformation in large organizations is a time consuming process, we need to act fast to think through the challenge with collective wisdom and draw up necessary road maps.'

Counter-currents to climatization of India's military strategy

On the one hand, the influence of norms of integrating climate risks into military strategy, which are increasingly becoming transnational, in the Indian military cannot be understated. This is manifested through, among other signs, the presence of Indian retired and military officials in epistemic networks such as GMACCC[7] and the adoption of lexicon of climate security by military scholars/officials and within the military documents. This can be partly attributed to the nature of the climate problem itself, which is seen as a transnational issue that requires transnational and trans-sectoral solutions, bringing different stakeholders, including the military, into the fold of solution-finding exercise. On the other hand, the Indian military's engagement with environmental issues in general, particularly conservation and protection, is not new. Yet, these norms have not been institutionalized, except in cases such as HADR and the ETF (through policy interventions) to some extent.

In fact, there is general acceptance among the epistemic communities dealing with climate change and/or security that the military's role in environmental and climate change issues should be on an 'as-needed basis' (and even no role at all), rather than an institutional one. Some believe that there should be institutionalized policies to govern the involvement of the military in issues such as disaster management. Others contend that the NDRF should instead be empowered to carry out the task it was created for in the first place, without any obstacles (based on several interviews with military personnel, academics and bureaucrats conducted by the author).

The question of whether the 'sphere of military action' should be allowed to 'infiltrate the "grey areas" of everyday life' (Cooper 2006) has been pivotal in deciding the role of the military in climate change-related issues, particularly in India. While some believe that the military is a respectable entity that is known to work with discipline and time-bound procedures that could also contribute to environmental and climate objectives, others deem the military not to be geared to deal with larger complexities of environmental and climate change. For instance, according to a former official of the Ministry of Environment and Forests (now Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change), Ministry of Environment and Forests, the military could

[7] Details regarding members of GMACCC can be found here: http://gmaccc.org/member/.

and should only handle simple tasks such as planting trees or tackling the phase-out of ODS (2014, personal communication). Inherent to these arguments are facets of civil–military relations, bureaucratic politics and trade-offs between environmental/climate objectives and security interests. For example, the retarded pace of defence reforms in the country is blamed upon 'bureaucratic politics' and 'political apathy' (Mukherjee 2009), as well as 'strong administrative, procedural and bureaucratic controls' over the military (Shukla 2012). Defence reforms are also linked to the military's ability to adapt to newer challenges such as climate change and these require budgetary allocation, which according to many ex-military officials is grossly insufficient (personal communication with military officials and security experts).

Similarly, the lack of coordination between civilian and military agencies, owing to turf war and parochialism (an 'institutional disease' as termed by many ex-military officials) that pervades the bureaucracy, is also cited as a reason for delay for action or non-action on critical issues, including climate change (personal communication with former military officials). It must be noted here that the military, despite being prepared for contingency planning, is known to be a rigid organization with its own standard operating procedures (SOPs), terms of reference (ToRs) and so on. According to a serving military official (anonymous), since the armed forces are trained to fight wars, they would be reluctant to train for other activities such as HADR. Moreover, in India's case, when the country faces rather tangible territorial threats from Pakistan and China, it cannot afford to divert resources into climate change-related issues. It is projected as an either–or situation. P. G. Kamath, a retired army officer, states, 'Environmental and climate security cannot be achieved at the cost of territorial security (2017, personal communication).'

Conclusion

In conclusion, this paper highlights the different approaches adopted by security actors to incorporate climate change concerns within their strategy and planning through the framework of climatization by using the case study of the Indian military. It provides an analysis of the military security–climate change interface, by going beyond the traditional notions of climate security based on the securitization theory. Indeed, the pathways being followed by the Indian military adhere more to the process of climatization even though they utilize the grammar of securitization and riskification occasionally. In comparison with the militaries of the USA, UK, Sweden, France and some of the other Western countries, the Indian military is far behind in: first, recognizing climate change as critical to their operations, strategy and survival; and second, integrating climate change with the full scope of its strategy. In fact, no military in the world has perhaps succeeded in accomplishing the second goal.

In the Indian context, neither the civilian establishment nor the military is entirely open to the idea of addressing climate change from a security perspective in a practical sense. Instead, the climate logic is being espoused in order to tackle the implications of climate change for India's security and, more specifically, military security. The measures that are being planned and implemented by the military, in

conjunction with the civilian authorities, are leading to subtle shifts in goalposts and reformation of procedures to accommodate climate change within the military strategy through a logic that complements and/or supplements military preparedness and effectiveness, but does not result in militarization of climate change. Exceptions are, however, made in cases such as the direct impacts of climate change on the military at tactical, operational and strategic levels.

The Indian military deals with many other environmental issues within the gamut of issues of concern, without restricting the discourse to just climate change, thereby resembling environmentalization practices. Importantly, the discourse on environment and development (positions adopted by the civilian agencies) has also had an influence on the military's engagement with security implications of climate change. However, there are increasing signs of incremental measures being taken in this direction as seen in the cases of expansion of renewable energy and studying/monitoring the impacts of climate change on it at various levels. This, as already specified, can be associated with 'symbolic', 'precautionary', 'strategic' and 'transformative' climatizing moves, more so 'symbolic' and 'precautionary'. These typologies may not be readily applicable in all contexts, especially where civil–military relations are complicated by predilections for military dictatorship, prevalence of weak/disempowered civilian governance machineries or other socio-cultural and political dynamics.

Futuristically, the Indian military is inclined to work towards climate change mitigation and adaptation, driven by both necessity and demand for stewardship by joining the country's efforts to address climate change at the national level. In HADR, it has spread its wings outside the national territory to cooperate with other countries (particularly since the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami). With the growing references to climate-induced extreme weather events serving as a catalyst for greater involvement of the Indian armed forces in such exercises in the region (and perhaps beyond), this element is expected to act as a strong stimulus for climatization.

By bringing out varied interpretations of climate security-military interface through securitization, riskification and climatization in different contexts, the paper attempts to analyse why and how militaries address climate change. There is further scope for comparative research on the militaries of the North and South, which could provide a more holistic view of the contextual conditions that influence climatization as well as, from a policy point of view, avoid universalization of these norms that are being promoted by the international organizations and networks. To some extent, such studies can also facilitate a more holistic understanding and even redefinition of climate security at both conceptual and practical levels.

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ORIGINAL ARTICLE

Climatizing the UN Security Council

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Abstract
Since 2007, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) has debated the security implications of climate change on several occasions. This article addresses these debates by exploring two interrelated questions: What drives the continuous efforts to place climate change on the UNSC's agenda and to what extent do the UNSC's debates illustrate an ongoing process of climatization? To answer these, the article draws on the concept of climatization, which captures the process through which domains of international politics are framed through a climate lens and transformed as a result of this translation. It suggests that climate change has become a dominant framing and an inescapable topic of international relations and that the UNSC debates follow a logic of expansion of climate politics by securing a steady climate agenda, attributing responsibility to the Council in the climate crisis, involving climate actors and advocating for climate-oriented policies to maintain international security.

Keywords Climate change · Climatization · International organizations · Securitization · Security Council · United Nations

Introduction: Debating Climate Threats at the UN Security Council

> First, can climate security be achieved through the quick fix of securitization of climate change to address climate-related disasters? International peace and security considerations often trump other considerations. Defining a problem as a security challenge therefore often increases the attention and resources devoted to addressing it. Securitizing climate change may help to heighten public awareness, but securitization also has significant downsides. A secu-

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> ritized approach risks pitting States into a competition, when cooperation is clearly the most productive avenue in tackling this threat. Thinking in security terms usually engenders overly militarized solutions to problems that inherently require non-military responses to resolve them. In short, it brings the wrong actors to the table. As the saying goes, if all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail. (Excerpt from the Indian delegate's intervention at the UNSC open debate held on 25 January 2019, UNSC S/PV.8451).

On 25 January 2019, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) held its 4th official open debate on the security implications of climate change. Despite the growing engagement of some member states, the Council could not reach an agreement on a presidential statement, let alone a resolution. Although an increasing number of states support the UNSC's involvement in climate politics, it is still a very contentious issue as the quotation by the Indian delegate attests. Since the first debate in April 2007, the UNSC has discussed climate-related issues on multiple occasions: Five official open debates (17 April 2007; 20 July 2011; 11 July 2018; 25 January 2019; and 24 July 2020) were supplemented by a series of informal meetings ('Arria-formula' sessions) that directly or indirectly explored the contested links between climate change and international security.

In international relations, these meetings have been extensively studied. Among this work, two main trends emerge: one revisiting the institutional debate on the role and functions of the UNSC and a second one on the process of securitization of climate change. First, scholars have traced these different debates shedding light on the agenda setting process, the content of the discussions and the opposing arguments presented by member states (Conca et al. 2017; Cousins 2013; Elliott 2003; Penny 2007; Scott and Ku 2018). They analyze how the Council integrates this emerging issue from an institutional perspective while questioning the potential role for the UNSC in the climate-security debate. Most of these studies consider why the UNSC should address climate change and how it could do it (Conca 2019; Conca et al. 2017; Elliott 2003; Scott and Ku 2018). They echo the monitoring and advocacy work conducted by different think tanks and policy-oriented research centers (Born 2017) whose coordinated efforts have been highly publicized through the Planetary Security Initiative launched in 2015 by the Netherlands' Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They discuss the legitimacy of the UNSC in considering climate-related issues and its authority to act on such topics. They list a series of options for its action on climate change and question their feasibility. While generally advocating for a broader transformation of the UNSC, they often recognize that the current Council's politics undermine the likelihood of the adoption by the UNSC of a strong framework on climate change (Conca 2019). A second trend in critical security studies has explored the case of the UNSC as an example of securitization of climate change (Andonova 2010; Kurtz 2012; Maertens 2016; Methmann and Rothe 2013; Rothe 2016; Scott 2012, 2008; Webersik 2012). Drawing on the work of the Copenhagen school on the discursive construction of security threats, these studies analyze the speech acts that intend to construct climate change as a security issue. The UNSC is both considered as a securitizing actor producing securitizing moves, especially through its 2011 presidential statement (S/PRST/2011/15, 20 July 2011) and case-by-case

resolutions,[1] and a securitization arena where member states and other speakers intend to proclaim climate threats. This work discusses the political implications of a security discourse applied to climate change and highlights the risk of militarization and depoliticization that could result from the UNSC's engagement in climate politics (Ide 2020; Louis and Maertens 2021).

On the one hand, the first trend of research underlines the current challenges that the UNSC faces in addressing climate change. These studies show the political disagreements among its members who even struggle to have formal open debates as attested by the use of informal sessions. On the other hand, the work in critical security studies highlights the risks of tackling climate change as an isolated threat within the Council. Despite these conclusions and the repeated failures, there is still much interest in bringing climate change on the UNSC's agenda.

This article proposes to discuss the persistence of such a political endeavor by drawing on recent work on the process of climatization (Aykut et al. 2017; Maertens and Baillat 2017; Oels 2013, 2012). Instead of looking at the process of securitization of climate change, it considers the reversed process of climatization through which other domains of world politics are framed through a climate lens and transformed as a result of such a translation. It therefore supplements both trends of research by exploring two interrelated questions: What drives the continuous efforts to place climate change on the UNSC's agenda and to what extent do the UNSC's debates illustrate an ongoing process of climatization? It suggests that climate change has become a dominant framing and an inescapable topic of international relations and that the debates conducted within the UNSC follow a logic of expansion of climate politics. By looking at the UNSC's case, it intends to give cues for a better understanding of the significant influence of climate change in world politics and global governance today.

Climate Threats: from Securitization to Climatization

Political discourse and academic work linking climate change to security have been studied by critical scholars, to understand the political motives of the actors drawing that connection. These scholars have identified two dominant narratives: (1) the role of climate change in causing conflicts and (2) the threat that climate change poses to various dimensions of human security (food, health, etc.) (Hardt 2017; Lucke et al. 2014; McDonald 2018, 2013; Oels 2012; Rothe 2016; Trombetta 2008). Most of this work relies on securitization theories to capture the way climate change has been discursively framed as a security threat. Developed by the Copenhagen School, the concept of securitization considers the social construction behind the notion of 'security.' For Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde, 'the exact definition and criteria of

[1] For instance, in the resolution 2349 adopted in March 2017 on the security situation in the Lake Chad Basin region, the Council 'Recognises the adverse effects of climate change and ecological changes among other factors on the stability of the Region, including through water scarcity, drought, desertification, land degradation, and food insecurity' (S/RES/2349 (2017), §26).

securitization is constituted by the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects' (1998, p. 25). In other words the process would consist of political elite designating a threat to survival—through a speech act—and making it recognized as such. According to these authors, a successful securitization process would allow the issue to be treated with the urgent and exceptional measures that characterize the field of security. The Copenhagen School's model, centered on a discursive analysis, has been widely criticized and expanded since its first formulation (Balzacq 2011; Collective 2006; McDonald 2008). Yet the securitization theories have inspired much work on the construction of the environment as a security issue and more recently on the case of climate change (Floyd 2010; Floyd and Matthew 2013; Lucke et al. 2014; McDonald 2013; Methmann and Rothe 2013; Oels 2012; Rothe 2016; Trombetta 2011).

In parallel to the literature on the securitization of the environment in international relations, the emergence of the concept of environmentalization in sociology can shed novel light on the relationship between environment and security. Like security matters, environmental issues can be socially constructed, through a process of 'environmentalization.' Acselrad (2010, p. 103) summarizes the work dedicated to this process in the following definition: 'The term can be used to designate both the adoption of a generic environmental discourse by different social groups, as well as the concrete incorporation of environmental justifications to legitimate institutional, political and scientific practices.' The environmentalization of security can be approached as akin to Elbe's (2010) formulations on the medicalization of security: He demonstrates how the connections between security and global health depend not only on the securitization of global health threats, but also on a process of medicalization of insecurity which impacts security practices. The environmentalization of security then aims to establish security activities as part of the environmental protection norms, policies and mandates (Maertens 2019). It also appears through practices and devices, shifted from the environmental sector to the security field.

Derived from the concept of environmentalization, climatization describes the process that defines a given issue as being part of the climate domain and relevant to climate policies. In the case of security, climatization is not a way that 'new phenomena are being constructed and exposed to the public sphere,' but rather the way that 'old phenomena are renamed' (Acselrad 2010, p. 103) as pertaining to the climate field. Aykut et al (2017) study how the climate governance extends its sphere of influence by climatizing other domains of global politics. They rightly show that climatization highlights a powerful yet uneven process in which climate change increasingly becomes the dominant frame through which other issues and forms of global governance are mediated and hierarchized. It depends less on legal dispositions in climate treaties or institutionalized linkages between international organizations. Instead it rests on the work of numerous actors which 'translate' issues and concerns using a climate lens. Work on environmentalization and climatization has been rather sparse in critical security studies, which has largely focused on the securitization of the environment and climate change. Without employing the concepts of climatization and environmentalization Trombetta (2008) approaches these questions by showing that the securitization of environmental issues leads to changes in terms of practices within the security field. Security actors integrate new logics of

action inspired from traditional environmental policies such as preventive actions and nonconfrontational responses. These conclusions echo Oels's (2012, p. 197) definition of the climatization of security: "'Climatization' of the security field means that existing security practices are applied to the issue of climate change and that new practices from the field of climate policy are introduced into the security field." Drawing on a Foucauldian approach and the Paris school's perspective on (in)securitization and security professionals, she shows that 'practices of disaster management are emerging in the defence sector while practices of adaptation are featured in migration and development policy' (2012, p. 202). By identifying these emerging practices, she sheds light on the progressive climatization of the sectors of migration, development and defense while advocating for more research on the implications of the climatization of the security field.

Building on Oels's work, Maertens and Baillat (2017) questioned the climatization process through a detailed empirical case study. They looked at 'how migration, security and conflict are framed as issues relevant to the climate convention' during the climate summit COP21 held in Paris in December 2015 and concluded that 'COP21 witnessed continued use of climatisation as a tool for alert, instrumentalised to shed light on climate change and sometimes also on issues completely unrelated to climate' (2017, p. 130). This study captures different objectives behind the climatization of migration, security and conflict, stresses the uneven degrees of climatization between these issues and points to the resistance that limits climatization. Yet it does not fully address the analytical implications of conceptualizing the relation between security and climate change as a process of climatization. Going further the present article unpacks the interrelated elements which compose the climatization process.

The literature on the medicalization of security provides a strong basis to conceptualize the various components of climatization processes. Drawing on different disciplines and Foucault's work, Elbe identifies three developments which support the medicalization of security: Insecurity is framed as a medical problem with a medical origin; medical professionals acquire a greater role in world politics; medical interventions are applied to secure populations (2010, pp. 22–29). Building on these conclusions, the present article approaches climatization as a definitional process which extends the realm of climate politics and identifies the different elements through which issues, actors and institutions are being climatized. Following an inductive and interpretative approach, I argue that the climatization of the UNSC consists of four interrelated developments: Climate change becomes an inescapable topic repeatedly put on the UNSC's agenda; the UNSC is enjoined to assume a responsibility in the climate crisis; climate actors expand their roles in the Council; climate policies steer solutions to maintain international security. This demonstration expands Elbe's initial framework in two ways. First, when applied to an actor like the UNSC instead of an issue, the framing process is twofold: The actor is progressively conceived as unavoidably concerned with climate change; and its role is becoming redefined in relation to its responsibility in the climate crisis. In other words, a climatized Council cannot escape climate change discussions. Secondly, while Elbe focuses on medical professionals, the case of climate change shows a growing role of not only climate professionals, including climate scientists, experts

and international organizations whose mandates address climate change, but also climate activists and climate change 'victims.' These elements are further explored in the following sections.

The multiple studies which have analyzed the content of the debates held within the UNSC on climate change highlight opposing arguments, agenda setting strategies, alliances' reconfigurations (especially since the North/South divide has been challenged by dissensions within both blocks) and member states' evolving discourses and positions over time (Born 2017; Scott and Ku 2018). Building on this work, this article revisits these debates (official and informal) in light of the concept of climatization. To do so, it relies on a qualitative content analysis of different primary sources: Official records of the five open debates held in the UNSC,[2] UN press releases, on site[3] and online information[4] regarding informal discussions organized under the UNSC's umbrella, complementary gray literature on the UNSC and think tanks' advocacy and outreach communications on the UNSC's engagement in climate politics. While the analysis covers all the debates, it does not intend to present each discussion in detail or review every member states' positions—this would repeat the detailed accounts available in the literature. Instead the article mentions selected abstracts representative of a specific discourse and presents illustrative examples of member states' strategies that shed light on the process of climatization of the UNSC.

Drivers of climatization

Before delving into the four components of the climatization process, this section discusses the factors and contextual elements which drive the Council's climatization. Extensive work has explored which states are driving the introduction of climate change at the UNSC and why (Conca 2019; Conca et al. 2017; Dellmuth et al. 2018; Scott and Ku 2018). Previous research on the securitization of climate change at the UNSC has also shown that the Council's debates took place in a context of growing concerns over the magnitude of the climate crisis with securitizing moves aiming at sounding the alarm and advocating for stronger governmental commitments. They also occurred when key security actors such as the US military showed increasing interest in the security implications of climate change. This section does not intend to reiterate these conclusions but rather pinpoints contextual elements which inform on the way the climatization process unfolds.

First, a key driver relates to the political gain expected from climatization. Scholars, as India also pointed out, have shown that securitizing actors often expect to attract attention by designating climate threats while profiling themselves on this

[2] The article mainly focuses on the four first open debates.

[3] I conducted a three-month participant observation within the UN Secretariat from October 2012 until February 2013. In that context, I attended the Arria-formula meeting dedicated to the security implications of climate change on 15 February 2013.

[4] Some governmental position papers presented in the context of informal and non-recorded debates on climate change are available online on the official page dedicated to the permanent representations of member states to the UN or circulated to thinks tanks and medias for distribution and discussion.

topic, especially for non-permanent members (Conca 2019; Maertens 2018; Scott and Ku 2018). The climatization of the UNSC also follows political strategies to raise awareness, create political momentum, acquire resources and gain material and symbolic power thanks to a specific expertise or a critical exposure to climate risks. The election of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines as the smallest state (about 110′000 inhabitants) to secure a seat at the UNSC (starting from January 2020) can be interpreted as an example of the capital acquired by the climatization process. The permanent mission of the Caribbean multi-island nation defines its 'unique opinions on the issue of climate change' as the reason why it was elected[5]: In this case the political gain does not result from proclaimed climate threats (securitization), but from the growing significance of climate change in international relations (climatization). Climatization is about giving a voice to actors specifically concerned with climate change.

Secondly, UNSC's climate debates connect to the chronology of the international negotiations on climate change. While the 2007 debate took place after the Kyoto protocol entered into force in 2005, it was also after a failed COP12 where emission cuts were hardly discussed. Later that year, the IPCC and Al Gore received the Nobel Peace Prize, a key milestone mentioned in introduction of the letter from the Permanent Representative of Germany to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General to justify the organization of the 2011 debate (S/2011/408, 5 July 2011). The 2011 debate was scheduled after the failure of the COP15 in 2009 in Copenhagen, soon accentuated by the declaration of withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol by the Canadian government in December 2011. If the debate at the UNSC could not entirely compensate for these governance failures, it did produce the only agreed decision on the overall links between climate change and international security through a Presidential Statement (S/PRST/2011/15).[6] The more recent discussions also took place in a controversial context with the US withdrawal from the Paris agreement and the climate denial of the Trump administration. During the UNSC's debates, member states thus reiterated their commitments to the different instruments attached to the climate convention (Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement) or called for their ratification and strengthening. They also punctually denounced their 'unfinished business' (Ghana, 2007) referring to states having 'too often failed to honor their commitments to such frameworks' (Nigeria 2011). The UNSC therefore appears as an alternative to global climate governance that has failed to mitigate global warming as put by the delegate from Namibia in 2007: 'Kyoto 2 will probably come and go, and so will Kyoto 3 and 4, while our peoples and countries are rendered more and more vulnerable. What we need is action now and not mere debates that do not produce concrete results. In this regard, my delegation would like to see

[5] Permanent Mission of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines to the United Nations. (2019) Facebook Profile, https://www.facebook.com/SVGMissionUN/. Accessed 14 October 2019.

[6] Other decisions were only agreed on a case-by-case approach.

the establishment of an effective mechanism to take charge of the governance of climate change.'[7] Climatization is about attributing responsibility.

Third dealing with sudden crisis as much as long-term political tensions, the UNSC is the international forum mandated to address cross-border 'emergencies.' Since 2007 (year of the first official debate held on climate change), the idiom of emergency has been increasingly used to describe the current climate situation. For instance, a growing number of public actors, including national parliaments, local governments and cities, are declaring climate emergency (The Climate Mobilization 2019). In the face of this 'emergency,' the UNSC's involvement therefore appears logical, even if the emergency framing has been less used by member states during the official debates,[8] with the notable exception of some small island countries such as Barbados whose delegate declared climate change as a 'global emergency' in the 2007 debate (S/PV.5663, 17 April 2007). Climatization is about ensuring the Council's legitimacy and up-to-date agenda in a changing world.

Building on this development, I suggest summarizing the drivers for climatizing the UNSC into three categories. First, they are strategic: Some member states can gain agency through symbolic and material capital by climatizing the UNSC, while others can benefit from shifting from the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change's universal venue to the exclusive club of the UNSC where they may already have more power.[9] Second, they are instrumental: The UNSC is addressed to overcome the failures of global climate governance and take responsibility *with* the (though unlikely) possibility to use coercion, *but without* the political and ethical implications of a security framing. Climatization of the UNSC places climate change in the highest international political forum while avoiding the security logic(s). Third they are symbolic: The climatization of the UNSC helps raise attention while keeping the Council's legitimacy as the main multilateral body in charge of managing global emergencies. In other words, climatization concerns agency and responsibility. The following section further develops these elements by unpacking the different dimensions through which climatization processes unfold.

Climatizing the UN Security Council

The analysis of UNSC's debates on climate change reveals that the Council's climatization consists of four interrelated developments which expand climate politics and help understand the continuous efforts to introduce climate change at the Council.

[7] Namibia, however, did not call for a direct engagement from the UNSC in 2007, endorsing the statements by the G77 + China and the Non-Aligned Movement.

[8] The other mentions referred to emergency aid and emergency preparedness, especially in the 2019 debate (UN Security Council, S/PV.8451, 25 January 2019).

[9] Some developing countries have, for example, claimed that developed countries were bringing climate change at the UNSC to impede their development.

Securing a Steady Climate Agenda

First despite recurring oppositions by key member states such as China, India and Russia, the Council keeps on organizing official debates, but more importantly informal meetings on climate change. If states can refuse to attend these meetings, such sessions maintain the issue on the agenda or 'ensur[e] the continuity of this debate' as Spain and Malaysia claimed in the concept note presenting the 'Open Arria-formula meeting on the role of Climate Change as a threat multiplier for Global Security' held on 30 January 2015.[10] Since 2013 five Arria-formula meetings have been entirely dedicated to climate change (Table 1).

Moreover, consistent advocates have also bypassed oppositions by indirectly tackling climate change through related issues. While climate change appeared among the issues addressed during the open debate on the 'new challenges to international peace and security and conflict prevention' (convened by Portugal on 23 November 2011), it was also a critical matter raised during an open debate on 'Peace and security challenges facing small island developing States' (convened by New Zealand on 30 July 2015). Climate change was also addressed during official and informal debates on water and security, on the Lake Chad Basin, on the Sahel region (Born 2017; Maertens 2018) and more recently on terrorism and violent extremism in Africa,[11] interested member states seizing every opportunity to keep it on the agenda. This strategy however has not gone unnoticed as expressed by the Russian representative during an open debate on hunger and conflicts (convened by the Dominican Republic on 29 April 2020): 'We understand that climate change is very trendy now, and there is always a temptation to insert it into every discussion. But we need to be frank with ourselves and not to exaggerate its significance in every crisis' (S/2020/340, 29 April 2020). Despite such recurring opposition, the UNSC has developed a steady and even growing climate agenda since the first debate in 2007.

Climate change has also become a campaign issue for member states that seek to obtain a seat as a non-permanent member. During the 2011 open debate, Finland, at the time campaigning for a seat for the 2013–2014 period,[12] stated: 'The Security Council should, given its pre-eminent role in maintaining international peace and security, keep an eye on the emerging security implications of climate change. If elected to the Security Council next year, Finland will contribute actively to any such assessment and action' (S/PV.6587 (Resumption 1), 20 July 2011). More recently the Canadian ambassador to the UN has announced that Canada's bid for UNSC's seat was to focus on economic security, climate change and gender equality (McParland 2019). Ireland (Houses of the Oireachtas 2018), Kenya (Kibii 2019) and Norway, also running for a seat in 2021–2022, all referred to climate change in connection with their candidacy, like the Norwegian delegate during the 2019

[10] http://www.spainun.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Concept-Note_ClimateChange_20150630.pdf. Accessed 9 July 2019.

[11] https://www.un.org/press/en/2020/sc14140.doc.htm. Accessed 29 May 2020.

[12] Luxembourg was eventually elected.

Table 1 Official and informal debates directly addressing climate change at the UNSC, 2007–2020. *Source*: Compilation by the author based on UNSC official records and the compilation of Arria-formula meetings by Security Council Report (2019). Data updated through July 2020

Date	Meeting type	Title	Convenors
17 April 2007	Open debate	Climate Change	UK
20 July 2011	Open debate	Maintenance of International Peace and Security. Impact of Climate Change	Germany
15 February 2013	Arria-formula meeting	Security Dimensions of Climate Change	UK and Pakistan
30 June 2015	Arria-formula meeting	Climate Change as a Threat Multiplier for Global Security	Spain and Malaysia
10 April 2017	Arria-formula meeting	Security Implications of Climate Change: Sea Level Rise	Ukraine (with the support of Germany and Sweden)
15 December 2017	Arria-formula meeting	Preparing for Security Implications of Rising Temperatures	France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Maldives, Morocco, the Netherlands, Peru, Sweden and the UK
11 July 2018	Open debate	Maintenance of International Peace and Security. Understanding and Addressing Climate-Related Security Risks	Sweden
25 January 2019	Open debate	Maintenance of International Peace and Security. Addressing the Impacts of Climate-Related Disasters on International Peace and Security	Dominican Republic
22 April 2020	Arria-formula meeting	Climate and Security Risks: The Latest Data	France together with Belgium, the Dominican Republic, Estonia, Germany, Niger, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Tunisia, the UK and Viet Nam[a]
24 July 2020	Open debate (video-teleconference)	Maintenance of international peace and security: climate and security	Germany with the support of Belgium, the Dominican Republic, Estonia, France, Niger, Tunisia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the UK and Viet Nam

Security Council Report. (2019) Arria-Formula Meetings, 1992–2019. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-security-council-working-methods/arria-formula-meetings.php. Accessed 30 August 2019

[a]https://onu.delegfrance.org/Event-on-Climate-and-Security-risks. Accessed 29 May 2020

open debate: 'The climate-security nexus merits, in our view, being firmly placed on the Council's agenda. It is also a priority for Norway, as a candidate country for a non-permanent seat in the Council' (S/PV.8451, 25 January 2019). Furthermore, the Undersecretary for Political Affairs of Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs pointed that 'during our election campaign we *rightly* focused on climate change' (Teesalu 2019, emphasis added), almost admitting the strategic dimension of such a focus since Estonia was elected for the period 2020–2021 (like Saint Vincent and the Grenadines). Germany is also presenting its two-year term (2019–2020) as one of advocacy in favor of climate change at the UNSC (Maas 2018) with the ultimate goal 'to *mainstream* matters of climate-related security in all resolutions and in the policy of the Security Council' (Climate Diplomacy 2019, emphasis added). Not surprisingly, the German representative expressed disappointment that the security implications of climate change were not included in the language of the resolution on South Sudan adopted in March 2020 (S/PV.8744, 12 March 2020). Germany, together with the Pacific state Nauru, also established a Group of Friends on climate and security at the United Nations in August 2018 (with 27 founding members) in order 'to bring the topic into even sharper focus on the United Nations political agenda' (Federal Foreign Office 2018). In other words, climate change has become a repeated item on the Council's agenda with continuous efforts to increase the UNSC's involvement in the matter. This first sign of climatization is supplemented by the responsibility attributed to the UNSC in the climate crisis.

Attributing responsibility in the climate crisis

The climatization of the UNSC also entails a definitional process in which the Council is framed as enjoined to assume a responsibility toward the climate crisis and the necessary political responses.

Over the past years, member states and other speakers intervening during the Council's meetings have asked the UNSC to take responsibility in the global climate crisis, like it has been called to do so in matters of human security in the 1990s. Most speakers emphasized the urgency of climate change to justify UNSC's debates. They refer to 'unprecedented' 'threat,' 'challenges,' 'changes,' 'scale' or 'impacts' while pointing to the 'new' or 'novel' character of climate change influence on societies, making clear reference to 'humanity' and calling for 'collective action.' In 2019 the delegate from Mauritius expressly emphasized the global dimension of climate change: 'no country is immune to the perils of climate change. […] The Security Council is therefore the appropriate platform to address this threat to the security and prosperity of the globe' (S/PV.8451, 25 January 2019). Climate change is defined as an urgent and unprecedented priority for the UNSC. The UN Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs who opened the 2019 debate also stated: 'Given the *critical role* and *responsibility* of the Security Council, I am encouraged by today's debate. It signals our willingness to establish a shared understanding of the impact of climate-related security risks on international peace and

security' (S/PV.8451, 25 January 2019). After her statement, several member states also refer to the Council's responsibility and obligations:

> '[I]t is our view that it is not illegitimate to think that the Security Council has *a role, a mission and a responsibility* that are yet to be defined.' (Algeria);
> 'It is clear that taking climate risks into account is no longer an option but a *necessity*, if the Council is to *assume its full responsibility* and strengthen its capacity to prevent conflicts.' (Belgium);
> 'The Security Council *must* become an early-warning system for international policy.' (Germany);
> 'The Security Council has the *primary responsibility* for maintaining international peace and security. The climate-security nexus *merits*, in our view, being firmly placed on the Council's agenda.' (Norway);
> 'The consequences certainly transcend the mandate of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and could require a response from the Security Council in *the context of its responsibilities* related to conflict prevention and resolution.' (Peru).
> 'The Council *needs* to equip itself with a system of risk assessment and strategies that integrate the impact of climate change into its analysis and into conflict prevention and peacekeeping.' (Spain).

Such responsibility is further invoked when international security practices are designated as climate problems. The UNSC is the main multilateral arena responsible for 'the maintenance of international peace and security' (UN Charter, Art. 24, §1) and plays a critical role in the regulation of international security practices. Yet the recent debates at the UNSC have revived the discussions initiated in the 1980s on the environmental impacts of conflicts. During their interventions, multiple member states emphasized the consequences of (in)security on climate change. For instance, in 2018, the delegate from Bolivia argued against discussions on climate change held in the UNSC, preferring the UN climate convention, but then dedicated a full paragraph to the impacts of 'military machinery of the most powerful countries on the planet' on the environment (S/PV.8307, 11 July 2018). In 2019, the Slovakian delegate called for an integrated approach 'linking humanitarian, development, climate-mitigation and peace and security-related action,' while advocating for 'further steps to more effectively address the critical threats that war and armed conflict pose to the environment and conservation efforts' (S/PV.8451, 25 January 2019). Growing debates over the climate footprint of peacekeeping operations further attest how international security issues and practices are understood as part of the climate problem.[13] Other interventions have also proposed a new account of warfare: 'Our conflict is not being fought with guns and missiles but with weapons from everyday life—chimney stacks and exhaust pipes. We are confronted with a chemical war of immense proportions.' (Tuvalu, 2007); 'Humanity, and the developing countries in particular, have been subjected to what could be described as low-intensity biological or chemical warfare.' (Namibia, 2007). Such reframing is reinforced in the

[13] http://greeningtheblue.org/what-the-un-is-doing/field-missions. Accessed 29 May 2020.

concrete suggestion of the Indonesian delegate during the 2019 debate: 'One concrete step that we can take is to better equip our peacekeepers with the capacity to undertake military operations other than war—to carry out not only peacekeeping operations but also climate peace missions' (S/PV.8451, 25 January 2019). In these quotes, a climate lens redefines what counts as war implying an (in)direct responsibility for the UNSC, while allowing a closer involvement of climate actors.

Expanding Climate Actors' Role

The climatization of the UNSC facilitates a greater role for three types of climate actors: climate experts, including climate scientists, international organizations mandated on climate change and think tanks; climate activists like non-governmental organizations (NGOs); and climate change 'victims' understood as states, communities or specific populations with a critical exposure to the adverse effects of climate change. Two main techniques have been used to open the Council's doors to these actors.

First during open debates, any UN member state has the right to request the UNSC's President 'to participate in the consideration of the item, without the right to vote, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter and rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure' (S/PV.5663, 17 April 2007). In 2007, 40 states representatives expressed their wish to take the floor alongside the 15 UNSC members, 47 in 2011 and 60 in 2019 (Table 2), setting a record for number of non-Council members participating in open debates (in 2007 and 2011). If only five extra states participated in the 2018 debate, the President of Nauru attended the debate and Iraq was represented by its Minister for Water Resources. In 2019, 15 delegations were represented at the ministerial level. During the 2020 video-teleconference open debate, six non-Council members intervened, among which Belize delivered a statement on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), Nauru on behalf of the Group of Friends on Climate and Security and Denmark on behalf of the Nordic countries, but 29 delegations also submitted written statements to express their views on the matter (S/2020/751). Among the non-Council members, states infamously well-known for their vulnerability to climate change, such as Bangladesh or Pacific small island developing countries, requested to participate, sometimes through a spokesperson like in 2018 when the representative of the Maldives addressed the Council on behalf of AOSIS. Their statements emphasized the legitimacy of their voice within the Council as the first ones concerned with the adverse effects of climate change: 'We are likely to become the victims of a phenomenon to which we have contributed very little and which we can do very little to halt' (Papua New Guinea, on behalf of the Pacific Islands Forum Small Island Developing States, 2007). Moreover, the closer involvement of those actors in the Council has not been limited to punctual interventions, but also appears in their access to non-permanent seat as mentioned previously with the case of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. The climatization of the Council calls for a greater role for states with a critical exposure to the effects of climate change.

Table 2 Participation during open debates on climate change at the UNSC, 2007–2020. *Source*: Author's compilation based on UNSC's official records

Debates	Number of participating member states	Invited guest speakers
17 April 2007	55	
20 July 2011	62	UN Secretary-General Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme Acting Head of the delegation of the European Union to the United Nations
11 July 2018	20	UN Deputy Secretary-General Representative from the International Indigenous Peoples Forum on Climate Change
25 January 2019	75	Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme Chief Scientist of the World Meteorological Organization Research Assistant at the Environmental Security Program of the Stimson Center Minister Counsellor of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations Permanent Observer of the African Union to the United Nations Permanent Observer of the International Committee of the Red Cross to the United Nations Permanent Observer of the Observer State of the Holy See
24 July 2020	21 interventions and 29 written statements	Assistant Secretary-General for Europe, Central Asia and the Americas Director of Niger's Centre National d'Études Stratégiques et de Sécurité Director of the Sustainable Pacific Consultancy Niue Head of Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations

Except for the first debate in 2007, each of the UNSC's meetings also welcomed UN senior officers, regional organizations' representatives and even members from civil society (NGOs and think tanks)—detailed list available in Table 2. During these debates, the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) intervened at the UNSC for the first time in their history, respectively, in 2011 (through its executive director) and 2019 (through its chief scientist). UN representatives and non-state actors were also key speakers during the Arria-formula sessions. Indeed if this format is mostly used to overcome some member states' reluctance, it also allows the interventions of multiple experts and NGOs' representatives that are at the frontline of the advocacy work in favor of mandating the UNSC on climate change. For instance, in 2013, the introductory messages by the UK, Pakistan (both convenors), the Marshall Islands and Australia (through a video), were followed by four interventions by the UN Secretary-General, the president of the German Advisory Council on Global Change, the Vice-President and Special Envoy on climate change of the World Bank, and the UN Under-Secretary-General for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States. NGOs' voices were represented by the intervention of the director of Climate Action Network. In the April 2020 Arria-formula meeting, organizers invited the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs to intervene followed by representatives of the NGO International Crisis Group[14] and the Stockholm International Peace and Research Institute (SIPRI).[15] Likewise, NGOs and experts[16] are highly active in support of the Group of Friends established by Germany and Nauru in 2018 (Adelphi 2019). While inviting guest speakers, organizing Arria-formula sessions and pursuing the debates outside the UNSC are not techniques specific to climate-oriented discussions, taken together they facilitate the greater involvement of climate experts, activists and 'victims' in the Council, signaling the progressive climatization of the UNSC.

Advocating for a Climate Fix

In their work on the securitization of climate change and the climatization of security, Trombetta (2008) and Oels (2012) shed light on the adoption of practices 'largely inspired by the practices developed within the environmental sector' by security actors (Trombetta 2008, p. 594). Trombetta (2008) shows the development of preventive and nonconfrontational measures (including insurance and compensation), and Oels discusses the 'new flexible military response capacities [that] are being developed in the North, so that the political order of overwhelmed Southern states can be re-established after climate change-induced disaster' (Oels 2012, p. 201). In the case of the UNSC, the renewed interest in prevention[17] cannot be

[14] https://www.crisisgroup.org/global/climate-change-shaping-future-conflict. Accessed 29 May 2020.

[15] https://onu.delegfrance.org/Event-on-Climate-and-Security-risks. Accessed 29 May 2020.

[16] For instance, see the independent Expert Working Group on Climate-related Security Risks: https://www.sipri.org/research/peace-and-development/climate-change-and-risk/expert-working-group-climate-related-security-risks. Accessed 30 August 2019.

[17] For instance, see the first intervention by the newly appointed UN Secretary-General at the UNSC: Security Council, S/PV.7857, 10 January 2017.

directly attributed to climatization since prevention has been an essential dimension of the Council's work since the 1992 *Agenda for Peace* by UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. Yet the solutions put forward at the UNSC to address the security implications of climate change entail recourse to climate-oriented policies based on science, preventive risk management, 'climate proofing' and institutional adaptation. In other words, the climatization of the UNSC emerges from these suggested responses which reinforce both a preventive approach toward conflicts and insecurities and an adaptation strategy in terms of climate change.

First, debates at the UNSC have emphasized the need to collect and exchange scientific data and information, echoing decision making in the field of climate change where scientific assessments are requested in preparation of international negotiations. While the 'latest data' on 'climate and security risks' were the focus of the April 2020 Arria-formula session, during open debates, states called for more 'comprehensive information from the field' (Poland, 2018) and for 'aggregating data' (USA, 2019), while insisting on 'improving the flow of information' (Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2011) and advocating for 'further informative exchanges with representatives and experts, including the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, on the security implications of climate change, as well as more integrated sharing of data and expertise' (Viet Nam, 2019). On the one hand, these recommendations reinforce the role of climate experts as relevant partners for the UNSC; on the other one, they encourage the application of tools used in climate science such as 'climate data collections, climate scenarios and early-warning systems' (Switzerland, 2019) to address climate and security risks. Such data and scientific mechanisms have been promoted to mainstream information throughout the UN system ('We must integrate that data into decision making across the entire United Nations system' (UK, 2019)) and to gather analysis tools in the hands of one 'guarantor of the scientific message that can build consensus on the links between climate and security' (France, 2020, Arria-formula session[18]). These tools also suggest a risk-management approach which aims to enhance 'a preventive assessment strategy' and 'anticipate the consequences' (France, 2020, Arria-formula session[19]). Echoing the work on processes of riskification through which the security implications of climate change are addressed based on a risk-management approach (Corry 2012; Estève 2020), these policy solutions suggest a climate fix to issues pertaining to international security.

The responses recommended during the UNSC's climate discussions also focus on 'climate proofing,' cross-cutting intersectoral mechanisms and institutional adaptation. For example, during the Arria-formula meeting held in December 2017, convenors invited one of the authors of the report 'A Responsibility to Prepare' published by the Center for Climate and Security alongside the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands. This report defines a preventive agenda intending to 'climate-proof' security institutions, 'climate proofing' notably includes 'routinizing,

[18] https://onu.delegfrance.org/Event-on-Climate-and-Security-risks. Accessed 29 May 2020.
[19] Ibid.

integrating, institutionalizing and elevating attention to climate and security issues at these bodies' (Werrell et al. 2017, p. 1). This process echoes the German Federal Foreign Office's aim to 'mainstream' climate-security issues (Climate Diplomacy 2019) and the objective defined by the French permanent representation 'to ensure that the work of the UN in countries vulnerable to the effects of climate change is climate-proofed' (Arria-formula meeting, 22 April 2020).[20] To do so, different member states advocated for the appointment of a special representative on climate and security within the UN secretariat—Nauru in 2011 and 2018, Canada, Norway, Ireland and Tuvalu in 2019. They also encouraged the institutionalization of climate-security governance within the UN, through the establishment of the Climate Security Mechanism in 2018. Staffed by the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the UN Development Programme and UNEP and supported by the governments of Sweden, Norway, Germany and UK,[21] it is tasked 'to provide integrated climate risk assessments to the UN Security Council and to other UN bodies' (Smith et al. 2019a; see also Smith et al. 2019b). The project intending to include climate considerations into peacekeeping and post-conflict peacebuilding[22] precisely illustrates a form of adaptation of security institutions through climate proofing. While mainstreaming and intersectoral management have been applied within the UN for other transversal topics such as gender, the solutions put forward in terms of climate change tend to adopt an adaptation strategy for UN institutions confronted with the adverse effects of climate change.

This section has identified four developments through which the UNSC is progressively being climatized. These different elements complement and reinforce each other, since for instance climate proofing sustains the Council's climate agenda and its responsibility in the climate crisis, while the recourse to climate policies and science increases the role of climate actors in the management of international security. They also promote a preventive approach and institutional adaptation seemingly raising less opposition than they did a few years ago.

Conclusion

Since 2007, the UNSC has debated the security implications of climate change on multiple occasions. Revisiting these discussions, this article enquires about the continuous efforts which aim to bring climate change on the UNSC's agenda despite apparent failures. Building on previous studies on the climatization of security, it considers the UNSC's debates as an example of a broader process of climatization of world politics and explores the different elements through which other domains of international politics can be climatized. More than analyzing these debates as a

[20] Ibid.

[21] https://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/2030-agenda-for-sustainable-development/peace/conflict-prevention/climate-security.html. Accessed 29 May 2020.

[22] UNEP has been advocating for this since its report on greening the Blue Helmets (United Nations Environment Programme 2012). It echoes the growing literature in environmental peacebuilding (Swain and Öjendal, 2018) and recent publications on climate adaptation and peace (see, for instance, van Schaik et al. 2019).

new form of greenwashing, the article proposes to look into the expansion of climate politics and the potential ensued transformations within other international arenas.

The contributions of this article are twofold. First, it contributes empirically by revisiting the UNSC climate debates in connection with other UNSC practices such as member states campaigning. Second, it challenges established analytical frames on two levels. It disputes the dominant approach based on the securitization framework and demonstrates that, in the case of climate change, a focus on securitization does not tell the whole story. It then proposes to further develop the concept of climatization by shedding light on the different components through which climatization processes unfold: securing a steady climate agenda; attributing responsibility in the climate crisis; expanding climate actors' role; and advocating for climate-oriented policy solutions.

Further research on the climatization of other policy domains and actors could explore the role of these dimensions, as well as identify additional components, while informing on the broader trend of climatization of international relations.[23] Moreover, the analysis suggests three fruitful research avenues. First, by identifying dynamics of inclusion through the growing involvement of climate actors and that of exclusion through the involvement of a non-universal arena, it invites to investigate the tension between universality and club diplomacy in global climate governance. Likewise, the case of the UNSC shows signs of routinization, through climate proofing and mainstreaming, as much as it calls for exceptional measures. Future research could explore this paradox in greater detail. Finally, while the climatization of the UNSC mainly entails preventive and adaptation policies, additional work could further characterize climatizing moves by distinguishing adaptation- from mitigation-oriented climatization. Such distinction may help further conceptualize ongoing processes of climatization as the debates over the UNSC's involvement in climate politics continue.

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[23] See other papers in this special issue.

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