

GIVE WAR A CHANCE REVISITED:
THE EFFECTS OF NON-INTERVENTION ON PEACE DURATION

Anne Etienne
University of North Texas
etienne@unt.edu

Ekong Peters
University of North Texas
EkongPeters@aol.com

ABSTRACT

The literature on international conflict management and conflict resolution can be classified into two main categories: third party intervention and nonintervention. Much empirical research centered on the former while the latter is virtually ignored by scholars except theoretical description. In this paper, our purpose is to test Luttwak's nonintervention thesis in intrastate conflicts empirically since its findings may have policy implications in conflict management. Using a combination of COW, Fearon and Laitin (2003), Regan (1994, 2002) and Bercovitch (1997a) datasets covering between 1942 and 1999, we conduct various statistical analyses to assess the relationship between nonintervention and the duration of peace at the conclusion of civil wars. The results of the logistic analysis show that nonintervention reduces the likelihood of a civil war recurrence lending support to Luttwak thesis. Like the logistic analysis, the Cox survival model and the Weibull survival model have the coefficient of nonintervention in the right direction, thus supporting the Luttwak theory of nonintervention in civil war. These findings have important policy implications.

INTRODUCTION

Since World War II, the interstate system has been relatively peaceful with few interstate wars. However, the relative peace at the international scene did not stop internal conflicts. Although this phenomenon has been going on during the Cold War era, its end, and the collapse of the Soviet empire, appear to fuel civil conflict (Gurr 1994; Posen 1993). Basically, the causes of civil wars can be attributed to a country's greater degree of ethnic/religious (identity) diversity, socio-economic and political grievances (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Of these, the identity civil wars are the most intense because of identifying loyalties, affection, and limited opportunity for compromise (Kaufmann 1996). No where in the world is internal conflict more rampant than in developing nations such as Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, Sudan, and Sri Lanka testify (Kaufmann 1996; Fearon and Laitin 2003). This said, it is important to emphasize that no region of the world is immune from civil war caused by identity/ethnic attachment and antagonism be it with varying degree. The highly developed countries have witnessed their share of the problem (Bonacich 1972; Leifer 1981; Ragin 1979; Gurr 1994) as illustrated in the US, Ireland and Spain. Ragin (1979) notes that while most of these conflicts have been fueled by nationalism.

Indeed, the most common cause of state-level violence in almost the last six decades has not been external wars but internal identity conflicts. According to Gurr (1994), all but five of the twenty-three wars being fought in 1994 are based on communal rivalries and ethnic challenges to states. About three-quarters of the world's refugees, estimated at nearly 27 million people, are in flight from or have been displaced by these and other ethnic conflicts. Eight of the United Nations' thirteen peacekeeping operations are aimed at separating the protagonists in ethnopolitical conflicts. Gurr's statistics are revealing and indicate the horrors of ethnic

conflicts. The toll in their wake is astronomical, albeit with variation, depending on the period and what is counted as ethnic conflict (Fearon and Laitin 1996).

If Gurr's (1994) statistics on the civil war toll is revealing, recent Fearon and Laitin (2003) numbers are shocking. According to the duo, between 1945 and 1999 in 25 interstate wars (fought by 25 states), there were about 3.33 million battlefield deaths compared to 127 civil wars (in 73 states) with a total death of 16.2 millions. As Fearon and Laitin (2003) point out, the death from civil conflicts between 1945 and 1999 is five times that of the interstate toll; the former occurred in more than a third of the United Nations system with a median of approximately six years duration. Fearon and Laitin (2003) posit that internal conflict in the period under study produced refugee flows far greater than their death toll and far greater than the refugee flows associated with interstate wars in the same period. These convincing evidences from Gurr and Fearon and Laitin point to the fact that civil wars are far more lethal and devastating than interstate conflicts. Hence the desire within the international community to seek diplomatic, economic, and military intervention to stop the atrocities caused by interstate conflicts.

Apart from the human toll that ethnic conflicts produces economic devastation is enormous (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Easterly and Levine 1997). Scholars and journalists have drawn attention to Afghanistan, Somalia, Rwanda, Lebanon, Bosnia and Burundi as testaments of the economic devastation that can result from civil conflicts. In Africa, for example, Easterly and Levine (1997) have shown that greater ethnic diversity increases the likelihood of adopting poor policies and under-providing growth-enhancing public goods. These authors in country case studies and empirical findings from a cross section of economies suggest that civil conflicts affect the economies in more subtle ways than stimulating interethnic violence. To improve

socio-economic and political conditions in civil war ravaged countries and bring hope to citizens and return the refugees to their homes, there has to be a lasting and durable peace, whether with international intervention or through nonintervention.

Finding a lasting and durable peace to civil war torn countries through negotiated settlement is an elusive adventure while truce agreements give the warring factions the opportunity to regroup (Walter 2002, 1997; Kaufmann 1996; Licklider 1995). To this end, Walter (2002) suggests that a third party monitors the implementation of the negotiated settlement while Kaufmann (1996) advocates enclave allotments to the warring factions. On the other hand, Luttwak (1999, 2001) argues that nonintervention is the best prescription for durable peace at the conclusion of any intrastate war. This argument is supported by conflict management data, which suggests that there is recurrence of conflicts after negotiated settlement has been signed (Fortna 2004; Water 2002). To assess the validity of Luttwak's argument, one has to conduct an empirical study and this is the purpose of this paper.

Although the determinants and approaches of third party intervention in civil war vary, the main purpose is saving lives and property from ensuing conflict. On the other hand, the proponents of nonintervention argue that allowing the parties in conflict to fight to a bitter end preserves the peace between the warring factions since one of the foes is completely and perhaps permanently defeated. The idea is that the defeated foe will not live to fight another day but the defeat will provide the victor the opportunity to consolidate its power. The proponents of the latter approach further argue that the third party intervention framework is riddled with recurrence of the same conflict even after signing a peace document.

Although a lot of research has been done on third party intervention (bargaining, negotiation, and mediation) in intrastate war, little is known about the nonintervention.

Conducting conflict management research in this area will fill the existing gap in comparative analysis between the outcome of the third party intervention approach to conflict resolution and the nonintervention thesis. The primary question that this research paper will seek to illuminate is the relationship between nonintervention and peace duration at the conclusion of the conflict as posited by Luttwak.

Our purpose in pursuing nonintervention explanation as a means to solve intrastate conflict is to contribute to the existing literature in international conflict management. Since there is paucity of empirical research on the nonintervention thesis, we hope that our effort will increase our knowledge in understanding which approach to conflict resolution will result in lasting and durable peace among warring parties. Secondly, we hope that if our empirical results support the nonintervention thesis, this will have important policy implications in resolving intrastate conflicts.

The plan for this paper is as follows: this introduction will be followed by literature review; then the theoretical framework and hypotheses to explain third party intervention, nonintervention and the duration of peace at the conclusion of civil war; research design; variable operationalization; data analysis and the last section conclusion, will summarize salient points in the paper.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The Civil War literature attempts to identify the causes of war onset, factors impacting war duration, the effects and role of third-party intervention, as well as characteristics that lead to sustainable peace. Of interest for our purpose are the literatures on civil war onset, civil war duration, the impact of intervention on civil wars, as well as approaches to conditions that promote sustainable peace once a civil war has ended. We will first review the literature on civil

war onset, then, we look at the different studies on the effect of intervention on duration, finally, we focus on theoretical premises over the positive effects of non-intervention on sustainable peace on war has ended.

Causes of Civil War

The literature on causes of civil wars presents somewhat diverging hypotheses based on theories focusing on either economic aspects, socio-political characteristics, or the impact of ethno-linguistic fractionalization on the occurrence of civil war. The main goal of this literature lays in attempting to decipher the characteristics, whether exogenous or endogenous to the cases at hand, which affect a country's likelihood to undergo a civil war. From an economic perspective, scholars have proposed that higher levels of economic development, as measured by GDP (Gross Domestic Product) per capita, should decrease the likelihood of civil war occurrence (Collier and Hoeffler 1998). Furthermore, Collier and Hoeffler (1998) also contend that there exists an inverted U-shape relationship between the percentage of one country's primary commodity exports of total GDP and the likelihood of civil war onset. In other words, when the share of GDP represented by primary commodity exports is either low or high, the likelihood of civil war occurrence increases and it increases for other values. Those authors also attempt to account for the effect of ethno-linguistic fractionalization and find no significance. The data they use includes civil war as coded by the COW (Correlates Of War) project. They do fail to account for many other potential explanatory variables as an attempt to provide parsimony and to focus mainly on economic factors. Conversely, Fearon and Laitin (2003) provide a more comprehensive analysis of causes of civil war. They claim that ethno-linguistic fractionalization, as proposed by much of the literature on civil war, creates nationalistic claims and demands for equal access to resources (e.g. Horowitz 1985, Ignatieff 1993, Connor 1994, and Huntington

1996), which increases the likelihood of civil war. However, they control for democratization and per capita income to conclude that ethnic fractionalization has no impact on civil war onset. Fearon and Laitin (2003) note that lower per capita income, political instability, rough geographic features, higher populations, and the reliance on oil exports for resources all increase the likelihood of civil wars. Differently from Collier and Hoeffler (1998), their case selection include all cases that have had a minimum of 1,000 deaths over the course of the civil war, which allows them to include more cases and to account for lower-intensity wars.

Interestingly, the literature on civil war duration often uses the same explanatory variables as the literature on civil onset to attempt to delineate a pattern as to why some civil wars last longer than others. Collier, Hoeffler, and Söderbom (2004) find that “the duration of conflict is systematically related both to structural conditions prevailing prior to conflict and to circumstances during conflict” (p. 268). Mainly, low per capita income, income inequality, and moderate levels of ethnic fractionalization increase the duration of civil wars while third party military intervention and a decrease in the share of primary commodity exports reduce the duration of civil war. Again, their cases are limited to those included in the COW project, which prevents them from taking into account lower intensity, and potentially longer-lasting, civil wars. Moreover, they may count recurring civil wars as two separate events while they may in fact be the same civil war with a period of lower-intensity operations. To counter this problem, Fearon (2004) used a broader definition of civil war since any conflict with 1,000 deaths over its course represents a civil war (as opposed to 1,000 a year in the COW project). A problem of his study emanates from the fact that he focuses on geographical factors as well as types of civil wars to explain their duration rather than looking at more endogenous characteristics of the nation-states themselves. Thus, he proposes that conflicts occurring in Eastern Europe, or because of a coup,

or as an anti-colonial war are all shorter than Asian civil wars and wars where the opposition has access to “contraband” resources. He adds that the interaction between some of those enhances one another – if Eastern Europe location occurs with a coup, for instance, the resulting civil war will be subsequently really short; conversely, Asian location and anti-colonialism aspects tend to cancel one another. Finally, he observes that ethnic fractionalization, economic development, population, democracy, and intensity have no effect on the duration of civil war. Again, it may appear that this study suffers from a selection bias in the sense that most of the significant variables are simple to decipher just by observing patterns across regions. Conventional wisdom posits that characteristics of the nation-state and of the different warring parties should help account for war duration rather than more simplistic regional or war-type features.

Some studies have shown that differences exist between characteristics conducive to civil war onset on the one hand and factors which affect war duration on the other hand (Hegre 2004). In other words, the reasons *why* civil wars start differ from those accounting for *how long* civil wars last. Still, Elbadawi and Sambanis (2002) demonstrate that factors that increase the likelihood of civil war onset also tend to increase civil war duration. They conclude that economic development has a negative effect on the likelihood of civil war and that there exist inverted U-shaped relationship between civil war onset and both ethnic fractionalization and political development. Though they claim that factors affecting the onset of war also impact war duration, they do not propose a clear-cut explanation. Thus, for the purpose of this study, we will mainly focus on characteristics that lead to civil war onset as potential factors that may shorten or lengthen peace duration. Because we purport that giving war a chance – i.e., letting the warring factions fight to exhaustion short of intervention – we now need to focus on the

intervention literature before looking at potential effects of the absence of intervention on peace duration.

The Intervention Literature

Some states have always intervened in other states' internal affairs on behalf of their own interests against the target's will (Morgenthau 2001). Morgenthau (2001) notes that since the French Revolution of 1789 and the emergence of the nation-states that the legitimacy of intervention was questioned. To this end, nonintervention article (Article 119) was enshrined in the French Constitution of 1793 declaring that the French people "do not interfere in the domestic affairs of other nations and will not tolerate interference by other nations in their affairs" (Morgenthau 2001:425). In the years that followed, state leaders, diplomats and international lawyers tried to fashion criteria to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate intervention. The questioning of the legality of intervention in other states' domestic affairs led to the incorporation of the Noninterference Declaration in the United Nations (UN) Charter of 1965 (Morgenthau 2001). Statesmen however, pay lip service to the UN Declaration while violating it with impunity. These statesmen disregard international norms because they have some interests in intervene in some civil wars—and not others—and want to impact on their outcome to maximize their perceived interests.

Interventions in other states' internal affairs by major and minor powers have attracted the attention of scholars and their impacts have received considerable amount of focus. Although scholars have done numerous researches in the field, there is no consensus on the definition of intervention. The literature is saturated with discussions of military interventions (Pearson 1974), propaganda interventions, economic interventions, diplomatic interventions, ideological interventions, and customs interventions (Rosenau 1969). And in some quarters,

Rosenau (1969) observes that inaction is regarded as intervention which results from definitional vagueness. Regan (1996:342) defines intervention as “convention-breaking grants or withdrawal of economic or military assistance with the apparent purpose of influencing the course of an ongoing civil conflict.” “Convention-breaking” because intervention violates the 1965 UN Declaration of Noninterference in another country’s domestic affairs. Regan employed this definition in different researches but the striking feature is the absence of diplomatic intervention. Regan’s arguments for the exclusion of diplomatic intervention (third-party) such as negotiation, bargaining, and mediation are that this area have “already received considerable amount of empirical attention” and that diplomatic intervention is not risky compared to military and economic interventions. The exclusion of diplomatic intervention from Regan’s (1996, 1998) models may cause misspecification thereby biasing the empirical results towards military, economic or mixed (military and economic) interventions. To rectify the situation, our model will include diplomatic intervention which is the least costly strategy. Hence, we will modify Regan’s definitions of intervention to suit our research purpose. Thus, intervention is defined as convention-breaking military, economic, diplomatic or mixed with the apparent purpose of influencing the course of an ongoing civil conflict in a foreign country.

The scholarship on intervention is pervaded with lofty goals of why countries intervene in others’ domestic crises. The reasons include humanitarian (Rosenau 1969; Regan 1998), preservation of self-interest and favorable ideology (Morgenthau 2001), regional and world system stability, territorial acquisition, cessation of hostilities (Regan 1996), and promotion of human rights and democracy (Smith 2001). Contemporary history is rife with third-party intervention such as Rwanda, Somalia, Bosnia, Haiti, China and North Korea, to mention but a few, for various reasons (Smith 2001). In general, the literature on intervention by third-party in

interstate conflicts argues that the goal is to bring the conflicts to quick terminations. However, Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2000) note that, other scholars argue the contrary. This later group maintains that “third parties intervene for less benevolent reasons, including lengthening the duration of a civil war in order to distract, or drain the resources of rival states, or simply to plunder the resources of the civil war state itself” (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000:616-617).

Empirical findings on the impact of third-party intervention are mixed but generally point to prolonging of conflicts. Assuming that third parties intervene in intrastate conflicts to terminate the hostilities in the underlying dispute, Regan (1996) sets out to test this proposition using success as dependent variable. The analysis indicates that of the 196 cases of intervention, only about 30% were considered successful. Focusing on strategy for intervention, the results clearly showed that a single emphasis on either a military or an economic approach is going to be less effective than a mixed (military and economic) strategy. The study further demonstrates that contrary to the assumption that third-party intervention brings quick end to conflict, “it is entirely possible that the interventions themselves prolong the conflict”. The statistics from Regan (1996) study are puzzling. On the one hand, the mean duration of all previously settled conflicts with outside intervention was 7 years. On the other hand, for hostilities in which there were no interventions, the average duration was only 1.5 years, with 10 years for the longest conflict. This conclusion of third-party intervention lengthening the duration of the intrastate conflict is supported by DeRouen Jr. (2004). DeRouen Jr. examined the civil war data covering 1944-1997; “in terms of duration, UN involvement increases the expected time needed for both government and rebel victories and decreases the time for a truce or treaty” (317). These differences may emanate from the proposition that the UN tends to intervene in complex conflicts, which very nature conditions their duration in a negative way. Therefore, by choosing

to interfere in complicated civil wars, the UN indirectly commits itself to long intervention missions.

Although the preceding studies on third-party interventions in intrastate conflict cast doubt on the effectiveness of it shortening the duration of the conflict, another study by Regan (2002) gives some hope even though some findings support the previous evidence. In studying the duration of conflict, Regan (2002) used a hazard model to examine the expected duration of a conflict. According to this study, it makes a difference whether the intervener supports one side in the conflict rather than trying to remain neutral. That means that the third-party must choose a side in the conflict in order for its duration could be shortened. However, Regan's (2002) assertion is based on the premise that the conflict is not a "balanced intervention" (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000). Examining the civil war duration from 1820 to 1992, Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2000) find that a "balanced intervention" prolongs a civil war resulting in stalemate. A balanced intervention is one in which both the government forces and the rebel forces are supported by third-parties committing equal amount of resources in the conflict.

Giving War a Chance

Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rotchild (2001) provided an interesting study on the factors that promote durable peace after a civil war. Their findings underline that democratic institutions, the duration of the war itself, provision for autonomy, and third party intervention all increase peace duration while the intensity of the ended conflict decreases peace duration. However, they study fails to provide for generalizability. Indeed, they only focus on civil wars that ended with a negotiated settlement between the warring factions, excluding all cases terminated by military victory, which represents a strong selection bias. Besides, peace duration is right censored since once a country has experienced peace for five years, it is dropped from the models for all years

thereafter. Finally, the fact that war intensity is negatively related to peace duration probably emanates from the fact that their case selection excludes all those civil wars ending in military victory, cases in which one might expect a high intensity potentially leading to a more durable peace because the defeated side has been exhausted by the war. Thus, as Luttwak (1999, 2001) posits, the best viable solution to preventing recurring conflict is to simply refuse to intervene so war ends through exhaustion and recurrence is strongly diminished because neither side has either the resources or the will to engage in another conflict. For instance, he states:

[W]ar can become the origin of peace by total victory of one side or another, by the sheer exhaustion of all sides, or – more often – because the conflict of aims that originally caused the war is resolved by the political transformation that war itself brings about. As fighting continues, the worth of whatever was to be gained or defended is reconsidered against its costs in blood, treasure, and agony, eventually diminishing or nullifying the ambitions that motivated the war in the first place (2001: 267).

An important aspect of this statement comes from the fact that not only can war itself promote peace through exhaustion, but, it also has the capacity to eradicate the reasons that lead to the eruption of war at the first place, which, in and of itself, should consolidate peace. Interesting as Luttwak's contentions appear, no empirical research has been conducted to test his theory.

Because most of the literature perceives intervention as having a positive effect on both war and peace duration – shortening the former, increasing the latter – Luttwak's contention appears contradictory to common wisdom. Yet, we believe that his theoretical premises provide an novel approach to peace consolidation after a civil war has ended. Often times, countries feel they need to intervene in lengthy and devastating civil wars to put an end to the atrocities they engender, however, those intervention often promote a fast end to those conflicts and undermine the impact intervention can have on peace duration. Again, as Luttwak contends, the main

priority of third-party interventions is to end conflict in a timely manner without giving a chance to war to exhaust all warring parties. Consequently, because they still have resources and the will to fight, the recurrence of war – and the failure of sustainable peace – becomes a strongly likely outcome. We will expand on Luttwak's propositions below to analyze the factors which promote peace duration.

THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

Third-Party Intervention

Although in December 1965, the UN General Assembly adopted the principle of nonintervention forbidding any nation from interfering in one another domestic or external affairs directly or indirectly for whatever reasons, we have witnessed all sorts of activities violating rules contained in this Declaration (Morgenthau 2001). The reasons for breaking the rules of the Declaration are obvious from the realist theory (Regan 1998). From the realist perspective, states act to protect their interests to ensure political stability in the particular region in which their interests are threatened (Regan 1996). Regan argues that this can be achieved by containing the level of violence by trying to arrange a cease-fire or to accelerate the defeat of one of the parties. On the other hand, human rights activists and humanitarians argue that interventions in other countries' domestic or external affairs are necessitated by the need to ensure human rights observance and alleviate human suffering while promoting democracy (Regan 1996; Smith 2001). Yet other scholars maintain that on the average, intervention quickens intrastate conflicts termination (Regan 1996; Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000).

There is no consensus among the realist scholars on the best means of terminating intrastate hostilities but one thing is clear in their analyses, intervention prolongs conflict duration (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Regan 2002). The search for the best way to

guarantee durable peace after settling interstate hostility is elusive. To this end, realist theorists like Luttwak (2001:266) suggests, “War can become the origin of peace by the total victory of one side or another, by the sheer exhaustion of all sides.” There are two implications in Luttwak’s suggestions. First, he advocates a nonintervention approach where the parties will fight until one and only one party achieves victory. In this instance, although the underlying grievance that causes the war is not resolved (DeRouen and Sobek 2004), the defeated foe will no longer have resources to reignite the conflict some other time. Conversely, there is another assumption stipulating that the victor may impose a political solution that brings to an end the grievances that ignited the civil war in the first place (Luttwak 2001). Such imposition of the settlement after the victory and the destruction of the enemy’s forces and resources can guarantee a durable peace. The crux of the first implication is that full defeat allows the victor to change the status-quo. By readjusting the balance of power between the previously warring parties, the victor can ensure political and economic stability. Thus, because the defeated party has lost its leverage, the victor can impose a unilateral settlement that will promote sustainable peace. From this logic, we can derive the following hypotheses:

H₁: If there is no third-party intervention in a civil war, the warring parties will exhaust their willingness and resources to fight, which, in turn, will promote durable peace, ceteris paribus.

H₂: If a civil war ends with a total victory of by one party, the more durable the ensuing peace, ceteris paribus.

The second implication in Luttwak’s argument of total victory before a lasting peace is achieved resides in the concept of exhaustion. This is what Regan (2002:59) terms as “using an intervention to create a ‘ripe’ moment.” In other words, for intervention to be successful in

bringing lasting peace, all the parties in the conflict must come to the conclusion that, at least, at this point in the conflict, the benefits to derive from the conflict is too low compared to the costs. Other scholars have argued that intervention can only be successful when the combatant have reached a stalemate whereby the costs of continued fighting exceed its benefits (Zartmn 1986, Koebler 1994, Regan and Stam 2000). Thus both sides agree that there exists another alternative to war and come to the conclusion that third-party intervention – mediation – is the only acceptable conflict management solution because neither of the parties is willing to accept a unilateral alternative imposed by the other party. In essence, continued fighting has become counter-productive but the balance of power of the warring factions remains such that no unilateral settlement can be reached, which necessitates the intervention of a third-party mediator. The cost-benefit calculus could be viewed from two angles – from the intervener perspective and the parties involved in the conflicts (Regan 1996). For the intervener, the costs could be summarized in terms of success or failure of the intervention (Regan 1996). Our concern here are the costs on the part of the warring parties since our interest is in the duration of peace after the conflict settlement. Regan (1996:341) observes, “The key to any intervention is to alter the calculations by which the antagonists arrive at particular outcomes. In other words, the goal of designing an intervention strategy is to make it too costly for the combatants to continue fighting. This can be achieved either by making the actual costs of fighting prohibitively high or by making the benefits of not fighting particularly attractive. A successful intervention strategy, then, will result in a cost-benefit calculation by the antagonists that results in not fighting providing the highest expected outcome.” Regan’s (1996) argument is based on carrot-and-stick principle at the point of exhaustion. The costs to the antagonists could range from outright intervention on one side, arms embargo and economic sanction to the country’s

diplomatic suspension by third-parties. The immediate costs to the parties fighting are mounting battlefield casualties and depletion of resources resulting in exhaustion and stalemate. At this ripe moment, the antagonists may realize that settling now is beneficial to all the parties than continuing fighting with the same future outcome. At this juncture, the settlement can produce a durable peace. Hence, we derive the following hypothesis:

H₃: If the antagonists reach a stalemate, third-party intervention can produce durable peace, ceteris paribus.

Luttwak posits that non-intervention allows for a total war between the two parties. An intervener can try to impose cease-fires to attempt to limit violence and promote diplomatic interactions between the warring parties. In doing so, the intervener brings a fragile and temporal halt to the fighting but may fail to successfully address the grievances that ignited the hostilities at the first place. Thus, though it appears that an intervener can succeed in peacefully ending the process, it merely manages to stop the hostility. Thus, because at least one of the formerly warring parties still have grievances to address, fighting may start again after a certain – and undetermined – period of relative peace. Conversely, non-interference allows the sides to pursue the conflict until one of them is non longer able to sustain fighting, allowing the winner to impose a unilateral settlement and to re-adjust the balance of power. In this case, since no artificial halt to the hostilities is brought by an outside actor, the fighting last as long as both sides can sustain it. Consequently, in the event of non-intervention, a civil war can potentially last longer than if a third-party had come in to mediate the conflict. However, others have argued that mediation allows for a shortening of the war and promote peace by better channeling information between the different factions (Holbrooke 1999). However, Luttwak's contention suggests that intervention fails to address all the sources of disagreement between the warring

factions and therefore leaves room for future conflicts. Thus, though civil wars which experience third-party intervention may be shorter than those without intervention, the ensuing settlement does not encompass all aspects that triggered the war at the first place. Thus, civil wars short of intervention better address grievances though they last longer than others. We expect the following to hold:

H₄: If there is no intervention in a civil war, the fighting will last longer. Since non-intervention should promote durable peace, by proxy, the longer the civil war lasts, the more durable the ensuing peace, ceteris paribus.

Finally, according to Luttwak's propositions, non-intervention, by proxy, can also affect other characteristics and outcomes of the war that we need to take into consideration for the purpose of this study. Another likely outcome of non-intervention, emanating from the fact that parties can fight a total war, is that, by *giving war a chance*, the potential number of fatalities over the course of the war is significantly higher than in cases where there are interventions. Also, high levels of fatalities also affect the human resources of both sides (especially of the side that loses the larger proportion of its population). Thus, not only does non-intervention affect the capital resources of the warring factions and the country overall, but it also directly impacts each faction's capacity to recruit personnel to carry out the fighting. A significant loss of human lives once the civil war ends undermines the likelihood of another civil in the short and medium run. Thus, we expect the following to hold.

H₅: The larger the number of fatalities in a civil war, the longer the peace duration, ceteris paribus.

Onset of Civil War

In order to account for the effects that may reduce peace duration, we need to also take into consideration the factors that lead to civil war onset. Arguably, those characteristics that originally led to the eruption of a civil war are also likely to undermine peace and affect the potentiality of a new war occurring after peace has been reached. Hence the importance of exhaustion of the warring parties in order to diminish the prevalence of those aspects which may trigger the onset of a new civil war. Consequently, we need to incorporate variables that are perceived to impact civil war onset within the existing literature. We utilize Fearon and Laitin's (2003) contentions in our model. We posit that the factors which lead to civil war onset undermine peace duration and we incorporate these in our model. Their first proposition pertains to the effects of ethnic and religious division on the likelihood of civil war onset. They argue that societies with an important ethnic, linguistic, or religious minority are more likely to endure a civil war than others. Conversely, strongly homogenous or heterogeneous countries are less likely to undergo a civil war.

Furthermore, Fearon and Laitin (2003) argue, once controlling for income distribution and per capita income, fractionalization has no significant effect on the likelihood of civil war onset. The rationale behind this expectation emanates from the fact low income creates grievances amongst the population. In addition, income inequality may reflect preferential treatment given to specific groups of the citizenry – for instance, an ethnic group – which creates grievances from the unprivileged factions of the society

Fearon and Laitin furthermore state that the presence of rough terrain increases the likelihood of war onset. Arguably, if the opposition has the capacity to hide in mountains or other difficultly reachable terrains, they are more likely to be able to sustain the war and exhaust the government, hence, succeeding in their enterprise.

Also, the political system of a given country affects the likelihood of civil war occurrence. Amongst the political aspects having an impact are the level of democratization and political instability. On the one hand, democracies provide opportunities for minorities to get access to the national resources, thus, undermining the potentiality of resorting to violence to address grievances. Along the same lines, authoritarian regimes provide so little opportunities and tend to use repressive and violent means to counter dissent that they also undermine the likelihood of the opposition to resort to violence to get their grievances addressed. On the other hand, political instability, denoted by frequent changes in the leadership, regime changes, and the intervention of the military in politics, increases the likelihood of war.

Fearon and Laitin (2003) also contend that large populations also affect the likelihood of a country undergoing a civil war. In effect, the more populated a country, the more likely it is to contain many ethnic, linguistic, and/or religious groups. In turn, the number of distinct cultural groups within a society affects the level of overall grievances a population may have. Consequently, because there exist more opportunities for discontent in diversely populated nations, those are more likely to endure a civil wars than smaller nations.

Finally, former studies have shown that the reliance upon a single export commodity for income increases the likelihood of civil war onset (Fearon and Laitin 2003). More specifically, countries relying upon oil exports are especially prone to undergo a civil war. This comes from the fact that, in general, a small portion of the population usually benefit from the income generated by oil exports. Furthermore, the governments of those nations often fail to redistribute revenues in such a way that the population feels that it has received a fair share thereof. Consequently, oil exporting nations fail to appropriately meet the demands of their citizenry by

mainly allocating resources from oil to a small elite, which increases the level of grievances of the population. Accordingly, we expect the following to hold:

In the next section, we explain more clearly how we conceptualize our variables. Furthermore, we also propose our operationalization before we explain our model and conduct our statistical analysis.

RESEARCH DESIGN

To empirically test our hypotheses, we employ a statistical approach referred to in the civil war/interstate war duration literature as event history models which is also known as duration model, hazard model or survival model (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997). According to Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (1997), event history approach permits investigators to answer broad questions than traditional econometric analyses by using information on the number, timing, and sequence of changes in the dependent variable. The scholarly literature on the research design notes that in event history study we are interested with patterns and causes of change. The literature further stresses that one of the main advantages of event history models is their capacity to account properly for right-censored observations than other approaches (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997). Moreover, this group of models permits the inclusion of time-varying covariates as well as time-invariant ones (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997). This design approach is appropriate for our study, since the scholarship on civil war intervention indicates that some intervention attempts are censored by the occurrence of a subsequent intervention attempt before the next conflict, and is impossible to determine the true time between that censored intervention attempt and the next use of force (Greig 2001). OLS models do not take into account the censoring of data in the event that a duration period ends because the dataset ends. Furthermore, OLS regression models cannot account for the effect of elapsed time

on the current and eventual time. Additionally, the event history methods allow us to explore peace duration with or without intervention since this is duration dependence process according to Bennett (1999).

In comparing event history model or duration model to other statistical analysis, Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (1997:1418) note that a dynamic model “can lead to insights on the full span of a social process.” With respect to cross-sectional designs, Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (1997) observe that the dynamics of a process cannot possibly be modeled using such approach. In addition, the flaw with cross-sectional designs is that researchers implicitly make the unlikely assumption that the process being modeled is in equilibrium (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997). Although panel study designs are appropriate in modeling data that undergo change, Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (1997) maintain, “a panel design may lead to inaccurate conclusions about the rates and timing of change,” while event history model can avoid these problems. Other limitations in using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression in event history data include: the violation of normally distributed errors assumption; the introduction of specification error; biased coefficients; and the possibility of predicting negative values for expected peace duration (Regan and Stam 2000).

The literature on event history designs identifies some subcategories appropriate for use in analyses under certain conditions (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997; Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000). Following Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2000), Greig (2001) and other scholars’ arguments on the advantages of the semi-parametric models which are associated with the Cox regression, we intend to use this model in our analysis.

The data used in this study is a combination of COW (Correlates of War, see Sarkees 2000), Fearon and Laitin (2003), Regan’s intervention (1994 and 2002), and Bercovitch (1997a)

datasets. These datasets contain variables such as country, type of intervention, conflict duration, type of conflict, number of fatalities, population, and per capita income, to mention but a few, which are pertinent to our study. The datasets will be used to derive our dependent variables and other necessary independent and control variables for our study. In addition to the Cox analysis for the peace duration, we intend to explore our dataset with logit/probit and OLS designs (see Appendix 1). Our data cover the period from 1945 to 1999 and our unit of analysis is the peace year. Because we propose to identify relationships between non-intervention and post-civil war peace duration, we only include countries which have had at least one civil war over the period under study. In our study, we have a total of 43 countries that underwent a civil war during the above mentioned period, for a total of 116 civil wars. There are 49 instances where a new civil war was experienced by a given country. Overall, we have a total of 1527 observations – denoting the number of peace year when a country was at risk of experiencing a failure of peace.

Now that we have underlined our research design and how we proceed to conduct our statistical analysis, we explain where we get our data and how the different dependent and independent variables are measured.

OPERATIONALIZATION

In this section, we explain how we go about measuring the variables necessary to test our hypotheses. We rely upon Fearon and Laitin's data to account for civil wars (Fearon and Laitin 2003). First, we underline the operationalization of our dependent variable, then, we focus on the independent variable, finally, we briefly discuss the measurement of our control variables.

Peace Duration

The main goal of this research project is to identify the relationship between non-intervention in a civil war and the sustainability of its subsequent peace. One way to measure peace duration would be to simply look at the number of years that elapse between the end of a civil war in a given country before a new civil war start in that same country. Alternatively, we could look at the number of average deaths per year per capita occurring after a civil war has ended in a given country. Also, we could consider a country to have successfully established peace after the end of hostilities if it never undergoes a civil war again. In light of those potential conceptualizations of sustainable peace or peace duration, we face the following three problems: 1) some countries only experience one civil war over the course of their lifetime, therefore, counting the years that elapse may pose a problem because not all wars in these instances end at the same time (thus, countries whose wars ended early in our dataset appear to have longer peace durations than others); 2) A related issues emanates from the fact that looking at peace duration per se may not necessarily indicate that a country has been at peace considering that the criteria to consider a country to undergo a civil war are rather restricting (most datasets considers countries to be enduring a civil war if there are the government is fighting rebel factions, and the number of yearly battle-deaths exceeds one thousand); 3) Countries may experience multiple civil wars over the time-period under study, but those wars may be so distant in time that we consider that there are different civil war, meaning that the original grievances had successfully been addressed and different ones triggered the next civil war. We focus on wars between two distinct parties and consider a civil war to not recur insofar as no more conflict between the two parties are observed after the original ending of the civil war. Thus, in instances when a country has undergone more than one civil war and the fighters are different factions for different civil wars, we identify those wars as independent from one another.

To account for those shortcomings, we propose to utilize three different models and we will compare the results of each to formulate more definite conclusions about our theoretical framework. To account for different durations of peace after a civil war has ended, we create a dichotomous variable coded “1” when no other civil war occurs in a specific country after the end of its first civil war and “0” otherwise. Since we base most of our analysis on Fearon and Laitin’s onset of war arguments, we utilize their dataset to decipher civil wars (Fearon and Laitin 2003). Because this model is too simplistic and fails to account for the potentiality of continued violence, we need to formulate a way to take this factor into consideration.

Though a civil war may have officially ended in a given country, the level of hostility may remain high so that deaths per year per capita remain higher than they would be in times of actual peace. Thus, we generate another dependent variable (and a second model) to fill that flaw. Rather than dichotomizing our dependent variable, we propose to conduct an analysis on a continuous variable where we operationalize peace sustainability by looking at a more positive peace. Negative peace represents the absence of war. Positive peace denotes instances where all citizens in a given society are free from oppression that would otherwise prevent them from reaching their full potential. Ideally, this conception of peace would entail full respect for human rights. However, this would be an inadequate measure for sustainable peace in this instance because, in most instances, minor conflict still occurs even though a civil war has formally ended. Furthermore, it may take decades to re-establish law and order, which would make the task of considering positive peace as a measure of “peace” a complicating undertaking. Rather, in this case, we look at the number of fatalities per year per capita in each country after a civil war has officially ended for every year during which that country is not engaged in a civil *if* that

country has experience at least one civil war over the life of our dataset. We utilize Fearon and Laitin's data on civil war onset (2003) and generate a variable to account for peace duration.

There still exist flaws in these two dependent variables: the dichotomous variable is too simplistic, and the number of deaths per year per capita may differ across observations for factors other than continued violence (i.e. level of economic development, diseases, etc.) Our third measurement of peace duration looks at duration of the peace itself. However, as explained earlier, peace duration may be permanent for certain countries in our dataset because some countries never experience another civil war and it also poses problems for the countries in which civil wars ended towards the end of our dataset (thus undermining the potentiality of a new civil war erupting). Therefore, we need to establish a threshold after which we can consider civil wars to have ended and peace to have been reached. This also helps account for countries that experience several civil wars for diverging reasons. Thus, we count the number of year until a country experiences a new civil war and drop cases if less than five years have elapsed without a new civil war. This operationalization is based on Hartzell *et al*'s measures of peace duration in settled civil wars (Hartzell *et al* 2001). Using This measure, we drop all countries whose civil war ended less than five years prior to the end of our dataset and which have not experienced another civil in the interim. Again, we use Fearon and Laitin's dataset to generate this variable (Fearon and Laitin 2003.) Now that we have outlined how we operationalize our dependent variable, we explain how we measure our independent variables.

Independent Variables

We have five independent variables for this study, mainly: non-intervention, total victory (by either side of the conflict), stalemate, war duration, and fatalities.

Non-Intervention: We generate a dichotomous variable code “1” when there was no intervention in a civil and “0” otherwise. We use Sambonis’ dataset (2000). Sambonis coded his variable in a fashion opposite to our whereby a “1” signified cases where there was intervention and “0” otherwise. Therefore, we replace his variable so a “1” signifies that there was no intervention in a specific civil war and “0” otherwise. Sambonis uses Regan’s (1996) dataset to code his intervention variables. Regan’s definition of third-party intervention is as follow:

I define third party interventions in intra-state conflicts as convention breaking military and/or economic activities in the internal affairs of a foreign country targeted at the authority structures of the government with the aim of affecting the balance of power between the government and opposition forces (Rosenau 1968. P.167)

Total Victory: Fortna (2004) provides a measure of victory in her study over the effects of peacekeeping intervention missions on peace duration. She created a dichotomous variable where a “1” denotes cases the civil war ended with the distinct victory of one side over the other and a ”0” otherwise.

Stalemate: Similarly, Fortna (2004) also has a code for her civil war data to signify cases where a war ends in a stalemate whereby neither side really wins the war but *also* where neither side can afford to continue fighting, therefore, the war just vanishes in a rather natural fashion. Again, we create a dichotomous variable where a score of “1” denotes cases where the civil war ends in a state of stalemate and “0” for other instances.

War Duration: To account for the impact of war duration on peace duration, for each individual civil war, we simply use Fearon and Laitin’s “estimated time of war” variable (Fearon and Laitin 2003.) This measures the number of years for which a country has endured a civil war; in some instances, countries are at war for the entire span of our dataset, therefore, those

cases are excluded because we cannot make any inferences on the effects of non-intervention on peace duration since virtually no peace has taken place per se.

Fatalities per Year per Capita: Regan (2002) provides an estimate count of the number of war related deaths in his civil conflict dataset. We utilize his data to account for the total number of fatalities. The data on population appears in Fearon and Laitin's dataset (2003). To get our variable, we divide the number of fatalities by the population of the country at the beginning of the war (in millions) and then divide this number by the amount of years for which the war lasted.

Control Variables

Since we attempt to assess the characteristics that may shorten peace duration after a war – i.e. we mean to find how long peace last after a civil war has ended – we also need to take into account factors that affect one country's likelihood of experiencing a civil war. As mentioned earlier, we utilize Fearon and Laitin's model of civil war onset (Fearon and Laitin 2003) and therefore use their theoretical expectations and the data they developed to account for those factors. In our model, we include measures of ethnic division, per capita income, geographic composition, regime type, political stability, population, and reliance on oil exports for income.¹ With this operationalization, we propose to run a logistic analysis, a ordinary least square multiple regression, and an event history hazard-ratio analysis, We next analyze and discuss those three models.

ANALYSIS

We conduct four different models: a logistic analysis, a simple OLS regression, a Cox event-history model, and a Weibull survival model. The unit of analysis for the post civil war peace

¹ For a comprehensive description of the data utilized, refer to Fearon and Laitin's study of the effect of ethnic fractionalization on civil onset (Fearon and Laitin 2003)

year for the survival models; each includes 115 subjects for a total of 1527 observations. For the first two model, we have a total of 112 civil war (because we exclude those wars that ended right before the end of our dataset). We analyze our results in the order outlined above – the results for the logit and the OLS models are presented in Appendix 1.

Event History Models

This model looks at the likelihood of failure given the independent variables. Furthermore, rather than giving negative and positive estimates, the output presents estimates above 0 and usually around 1. To facilitate interpretation, we also presented the coefficients which are expressed in a form similar to that obtained through OLS regression. The Cox survival model assumes proportionality (normal distribution) and the Weibull survival model assumes an logarithmic distribution. We first analyze the results of the Cox analysis (presented in Table 1) and then those of the Weibull model (presented in Table 2). We also present a graphical presentation of our results of our Cox analysis (Figure 1) and our Weibull model (Figure 2).

Most of the independent variables derived from Luttwak's theory have an effect in the predicted direction. Nonintervention decreases the likelihood of the recurrence of civil war; so does the fact that a war ends in a victory of one of the parties or that it ends in a truce. Yet, war duration has a negative effect on peace duration, which contradicts our expectations. The severity of the war does have any effect on peace duration. However, none of those results meet statistical significance, therefore, we fail to support our hypotheses. Yet, it remains interesting to notice that nonintervention appears to lengthen peace duration, in spite of the low level of significance.


Table 1: Cox Survival Model on Nonintervention and Peace Duration

	Cox Survival Estimates	
	Hazard Ratios	Coefficients
Non Intervention	0.658 (0.254)	-0.419
Victory	0.680 (0.270)	-0.386
Truce	0.518 (0.270)	-0.657
War Duration	1.003 (0.912)	0.003
Deaths	1.000 (0.352)	<0.001
Ethnic Fractionalization	1.000 (0.212)	<0.001
GDP per Capita	0.942 (0.599)	-0.060
Mountainous Terrain	1.011 (0.155)	0.011
Democracy	1.005 (0.861)	0.005
Instability	1.938 (0.061)*	0.662
Population(logged)	0.798 (0.063)*	-0.226
Oil Exports	1.074 (0.882)	0.071
Observations		1527
χ^2		17.27 (0.140)

p values in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Political instability has a negative effect on peace duration at the .1 level. This supports the proposition that politically instable regimes are characterized by high levels of civil unrest which may eventually escalate into a civil war. Thus, when a war ends and the new regime has high levels of instability, a new crisis is likely to occur. Surprisingly, high populations are positively related to peace duration. We should be skeptical about those findings insofar as three Chinese peace periods are included in the dataset, all of which never saw a recurrence of conflict since their causes were all different in nature.

Figure 1: Cox Proportional Regression



As demonstrated by the graph, the model assumes that the data is proportionally distributed. However, by looking at the data, we can notice that a good proportion of our subjects have long peace duration (they actually never observe a failure through the recurrence of war) and a few cases undergo several civil wars with more or less short periods of peace in the interim. Therefore, the Cox model does not address the nature of the data appropriately. Conversely, a Weibull model assumes that the longer the peace has existed, the likely it is to persist – the ultimate peace duration is related to the current duration – whereas a Cox model assumes that duration is not dependent on how long the current duration has lasted. Thus, we conduct a Weibull analysis on the data to better address its nature. The results of this analysis resemble those obtained from the Cox analysis. However, because it better represents the distribution of the data, the significance levels are slightly improved, though our main independent variables still fail to meet statistical significance.


Table 2: Weibull Survival Model on Nonintervention and Peace Duration:

	Weibull Survival Estimates	
	Hazard Ratios	Coefficients
Non Intervention	0.600 (0.165)	-0.511
Victory	0.624 (0.184)	-0.471
Truce	0.495 (0.244)	-0.703
War Duration	1.005 (0.858)	0.005
Deaths	1.000 (0.351)	<-0.001
Ethnic Fractionalization	1.000 (0.195)	<0.001
GDP per Capita	0.931 (0.544)	-0.071
Mountainous Terrain	1.012 (0.127)	0.012
Democracy	0.993 (0.792)	-0.007
Instability	2.145 (0.025)**	0.763
Population(logged)	0.787 (0.044)**	-0.240
Oil Exports	1.178 (0.728)	0.164
Constant		-1.428 (0.209)
Observations		1527
χ^2		21.19 (0.048)

p values in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Nonintervention increases peace duration and diminishes the likelihood of the recurrence of war altogether, other things equal; however, it fails to meet statistical significance (significant at the .17 level). Wars ending by the victory of one side or in a stalemate (truce) have longer peace durations than others, yet, their effects do not meet statistical significance either (respectively .18 and .24). Thus, though we find some support for our hypotheses, we need to remain cautious as to their actual impact since all fail to meet statistical significance.

Figure 2: Weibull Regression



Similarly to what we found using a Cox distribution, political instability decreases peace duration and high populations increase peace duration. Because this model better addresses the nature of the data, the statistical significance pertaining to those two variables is greater (instability and population are significant at the .05 level). The explanation for those findings has been formulated earlier. The graphical representation of the Weibull event history analysis appears in Figure 2.

CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

Throughout this research project, we have attempted to delineate a relationship between non-intervention and an overall state of “stalemate” in the aftermath of a civil war and the ensuing peace duration, based on Luttwak’s theory. We demonstrated that most of the literature focuses on the “positive” effects of intervention, but that it uses flawed measures of success by using logit models or OLS techniques with a ceiling of five years, thus failing to account for the potentiality that the war will recur more than five years after it first ended. We derived hypotheses from Luttwak’s contentions and underline the expected positive effects of nonintervention, stalemate,

full victory, severity, and war duration of sustainable peace. Though we did not find conclusive evidence, one important characteristic of the finding is that, despite the fact that nonintervention does not seem to systematically promote durable peace, the same can be said of third-party intervention. The results tend to show that intervention does not have an effect on peace duration in war torn societies, it even appears to shorten it, though not significantly.

When looking at success from a more restrictive perspective – the non-recurrence of war, without regard to peace duration – nonintervention does indeed promote the terminal ending of hostilities between the two parties involved. Overall, we find some support for Luttwak’s propositions across all models (with the exception of the regression model), yet, all fail to meet statistical significance. We tried to use different approaches (by excluded potentially collinear variables) and found similar results as those provided here.

Future research should focus on deciphering between different types of interventions based on the intervention mandate, the characteristics of the intervener (multilateral, bilateral) and their respective effects on peace duration. In this project, we included all types of military interventions and treated them as equal. It may be that certain military interventions are better able to promote peace than others and vice versa. Thus, we need to create a categorization of those interventions to identify the differences between the effects of each as well as how each differ from nonintervention cases.

Another problem coming out of this research emanates from the fact that intervention usually occurs to stop the fighting, not necessarily to promote the ensuing peace. Thus, in instances where there is a sharp victory by one side, intervention is less likely and durable peace becomes a strongly foreseeable opportunity. By nature, interventions occur in complex and severely hostile conflicts, a selection bias that inherently undermines intervention’s capacity to

promote peace. Future research in the field should try to find means to account for this selection bias problem.

Furthermore, there still exists an operationalization shortcoming with research to the identification of success. As we demonstrated, success can be measured in terms of a civil war never recurring, peace lasting more than five years, or the total duration of peace until a new civil war occurs or the observation exits the dataset. A second, and related, problem stems from the ways we should approach civil wars within a same country. In this research paper, we counted civil wars within a given country between different parties as independent. For instance, the MNLF/MILF-Philippines (1972-1996) and the Philippines' civil war (1950-1952) may be related but they are treated as independent. In order to solve this problem, we should derive data that adequately differentiates between dependent and independent cases through the use of case studies.

APPENDIX 1

Event history models better account for the effects of time on the likelihood of civil war recurrence. Analyzing Luttwak's theory by minimizing the dependent variable to a dichotomous or continuous variable through logit or OLS poses some shortcomings. Therefore, though the two approaches used below may shed some light on why conflicts recur, they fail to adequately address all of the mechanisms at work. For comparison purposes, the results of the logit and the OLS regressions are presented here.

Peace Success

Again, peace success is defined as a case where a civil war ends and there is no recurrence of fighting between the parties. The results of the logistic analysis are presented in Table 3. As shown, non-intervention has a significant effect on peace success – at the .1 level. Non-intervention reduces the likelihood that a civil war recur by 33%, other things equal; this lends support to Luttwak's proposition. Of the other expectations from our derivations of Luttwak's theory, only truce seems to have an effect on peace success. It appears that if a war ends in a stalemate (denoted by an end of a civil war through a truce), it is 35% more likely to not recur other things equal (at the .05 level).

Neither the level of hostility of a civil war (deaths) nor its duration has a significant effect on the likelihood of peace success. Civil wars that end in the victory of one of the warring sides do not appear to have a more successful peace than other wars ending in a settlement for instance. Though we found some support for Luttwak's proposition, a logit analysis remains limited in scope and does not necessarily treat all "successful" cases evenly insofar as the duration of peace is not taken into account. Rather than identifying the effects that intervention and nonintervention have on sustainable peace, this model only identifies one aspect of peace,

mainly, whether fighting has totally ended or not. Other models are better able to underline the effects of the proposed explanatory variables on the duration of peace *per se*. We now conduct a regression analysis on peace duration.

Table 3: Logit Regression Estimates for the Relationship between Noninterference and Peace Success

	Peace Success
Non Intervention	0.777 (0.088)*
Victory	0.134 (0.438)
Truce	1.350 (0.048)**
War Duration	0.036 (0.333)
Deaths	0.000 (0.372)
Ethnic Fractionalization	-0.000 (0.900)
GDP per Capita	-0.041 (0.762)
Mountainous Terrain	-0.011 (0.306)
Democracy	0.020 (0.584)
Instability	-0.344 (0.423)
Population(logged)	0.122 (0.419)
Oil Exports	0.202 (0.743)
Constant	-1.509 (0.271)
Observations	112
Pseudo χ^2	0.101

p values in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Peace Duration

Peace duration in this analysis represents the number of years occurring between the end of a civil war and the beginning of a new one in a given country, up to five year since there exist arguments in the literature stipulating that peace has been sustained after a certain period of time has elapsed (Hartzell *et al.* 2004). The results of the analysis are presented in Table 4. Evidently, none of our main variables seems to have an effect on peace duration as calculated in this model.

Table 4: Regression Estimates for the Relationship between Noninterference and Peace Duration

	Peace Duration
Non Intervention	0.089 (0.816)
Victory	0.037 (0.559)
Truce	0.573 (0.281)
War Duration	0.039 (0.206)
Deaths	-0.000 (0.959)
Ethnic Fractionalization	0.000 (0.811)
GDP per Capita	0.003 (0.979)
Mountainous Terrain	-0.003 (0.710)
Democracy	-0.022 (0.488)
Instability	0.101 (0.787)
Population(logged)	-0.103 (0.419)
Oil Exports	0.375 (0.484)
Constant	4.552 (0.000)***
Observations	112
Adjusted χ^2	-0.071

p values in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%

Again, this model possesses shortcomings. First, it assumes linearity, however, most likely, the relationship between peace duration and the independent variables is curvilinear. Second, it assumes normal distribution when most of the observations have either really short peace duration or really long ones. Finally, truncating duration after five years fails to account for instances where there has been at least five years of peace but a civil war has occurred eventually and it thus poorly addresses the theory. In the next section, we utilize event history models to address those shortcomings and better estimate the relationship between peace duration and our independent variables.

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