Rivalries and Human Rights:

Are They Intrinsically Related?

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ABSTRACT

Scholars of the enduring rivalries literature have focused on the patterns of rivalry escalation to wars and its subsequent effects on international wars. Similarly, the human rights literature posit that countries engaged in wars tend to have worst human rights records than others. Which effects do rivalries dynamics on human rights violations? In this study, I combine the rivalry literature with the human rights literature to try to answer this question. I posit that hostility levels expressed by a country participating in an enduring rivalry as well as the number of rivalries and disputes in which it is engaged any given year should have a negative effect on human rights. Conversely, the level of hostility experienced by an enduring rival should positively affect human rights. I conduct a times-series cross-sectional analysis from 1976 to 2001 on two different measures of human rights. I find mixed support for the proposed hypotheses.

INTRODUCTION

The rivalry literature has each systematically and empirically underlined patterns of initiation, escalation, and termination. Similarly, the human rights literature has managed to reach a consensus as to which aspects lead states to repress emphasizing domestic and systemic aspects that conduce to human rights violation. However, no study has ever tried to analyze or underline a potential relationship between rivalries dynamics and human rights records. With the growing concern for human rights within the international community and the persistence of rivalries and their accompanying clashes and peaceful periods, it might be of interest for both schools to go beyond their traditional scope and integrate principles and findings to include other potential intervening variables. Do rivalries dynamics affect the human rights records of the countries engaged in enduring rivalries? In this study, I attempt to utilize some of the rivalry dynamics literature findings and identify a potential relationship between rivalries and human rights records.

I conduct a statistical analysis of the impacts of different aspects of enduring rivalries on human rights from 1976 to 2001. Since no research has been conducted so far in an attempt to identify the effects of rivalries' disputes and clashes on human rights records, I first sketch out the findings of the rivalry literature as well as those of the human rights literature. In the second part of this paper, I propose a theory based on the integration of findings from both literatures. The third part outlines the operationalization of the different variables used in the study. Fourth, I conduct a statistical analysis on the rival countries. Finally, I discuss the findings and propose directions for future research.

STATE OF THE ART: RIVALRIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS

Rivalries

The main concern of the rivalry literature deals with the explanation of wars and recurrent patterns within rivalries that make rival countries more likely to go to war than non-rival states. The sheer definition of what represents a rivalry creates many worries since it undermines the validity of empirical research (Goertz and Diehl, 1993.) However, though many researches have been conducted using different definitions and operationalizations of what constitutes a rivalry Diehl and Goertz (2000) have proposed a definition that have seemed to have become accepted by the rivalry community. They first identify different types of rivals as follow:

> (1) [S]poradic rivalries between a pair of states, (2) proto-rivalries, which consist of repeated conflict between the same states, but not to the extent that an enduring rivalry can be said to exist, and (3) enduring rivalries, which are severe and repeated conflicts between the same states over an extended period of time. (p. 22)

Thus, states that only engage in dispute on a sporadic level, due to short-term disputes and conflicts of interests do not meet the criteria for inclusion within rivalries. Thought the divide between sporadic rivalries and proto-rivalries seem clear and obvious; based on the rivalry literature and previous research, they add clarification as to what constitutes an enduring rivalry as opposed to a proto-rivalry:

> Keeping both past definitions (especially the COW set of definitions) and our own empirical observations in mind, we have decided to define as enduring rivalries any of those rivalries that involve six disputes or more *and* last for at least twenty years. (p.44)

Though this clear-cut definition has been proposed relatively late, scholars within the rivalry field have been using definitions similar enough to this one except for a few earlier studies. This allows researchers to have a consensus over which dyads are engaged in enduring rivalries and which are not.

Having elaborated upon the concept of enduring rivalry and what it entails, political scientists within the rivalry literature have been able to identify patterns of conflict and escalation between rivalries. Goertz and Diehl (1995) claim that rivalries emanate from political shocks, such as international wars or territorial disputes. Furthermore, the termination of rivalries also stem from similar shocks. These shocks can either occur at the systemic level or at the state level. Conversely, Colaresi (2001) found no statistical significance between systemic shocks and either rivalry initiation or rivalry termination. However, his measures and cases selection may explain for this discrepancy, since, in an earlier research, Goertz and Diehl (1998) had underlined a clear pattern of conflict escalation as follow:

> [C]onflict interactions always involve an escalating pattern; each successive interaction between the same states is more hostile. Second is the expectation that the process culminates in war; in effect, war is the end product, and there is little concern with subsequent events. Third is the theme that the mechanism driving the process may be endogenous or exogenous to the rivalry relationship. (p. 102)

The above statement clearly specifies the patterns specific of rivalries and identify war the factor that triggers the termination of rivalries. Furthermore, they also state that rivalries are subject to either rivalry specific or external events; in effect, those events relates to the shocks, either in the form of territorial change (rivalry specific) or systemic change, i.e., an international war (external event.) The empirical findings give more support to Goertz and Diehl's contention than to Colaresi's.

Not all rivalries are equal in their severity; some regularly escalate to war while others never experience war. Thompson (1995) outlines several characteristics of rivalries and briefly hypothesizes on each of them; one of his propositions states that regional rivalries tend to escalate to war more often than global rivalries, which helps account for the fact that the USSR

and the USA never really experienced direct war while India and Pakistan regularly engage in small-scale wars. I utilize this aspect later to account for the effects of rivalries on human rights. To support that point raised by Thompson, Vasquez (1996) conducted a statistical analysis to differentiate between rivalries that escalate to wars from those which do not. He concluded that territorial rivalries tend to systematically escalate to war while positional ones barely ever escalate to war. This, again, explains for the diverging behaviors of the ideological USA-USSR or USA-Cuba rivalries and the Pakistan-India or Iraq-Iran ones.

Finally, the democratic peace argument has been utilized to explain the diverging attitudes of states engaged in rivalries. One of the findings asserts that democracies, all other things equal, are less likely to even engage in enduring rivalries than non-democracies (Hensel, Goertz and Diehl, 2000.) Furthermore, the same authors also infer that democratization tends to soften rivalries and to provide states with other mechanisms (such as diplomacy) to settle to salient disputes. As will be outline later in this paper, the democratic peace argument leads to similar contentions within the human rights literature. Now that I have underlined the rivalry literature of relevance to the present study, I outline the human rights literature that pertains to explaining personal integrity violations and state repression.

Human Rights Violation and State Repression

Human rights scholars are concerned about several political phenomena including the impact of foreign aid on human rights, the role of international law and international institutions with respect to human rights, and the aspects, both internal and external, conducive to human rights violations. I mostly overview the latter aspect of the literature since all others are not necessarily of interest to the present study. Poe (2004) has summarized the existing literature over why states repress within the Most and Starr strength and threat analysis. He purports that states tend

to repress the personal integrity rights of their citizens when they perceive their strength, relative to the opposition, is decreasing, which, in turn, increases their perception of threats from the same opposition. Consequently, states resort to violent means to reduce the threats and re-establish their strength and control over internal affairs.

In their comprehensive analysis of determinants of state repression and systematic violations of human rights to personal integrity, Poe and Tate (1994) made a significant contribution to the understanding of state behavior with regards to human rights. Interestingly, and against intuition, they found that leftist governments are no more likely than others to systematically use violent means to enforce their policies; nor do former British colonies have a tendency to better respect human rights than other countries. They do find a relationship between the occurrence of war, whether international or civil, and violation of security rights of a country's population. Furthermore, democratic countries show more respect for the personal integrity of their citizens than non-democracies. This study paved the road for more similar studies that attempted to underline the relationship between state and their opposition's characteristics and human rights violations.

Focusing on the aspects of the oppression, other scholars have identified relationships based on the Most and Starr strength and threat perception model. Using such a model, Davenport (1995) cautioned that frequency of dissent from the opposition does not have an impact on the response adopted by the government. In other words, the more the opposition display its discontent with its government's policies does not affect the mechanisms the latter uses to prevent further dissent. Instead, the means used by the oppositions directly affect the government's response without regard to how frequent those expressions of dissent are. Thus, Davenport claims that when the opposition uses violent means, such as revolutions, direct attacks

on government symbols, as opposed to more passive means (protest, non-violent demonstrations), the political authorities are more likely to resort to violent means and to systematically abuse the personal integrity rights of their citizens through systematic random arrests, denial of civil rights, or the establishment of a state of emergency. Those findings have recently been reinforced by Carey's illustration of the different effects of the means used by the opposition on personal integrity human rights (Carey 2004.) She restated Davenport's contention that the opposition's use of violent methods tends to be reciprocated by an equally, if not more. violent response from the government.

Human rights scholars, similarly to rivalry researchers, have also incorporated the democratic peace arguments and propositions within their models. The contention stipulates that democracies have the necessary mechanisms to deal with opposition groups through their institutional apparatus in order to accommodate without repressing (Hofferbert and Cingranelli, 1996.) However, because autocracies create an atmosphere of constant fear of retaliation in the event of dissent, the opposition tends to not speak out as much in autocracies and authoritarian regimes than in other regimes (Fein, 1995.) Consequently, low levels of repression and human rights violations are experienced in both established democracies and ruthless authoritarian regimes (Regan and Henderson, 2002.) Thus, it is argued that democratizing countries tend to experience the highest levels of human rights violations because the oppositions expects the government to provide for its demands and the political authorities tend to use violent means in order to establish their democracy and maintain stability (Fein, 1995, Regan and Henderson, 2002.) Finally, Callaway and Harrelson-Stephens (2004) outlined that trade openness leads to democratization, which in turn leads to higher respect for both security and subsistence rights.

One of the major shortcomings of the existing human rights literature emanates from its concern about personal integrity rights only. This stems from the lack of validated measures of either civil and political rights or social and economic rights, as well as from the belief that while states must provide for the physical integrity of their citizens, they do not necessarily have the means or capacity to provide for their subsistence rights. Nevertheless, attempts have been made to create composite measures of social and economic rights. Apodaca (2000) used illiteracy rates, income levels, and life expectancy differences between men and women in her study of women's social and economic rights and foreign aid. She outlined the need for the creation of reliable measures of such rights. Similarly, Miller (2004) conducted an analysis of arms transfers and the respect for human rights in developing countries. She used two measures of human rights, one pertaining to personal integrity rights and the other to social and economic rights. There exists much agreement within the literature about the measurement of personal integrity rights: most scholars use the Political Terror Scale. However, measuring economic and social rights pauses more concern; Miller used the Physical Quality of Life Index developed by Morris (1979.) I will explain the measurement of both when I operationalize my variables. Based on those two different literatures, I now provide a theoretical basis to my analysis.

THEORETICAL EXPECTATIONS

Hostility levels utilized by states involved in enduring rivalries and the disputes associated with them are likely to reflect the levels of hostility used within. In other words, if a state uses violent means in its relationship with its rivals, it is likely to use similar means to cope with internal dissent. I can formulate the following hypothesis:

> H_1: the more violent the disputes in which a rival state is engaged, the more likely it is to disrespect its citizens' human rights.

I draw this theoretical expectation from the assertion that states engaged in civil wars are more likely to violate human rights than others (Poe and Tate, 1994.) I argue that the severity of the means used by states involved in rivalries are directly affected by internal factors: if a state uses violent means within, those means are likely to be reciprocated in the way it deals with other states, especially rivals. In essence, when a state utilizes violence against a rival, it may represent an extrapolation of the level of violence the former employs to put down dissent domestically.

Conversely, the level of hostility experienced by a state, i.e., the actions its rival takes, should have a negative effect on human rights. I expect to notice the following relationship:

H_2: *the more violent the hostility level of a state's rival, the better the human rights records of the state experiencing the hostility.*

Here, I expect that the fact that one's adversary uses violent means within the disputes creates a "rallying behind the flag" effect which in turn reduces discontent within. Rather than focusing their anger towards their own government, an attacked country's citizens focus their energy towards the rival as a common enemy of the state. As such, the occurrence of violent attacks against a state makes the population thereof sympathetic with its own government, directly decrease the level of discontent of the citizenry. As the level of internal dissent reduces, and the means to express dissatisfaction with the government's actions become less violent, the government should take less violent measures against its citizens (Davenport, 1995, Carey, 2004.)

The number of disputes in which a state is involved reflects turmoil within. According to diversionary theories, states attempt to externalize their internal turmoil by engaging in wars (Lian and Oneal, 1993; Meernik and Waterman, 1996). A similar pattern may as well apply to

rivalries since, though they may be short of war, militarized interstate disputes (MID) share characteristics of international wars. Thus:

H_3: *the more disputes a country experience, the more likely it is to violate human rights.*

The human rights literature also asserts that states engaged in international wars are more likely to have poor human rights records than others (Poe and Tate, 1994.) Furthermore, this expectation about the number of disputes in which a state is involved can further be extended to the number of enduring rivalries in which a country participates:

H_4: *the more enduring rivalries in which a country is involved, the more likely it is to violate human rights.*

The human rights literature, as well as the democratic propositions about rivalries, implies the inclusion of control variables. Other things equal, democracies are both less likely to violate human rights and less likely to engage in enduring rivalries (and to escalate them to war.) Furthermore , according to Fein (1995), Regan and Henderson (2002), and Hensel et al. (2000), not only should there be less democracies within the population of cases, but those democracies should have better human rights records. It is necessary to underline that the United States may represent an outlier within the data since it is the country that has been engaged in the most disputes and rivalries, yet, it is one of the oldest democracies. Additionalluy, the human rights literature claims that countries engaged in either a civil war or in an international war tend to experience higher levels of human rights violations than others (Poe and Tate, 1994.) Therefore, I control for the effects of levels of democratization and whether countries engaged in rivalries are concurrently partaking in civil and/or international wars.

Now that I have stated my theoretical expectations, I explain the operationalization of my variables.

OPERATIONALIZATION

Dependent Variable: Human Rights Records

I use two different measures of human rights records. The first one addresses violations to personal integrity, the most commonly used measure of human rights, while the second measures the level of social and economic rights within a given country.

Personal Integrity: in order to measure personal integrity rights, I use the Political Terror Scale (PTS.) The scale is coded 1 to 5 with one indicating good human rights practices and overall respect for citizen's security rights while 5 denotes systematic human rights violations in the form of random arrests, disappearances, and torture. The coders used two different sources to code the variable. One set of codes uses the Amnesty International country reports and codes the human rights records of countries based on the stipulations of abuses within these reports; the second scale uses the U.S. State Department annual country reports in a similar fashion. The data cover the 1980-2001 period; it has been updated and partly coded by Gibney and Poe (Gibney et al. 1996.) The data covering the 1976-1979 timeframe was provided by Poe.

Social and Economic Rights: To capture the social and political rights aspects of human rights, I use the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) developed by Morris (1979.) This index ranges from 0 to 100. It is a composite of infant mortality, life expectancy at age 1, and literacy rate at age 15. Each of these indicators has been scaled on a 0 to 100 range and the means of the three was computed to get the PQLI measure (see Morris, 1979, for further description of the data generating process.) This measure is strongly correlated with GNP per capita and better captures the nature of social and economic rights that the latter since it implicitly accounts for access to health care and schooling amongst other. The updated data was provided by Callaway (Harrelson-Stephens and Callaway 2003.)

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Independent Variables

I use the Militarized Interstate Disputes (MID) data in order to compute all of my independent variables. The data can be found on the Correlates of War II website (Jones *et al.*, 1996; Gosh *et al.,* 2003; Gosh *et al.*, 2004) Only countries engaged in enduring rivalries are included within the data since this study pertains to the explanation of the relationship between rivalries' dynamics and human rights records.

Displayed Hostility: This variable measures the level of hostility used by a given country against its rival in a given year. The hostility level takes values between 1 and 5; 1 denotes low levels of hostility while a 5 refers to a war. Since some countries are sometimes involved in more than one dispute in a single year, I use the highest level of hostility used by a state within any given year. The theoretical expectation states that the higher the value of this variable, the higher the walue of the PTS should be and the lower the value of the PQLI.

Experienced Hostility Level: This measures the level of hostility that the rival of a given state inculcate on the former. This variable is computed in the similar manner as the previous one; I also only take into account the highest value in instances where a state is involved in more than one dispute. Conversely to the previous variable, I expect a negative relationship between this variable and the measures for human rights.

Number of Disputes: I counted the number of MIDs in which each states was involved. However, I only included those disputes that were part of rivalries, i.e., cases where two enduring rivals engaged in an MID. Consequently, all countries that took part in the Gulf War and were rivals of states other than Iraq did not get a count for this war. Thus, only disputes relevant to rivalries were considered for inclusion. Again, I expect that the more MIDs in which a state is engaged, the worse its human rights records.

Number of Rivalries: This simply denotes the number of enduring rivalries in which a state is involved in any given year. As soon as a rivalry is over, the countries that were involved in it are dropped from the model; unless they are involved in other enduring rivalries. Countries may endure anywhere from 1 to 6 rivalries (the USA experiences the most rivalries of all cases.) I expect that the most rivalries in which a country is involved, the worst its human rights.

Control Variables

Theses variables are mostly derived from the human rights literature and its existing findings about the characteristics of human rights violating countries.

Democracy: To operationalize democracy, I use Polity IV (Gurr 1974, Gurr et al. 1990.) The measure ranks from -10 to 10 with the former denoting autocracies and the latter reflecting the highest possible level of democracy. In order to show direct positive relationship, I modified the data so that it takes measures between 0 and 20 with 0 signifying a "perfect" democracy and 20 the worst types of autocracies. Thus, I expect a direct positive relationship between this variable and the PTS and an indirect one between it and the PQLI.

Civil War: I created a dichotomous variable with a value of 1 when there is a civil war within a given country and 0 otherwise. I used the Correlates of War II (COW) data (Sarkees 2000) to code this variable. COW provides a list of all civil wars that occurred between 1815 and today. I simply referred to this list and coded the countries included in this study in the above-mentioned manner. I expect this control variable to have a negative effect on human rights, i.e., human rights records should worsen when it takes a value of 1.

International War: I created a dichotomous variable with a value of 1 if a state is engaged in an international war and 0 otherwise. I used the Correlates of War II (COW) data (Sarkees 2000) to code this variable. COW provides a list of all international wars that occurred between

1815 and today accompanied with a list of participants. I simply referred to this list and coded the countries included in this study in the above-mentioned manner. I expect this control variable to have a negative effect on human rights, i.e., human rights records should worsen when it takes a value of 1.

Now that I have outlined the operationalization of the different variables used to depict the relationship between rivalries' dynamics and human rights, I conduct my statistical analysis.

DATA ANALYSIS

The data cover the 1976 to 2001 period as far as personal integrity rights go and the 1976 to 1996 period for social and economic rights. The unit of analysis is the country year. I conduct a OLS analysis on the data, since I do not particularly expect either serial correlation or heteroscedasticity within the observations (results from the time series analysis can be obtained upon request.) I conducted three separate analyses: one on each of the two PTS indexes and one on the PQLI. I first address the findings pertaining to the personal integrity rights and then present the findings on the analysis over the social and economic rights.

Rivalries Dynamics and Personal Integrity

The results of the analysis of the effects of rivalries dynamics are presented in Table 1. Since the Amnesty International and the U.S. State Department scales do not cover the same sets of countries, I explain the results separately.

[Table 1 about here]

Amnesty International:

All variables have the expected effect on human rights with the exception of the number of disputes in which a state is engaged (which probably denotes the effects of the United States.) A one unit increase in the level of hostility used by a state leads to a .13 increase in human rights

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records at the .01 level. This supports hypothesis one that states that the level of hostility used by a state reflects its internal level of violence. Conversely, a one unit increase of the level of hostility used by the rival of a state leads to a .017 decrease in human rights violations. Though this meets the theoretical expectations proposed in hypothesis 2, it fails to meet statistical significance and therefore fails to provide enough support for this hypothesis. A one unit ncrease in the number of disputes in which a state is engaged leads to a .069 decrease in human rights violations; again, it fails to meet the statistical significance test. Finally, the number of rivalries in which a state is involved directly and negatively affects human rights records within a given country; however, it fails to get statistical significance. All of the control variables, but international war, reassert the propositions of the human rights literature, mainly that democracies have better human rights records than non-democracies and that states engaged in civil wars tend to disrespect human rights more due to the necessity of fighting the opposition.

U.S. State Department

The cases covered by the U.S. State Department exclude the United States and may therefore help correct for the results found using the Amnesty International scale since the United States is involved in more rivalries and more disputes than any other state yet it has one of the best human rights records. The fit of the model is improved using this measure of human rights violations, so are the findings. The direction of the relationships exactly matches that of the Amnesty International findings, except for the effects of the experienced levels of hostility; statistical significance and the actual effects of the different phenomena vary. A one unit change in the level of hostility used by a state leads to a .12 increase in its human rights records at the .01 level. Though the relationship is not as strong as with the Amnesty International scale; this finding reinforces the fact that external violence either reflects or is reflected by internal

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violence. Contrary to theoretical expectations, a one unit increase in the level of hostility used by one's rival leads to a .024 increase in human rights violations; again, this fails to show statistical significance and consequently does not support hypothesis 2. The number of disputes in which a country is involved any given year has a negative effect on human rights violation, which contradicts theoretical expectation; yet, it fails to meet statistical significance and shall therefore not be given too much emphasis. As opposed to the former model, this model shows support for hypothesis 4; a one unit increase in the number of rivalries in which a country is involved leads to a .21 increase in its human rights records at the .001 level. This new findings most likely emanates from the withdrawal of the US cases from the model. Removing this outlier helps accounting for the truly internal and external aggressiveness of countries engaged in enduring rivalries. The control variables support the propositions of the human rights literature with the exception of the international war dichotomous variable. I now analyze the effects of rivalries dynamics on social and economic rights.

Rivalries Dynamics and Social and Economic Rights

The results of the analysis over the impact of rivalries dynamics on social and economic rights are presented in Table 2. Those findings strongly question the theoretical propositions outlined earlier. Though some of the results clearly support the hypotheses, most of the other findings undermine the strength and validity of the theory I proposed. While the level of hostility used by a given state against a rival and the hostility of the latter have the expected effect on economic and social rights, the number of disputes and of rivalries in which a state participates has the opposite impact on social and economic rights. Other things equal, states have an average of 79.55 on the PQLI scale, a result that is inflated by the presence of countries such as Canada, Norway, the USA, or Japan. A one unit increase in the level of hostility used by a state leads to a

2.5 decrease in the PQLI score of this country, this finding is of particular importance since it is statistically significant, thus lending support for hypothesis 1. Similarly, a one unit increase in the hostility level experienced by a state leads to a .292 decrease in the PQLI score of the attacked country. Though this fails to support hypothesis two, it also lacks statistical significance and should not be given too much weight.

[Table 2 about here]

The results over the effects of the number of disputes and the number of rivalries in which a state is involved both failed to support the proposed expectations. A one unit increase in the number of disputes in which a state is involved leads to 3.97 unit increase in its social and economic records while a similar increase in the number of rivalries in which a state participates leads to a 2.28 increase in its PQLI score. Both findings are of statistical significance and both contradict their respective hypotheses. One potential explanation may lay in the fact that the country that has been involved in the most disputes and the most rivalries over the period of time under study is also one of the countries that has the best social and economic rights, mainly the United States. Furthermore, other democracies that perform well on the PQLI variable may help justify the findings. In lights of those findings, it appears that the level of democracy best describes the nature of the PQLI score of any given country. Unfortunately, the available data and measure do fail to clarify the effects of rivalries dynamics on economic and social rights, with the exception of the level of hostility used by a state.

CONCLUSION

This study attempts to statistically outline a relationship between the dynamics f rivalries and a country's personal integrity rights and social and economic rights. I conduct a statistical analysis over all countries engaged in rivalries between 1976 and 2001 on their personal integrity rights

and I did a similar analysis on the same set of countries from 1976 to 1996 on their social and economic rights. Incorporating propositions of the human rights literature to assessments of the rivalry literature, I proposed four hypotheses that outline a potential relationship between the above mentioned phenomena and I introduced three control variables based on the human rights literature. Overall, this study helps account for the effects of the level of hostility used by a state on its human rights; the most severe the means a country uses to retaliate against rivals, the worse his personal integrity and social and economic rights; this finding held across models. However, I found no support for hypothesis 2 and found mixing results with regards to hypotheses 3 and 4 with results in the direction opposite to the proposed one in the case of the effects of the number of rivalries a state participates in.

The latter findings most likely outline the theoretical weaknesses of this study; other propositions need be formulated to help account for the effects of the number of disputes and the number of rivalries in which a state is engaged on human rights. Furthermore, the lack of certain observations, such as North Korea, and the prevalence of countries with good human rights records, i.e., the USA, may undermine the true relationship between rivalries dynamics and human rights. Nevertheless, this paper tries to fill a gap in the literature and outlines the necessity to conduct more research in this area to clarify causation and the nature of the relationships; subsequently, the formulation of more generalizable theories may ensue.

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Table 1: The effects of Rivalries' Characteristics on Personal Integrity Rights.

	Amnesty International		State Department	
	Coefficient	p-value	Coefficient	p-value
Hostility Used	.129*** (.031)	.000	.118*** (.036)	.001
Experienced Hostility	-.017 (.025)	.496	.024 (.038)	.532
Number of Disputes	-.069 (.061)	.254	-.093 (.066)	.162
Number of Rivalries	.002 (.035)	.962	.210*** (.043)	.000
Democracy	.040*** (.004)	.000	.042*** (.004)	.000
Civil War	.717*** (.073)	.000	.989*** (.073)	.000
International War	-.004 (.128)	.976	-.013 (.136)	.925
Constant	2.258*** (.079)	.000	1.548*** (.073)	.000
N	944		997	
Adjusted R^2	.238		.382	
Prob > F	.001		.001	

* indicates p<.1, ** indicates p<.05, and *** indicates p<.01; Standard errors in parentheses.

Table 2: The effects of Rivalries' Characteristics on Social and Economic Rights.

	Coefficient	p-value
Hostility Used	-2.511*** (.668)	.000
Experienced Hostility	-.292 (.689)	.672
Number of Disputes	3.972*** (1.234)	.006
Number of Rivalries	2.284*** (.810)	.001
Democracy	-1.183*** (.081)	.000
Civil War	-1.192 (1.353)	.378
International War	3.696 (2.493)	.138
Constant	79.554*** (1.356)	.000
N	791	
Adjusted R^2	.254	
Prob > F	.001	

* indicates p<.1, ** indicates p<.05, and *** indicates p<.01; Standard errors in parentheses