

International Sports and Match Fixing

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***Overview:** Chappelet and Verschuuren trace the history of match fixing and corruption in international sports. They explore the fight against modern match fixing, notably through the Macolin Convention of 2014, and the move toward combating general corruption in sports. The authors conclude by looking at the future of sporting integrity.*

Match fixing became a major issue in international sports over a decade ago, following a series of scandals in football (soccer) starting in 2005 and in the Olympic world in 2007. For the Olympics, the issue was considered a more serious moral threat than doping. Perceptions of the problem's gravity were such that, in 2014, the Council of Europe drew up a Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions, known as the Macolin Convention, to help combat the phenomenon. These concerns are just the latest reaction to a problem that has existed since modern sports first emerged in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century England, although it has been exacerbated in recent years by the development of online betting. According to the Macolin Convention, "manipulation of sports competitions means an intentional arrangement, act or omission aimed at an improper alteration of the result or the course of a sports competition in order to remove all or part of the unpredictable nature of the aforementioned sports competition with a view to obtaining an undue advantage for oneself or for others" (Council of Europe 2014, article 3.4). This definition is the one used throughout this chapter.

Initial efforts by sports authorities to combat the manipulation of competitions focused on betting-related match fixing and the detection of irregular betting. The measures taken by these authorities, most notably the introduction

KEY CONCEPTS

Amateurism
Corruption in sports
Integrity Betting Intelligence System (IBIS)
Joint Assessment Unit (JAU)
Macolin Convention
Match fixing in international sports
Online sports betting
Sports integrity

of systems to monitor sports betting, have been seemingly successful in limiting match fixing at major competitions, but they do not address the roots of the problem, including the precarity of a major part of the athletes and the deficiencies of internal and external regulation. Moreover, betting-related match fixing is just one aspect of a much wider problem of corruption, either by athletes, their entourages, or officials. Such cheating may involve losing on purpose (e.g., to avoid a stronger opponent) or taking steps to win by any means (e.g., by doping or by buying votes or points).

This chapter begins by looking back at the origins of match fixing before reviewing the sports system's initial efforts to combat the problem, which focused mostly on detecting irregular betting and other external causes (such as organized crime), and which culminated in an international convention on match fixing signed in 2014. It then shows how a range of initiatives resulted in a more general fight against cheating and corruption, of which match fixing is just one part. The conclusion outlines the importance of structural causes of this corruption and identifies possible avenues for combating it.

THE ORIGINS OF SPORTS AND MATCH FIXING

Sporting activities and prestigious competitions have existed since antiquity, most famously in ancient Greece, where the original Olympic Games began in the sixth century BCE, but also in other civilizations. Nevertheless, most historians agree that modern sports were born in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century England, with the Industrial Revolution (Vamplew 2015). The first modern sports, such as horse racing, running, boxing, and football, evolved out of traditional and rural games in preindustrial Britain. Competitions involving these activities, the forerunners of contemporary sports events, became extremely popular with the newly emerging working classes, who enjoyed them as a welcome break from their daily toil. For participants, competitions were a way of earning money, as athletes were generally paid and could win prizes (usually cash). Spectators could also make (and lose) money through betting, which was an essential part of sports and leisure for many people. Bets were placed with and paid off by bookmakers, a new line of work that grew up around competitions. Some bettors were tempted to try to guarantee they would win by rigging competitions—in other words, by fixing matches.


One of the earliest types of competition was footracing (running and walking, then called pedestrianism), which began around 1820 (Sears 2015). Pedestrianism was very popular in the British Isles, attracting large numbers of spectators,

many of whom bet on the outcome. As contemporary lithographs show, it was not unknown for spectators to attack racers (pedestrians) if they thought they had cheated to allow other bettors to win. Pedestrianism even found its way into Britain's public (considered private in US terms) schools (Sears 2015).

Sports such as wrestling, running, and cricket developed quickly in England, partly because of the betting associated with them. In fact, the main reason for establishing fixed rules for cricket in the middle of the eighteenth century was to avoid arguments between bettors (Munting 1996). Laws governing gambling and betting were first introduced in Great Britain in the nineteenth century, through the 1845 Gaming Act and the 1853 Betting Act. The tight restrictions these laws placed on commercial gambling, which were aimed specifically at the lower echelons of society, encouraged the development of underground betting (Brooks and Lavorgna 2018).

The popularity of footraces in nineteenth-century England coincided with a growing realization by the country's educators, including Thomas Arnold, the headmaster of Rugby School, that physical activity supported the goals of education. However, sports connected with betting were not considered suitable training for young minds and bodies, so public schools turned to team games, such as football, which were thought to encourage teamwork and self-governance.

Also at this time, as the corrupting role of money in and around competitions became a concern, the idea of amateurism, doing sports without receiving any form of payment or prize money, began to emerge. In fact, "professional sport was firmly established before the amateur ideal was invented in the nineteenth century" (Munting 1996, 16). Amateurism soon became the ideal on which international sports, with their competitions for "gentlemen," was founded. It was the stated theme of the conference held in Paris in 1894 at which Pierre de Coubertin realized his dream of reviving the Olympic Games. Thanks to an informal consensus among British, French, and American sports organizations, the conference adopted a resolution to revive the games, as long as they were open only to "amateurs" (MacAloon 1981). Thus, the ethos of the newly created modern Olympics (and modern sports) had little in common with the ancient



Cover of *Frank Leslie's Illustrated Newspaper*, October 1879, depicting a "pedestrian championship" match at Madison Square Garden. Footracing (running and walking, then called pedestrianism) gained popularity in the nineteenth century, attracting large numbers of spectators, many of whom bet on the outcome. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, PRINTS & PHOTOGRAPHS DIVISION, REPRODUCTION NUMBER LC-USZ62-88333.

games (and sports), where the concept of amateurism was unknown but where cheating and betting fraud were common (Badinou 2001). By the late twentieth century, most sports had embraced professionalism, thereby bringing the amateur era to an end in the Olympics.

Greatly influenced by the ideals of amateurism, the structure of modern sports took shape during the first three decades of the twentieth century. Contrary to those ideals, however, betting played an important part in modern sports' development. Many countries financed national sports organizations from the proceeds of betting. For example, in 1938 Switzerland followed in Sweden's footsteps by introducing federal legislation to create an association to run lotteries throughout the country and redistribute the profits to sports. This new association, called Sport-Toto, would redistribute 75 percent of its profits into funds set up in the Swiss cantons (which have a monopoly over lotteries) for sports facilities and equipment. The remaining 25 percent went to Switzerland's football and ice hockey federations (two sports on which betting was authorized) and the National Association for Physical Education (now called the Swiss Olympic Association), an umbrella association representing all the country's sports federations. Between 1938 and 2003, Sport-Toto contributed more than 1 billion Swiss francs to organized sports in Switzerland. In the United Kingdom, restrictions on the size of lotteries, introduced under a 1934 act of Parliament, remained in place until 1994, when new legislation was brought in to create the UK National Lottery, which is required to redistribute a percentage of its turnover to "good causes," including sports. Similarly, numerous temporary lotteries have been set up to benefit the Olympic Games, even in places where sports betting was or is forbidden (e.g., New York State held an Olympic lottery beginning in 1978 to support the 1980 Winter Games in Lake Placid).

After World War II, Italy's government mandated the Italian Olympic Committee (CONI) to run Totocalcio, a unit that was set up to manage betting on the Italian football championship. As a result, CONI became the equivalent of a sports ministry with responsibility for financing the country's sports federations (using Totocalcio's substantial profits). However, a decline in Totocalcio sports betting since the end of the twentieth century, a result of decrease of public interest and the emerging competition of online betting, has caused major problems for this model. In France, the Pari-Mutuel Urbain (PMU) was founded in 1930 to oversee betting on horse races and to finance the horse racing industry (racecourses, racing companies, breeders, etc.). Pari-mutuel cafés with off-track betting licenses cropped up as locations to place bets.

Given the financial contribution of betting-related funding to the sports system, it was important to protect the betting industry's reputation, which had been sullied by a number of scandals. These scandals included, in France in the early 1970s, the *tiercé* off-track betting scandal, named for the rigging of the *tiercé* betting formula, which consists in picking the first three winning horses in order, and, uncovered in Italy in 1980, the *totonero* affair, a match-fixing scandal named for the practice of illegal betting on football matches. In the 2010s, although many models of betting lotteries had been overtaken by pure games of chance (e.g., EuroMillions, scratch cards) or private online betting operators, sports continued to receive substantial funding by the national lotteries.

FIGHTING MODERN MATCH FIXING, 2005–2014

The decline of traditional sports lottery games, where bettors have to guess every score of one championship's day and bet in physical shops, can partly be explained by the development of the internet, which enabled modern forms of betting to emerge. Rapidly, numerous online betting sites started to propose fixed-odds bets (on one particular game) worldwide. An increasing number of sports competitions were proposed, sometimes even nonprofessional or minor games. Bets could even be placed during matches. This exponential growth of the betting market, combined with major deficiencies in its regulation (most popular online betting companies accept bets from all around the world, meaning that more than 80% of the bets are considered illegal) and vulnerabilities of sports actors, led to a surge in match fixing at the turn of this century. Many instances of match fixing originated in Southeast Asian countries, where, broadly speaking, betting is banned yet is very popular. Some cases were reported extensively in the media, including the alleged fixing of the 2007 tennis match, held in Poland, between the Russian Nikolay Davydenko and the Argentine Martín Vassallo Argüello (both players were eventually cleared in an inquiry by the Association of Tennis Professionals); the 2011 Calciocommesse (football bet) scandal in Italian football, which resulted in a variety of punishments; and a number of high-profile court cases relating to the rigging of football matches, notably in Germany (Bochum in 2010), where defendants were convicted and given jail terms, and Switzerland (Bellinzona in 2017), where defendants were acquitted.

These and other similar events challenged the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) and the International Olympic Committee (IOC). FIFA's first response, in 2005, was to set up an early warning system (EWS) to monitor the betting market on certain football matches (Haberfeld and Sheehan 2013). In June 2008, just before the Beijing 2008 Summer Olympics, the IOC set out its first set of rules against match fixing and asked FIFA's EWS to monitor the event. Only one case of betting by an athlete (an Irish sailor) was detected, long after the Games, and it did not result in any sanctions due to a lack of clarity in the rules at the time (Mackay 2012).

Match fixing relating to irregular betting was once again on the agenda at the 2009 Olympic Congress in Copenhagen. These discussions led to the incorporation of two new rules into the IOC's Code of Ethics, in time for the Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympics and London 2012 Summer Games. The first stated: "All forms of participation in, or support for betting related to the Olympic Games, and all forms of promotion of betting related to the Olympic Games are prohibited." The second stated: "Also, in the context of betting, participants in the Olympic Games must not, by any manner whatsoever, infringe the principle of fair play, show non-sporting conduct, or attempt to influence the result of a competition in a manner contrary to sporting ethics" (IOC 2010).

The IOC's president at the time, Jacques Rogge, was very worried about the risk of match fixing at the 2012 London Olympics, given the cultural context of the United Kingdom, where betting shops are popular. Rogge went as far as to describe match fixing as a bigger threat to the integrity of sports than doping, an

issue he had considered a top priority at the beginning of his presidency. Hence, for London 2012, the IOC joined forces with the London organizing committee, the international federations (IFs), Interpol, and the British authorities to set up a Joint Assessment Unit (JAU) to monitor sports betting around the 2012 Olympics. Also, in 2010, SportAccord (now the Global Association of International Sports Federations) decided to create its own Sport Integrity Unit to help IFs combat match fixing in their sport, most notably by modifying their sporting rules on the basis of standard rules drawn up by SportAccord. This initiative was, however, short lived as the unit was disbanded following the collapse of SportAccord and the resignation of its newly elected president, Marius Vizer, in 2015.

Some observers began calling for the creation of an ad hoc structure, similar to the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), to fight match fixing and/or sports corruption and to monitor sports betting. But the Olympic system wanted to develop its own solution, based on “soft” partnerships and alliances with governments, betting regulators and intergovernmental organizations such as the Council of Europe, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and Interpol. A 2011 “memorandum of understanding” (MoU) between the IOC and UNODC enabled the exchange of expertise and the publication of a joint report (IOC and UNODC 2016), notably to facilitate the prosecution of match fixing. Another MoU with Interpol, signed in 2014, provided a framework for initiatives such as regional match-fixing awareness and prevention seminars, capacity-building and training events, and the publication of technical reports (Interpol and IOC 2016). In 2011, Interpol signed an agreement with FIFA that included financing to set up a special anti-match-fixing unit in Singapore, but it suspended this agreement in July 2015, a few weeks after the emergence of the so-called FIFAgate scandal, in which numerous FIFA executives were implicated.

Sixteen cases of match fixing were reported to London’s JAU, but none of them related to irregular betting (e.g., an unusual volume of betting for a given match) or, as far as can be ascertained, illegal betting (UK Gambling Commission 2013; Carpenter 2011). The IOC decided to continue JAU-style operations at Sochi 2014, Rio 2016, and subsequent games by creating the Integrity Betting Intelligence System (IBIS). Launched in time to detect irregular betting at Sochi 2014, through alerts sent by betting operators, IBIS also includes a phone number and an email address for use by potential whistle-blowers. Because IBIS is financed by the IOC and available to IFs free of charge, it was rapidly adopted by all the IFs of Olympic sports for their own events (IOC 2017a).

IBIS is an information-sharing system that is managed by a specialist match-fixing unit financed by the IOC. It is open to all stakeholders in sports betting who have signed an MoU, including, on one hand, betting operators, international betting associations, and national regulators, and, on the other hand, IFs and, increasingly, organizers of major events in addition to the Olympics. By providing a confidential channel for gathering and exchanging information and for issuing alerts about irregular betting, IBIS enables each stakeholder to take appropriate action in line with sporting rules and the legislative context, though this varies from one country to another (IOC and UNODC 2013); sharing information with IBIS serves as a single contact point for the organizations involved (IOC 2017a). However, IBIS has little information about nonmember betting operators, who, by

definition, are often unknown or even underground. Furthermore, it is difficult to assess the system's usefulness due to a lack of transparent annual reports detailing, for example, the number of alerts and responses to them.

Even though the global sports betting market is extremely fluid and fragmented, a large part of it is now monitored directly by specialist companies working for the IOC and other sports organizations. Actions taken within the sports system also include setting up awareness and prevention programs for sports' stakeholders, for example, by presenting how fixers can approach athletes, or how inside information on the teams and the competitions should not be disclosed to the outside. International and national sports authorities adapted the sporting rules to cover forms of cheating associated with sports betting (ban on betting on one's own competitions or sport, ban on providing insider information about matches, obligation to report any approaches relating to match fixing, etc.). Thanks to these new legal grounds, match fixers have been sanctioned, their punishments serving as examples within the sports realm.

THE MACOLIN CONVENTION (2014)

The fight against match fixing cannot be won by the sports sector alone. First, it requires the mobilization of states, since many match-fixing cases involve complex transnational organized-crime networks, and sophisticated gambling and money-laundering techniques. Sport organizations do not have the capacity (or mandate) to address these criminal networks. Second, it calls for international cooperation, because match-fixing networks and sports-betting operators are not confined by national borders, especially in the case of online betting (Costa 2018). Third, it requires multisector cooperation between law-enforcement bodies (police, justice systems), sports organizations, sports-betting operators, and the (usually public) authorities responsible for regulating sports betting. Because of the number of actors involved and the complexity of the undertaking, in 2012 the Council of Europe began multipartite discussions aimed at drawing up a convention against match fixing.

The result was the Council of Europe Convention on the Manipulation of Sports Competitions, which was signed initially by fifteen countries and then opened to signature by others (including nonmember states) at Macolin, Switzerland, on 18 September 2014. As well as imposing rules and obligations on three major categories of stakeholders—signatory states, sports organizations, and sports-betting operators—it also sets out definitions of several key concepts, including “illegal sports betting,” many of which were subject to heated debate. One of the convention's aims is to encourage state parties to create national platforms enabling the sharing of information on match fixing among all national public and private bodies involved in the fight against match fixing. Although the IOC cannot be a formal party to the Macolin Convention, IBIS could be considered such a platform at the international level. In addition, a convention secretariat was set up to facilitate international cooperation and implementation of the treaty.

The Macolin Convention is an ambitious initiative because it involves all the stakeholders and is open to states that are not members of the Council of

Europe. However, by December 2018, more than four years after the convention was opened for signature, it had still not received the five ratifications needed for it to come into force. Thirty-three states have signed the document, but the ratification process by European countries has been suspended on the advice of the European Union (EU). The main obstacle seems to be EU member Malta's refusal to accept the definition of illegal sports betting, which it believes goes beyond the scope of the convention and which would be damaging to the country's lucrative online gaming industry. In the meantime, the convention's stakeholders have been implementing its main provisions voluntarily and as they see fit. Around fifteen states have created national information-sharing platforms, and an informal international forum through which platforms can exchange information and good practices, known as the Group of Copenhagen, has been set up under the auspices of the Council of Europe.

Although some states have committed themselves to the convention proactively, this is not the case for most governments, for whom the integrity of sports competitions tends to be much less of a priority than other threats to society, such as terrorism and drug trafficking. What is more, the transnational nature of match fixing, together with the absence of direct victims, mean that law-enforcement services are often reluctant to launch complex investigations—especially since numerous disciplinary sanctions are being enforced by sports organizations against sports actors who fix matches.

THE MOVE TOWARD A MORE GENERAL ANTICORRUPTION EFFORT (2015–2018)

Since the signing of the Macolin Convention and its slow coming into force, the phenomenon of match fixing has ceased to be a top priority for sports organizations. There are several reasons for this.

First, the match-fixing scandals since 2015 have not directly concerned top-level sports competitions. Between 2005 and 2015, cases of suspected match fixing came to light in some of the world's most popular sports, and at its highest levels. The seemingly exponential increase in match fixing was seen as a threat to the viability of the football economy and football spectacle throughout the world. Since then, the leaders of world sports have changed their tune. Since 2015, match-fixing cases have concerned what can be considered secondary disciplines and/or countries on the margins of the sports economy. Although no sports event is completely safe, and the reality of the phenomenon remains uncertain, match fixing no longer seems to threaten the viability of major tennis tournaments, football competitions, or the Olympic Games, as it did in previous years.

This can be attributed, at least in part, to the efforts made by the IOC and sports authorities to address the problem. States also contributed. A number of governments introduced legislation to create suitable criminal offenses and formed specialized police units to investigate sports fraud. In parallel, some states introduced stricter regulations and controls for the sports-betting market, for example, by blocking foreign and ill-regulated websites, or limiting the types of bets that could be allowed.

Moreover, in the 2010s, scandals relating to aspects of sports integrity other than match fixing have occupied the sports political agenda. The FIFAgate scandal, which broke in May 2015, raised serious questions of impropriety about world football's leaders and led to the resignation of FIFA's president, Sepp Blatter. Most of the executive committee members who took part in the (murky) vote awarding the 2018 World Cup to Russia and the 2022 event to Qatar have been removed from their positions and face legal proceedings, and have been sanctioned by FIFA's disciplinary bodies (Bayle and Rayner 2018). Also in 2015, a serious scandal "involving doping, extortion and corruption" shook the International Association of Athletics Federations (IAAF), the world governing body for the sport of athletics (track and field) (Ingle 2016).

At the same time, a WADA investigation uncovered evidence of what it called "institutionalised doping" in Russia, most notably at the Sochi Olympics in February 2014, triggering a crisis that by 2018 was still not fully resolved. In fact, doping scandals have continued to come to light, including an April 2018 case affecting the International Biathlon Union. In addition, justice departments in several countries opened investigations into corruption scandals involving senior sports executives, including members of the IOC. Hence, corruption within sports' institutions has eclipsed the threat of match fixing.

These developments have led sports organizations to change their strategy and focus on protecting the integrity of sports' institutions, as well as that of individual competitions. Such concerns first emerged in the late 1990s with the bribery scandal surrounding the granting of the Winter Olympics to Salt Lake City and continued through the next decade with corruption scandals within numerous IFs. In an effort to improve the Olympic movement's image and credibility, in 2008 the IOC drew up its Universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic and Sports Movement, which it subsequently referred to in the Olympic Charter and its code of ethics.

A sign of this change in priorities is the absorption of the fight against match fixing into the much vaster issue of sporting integrity and the fight against corruption in sports. Consequently, match fixing now falls within the remit of the IOC's Ethics and Compliance Office, which was created by Thomas Bach in early 2015, soon after his election as IOC president, and which oversees cooperation between the IOC and other international bodies, including Interpol, concerned by sports corruption. This cooperation now goes much further than the fight against irregular betting.

The International Forum for Sports Integrity (IFSI), launched in April 2015 to succeed the Founding Working Group on the Fight against Irregular and Illegal Betting, created in June 2011, provides another example of this shift toward sporting integrity. Discussions at the IFSI were structured around two main strands, one covering the manipulation of competitions and the other addressing sporting ethics and the fight against corruption. However, in December 2017, the IFSI was incorporated into the International Partnership against Corruption in Sport (IPACS), a new initiative that had been launched in June 2017. IPACS set up three task forces to examine ways to (1) reduce the risk of

corruption in public procurement relating to the construction of sports infrastructure and the organization of sports events; (2) ensure integrity in the selection of hosts for major sports events, initially focusing on managing conflicts of interest; and (3) optimize compliance processes so they concord with governance principles and reduce the risk of corruption. None of these task forces directly covers the issue of match fixing. The issue is now routinely coordinated by IBIS. Another interesting aspect of IPACS is the key role played by public governing bodies—national governments, the G20, the Council of Europe, and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The sports movement is also in the minority within IPACS's structure, as the partnership's core group includes just one sports organization (IOC), but four non-sports governing bodies (OECD, Council of Europe, UNODC, and the British government).

Hence the changing nature of corruption scandals and the directions taken by legal proceedings, which the sports movement cannot control, have led to rapid changes in the institutional landscape and political strategies surrounding the issue of sports integrity and governance. In late 2017, the IOC and the Global Association of International Sports Federations signed a memorandum of understanding under which the IOC coordinates the IFs on issues relating to integrity, whether with respect to IBIS (whose alerts the IOC can pass on to the IFs), representation within IPACS, or questions relating to doping. The IOC will also closely monitor the IF governance self-evaluation process, which has been coordinated by the ASOIF's Governance Task Force since 2016. Pushed by a succession of legal cases and strategic pressure from the public authorities, via IPACS, the IOC must ensure the Olympic movement implements acceptable standards of governance.

THE ROOTS OF MATCH FIXING AND SPORTS CORRUPTION

Despite being subsumed into the more global issue of sports corruption, match fixing remains a significant threat, as is shown by the 266 “alerts” (including 160 relating to tennis and 45 relating to football) received during 2017 by the European Sports Security Association (ESSA), which monitors betting for betting operators (ESSA 2017). In addition, according to a 2017 survey (IRIS 2017), many athletes said they had been approached by match fixers within the previous twelve months. However, these phenomena do not (or no longer) seem to concern elite athletes or the major competitions that underpin the existence of sports organizations and the Olympic movement in general. Most important, the highest-profile scandals of this century have involved doping and corruption within sports' institutions. Nevertheless, it would appear essential to integrate the fight against match fixing into a wider policy to protect the integrity of sports and thereby address the deep-seated causes that allow match fixing to proliferate.

Since the start of the twenty-first century, sports' authorities have tended to concentrate on two explanatory factors: sports betting as an incentive to cheat and criminal networks as corrupters of the sporting spirit (Moriconi 2016). This

narrow focus overlooks the importance of other forms of non-betting-related manipulation, such as rigged judging or arrangements made to avoid relegation or achieve promotion at the end of a season. In addition, many cases of betting-related match fixing were initiated internally by athletes or their entourages (e.g., club presidents and coaches). Hence, by focusing on external causes, the sports movement has tended to ignore the internal (and structural) causes of match fixing, that is, financial inequalities (e.g., between clubs), athletes' often very fragile earnings (as noted in Andrews and Harrington 2016 and Chappelet 2011), insufficient control and monitoring of affiliated bodies (federations, leagues, clubs, sports centres), and a lack of ethical awareness among actors within sports. By examining issues relating to governance, the sports movement is indirectly and gradually facing up to its responsibilities and eliminating unhealthy attitudes that have helped corruption develop and flourish (both on and off the field of play). But the issue of athletes' earnings remains as central as it was in the early days of modern sports with pedestrians. Ensuring that athletes are adequately remunerated for competing will not solve the issue of match fixing, but it would reduce the temptation to take bribes.

Beyond financial measures, adopting a more global approach to sporting integrity will require profound internal changes in order to ensure compliance with the principles of governance and to give athletes a greater say in how their sport is run. In 2017, the World Players Association, an umbrella association of athletes' unions, issued a Universal Declaration of Player Rights. In a similar vein, WADA's Athlete Committee, in conjunction with the FairSport foundation, drew up an Athletes' Charter for presentation at WADA's first Global Athlete Forum, held in Calgary in 2018. A few months before, the IOC called on the sports movement to ensure better representation for athletes, notably by requiring the creation and election of athlete commissions (IOC 2017b). In fact, the IOC launched its own Athlete Charter in 2018, and the German Athletes' Commission was asking to receive appearance money for participating in the Olympics. However, only time will tell whether legal documents and political speeches actually lead to more democratic decision-making processes within international sports and a healthier and more open redistribution of the revenues generated by sports.

More widely, competitions need to be developed in a new way, ensuring that commercial revenues are used to promote human fulfilment and the sustainability of sports activities, rather than the fortunes of sports organizations. This would enable the sports movement to prevent problems rather than reacting to scandals when they occur. Steps must be taken to ensure that individual executives and athletes act responsibly while also ensuring compliance by institutions—good apples in good barrels. Sports' stakeholders need to take action, within their area of responsibility, to make sports clean and healthy. This may require more openness and transparency by executives (e.g., in relation to the compensation they receive and their political activities) and by athletes (e.g., taking more proactive steps against doping by publishing certain physiological data). It may also require changing the status of sports associations, which could become cooperatives with athletes as members with full voting rights.

Such holistic changes will take time and require effort from all the stakeholders in the sports system. But if they take too long to materialize, the sports

movement risks being overtaken by two separate movements: an external one, in which public governing bodies could impose outside supervision on sports institutions (e.g., resolutions by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe called for the creation of an independent foundation to oversee sports organization governance), and an internal one, from athletes themselves, who would have the legitimacy to take power away from existing institutions by creating their own competitions and organizations.

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