



UNIL | Université de Lausanne

Unicentre

CH-1015 Lausanne

<http://serval.unil.ch>

Year : 2022

How Muslims experience and report discrimination. A multi-method approach

Lindemann Anaïd

Lindemann Anaïd, 2022, How Muslims experience and report discrimination. A multi-method approach

Originally published at : Thesis, University of Lausanne

Posted at the University of Lausanne Open Archive <http://serval.unil.ch>

Document URN : urn:nbn:ch:serval-BIB_909802FE90FC1

Droits d'auteur

L'Université de Lausanne attire expressément l'attention des utilisateurs sur le fait que tous les documents publiés dans l'Archive SERVAL sont protégés par le droit d'auteur, conformément à la loi fédérale sur le droit d'auteur et les droits voisins (LDA). A ce titre, il est indispensable d'obtenir le consentement préalable de l'auteur et/ou de l'éditeur avant toute utilisation d'une oeuvre ou d'une partie d'une oeuvre ne relevant pas d'une utilisation à des fins personnelles au sens de la LDA (art. 19, al. 1 lettre a). A défaut, tout contrevenant s'expose aux sanctions prévues par cette loi. Nous déclinons toute responsabilité en la matière.

Copyright

The University of Lausanne expressly draws the attention of users to the fact that all documents published in the SERVAL Archive are protected by copyright in accordance with federal law on copyright and similar rights (LDA). Accordingly it is indispensable to obtain prior consent from the author and/or publisher before any use of a work or part of a work for purposes other than personal use within the meaning of LDA (art. 19, para. 1 letter a). Failure to do so will expose offenders to the sanctions laid down by this law. We accept no liability in this respect.



UNIL | Université de Lausanne

FACULTÉ DES SCIENCES SOCIALES ET POLITIQUES

-

INSTITUT DE SCIENCES SOCIALES DES RELIGIONS

**How Muslims experience and report discrimination.
A multi-method approach**

THÈSE DE DOCTORAT

présentée à la

Faculté des sciences sociales et politiques de l'Université de Lausanne

pour

l'obtention du grade de Docteur en sciences sociales

par

Anaïd Lindemann

-

Directeur de thèse

Professeur Jörg Stolz, Université de Lausanne

Jury de thèse

Professeure Eva Green, Université de Lausanne
Professeur Marc Helbling, Universität Mannheim
Professeur Matthias Koenig, Universität Heidelberg

-

Lausanne, 2022



UNIL | Université de Lausanne

Faculté des sciences
sociales et politiques

IMPRIMATUR

Le Décanat de la Faculté des sciences sociales et politiques de l'Université de Lausanne, au nom du Conseil et sur proposition d'un jury formé des professeurs

- M. Jörg STOLZ, Professeur à l'Université de Lausanne et directeur de thèse
- Mme Eva GREEN, Professeur à l'Université de Lausanne
- M. Marc HELBLING, Professeur à l'Université de Mannheim, Allemagne
- M. Matthias KOENIG, Professeur à l'Institut de sociologie Max-Weber à Heidelberg, Allemagne

autorise, sans se prononcer sur les opinions du candidat, l'impression de la thèse de Madame Anaïd LINDEMANN, intitulée :

"How Muslims experience and report discrimination. A multi-method approach."

Nicky LE FEUVRE
Doyenne

Lausanne, le 19 septembre 2022

Abstract

In Switzerland, the public display of discrimination on the basis of a person's religious affiliation has been prohibited by the Criminal Code since 1994. Yet, three out of ten Muslims report having experienced discrimination in the previous year, a proportion close to that of other European countries. This gap between a creed of equality and the widespread experience of discrimination on the part of a minority group is a challenge for Western Europe, marked as it is by growing religious and ethnic diversity. This PhD thesis is a sociological inquiry into the extent and nature of discrimination against Muslims on a national scale, and will answer the following questions: Are Muslims disadvantaged on the labour market in Switzerland, and, if so, can this be attributed to ethno-religious discrimination? To what extent do Muslims perceive discrimination? What kind of discrimination do Muslim women who wear the *hijab* face, and why? Finally, once they have perceived discrimination, to what extent do Muslims report it compared to another religious minority, and what might explain any possible differences between the two minority groups? Mobilizing different theoretical frameworks (mainly the theories of attribution, human capital, intersectionality, and choice-environment), and drawing on various datasets (population surveys and censuses, a corpus of qualitative interviews, records of self-reports, legal records), our study has produced results that may be useful both academically and in practical terms. These results not only contribute to the existing literature on discrimination, but can also inform policies that aim to reduce anti-Muslim discrimination in Switzerland in particular, and to address discrimination against ethno-religious minorities in general.

Résumé

En Suisse, toute discrimination publique sur la base de l'appartenance religieuse est formellement interdite par le code pénal depuis 1994. Pourtant, trois musulman-e-s sur dix estiment avoir été victime de discrimination durant l'année écoulée, une proportion similaire à celle d'autres pays européens. Cet écart entre un principe d'égalité et une expérience répandue de la discrimination de la part d'un groupe minoritaire est un défi pour l'Europe occidentale, marquée comme elle l'est par une diversité religieuse et ethnique croissante. Cette thèse de doctorat est une enquête sociologique sur l'étendue et la nature de la discrimination à l'encontre des musulman-e-s à l'échelle nationale, et répond aux questions suivantes : Les personnes musulmanes sont-elles désavantagées sur le marché du travail en Suisse et, si tel est le cas, ce désavantage peut-il être attribué à une discrimination ethno-religieuse ? Dans quelle mesure les musulman-e-s perçoivent-ils/elles la discrimination ? Quel type de discrimination les femmes musulmanes qui portent le *hijab* subissent-elles, et pourquoi ? Enfin, lorsque la discrimination est perçue, dans quelle mesure les personnes musulmanes la signalent-elles par rapport à une autre minorité religieuse, et comment expliquer d'éventuelles différences entre les deux groupes minoritaires ? Mobilisant différents cadres théoriques (principalement les théories de l'attribution, du capital humain, de l'intersectionnalité et du choice-environment) et s'appuyant sur divers jeux de données (enquêtes et recensements de population, corpus d'entretiens qualitatifs, recueil de cas auto-déclarés, recueil de cas juridiques), nos études fournissent des résultats qui peuvent être utiles tant sur le plan académique que sur le plan pratique. Nos résultats contribuent non seulement à la littérature existante sur la discrimination, mais ils peuvent également informer les politiques de lutte contre la discrimination, envers les musulman-e-s ou plus généralement envers les minorités ethno-religieuses.

À mes enfants,
pour leur énergie contagieuse.

À mon mari et ma famille,
pour leur soutien inconditionnel.

Acknowledgements

First of all, I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor, Jörg Stolz, for his supportive guidance throughout this endeavour, his (always very quick) feedback and the many fruitful collaborations we have had over the years (that I do not dare to count) since my Master.

I want to convey my utmost appreciation to Professors Green, Koenig, and Helbing, the three members of the defence committee, for their insightful and constructive comments that significantly improved the first version of my manuscript.

Special thanks to CIHSR, FTSR, ISSR, and the SAV for providing the financial support for proofreading and acquisition of equipment. Particularly, Monique Thiévent, Frank Müller and Joël Pfister have been of great help in the various administrative processes of these entities.

I acknowledge the precious help provided by Amélie de Flaugergues and Maik Roth (FSO) in the acquisition and understanding of statistical data, as well as the valuable advice provided by Professor Antonietti and Professor Berchtold for statistical analyses.

I extend my special thanks to David West, who thoroughly proofread every single manuscript of this thesis over the years.

My colleagues also supported me in various ways and I would like to thank them for their generosity: my office-mates Liudmila Gamaïunova and Jeremy Senn for their valuable support and the passionate discussions we have had on various occasions; Stefano Torres, Philippe Therrien, and Lara Loye for the stimulating exchanges we had during our doctoral meetings and over (many) cups of coffee; Manéli Farahmand, Pascal Tanner, Gregory Dessart and Alexandre Grandjean for their encouragement and friendship. Josselin Tricou and Nicolas Meylan for always being up for lunch and sharing with me their experiences in the path to the doctorate.

Last but far from least, I am infinitely grateful to my husband for his immeasurable help in formatting my manuscripts, for the fruitful technical reflections that we sometimes had late in the night, and for his unconditional, irreplaceable support during this long-term process.

Table of contents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	I
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	IV
1 INTRODUCTION	1
1.1 THEORY: ON DISCRIMINATION, RACISM, AND ISLAMOPHOBIA	5
1.2 EFFECTS OF AND RESPONSES TO DISCRIMINATION AMONG MUSLIMS: PREVIOUS EMPIRICAL RESEARCH	25
1.3 CONTEXT: THE SPECIFICITY AND GENERALIZABILITY OF THE SWISS CASE	38
1.4 METHODOLOGY: RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES, DIVERSE DATA, DIVERSE METHODS	55
1.5 OVERVIEW OF THE RESULTS	65
2 THE MUSLIM EMPLOYMENT GAP, HUMAN CAPITAL, AND ETHNO-RELIGIOUS PENALTIES: EVIDENCE FROM SWITZERLAND	69
3 PERCEIVED DISCRIMINATION AMONG MUSLIMS AND ITS CORRELATES. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS ...	83
4 DISCRIMINATION AGAINST VEILED MUSLIM WOMEN IN SWITZERLAND: INSIGHTS FROM FIELD EXPERTS	109
5 TO SPEAK OUT OR NOT TO SPEAK OUT? EXPLORING THE REPORTING OF DISCRIMINATION AMONG MUSLIMS AND JEWS IN SWITZERLAND	129
6 CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION	153
6.1 MAIN RESULTS	153
6.2 CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE FIELD	155
6.3 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS: RESEARCH AND POLICY LEADS	164
7 REFERENCES.....	169

List of abbreviations

CICAD:	Coordination Intercommunautaire contre l'Antisémitisme et la Diffamation
CP:	Swiss criminal code (stands for Code pénal)
CPM:	Military Swiss criminal code (stands for Code pénal militaire)
Cst:	Constitution
DoSyRa:	Dokumentationssystem Rassismus (dataset on self-reported racist incidents)
FCR:	Federal Commission against Racism
FPS:	Federal Population Survey
FSO:	Federal Statistical Office
ICERD:	International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
LRCS:	Language, Religion and Culture Survey (editions 2014 and 2019)
RS:	Relevé structurel
SIG:	Schweizerischer Israelitischer Gemeindebund

1 Introduction

any person who publicly denigrates or discriminates against another or a group of persons on the grounds of their race, ethnic origin, religion or sexual orientation in a manner that violates human dignity, whether verbally, in writing or pictorially, by using gestures, through acts of aggression or by other means [...] shall be liable to a custodial sentence not exceeding three years or to a monetary penalty (art. 261bis Swiss Criminal Code).¹

On 27 April 2015, Ms. M is walking down the street in Sion, the city where she lives with her two children, when she hears a woman yell at her: “Dirty Arab, you are in Europe here, you must remove your veil. If you want to dress like that, go back to Saudi Arabia”. A Swedish woman of Montenegrin origin, Ms. M tries to deal calmly with the aggression, which goes on for ten minutes before a passer-by comes to help.² In 2019, Mr. P is called “Taliban” by the head chef of the restaurant where he works, an expression that the entire kitchen team then takes up. And a team leader of a transport company calls his employees who practise Ramadan a “threat”.³ In 2018, the website of an organization in Bern that promotes interfaith dialogue features the comment: “The only good Muslim is a dead Muslim”.⁴

A recent population survey reveals that three out of ten Muslims had felt discriminated against in the previous year. Anti-Muslim incidents are reported each year to centres that support victims of racism, a growing number of Muslim victims are taking the perpetrators of discrimination to court,⁵ and a significant proportion of the population expresses negative

¹ Art. 261bis of the Swiss Criminal Code is available at:

https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/cc/54/757_781_799/en#art_261_bis (accessed 9 March 2022).

² Favre, C. (2 May 2015). “Avant, je me sentais forte”, *Le Matin*. Our translation from French : “Sale Arabe, tu es en Europe ici, tu dois enlever ton voile. Si tu veux t’habiller comme ça, retourne en Arabie Saoudite!”.

³ Testimonials from the 2019 report published by the Réseau de centres de conseil: https://network-racism.ch/cms/upload/200421_Rassismusbericht_19_F.pdf (accessed 29 March 2022).

⁴ Lawsuit publicly available at: <https://www.ekr.admin.ch/prestations/f524/2018-023N.html?db=N&keyword2=23&p=1> (accessed 29 March 2022). Our translation from German : “nur ein toter Muslem ist ein guter Muslem”.

⁵ A database of court proceedings within the framework of art. 261bis is available at: www.ekr.admin.ch/prestations/f518 (accessed 24 March 2022).

views on Muslims.⁶ Switzerland is no exception when it comes to this widespread experience of discrimination among Muslims: 25% of Muslims living in the European Union report having faced discrimination during the last 12 months, and 39% during the last five years, and this five times a year on average. Unfavourable views on this minority have decreased during the last decade in Western Europe, but remain high, since between 18% and 77% of the population express unfavourable views on Muslims depending on the country, with an average of 44%.⁷

Yet, in Switzerland, discrimination on the grounds of religious affiliation has been prohibited under article 261bis of the Criminal Code (CP) since 1994. This, in Merton's words (1948, p. 192)⁸, constitutes a general creed enacted in law. Hence, this is a case in point where there is a discrepancy between a general creed of equal treatment to which most of the population adhere, and patterns of behaviour, described by Merton (1948) before the Civil Rights movement and recently revisited by contemporary scholars (Quillian, 2006). To understand discrimination against Muslims in countries under the rule of law represents an important challenge in a context of growing religious diversity in Europe in general, and in Switzerland in particular (Baumann & Stolz, 2009, p. 182).

Until now, hostility towards Muslims in Switzerland has been analyzed almost exclusively through the lens of the attitudes and representations of the majority population.⁹ However, discrimination can be studied not only from the majority perspective (prejudice), but also from two other points of view:¹⁰ the minority perspective (perceived discrimination and how people respond to discrimination), and the objective perspective (from the "outside"), which can be done by measuring and comparing outcomes for minority and majority groups (Pager & Shepherd, 2008). Only one study has dealt with perceived discrimination among non-Swiss

⁶ For surveys in Switzerland, see: (Federal Statistical Office, 2019, 2020; humanrights.ch & Federal Commission against Racism, 2020).

⁷ For surveys in Europe, see: (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2017b; Pew Research Center, 2019, p. 80).

⁸ The bibliographical references for the introduction and conclusion are all gathered at the end of the thesis (section 7. References), otherwise in articles.

⁹ For research on population attitudes and media representations in Switzerland, see, for example: (Ettinger & Imhof, 2011; Fasel, Green, & Sarrasin, 2013; Helbling, 2008a; Lindemann & Stolz, 2014; Sarrasin & Green, 2015; Stolz, 2005).

¹⁰ This three-fold typology of perspectives (*majority*, *minority*, and *objective*) was inspired by the work of Pager and Shepherd (2008).

Muslims, and this in a descriptive, bivariate way (Gianni, Giugni, & Michel, 2015), while only two experimental studies have measured actual discrimination (Aidenberger & Doehne, 2021; Berger & Berger, 2019). In other words, there has been little research so far on how Muslims in Switzerland *experience* and *respond* to discrimination.

In other Western contexts,¹¹ social scientists have recently investigated the perception of discrimination and the objective effects of discrimination on life chances for Muslims. Research casting perceived discrimination as an independent variable has mainly shown that it negatively impacts well-being and integration,¹² while research investigating perceived discrimination as a dependent variable points to variation between Muslim groups, be it in terms of generation (Yazdiha, 2019), or of ethnicity (Zainiddinov, 2016), but comparisons with majority groups have not been undertaken yet. As for outcomes for Muslims in different life domains such as the labour market and courtesy situations, research consistently points to disadvantages for Muslims.¹³ One aspect that has been quite poorly investigated, however, is how Muslims respond to discrimination, and the reasons for why they respond in the ways that they do.

In short, there is a lack of inferential analysis of objective and perceived discrimination against Muslims in Switzerland, and of studies on their responses to discrimination in the literature in general. This thesis fills this gap, providing as it does results that can to some extent be generalized beyond the Swiss case, and that contribute both to the literature on inter-group relations and to anti-discrimination policies.

This thesis aims to provide empirical evidence of discrimination against Muslims on a national scale, and to understand its extent and nature. Several difficulties arise when it comes to investigating discrimination, and especially so because “it is an often illegal and hidden practice” (Quillian, 2006). One way of doing so, though, is to study discrimination from different perspectives and to draw on different kinds of data. Thus, we have used survey data

¹¹ In this thesis, “the West” must be understood in Voas and Fleischman’s sense: namely, it refers to the countries of Western Europe, North America, and Australia/New-Zealand (Voas & Fleischmann, 2012).

¹² For research on perceived discrimination as an independent variable among Muslims, see, for example: (Dana, Lajevardi, Oskooii, & Walker, 2019; Jasperse, Ward, & Jose, 2012; Saleem, Dubow, Lee, & Huesmann, 2018).

¹³ For research on life-chance outcomes among Muslims in Europe, see: (Adida, Laitin, & Valfort, 2010; Ahmed, 2010; Connor & Koenig, 2015; Di Stasio, Lancee, Veit, & Yemane, 2021; Helly, 2004; Valfort, 2018; Weichselbaumer, 2020; Widner & Chicoine, 2011).

to investigate the subjective perception of discrimination; survey data again, to explore the outcomes in a life domain relative to other groups; and interviews with field experts, to study the gender aspect of discrimination. In addition, we have triangulated the interviews with field experts and databases on people's reporting of discrimination and on any legal action that they take in order to investigate individual responses to discrimination and their aggregated effects.

The key question of this thesis is: To what extent do Muslims experience and report discrimination in Switzerland? Within this overall question, there are four much more specific questions that we investigate:

- a) How large is the Muslim employment gap in Switzerland, and to what extent can it be attributed to human capital, migratory factors, religiosity, and a hostile societal context?
- b) How widespread is perceived discrimination among Muslims compared to other groups in Switzerland, and what are the life domains and attributes associated with such discrimination? What important correlates does perceived discrimination among Muslims have compared to other religious groups? More specifically, to what extent is perceived discrimination correlated with socio-structural disadvantages and religious/ethnic in-group identification?
- c) How do governmental and non-governmental experts describe and explain the discrimination experienced by *hijabis* (women who wear a headscarf) in Switzerland, and how do these experts differ in terms of their knowledge of such discrimination?
- d) What is the extent of perceived discrimination among Muslims and Jews, and how likely are they to report discriminatory incidents and take the matter to court? What cultural, structural, and organizational reasons might there be to explain possible differences between Muslims and Jews when it comes to reporting discriminatory incidents and initiating court proceedings?

This thesis answers these questions in four peer-reviewed articles, three of which have been co-authored by the director of the thesis. Before presenting the four articles, we will first develop the introduction along four lines: theory, state of the art, context, and methods. The aim of this introduction is to set the scene for the research: What are the most important

concepts used in the research, and from what traditions in the social sciences are they derived? What do we already know from the existing literature on discrimination against Muslims in the West? What methodological strategies does the research choose, and why?

First, we will sketch the overarching theoretical framework with regard to discrimination by defining important concepts (1.1). In a second step, we will review the results of the most important empirical studies on perceived discrimination, objective discrimination, and the reporting of discrimination among Muslims in the West (1.2). Then, we will present the socio-historical and legal specificities of the Swiss case, along with the current knowledge on discrimination against Muslims in the country (1.3). In the next section, we will highlight our methodological choices and strategies briefly, since we discuss them at greater length in the articles themselves (1.4). Finally, we will synthesize our main findings and indicate how they can contribute to the existing literature (1.5). The four articles will follow in the chronological order and the original journal format in which they were published (2 to 5).¹⁴ Each chapter corresponds to an article and can be read independently. We will conclude by discussing the main results in terms of generalizations, limitations, and contributions to the field relative to previous research presented upstream, and their implications for anti-discrimination policies (6).

1.1 Theory: On discrimination, racism, and Islamophobia

No language can hope to capture the complexity of the world because the world is infinitely complex. [...] To deprive the social science community of certain words, or of certain uses of commonly understood words, is bound to create confusion, and also to limit the usefulness of social science as a way of apprehending the world. It is to tie our hands behind our backs prior to heavy lifting (Gerring, 2012, p. 67).

“Discrimination”, “prejudice”, “racism”, “stigmatization”, “stereotypes” – these terms are often used interchangeably in everyday language. Yet, in the social sciences, they are

¹⁴ Permissions have been gained from each journal and the original paginations are respected.

concepts with specific meanings and definitions. Drawing on seminal works in the field of inter-group relations, we will define the central concepts here that are used in the study of discrimination, before then discussing the relevance of speaking of “Islamophobia” and “racism” when it comes to examining discrimination against Muslims in particular.

Definitions of central concepts: prejudice, stigmatization, and discrimination

Definitions of discrimination can either be very broad (all inequality is a consequence of discrimination), or very narrow (discrimination only includes behaviour that intentionally restricts a group’s access to equal chances) (Pettigrew & Taylor, 2015, p. 542). Definitions can also consider micro- to macro-level dynamics, namely from individual actions against other individuals to structural factors, along with direct to indirect forms (Pettigrew, 2015). One common denominator is the existence of *differential treatment* and the presupposition of targeted *groups* (Quillian, 2006). This also assumes the social and context-dependent construction of group boundaries (Wimmer, 2013), made through social categorization and sometimes resulting in inter-group conflicts, more precisely between *in-groups* and *out-groups* (Allport, 1954; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986).

This thesis adopts an intermediate and quite common working definition, close to that used by national and international agencies (National Research Council, 2004; United Nations - Commission on Human Rights, 1949): **Discrimination can be defined as any form of differential treatment,¹⁵ by individuals or institutions, on the basis of real or supposed group membership, that disadvantages members of the targeted group.** This definition applies to what sociologists call “direct discrimination”, but does not entail “indirect discrimination”, where race-blind rules or procedures applied equally to everyone still disadvantage certain groups (Fibbi, Midtbøen, & Simon, 2021). An example of indirect discrimination is when an employer requires a candidate for a job to provide a certificate of qualification that only the host country issues, thereby making the job opportunity

¹⁵ Authors make a distinction between differential treatment (intentional or direct discrimination) and disparate impact (structural or indirect discrimination) (National Research Council, 2004, p. 39; Pager & Shepherd, 2008, p. 182). Disparate impact is the consequence of equal procedures or factors not related to group membership criteria that still produces disadvantages for a particular group. We do not include this component in my definition but will raise this question in the chapters. Rather, we adhere to the conventional definition introduced by Allport (1954) and since followed by numerous authors, which sees discrimination in terms of *actions* or *behaviour*.

unavailable to first-generation migrants who completed their education in their country of origin.

When speaking of “racial discrimination”, researchers originally defined group membership in terms of “race”, mainly in the historical context of the United States, but this has now been broadened to include ethnic and religious affiliations, too (Carr, 2016, p. 38). For this reason, discrimination against Muslims is often apprehended in terms of racial discrimination. This point will be developed in the following sub-section *Discrimination against Muslims: racism and Islamophobia*, especially through the lens of racialization processes.

Many authors highlight the “importance of modelling discrimination as process rather than as a single-point outcome” (Pager & Shepherd, 2008, p. 188), meaning that different aspects of it can be scrutinized scientifically and from different perspectives. On the one hand, it is possible to study discrimination from three different points of view that we could label *majority*, *minority*, and *objective* perspectives: the majority perspective refers to how *prejudice* and *stereotypes* are formed, and how they sometimes translate into discriminatory *behaviour* on the part of the majority population; the minority perspective deals with how discrimination is perceived and experienced by the *stigmatized* individuals; and the objective perspective deals with the effects of discrimination on the life chances of the stigmatized individuals.

One possible cause of racial discrimination is prejudice.¹⁶ Seminal here is the work of social psychologist Gordon Allport, who defines ethnic prejudice as follows: “Ethnic prejudice¹⁷ is an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization. It may be felt or expressed. It may be directed toward a group as a whole, or toward an individual because he is a member of that group” (Allport, 1954, p. 9). This definition embeds the two “essential ingredients” of prejudice: the affective component, expressed in a negative attitude (*antipathy*); and the

¹⁶ Other causes at the individual level have long been studied by social psychologists, the main ones being personality traits and religiosity. Research on personality traits and religiosity as predictors of prejudice was initiated by Adorno and Allport (Adorno, Frenkel-Brenswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Allport & Ross, 1967). For more recent work, see, for example: (Chen & Palmer, 2018; Duckitt, 2015; M. K. Johnson, Rowatt, & LaBouff, 2012; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008).

¹⁷ Many authors use this definition without explaining why “ethnic” prejudice applies to their case. It makes sense to use a definition of ethnic discrimination in this thesis because the religious background of Muslims usually overlaps with their ethnic origins. We use the expression “ethno-religious” minority in the chapters to account for this aspect.

cognitive component, expressed in an overgeneralized belief (*inflexible generalization*) about characteristics ascribed to a group, commonly called a *stereotype*. Even today, most social scientists define prejudice as a negative attitude based on stereotypes (Dovidio, Hewstone, Glick, & Esses, 2010; Jackson, 2020).¹⁸ To apply this definition to the subject of this thesis, we define **prejudice towards Muslims as a negative attitude towards individuals or groups of individuals categorized as Muslims, based on generalized and erroneous beliefs (stereotypes) with regard to Muslims.**

Allport also emphasized that overgeneralization and judgment are the results of normal brain processes: “Why do human beings slip so easily into ethnic prejudice? They do so because the two essential ingredients [of prejudice] – *erroneous generalization* and *hostility* – are natural and common capacities of the human mind” (Allport, 1954, p. 17).¹⁹ Subsequent theoretical developments stemming from research on implicit cognition (Greenwald & Banaji’s, 1995) have refined this definition by including the implicit (unconscious) and explicit (conscious) nature of prejudice (Devine, 2001; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986).

Finally, we need to clarify the relationship between prejudice and **stigmatization**. According to Goffman, who first defined the concept, social stigmas are attributes that differ from normative expectations and that are used to discredit the individual who possesses them: “stigma is a special kind of relationship between attribute and stereotype”, where the attribute “that stigmatizes one type of possessor [...] is neither creditable nor discreditable as a thing in itself” (Goffman, 1963, pp. 3-4).²⁰ More precisely, **stigmatization occurs when differences are labelled and linked to stereotypes (undesirable characteristics relative to a norm), discrediting the people labelled and presenting them as distinct from the in-group, resulting in status-loss and discrimination** (based on Link & Phelan, 2001).

A huge amount of theoretical and empirical literature in the social sciences has focused on how and why prejudices are formed. It is assumed that, in its search for an “economy of

¹⁸ Scholars have also called attention to missing dimensions (like situational context), and to new directions for theoretical clarifications. See, for example: (Dovidio, Glick, & Rudman, 2005).

¹⁹ Italics in original text.

²⁰ For a discussion of the many definitions of social stigmas in the literature and the theoretical challenges to these definitions, see: (Link & Phelan, 2001).

thoughts” to apprehend the world, the human mind has a natural tendency to categorize objects (Allport, 1954, p. 109).

This process of categorization, when applied to human beings, is called “social categorization”, and leads to the construction of an in-group, i.e. a group to which an individual considers herself to belong, and out-groups, which are groups that the individual does not identify with. The social construction of an in-group is natural, and does not necessarily entail hostility towards an out-group. When hostility does arise, though, it can be a consequence of historical contingencies, but also an inherent feature of social categorization: “the mere perception of belonging to two distinct groups – that is, social categorization per se – is sufficient to trigger intergroup discrimination favouring the in-group” (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p. 38). This propensity to valorize the in-group over the out-group, which is called in-group favouritism and is driven by ethnocentrism, leads to prejudices that then aim to justify such favouritism. When the out-group is lower on the social hierarchy, it can be referred to as a “minority”.

Once formed, prejudice can lead to **discriminatory actions** against members of the out-group, which can be either individual behaviour or organizational processes that disadvantage out-group members. However, there is no inevitable transition from prejudice (attitudes and stereotypes held in people’s minds) to discriminatory actions (“acting-out prejudice”) (Allport, 1954, p. 14), and discriminatory actions are not necessarily driven by prejudice. In other words, prejudiced individuals may never discriminate against members of an out-group, while it is possible for unprejudiced individuals to discriminate against minority members (Merton, 1948). What is more, there can even be a discrepancy between support for the principles of equality and actual discriminatory actions (Quillian, 2006, p. 309). We could also add between these two stages (from prejudice to behaviour) the intention to discriminate. Several scholars have investigated the relationship between prejudice, intention to discriminate,²¹ and actual discriminatory behaviour (for a meta-analysis, see Schütz & Six, 1996).

Going beyond the intra-individual level concerned with the mental processes involved in social categorization and prejudice, scholars have developed the theoretical framework of

²¹ The question of responsibility and intentionality on the part of the person who discriminates is posed by Fiske in her “courtroom drama” metaphor (Fiske, 1989).

boundary-making to account for the way that groups define who they are and who they are not (i.e. how they make “boundaries”), and how these social differentiations manifest themselves in the unequal access to resources (Lamont & Molnár, 2002; Wimmer, 2013). Departing from the constructivist consensus that ethnicity is constructed and unstable across temporal periods and societies (Brubaker, 2009), this theory posits that “[s]ocial and symbolic boundaries emerge when actors distinguish between different ethnic categories and when they treat members of such categories differently” (Wimmer, 2013, p. 3). Here, an important distinction is made between symbolic and social boundaries: symbolic boundaries are conceptual differentiations between in-group and out-group based on principles of categorization defining social groups, while social boundaries are “objectified forms” of these differentiations that are manifested in unequal access to resources and opportunities among social categories (Lamont & Molnár, 2002, pp. 168-169).²² In this sense, Koenig rightly argues that discrimination and stigmatization are the boundaries as *experienced* by members of the categorized groups (Koenig, 2017). When the boundaries of a group are not easily crossed (i.e. when it is difficult or impossible for new individuals to be considered members of the group), then we talk of a high degree of social closure (Wimmer, 2008, p. 980).

The principles of categorization can vary from one society to the other, and they can also vary over time: some criteria (language, religion, phenotypical characteristics, etc.) can work as bright boundaries in some contexts, and have barely any relevance (i.e. can be blurred) in others (Alba, 2005). We talk of “categorical exclusion” when a person’s access to resources and opportunities²³ is reduced on account of her categorical belonging, this exclusion taking the form of discriminatory actions. To use Brubaker’s thought experiment, we can say that, when vertical categories (the rich and the poor, for example) and horizontal categories (the natives and the migrants, for example) are dependent in some way, then categorical differences have a bearing on inequality (Brubaker, 2015). For example, if “being Muslim” is

²² Wimmer distinguishes between a category (which is “imposed by outsiders”) and a group (which individuals identify themselves as belonging to), and observes that the former can evolve into the latter over time, when the category imposed is embraced by its members (referred to as groupness). In this sense, ethnicity can be both a category and a group (Wimmer, 2008, p. 980). As for the subject of this thesis, “Muslim” can also be both a category, imposed by majority members on individuals who would otherwise not define themselves as such, and a group, when individuals identify themselves as such.

²³ As Fibbi and colleagues highlight, since “discrimination often occurs in processes of allocation of goods and positions – such as housing or employment – discrimination is fundamentally a matter of access to opportunities, power, and resources” (Fibbi et al., 2021, p. 14).

a categorical difference in a society where religion functions as a bright boundary, then we would expect that discriminatory actions will reduce the access that Muslims have to resources such as the labour market or housing. In this sense, citizenship regimes, i.e. the criteria that a nation-state sets for an individual if she wishes to be admitted as a full member of the society (Helbling, 2008b), are one example of formal boundary-making strategies that vary greatly from one context to the other.

Hence, **discriminatory actions can be defined as behaviours or processes that create distinctions based on individual or group characteristics, correctly or incorrectly attributed, resulting in some form of exclusion of the individual or group of individuals targeted.**

These actions can take different forms. Various national and international bodies of research refer to discriminatory actions in a broader way, including: (a) explicit (or direct) behaviour such as verbal antagonism (from racist jokes to verbal abuse), avoidance, segregation (including any form of exclusion from resources or from access to institutions), physical attack, and extermination; (b) statistical discrimination (making a quick decision to disadvantage a minority member based on beliefs regarding this minority as a proxy for relevant data that are missing (Anderson, Fryer, & Holt, 2006; Phelps, 1972)), or profiling; (c) more subtle behaviour such as implicit (or indirect) actions, like blaming the minority for its disadvantaged position, or automatic behaviour that can be unconscious (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986); and, finally, (d) structural discrimination, which is the result of formal or informal institutional processes that “lead to differential racial treatment or produce differential racial outcomes” (National Research Council, 2004, p. 63).²⁴

Effects of and responses to discrimination: ethnic penalties, perception, and coping

Discrimination can have three types of effect: direct effects on life chances for minority members such as poorer outcomes in employment, health, housing, etc. (ethnic penalty); the perception of discrimination (when a person attributes a negative event to discrimination and not to her own performance); and the impact of the perceived discrimination on certain

²⁴ This typology of discriminatory actions is drawn from the report conducted by the National Research Council, *Measuring Racial Discrimination*. Very similar typologies are used by other national and international reports (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2017a; humanrights.ch & Federal Commission against Racism, 2022) as well as scientific studies (Allen, 2020; Pettigrew & Taylor, 2015).

outcomes. When perceiving discrimination, individuals can respond in different ways to cope with it. Here, we sketch the general theoretical framework for each of these aspects of discrimination, and focus on those that we will then investigate in the four empirical studies: namely, the possible *ethnic penalties* that Muslims face; their *perceived discrimination*, used as a dependent variable; their *reporting* of discrimination as one possible response to discrimination.

Starting with the direct effects on life chances, social scientists hypothesize that discrimination reduces life chances by producing (or, rather, helping to produce)²⁵ poorer outcomes in different life domains for minority members compared to members from the majority population. In fact, disparities between minority and majority groups (referred to as “race gap” or “racial discrepancy”) can be explained by factors unrelated to direct discrimination such as different socio-demographic features, human capital such as the level of education or language proficiency, or even contextual factors like the regional unemployment rate. In other words, the gross disadvantage faced by a minority group can be due to its lack of resources or to contingent factors. The remaining net disadvantage after accounting for these factors is termed an “**ethnic penalty**”, and is often used as a proxy for discrimination (Heath & Cheung, 2007).²⁶ Here, “[d]iscrimination is the causal effect of race on an outcome with other factors held constant” (Quillian, 2006, p. 302). In the case of Muslims, scholars speak of a “Muslim gap” and of a “Muslim penalty” (Connor & Koenig, 2015; Heath & Martin, 2013; Khattab & Modood, 2015).

We talk of “differential returns to human capital” when the link between level of human capital and outcome is different for ethnic minorities and the majority population, i.e. if there is an interaction between human capital and minority status (Heath & Cheung, 2007). For example, if Muslims are more likely to be unemployed when they are highly educated, while the relation is reversed for the majority population, then we could say that, all other variables being held constant, Muslims have a differential return on education.

²⁵ Studies usually try to capture the direct effect of discrimination, because “[d]iscrimination may occur at one stage in a process (e.g. the labour market) and contribute only a small amount to racial differences in immediate outcomes” (National Research Council, 2004, p. 245).

²⁶ For a critique of the unquestioned use of the net disadvantage as a proxy for discrimination, see (Koopmans, 2016). Koopman’s work will be discussed in section 1.2.

To test these hypotheses of ethnic penalties, researchers either analyze observational data and measure the difference in outcomes between minority and majority groups after controlling for other factors unrelated to ethnicity, or they carry out field experiments in which they use confederates²⁷ (audit test) or fictional candidates (correspondence test) with identical profiles except ethnic backgrounds in a job application, the difference in success rate (outcome) then being attributed to discrimination.

The domains most frequently investigated are labour markets, housing, credit, and consumer markets, and (more rarely) health.²⁸ Reviews of empirical research in these domains consistently point to racial disparities attributed to discrimination in all these domains (Pager & Shepherd, 2008; Riach & Rich, 2002).

Discrimination can go unnoticed, but it can also be perceived by the individuals targeted, which the literature usually refers to as “**perceived discrimination**”. Other authors use the term “perceived stigmatization” as a broader concept “that includes perceived misrecognition, prejudice, stereotyping, racism, discrimination, exclusion, etc.” (Lamont, Welburn, & Fleming, 2016). Here, we focus on perceived discrimination, i.e. a person’s perception that she has been treated unfairly because of her (supposed) group membership. As discussed in the section *Definitions of central concepts: prejudice, stigmatization, and discrimination*, discrimination can take various forms, from subtle behaviours to explicit discriminatory actions. We follow Trittler in his definition of perceived discrimination, since the definition “enables the grasping of a broad range of exclusionary behaviour, from verbal and physical attacks to subtler forms, such as disrespectful treatment, conversations on the street, unfriendly looks, and avoidance” (Trittler, 2019, p. 1133).

In accounting for the fundamental mechanisms that are at work in the perception of discrimination, attribution theory assumes that individuals explain events, and more specifically the behaviour of other individuals, causally. In other words, individuals try to make sense of events or behaviours by attributing understandable causes to them (Kelley, 1973). Crocker and colleagues (1998) first applied these principles to stigmatization, demonstrating

²⁷ “Confederates” are research actors that are trained to act as candidates or customers in real-life situations.

²⁸ Poorer health is usually linked to self-reported (perceived) discrimination, but some studies provide evidence of the role of discrimination in contributing to racial/ethnic disparities. See, for example: (Colen, Ramey, Cooksey, & Williams, 2018).

that stigmatized people may in fact attribute negative outcomes either to discrimination or to personal failures. This two-option explanation is called “ambiguous attribution”: “Negative outcomes from others could be due to one’s lack of merit, inferior qualifications, poor performance, or other shortcomings. Alternatively, they could be due to prejudice and discrimination based on one’s devalued social identity” (Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998, pp. 519-520). In short, a person’s attribution of a negative event or encounter to prejudice aims to explain it as being the result of a bias against her social category (Schmitt, Branscombe, Postmes, & Garcia, 2014). This understanding of perceived discrimination corresponds to what authors term “perceived *individual* discrimination”, which focuses on personal experiences, as distinct from “perceived group discrimination”, which focuses on the way that people perceive how members of their group are treated (Bourguignon, Seron, Yzerbyt, & Herman, 2006; Taylor, Wright, Moghaddam, & Lalonde, 1990).

The literature discusses the link between actual and perceived discrimination, and the extent to which they overlap. It is now widely agreed that perceived discrimination cannot be used as a direct indicator of actual discrimination (Diehl & Liebau, 2017; Diehl, Liebau, & Mühlau, 2021; Jean S. Phinney, Madden, & Santos, 1998). In fact, perceived discrimination can stem from actual discrimination, but it may also be that actual discrimination goes unnoticed; conversely, an individual or a group may attribute a negative event to discrimination when in fact there was no discrimination present. In short, an individual can correctly attribute a negative outcome to discrimination, but can also exaggerate or underestimate discrimination because of inference difficulties (Crocker et al., 1998, p. 517).

However, there may be factors that influence the perception of discrimination, factors that have recently caught the attention of social scientists. For one thing, minority members with low socio-economic statuses (SESs) could be more likely to perceive themselves as being the objects of discrimination, either because they actually face more discrimination than others in a better position, or because they compare themselves to individuals with higher SESs who fare better (Olson, Herman, & Zanna, 1986; Smith, Pettigrew, Pippin, & Bialosiewicz, 2012). For another, recent empirical research suggests that, on the contrary, higher educated minority members tend to perceive more discrimination than their less educated counterparts (Diehl et al., 2021; Steinmann, 2019; Verkuyten, 2016). This puzzling

phenomenon, called the “paradox of integration”,²⁹ may be explained by pointing to two main mechanisms: first, individuals who are more integrated³⁰ are more *exposed* to discrimination since they have more contact with the majority population; second, individuals who are more integrated *attribute* negative outcomes to discrimination more easily because they engage in intergroup comparison with the majority members, or because they have higher expectations, or because they are more aware of processes of inequality (Verkuyten, 2016).

Finally, the perception of discrimination (rightly or wrongly attributed) can impact health, well-being, and performance. Empirical studies using perceived discrimination as an independent variable repeatedly point to a link between perceived discrimination and poorer mental health/well-being, measured mainly through indicators of stress, anxiety, and depression, and also physical health such as blood pressure, cardiovascular effects, and general self-reported health status (for reviews of empirical research, see for example Krieger, 1999; Schmitt et al., 2014; Williams, Neighbors, & Jackson, 2008; Williams & Williams-Morris, 2000). These results provide empirical evidence to support social-stress theory, which “argues that certain groups within society are in a disadvantaged social position, which leads to an increased exposure to social sources of stress and less resources with which to cope with stress” (Paradies et al., 2015). As for performance, it has also been shown that the perception of prejudice among members of stigmatized groups has a negative effect on educational and neuropsychological performance (Steele, 1997; Steele & Aronson, 1995; Thames et al., 2013). These results confirm stereotype-threat theory, which argues that individuals from stigmatized groups underperform “when they become hyper-aware that their performance could confirm the very stereotype that they wish to avoid” (Thames et al., 2013, p. 584).

²⁹ To be more precise, the paradox of integration implies that the more integrated (highly educated, for example) immigrants become, the less emotionally oriented they are towards the host society (having positive attitudes towards or identifying with it) (Verkuyten, 2016). A current of research has expanded the contours of this paradox by including within it perceived discrimination (Diehl et al., 2021; Steinmann, 2019).

³⁰ Integration can be understood both in social and structural terms: social integration refers to contacts with the majority population, operationalized as the frequency of inter-ethnic relationships, and structural integration encompasses all forms of socio-economic participation in the host society, such as being on the labour market or having a high level of education (Diehl et al., 2021).

When discrimination is perceived, the individuals targeted can **respond to it** either voluntarily or involuntarily; when voluntary, the response can be engaging or disengaging.³¹ One convincing theory with regard to how people respond to discrimination stems from the literature on coping strategies, which defines coping as “constantly changing cognitive and behavioural efforts to manage specific external and/or internal demands that are appraised as taxing or exceeding the resources of the person”, these efforts being distinct from involuntary or automatized adaptive behaviour such as physiological or emotional arousal (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984, p. 141). These “demands” are stressors, and scholars have established that stigmatization and discrimination constitute such stressors (see Miller & Kaiser, 2001, for a review).

Miller and Kaiser (2001) have used this model to develop a twofold typology of coping strategies. First, engagement coping includes strategies that a person uses to confront the stressor, i.e. discrimination and/or its perpetrators. This confrontation can take a collective form (seeking intragroup support) or an individual form (such as reporting discrimination to a body that specializes in such matters, or taking the offender to court). Rejection-identification theory has identified ethnic-identification as one important group-based coping strategy. The theory argues that “the generally negative consequences of perceiving oneself as a victim of racial prejudice can be somewhat alleviated by identification with the minority group”, and that this identification “may be the best possible strategy for feeling accepted and enhancing psychological well-being” (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Harvey, 1999, p. 137). While the direction of the relationship between identification and discrimination is often discussed, statistical tests on longitudinal data point to discrimination as a “trigger” for strengthening ethnic identification and for engaging in activism (Cronin, Levin, Branscombe, van Laar, & Tropp, 2012; Schmitt et al., 2014).³²

³¹ Koenig (2017) suggests a somewhat different classification of the strategies used to deal with discrimination (strategies that he calls “micropolitics of recognition”), this classification being based on Hirschman’s theorizing of how people deal with short-term organizational decline. Hirschman (1970) distinguishes between “exit” options, which consist of turning to the competition and leaving the dysfunctional institution, and “voicing”, which consists of complaining to the institution to seek improvement. Drawing on this distinction, Koenig suggests that, when individuals who perceive discrimination isolate themselves from the majority population instead of seeking to gain respect from it, then this corresponds to an “exit” option, while those who confront the discrimination in order to gain recognition are choosing a “voice” option.

³² Portes and Rumbaut had already described this process in their study of second-generation immigrants in the United States and their experience of discriminatory policies. They coined the term “reactive ethnicity” to

As for individual responses, some scholars identify all sorts of costs that are important when it comes to understanding why individuals choose to respond to discrimination or not. Mainly working within the framework of the *homo oeconomicus* model, these scholars conceive of the stigmatized person as a rational and calculating individual who weighs up the best option for coping with a stressful situation. In fact, as the *homo oeconomicus* model claims, an individual's perception of discrimination makes them feel dissatisfied, a feeling that they will then seek to reduce by choosing to complain if the benefits of complaining seem to outweigh the costs (Feagin & Sikes, 1994; Kaiser & Miller, 2001; Kowalski, 1996; Lindenberg, 1990).³³

Other authors suggest moving beyond a micro-level study of the experience of discrimination, and taking into account meso- or macro-level factors: for example, “[c]onsidering repertoires is an essential macro complement to the generally more micro approaches to resilience and responses to stigma. It shifts the focus on social resilience conceived as a feature of groups, as opposed to a feature of individuals” (Lamont et al., 2016, p. 130). In fact, cultural and institutional factors also play a role in the choice of a mode of response to discrimination (Koenig, 2017): the cultural repertoires available will enable individuals to draw on specific strategies to formulate their responses; variation in how boundaries are made salient between groups will also make some responses more or less likely (Lamont et al., 2016); and access to resources such as organizational capacities, legal provisions and information will also determine the strategies that stigmatized individuals will favour (Edwards & McCarthy, 2004; Witte, 2018).

Second, disengagement coping includes strategies that enable a person to avoid situations in which discrimination can occur, be it physical, cognitive, or social avoidance, as well as strategies that enable the person to minimize or ignore discrimination. Goffman describes such strategies in his well-known work on stigma, saying that stigmatized individuals have different possibilities to manage social stigma during “mixed contacts”, i.e. encounters between stigmatized people and so-called “normals”,³⁴ and that there is a continuum

describe how “direct experience of discrimination triggers a reaction away from things American and toward reinforcement of the original immigrant identities” (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001, p. 187). They also explain how such experience can lead to political mobilization and in-group solidarities.

³³ The fourth chapter of this thesis (Lindemann & Stolz, 2022) draws on another theory to account for underreporting among minority groups: namely, choice-environment theory.

³⁴ “Normals” are individuals whose social identity coincides with socially established norms. Nowadays, we would probably prefer the term “members of the majority society”.

between complete secrecy and complete information on stigma. Between the two extremes, individuals can resort either to *passing* strategies by keeping the stigma unnoticed when it is invisible or unknown (discreditable), or *covering* strategies by making it less apparent or less disturbing for the normals when it is already known (discredited). Finally, withdrawing to back places can be a way for a person to avoid discrimination physically. Indeed, Goffman claims that three kinds of places divide up the social world for stigmatized individuals, each of which is marked by a certain degree of accessibility: forbidden places are simply closed to stigmatized individuals; civil places are accessible, but the stigmatized individuals are in fact disqualified from entering them freely; and back places are accessible, with the individual not needing to make any effort to pass or cover (Goffman, 1963).

Discrimination against Muslims: racism and Islamophobia

The concepts already defined would suffice to understand the four studies that follow, but the relevant literature investigating discrimination against Muslims often draws on two other terms: Islamophobia and racism. Therefore, we must clarify our understanding of the relationship between prejudice, discrimination, and these two terms. In addition, how discrimination against people categorized as Muslims is characterized plays a role because it has legal implications under anti-discrimination law: if such discrimination is characterized as *racial* discrimination, then it is punishable by law. It is also important for methodological reasons, since the data that are used in the studies come from databases monitoring *racist* incidents. The concepts of Islamophobia and racism have become the object of debate within academic and political circles, these circles having increased their interest in these questions in recent years.

In this section, we argue that (1) discrimination against Muslims should be regarded as the behavioural *manifestation of Islamophobia*, and that (2) Islamophobia should be conceived as a form of *racism*. The reasons for the first argument lie in the definition of Islamophobia, and more precisely in the components that are included in the definition, while the reasons for the second argument are to be found in the definition of the targets of Islamophobia.

To understand the emergence of this field of study and the debates within it, we should keep in mind three important turning points: the publication of Edward Said's seminal book

Orientalism in 1978; the publication of the first Runnymede Trust report *Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All* in 1997; and the 9/11 terrorist attack of 2001, together with subsequent terrorist attacks.

Said's work was probably the first attempt to account for the negative representations of Muslims and Islam in the West, an attempt that was part of a broader analysis of Orientalism as a "system of thought about the Orient" produced by a hegemonic Occident.³⁵ Said points in his analyses to how the work of different European writers essentialized Islam and Muslims, thereby shaping and supporting Western hegemonic projects. He also points out that the Islamic East has been depicted as dangerous and threatening since the 1950s, a depiction that fuels anti-Arab and anti-Muslim prejudice, which is reflected in the development of Orientalism (Said, 1978, p. 26; 1981). *Orientalism* had an international impact and is widely considered to be the foundation of postcolonial studies.³⁶

Twenty years later, the Runnymede Trust, a British non-governmental think tank dedicated to questions of race equality, published a well-known report entitled *Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All*, which aimed to deal with "the dislike [of Muslims that] has become more explicit, more extreme and more dangerous", and is expressed in hostile political rhetoric, media discourses, and the discrimination faced by Muslim communities in Great Britain (The Runnymede Trust, 1997, p. 1). Although the term "Islamophobia" had already existed before 1997,³⁷ the report was not only the first attempt to define the phenomenon, but also the starting point for a field of study that took as its research object hostility towards Muslims.

The report also shows that Muslims and Islam had already been problematized before 9/11,³⁸ and especially so through the lens of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, the 1988 Salman Rushdie affair, and the 1996 suicide bombings in Jerusalem (Helbling, 2012, p. 3). What is more, 9/11

³⁵ Said's work understands the Orient and the Occident, the East and the West, as being constructions produced by literature, the academic world, and the colonialist enterprise.

³⁶ For a criticism of this widespread understanding of the role of Said's work in postcolonial theories, see: (Young, 2012).

³⁷ The term had already been used in Muslim communities to describe their experiences of discrimination in the United Kingdom (The Runnymede Trust, 1997, p. iii). It has been shown that the term first appeared in French in 1918 (Helbling, 2017, p. 4).

³⁸ The publication of *The Clash of Civilizations* in 1996 is a good example of such a problematization, Huntington claiming that "Islam" and "the West" are culturally incompatible and in conflict (Huntington, 1996).

happens to have had no lasting effects on people's attitudes towards Islam/Muslims (for an overview, see Helbling, 2012, p. 13). However, we should not minimize one impact that it undoubtedly had: namely, it dramatically increased the frequency with which Muslims reported implicit and explicit discrimination (such as hate crimes) (Allen & Nielsen, 2002; Kishi, 2017; Sheridan, 2006).

This historical background gave rise to a new field of research in the social sciences, one that investigates the hostility faced by Muslims/Islam, with the difficult question of how to define this social phenomenon becoming the subject of intense debate. While the term "Islamophobia" has now become common, the Runnymede Trust's first attempt at definition did not result in academic consensus. The report defined Islamophobia as an "unfounded hostility towards Islam", and more precisely as "a dread or hatred of Islam" or "fear or dislike of all or most Muslims" (The Runnymede Trust, 1997, pp. 4, 1). The report gave much consideration to distinguishing between closed and open views of Islam, and between legitimate criticisms and unfounded prejudice with regard to the religion.³⁹

Bleich considers this first attempt at a definition of "Islamophobia" to be "relatively specific and well-developed" compared to other later attempts, but he proposes an alternative definition that draws on research on prejudice: according to him, Islamophobia consists of "*indiscriminate negative attitudes or emotions directed at Islam or Muslims*" (Bleich, 2011, p. 1585).⁴⁰ Other scholars have widened the definition by including behavioural expressions of negative attitudes. For example, Stolz defines Islamophobia as "a rejection of Islam, Muslim groups or Muslim individuals on the basis of prejudice and stereotypes. It may have emotional, cognitive, evaluative as well as action-oriented elements (e.g. discrimination, violence)" (2005, p. 2). The Runnymede Trust itself broadened its definition in its 2017 anniversary report by including the forms that discriminatory actions can take: "Islamophobia is any distinction, exclusion or restriction towards, or preference against, Muslims (or those perceived to be Muslims) that has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the

³⁹ These cautious distinctions were made in anticipation of objections to the term "Islamophobia" on the grounds that it is a dangerous instrument that would make it impossible to criticize anti-democratic Islamic practices or principles, and that would restrain the right to free speech. These questions are still raging in the political and academic fields, especially around the accusation of "Islamism" in the French context (Fassin, 2021).

⁴⁰ In italics in the original text.

recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of public life” (The Runnymede Trust, 2017, p. 7). Other scholars use the term “Muslimophobia” (Modood, 2015) or suggest replacing the term with “anti-Muslimism”, because the target is presumably not Islam (faith) but Muslims (individuals),⁴¹ and because the term “Islamophobia” conveys an essentializing idea that there is one Islam and one monolithic community of Muslims (Halliday, 1999).

As we can see, the variations in the definitions mainly concern what dimensions of discrimination should be included in the definition (prejudice, attitudes and affects, and/or behaviour, and/or consequences for the stigmatized individuals), and the nature of the target (Islam and/or Muslims). We cannot propose a new definition or a new term here, and we continue with the term “Islamophobia”, since, as Helbling argues, “it has already taken root in public, political and academic discourses. Ignoring a widely used term would only cause confusion, after all. [...] instead of abolishing a widely used term, supplying a definition upfront – one that makes clear what we are measuring from the beginning – is much more fruitful” (Helbling, 2017, p. 6).⁴² We therefore favour one definition based on its usefulness to our research object and its appropriacy regarding the theoretical framework in which it is embedded. As other authors have already pointed out, discriminatory actions are not always caused by prejudice, and prejudice does not always lead to discrimination or even to the intention to discriminate (Allport, 1954, p. 14; Merton, 1948). This makes it difficult to account for the role of Islamophobia in discriminatory actions and their effects on the individuals targeted.

⁴¹ However, empirical psychometric analyses have shown a strong correlation between negative attitudes towards Islam and negative attitudes toward its followers. See, for example: (Lee, Gibbons, Thompson, & Timani, 2009).

⁴² The Runnymede Trust reports of 1999 and 2017 also argue along these lines. The first publication explained the need for a word “because there is a new reality which needs naming: anti-Muslim prejudice has grown so considerably and so rapidly in recent years that a new item in the vocabulary is needed so that it can be identified and acted against” (The Runnymede Trust, 1997, p. 4). The 2017 report, for its part, expresses a somewhat exasperated response to its opponents: “Social phenomena are often defined by terms that don’t precisely correspond to those phenomena in a literal, dictionary way. Just as criticisms of ‘antisemitism’ that argue ‘Arabs are Semites too’ are pedantic distractions, so too many criticisms of Islamophobia suffer from bad-faith literalism” (The Runnymede Trust, 2017, p. 7).

For these reasons, it is the definition provided by Bleich, one that focuses on prejudice (attitudes and affects), that is the most adequate and cautious: **Islamophobia is “indiscriminate negative attitudes or emotions directed at Islam or Muslims”** (Bleich, 2011, p. 1585).⁴³ This definition sees Islamophobia as being distinct from differentiated attitudes towards the object (legitimate criticisms vs. indiscriminate attitudes), and is measurable in terms of attitudes and affects with regard either to the out-group or the religion, excluding actions that would be a behavioural manifestation of these attitudes. Hence, we conceive of **discrimination against Muslims as one possible manifestation of Islamophobia, and by this we mean that prejudice against Muslims, including stereotypes and negative attitudes, can be “acted out” in discriminatory behaviour.** As our readers will notice, the four chapters very rarely use the terms “Islamophobia/Islamophobic”, since we focus on discrimination against Muslims and avoid making statements on the prejudice that might have caused it. To take an example, it could be that unprejudiced employers discriminate against Muslims not because they are prejudiced against Muslims or Islam, but because they anticipate customers’ Islamophobia (Fernández-Reino, Di Stasio, & Veit, 2022, p. 4).

Another important question concerns the nature of the targets of Islamophobia, i.e. whether Islamophobia is a unique form of hostility, a form of racism, or a form of xenophobia. In fact, Muslims can be discriminated against because they are perceived as foreign and mostly from Arabic countries (xenophobia), or because they are seen as intrinsically different and inferior, culturally more than genetically (modern racism). Since ethnic origins, religious belonging, and migratory backgrounds sometimes overlap, both sociologically or in social representations, the trigger for discrimination is unclear, and disentangling these dimensions empirically has proven very difficult. This overlapping of different minority characteristics also calls for an intersectional approach to the phenomenon of discrimination against Muslims. Indeed, it is extremely difficult to differentiate the motives behind discrimination against Muslims (ethnicity, race, skin colour, religion) (Amiriaux, 2004), and especially so when it comes to women who wear the *hijab*, since gender-based and religion-based discrimination intersect (Amiriaux, 2007, p. 137). In other words, the discrimination that such women experience is at the intersection of systems of oppression (Crenshaw, 1989) with regard to ethnic minorities, religious groups, and women (Halrynjo & Jonker, 2015; Hopkins, 2016).

⁴³ In italics in the original text.

Nevertheless, as we shall see, the answer to the question of whom Islamophobia is targeted at is relevant theoretically, methodologically, and in terms of policy-making.

Scholars have carried out empirical studies to discover whether Islamophobia is one aspect of a broader phenomenon that includes other forms of hostility such as racism, xenophobia, and anti-Semitism, most results suggesting that it is. On the one hand, empirical studies reveal strong correlations between indicators used to grasp Islamophobia (anti-Arab, anti-Muslim, and anti-Islam attitudes), and indicators used to measure anti-Semitism and modern racism (Echebarria-Echabe & Fernández Guede, 2007; Lee et al., 2009). On the other, xenophobic and Islamophobic attitudes, along with the factors that influence how intense they are, cannot be differentiated (Helbling, 2008a; Stolz, 2005), meaning that Islamophobia and xenophobia are part of the same phenomenon.

Scholars suggest that this phenomenon is racism. For example, Allen claims that Islamophobia is a racist phenomenon that contains the three major components of racism: a political programme or ideology, interdependent with that of nationalism; prejudices, opinions, and attitudes; and exclusionary practices as a consequence of these prejudices (Allen, 2010, p. 160). Carr agrees with this claim, stressing that the construction of the targets has a core element: it is made through a process of racialization, which he defines as “processes of signification where meaning is attached to ‘markers’ of the ‘self’ (ingroup) or the ‘other’ (outgroup),⁴⁴ defining who belongs and who does not” (Carr, 2016, pp. 36-37). Interestingly, Allen and Carr both draw on the conceptualization of racism provided by Miles and Brown (Miles & Brown, 2003), although the latter do not consider Islamophobia to be a form of racism: “However, like other religious Others, the alleged distinctiveness of the Muslim is not usually regarded as biological or somatic, so Islamophobia is not to be regarded as an instance of racism. However, it does interact with racism” (Miles & Brown, 2003, p. 164). Carr addresses this point, arguing convincingly instead that racism should not be restricted to phenotypical differences, and that cultural or religious markers can serve as a “proxy for ‘race’” and as symbols of essentialized otherness (Carr, 2016, p. 38). This argument echoes theories of modern racism and “racism without race” (Quillian, 2006; Semati, 2010).

⁴⁴ Terms in brackets have been added.

Hence, we conceive of **Islamophobia as a form of racism in its modern understanding (not restricted to phenotypes like traditional racism), because the targets (Muslims) are made Others through a process of racialization**. This definition also has the merit of being “attuned to already existing definitions from research in the field of racism, stereotypes and prejudice, in order to enable comparison between Islamophobia and other out-group phobias” (Stolz, 2005, p. 548).

Conceptualizing Islamophobia as a form of racism is also relevant in terms of policy and methodology, since discrimination against Muslims is treated by national and international equality bodies as racial discrimination that violates anti-racism laws. For example, the Runnymede Trust has always treated Islamophobia within the framework of race equality: thus, it defines itself as an “independent race equality think tank”;⁴⁵ the booklet preceding the 1997 report, “Islamophobia: Its Features and Dangers”, was sent to race equality councils and race equality officers in public bodies in Great Britain (The Runnymede Trust, 2017, p. 83); it framed discrimination against Muslims as “racial discrimination/violence”; and it formulated recommendations to address Islamophobia as part of the wider objective of eliminating racial discrimination.⁴⁶ Treating Islamophobia and its manifestations as racial discrimination is now widespread in national and international reports on racism. For example, at a national level, the French “Rapport sur la lutte contre le racisme, l’antisémitisme et la xénophobie” draws on data from monitoring systems that gather reports of racist incidents, with a special category for anti-Muslim incidents (Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l’Homme, 2021, pp. 13, 73-81). At the European level, the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia issued a specific report on

⁴⁵ <https://www.runnymedetrust.org/> (accessed 17 April 2022).

⁴⁶ Recommendations 56 and 57, for example, enjoin race equality organizations and monitoring groups to “[a]ddress Islamophobia in their programmes of action” and to “[r]eview the definitions of ‘racial harassment’ used in their policy documentation, and ensure that there is an explicit reference to religion” (The Runnymede Trust, 1997, p. 64). The report also refers to a British government’s submission to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD). The ICERD does not explicitly apply to religious groups *per se*, however, since its definition of racial discrimination only includes “race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin” as possible grounds for discrimination (ICERD, art. 1.1) <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-convention-elimination-all-forms-racial> (accessed 17 April 2022). This definition of racial discrimination poses several difficulties when it comes to discrimination against Muslims and Muslim communities, especially regarding the distinction between ethnic origin and religious affiliation. For a legal discussion, see, for example: (Berry, 2011).

“discrimination and Islamophobia”, this report also drawing on data from systems monitoring racist incidents (European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, 2006).

This is the stance that is also adopted in Switzerland. State-funded anti-racism bodies support the victims of “racist incidents” and refer to incidents targeting Muslims in their annual analyses as “Islamophobic incidents” (humanrights.ch & Federal Commission against Racism, 2020).⁴⁷ Such bodies also owe their existence to the anti-racism provision contained in article 261bis of the Swiss Criminal Code (art. 261bis CP), which itself exists because Switzerland signed the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) in 1994 (for more on this matter, see section 1.3). Hence, this framing of Islamophobia in terms of racism not only permits Muslim victims of discrimination to seek support as victims of racial discrimination, but also to defend themselves as such legally. Moreover, this racial equality field provides data on Islamophobic incidents, in the form either of self-reported cases to anti-racism bodies, or of legal procedures under art. 261bis CP.

1.2 Effects of and responses to discrimination among Muslims: Previous empirical research

Here, we review and organize the empirical literature on discrimination against Muslims by outlining the three aspects of discrimination under scrutiny in this thesis: namely, ethnic penalties, perceived discrimination, and responses to experienced discrimination. Results of previous research that concern the gender side of Islamophobia are treated in all three aspects of discrimination in a dedicated part. The results of our studies will be discussed in the light of this empirical literature in the conclusion (section 7).

The Muslim penalty in the West

Building on the well-established empirical literature on ethnic penalties for migrants and second-generation people in terms of their socio-economic achievements in Europe (for a review, see Heath, Rethon, & Kilpi, 2008), sociologists have recently identified and explained a specific “Muslim penalty”. Their hypothesis is that, given the rise of Islamophobia over the

⁴⁷ To be more precise, we should note that the annual reports of this network of bodies included “Islamophobia” in their analyses of racist incidents reported to them in 2010, before changing the term to “hostility towards Muslim individuals” in 2014.

last two decades, belonging to Islam may also account for some of the ethnic penalties observed on the labour market. In other words, Muslims, regardless of their ethnicity and social background or human capital, may be more penalized than non-Muslims.

National studies⁴⁸ carried out to test this hypothesis provide consistent evidence of a Muslim penalty. For example, Lindley (2002) compared the rate of employment and level of earnings of six ethnic minorities in Great Britain comprising Muslim individuals, controlling for other characteristics that might explain the gaps between minority and majority members. By driving the analyses separately, she managed to disentangle ethnicity from religious affiliation. She found evidence of a substantial disadvantage for Muslims, since only half of the gap can be explained by poorer socio-economic characteristics. Nevertheless, there are also variations between groups: Pakistani Muslim men are more likely to be unemployed than Muslims from other groups. Since the data were gathered in 1994, these results show that there was a Muslim penalty before the rise of post-9/11 Islamophobia. Heath and Martin (2013), as well as Khattab and Modood (2015), have used more recent data (from 2001 and later) to analyze outcomes for different ethno-religious groups on the labour market, and come to similar findings: they observe a consistent pattern for Muslims, who face significantly more penalties in entering the labour market than their co-ethnics who belong to other religions but have similar qualifications. They also show that processes of racialization worsen the situation, with black Muslims facing the most severe penalties (Khattab & Modood, 2015), although religion appears to have a greater impact than skin colour (Khattab, 2009).

More rare but not less telling are correspondence tests, which provide insightful findings on opportunities for Muslims on the labour market compared to their Christian counterparts: in France, a Muslim candidate from the second generation needs to send 2.5 times more applications to obtain a job interview than a Christian candidate with identical qualifications and migratory background. This, according to the authors, would explain the net income gap observed in population survey data between Muslim and Christian households from the second generation (Adida et al., 2010). It seems, however, that the religiosity of Muslims can work as a moderator: immigrant Muslim candidates that are ostensibly not religious are as

⁴⁸ Such national studies have been carried out especially in the British context, probably because census data capturing religious affiliation are available, and because there are a large number of ethnic communities.

likely as their Christian co-ethnics to be invited to a job interview, but as soon as they stress their religiosity, they become 2.5 times less likely to be called back than their religious Christian counterparts. The penalty is especially strong for male applicants, since religious Muslim men must apply four times more often to be invited to an interview than religious Christian men from the same country of origin (Valfort, 2018). Other researchers have tried to disentangle the ethnic from the religious grounds when it comes to discrimination in hiring practices in five European countries (Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and the UK). On the one hand, with the exception of Spain, Muslims “by default”, i.e. candidates from Muslim majority countries who do not disclose their proximity to Islam, are significantly less likely to be invited to an interview than majority members; on the other, Muslims who do disclose their proximity to Islam are even more strongly disadvantaged, and especially so in Norway, where the state does not accommodate for minority religions (Di Stasio et al., 2021). Their results are very similar to what Pierné (2013), using a similar methodology, finds for France.

Connor and Koenig’s study (2015), which pooled together 17 countries, aimed to identify whether first- and second-generation Muslims face barriers when entering the labour market in Western Europe in general. Again, after controlling for relevant factors that might explain the gap, the authors used the remaining part of unexplained variance in the rate of unemployment among Muslims and non-Muslims as a proxy for ethno-religious penalties on the European labour market. When only controlling for basic socio-demographic variables such as sex, age, and marital status, they found that the likelihood of employment is dramatically lower both for first- and second-generation Muslims than it is for non-Muslims. This gap is reduced when human capital and self-perceived discrimination are taken into account, but a substantial amount of unexplained variance remains, especially for second-generation Muslims. The authors interpret these results as providing some evidence of the tangible effects of bright symbolic boundaries against Islam in the context of a secularized Europe, but they are careful to avoid labelling this as direct discrimination.

Such caution is also called for by authors who suggest that Muslims fare less well than non-

Muslims due not only to demand-side, but also to supply-side, mechanisms.⁴⁹ First, socio-cultural factors such as interethnic social ties and gender values might be another unexplored source of the unexplained group differences. In fact, these scholars hypothesize that Muslims who do not “culturally assimilate” by limiting their contact with the majority population and rejecting liberal gender values will underperform on the labour market because they lack “bridging” social capital: through interethnic ties, “one diversifies the social network, resulting in more opportunities”, and one can access “a resource-rich network of those in control of the labour market” (Lancee, 2012, p. 66). Following this line of research, Koopmans (2016) finds, for example, that taking into account social ties to the majority and to gender values strongly reduces the gap between Muslims and non-Muslims, and between first- and second-generation Muslims. In other words, Muslims who achieve socio-cultural assimilation through contacts with majority members, language proficiency, and liberal gender values, are almost as likely to be employed and active on the labour market as their non-Muslim counterparts.⁵⁰ Kanas & Müller (2021) challenge these results, however, arguing that, if socio-cultural factors account for the lower participation of immigrant women in the European labour force, then one exception is precisely Muslim women. In their case, the negative impact of affiliation to Islam on their position on the labour market persists even after controlling for religiosity and gender-role attitudes. Interestingly, a study carried out in Germany indicates that second-generation Muslim adolescents still face barriers in their transition to work (measured by their success in finding an apprenticeship after lower secondary education), but that the gap widens for those who display their religiosity publicly, while not being affected by private religiosity (Roth, 2020).

Second, besides socio-cultural factors, the strategies that people use to find a job might also influence the impact that discrimination in hiring has on ethnic penalty. In other words, two

⁴⁹ This literature distinguishes between demand-side mechanisms, namely the hiring behaviour of employers who are looking for new employees, and supply-side mechanisms, mainly the strategies that candidates use to search for a job.

⁵⁰ An important loophole in this study resides in the data used by Koopmans. The EURISLAM dataset contains only non-national Muslims from a limited set of origins and with foreign-sounding names: excluded from the sample are Muslims who are naturalized, nationals who have converted to Islam, Muslims with a name from the host society, and Muslims from many countries. Also, the category of “Muslim” is problematic since it is based on a sociological definition rather than a self-declaration: individuals with “a Muslim background” are categorized as Muslims, even if they do not identify with Islam. All these sampling criteria might introduce important biases in the results. For a detailed description of the sampling procedures of EURISLAM, see: <https://easy.dans.knaw.nl/ui/datasets/id/easy-dataset:62447> (accessed 31 August 2022).

ethnic groups might be equally discriminated against by employers but, because they use different strategies to counter discrimination, they display different overall ethnic gaps with regard to the majority population. Although they identify the existence of a consistent Muslim penalty in employment outcomes, Heath and Martin (Heath & Martin, 2013) draw attention to the fact that we cannot rule out the possibility that a so-called “chill factor” exists, i.e. stigmatized individuals avoid applying for certain jobs because they anticipate discrimination. Although it does not focus on Muslims, an interesting study carried out by Zwysen and colleagues (2021) tries to estimate the role that behaviour with regard to looking for a job plays when it comes to the ethnic gap. Focusing on different minorities in the United Kingdom, they compare the level of discrimination in hiring as captured through field experiments on the one hand, and ethnic penalties measured through observational data from population surveys on the other. What they find is that groups facing a high level of discrimination in hiring (measured in field experiments) also experience significant employment gaps (measured in observational data), but that the extent to which the two are congruent varies from group to group: for example, while Indian and Chinese people do face high levels of employer discrimination, their ethnic penalty is not as high as expected, the authors hypothesizing that this could be due to the fact that these groups employ more efficient strategies when looking for a job, such as having access to more resourceful social networks or becoming self-employed.

To sum up, various studies provide evidence of a consistent Muslim penalty on the labour market in Europe, which gives support to the boundary-making theory: in a secularized context that privileges Christianity, Muslims face bright boundaries resulting in categorical exclusion from the labour market. Some studies have recently tried to test alternative explanations of this ethno-religious penalty (supply-side mechanisms). Their results are mixed or do not concern Muslims in particular. Thus, Heath and Martin were right to call for further investigation of these alternative explanations: “It may be wise, therefore, to consider additional mechanisms such as those to do with the ‘chill factor’ or with social networks and access to bridging social capital” (Heath & Martin, 2013, p. 1026). Also, these studies, making the theoretical assumption that more human capital leads to better socio-economic outcomes, always use human capital as a mediating variable. This is what the first study in this thesis sets out to challenge.

Perceived discrimination among Muslims

A report reveals that Muslims perceive very high levels of discrimination in Europe compared to other religious minorities: four out of ten Muslims felt that they had been discriminated against in the previous five years, and this five times a year on average (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2017b). Research in the social sciences has recently investigated how this perception affects the lives of Muslims and the factors that influence this perception.

The first body of research uses perceived discrimination as an independent variable to identify and measure its effects on outcome variables. Studies have, for example, analyzed the role of perceived discrimination in predicting psychological well-being among Muslims. While an increase in exposure to perceived discrimination is associated with a deterioration in mental health among Muslims (Ghaffari & Çiftçi, 2010; Jasperse et al., 2012; Padela & Heisler, 2010) and life satisfaction (Arat & Bilgili, 2021), and in turn provokes increased vigilance and subclinical paranoia (Rippy & Newman, 2006), it seems that the behavioural component of Muslim identity (Islamic practices and wearing the *hijab*) and intra-ethnic social ties lessen the impact of perceived discrimination on well-being (Arat & Bilgili, 2021; Jasperse et al., 2012). These results are in line with what research has already documented in the case of other minorities with regard to the relation between perceived discrimination and well-being, and the moderating role of ethno-religious identification (Branscombe et al., 1999; Tummala-Narra & Claudius, 2013).

Other studies use perceived discrimination as a predictor of social integration: for example, perceived discrimination is negatively associated with social integration (operationalized as the intention to mix with the majority group) among young Muslims, but the feeling that their Muslim and host-society identities are compatible suppresses this association (Saleem et al., 2018). Finally, it has been demonstrated that, under specific conditions, the perception of discrimination is associated with more pronounced religiosity and religious identification (Ghaffari & Çiftçi, 2010), especially for Muslims from established immigrant groups (Maliepaard, Gijssberts, & Phalet, 2015), without there being certainty as to the direction of the relationship.

Qualitative research also demonstrates the psychological and social consequences of

experiencing discrimination, be it explicit or subtle.⁵¹ Blackwood and colleagues (2015) show through interviews and focus groups how their experience of stigmatization by authorities in a public space (an airport) leads Muslims to adopt strategies whereby they can avoid unpleasant encounters, and how these strategies impede citizenship behaviours. For example, respondents report that, in trying to avoid the suspicious scrutiny of authorities, they are forced to act in such a way that they can avoid interaction – thus, they refrain from smiling or from offering their help to others. The same authors also highlight how the fact that Muslims feel that their identities are devalued and that they are not recognized as full citizens, be it in everyday interactions (Hopkins & Blackwood, 2011) or in specific settings (Blackwood, Hopkins, & Reicher, 2013), creates a sense of alienation (losing a sense of agency).

When it comes to research that investigates perceived discrimination as a dependent variable (as we do in one of our studies), this research tries to explain such discrimination by pointing either to individual-level characteristics or to contextual factors.

As for individual-level characteristics, research findings reveal that the level of perceived discrimination varies according to ethnic group, gender, and generation. Zainiddinov's study (2016) reveals that racialized Muslims (who belong to non-white ethnic groups in the US) are, with the exception of Asian Muslims, more likely to report having experienced discrimination than "white" Muslims. This difference, however, disappears for almost all the groups when socio-demographic characteristics are taken into account. As for Muslim women, they are significantly less likely to perceive discrimination than Muslim men, which contradicts hypotheses based on cumulative socio-cultural disadvantages. As for generational background, a study reveals that being born or living in Britain/France for a long time actually increases the likelihood of perceiving group discrimination among Muslims: in fact, Muslims who are "more incorporated", i.e. second-generation Muslims and long-term Muslim

⁵¹ Authors do not refer explicitly to "perceived discrimination" but rather to "experiences of misrecognition" that arise when Muslims are asked inappropriate questions by security agents, experience hyper-surveillance, or are looked at suspiciously. All of these experiences are forms of more or less subtle discrimination that, when they are perceived, we would categorize as perceived discrimination (see section *Effects of and responses to discrimination: ethnic penalties, perception, and coping* for a discussion).

immigrants, are more likely to perceive discrimination than first-generation and short-term Muslim immigrants (Yazdiha, 2019).

Yazdiha goes beyond individual-level correlates of perceived discrimination, and introduces country-level factors, too. In fact, Muslims living in countries characterized by more inclusive settings⁵² (France and Britain) are more likely to report experiences of discrimination than Muslims living in countries with less inclusive features (Germany and Spain). Also, in inclusive settings, second-generation Muslims are more likely to perceive general hostility than first-generation Muslims. She offers three possible explanations to account for this puzzling finding, echoing the explanations of the paradox of integration provided by other authors (Lamont et al., 2016; Verkuyten, 2016). She lays particular emphasis on the different levels of expectation and cultural repertoire that exist between the two generations:

“[G]roups who are socioeconomically or racially advantaged may have greater expectations of inclusion in an inclusionary host society than groups with long histories of oppression. Individual experiences of discrimination may also have different effects across national contexts, for example, in legal contexts more amenable to categorizing discrimination. [...] The generational gap in perceptions might be explored by bridging segmented assimilation theory with cultural sociology to examine how the native-born draw upon a broader cultural repertoire, enabling the formation of perceptions of discrimination and its contestation” (Yazdiha, 2019, p. 795).

Another contextual predictor of perceived discrimination among Muslims examined by scholars is the salience of symbolic boundaries. Trittler comes to the unexpected finding that, when religious symbolic boundaries are salient, i.e. when a majority group defines nationhood in terms of religious belonging (as is the case, for example, in Ireland, Bavaria, North Rhine-Westphalia, and northwestern Switzerland), Muslims are less likely to experience discrimination. Conversely, when secular symbolic boundaries characterize a majority group, i.e. when a significant proportion of the population is relatively unreligious (as in France and Brussels, as well as some parts of England, Germany, and Sweden), Muslims

⁵² Yazdiha builds an index of inclusiveness from 0 to 6 that collapses indexes for citizenship regimes, migrant integration policies, and anti-discrimination policies (Yazdiha, 2019, p. 788).

report having experienced discrimination more often. The author explains these puzzling findings as other scholars do, pointing out that boundaries in Western Europe seem to be drawn along religious/non-religious rather than denominational lines (Carol, Helbling, & Michalowski, 2015), and that a secular understanding of belonging might result in the stigmatization of religious minorities.

Thus, there is evidence that the perception of discrimination among Muslims in the West has significant implications for their well-being and their lives in society. What can best explain the patterns of these perceptions are individual-level factors, such as ethnicity (racialized Muslims are more likely to experience discrimination), generation (second-generation Muslims seem to perceive more discrimination), and gender (women are less likely to report having been discriminated against). The experience of discrimination among Muslims is also influenced by more or less inclusive contexts and the way that boundaries are drawn between majorities and minorities. While most comparative studies have focused on intra-religious comparisons (i.e. they compare perceived discrimination among Muslims from different ethnic groups), and have measured these perceptions using general measurements, there has been little research on the extent to which the perception of discrimination among Muslims resembles the perception of discrimination among religious groups with a majority or minority status. It is precisely this resemblance that we investigate in the second study of this thesis, and we do so by using a fine-grained means of measuring the perception of discrimination that allows us to discern how widespread this perception is in different life domains.

The gendered side of Islamophobia

There has been much research on how Muslim women experience discrimination, which is a result especially of their enhanced visibility when they wear the *hijab*, and of the fact that their experience of exclusion is situated at the intersection of systems of oppression such as xenophobia, Islamophobia, sexism, etc.⁵³

⁵³ See section *Discrimination against Muslims: racism and Islamophobia* for a more detailed theoretical treatment of intersection.

Research on objective discrimination against Muslim women in general, i.e. research that does not focus on their wearing of the *hijab*, provides mixed results: while some studies focus either on women (Adida et al., 2010) or on men (Pierné, 2013),⁵⁴ those that test the gender effect sometimes point to a stronger disadvantage for Muslim men on the labour market (Valfort, 2018), sometimes to a stronger disadvantage for Muslim women (Berthoud & Blekesaune, 2007), and sometimes to no difference between the two (Connor & Koenig, 2015; Heath & Martin, 2013). As for the perception of discrimination, findings are also mixed, with Muslim men being more likely to report having experienced discrimination in the US (Dana et al., 2019; Zainiddinov, 2016), but the opposite being the case in France, where Muslim women perceive more discrimination than their male counterparts (Yazdiha, 2019).

A very different picture emerges when it comes to studies on discrimination against visible Muslim women,⁵⁵ these studies yielding results that are more consistent. For one thing, the studies provide clear evidence of a negative *hijab*-effect in different life domains. For example, in a courtesy situation, *hijab*-wearers are much less likely to receive help from bystanders than majority members or immigrants not wearing religious clothing (Choi, Poertner, & Sambanis, 2021). The same is true of the labour market, where a female Muslim candidate for a job who wears the *hijab* is much less likely to be invited to a job interview than a candidate with identical qualifications and background who does not do so. In Germany, to be offered a job interview, a Turkish woman without the *hijab* must send 4.5 more applications than an identical German candidate, but a Turkish woman with the *hijab* must send 3.2 times more applications than a Turkish candidate without the *hijab* (Weichselbaumer, 2020). This is the case in the Netherlands, too, where wearing the *hijab* places the woman in a disadvantageous position relative not only to majority members, but also to Muslim women who do not wear the *hijab* (Fernández-Reino et al., 2022). In short, “[d]iscrimination occurs against female immigrants, and the level of discrimination increases if they wear a headscarf, which points to multiple discrimination” (Weichselbaumer, 2020, p. 614). However, the extent of discrimination seems to vary according to national context and

⁵⁴ This is mostly done in field experiments because of the difficulty of accounting for a gap between male and female applicants due to an *a priori* probability of motherhood.

⁵⁵ Visible Muslim men are also more exposed to racism and marginalization. On this topic, see, for example: (Hopkins, 2004).

whether candidates apply for a job that has a high level of customer contact (Fernández-Reino et al., 2022).

Wearing the *hijab* is also a strong predictor of perceived discrimination among Muslim women. Dana and his colleagues (2019) use data from a large population survey to show that Muslim women who wear the *hijab* are more likely to report having been discriminated against than Muslim women who do not wear one, this being the case across various life domains. What is more, wearing the *hijab* is one of the strongest indicators of perceived discrimination. Once the *hijab* is accounted for, however, it appears that men are more likely than women to perceive discrimination. While associated with a higher level of perceived discrimination, wearing the *hijab* also lessens the negative effects of perceived discrimination on a person's well-being. Despite increasing the risks of visibility, wearing the *hijab* has a "protective function": namely, it is associated with "greater life satisfaction and fewer symptoms of psychological distress" (Jasperse et al., 2012, p. 263). These findings echo what other authors find in qualitative interview material: namely, that women who wear the *hijab* do indeed experience stigmatization and are especially vulnerable to Islamophobic discrimination and mis-categorization (Allen, 2015; Carr, 2016; Hopkins & Greenwood, 2013; Najib & Hopkins, 2019), but that doing so also allows them to consolidate their identity and thereby alleviate the psychological stress caused by discrimination (Droogsmas, 2007; Hopkins & Greenwood, 2013).

In short, what the research on the discrimination experienced by Muslim women wearing the *hijab* shows is that they are more likely to perceive discrimination and to be objectively penalized in different life domains, but that wearing the *hijab* also lessens the negative effect of these experiences on their well-being. Such discrimination is peculiar in that it involves multiple systems of oppression. What is less known, however, is the different forms that these discriminatory experiences take, and how the social world is segregated for women wearing the *hijab*.

Responses to anti-Muslim discrimination

With some exceptions, there has been relatively little research on how Muslims respond to experiences of discrimination in the West. Some quantitative studies suggest that there is a

correlation between the perception of discrimination (Maliepaard et al., 2015; Simon & Tiberj, 2013) or of less welcoming/accommodating contexts (Connor, 2010; Phalet, Maliepaard, Fleischmann, & Güngör, 2013) on the one hand, and the strength of religious identification under specific conditions, such as the degree to which Muslim immigrants are established in a country, on the other. Some evidence also points to an alleviating role of co-ethnic social ties (be they local or transnational) on the negative effect of perception of discrimination among Muslims (Arat & Bilgili, 2021). However, the direction of these correlations is unclear, i.e. does experiencing stigmatization make Muslims identify more strongly with their religion or socialize more strongly with their co-ethnics, or is it Muslims who identify strongly with their religion/co-ethnics and who are therefore potentially more visible who experience more discrimination? It is also unclear whether a person's stronger identification with religion and stronger social ties with co-ethnics is one of a number of voluntary strategies that the person adopts to cope with discrimination, or whether it is unconscious.⁵⁶

There are few studies on voluntary responses to discrimination, and especially on strategies of engagement such as reporting discrimination to specialist bodies or seeking legal support. It has been shown that Muslims underreport discrimination: despite high levels of perceived discrimination among Muslims in Europe, only 12% of those who felt discriminated against reported discrimination to a specialist body or to the place where the instance of discrimination occurred (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2017b). Other studies have provided evidence of this underreporting at a national level (Allen, 2015; Carr, 2016; Poynting & Noble, 2004).

Studies remain relatively vague when addressing the question of why Muslims rarely report their experiences of discrimination. Shammass (2015) has shown through focus groups that Muslim and Arab college students in the US underreport discrimination in surveys because of its perceived social costs and the difficulty of being sure that they have been discriminated against. Carr suggests that “they become homo-œconomicus, measuring their options as to

⁵⁶ In the case of specific religious practices, Haddad's study suggests, for example, that the number of Muslim women wearing the *hijab* increased in the US in the aftermath of 9/11, and that the *hijab* became a symbol of resistance against the anti-Islamic policies that followed (Haddad 2007). Peek (2005) has provided similar results for the US context.

whether they should keep their experience to themselves or report to an NGO” (Carr, 2016, pp. 138-139). The FRA reports roughly group the main reasons for not reporting together as the perceived futility of doing so, the normalization of such experiences, and the lack of awareness that statutory organizations and services actually exist (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2009, 2017b). Finally, Poynting and Noble (2004) highlight similar reasons why there was an underreporting of experiences of discrimination among Arabs and Muslims in Australia: namely, the perceived futility of reporting discrimination or fear of not being taken seriously, unawareness of supporting bodies, the perceived risks associated with complaining, and the inability to identify the offender. Beyond claims of discrimination at the national level, socio-legal scholars have tried to explain why some minorities engage and others do not engage in international court cases dealing with minority rights. For example, Harms (2021) demonstrates that what encourages or discourages groups or people from pursuing legal claims to do with religious freedom at the European Court of Human Rights are not only institutional structures and access to legal support, but also organizational identities and the position of the minority in power relations, Muslim pressure groups being more likely to refrain from going to Strasbourg because losing the case “would add to their marginalization” in their domestic settings and would not serve the purpose of community-building.

There is also a dearth of research on strategies of disengagement, but it is worth mentioning the handful of studies that there are. Najib and Hopkins (2019) have demonstrated through qualitative interviews that Muslim women wearing the *hijab* in Paris who are discriminated against usually adopt strategies not only of disengagement (namely, avoiding places where discrimination can occur, or making themselves less visible), but also of engagement (e.g. actively challenging negative representations of *hijabis*). In the US context, it appears that Muslims faced an increase in discriminatory behaviour such as social exclusion after the 9/11 attacks, which restricted their access to leisure activities. Qualitative interviews reveal that, in order to avoid discriminatory settings, these individuals used disengagement strategies, such as avoiding travelling and “blending in” (Livengood & Stodolska, 2004).

What stands out in the research on how Muslims respond to discrimination is that certain circumstances might see them turning to religion to cope with exclusion, but that there is no certainty here with regard to causality, and nor to whether it is conscious. When it comes to

the conscious strategies that people use to cope with discrimination, very few Muslims choose to report their experiences to specialist bodies; what is not known, however, is whether the extent of underreporting among Muslims is comparable to that among other minorities. Also, our understanding of the reasons for such underreporting is very superficial and focuses on micro-level factors only. Calls to address meso-level factors such as the availability of cultural repertoires and situational conditions to explain why members of minorities choose one or the other strategy to cope with discrimination (Koenig, 2017; Lamont et al., 2016) have gone largely unheeded. The last study in this thesis seeks to close this gap by comparing the reporting of discrimination and the reasons for (not) reporting among Muslims and Jews.

1.3 Context: the specificity and generalizability of the Swiss case

When studying discrimination against Muslims in Switzerland, we should note three points in particular. First, Muslims represent a sizeable proportion of the resident population, have diverse migratory backgrounds, and their specificities are known from representative population surveys. Second, the legal framework in Switzerland prohibits racial discrimination and provides monitoring systems that allow racist incidents to be tracked and racial discrimination to be addressed legally. Third, as a semi-direct democracy, Switzerland is a country where the population is regularly called upon to vote on popular initiatives or in referendums on Islam-specific laws.⁵⁷ In some regards, Switzerland is comparable to other Western European countries, while in others it is distinct, thus making it possible to generalize the Swiss case up to a point. This section aims to present the socio-demographic and structural specificities of Switzerland for two reasons: they are crucial to helping us understand the interpretation and political implications of the results of the four studies; and they provide important information on the sources of data used in the studies.

⁵⁷ The ban on constructing minarets (known as the “anti-minaret law”) has been inscribed in article 72 al.3 of the Constitution since 2009, and the ban on full-face covering (known as the “anti-burqa law”) in article 197 al.12 of the federal Constitution since 2021, and in cantonal constitutions before that. The aforementioned articles are available at: https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/cc/1999/404/fr#art_72 and https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/cc/1999/404/fr#art_197 respectively (accessed 28 April 2022).

The Swiss confederation has collected data on the religious affiliation of the resident population aged 15 and over since 1850, and has included the possibility of indicating “Islam” or specific branches of Islam since 1970. These data, collected by the Federal Statistical Office (FSO) through a federal population census (FPS) until 2000 and through a “relevé structurel” (RS) since then, allow researchers to give accurate estimates of the proportion of self-declared Muslims in Switzerland over the decades, as well as the socio-demographic specificities of this population. The question that the RS currently asks to capture religious affiliation is: “What church or religious community do you belong to?”⁵⁸ The FSO also carries out population surveys, such as the Language, Religion and Culture Survey (LRCS), which phrases the question slightly differently: “To which church, religious community or spiritual current do you feel close?”⁵⁹

Since this thesis uses data from the FSO (among others), we can define a Muslim as **any individual who identifies himself or herself with Islam in general or with any specific Islamic denomination such as Sunnism, Shiism, or Sufism, regardless of actual beliefs and practices.**⁶⁰ To investigate the stigmatization and discrimination that minorities experience obviously raises the question of (sometimes wrongly) ascribed group membership. Indeed, individuals who possess certain attributes can be wrongly perceived as Muslims when in fact they are not (an Arabic-sounding name for a Coptic Catholic or the wearing of a veil by Orthodox women from Eritrea, for example), and they can experience discrimination originally directed at Muslims. Although these specific cases are of course one expression of

⁵⁸ Our translation (original question: *De quelle Église ou de quelle communauté religieuse faites-vous partie?*). For a detailed view on the history of the Swiss data collection strategies and the evolution of the questions asked and response options in official surveys and censuses, see (Stolz, Amiotte-Suchet, & Fortin, 2009). The methodological documents on official censuses and surveys regarding religion are available at:

<https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/fr/home/statistiques/population/langues-religions/religions.assetdetail.1900342.html> (accessed 18 April 2022).

⁵⁹ Our translation (original question: *De quelle Eglise, communauté religieuse ou courant spirituel vous sentez-vous proche?*). The methodological documents on the LRCS are available at:

<https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/fr/home/statistiques/population/enquetes/esrk.html> (accessed 18 April 2022).

⁶⁰ This definition of group membership is based on auto-identification, which differs from a sociological definition that considers a Muslim to be any person who is born to at least one Muslim parent. The latter definition is problematic because it could include individuals who actually identify with other religions or to no religion, and because in an exogamous family it arbitrarily favours the Islamic over the other affiliation (the child of a Christian and a Muslim would be categorized as a Muslim).

the stigmatization and discrimination experienced by Muslims, we will barely discuss it in the present thesis.

The proportion of Muslims in the resident population aged 15 and over rose between 1970 and 2020 from less than 1% to 5.4%,⁶¹ the Pew Research Center providing an estimation that included children of 6.1% in 2016. This situation reflects that of neighbouring countries, although comparisons are not ideal since the methods of data collection vary.⁶² Muslims also account for 6.1% of the total resident population in Germany, while they represent 6.9% in Austria, 4.8% in Italy, and 8.8% in France. The overall proportion of Muslims in Europe⁶³ was 4.9% in 2016 (Pew Research Center, 2017, p. 4).

The Muslim population in Switzerland is characterized by certain demographic features that mirror those in Europe in general: namely, they are on average younger than the majority population, and most have a migratory background. Indeed, Muslims constitute an especially young population in Switzerland, since 48% are between 15 and 34, and very few are older than 64, with men being overrepresented. Most live in urban centres, and are concentrated in cantons with large economic, political and industrial centres such as Zurich/Geneva, Bern, and Aargau/Sankt Gallen respectively. While many have a migratory background, with 97% being from the first or second generation, 40% now have Swiss citizenship (Federal Statistical Office, 2016, 2020; Schneuwly Purdie, 2009).

As in many other Western European countries, the presence of Muslims in Switzerland is in fact due mostly to migration (Pew Research Center, 2009, p. 21). The immigration and settlement of Muslims in Switzerland is commonly divided into four “moments” or waves: economic immigration; familial reunification; political and humanitarian immigration; second and third generations (Schneuwly Purdie & Lathion, 2003; Schneuwly Purdie, 2009). The first wave started in the 1960s when Switzerland experienced an economic boom and needed manpower; this manpower was taken from Turkey and Yugoslavia, following a period of recruitment in the South of Europe in the 1950s. Hence, this first migratory movement

⁶¹ Results of the FPS (1970-2000) and the RS (2010-2020) are available at: <https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/fr/home/statistiques/population/langues-religions/religions.html> (accessed 18 April 2022).

⁶² France, for example, has not allowed population censuses to collect data on religious belonging since 1872 (Dargent, 2009), and provides less reliable data collected in population surveys.

⁶³ This Pew Research Center report defines Europe as the 28 EU countries plus Norway and Switzerland.

represented a temporary immigration and most of these Muslims were unaccompanied men. Swiss law has allowed family reunification since the mid-1970s, but not without political controversy. The arrival of women and children led to more balanced gender ratios and marked the beginning of permanent settlement in Switzerland. 1991 marked the beginning of political and humanitarian immigration, with the arrival of refugees fleeing wars (mainly Yugoslavia, but also Lebanon, Iraq, and Palestine) and famines (Somalia, Sudan). For these reasons, the Muslim population in Switzerland is mostly made up of individuals from the former Yugoslavia and from Turkey, with a small minority of Arabic-speaking persons. The distribution of origins varies between linguistic regions, since most people from the Maghreb reside in French-speaking Switzerland, while German-speaking Switzerland is home to more people from Turkey and the Balkans. These differences are due to linguistic affinities linked to the history of the countries of origin. Finally, Switzerland already had second and third generations of Muslims (i.e. individuals who were born and entirely educated in the country) by the end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century.

The proportion of the Muslim population who are Swiss citizens has therefore never stopped growing (Schneuwly Purdie & Lathion, 2003; Schneuwly Purdie, 2009), but nevertheless remains low (40%) compared to other European countries, where Muslims hold citizenship in 53% of cases (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2017b, p. 10). The relatively low percentage of Muslims who are Swiss nationals can be explained by the fact that Swiss naturalization is based on the concept of *ius sanguinis*, meaning that individuals born in Switzerland are not automatically granted citizenship unless one of their parents is Swiss. To apply for citizenship, people from the first and second generation must have resided in the country for at least ten years and meet certain additional criteria, with a somewhat simplified process for the third generation and for individuals married to Swiss nationals. Moreover, the system of naturalization in Switzerland is peculiar: the attribution of citizenship is regulated not by the state but rather by the municipalities, which means that the criteria used to grant citizenship vary in their restrictiveness (Helbling, 2010b). There has been evidence of discrimination when it comes to granting citizenship to applicants from Muslim majority countries (former Yugoslavia and Turkey), but the cause of this discrimination could not be confirmed as Islamophobia (Hainmueller & Hangartner, 2013).

In addition to its cultural diversity, the Muslim population is also religiously diverse. An FSO population survey published in 2020 (Federal Statistical Office, 2020) showed that Muslims are the religious group that attends religious services least often (immediately after the “nones”, i.e. individuals with no religious affiliation): almost half (45.8%) had not been to a religious service once in the previous 12 months, while 13% had been once a week. In terms of prayer, a third of Muslims had not prayed once in the previous 12 months (a proportion similar to Catholics, minority Christians, and other religions), while 13.5% reported that they had prayed several times a day. As for belief in a unique god, Muslims, like Evangelicals, stand out, with 92.3% adhering to this belief. While providing information on general trends regarding the religiosity of Muslims, these statistics fail to grasp how qualitatively diverse Muslims are when it comes to living and interpreting their religion. Qualitative research on this issue has revealed a multitude of religious profiles and meanings attached to different practices such as the wearing of the headscarf (Gianni, Schneuwly Purdie, Jenny, & Lathion, 2010; Schneuwly Purdie, 2010).

The system of religious regulation has a direct impact on how Islam is organized in Switzerland. In fact, while federal law guarantees the principle of freedom of conscience and belief in article 15 of the Constitution, article 72 al. 1 of the Constitution states that the responsibility for managing the relationship between the religious communities and the state lies with the cantons.⁶⁴ Therefore, we could say that there exist as many regulations as there are cantons. However, most of the 26 cantons grant *public law recognition* to the historical churches (Roman Catholic and Protestant), and have cantonal constitutions that allow minority communities to obtain *public interest recognition*, which can be gained by minority communities if they meet certain criteria, and which come with different rights and obligations.⁶⁵ Among other benefits, these rights usually include subsidies for activities of public interest, tax exemption, and access to chaplaincies in hospitals and prisons.⁶⁶ Six cantons have recognized Jewish communities so far, while public interest recognition has

⁶⁴ Article 15 of the Swiss Constitution is available at:

https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/cc/1999/404/en#art_15, and article 72 is available at: https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/cc/1999/404/en#art_72 (accessed 19 April 2022).

⁶⁵ For a detailed presentation of the state recognition system and its implications, see, for example: (Pahud de Mortanges, 2018).

⁶⁶ See, for example, the “law on the recognition of religious communities and on the relations between the State and religious communities recognized as being of public interest” of the canton Vaud: <https://www.lexfind.ch/tolv/134760/fr>.

been granted to one Muslim community (the Alevi community in the canton of Basel city in 2012).

Beyond its symbolic dimension, such recognition as a “déclaration d’intégration sociale” or a “label de qualité” (Pahud de Mortanges, 2018, p. 123) can also provide financial support through subsidies and tax exemption. Without state recognition, communities depend entirely on donations and help from other countries, and they have to formalize their existence under legal forms of private law such as associations or foundations. For these reasons, Islam is organized in Switzerland in a complex mosaic of associations and federations of associations, these being created either on confessional or on ethnic grounds. As an example, the canton of Geneva counted 21 associations in 2013, some of which were represented by one umbrella organization, there being 20 such umbrella organizations (Banfi, 2013) and more than 300 religious congregations in the whole country (Monnot & Stolz, 2014, p. 81).

In some respects, the Swiss case is quite similar to other European countries, and can be generalized with a certain degree of caution. First, in socio-demographic terms, Switzerland is close to the European average (4.9%), with 6.1% of its population being Muslim, which places it between Portugal, with the smallest proportion of Muslims (0.4%), and France, with the largest (8.8%) (Pew Research Center, 2017). Also, as in other European countries, the Muslim presence in Switzerland is due mainly to the wave of immigration that started after World War II as a response to an economic need, when it was thought that the presence of Muslims would be temporary. Where these immigrants come from differs for historical reasons, however: due to their ancient relationships with Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire, Switzerland, Germany and Austria have a Muslim population that comes predominantly from Turkey and the Balkans; because of their colonial past, France, Spain and the Netherlands have a Muslim population that comes mainly from the Maghreb; also because of its past colonies, the UK has a Muslim population that comes mostly from South Asia; and, as a final example, Italy has a Muslim population predominantly from the Maghreb due to its geographical proximity to North Africa (Mohiuddin, 2017, pp. 394-395).

Second, the system of religious regulation that privileges the historical churches (*public law*) and that makes it difficult for minorities to obtain a reduced level of recognition (*public*

interest) fits the definition of “bright boundaries” that Alba uses to describe two neighbouring countries, France and Germany: for Alba, religion is a site of boundary construction, and “the ways in which Christian religions have been institutionalized and constitute, through customs and habits of thought, part of the definition of ‘who we are’ make it difficult for Islam to achieve parity” (Alba, 2005, p. 32). In this sense, religious regulation in Switzerland marks a bright (unambiguous) boundary between the Christian in-group and the Muslim out-group. As noted by Alba, established religions in Germany also benefit from financial support, and German citizens oppose granting Islam parity. While the institutionalization of Christianity is more subtle in France, it nevertheless produces a bright boundary for Muslims (Helbling & Traunmüller, 2016, p. 398). Furthermore, there is evidence that such state support for majority religions has a negative impact on majority attitudes towards Muslims: in Swiss cantons characterized by high levels of favouritism to the historical churches, citizens are more likely to think that there are too many Muslims in the country, that they should not be allowed to build minarets, and that headscarves should be banned in public spaces (Helbling & Traunmüller, 2016).

Direct democracy, politics, and Muslims

These general negative attitudes reflect symbolic boundaries between Muslim minorities on the one hand, and the majority population on the other, which, despite its rapidly decreasing religiosity (Helbling & Traunmüller, 2016; Stolz & Senn, p. 397), identifies with a Christian heritage, these boundaries having crystalized in different ways at the national level.

First, these negative attitudes towards Muslims have translated into popular votes at the federal and cantonal level. As a semi-direct democracy, Switzerland regularly calls upon its population to vote on popular initiatives⁶⁷ related to Muslims and Islam, these initiatives often being championed by right-wing political parties such as the Swiss People’s Party, which since 2001 has increasingly problematized Islam in terms of the presumed threat that it poses (Direnberger, Banfi, & Eskandari, 2022). For example, the ban on constructing minarets (known as the “anti-minaret law”) has been inscribed in article 72 al.3 of the Constitution

⁶⁷ A popular initiative is a way for the population to ask for a modification of the federal or cantonal Constitutions. Citizens who want to launch the initiative need to collect a certain number of signatures in favour of their proposition within a certain period of time. If they succeed, the Parliament decides whether it is valid and, if so, puts it to a popular vote.

since 2009, and the ban on full-face covering (known as the “anti-burqa law”) in article 197 al.12 of the federal Constitution since 2021, and in cantonal constitutions before that.⁶⁸ Also, the initiative that aimed to facilitate the naturalization of second- and third-generation immigrants was rejected in 2004, its opponents framing the public debate in terms of the increased threat posed by the Muslim population (Lindemann & Stolz, 2014). The same “Islamization” of public debates on immigration (Behloul, 2009) could be observed with the federal initiative “against mass immigration” that aimed to limit immigration through quotas, resulting in its acceptance in 2014.

More specifically, questions dealing with the wearing of Islamic clothing have been the subject of heated political debate in Switzerland. For example, during the campaign on the “anti-burqa law”, TV and radio debates often slipped from talking about the *niqab* or *burqa* (full-face covering) to talking about the *hijab* (headscarf), the latter not being covered by the law. Another example is the passing of the “Loi sur la laïcité” in Geneva in 2019, which resulted in state employees being banned from wearing the *hijab*.⁶⁹ Finally, the issue of pupils wearing the *hijab* in schools has been the subject of highly mediatized court cases and statements in parliament.⁷⁰

Second, the unique citizenship regime of Switzerland has important implications for Muslim immigrants and their descendants with regard to their access to citizenship. As a set of criteria defining the symbolic boundaries of the nation, naturalization policies formally decide on who can be considered a full member of the nation-state and who must be excluded, and are therefore important spaces of boundary-making. Since it follows the *ius sanguinis* principle of citizenship, Switzerland does not automatically grant Swiss citizenship to individuals born on Swiss territory, and it is relatively difficult for such individuals to obtain citizenship.⁷¹

⁶⁸ The aforementioned articles are available at: https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/cc/1999/404/fr#art_72 and https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/cc/1999/404/fr#art_197 respectively (accessed 28 April 2022).

⁶⁹ This law can be consulted at: https://silgeneve.ch/legis/data/rsg_a2_75.htm (accessed 8 September 2022).

⁷⁰ See, for example, the proposition submitted to the National Council in 2020 entitled “Prohibit the wearing of veils by children in compulsory schools and pre-schools. A question of equality and protection of the child, not a religious question” (our translation): <https://www.parlament.ch/fr/ratsbetrieb/suche-curia-vista/geschaefft?AffairId=20204728> (accessed 8 September 2022).

⁷¹ To be granted naturalization, a person must fulfill different criteria: uninterrupted residency for at least 10 years, respect of the legal order, not being a threat to the security of the country, and being “integrated”. This last criteria is judged at the local level, and can take the form of exams testing knowledge of Swiss history, traditions, language skills, and politics (Helbling, 2010a, pp. 35-36).

Moreover, given its strong federalism, Switzerland is the only country in the world where naturalization is regulated at the local level: each municipality decides on the criteria and procedures governing whether a foreigner is granted citizenship, with members of the local population being directly involved in the final decision (Helbling, 2008b). Hence, as researchers have shown, there are significant variations across the country with regard to the proportion of applicants for citizenship who are rejected.

There is evidence that individuals from majority Muslim countries are much more likely to be rejected when they apply for citizenship. For example, most people rejected between 1990 and 2002 were from Muslim countries, mainly Turkey and the former Yugoslavia, which can be explained primarily by the local population's general understanding of citizenship, and by their level of involvement in the decision-making process: the more the local population have a restrictive understanding of citizenship and the more they are directly involved in the decision-making process (through popular votes at ballot), the more they are likely to reject candidates from Muslim countries (Helbling, 2010a). Hainmueller and Hangartner (2013) produced similar results, their study showing that Turkish people and people from the former Yugoslavia have clear disadvantages when it comes to obtaining Swiss citizenship in municipalities using secret-ballot referendums to decide whether a candidate should be granted citizenship.

These examples of popular votes and naturalization policies that result in the exclusion of Muslims from society in Switzerland provide some idea of how direct democratic instruments can lead to more restrictive policies and social closure.

Anti-discrimination legislation and enforcement agencies

To understand some of the methodological choices made in this thesis, it is important to take account of the legal framework surrounding racial discrimination in Switzerland and how this legal framework is implemented. Like all other European countries (European Commission, 2017),⁷² Switzerland has legal provisions prohibiting racial discrimination, formalized in its Constitution (Cst.) and in its Criminal Code (CP).

⁷² Although all EU member states have legal provisions against racial discrimination, the levels of protection and implementation vary. For example, some countries (Belgium, Bulgaria, Finland, Poland, and Sweden) were

In the Constitution, the foundation of the prohibition of discrimination lies in the principle of equality as stated in article 8. It was only in 2000, when the revised version of the Constitution came into force, that the explicit prohibition was added to this article in the second alinea, including religious grounds. Finally, the Constitution also compels the authorities to respect fundamental rights, including non-discrimination, and to contribute actively to their realization:

All human beings are equal before the law (Art.8 al.1 Cst.).

No one shall be discriminated against on the basis of origin, race, sex, age, language, social status, lifestyle, religious, philosophical or political beliefs, or physical, mental or psychological disability (Art.8 al.2 Cst.).

Anyone who performs a state task is obliged to respect fundamental rights and to contribute to their realization (Art.35 Cst.).⁷³

These principles are translated into legal provisions in the Criminal Code (Art.261 bis CP) and the Military Criminal Code (Art.171c CPM), which explicitly criminalize any form of racial discrimination in the public sphere, threatening up to three years' imprisonment and/or a fine:

any person who publicly denigrates or discriminates against another or a group of persons on the grounds of their race, ethnic origin, religion or sexual orientation in a manner that violates human dignity, whether verbally, in writing or pictorially, by using gestures, through acts of aggression or by other means, or any person who on any of these grounds denies, trivialises or seeks justification for genocide or other crimes against humanity, [...] shall be liable to a custodial sentence not exceeding three years or to a monetary penalty (Art.261 bis CP).⁷⁴

sent letters of notice by the European Commission "as their national laws do not fully or accurately transpose EU rules on combating racism and xenophobia by means of criminal law".

https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/inf_21_441 (accessed 20 April 2022).

⁷³ Our translation. For the original text in French, see <https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/cc/1999/404/fr#a8> and <https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/cc/1999/404/fr#a35> (accessed 20 April 2022).

⁷⁴ Their translation, which is available at: https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/cc/54/757_781_799/en (accessed 21 April 2022).

This legal provision, commonly known as the “anti-racism law” and accepted by the Swiss people in 1993, came into force in 1994 as a consequence of Switzerland’s adherence to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) in 1971. Indeed, by ratifying this binding convention, Switzerland was compelled to pursue a policy that aimed to “prohibit and bring to an end, by all appropriate means, including legislation as required by circumstances, racial discrimination by any persons, group or organization” (Art.2 1.d. ICERD).⁷⁵ Any violation of art. 261bis is prosecuted *ex officio*, i.e. any person can report to the police or to an investigating judge, and the authorities are obliged to initiate legal proceedings and verify the facts, with this not requiring the plaintiff to pay any legal fees. This provision has faced criticism from civil society and legal experts, though, especially regarding the question of what constitutes public discrimination and how the provision might contradict freedom of expression (Leimgruber, 2021).

In addition to legislative amendments, Switzerland also had to implement several measures to combat racial discrimination, this leading to the creation in 1995 of an extraparliamentary commission, the Federal Commission against Racism (FCR), whose responsibility it is to coordinate these measures regarding prevention, support for victims of racism, and communication to diverse audiences. For example, the FCR created an online and publicly available database⁷⁶ that contains all the legal proceedings filed under Art. 261bis CP, and that provides different information such as the category of the victim (Yenish, Muslim, Jew, black, etc.), the court decision (defendant found guilty, not guilty, etc.), the canton, the year, etc.

The FCR also created a national network of centres that support victims of racism, the first opening in 2005 and growing in number to 21 by 2020. These centres are attached either to cantonal services or to civil associations, but they all benefit from state support. They provide free help to any person who experiences or witnesses racial discrimination, this help being offered in various forms (mediation, advice on how to take the offender to court, listening) and by counsellors (who usually work part-time) via telephone, via email, or in person. The counsellors record each case reported to them in a confidential and non-public database

⁷⁵ The ICERD text is available at: <https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-convention-elimination-all-forms-racial> (accessed 21 April 2022).

⁷⁶ The FCR database is available at: <https://www.ekr.admin.ch/prestations/f518.html> (accessed 21 April 2022).

called DoSyRa (Dokumentationssystem Rassismus), this providing information on different variables with regard to the case, such as type of racism (anti-Muslim, anti-Semitism, xenophobia, anti-black, etc.), the form of discrimination (insults, violence, placards, etc.), and the life domain in which the discrimination occurred (public transport, neighbourhood, school, state offices, etc.). The FCR draws on this database to produce an annual report that provides descriptive statistics on self-reported racist incidents.

Beside state-organized efforts to combat racism, there are various civil associations that dedicate all or some of their activities to this end, although very few concentrate on Islamophobia. There are associations that deal with racism in general, and those that focus on certain forms of racism.⁷⁷ As for religious-based racism, the Schweizerischer Israelitischer Gemeindebund (SIG) and the Coordination Intercommunautaire contre l'Antisémitisme et la Diffamation (CICAD), founded in 1904 and 1991 respectively, deal with anti-Semitism: these umbrella associations have monitored cases of anti-Semitism for about two decades, publish annual reports on these cases, and provide formal support to victims. As for Islamophobia, it is only recently that one of the umbrella associations, the Föderation Islamischer Dachorganisationen Schweiz (FIDS), has set up a digital platform where Muslim victims can report a case: no report has been published until now.

These two types of bodies, whose aim is to combat racism, correspond to Allport's typology of enforcement agencies, divided between public and private agencies: "All organizations devoted to the betterment of group relations – and there are thousands of them – can be classified either as *public* or as *private*⁷⁸ agencies. [...] Public agencies likewise include city, state, or federal commissions empowered to enforce antidiscrimination laws [...] Private agencies are even more numerous in type. They can range from small "race relations" or "good neighbor" committees of women's club, service club, or churches, to large-scale national organizations" (Allport, 1954, p. 461).

⁷⁷ Examples of the former are the Ligue Internationale contre le Racisme et l'Antisémitisme (LICRA), whose Swiss section was created in Geneva in 1971, and the Foundation against Racism and Anti-Semitism (GRA), founded in Zurich in 1921. Examples of the latter are the Carrefour de Réflexion et d'Action contre le Racisme Anti-Noir (CRAN) and the Collectif Afro Suisse, both of which deal with anti-black racism.

⁷⁸ Italics in original text.

Generally speaking, when it comes to discrimination against Muslims in Switzerland, scholars have mainly focused on the majority perspectives, i.e. they have looked at majority attitudes (prejudice) and media discourses. Less has been done, however, to address the objective effects on life chances for Muslims, their perception of discrimination, and their possible responses to it. Here, we review important studies along these lines: anti-Muslim prejudice, discriminatory behaviour, effects on life chances, perceived discrimination, and responses to discrimination. European aggregated studies using data from the Pew Research Center, ESS, WVS, and SCICS (among others) regularly include Switzerland of course, but our focus here will be on studies that specifically investigate the Swiss case.

Starting with prejudices, scholars have identified **individual and socio-cultural factors of Islamophobia** in Switzerland. What stands out is that being more conservatist (Stolz, 2005), having an ethnic (i.e. restrictive) self-understanding of national belonging (Helbling, 2008a), and living in a canton that favours the historical churches over religious minorities (Helbling & Traunmüller, 2016) is a strong predictor of anti-Muslim attitudes. It has also been shown that people scoring high on the importance of national identity are more likely to hold anti-Islam attitudes (Yendell & Huber, 2020). When it comes to a more specific aspect of Islamophobia, i.e. hostility towards the wearing of headscarves, there seem to be three explanatory factors: people living in a canton characterized by government favouritism towards the historical churches are more likely to oppose the wearing of the *hijab* in public spaces (Helbling & Traunmüller, 2016); women who belong to the majority population are more inclined to accept the *hijab*, mainly because they tend to “hold a stronger left-wing political ideology, which translates into more positive stances toward multiculturalism and gender equality” (Sarrasin & Green, 2015); and members of the majority population are more likely to see the *hijab* as being incongruent with naturalization if they are conservative and live in a conservative community with a high proportion of Muslim immigrants, while non-conformist individuals in progressive communities tend to have anti-veil attitudes if the proportion of Muslim immigrants is low (Fasel et al., 2013). A relatively high proportion of Muslim immigrants increases inter-group contact and therefore increases indirectly the perception of threat that the majority population has with regard to immigration; in contrast, the relatively high proportion of people from Northern/Western Europe indirectly decreases

the perception of threat (Green, Fasel, & Sarrasin, 2010). Finally, news consumption in general appears to have no impact on anti-Muslim attitudes (Stolz, 2005), but news coverage of crime committed by immigrants in particular does explain why people voted to ban the building of minarets in 2009 (Couttenier, Hatte, Thoenig, & Vlachos, 2021). Some of these studies point to the lack of differentiation between Islamophobia and xenophobia in general, since anti-Muslim attitudes strongly correlate with the rejection of other historically recent out-groups (Stolz, 2005, pp. 559-560) and are explained by the same underlying factor (Helbling, 2008a).

As for the **content of anti-Muslim prejudice**, studies on both its stereotypical (cognitive) and emotional (affective) dimensions within the majority population and majority discourses provide evidence of widespread negative stereotypes and attitudes with regard to Muslims and/or Islam in Switzerland. This field of research can range from national surveys that simply measure the proportion of the population who agree with stereotypes or who dislike/fear Muslims, to more complex qualitative analyses of the content of these stereotypes, especially in media coverage and political rhetoric. For example, a 2017 survey by the Pew Research Center revealed that 31% of the non-Muslim Swiss population would not be willing to accept a Muslim as a family member, while 25% believe that “[i]n their hearts, Muslims want to impose their religious law on everyone else” (Pew Research Center, 2018, p. 64/71). For its part, an FSO national survey shows that 11% of the Swiss population agree with stereotypes of Muslims (that they are fanatical and aggressive, oppress women, and do not respect human rights), while almost a third reject Islam (Federal Statistical Office, 2019, pp. 8-10).

As for media coverage, studies point to the negative framing of Muslims, who are depicted as Other, threatening, and problematic (Ettinger, 2008; Ettinger & Imhof, 2009; Ettinger & Udris, 2009; Lindemann & Stolz, 2014, pp. 302-311), and to the negative treatment of Islam compared to Christianity (Dahinden, Koch, Wyss, & Keel, 2011). The media treatment of Islam appears to be influenced by various contextual variables such as the state-religion relationship and the strength of right-wing populism: unlike in Germany and Austria, where positions are discussed in more pragmatic terms, in Switzerland, where Islam is not recognized or accommodated, the statements reported in the press are justified by identity-based and moral-universal arguments. In Switzerland as in Austria, right-wing populist views are predominant, which contrasts with the situation in Germany, where such views are largely

absent from the debate (Dolezal, Helbling, & Hutter, 2010). As for political debates, Eskandari and Banfi's content analyses of parliamentary debates and legislative documents (2017) have highlighted how narratives supporting the banning of burqas and minarets were driven by Eurocentrism, undifferentiated representations of Muslims, and an instrumentalization of the rationales of women's rights. Finally, more general studies have examined how the category of "Muslim" has become significant in identifying a new out-group over the last few decades (Behloul, 2009), and how Islamophobia is insufficiently framed in terms of racism (Boulila, 2019).

As for **acts of discrimination**, national reports give a somewhat incomplete idea of direct or structural forms of discrimination against Muslims in Switzerland. For example, the FCR annual reports on cases of discrimination reported to the network of centres provide descriptive statistics on the forms of discrimination inflicted on victims (physical violence, verbal aggression, exclusion, etc.), but do not provide separate results for each type of victim (Muslims, blacks, Jews, etc.). The only indications are to be found in the few examples described in the reports drawn from the DoSyRa database (see for example humanrights.ch & Federal Commission against Racism, 2022, p. 16), and in a list of descriptions displayed in a special issue of the FCR publication TANGRAM (Federal Commission against Racism, 2017, pp. 22-26): for example, the expulsion of a Muslim woman from a sauna because she refused to be completely naked, and a Muslim family who faced regular insults and had unfair rules imposed upon them by the caretaker of the building where they lived. Examples of direct and structural discrimination (mostly hate crimes and anti-Muslim/Islam laws or drafts of laws) are also collected in the national reports on Islamophobia submitted to the Foundation for Political, Economic and Social Research (SETA) for their yearly European Islamophobia reports (see for example Ademović-Omerčić, 2018; Wäckerlig, 2020). Structural discrimination has also been highlighted through a study that attempts to explain the rate at which people reject/accept referendums on specific rights for religious minorities, this study concluding that decisions are largely to the detriment of Muslim communities (such as the refusal to grant state recognition, the ban on minarets or ritual slaughter), since people do not consider Muslims to be an integral part of society (Vatter & Danaci, 2010):

Die überraschende Annahme der Minarettverbots-Initiative auf Bundesebene im November 2009 (Hirter u. Vatter 2010), die Verwerfung aller Vorlagen zur

öffentlich-rechtlichen Anerkennung der muslimischen Minderheit in den Kantonen sowie der vergleichsweise hohe Anteil an negativen Volksentscheiden zu Ausländerrechten machen deutlich, dass das Stimmvolk besonders dann zum Nachteil einer Minderheit entscheidet, wenn diese in der öffentlichen Wahrnehmung als schlecht integriert gilt und fremde Wertevorstellungen vertritt. Als nicht-christliche Minderheit und Ausländer sind Muslime davon gleich in doppeltem Maße betroffen (Vatter & Danaci, 2010, p. 211).⁷⁹

Surprisingly, hardly any studies have tried to assess the **effects of discrimination on life chances** (4) for Muslims in Switzerland. There have, however, been two experiments on courtesy, which reveal strong discrimination against visible Muslim women, and four experiments on access to the labour market, housing, and citizenship, which investigate the effects that certain origins have on such access, but do not account for religious affiliation. It is nonetheless possible to formulate some hypotheses.

Berger and Berger (2019) used two lost-letter experiments in Zurich to test whether hostility towards Muslims was in fact not xenophobia, but a reaction to what people perceived as a “threat to secularization”, with one hypothesis being that Muslims who display no sign of religiousness would not be discriminated against. Their results show that a lost letter is less likely to be sent back to a Muslim than to a Swiss native, and that the former is more likely to be sent the letter if he or she displays no sign of religiousness. For their part, Aidenberger and Doehne (2021) have carried out field experiments with actors wearing a headscarf to test day-to-day discrimination, their study showing that women wearing the *hijab* are more likely to be sanctioned for violating a social norm than bare-headed women, and that the former are also less likely to be given help by passers-by when they ask for it.

As for the other experiments, they all point to discrimination against individuals with Turkish and Kosovar origins when it comes to access to the labour market, housing, and citizenship, which suggests that what causes this discrimination is Islamophobia. While these studies did

⁷⁹ Our translation: “The surprising approval of the initiative to ban minarets at the federal level in November 2009 (Hirter & Vatter, 2010), the rejection of all proposals for the recognition of the Muslim minority under public law in the cantons, and the comparatively high proportion of negative referendums on foreigners’ rights make clear that the voters decide to the disadvantage of a minority in particular when this minority is perceived by the public as poorly integrated and represents foreign values. As a non-Christian minority and as foreigners, Muslims are doubly affected by this”.

not in fact take religious belonging into account, the fact that Turkey and Kosovo are countries with a majority Muslim population might mean that religious discrimination is at work here.

Regarding access to the labour market, Fibbi and colleagues have carried out two correspondence tests to assess whether fictional candidates from first (Fibbi, Kaya, & Piguet, 2003) and second (Zschirnt & Fibbi, 2019) generations were disadvantaged on the labour market compared to candidates without a migratory background. These studies showed that, all qualifications and socio-demographics being equal, first-generation non-Swiss candidates (born abroad but having completed schooling in Switzerland), as well as second-generation Swiss candidates (born in Switzerland and naturalized), are less likely than their native counterparts to obtain a job interview. Candidates whose origins lie in Turkey or Kosovo are especially disadvantaged. Another study that uses the same data but explores more subtle discrimination, such as the tone of the response or the time that it takes for the response to arrive, comes to the same conclusion (Zschirnt, 2019).

In the field of naturalization, Hainmueller and Hangartner's natural experiment shows that discrimination exists in the granting of citizenship to candidates with the same origins (former Yugoslavia and Turkey), although the experiment could not confirm that the cause of this discrimination was Islamophobia (Hainmueller & Hangartner, 2013).

Finally, as for access to housing, a correspondence test with fictitious people responding to an ad for a flat reveals that those with Kosovar and Turkish names are less likely to be invited to visit the flat than people with typical Swiss-sounding names or names from neighbouring countries. What explains the difference in positive response rates is ethnic discrimination, since the fictitious applicants only differed in their names, while being identical in every other respect (Auer, Lacroix, Ruedin, & Zschirnt, 2019).

As for the question of whether and to what extent Muslims **perceive this discrimination**, research reveals high levels of perceived discrimination among the Muslim population, these levels varying across ethnic groups and life domains. Gianni and colleagues demonstrate that non-Swiss Muslims from the former Yugoslavia, Turkey and North Africa perceived significant levels of discrimination, with perceived group discrimination being more important than individually experienced discrimination. The percentages vary by group of origin, with people

from the Maghreb being the group that feels the most discriminated against on religious grounds, followed by Turks and then people from the former Yugoslavia. In terms of life domains, the most affected are education and the labour market (Gianni et al., 2015, pp. 52-56). Population surveys from the FSO and a private research institute (GFS Bern) point in a similar direction, showing as they do that three out of ten Muslims had perceived discrimination in the previous year (Federal Statistical Office, 2020, p. 28; Golder, Mousson, & Tschöpe, 2018, p. 4). These studies do not explore correlates and interactions, however, which means that their understanding of these perceptions is quite superficial. As for the effect that the perception of discrimination has on life chances, such as on mental health outcomes – this has not yet been dealt with by any research programme in Switzerland.

Finally, there has also been no investigation at all of how Muslims in Switzerland **respond to discrimination**.

To sum up, empirical research on discrimination against Muslims in Switzerland has mainly focused on majority attitudes and discourses, and has highlighted the preponderance of negative attitudes towards Muslims and Islam, and the fact that they are framed negatively in the media. What has been largely neglected in the research, however, are the objective effects of such negative attitudes (objective perspective). There have been very few studies on life chances, and the few studies that there are do not directly address religious belonging as a ground for discrimination. There has also been little attention paid to how the minority population in Switzerland experiences discrimination (minority perspective). It is these empirical gaps that the present thesis seeks to fill, and we do so by using different data and methodologies to study both perspectives (objective and minority).

1.4 Methodology: Research opportunities, diverse data, diverse methods

Sociology is an intellectual discipline and should indeed remain so. But the question is if we should let philosophical discourses about, say, the possibility of knowledge, capture us too much. There is a risk that we end up like Freud's patient who always polished his glasses but never put them on (Brante, 2001, p. 186).

The individual chapters will discuss the methods used in detail. However, since we draw on four types of data in total, it is worth clarifying why we privilege certain types of data, and what our stance is on scientific research in general.

Epistemological stance

To echo Brante's analogy, we could say that our aim is to put our glasses on and look at discrimination against Muslims in Switzerland. The question here is whether "discrimination" and "Muslims" are only "reified constructions" that are only made by scientific discourses and do not exist in reality. Or whether they do exist in social reality independently of social scientists, and can therefore be considered "research objects" that scientific methods can yield knowledge about. This kind of question has been the centre of heated epistemological and ontological debate in the social sciences since the 1960s, when positivism was questioned and opposed by relativism. We adhere in this thesis to a realist stance that is inspired by Brante's realist postulates for the social sciences: namely, that "[t]here is a social reality existing independently of social scientists' representations or awareness of it (ontological postulate for social science)", that "[i]t is possible to achieve knowledge about this reality (epistemological postulate)", and that "[a]ll knowledge is fallible — and correctable (methodological postulate)" (Brante, 2001, p. 172).

This does not debunk the constructivist view that certain social phenomena are constructed by preconceptions, as examples of self-fulfilled prophecies illustrate, and that social phenomena are the products of human beings and are not naturally given. In fact, constructivism has achieved an important consensus in challenging essentialist approaches to social phenomena: social categories and mechanisms, like "ethnicity" or "inequalities", are not naturally given, nor stable over time and across societies; rather, they are constructed and contingent. However, as Wimmer puts it, we should "go beyond this consensus" and try to explain why and how such categories matter (or do not matter) in the way that resources are allocated to different degrees and in different forms across societies and times:

"So far, constructivist scholarship has achieved little in comparatively explaining these varying roles played by ethnic distinctions. The failure to develop a comparative analytic is perhaps due to constructivists'

preoccupation with epistemological questions, with exorcising essentialism, reification, and objectification from the study of ethnicity. This struggle sometimes leads researchers to exaggerate the constructivist position and to overlook empirical variation in how ethnicity shapes the life of individuals” (Wimmer, 2013, p. 2).

This realist postulate has important implications for the research object of this thesis. The category of “Muslim” is of course a social construction in the sense that language is used to classify a heterogeneous group of human beings on the basis of a single criterion (religious belonging), which is itself a human construction and not a biological and immutable given. However, the existence of such a category has real consequences for individuals in society, since it is used by individuals either to define themselves (in-group identification), this being the case for example when a respondent indicates “Muslim” in a survey questionnaire, or to define others (out-group identification). What is more, the way we as social scientists define these categories or what categories we choose to use, changes the contours of the very phenomenon that we seek to describe and explain. For example, our results are very likely to differ greatly, depending on whether we define “Muslims” through how people define themselves, or through their filiation. Similarly, the phenomenon that we observe will again be different, if we decide that the category of “Muslim” is not relevant, but that of “non-Christian” is.

Whether individuals themselves identify as Muslims, or whether they are ascribed a Muslim identity, or whether some attributes are ascribed to this “Muslim identity” – these categorizations have a concrete impact on individuals, such as unequal access to resources, which we can call “discrimination”. Again, “discrimination” is of course a term that aims to encapsulate or identify a very complex reality, and our theoretical choices influence how we conceive it. Nonetheless, it can certainly not be regarded as being merely a construct of scientific discourse: “The content of scientific facts is a product of many factors. One of these is reality” (Brante, 2001, p. 189).

Hence, like other scholars working on racism in general, we claim that the impact of categorization is real (discrimination), that it exists independently of our decision to study it, and that well-chosen scientific methods can at least partially describe and explain it. We also

believe that comparing groups is both beneficial and feasible. Comparing how Muslims perceive discrimination with how other minority or majority groups do so, or comparing the reporting behaviour of Muslims and Jews, allows us to identify both peculiarities and similarities, and therefore achieve a better understanding of out-group discrimination. This by no means hierarchizes the status of victims or minimizes one or the other experience of racism. As Schiffer and Wagner point out, “[t]o compare is not to equate [...]. Quite the contrary. When comparing, one naturally also examines the differences between two things. To equate anti-Semitism and Islamophobia would not only be a moral problem, but an analytical one as well” (Schiffer & Wagner, 2011, p. 78).

Methodological choices

As the large empirical literature on discrimination shows, this social phenomenon can be analyzed by drawing on a wide range of data, by using various methods, and by answering many different research questions. Focusing on one or the other aspect or perspective with regard to the discrimination described above, researchers utilize data as varied as observational data from population surveys, results from field or lab experiments, qualitative data from in-depth interviews, records of court cases, and media content, to name a few (for an overview, see Pager & Shepherd, 2008; Quillian, 2006). The choice of data and the appropriate analytical strategies depends on factors such as the research question, the accessibility of the data, and disciplinary affinities.

The methods used in this thesis take a pragmatic approach,⁸⁰ and depend on data opportunities and research questions. In short, researchers who adhere to such an approach “consider the research question more important than either the method or the worldview supposed to underlie the method. They address their research questions with any methodological tools available using the pragmatic credo of ‘what works’” (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 1998, p. 23). Indeed, we see methods as being not good or bad *per se*, but rather suitable or unsuitable to a certain type of data and/or a certain research question. This stance implies that we do not think that we must decide between supposedly mutually exclusive

⁸⁰ Not to be confused with a “pragmatist” approach, which is derived from the philosophical tradition of pragmatism that influenced the social sciences mostly through authors such as Dewey and James (Frega & Carreira da Silva, 2011).

options: *either* deduction *or* induction, *either* total context-dependency *or* generalization, *either* qualitative *or* quantitative data. In this, we follow Morgan in his plea for a pragmatic approach that privileges an iterative reasoning “that moves back and forth between induction and deduction”, and “where the inductive results from a qualitative approach can serve as inputs to the deductive goals of a quantitative approach, and vice versa” (Morgan, 2007, p. 71). Morgan’s plea also highlights the compatibility between a realist stance and a pragmatic approach, when he states that, “[i]n a pragmatic approach, there is no problem with asserting both that there is a single ‘real world’ and that all individuals have their own unique interpretations of that world” (Morgan, 2007, p. 72).

Thus, while differing in terms of data, methods, and the aspect of discrimination focused upon, the four articles that constitute this thesis are similar regarding the social phenomenon that they investigate and the scientific outlook that they adopt: in one way or another, they all study discrimination against Muslims in Switzerland and its effects, and employ a realist approach by using theory, methods, and empirical data to give valid answers to research questions about the social reality of such discrimination.

All in all, we draw on three types of data (observational data, qualitative interviews, registered cases/court proceedings regarding discrimination) from seven different datasets (LRCS 2014/2019, RS, corpus of interviews, DoSyRa database, FCR database, SIG database, CICAD database) that called for specific methods and helped answer distinct research questions linked to perceptions of discrimination among Muslims in Switzerland, as well as the effects of actual discrimination, and responses to it (see Table 1 for an overview of the data). Our choices were driven by data opportunities and new questions that arose during our investigations, these calling for adequate methods and involving specific threats to validity that needed to be addressed.

Table 1. An overview of the research questions, data used, and analytical strategies for each article

	ARTICLE 1	ARTICLE 2	ARTICLE 3	ARTICLE 4
References	Lindemann, A., & Stolz, J. (2018). The Muslim Employment Gap, Human Capital, and Ethno-Religious Penalties: Evidence from Switzerland. <i>Social Inclusion</i> , 6(2), 151–161.	Lindemann, A., & Stolz, J. (2021). Perceived discrimination among Muslims and its correlates. A comparative analysis. <i>Ethnic and Racial Studies</i> , 44(2), 173-194.	Lindemann, A. (2021). Discrimination against veiled Muslim women in Switzerland: insights from field experts. <i>Religions</i> , 12, 1-16.	Lindemann, A., & Stolz, J. (2022). To speak out or not to speak out? Exploring the reporting of discrimination among Muslims and Jews in Switzerland. <i>Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies</i> .
Research questions	How large is the Muslim employment gap in Switzerland, and to what extent can it be attributed to human capital, migratory factors, religiosity, and a hostile societal context?	How widespread is perceived discrimination among Muslims compared to other groups in Switzerland? What important correlates does perceived discrimination among Muslims have compared to other religious groups? More specifically, to what extent is perceived discrimination correlated with socio-structural disadvantages and religious/ethnic in-group identification?	How do governmental and non-governmental experts describe and explain the discrimination experienced by <i>hijabis</i> (women who wear a headscarf) in Switzerland, and how do these experts differ in terms of their knowledge of such discrimination?	What is the extent of perceived discrimination among Muslims and Jews, and how likely are they to report discriminatory incidents and take the matter to court? What cultural, institutional, and structural reasons might there be to explain possible differences between Muslims and Jews when it comes to reporting discriminatory incidents and initiating court proceedings?
Data	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> LCRS 2014 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> LCRS 2014 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 23 expert interviews 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> 27 expert interviews LCRS 2019 RS 2019 FRC legal database Racist incid. databases (3)
Analytical strategies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Logistic regression model predicting unemployment Difference explained variance Comparison of probabilities 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Predictive models of perceived discrimination Comparison of proportions Predicted means 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Thematic content analysis (TCA) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> TCA Proportion estimations based on population estimates Descriptives

This study does not adopt a mixed methods design per se (Maxwell & Loomis, 2003; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2003), but it does employ a multi-method approach in that it draws on different types of data and adopts both quantitative and qualitative research methods. As Teddlie and Tashakkori point out, mixed methods and multi-method designs are often confused (Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2003, p. 11). The first use data collection and data analysis techniques of quantitative and qualitative data either in parallel or in sequential phases within a single research project. The latter entail studies in which different data collection procedures are used independently, but whose “results are then triangulated to form a comprehensive whole” (Morse, 2003, p. 190).

For the first article, we were very interested when the first round of the LRCS was launched in 2014 and its data released in 2016 in looking at this representative population survey since it contained items that would allow us to replicate, this time on a national scale, Connor and Koenig’s well-known study of the Muslim employment gap in Europe (2015) that investigated whether Muslims are more disadvantaged on the labour market, and the extent to which the employment gap can be attributed to discrimination. This study is important because it addresses the difficult question of how to measure the effects of discrimination, and not just racial disparities, on a minority’s access to the labour market. We therefore adopted their methodology with the LRCS 2014 data, which contained an item on professional status. The method consists in logistic regression models predicting unemployment and a calculation of how much of the difference between Muslims and non-Muslims is explained by the models.⁸¹ We paid special attention to interactions between level of education and religious affiliation to identify the role of education in accessing the labour market. An important threat to validity was that of collinearity between variables grasping religious affiliation and origins. We addressed this threat by including one broad control variable (European/non-European) to avoid a too strong overlapping of religious and ethnic categories. We also opted for the concept of “ethno-religious” penalties to avoid jumping to conclusions about the possible motives for discrimination that employers may have. The results are interesting in that they point to national-scale tendencies, demonstrate the existence of obstacles to inclusion for

⁸¹ As reviewers pointed out, one could also have used a multilevel modeling approach with individuals (level 1) nested in cantons (level 2). We did not use this approach since we find an almost inexistant intra-class correlation (ICC = 0.053).

Muslims, and challenge the traditional assumption of the mediating role of human capital. Nonetheless, they fail to reveal the precise mechanisms at work and the qualitative differences between categories of Muslims.

The second article uses the same dataset, since the survey from which the dataset comes also contains detailed items on the perception of discrimination in different life domains across Switzerland that had not been investigated before. Coupled with items on religious belonging and religious/ethnic in-group identification, the survey is a perfect opportunity for us to examine how far and in what life domains Muslims perceive discrimination compared to other groups, and whether this is associated with in-group identification and other correlates. We were able to establish general tendencies that distinguish Muslims from other groups through proportion comparisons, predictive models for perceived discrimination among groups, and predicted means of perceived discrimination according to in-group identification. One of the most significant threats to validity was posed by the risk of collinearity between variables grasping ethnic and religious identification. This we addressed by including control variables and running Exploratory Factor Analyses to make sure that they were two different constructs. The results of this study are interesting in that they provide empirical evidence of widespread and generalized perceptions of discrimination among Muslims in Switzerland, which are similar in extent to what has been observed in other European countries, as well as strong support for the claim that there is a link between ethno-religious identification and experiences of discrimination. However, the results fail to prove actual discrimination and to test the direction of the association, and nor do they permit us to account for qualitative differences in the experience of discrimination for certain categories (women or visible Muslims, for example).

After these two quantitative studies investigating individual-level variables, our third and fourth studies aim at a meso-level understanding of factors shaping how people experience and respond to discrimination, such as cultural rationales, organizational resources, and structural features. Taking such meso-level factors into account in the study of discrimination has been encouraged by other authors in the field (Lamont et al., 2016). Given the existence of centres for victims of racism and the significant number of Muslim associations, we felt that individuals active in these structures would be a good entry point to help us come to a better understanding of structural and cultural mechanisms in processes of discrimination.

Labelled “state and non-state experts” respectively, these are defined by us using Meuser and Nagel’s conception of experts (2009) as “individuals who are active agents in a specific field and, through their social positioning and experience, acquire practical knowledge on particular issues” (Lindemann, 2021, p. 5).

To grasp the situated knowledge of these experts, we carried out semi-structured interviews with key informants from these two types of agencies in all three linguistic regions of Switzerland, the idea being that these experts have three characteristics that would serve our research purposes, and that that would not be possible with other sources of data: namely, they are in contact with many individuals who are discriminated against, and therefore hear many testimonies from victims, which gives them an overview of situations of discrimination that cannot be accounted for in survey data (the experience of visible Muslims, for example); their position in such structures gives them an understanding of broader social issues and how structures function; and, since they are active in agencies that deal with racism in general or Islamophobia in particular, their roles and discourses are important factors in the choice environment in which victims select coping strategies.

Using interviews with experts working in structures that deal with racism/Islamophobia is original and relevant first of all because it allows us to carry out a meso-level analysis, one that focuses not on the individual level (as the first articles do), but rather on the cultural and structural factors that shape how Muslims experience and respond to discrimination; and second because perceived discrimination can involve a very wide range of exclusionary attitudes and behaviours on the part of the majority population, from unwelcoming looks, to overt discrimination and even physical assault (Trittler, 2019, p. 1134). Drawing on expert interviews allows us to grasp this diversity of perceived discrimination, since such interviews are “receptacles” to many experiences of discrimination. Had we used qualitative interviews of, say, 30 Muslims, we would certainly not have had enough accounts of experiences of discrimination to cover this diversity.

Two issues addressed by the experts during the interviews attracted our attention for different reasons. First, the role that wearing the *hijab* has in processes of discrimination, something that, despite heated political debate, has been neglected in Switzerland. Second, the fact that Muslims seem to report and legally pursue cases of racial discrimination less

often than Jews, a tendency that data from different sources in Switzerland allow us to measure. Our third and fourth articles investigate these two issues.

The third article seeks to understand how experts describe and explain the discrimination experienced by women wearing the *hijab* in Switzerland, and how these experts differ in terms of their knowledge. We do so by coding the interviews thematically and comparing coded segments from state and non-state experts. Both sets of experts have a necessarily situated knowledge that is both narrower than that of the victim (it does not fully encompass the victim's exact point of view) and broader (it is an overview based on multiple testimonies). One of the challenges of this study was to judge the validity of the experts' descriptions, which we did by drawing on the testimony provided by a large number of experts who belonged to one of the two different types, and by carefully triangulating their insights.

Finally, the fourth article investigates the extent to which Muslims report and legally pursue cases of racial discrimination in comparison to Jews, and the reasons that could explain the differences. To assess the first part of the question, we drew on data from three systems that monitor racist incidents (DoSyRa, CICAD and SIG records) and legal cases initiated under art.261 bis (FCR records), as well as on data from the latest LRCS population survey and census (LRCS 2019, RS 2019), which helped us estimate the absolute number of individuals who perceived discrimination among the two groups. To identify the reasons for why Muslims might not report discrimination, we then used the interviews with the experts and added interviews from experts in Jewish organizations that run their own monitoring systems. Given the uncertainties linked to population estimates in the population census, one difficult task that we faced was to ensure the accuracy of our estimations. To do so, we ran simulations to calculate the *p*-values. We also limited our analyses to the year in which all the data were available, i.e. the year referred to in the survey's questionnaire (2019). Also, one possible problem was that the individuals surveyed in 2019 are not the same individuals who reported discrimination or initiated court proceedings. However, we made the assumption that the proportion of Muslims/Jews who felt discriminated against, and the number of court proceedings/reported cases, differ very little from one year to the next. Finally, we also had to apply the same caution with regard to the experts' interviews, since they reflect a situated knowledge rather than a direct experience of reporting; however, their active role in the

opportunity structure for reporting/legally pursuing a case of discrimination was exactly what we were looking for on this occasion.

1.5 Overview of the results

This thesis complements the state of the art by challenging some theoretical assumptions in the study of discrimination and by studying aspects of discrimination against Muslims that have received little attention in Switzerland. In fact, the first chapter (article 1) measures the Muslim employment gap and the extent to which it can be attributed to discrimination in the labour market (objective perspective); the second (article 2) investigates the perception of discrimination among Muslims (minority perspective); the third chapter (article 3) explains how the lives of Muslim women are affected by their wearing of the *hijab* (minority perspective); and, finally, the fourth chapter (article 4) analyzes one type of response to discrimination: namely, reporting the perpetrators of discrimination or taking them to court (minority perspective). The conclusion (section 6) discusses in more detail whether these results challenge or support existing theories.

Article 1, which was published in *Social Inclusion* and entitled “The Muslim employment gap, human capital, and ethno-religious penalties: Evidence from Switzerland” (Lindemann & Stolz, 2018), replicates for the Swiss case a study carried out on the aggregation of 17 Western countries (Connor & Koenig, 2015). We show not only that Muslims are strongly disadvantaged on the labour market, but also that this employment gap can reasonably be attributed to discrimination. Counterintuitively, human capital does not improve their chances in a linear way, which contradicts the theory on the mediating role of human capital on socio-economic outcomes for minority groups. In fact, the level of education moderates the likelihood of being unemployed among Muslims, with highly educated Muslims being more likely to be unemployed than their less educated counterparts. This finding has important implications for both the theoretical and political level, especially in the light of recent research on the paradox of integration. Furthermore, Muslim women are not more likely than Muslim men to be unemployed, which is also a counterintuitive finding given the wide empirical literature documenting discrimination against visible Muslim women.

Article 2, which was published in *Ethnic and Racial Studies* and entitled “Perceived discrimination among Muslims and its correlates: A comparative analysis” (Lindemann & Stolz, 2021), analyzes patterns of perceived discrimination among groups. It reveals through statistical analyses of survey data that Muslims show especially high levels of perceived discrimination compared to other minority and majority groups, no matter what their socio-economic status, gender, life domains, and grounds attributed to the discrimination are. In contrast to the other groups, in-group identification and activity in associations correlate strongly with these perceptions. This finding gives partial support to the rejection-identification theory, with the direction of the relationship remaining uncertain and the relationship being absent for other groups. The role of activity in an association should also be discussed in the light of theories of bonding vs. bridging social capital. The labour market stands out as the life domain where the perception of discrimination is at its strongest, which calls for more theorizing on the relative potential of exposure that different life domains entail.

An important aim remaining is to understand the qualitatively distinct nature of discrimination against Muslim women, and particularly visible Muslim women, since they are especially stigmatized (Helbling, 2014; Weichselbaumer, 2020). We therefore used a qualitative approach to investigate how wearing the *hijab* affects the extent to which this category of Muslim women enjoys socio-economic inclusion. Our third article, entitled “Discrimination against veiled Muslim women in Switzerland: insights from field experts” and published in *Religions* (Lindemann, 2021), carries out a qualitative analysis of 23 semi-structured interviews with field experts, and suggests that the *hijab* is the most important marker in processes of discrimination, and that such discrimination takes a variety of forms and affects a wide range of domains and socio-demographic profiles. These results provide the first empirical evidence of the impact of wearing the *hijab* in Switzerland, but it also makes a methodological contribution, since it is a good example of the relevance of expert interviews when access to representative data is hindered. One interesting result was the insistence of field experts that these women are unwilling to report discrimination to the relevant offices or to pursue the matter legally under article 261bis CP.

Article 4 investigates the issue of underreporting among Muslims in general. This is an issue that national and European reports have frequently mentioned, but that social scientists have

largely ignored. Published in the *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* and entitled “To speak out or not to speak out? Exploring the reporting of discrimination among Muslims and Jews in Switzerland”, this article uses the same qualitative material as the third article, and adds expert interviews from the Jewish community, data from records of reports of discrimination and legal proceedings among different groups. It appears that Muslims report discrimination significantly less often than Jews, and that this tendency to underreport cannot be entirely explained by the usual *homo oeconomicus* model. On the contrary, normative and structural factors, as well as the mobilization of organizational resources, create a choice-environment (Thaler, Sunstein, & Balz, 2013) or opportunity structure that discourages Muslims from reporting discrimination. For one thing, these results show how important cultural and institutional group-resources are for a person to be able to respond successfully to discrimination; unlike micro-level studies that focus on individual coping strategies, our meso-level analyses allow us to contribute to the burgeoning literature on how minorities respond to stigmatization. For another, they exemplify the benefits of adopting a multi-method research design and using expert interviews: it is only through triangulating very different kinds of data that we can measure rates of reporting (aggregated effects) and make sense of reporting behaviour among minority members who experience discrimination.

2 The Muslim employment gap, human capital, and ethno-religious penalties: Evidence from Switzerland

Published article

Lindemann, A., & Stolz, J. (2018). The Muslim Employment Gap, Human Capital, and Ethno-Religious Penalties: Evidence from Switzerland. *Social Inclusion*, 6(2), 151–161.

DOI : 10.17645/si.v6i2.1395

Version retrieved from the journal's website with its permission.

Article

The Muslim Employment Gap, Human Capital, and Ethno-Religious Penalties: Evidence from Switzerland

Anaïd Lindemann* and Jörg Stolz

Institute of Social Sciences of Religions, University of Lausanne, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland;
E-Mails: anaid.lindemann@unil.ch (A.L.), joerg.stolz@unil.ch (J.S.)

* Corresponding author

Submitted: 30 January 2018 | Accepted: 24 March 2018 | Published: 22 June 2018

Abstract

In Europe, Muslims are more likely to be unemployed than non-Muslims. Many studies try to explain this employment gap by human capital and contextual factors on the one hand, and by ethno-religious penalties (discrimination due to religious affiliation, religiosity, or migration factors) on the other. In these studies, it is normally assumed that human capital mediates the effect of Muslim affiliation, and that controlling for human capital will therefore reduce the odds for Muslims of being unemployed. We replicate the well-known study by Connor and Koenig (2015) along these lines, using the most recent and representative Swiss data from 2014 (N = 16,487). Our key result is that the effect of Muslim affiliation on unemployment is not mediated, but actually moderated by human capital. We find a powerful interaction in that Muslims both with a very low and a very high level of education are disproportionately often unemployed. This is important because it means that raising the human capital of Muslims will not automatically lessen, but may instead actually widen, the employment gap. We discuss possible theoretical mechanisms that might explain this finding.

Keywords

discrimination; employment penalties; ethno-religious penalties; integration; Islamophobia; labor market; migration; Muslims; religious minority; religious penalties; unemployment; xenophobia

Issue

This article is part of the issue “Complex Religion: Intersections of Religion and Inequality”, edited by Melissa J. Wilde (University of Pennsylvania, USA).

© 2018 by the authors; licensee Cogitatio (Lisbon, Portugal). This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (CC BY).

1. Introduction

Many recent studies have provided evidence that Muslims face difficulties in entering and succeeding in the labor market in European countries. This has been shown in specific national contexts (Adida, Laitin, & Vafort, 2010; Cheung, 2014; Khattab, 2009; Khattab & Modood, 2015; Kohler, 2012; Lindley, 2002) and in cross-national perspectives (Connor & Koenig, 2013, 2015; Heath, Rothon, & Kilpi, 2008; Tubergen, Maas, & Flap, 2004).

Several studies try to explain this employment gap by human capital and contextual factors on the one hand, and to ethno-religious penalties (discrimination, prejudice) on the other. In these studies, it is normally as-

sumed that human capital mediates the effect of Muslim affiliation, and that controlling for human capital will reduce the odds for Muslims of being unemployed. The central idea is that Muslims in Western European countries show higher unemployment partly because of a lack of human capital. Controlling for human capital and other individual and contextual factors should, it is thought, reduce the odds of unemployment for Muslims—and any differences that remain must be accounted for by other mechanisms, such as migratory factors and factors of religiosity; in short, “ethno-religious penalties”. Ethno-religious penalties can be defined as barriers or obstacles that an individual meets when trying to reach a position; these barriers or obstacles are

created or come into effect because of the ethnic or religious background of the individual (cf., Heath & Martin, 2013).

In this study, we engage with this literature by asking exactly the same questions for a country in which extensive research on the Muslim employment gap has not yet been carried out: Switzerland. To gain a focus, we replicate the methodology of the well-known study by Connor and Koenig (2015). Specifically, we also test the implicit assumption made by Connor and Koenig (2015) that human capital mediates the influence of Muslim affiliation on unemployment.

Our key question in this article is therefore: how great is the Muslim employment gap in Switzerland, and to what extent can it be attributed to human capital, migratory factors, religiosity, and a hostile societal context?

Our most central result is that the “mediation-assumption” made by the literature does not hold for the Swiss data. In our data, the effect of Muslim/non-Muslim affiliation on unemployment is not linearly mediated by human capital variables. In fact, we find a powerful *interaction* in that Muslims both with a very low and a very high level of education are disproportionately often unemployed. This is important because it means that raising the human capital of Muslims will not automatically lessen, but may instead actually widen, the employment gap. We discuss possible theoretical mechanisms that might explain this finding.

We use the most recent and representative data on Switzerland from the 2014 Language, Religion and Culture Survey provided by the Federal Office of Statistics (Flaugergues, 2016; Mayer, 2011) with $N = 16,487$. This is a high-quality data set that includes good measures for our different mechanisms.

Switzerland, with its multicultural and federalist history, is an interesting country to investigate with regard to the Muslim employment gap for two reasons. First, Muslims are the largest non-Christian religious minority, and the question of the presence of Muslims is one of the most salient themes in public discourse. Switzerland has experienced a growing religious diversity for the past sixty years; it has changed from being an almost exclusively Christian society (mainly Catholics and Protestants) to a pluralist society, including more than 20% “no religious affiliation” and an increasing number of minority religions, among which Muslims are the largest with more than 5% in 2014 (Baumann & Stolz, 2009; Flaugergues, 2016). Second, the Swiss population in different cantons has voted on specific issues related to migration and religion, allowing us to construct a measure of the degree of out-group hostility in the cantons and to test its effect on the Muslim employment gap. Switzerland is a so-called “direct democracy”, where people are called to vote on substantive issues on the national, cantonal, and local level at numerous times throughout the year. These direct democratic instruments can, depending on how these minorities are perceived as out-groups and their proportion in the region of residence, lead to

structural discrimination against them (Green, Fasel, & Sarasin, 2010; Vatter & Danaci, 2010).

We see a twofold contribution of our article. On the one hand, we investigate the Muslim employment gap in Switzerland, a country where this question has not yet been extensively studied. On the other, we challenge former research by showing that, for the Swiss case, a central assumption of many studies—namely, the mediating effect of human capital—does not hold. If our finding carries over to other contexts, it may mean that conclusions concerning the Muslim gap must be revised in many countries.

The plan of our article is standard. We present the state of the art in Section 2, and the theoretical framework in Section 3. Section 4 is concerned with the method used, Section 5 presents the results, and Section 6 concludes.

2. State of the Art

Heath et al. (2008) provide an overview of recent studies on the educational and labor market outcomes for second-generation minorities in ten Western European countries. What strikes the reader is the consistency of one result that arises from all the studies: Muslims are, regardless of ethnicity, always the most penalized group. This consistent Muslim penalty has been addressed from both national and cross-national perspectives.

A prominent example of a national study is Heath and Martin (2013), who also tackle the difficult “identification problem” (i.e., disentangling ethnicity from religious belonging) in Great Britain. Their results show a “consistent pattern for Muslim men and women to in which they experience greater labour market penalties than other members of their co-ethnic groups who belong to other (or no) religions” (Heath & Martin, 2013, p. 1024). The Swiss case has not yet received much attention in the sociological literature on ethno-religious penalties, with the exception of Kohler (2012), who points to a double discrimination for Muslim immigrants in Switzerland (being immigrant and being Muslim) that persists for the second generation. Two other works have provided evidence of discrimination in Switzerland against Turks and ex-Yugoslavs (Fibbi, Kaya, & Piguet, 2003), and against immigrants in general (Golder & Straubhaar, 1999), but without specifying the effect of religious belonging.

The most prominent example of a cross-national study is the research by Connor and Koenig (2015). Their paper aims to determine whether first- and second-generation Muslims in 17 Western European countries (including Switzerland) face barriers when entering the labour market. They use ESS data, pooled across countries and survey rounds (2002–2012). In their mediation analysis, they estimate logistic regression models predicting employment. Their null model enters Muslim/non-Muslim religious affiliation (and controls). They then estimate different models, with “variable sets, which capture potential individual-level mechanisms un-

derlying employment penalties. In this way, explained variance for the Muslim gap can be determined as each variable set is introduced” (Connor & Koenig, 2015, p. 194). They present an overall model as well as a model for the first and second generation. Their results show a significant employment gap (6% unemployment for non-Muslims, against 18% for Muslims). According to their models, 13% of this gap can be explained by variables capturing human capital; 1% by variables of religiosity; and 21% by variables measuring migration factors (Connor & Koenig, 2015, p. 196). Even after controlling for human capital factors, migratory variables and socio-demographic characteristics, some variance between Muslims and non-Muslims remains unexplained, which they use as a proxy for possible ethno-religious discrimination processes.

An important claim of this study is that the different variables representing the mechanisms are “mediating” variables. This means that Muslim/non-Muslim religious affiliation acts on unemployment “through” the intermediate variables specified by the mechanisms. It is the methodology of this study that we take as a model to analyse the Swiss case.

3. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses

3.1. Symbolic Boundaries and Social Closure

A first explanation for the Muslim employment gap focuses on symbolic boundaries and social closure. According to this explanation, a majoritarian non-Muslim society may engage in social closure and either consciously or unconsciously exclude Muslims from employment positions. Such social closure is often found concerning religious boundaries or attributes that are highly salient or “bright” in the respective society (Alba, 2005; Lamont & Molnár, 2002). In Switzerland, religion can be seen as a bright symbolic boundary since Islam is officially distinguished from a presumed “autochthonous culture”: a ban on building minarets is inscribed in the Constitution (Mayer, 2011; Rayner & Voutat, 2014), and the state regulates the religious market, privileging the Catholic and Reformed Churches. Several studies have highlighted how being a Muslim in Switzerland constitutes a marker of “otherness”, especially in media discourses (Behloul, 2009; Lindemann & Stolz, 2014). Fibbi et al. (2003) have empirically tested the exclusion of second-generation individuals from majority Muslim countries in Switzerland. Through a thorough testing method (consisting of sending fictitious resumes and analysing the rate of invitation to a job interview), they demonstrate that Albanians from ex-Yugoslavia and Turks in German-speaking Switzerland are respectively 59% and 30% less likely to be called back than Swiss people without a migratory background (Fibbi et al., 2003).

Of course, just because we find a Muslim employment gap, we cannot immediately conclude that social closure and discrimination are in operation, as the em-

ployment disparities could be explained by other mechanisms. In the following, we therefore present a series of alternative explanations that might each account at least in part for the employment differences between Muslims and the non-Muslim population.

3.2. Human Capital

Being a Muslim might lead to higher unemployment because of a lack of human capital. As Connor and Koenig (2015, p. 192) suggest, “[m]ost Muslim immigrants entering Europe have come from a lower socio-economic class background compared to the European population as a whole and sometimes to the other immigrant groups”. This explanation can apply to the Swiss case too, since the majority of Muslims have a migratory background. Furthermore, this fact leads to a situation in which the second generation of Muslim immigrants grows up in households with lower socio-economic status and less human capital than the surrounding society. The link between human capital and unemployment that underlies this argument is well established in the literature. We define “human capital” as the educational, linguistic, and social resources of an individual (cf., Bourdieu, 1986). This theory suggests that factors such as educational level, job training, language abilities, parental socio-economic characteristics, and the density of social networks should explain most of the variation of professional performance between individuals, be it in terms of access to the labour market, earnings, or occupational achievement (Becker, 1964, 1994). The relationship finds empirical support in recent studies. For example, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) published a report showing that:

In all OECD countries [including Switzerland], people with high qualifications have the highest employment rates, and in most countries, they also have the lowest risk of being unemployed. At the same time, people with the lowest educational qualifications are at greater risk of being unemployed or out of the labour market. (Valle, Normandeau, & González, 2015)

Note that the human capital account could at least in principle explain all or part of the Muslim employment gap without recourse to any discrimination or “ethno-religious penalties”. This is not the case for the following mechanisms, however.

3.3. Religiosity

Higher Muslim unemployment could also be caused by a religiosity mechanism. On this account, employers would discriminate not so much against Muslims as such, but only or particularly highly religious Muslims. Employers might think that highly religious Muslims could have an excessive cultural distance from general society, which could be harmful to their organization either in its inter-

nal functioning or in the interaction of the organization with the public, clients, or markets. Well-known examples are schools and stores that refrain from employing veiled women (for a literature review of experiments, see Weichselbaumer, 2016). Highly religious Muslims may also be stereotyped as “fanatics” or even associated with Islamic terrorism (Ettinger & Imhof, 2011; Gianni, Giugni, & Michel, 2015). Highly religious individuals could presumably be singled out by dress, appearance (e.g., veil, beard) or information otherwise obtained (e.g., in job interviews). It is empirically difficult to distinguish such social closure on the basis of religiosity on the one hand, and ethnicity on the other, but the distinction can and should be made at least analytically.

3.4. Migration Background

Another complex of factors affecting Muslim affiliation and higher unemployment are those of migration. Muslims in Switzerland are overwhelmingly either first- or second-generation immigrants (Flaugergues, 2016), and migration background is a well-known factor influencing unemployment in Switzerland (Fibbi et al., 2003; Golder & Straubhaar, 1999; Kohler, 2012). Just like religion, this factor can be seen as a bright boundary in Switzerland, partly because of the strict nationality law in Switzerland, which is based on the idea of *jus sanguinis* (Castles & Miller, 2003). In the light of such bright boundaries, migrants, and especially those working in manual labour, may have more difficulty gaining employment when competing with individuals without such a background. As a disruptive life event, migration can also indirectly affect unemployment probability by influencing human capital: through migration, individuals lose their social networks, are confronted in many cases with a new language, and may see their educational qualifications not recognized in the receiving country (Cheung, 2014).

Compared to the first generation of immigrants, the second generation can expect to see their situation improve because of the human capital (education, linguistic abilities, and social networks) that they have acquired in the country (Cheung, 2014, pp. 143–144). Other than this human capital hypothesis, we could expect that employers do not see individuals of the second generation as “culturally distant” because of their socialization in the autochthonous context. In terms of origins (nationality at birth), we can intuitively expect that non-European origins are perceived as culturally more distant than European origins. Consequently, employers could favour Europeans at the expense of non-Europeans. Also, acquiring Swiss nationality may be seen as an indicator of “integration” and may help when competing for employment.

3.5. Hostile Context

Finally, a xenophobic context would supposedly impact on the unemployment chances of individuals from different cultural and religious backgrounds. Studies us-

ing questionnaires have demonstrated that xenophobia and/or Islamophobia is present in Switzerland (for an in-depth theoretical discussion of these concepts and results, see Gianni et al., 2015; Helbling, 2008; Stolz, 2005). The most recent study points to the fact that non-Swiss Muslims feel discriminated amongst, with 21% of Turks, 31% of North Africans, and 15% of ex-Yugoslavians in the sample having had a feeling that they were discriminated against on the basis of their religion in the past 12 months (Gianni et al., 2015). Hostility towards immigrants and Muslims is reflected in the political context of Switzerland, where the campaigns and results of elections are useful indicators: support for the “anti-minaret” and “anti-mass-immigration” initiatives, in 2009 and 2014 respectively, by a majority of Swiss citizens are two of its clearest expressions. Both initiatives focused strongly (or, with the first initiative, exclusively) on the alleged threat that Muslims posed to Switzerland, Swiss democracy, and Swiss culture. Interestingly, supporters of the 2014 initiative linked mass migration with the existence of a (supposedly) ever-growing Muslim population. Here, the borders between Islamophobia and xenophobia are blurred. Cantons differed very markedly in their support or rejection of these initiatives. For example, the support given to the anti-minaret initiative by the rural canton of Thurgau was 67.7%, while the figure for the canton of Geneva was 40.3%. We capitalize on this important inter-cantonal variation and use the results of these elections to measure the degree of hostility towards Muslims/immigrants in each canton.

3.6. Accounting for the Muslim Employment Gap and Ethno-Religious Penalties

Our strategy will first be to ascertain whether there is in fact a Muslim employment gap in Switzerland. If there is, we will investigate how much of this gap can be “accounted for” when controlling for human capital, religiosity, migration background, and hostility of context. Any significant remaining differences that cannot be explained by human capital can be seen as forms of “ethno-religious penalties” and can be further unpacked with the other factors.

4. Methodology

4.1. Sample and Population

To analyse mechanisms accounting for Muslim/non-Muslim unemployment disparities, we use the most recent and representative data currently available for Switzerland: the 2014 Language, Religion and Culture Survey. Gathered by the Federal Statistical Office (FSO), this dataset used telephone-based interviews and, in a second stage, written questionnaires in all cantons of Switzerland. The response rate was 46.6%. It is a sample of 16,487 permanent residents aged 15 and above. As our study focuses on the labour market, we selected only

work-active individuals: permanent residents aged 16 (age when employment begins) to 64 (age of retirement), excluding also those individuals not able to work and those working full-time in the household. Since we analyse differences between Muslims and non-Muslims, we also excluded people who had not answered the question on their religious affiliation. We use weights provided by the FSO to calibrate socio-demographic variables.

We end up with a sample of 11,012 individuals, composed of 694 Muslims and 10,318 non-Muslims (namely, all other religious affiliations and those without a religious affiliation). In other words, our sample is made up of 6.3% of Muslims in the active population, which is slightly more than the 5% of the Muslim population in the general resident population (Flaugergues, 2016). Because some variables lack data, the logistic regressions are run with a slightly lower $N = 10,916$ (Muslims $n = 682$; non-Muslims $n = 10,234$). Fortunately, only 12 Muslims had to be excluded for the reason of missing data.

We define as “Muslim” any individual who identifies himself or herself with Islam or with any specific denomination considered Islamic by the FSO, such as Sunnism, Shiism, Alevism, and Sufism (Flaugergues, 2016). Non-Muslims are therefore all individuals who identify themselves with other religions or who say that they have no religious affiliation or are atheist/agnostic. Individuals who did not answer the question were excluded from our sample.

4.2. Variables and Operationalization

Our dependent variable is unemployment, translated into a binary variable “employed/unemployed”, where employed is the reference modality. The definition of “unemployed” in our data is based on the definition provided by the International Labor Office (ILO), according to which an unemployed individual is a person who is available to work but currently not working and who has been looking for a job for the last four weeks (Walter et al., 2016). Muslim affiliation was measured by self-identification.

As in the methodology used by Connor and Koenig (2015), the different mechanisms accounting for unemployment differences between Muslims and non-Muslims are captured by sets of mediating variables:

Human capital was measured by three variables. Education is a four-step variable distinguishing between completed compulsory schooling, non-compulsory schooling (apprenticeship, post-16 education), higher professional education, and university education (including the *Hochschulen*, HEP, HES). A dichotomous variable measures whether the interviewer detected no linguistic difficulties or some (small or significant) linguistic difficulties in the respondent’s answers. Another dichotomous variable captures whether the respondent engages in some or no voluntary activity (i.e., indicator of social network as part of human capital) (Nakhaie & Kazemipur, 2013).

¹ We did not use multi-level modelling (with cantons as higher level) because of insufficient numbers of Muslims in several cantons.

Religiosity was measured by an additive scale composed of frequency of attendance at religious services and frequency of prayer (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .661$). This measure represents a theoretical and methodological challenge, like any research dealing with religiosity (Cutting & Walsh, 2007). Tests have been made to make sure biases are not introduced for Muslim women (not compelled to attend religious services) and are discussed in the analyses.

Migration background was captured with three variables. A three-step variable distinguishes autochthonous individuals from first-generation and second-generation immigrants. According to the definitions of the FSO, autochthonous individuals are Swiss-born with at least one parent born in Switzerland, and naturalized individuals with both parents born in Switzerland (Flaugergues, 2016). We define second generation as individuals born in Switzerland or those who arrived before the age of 12 (attended primary school in Switzerland); and first generation as non-Swiss, foreign-born individuals or those who arrived after the age of 11. A dichotomous variable distinguishes between individuals of European and non-European origin. We define “European” in geographical terms (Europe as a continent) based on the classification of the FSO, and not in political terms (part of the European Union). Our data did not allow for a more precise inclusion of ethnicity/nationality in the models because of collinearity problems, i.e., a too strong overlap between variables of ethnicity and religion. A dichotomous variable distinguishes between individuals of Swiss nationality (be this by birth or “naturalization”) and non-Swiss nationality.

Hostility of cantonal context was measured by adding two variables: the percentage of support in a canton for the anti-minaret referendum of 2009, and for the mass-immigration referendum of 2012. The two variables are strongly correlated (Cronbach’s $\alpha = .960$).

We also controlled for individual level variables of age (a continuous variable), sex (female/male), and marital status (married/not married), as well as for two additional contextual factors: the rate of unemployment in the canton and a dichotomous variable distinguishing between individuals living in an urban or rural area.

4.3. Analytical Strategy

Following the analytical strategy of Connor and Koenig (2015), we explain the Muslim employment gap with a series of logistic regressions predicting employment.¹ A first model only enters the Muslim/non-Muslim variable (including controls) and represents the baseline model. Every one of the following models introduces one set of mediating variables representing a specific mechanism. Comparing the baseline model with every one of the following models concerning the size of the effect of Muslim affiliation on unemployment gives us a measure of how much of the gap can be explained by the respective mechanism.

We checked for the multicollinearity assumption and did not include some variables in the models or rework them: we do not control for linguistic region as this variable is highly correlated with the percentage of unemployment.

We present seven models: model 1 only includes the religious-affiliation variable and controls; model 2 enters human capital variables; model 3 tests religiosity; model 4 concerns migration variables; model 5 tests hostility of cantonal context; model 6 is a full model without interactions; finally, model 7 adds an educational interaction. For each model, we indicate the odd's ratios $\exp(\beta)$ and their degree of significance ($p < .05$). We also indicate a measure for the difference of β -coefficient of the Muslim affiliation of the respective model to that of the baseline model—this is interpreted as the percentage of the Muslim employment gap that can be accounted for by the mediating variables of the specified mechanism.

5. Findings

5.1. Descriptive Results

As the descriptive statistics show below (Table 1), Muslims (8.9%) are more likely to be unemployed than non-Muslims (3.5%). This represents a significant employment gap between Muslims and non-Muslims in Switzerland.

Other differences can be found between the two groups (Table 1). Muslims are more likely than non-Muslims to be male and young, and they mostly live in urban areas; Muslims are significantly less likely to have entered post-school education and they are five times more

likely to have linguistic difficulties than non-Muslims. It is a very new immigrant population since the majority are from the first generation (born elsewhere and arrived after the age of 11). Most have European origins, while a third have Swiss nationality in 2014. Interestingly, and quite contrary to public expectations, they do not differ in terms of intensity of religiosity. Regarding perception of discrimination, while 8% of non-Muslims say that they have felt discriminated against during the last 12 months, 16% of the Muslim respondents mention such feelings. This variable is not taken into account in the explicative analysis of unemployment, but it gives us a hint at the situation of Muslims in Switzerland.

These findings replicate what other scholars have found about Muslims in Switzerland (Gianni et al., 2015; Gianni, Purdie, Lathion, & Jenny, 2010). The question is, however, whether these differences also help to explain the Muslim employment gap. To answer this question, we now present the results of the logistic regressions predicting unemployment.

5.2. Explanatory Results

The results of mediating models in Table 2 present the logged odds ($\exp(\beta)$) and their significance levels. All models control for age, gender, marital status, unemployment in the canton, and urban area. Our first model only introduces the dichotomous variable Muslim/non-Muslim affiliation (together with the controls) and acts as a baseline model. It shows that, for the Swiss case, Muslims are 2.434 times more likely to be unemployed. This represents the “baseline Muslim employment gap”.

Table 1. Variable means and percentages by group.

	Muslims	Non-Muslims
Unemployed	0.089*	0.035*
Women	0.379*	0.478*
Age	34*	41*
Married	0.622*	0.495*
% of unemployment in canton	0.032	0.031
Lives in a city	0.591*	0.467*
Compulsory schooling	0.328*	0.127*
Non-compulsory schooling	0.544*	0.476*
Post-school education	0.128*	0.397*
At least one voluntary commitment	0.419*	0.534*
Minor or significant linguistic difficulties	0.331*	0.079*
Religiosity (1 to 7 scale)	2.56	2.66
— Autochthonous	0.052*	0.639*
— 1st generation (arrived after 11)	0.598*	0.265*
— 2nd generation (arrived before 12 or born in Switzerland)	0.350*	0.096*
European origin (nationality at birth)	0.788*	0.947*
Swiss passport	0.377*	0.730*
% of support in canton for anti-minaret campaign	0.567	0.573
% of support in canton for anti-mass-migration campaign	0.493*	0.501*
Felt discriminated against during the last 12 months	0.186*	0.079*

Notes: Sample limited to individuals in the labour force; * Cramer V of $p < 0.05$.

Table 2. Logistic regression with $\exp(\beta)$ coefficients predicting unemployment.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7
Symbolic boundaries:							
Muslim affiliation							
Muslim (ref: non-Muslim)	2.434***	1.734***	2.336***	1.652*	2.448***	1.373*	3.756**
Human capital							
• Compulsory schooling (ref: HE/university)		1.838***				1.683**	1.615**
• Non-compulsory schooling (ref: HE/university)		1.641***				1.680***	1.938***
• Professional education (ref: HE/university)		0.696				0.746	0.840
• Linguistic difficulties (ref: none)		1.951***				1.486**	1.535**
• Voluntary commitment (ref: no commitment)		0.771*				0.775*	0.774*
Religiosity							
Religiosity			1.143**			1.112**	1.112**
Migratory background							
• First generation (ref: autochthonous)				1.654**		1.530**	1.535*
• Second generation (ref: autochthonous)				1.674**		1.588**	1.635**
• Citizenship (ref: non-Swiss)				0.865		.947	.928
• Non-European origin (ref: European origin)				1.981***		0.550**	0.568***
Hostile context							
Hostility of canton					1.017*	1.018*	1.018*
Human Capital Interaction							
• Compulsory schooling X Muslim							0.550
• Non-compulsory schooling X Muslim							0.207***
• Professional education X Muslim							0.000
Constant	0.025***	0.011***	0.019***	0.029***	0.121***	0.006***	0.004***
Muslim/non-Muslim difference explained variance ⁽¹⁾	—	38.0%	4.7%	43.6	– 0.6%	64.4%	—

Notes: Total N = 10,916 (Muslims n = 682; non-Muslims n = 10,234). Models control also for age, gender, marital status, unemployment in the canton and urban area. * = $p < 0.05$; ** = $p < 0.01$; *** = $p < 0.001$. (1) Calculated as $(\beta(\text{Baseline model}) - \beta(\text{this model})) / (\beta(\text{Baseline model}))$ for the Muslim affiliation coefficient.

In Model 2, we enter our mediating human capital variables of education, linguistic difficulties, and voluntary commitment. Doing so reduces the $\exp(\beta)$ coefficient: Muslims are in this model only 1.734 more likely to be unemployed than non-Muslims. Another way of saying this is that we can account for 38% of the employment gap by introducing human capital variables. It is interesting to see that both linguistic difficulties and lack of formal education are about more or less equally important in explaining some of the employment gap (although we will show in later models that the link to formal education is actually a complex one).

Model 3 shows that religiosity has only very little explanatory power. We can account only for 4.7% of the

unemployment differences. This result is very much in line with previous findings by Connor and Koenig (2015, p. 196). Our religiosity measure included frequency of attendance at religious services, and, since mosque attendance is not compulsory for women, one might suspect that our results may be biased. To check for this possibility, we ran our model separately for men and women. The results are very similar for both groups, with an $\exp(\beta)$ coefficient for religiosity of 1.161** and of 1.130** respectively. We conclude that there does not seem to be bias caused by our religiosity measure.

In Model 4, migratory variables are introduced, accounting for 43.6% of the employment gap. Three points seem to be important here. First, there is no significant

difference in the mediating effect of the generation variable. This is surprising since one could have expected that members of the group of second-generation immigrants might have more resources leading to less unemployment. Second, and surprisingly, citizenship has no significant mediating effect. Third, a very strong mediating effect can be found in the European/non-European distinction. Non-Europeans face higher employment barriers. Clearly, non-European origin is an important disadvantage on the Swiss labour market and it raises the question of intersectionality between origins and religious affiliation in the experience of discrimination.² We can note, however, that, even when we control for their European or non-European origin, Muslims still remain 1.652 times more likely to be unemployed than non-Muslims, which points to specific religious discrimination.

Model 5 enters hostility of cantonal context. The effect is barely significant and controlling for this variable does not reduce the odds of Muslim unemployment but increases it slightly. The effect is very small and should be interpreted with care.

Model 6 includes all sets of variables (except interactions) and shows that their mediating influence accounts for 64.4% of the unemployment differences given by the baseline model.

Model 7 introduces an interaction between education and Muslim affiliation. This interaction is strong and

highly significant. Introducing an interaction (or “moderating effect”) means that we cannot interpret the coefficients in the same way as we did in the previous models. Muslim affiliation no longer has a common overall effect on unemployment, but different effects depending on educational achievement. Thus, Muslims with a university degree (the reference in the education group) are 3.756 times more likely to be unemployed than non-Muslims in general. Compared to this group, Muslims who have had post-compulsory schooling are unemployed significantly less often.

The effect can be seen in Figure 1. We see that both Muslims with compulsory education and Muslims with university education have a significantly higher probability of being unemployed than Muslims with non-compulsory education and professional education (although, because of small N, the latter effect does not turn out to be significant). Formal education clearly diminishes the probability of being unemployed when going from compulsory to non-compulsory and professional education—but it then raises the unemployment probability again when going to university education. This is an interesting finding, since the literature expects education to lower the probabilities of unemployment.

We can only speculate as to possible reasons for this finding. Individuals with a university degree often have an education that is less clearly geared to a profession




Figure 1. Probability of being unemployed for Muslims compared to non-Muslims for different levels of education.

² According to intersectional approaches, one cannot use analytical categories such as gender, race, and class independently, in the sense that they produce overlapping structures of inequalities (Browne & Misra, 2003). The same can be said about religious affiliation and ethnicity: they work as “simultaneous and linked’ social identities” (Wilde & Glassman, 2016), and it is not always possible to distinguish discrimination mechanisms based on one or the other.

than individuals who have a qualification from a post-school training institution; they may also lack social networks, which are useful to access the labour market after university. In such a situation, the ethno-religious penalty may become important when competing with non-Muslim individuals for highly attractive jobs.

We must remember, however, that, for the majority of Muslims in Switzerland, formal education works in the expected direction. Most Muslims in Switzerland have either compulsory (32.8%) or non-compulsory (54.4%) education, and, for them, the well-known education-leads-to-employment mechanism works. It is only for a smaller group of Muslims (12.8%) with university or professional education that the reverse mechanism seems to operate.

6. Conclusions

In this article, we have investigated whether (1) a Muslim employment gap exists in Switzerland, and (2) to what extent this gap may be attributed to human capital, migratory factors, religiosity, and a hostile societal context.

A number of results confirm what former research in other countries or cross-country research has shown: namely, that there is indeed a significant Muslim employment gap in Switzerland. Without controls, Muslims have a probability of being unemployed of 8.9%, while non-Muslims only have a probability of 3.5%. In terms of odds and controlling for socio-demographic variables (without education), Muslims are 2.4 times more likely to be unemployed than non-Muslims. Other findings that confirm previous research are that human capital factors and migration factors are indeed important and explain much of the variance of the employment gap; and that religiosity is only a very minor factor and does not explain much of the employment gap. We find, like much of the literature, that the second generation of Muslims do not fare significantly better in terms of employment than the first generation.

Three findings are surprising and contribute to the state of the art in a novel way.

First, we find that citizenship does not explain any variance of the employment gap. Swiss citizenship is difficult to obtain; the criteria are strict and obtaining Swiss citizenship means for immigrants an important investment in terms of time, energy, and money. Facilitating naturalization is often proposed as a means of integrating immigrants further. It is therefore remarkable that we do not find any significant effect arising from citizenship. One explanation might be that citizenship is so difficult to obtain that it cannot be a good indicator of integration.

Second, we have used an original measure: the hostility to migrants and Muslims in a cantonal context. We find a statistically significant effect, but only a small effect that does not reduce the Muslim affiliation coefficient, but rather increases it. Substantively, this can be explained by the fact that we find unemployed Muslims more often in cantons with less out-group hostility.

The reason is simply that in the very rural cantons with the highest levels of anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant attitudes, there are hardly any Muslims.

Our most important new finding is clearly that the effect of Muslim affiliation on unemployment is not mediated, but actually moderated by human capital. We find a powerful interaction in that Muslims with both a very low and a very high level of education are disproportionately often unemployed.

The finding is important because it means that raising the human capital of Muslims will not automatically lessen, but may actually widen, the employment gap. It seems worthwhile exploring this phenomenon further, be it with additional quantitative or qualitative methods. It would also be very interesting to see whether the finding can be generalized to other contexts. If it holds and is found to be a generalizable phenomenon, then we will have to think differently about the relationship of human capital and Muslim employment opportunities.

Acknowledgements

The authors thank André Berchtold and Jean-Philippe Antonietti for their help with statistical procedures used in this article. We also thank Ms Amélie de Flaugergues for her time and consideration in the exploratory phase of this research. Finally, we are grateful to the FSO for the provided ELRC dataset. We thank David West for correcting the English version of this text.

Conflict of Interests

The authors declare no conflict of interests.

References

- Adida, C. L., Laitin, D. D., & Vafort, M.-A. (2010). Identifying barriers to Muslim integration in France. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, 107(52), 22384–22390.
- Alba, R. (2005). Bright vs. blurred boundaries: Second-generation assimilation and exclusion in France, Germany, and the United States. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 28(1), 20–49.
- Baumann, M., & Stolz, J. (2009). *La nouvelle Suisse religieuse. Risques et chances de sa diversité*. Genève: Labor Et Fides
- Becker, G. (1964). *Human capital. A theoretical and empirical analysis*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
- Becker, G. (1994). Human capital revisited. In G. S. Becker (Ed.), *Human capital: A theoretical and empirical analysis with special reference to education* (3rd ed., pp. 15–28). Chicago, IL: National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Behloul, S. M. (2009). Discours total! Le débat sur l'islam en Suisse et le positionnement de l'islam comme religion publique. In M. S. Purdie, M. Gianni, & M. Jenny

- (Eds.), *Musulmans d'aujourd'hui. Identités plurielles en Suisse* (pp. 53–71). Genève: Labor et Fides.
- Bourdieu, P. (1986). The forms of capital. In J. Richardson (Ed.), *Handbook of theory and research for the sociology of education* (pp. 241–258). New York, NY: Greenwood.
- Browne, I., & Misra, J. (2003). The intersection of gender and race in the labor market. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 29, 487–513.
- Castles, S., & Miller, M. J. (2003). *The age of migration: International population movements in the modern world*. New York, NY: Guilford.
- Cheung, S. Y. (2014). Ethno-religious minorities and labour market integration: Generational advancement or decline? *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 37(1), 140–160.
- Connor, P., & Koenig, M. (2013). Bridges and barriers: Religion and immigrant occupational attainment across integration contexts. *International Migrant Review*, 47(1), 3–38.
- Connor, P., & Koenig, M. (2015). Explaining the Muslim employment gap in Western Europe: Individual-level effects and ethno-religious penalties. *Social Science Research*, 49, 191–201.
- Cutting, M., & Walsh, M. (2007). Religiosity scales: What are we measuring in whom? *Archive for the Psychology of Religion*, 30(2008), 137–153.
- Ettinger, P., & Imhof, K. (2011). *Ethnisierung des Politischen und Problematisierung religiöser Differenz*. Schlussbericht. Zurich: Forschungsbereich Öffentlichkeit und Gesellschaft/Universität Zürich. Retrieved from http://www.nfp58.ch/files/news/116_NFP58_Schlussbericht_Imhof.pdf
- Fibbi, R., Kaya, B., & Piguët, E. (2003). *Nomen est omen: Quand s'appeler Pierre, Afrim ou Mehmet fait la différence*. Berne: Herausgeber. Retrieved from http://www.humanrights.ch/upload/pdf/100630_synthesis_nomen_est_omen.pdf
- Flaugergues, A. D. (2016). *Pratiques et croyances religieuses et spirituelles en Suisse. Premiers résultats de l'Enquête sur la langue, la religion et la culture 2014*. Neuchâtel: Office fédéral de la statistique OFS.
- Gianni, M., Giugni, M., & Michel, N. M. (2015). *Les musulmans de Suisse. Profil et intégration*. Lausanne: Presses polytechniques et universitaires romandes.
- Gianni, M., Purdie, M. S., Lathion, S., & Jenny, M. (2010). *Vie musulmane en Suisse. Profils identitaires, demandes et perceptions des musulmans en Suisse*. Berne-Wabern: Commission fédérale pour les questions de migration CFM.
- Golder, S. M., & Straubhaar, T. (1999). *Discrimination in the Swiss labour market: An empirical analysis* (Working paper). London: Centre for Economic Policy Research.
- Green, E. G. T., Fasel, N., & Sarrasin, O. (2010). The more the merrier? The effects of type of cultural diversity on exclusionary immigration attitudes in Switzerland. *International Journal of Conflict and Violence*, 4(2), 177–190.
- Heath, A., & Martin, J. (2013). Can religious affiliation explain 'ethnic' inequalities in the labour market? *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 36(6), 1005–1027.
- Heath, A., Rethon, C., & Kilpi, E. (2008). The second generation in Western Europe: Education, unemployment, and occupational attainment. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 34, 211–235.
- Helbling, M. (2008). *Islamophobia in Switzerland: A new phenomenon or a new name for xenophobia?* Paper presented at the Annual conference of the Midwest Political Science Association (MPSA), Chicago.
- Khattab, N. (2009). Ethno-religious as a determinant of educational and occupational attainment in Britain. *Sociology*, 43(2), 304–322.
- Khattab, N., & Modood, T. (2015). Both ethnic and religious: Explaining employment penalties across 14 ethno-religious groups in the United Kingdom. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 54(3), 501–522.
- Kohler, P. (2012). *Three essays on the economic and cultural integration of migrants in Switzerland: Putting into perspective the influence of economic discrimination and of host society culture* (PhD dissertation). University of Geneva, Switzerland.
- Lamont, M., & Molnár, V. (2002). The study of boundaries in the social sciences. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 28, 167–195.
- Lindemann, A., & Stolz, J. (2014). Use of Islam in the definition of foreign otherness in Switzerland. A comparative analysis of media discourses between 1970 and 2004. *Islamophobia Studies Journal*, 2(1), 44–58.
- Lindley, J. (2002). Race or religion? The impact of religion on the employment and earnings of Britain's ethnic communities. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 28(3), 427–442.
- Mayer, J.-F. (2011). A country without minarets: Analysis of the background and meaning of the Swiss vote of 29 November 2009. *Religion*, 1(41), 11–28.
- Nakhaie, R., & Kazemipur, A. (2013). Social capital, employment and occupational status of the new immigrants in Canada. *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, 14(3), 419–437.
- Rayner, H., & Voutat, B. (2014). La judiciarisation à l'épreuve de la démocratie directe. L'interdiction de construire des minarets en Suisse. *Les Presses de Sciences Po*, 64(4), 689–709.
- Stolz, J. (2005). Explaining islamophobia. A test of four theories based on the case of Switzerland. *Swiss Journal of Sociology*, 31(3), 547–566.
- Tubergen, F. V., Maas, I., & Flap, H. (2004). The economic incorporation of immigrants in 18 Western Societies: Origin, destination, and community effects. *American Sociological Review*, 69, 704–727.
- Valle, R. C., Normandeau, S., & González, G. R. (2015). *Education at a glance interim report: Update of employment and educational attainment indicators*. Paris: OECD. Retrieved from <https://www.oecd.org/edu/EAG-Interim-report.pdf>

Vatter, A., & Danaci, D. (2010). Mehrheitstyannei durch Volksentscheide? Zum Spannungsverhältnis zwischen direkter Demokratie und Minderheitenschutz. *Polit Vierteljahresschr*, 51, 205–222.

Walter, P., Herrmann, A. B., Cangemi, V., Murier, T., Perrenoud, S., Reutter, R., . . . Zimmermann, M. (2016). *Indicateurs du marché du travail 2016*. Neuchâtel: Of-

fice fédéral de la statistique.

Weichselbaumer, D. (2016). *Discrimination against female migrants wearing headscarves* (Working paper). Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor Bonn.

Wilde, M., & Glassman, L. (2016). How complex religion can improve our understanding of American politics. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 42, 407–425.

About the Authors



Anaïd Lindemann is a PhD candidate in Sociology at the University of Lausanne. Specialized in sociology of religions, she is writing her thesis on the different forms of discrimination and prejudice against Muslims in Switzerland. She co-wrote and published articles on other topics such as religious diversity, religion/spirituality in prisons and media discourses on immigration. She mainly resorts to quantitative and mixed methods in her research.



Jörg Stolz is Professor of Sociology of Religion at the University of Lausanne. Combining an explanatory approach with mixed methods, he works on the description and explanation of different forms of religiosity, evangelicalism, secularization, and islamophobia. He is the author of many articles in leading sociology and sociology of religion journals, among them, 'Explaining religiosity. Towards a unified theoretical framework' in the *British Journal of Sociology*.

3 Perceived discrimination among Muslims and its correlates. A comparative analysis

Published article

Lindemann, A., & Stolz, J. (2021). Perceived discrimination among Muslims and its correlates. A comparative analysis. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 44(2), 173-194.

DOI : 10.1080/01419870.2020.1729389

Version retrieved from the journal's website with its permission.



Perceived discrimination among Muslims and its correlates. A comparative analysis

Anaïd Lindemann  and Jörg Stolz 

Institut de Sciences Sociales des Religions, University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland

ABSTRACT

Many studies have found that Muslims in Western countries perceive more discrimination than most other religious groups. However, less attention has been paid to the life domains and correlates of this perceived discrimination. The aim of this study is to determine the scope of perceived discrimination among Muslims and to test hypotheses regarding how their perceived discrimination is correlated with socio-structural disadvantages and ingroup identification in comparison to other religious groups. We use a representative cross-sectional sample of 12,241 residents in Switzerland that has a very fine measure of perceived discrimination. Our study yielded three main findings. First, there is a much higher level of perceived discrimination among Muslims across all life domains and attributes. Second, socio-structural disadvantages do *not* correlate with perceived discrimination among Muslims. Third, perceived discrimination is significantly higher among Muslims who have a higher level of ethno-religious ingroup identification and who do voluntary work in associations.



ARTICLE HISTORY Received 5 September 2019; Accepted 30 January 2020

KEYWORDS Ingroup identification; islamophobia; migration; muslims; perceived discrimination; religious minority

Introduction

Anti-Muslim discrimination is a challenge for most Western countries marked by religious and ethnic diversity, and is a phenomenon that has increasingly gained attention over the last few decades, be it from politicians and institutional actors, or from social scientists. Many recent reports have revealed a general perception of discrimination among Muslims across various countries in Europe and North America (2017a, 2017b, 2017c, 24). Switzerland is no exception, since hostility toward Muslims was among the most frequently reported “racist incidents” in 2017 (Sutter, Brogini, and Wiecken 2018).

Actual discrimination against Muslims has been shown to exist in various life domains, such as labour markets (Adida, Laitin, and Vafort 2010; Widner

CONTACT Anaïd Lindemann  anaid.lindemann@unil.ch, [linkedin.com/in/anaid-lindemann-406b2654](https://www.linkedin.com/in/anaid-lindemann-406b2654)
 @AnaïdLindemann

© 2020 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

and Chicoine 2011; Connor and Koenig 2015; Weichselbaumer 2016; Valfort 2017; Lindemann and Stolz 2018), prisons (Marcus 2009), and in everyday life situations such as having the courtesy to send back a lost letter (Helly 2004; Ahmed 2010). There is now a large body of sociological literature that tries to account for such discriminatory behaviour at both an individual and a structural level (for an overview, see (Helbling 2012, 99–161).

A different question is how Muslims *perceive* discrimination in Western societies. Studies on perceived discrimination are just as necessary as those on actual discrimination, since perceived discrimination has important effects both on society and on the perceiving individuals – for example, on their self-esteem (Bourguignon et al. 2006; Ghaffari and Çiftçi 2010) and health (for a literature review, see (Williams, Neighbors, and Jackson 2008).

The handful of quantitative studies that describe the different domains and correlates of perceived discrimination among Muslims (Zainiddinov 2016; Yazdiha 2019) do not compare perceived discrimination among Muslims with perceived discrimination among other religious groups, which leaves unclear whether other social or religious groups would have reported similar or even higher levels of perceived discrimination in similar life domains. We therefore investigate our question by comparing perceived discrimination among Muslims to perceived discrimination among other religious groups.

Previous research has shown that perceived discrimination may be influenced by cumulative socio-structural disadvantages (Olson, Herman, and Zanna 1986; Moore 1990; Alanya et al. 2015, 195) and by ingroup identification (Crocker, Major, and Steele 1998). We apply these theories to the case of Muslims in Switzerland.

Our key questions are: (1) What is the extent, and what are the life domains and attributes, of perceived discrimination among Muslims compared to other groups in Switzerland? (2) What important correlates does perceived discrimination among Muslims have compared to other religious groups? More specifically, to what extent is perceived discrimination correlated with socio-structural disadvantages and religious/ethnic ingroup identification?

It is important to note that our analysis is not causal, but only descriptive. We aim to describe relationships between variables, but, because of limitations to our data, we cannot claim that one variable has causally influenced another. Nevertheless, we believe that providing a sociological description of correlates of perceived discrimination is a valid enterprise, since doing so may, for example, establish the explanandum for future work.

Background

In what follows, we first define perceived discrimination and discuss its links to attribution theory. We then present the state of the art concerning perceived

discrimination among Muslims. Finally, we establish a theoretical framework to explain the link between perceived discrimination and socio-structural disadvantages and ingroup identification, with a testable hypothesis being deduced each time.

Defining perceived discrimination

We define perceived discrimination as a person's subjective and self-assessed experience of obstacles when it comes to accessing any aspect of social life, with these obstacles being attributed by the person to the discriminatory actions or structures in the social environment – regardless of whether this attribution is factually correct or not (compare to Schmitt and Branscombe 2002). Discriminatory actions can be defined as actions that create distinctions based on individual or group characteristics, correctly or wrongly attributed, resulting in any form of exclusion of the targeted individual or group of individuals.

Our concept of perceived discrimination is influenced by attribution theory that discusses how individuals give causal explanation to events, and more specifically to the behaviour of other individuals by attributing understandable causes to them. Crocker, Major, and Steele (1998) applied these principles to stigmatization. In fact, people may attribute negative outcomes or situations either to discrimination (which is what we mean by *perceived* discrimination) or to personal faults.

Discrimination can take place in different *life domains* and can be seen as the result of different *attributes*. In our study, we will distinguish four of them: the workplace, state institutions, the healthcare system, and culture. Furthermore, a person may experience discrimination on the basis of different attributes, and we distinguish four different such attributes: religious affiliation, name or accent,¹ physical appearance or skin colour, and ethnic, cultural or national origins.

Note that, unlike Gianni et al., who specifically asked different questions to gauge personal experiences on the one hand, and a general feeling of discrimination against the group on the other (Gianni, Giugni, and Michel 2015), we understand perceived discrimination here not as the perception of group discrimination in general, but as an *individual* experience.

Perceived discrimination among Muslims

Several reports point out a high degree of perceived discrimination among Muslims in Europe. The Runnymede Trust, a UK think tank, published a report that addresses the inequalities faced by Muslims in the UK (2017a). Similarly, a CNCDH publication reported that Muslims remain among the most rejected minorities in France (2017b), while the Second European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey has shown that four out of ten

Muslims in the EU felt that they had been discriminated against in the previous four years (2017c, 24). Finally, in Switzerland, the study by Gianni et al. revealed that non-Swiss Muslims report high levels of individual and group discrimination, irrespective of their ethnic origins (Gianni, Giugni, and Michel 2015).

One possible reason that scholars give for the comparatively high level of perceived discrimination is the fact that Muslims are currently the most negatively viewed religious group in Europe. The findings of the Pew Global Attitude Project revealed highly negative attitudes towards Muslims in five European countries (2008). In Switzerland, Muslims are the most negatively viewed group along with Blacks (2019). Finally, a recent study in Switzerland on how the media report on Muslims has highlighted that the media treatment of related issues is negative and distant (Ettinger 2018). Such negative sentiments towards Muslims have usually been attributed to international events (Ettinger 2008; Allen 2010) and to more general xenophobic attitudes (Helbling 2012). We deduce from this state of the art the following hypothesis:

H1: Muslims will perceive more discrimination than any other religious group.

Since previous studies on perceived discrimination among Muslims have not yet identified the different life domains and attributes particularly subject to discrimination, we do not formulate any specific hypotheses with respect to domains and attributes.

Cumulative socio-structural disadvantages

A number of studies have shown that individuals subjected to socio-structural disadvantages are more likely to perceive themselves as being the objects of discrimination (Olson, Herman, and Zanna 1986; Moore 1990). We define socio-structural disadvantages here in a broad way, seeing them as positions with less power in different social areas such as gender relations (being female), the educational and professional system (being unemployed, being less educated), citizenship (not having citizenship, being a recent immigrant), everyday resources (having language difficulties), and health (being in poor health) (compare to Bakouri and Staerklé 2015).

Several possible mechanisms link structural disadvantages to perceived discrimination. First, attribution theory would argue that discrimination can be correctly attributed to disadvantages, but that it can also be both overestimated and underestimated (Crosby 1984, 377; Crocker, Major, and Steele 1998, 517). Second, Goffman's self-fulfilling prophecy theory would argue that disadvantaged individuals could fear discrimination and therefore act in a defiant way, which in turn triggers negative or discriminatory reactions from their surroundings (Goffman 1963). While these mechanisms may well sometimes be at work, we assume instead that individuals in structurally

disadvantaged positions are actually more likely to face discrimination (Olson, Herman, and Zanna 1986; Moore 1990; Alanya et al. 2015, 195), which leads to a higher rate of perception of such discrimination. We also suspect that individuals who cumulate disadvantaged positions (for example, being a foreign female Muslim) will perceive more discrimination than others.²

Of course, as the literature review reveals, being a Muslim in Western Europe is itself a socio-structurally disadvantaged position. What we are interested in here, though, is whether Muslims with additional socio-structural disadvantages feel more discriminated against than Muslims with fewer or no such additional disadvantages. We cannot rely on the state of the art to form clear expectations here as to whether the influence of socio-structural disadvantages on perceived discrimination is similar or different for Muslims and other groups. We nonetheless speculate that the effect will be similar, and deduce from this the following hypothesis:

H2: Muslims who have and cumulate structural disadvantages are more likely to feel discriminated against than Muslims with fewer or no socio-structural disadvantages. The influence of socio-structural disadvantages is similar for both Muslims and other religious groups.

Ingroup identification

A number of studies have shown that ingroup identification may be associated with perceived discrimination (Tajfel and Turner 1986; Crocker, Major, and Steele 1998). We define ingroup identification as how, and how far, individuals categorize themselves through group belonging (compare to (Gaertner et al. 1993). In this study, we will focus on ethno-religious identification – namely, on people’s identification with an ethno-religious group. The latter is understood as an ethnic group whose members “entertain a subjective belief in their common descent” because there are similarities of customs, language, physical traits or history (Weber 1978, 389) and that shares a common religious background.

Different mechanisms may lead to such an association between ethno-religious identification and perceived discrimination. First, individuals who identify more strongly with their own ethno-religious group may be more visible and thus more likely to be singled out for discrimination (Crocker, Major, and Steele 1998). One obvious example is the effect of wearing a religious symbol, which may then trigger discrimination (Berger and Berger 2019). In this sense,

[s]alience of the stigmatized group identity, and the degree to which stigmatized individuals are highly identified with their group, are also likely to affect the extent to which these individuals perceive themselves as targets of discrimination based on their group membership. (Crocker, Major, and Steele 1998, 523)

Second, the relationship can work the other way around: namely, perceived discrimination may increase ingroup identification (Tajfel and Turner 1986). Research has documented how, when faced with perceived threats such as

social exclusion, individuals accentuate group identification and solidarity (Holtz, Dahinden, and Wagner 2013). This phenomenon, framed in the rejection-identification hypothesis, has been called “reactive ethnicity” (Branscombe, Schmitt, and Harvey 1999; Portes and Rumbaut 2001, 148) and “reactive religiosity” (Peek 2005; Haddad 2007; Connor 2014).

Third, there may be combinations of the mechanisms mentioned. For example, actual discrimination may lead to a stronger identification with the ingroup, which in turn increases visibility and triggers new discrimination, etc. (Operario and Fiske 2001, 555).

We can formulate from these theoretical propositions the following expectations:

H3: Muslims who have a higher level of ethno-religious ingroup identification and/or are active in ethno-religious associations are more likely to feel discriminated against.

Again, it will be interesting to analyze how (and whether) the effects of these correlates on Muslims differ to their effects on other religious groups.

Methodology

Data and analytical strategy

We use the dataset provided by the 2014 Language, Religion and Culture Survey (ELRC). The data were collected by the Federal Statistical Office (FSO), which used telephone interviews and then self-reported written questionnaires in all cantons of Switzerland. The survey comprised a sample of 16,487 permanent residents aged 15 and above. The response rate was 46.6%. We excluded from our study people who had not answered the question in the survey on their religious affiliation, and also people who had not answered the paper-based questionnaire. We used weights provided by the FSO to calibrate socio-demographic variables. We also used straightforward multiple OLS regressions.

Our sub-sample has $N = 12,241$ (Muslims, $n = 546$; majority Christians, $n = 8,359$; minority Christians, $n = 357$; nones, $n = 2,979$). We used multiple imputation (MI) (Schlomer, Bauman, and Card 2010), and imputed between 0% and 1.5% of missing data for different independent variables. We did not impute values to our dependent variables, resulting in the loss of only 6.5% of the data. We made systematic use of the pooled dataset.

Measures

Perceived discrimination

Our dependent variable is perceived discrimination. Respondents were asked in the written questionnaire whether they had personally perceived in the past year obstacles in four life domains (work; state institutions;

healthcare system; culture)³ based on four attributes (religious affiliation; name or accent; physical appearance or skin colour; ethnic, cultural or national origins). The respondents could choose between four modalities: very significant obstacle; quite significant obstacle; relatively insignificant obstacle; not an obstacle. This results in 45 possible combinations. We added up the items to create an index of ethno-religious perceived discrimination. The index ranges from 1 to 4 and has a high level of reliability ($\alpha = 0.932$). We refer to this index in the following with the shorthand “perceived discrimination”.

Religious belonging

Our independent variables are grouped together in a religion variable and three different sets of predictors. Religious belonging is captured by a four-step variable that distinguishes self-identified Muslims, majority Christians (Protestants and Roman Catholics), minority Christians, and nones. It makes sense to have the second category, since the two denominations are publicly recognized (to varying degrees) in all cantons, and together account for the majority of the population.⁴

Cumulated disadvantages

Cumulated disadvantages can be conceptualized as the accumulation of underprivileged socio-structural positions. For us, being a Muslim, being unemployed, having only a basic level of schooling, having poor or very poor health, belonging to the first generation of migrants, being foreign, being non-European, having language difficulties, and being female are all disadvantaged positions.

Professional insertion is a three-step variable distinguishing employed, unemployed, and not on the labour market. This variable is captured by two dummies (reference: employed).

Education is measured with a five-step variable with the options basic level of schooling, vocational secondary education (apprenticeship), general secondary education (high school), higher professional training, and university. We created a dichotomous variable distinguishing between having a basic level of schooling and having a higher level of schooling.

Self-assessed health is measured with a five-step self-rating scale ranging from very poor to very good.

The following variables capture migratory background and gender: generation (first generation as having arrived after the age of 11; second generation as having arrived before the age of 12; no migratory background); naturalization (naturalized, foreign, Swiss-born); origins (European vs. non-European); language difficulties (no difficulty, at least some difficulty noticed by the telephone interviewer); gender (male, female).

Ingroup identification

Ingroup identification is operationalized through religious identification, ethnic identification, and voluntary activity in an association. For the first two, we ran an Exploratory Factor Analysis with oblimin rotation (Costello and Osborne 2005) on seven items. The pattern matrix clearly showed one factor capturing ethnic identity and one factor capturing religious identity. We then collapsed them into the following indexes.

Religious identification is captured by an additive index (1 to 4) including four items: “My religion characterizes me” (four-step), “Frequency of prayer” (seven-step), “Frequency of attending a religious service” (seven-step), and “I consider myself religious” (four-step). This index has a level of reliability of $\alpha = 0.793$.

Ethnic identification is measured by an additive index (1 to 4) made up of three items: “My origins characterize me” (four-step), “My language characterizes me” (four-step), “My nationality characterizes me” (four-step). This index has an α of 0.762.

Voluntary activity in an association is captured by two variables: a dummy variable that is coded 1 for when an individual is active in at least one association, and 0 for when an individual is not active in any association; a more detailed (three-step) variable captures the type of association, and distinguishes ethno-religious associations, other types of associations, and no activity.⁵

We tested whether activity in certain types of associations was another dimension of ethnic and/or religious identification. The factor analysis revealed that this was not in fact the case, as three different factors emerged, with each capturing voluntary activity (all types of associations included), ethnic identification, and religious identification separately.

Results

Descriptive information

Table 1 gives some descriptive information on our dependent variable and predictors. We first highlight four important points of our predictors; this will inform our later analyses.

First, Muslims differ from the other religious groups in terms of sociodemographic features. They are more likely to be male and young. This is explained by recent migratory processes: Muslims are majoritarily (94.7%) first- or second-generation individuals.

Second, Muslims are sociodemographically disadvantaged in that they comprise a comparatively high percentage of individuals who have only had a basic level of schooling, who are unemployed, and who are in poor or very poor health. Indeed, Muslims on the labour market are more likely to be unemployed than any other group.

Table 1. Descriptives of independent variable.

	Muslims	Majority Christians	Minority Christians	Nones <i>n</i> = 2979	χ^2
<i>N</i> = 12,241	<i>n</i> = 546	<i>n</i> = 8359	<i>n</i> = 357		
Perceived discrimination (index from 1 to 4)	1.51 ^{ab}	1.09	1.12	1.07	
Perceived ethno-religious discrimination in at least one of four life domains	39.7%	7.7%	14.2%	10.1%	***
Female	42.0%	51.7%	49.9%	47.4%	***
Age	35*	49*	44	43	
Working	73.8%	67.6%	72.5%	76.7%	***
Basic level of schooling	32.2%	14.0%	15.4%	9.6%	***
Unemployed	9.3%	2.0%	3.1%	2.3%	***
Poor or very poor health	5.1%	3.2%	2.0%	3.0%	***
Swiss-born	4.9%	71.2%	66.2%	62.5%	***
Naturalized	32.7%	9.5%	14.1%	11.8%	***
Foreign	62.4%	19.3%	19.7%	25.7%	***
Of European descent	77.1%	97.0%	92.1%	96.0%	***
No migratory background	5.3%	72.5%	67.0%	63.7%	***
First generation (arrived after the age of 11)	62.2%	19.9%	23.2%	27.2%	***
Second generation (arrived before the age of 12)	32.5%	7.6%	9.8%	9.1%	***
Minor or significant language difficulties	34.5%	5.6%	9.8%	5.9%	***
At least one voluntary activity	59.3%	64.2%	81.9%	55.6%	***
Ethnic identity (index from 1 to 4)	3.35*	2.98*	2.85*	2.66*	***
• Self-characterized by origins	85.7%	69.8%	63.6%	55.0%	***
• Self-characterized by nationality	82.8%	69.5%	62.6%	48.3%	***
• Self-characterized by language	88.0%	78.8%	74.7%	69.6%	***
Religious identity (index from 1 to 4)	2.39*	2.22*	3.06*	1.42*	***
• Self-characterized by religion	73.4%	44.0%	82.1%	17.6%	***
• Self-defined as religious	62.4%	47.9%	75.5%	6.3%	***
• Prays at least once a month	46.4%	54.1%	84.5%	14.7%	***
• Attends a religious service at least once a month	19.8%	24.4%	75.7%	2.1%	***

^aAverages with a non-overlapping c.i. (cultural identity?) are marked with a (*). For proportions, all Pearson χ^2 are $p < 0.001$.

Third, Muslims are disadvantaged with regard to immigration. Over 60% do not have Swiss citizenship, a high percentage that is explained by the fact that the nationality law in Switzerland is based on *jus sanguinis*. The majority of Muslims belong to the first generation of immigrants. More than a third have minor or significant language difficulties (four to seven times more than the other groups), which is also explained by migratory factors.

Fourth, in terms of ethnic and religious identification, Muslims are highest when it comes to ethnic identification, while minority Christians are highest when it comes to religious identification. However, this does not tell us anything about *how* they actually differ, which is the reason that we broke the indexes down into their different components.

Muslims are more likely than the three other groups to identify with their ethnic origins, which can be explained by their stronger migratory background and the identification processes presented in the theoretical framework. However, minority Christians are more likely to characterize

themselves according to their religion, pray and attend religious services more often, and are more likely to define themselves as religious. In fact, most minority Christians are Evangelicals, who are known for their strong religiosity.

Finally, Muslims are less active in associations than Christians, with minority Christians being the most active. We ran more detailed analyses of the types of voluntary activity, which showed that Muslims are usually active in ethnic/national associations, while minority Christians are more active in religious associations. However, religious and ethnic associations may overlap for Muslims, as mosques or “Islamic centers” are often formed according to national or ethnic attributes.

The extent of perceived discrimination among Muslims

Our first hypothesis stated that Muslims would be the group with the highest level of perceived discrimination. As [Table 1](#) shows, this hypothesis can be verified. Almost 40% of Muslims report having experienced some kind of ethno-religious discrimination (in one or other of the four life domains), as opposed to 7.7%, 14.2%, and 10.1% for majority Christians, minority Christians, and nones respectively. Muslims are therefore between 2.8 and five times more likely to report discrimination than the other groups.

This finding remains highly significant when we control for other variables, and it confirms the Second European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey (2017c), which had the same proportion of Muslims reporting experiences of discrimination in the EU. The second group who perceive discrimination are Christians from minority denominations, but they do so to a much lesser extent than Muslims (Muslims are more than twice as likely to report discrimination than minority Christians).

Life domains and attributes of perceived discrimination

A number of observations can be made concerning the life domains and the grounds of perceived discrimination among Muslims as compared to other groups ([Figure 1](#)). For one thing, the higher level of perception of discrimination among Muslims is general: it occurs regardless of life domain (work, state institutions, healthcare system, or culture) and attribute (religious affiliation, name or accent, physical appearance or skin colour, or origins).

The patterns of discrimination vary among the groups, but especially in terms of “Muslim/non-Muslim”, as the group of minority Christians do not feel more discriminated against than the other groups. In this sense, we can say that perceived discrimination is not a function of religious-minority status, but is particularly strong among Muslims.




Figure 1. Proportions of individuals who perceived discrimination, by attributes and life domains among all groups (C.I. do not overlap) (a) Perceived discrimination based on **name / accent**; (b) Perceived discrimination based on **origins**; (c) Perceived discrimination based on **religion**; (d) Perceived discrimination based on **skin colour**.

For another, there seems to be a relatively stable hierarchy of perceived discrimination in different life domains. Individuals perceive most discrimination in the domain of work, followed by state institutions, the healthcare system, and culture. However, this hierarchy is more pronounced among Muslims.

The labour market appears invariably to be the area that is most subject to perceived discrimination among Muslims, which may partly be explained by the high percentage of Muslims on the labour market who face unemployment (Lindemann and Stolz 2018). Another hypothesis is that they may face discrimination not only in obtaining a job, but also while they are employed. This could take multiple forms (which we cannot verify with our data), such as proscribing the wearing of the hijab for women, refusing to allow time for prayers or adapting the work schedule accordingly, verbal intimidation, and racist jokes in the workplace.

Second most frequently evoked by Muslims as the life domain in which they perceive discrimination is that of state institutions, which may be due in part to the fact that almost two thirds of the Muslim population have a migratory background, resulting in administrative difficulties in different aspects of life. We tested for this relationship and found that Muslims with language difficulties and first-generation women report significantly more discrimination in administrative procedures.

Finally, we find an interesting and Muslim-specific hierarchy of attributes. In fact, Muslims do not mention religion as the first ground. Rather, they more often mention their name or accent, followed closely by ethnic, national, or cultural origin, and only in third place (and practically *ex aequo*) religion and physical appearance or skin colour. While it is often said that being a Muslim is currently the most “othering” marker, our findings show that Muslims often perceive that they are discriminated against due to other attributes.

The reason for this may be either that being a Muslim is actually not the strongest marker, or that religion is often simply not visible in everyday life situations, whereas name, accent, or non-autochthonous ethnicity are somewhat more visible. Furthermore, we need to temper this finding in the light of how difficult it actually is for people to rank or distinguish the attributes involved in an experience of discrimination. Although respondents mention religion less often than name or origins as possible reasons for discrimination, it is certainly difficult for people to disentangle these attributes, a difficulty that the quantitative data can obviously not reveal.

Cumulated socio-structural disadvantages

Our multiple regressions test our hypotheses concerning the correlates of perceived discrimination. We systematically compare the adjusted R^2 to assess

the contribution of each block of indicators. We also run a comparison with the other groups in order to reveal specificities or regularities among Muslims.

Hypothesis 2 states that cumulated socio-structural disadvantages will lead to a higher level of perceived discrimination. Since the minority status of being a Muslim can itself be seen as a disadvantaged position, low SES or unemployment can create an accumulation of disadvantages. The main effects of, and interactions between, SES and migration can therefore be seen as capturing cumulated disadvantages.

In model 1, we enter gender and SES variables. We find that, in contrast to the other groups, SES and gender do not account for perceived discrimination among Muslims, which therefore contradicts our second hypothesis for Muslims: gender and SES explain less than 1% of the variance, and neither is significant. In other words, whatever their gender, employment situation, level of education, or health, Muslims have the same average level of perceived discrimination. On the other hand, these factors are important to explain perceived discrimination among Christians and nones (they account for between 2.73% and 7.71% of the variance).

Interestingly, women of all groups are actually less likely to report perceived discrimination than men, which could be due to the fact that we measure ethno-religious perceived discrimination and not gender-based discrimination (Table 2).

Model 2 adds migration variables. For Muslims, perceived discrimination only increases with regard to the first generation. Surprisingly, none of the usual disadvantageous characteristics (being foreign, being of non-European descent, having language difficulties) impact on their perception of discrimination, a finding that largely contradicts our third hypothesis. Similar comments can be made for minority Christians, for whom only language difficulties worsen perceived discrimination. For majority Christians and nones, however, being European diminishes perceived discrimination, and the usual disadvantageous characteristics do worsen perceived discrimination. These factors account for twice the explained variance among majority Christians and nones than among the other groups.

Model 3 includes interaction terms between gender and other disadvantageous characteristics to test our second hypothesis (cumulative disadvantages) further. The interaction terms are either not significant, or significant but in the opposite direction to the hypothesis (unemployed Muslim women feel a little less discriminated against than other Muslims). The interactions raise explained variance only slightly among all models.

To recap the main results concerning socio-structural disadvantages: for Muslims, the cumulation of being a Muslim with low SES or with usually disadvantageous migratory characteristics do not worsen perceived discrimination. In short, Muslims feel equally discriminated against no matter what their socio-structural position.

Table 2. Predictive models of perceived ethno-religious discrimination: Standardized Regression Coefficients among groups (N = 12,241).

Predictors	Muslims (n = 546)					Majority Christians (n = 8,359)				
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
<i>Gender</i>										
Female	-0.181	-0.108	-0.130	-0.142	-0.104	-0.042***	-0.030**	-0.042***	-0.043***	-0.050***
<i>SES</i>										
Unemployed (ref: employed)	0.068		0.061		0.074	0.056***		0.034**		0.039***
Not on job market (ref: employed)	0.108		0.073		0.09	0.004		0.020		0.012
Only completed compulsory school	-0.013		-0.061		-0.124	0.163***		0.117***		0.121***
Health	-0.183		-0.170		-0.226*	-0.121***		-0.106***		-0.109***
<i>Migration</i>										
European		3.586 ^{E-5}	0.003		0.01			-0.114***		-0.113***
Foreign (ref: Swiss born)		-0.152	-0.126		-0.12			0.038		0.030
Naturalized (ref: Swiss born)		-0.295	-0.285		-0.225			-0.041*		-0.032
1st generation (ref: no migr.)		0.444*	0.435*		0.527**			0.135***		0.117***
2nd generation (ref: no migr.)		0.022	0.009		0.057			0.067***		0.059**
Linguistic difficulties		-0.101	-0.134*		-0.130*			0.095***		0.070***
<i>Ingroup identification</i>										
Assoc. volunteering				0.457***	0.486***				-0.013	0.036**
Ethnic identity				0.222*	0.271*				0.095***	0.075***
Religious identity				0.331**	0.291**				0.075***	0.028*
<i>Interactions</i>										
Female – unemployed			-0.126*		-0.129**			-0.010		-0.009
Female – low education			0.022		0.001			-0.017		-0.024*
Female – 1st generation			0.156		0.09			-0.002		-0.013
Female – linguistic difficulties			-0.076		-0.061			0.017		0.008
Constant	1.084***	0.995***	1.034*	0.967***	0.608	-0.009	-0.009***	-0.009	-0.036**	-0.011
Adjusted R ²	0.58%	3.09%	4.63%	8.90%	14.11%	4.73%	6.87%	9.77%	1.77%	10.57%

Predictors	Minority Christians (n = 357)					Nones (N = 2,979)				
	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5
<i>Gender</i>										
Female	-0.064	-0.106*	-0.084	-0.083	-0.089	-0.027*	-0.034**	-0.039**	-0.034**	-0.045***
<i>SES</i>										
Unemployed (ref: employed)	0.076		-0.012		-0.011	0.033**		0.025*		0.023
Not on job market (ref: employed)	-0.017		-0.080		-0.089	0.022		0.028		0.028
Only completed compulsory school	0.216***		0.194***		0.188***	0.083***		0.074***		0.073***
Health	-0.159*		-0.168**		-0.172**	-0.057***		-0.063***		-0.068***
<i>Migration</i>										
European		-0.084	-0.086		-0.08		-0.010	-0.008		-0.007
Foreign (ref: Swiss born)		0.059	-0.113		-0.125		-0.076**	-0.071**		-0.065*
Naturalized (ref: Swiss born)		-0.036	-0.095		-0.107		-0.032	-0.029		-0.026
1st generation (ref: no migr.)		0.122	0.151		0.155		0.179***	0.180***		0.178***
2nd generation (ref: no migr.)		0.015	0.060		0.07		0.094***	0.090***		0.089***
Linguistic diffic.		0.104*	0.207***		0.219***		0.085***	0.074***		0.070***
<i>Identification</i>										
Assoc. volunteering				-0.076	-0.042				0.012	0.029*
Ethnic identity				0.067	0.064				0.049***	0.041**
Religious identity				0.072	0.027				0.041*	0.045*
<i>Interactions</i>										
Female – unemployed			-0.008		-0.014			-0.005		-0.006
Female – low education			-0.107*		-0.103*			-0.044**		-0.044*
Female – 1st generation			0.005		0.006			-0.020		-0.022
Female – linguistic difficulties			-0.248***		-0.243***			-0.023		-0.021
Constant	0.044	0.000	0.033	-0.018	0.017	-0.080***	-0.125***	-0.101***	-0.052*	-0.047*
Adjusted R ²	7.71%	9.04%	20.20%	1.28%	19.90%	2.73%	6.78%	9.36%	1.23%	10.07%

Note: All models control for gender, marital status, and age.

*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001.

Ingroup identification

Our third hypothesis stated that the higher the level of ethnic and religious identity, the more individuals will perceive discrimination.

Model 4 adds the identification factors. This model shows one of the most interesting findings of our study: namely, that perceived discrimination among Muslims is strongly determined by dimensions of identification, which is not the case for non-Muslims. Muslims who have a high level of ethnic/religious identity and who are voluntarily active in associations are more likely to feel discriminated against. Ethnic and religious identities, coupled with voluntary activities in associations, account for almost 9% of our dependent variable for Muslims, but less than 2% for the other groups.

Even though ethnic and religious identification have significant coefficients for nones and majority Christians, their effect sizes are four to eight times smaller than they are for Muslims.

Interestingly, religious identification has no effect among minority Christians, although it is especially high among Muslims. This seems to challenge a relatively new theory, which sees discrimination against Muslims as an expression of a generalized anti-religiosity and not of "Islamophobia" (Berger and Berger 2019). If this were the case, though, then we could expect highly religious Christians also to perceive discrimination.

These correlations are particularly striking in [Figure 2](#), which show the predicted mean of perceived discrimination for the different groups according to religious and ethnic identification. As we can see, the more a Muslim identifies with an ethnic group or religion, or becomes involved in an association, the more he or she perceives discrimination. This correlation barely exists for the other groups. The actual direction in which the correlation runs is open to debate.

We also tested the different types of associations (ethno-religious vs. other types) in *ad hoc* regression models, and controlled for gender, age and marital status. We highlight two main findings.

First, and very clearly, Muslims who are active in an ethno-religious association feel more discriminated against than those who are active in other types of associations. This result is highly significant ($p > 0.001$), and the effect size of the coefficient is important ($\beta = 0.280$). Second, this is particular to Muslims, since ethno-religious associations are either not significant or the effect sizes are small ($\beta < 0.080$) among the three other groups.

To conclude, model 5 enters all the blocks of indicators and interaction terms. As we can see in these complete models, the significant coefficients observed in the separate models stay significant. We can therefore reasonably consider our results to be robust.

To sum up the main results for our ingroup identification hypotheses, we can argue that perceived discrimination among Muslims is strongly




Figure 2. Proportions of individuals who perceived discrimination, by attributes and life domains among all groups (C.I. do not overlap) (a) Predicted mean for discrimination according to **religious identity**; (b) Predicted mean for discrimination according to **ethnic identity**; (c) Predicted mean of perceived discrimination according to **voluntary activity**.

determined by ethno-religious identification. The more Muslims identify with their ethnicity or religion, and the more they are active in associations linked to these identities, the more they feel discriminated against. As already noted, our findings do not permit us to tease out the causality, however.

Conclusion

Muslims perceive greater discrimination than most other groups. This fact is now well-documented by studies and reports across the world (2017a, 2017b, 2017c, 24). What the present study adds is an investigation of the life domains and correlates of this perceived discrimination among Muslims in comparison to other groups.

Our analyses have yielded three main findings. First, Muslims perceive considerably more discrimination than majority Christians, minority Christians, and nones. They are between 2.7 and five times more likely to perceive discrimination, and almost 40% say that they have experienced some kind of ethno-religious discrimination in the past year. This higher level of perceived discrimination is present in all life domains and all attributes.

Second, the analysis of the link between socio-structural disadvantages and perceived discrimination among Muslims produces surprising findings: in contrast to the majority groups, gender, unemployment, and education have no significant effect among Muslims, while health only has an effect when controlling for other variables (models 4 and 5). There is no significant effect of being foreign and not naturalized, but there is a clear effect of being of the first generation. The cumulation of disadvantages does not lead to a higher level of perceived discrimination, and sometimes the opposite is in fact the case. Overall, the effect of cumulated disadvantages is different for Muslims compared to the other groups – namely, it is null for Muslims and strong for the others.

A possible interpretation of this finding may be found in the notion of “master status” (Becker 1963, cop. 1973; Backman 1981), which argues that being a Muslim can be seen as a master status, i.e. a social identity that in the eyes of society becomes the unique definition of an individual, as this identity “tends to overpower, in most crucial situations, any other characteristics which might run counter to it” (Hughes 1945). Thus, regardless of their educational level, their Swiss citizenship, their language abilities, and their European background, Muslims still experience a high level of discrimination. This finding also correlates with studies that have shown a clear dissociation between socio-economic attainments and perceived discrimination among minority members, be they second-generation Muslims (Alanya et al. 2015) or Blacks (Feagin and Sikes 1994).

Third, we find relatively strong and highly significant correlations between ingroup identification and perceived discrimination, with Muslims who

identify more closely with their religion and with their ethnicity perceiving significantly more discrimination. This finding could be explained either by the theory of “reactive ethnicity” (namely, that Muslims who perceive a threat to their social inclusion or identity will intensify ingroup solidarity), or by the fact that individuals with a high level of identification are simply more visible. The nature of our data does not permit us to discern the direction of causality here. Furthermore, Muslims who are voluntarily active in ethno-religious associations feel more discriminated against, which again could be explained by several mechanisms, where it is difficult to discern the direction of causality.

First, researchers have suggested that joining associations or collective actions represent coping strategies in the face of social exclusion (Outten 2012; Holtz, Dahinden, and Wagner 2013). Thus, Muslims who are more aware of discrimination may be more likely to join ethno-religious groups in order to find solidarity and support. This may be called a mechanism of self-selection. Second, Muslims who are active in associations may become more visible and hence more exposed to discrimination. Third, discrimination may be an issue that is often discussed in associations, be it through informal discussions among pairs or through formal workshops, roundtables, and focus groups. If this is the case, then Muslims might be more aware of discrimination and hence perceive discrimination more often. Such mechanisms may indeed exist, but the hypotheses would need further empirical testing.

One limitation of our contribution is that we are not able to disentangle the causal relationships at work. Due to the cross-sectional and observational nature of our data, we cannot identify the precise factors that have caused the phenomena that we have established. We welcome future research with possibly longitudinal research designs or qualitative investigations that would help push this research agenda forward.

Notes

1. We concede that combining these two characteristics is unfortunate, but the questions asked in the ELRC questionnaire merged them and it is no longer possible to disentangle them.
2. How we framed this research made it difficult to integrate and test intersectionality theories, although the question of “being a foreign female Muslim”, for example, could be treated in the light of intersectional assumptions. For an in-depth discussion of these methodological and theoretical challenges, see (Bowleg 2008).
3. “For the past 12 months, how far have the characteristics listed below been an obstacle in the context of ... your work or potential job search? ... contacts with health staff (doctors, nurses, assistant nurses, etc.)? ... administrative tasks conducted face-to-face or by phone? ... your access to culture? Think about going to exhibitions, to festivals, the theatre or concerts, watching cultural

programmes or movies on TV, reading a book, accessing cultural sites on the Internet, going to the movies or to a nightclub to listen to a DJ" (our translation)."

4. Source: <https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/fr/home/statistiques/population/langues-religions/religions.html> (accessed 27 August 2019).
5. The original variable distinguished seven types of associations: origin-based, religious, cultural, social/charitable, political, sporting, and others. We collapsed the first three into one, since religious and origin-based associations frequently overlap for Muslims (mosques and "Islamic centers" are often based on national or ethnic attributes).

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

ORCID

Anaïd Lindemann  <http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2200-1528>

Jörg Stolz  <http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3849-7812>

References

2008. "Unfavorable Views of Jews and Muslims on the increase in Europe." In *The Pew Global Attitudes Project*. Washington: Pew Research Center.
- 2017a. *Islamophobia. Still a Challenge for Us All*. Edited by Farah Elahi and Omar Khan. London: Runnymede.
- 2017b. *Rapport sur la lutte contre le racisme, l'antisémitisme et la xénophobie*. Paris: Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l'Homme CNCDH.
- 2017c. "Second European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey. Muslims – Selected findings." In *EU-MIDIS II*. Luxembourg: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights.
2019. "Survey on Diversity and Coexistence in Switzerland (VeS): Results 2018." In *01 Population*. Neuchâtel: Office fédéral de la statistique.
- Adida, Claire L., David D. Laitin, and Marie-Anne Vafort. 2010. "Identifying Barriers to Muslim Integration in France." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America* 107 (52): 22384–22390.
- Ahmed, Ali M. 2010. "Muslim Discrimination: Evidence From Two Lost-Letter Experiments." *Journal of Applied Social Psychology* 40 (4): 888–898.
- Alanya, Ahu, Marc Swyngedouw, Veronique Vandezande, and Karen Phalet. 2015. "Close Encounters: Minority And Majority Perceptions Of Discrimination and Intergroup Relations in Antwerp, Belgium." *International Migration Review* 51 (1): 191–217.
- Allen, Chris. 2010. *Islamophobia*. London: Routledge.
- Backman, Carl W. 1981. "Attraction in Interpersonal Relationships." In *Social Psychology. Sociological Perspectives*, edited by Morris Rosenberg and Ralph H. Turner, 235–268. New York: Basic Books.
- Bakouri, Mouna, and Christian Staerklé. 2015. "Coping with Structural Disadvantage: Overcoming Negative Effects of Perceived Barriers Through Bonding Identities." *British Journal of Social Psychology* 54: 648–670.
- Becker, Howard S. 1963, cop. 1973. *Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance*. London: The Free Press.

- Berger, Roger, and Joël Berger. 2019. "Islamophobia or Threat to Secularization? Lost Letter Experiments on the Discrimination Against Muslims in an Urban Area in Switzerland." *Swiss Journal of Sociology* 45 (1): 83–105.
- Bourguignon, David, Eleonore Seron, Vincent Yzerbyt, and Ginette Herman. 2006. "Perceived Group and Personal Discrimination: Differential Effects on Personal Self-esteem." *European Journal of Social Psychology* 36: 773–789.
- Bowleg, Lisa. 2008. "When Black + Lesbian + Woman ≠ Black Lesbian Woman: The Methodological Challenges of Qualitative and Quantitative Intersectionality Research." *Sex Roles* 59 (3): 312–325.
- Branscombe, Nyla R., Michael T. Schmitt, and Richard D. Harvey. 1999. "Perceiving Pervasive Discrimination among African Americans: Implications for Group Identification and Well-being." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 77 (1): 135–149.
- Connor, Phillip. 2014. *Immigrant Faith. Patterns of Immigrant Religion in the United States, Canada, and Western Europe*. New York: New York University Press.
- Connor, Phillip, and Matthias Koenig. 2015. "Explaining the Muslim Employment Gap in Western Europe: Individual-level Effects and Ethno-religious Penalties." *Social Science Research* 49: 191–201.
- Costello, Anna B., and Jason W. Osborne. 2005. "Best Practices in Exploratory Factor Analysis: Four Recommendations for Getting the Most From Your Analysis." *Practical Assessment, Research & Evaluation* 10 (7): 1–9.
- Crocker, Jennifer, Brenda Major, and Claude M. Steele. 1998. "Social Stigma." In *Handbook of Social Psychology*. 4th ed., edited by D. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, and G. Lindzey, 504–553. Boston: McGraw-Hill.
- Crosby, Faye. 1984. "The Denial of Personal Discrimination." *American Behavioral Scientist* 27 (3): 371–386.
- Ettinger, Patrik. 2008. "The Problématisation of Muslims in Public Communication in Switzerland." Etude Qualitative et Quantitative - MCA Conference Representing Islam, Comparative Perspective, Panel 8: Islam in Political Discourse, Zürich.
- Ettinger, Patrik. 2018. *La qualité de la couverture médiatique des musulmans de Suisse*. Bern: CFR.
- Feagin, Joe R., and Melvin P. Sikes. 1994. *Living with Racism: The Black Middle-class Experience*. Boston: Beacon.
- Gaertner, Samuel L., John F. Dovidio, Phyllis A. Anastasio, Betty A. Bachman, and Mary C. Rust. 1993. "The Common Ingroup Identity Model: Recategorization and the Reduction of Intergroup Bias." *European Review of Social Psychology* 4 (1): 1–26.
- Ghaffari, Azadeh, and Ayse Çiftçi. 2010. "Religiosity and Self-esteem of Muslim Immigrants to the United States: The Moderating Role of Perceived Discrimination." *International Journal for the Psychology of Religion* 20 (1): 14–25.
- Gianni, Matteo, Marco Giugni, and Noémi Michel. 2015. *Les musulmans de Suisse. Profil et intégration*. Lausanne: Presses polytechniques et universitaires romandes.
- Goffman, Erving. 1963. *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
- Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck. 2007. "The Post-9/11 'Hijab' as Icon." *Sociology of Religion* 68 (3): 253–267.
- Helbling, Marc, ed. 2012. *Islamophobia in the West. Measuring and Explaining Individual Attitudes, 1st Edition*. London: Routledge.
- Helly, Denise. 2004. "Are Muslims Discriminated Against in Canada Since September 2001?" *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 36 (1): 24–47.

- Holtz, Peter, Janine Dahinden, and Wolfgang Wagner. 2013. "German Muslims and the 'Integration Debate': Negotiating Identities in the Face of Discrimination." *Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science* 47 (2): 231–248.
- Hughes, Everett Cherrington. 1945. "Dilemmas and Contradictions of Status." *American Journal of Sociology* 50 (5): 353–359.
- Lindemann, Anaïd, and Jörg Stolz. 2018. "The Muslim Employment Gap, Human Capital, and Ethno-religious Penalties: Evidence from Switzerland." *Social Inclusion* 6 (2): 151–161.
- Marcus, Kenneth. 2009. "Jailhouse Islamophobia: Anti-Muslim Discrimination in American Prisons." *Race and Social Problems* 1 (1): 36–44.
- Moore, Dahlia. 1990. "Discrimination and Deprivation: The Effects of Social Comparisons." *Social Justice Research* 4 (1): 49–64.
- Olson, James M., C. Peter Herman, and Mark P. Zanna. 1986. *Relative Deprivation and Social Comparison*. Vol. 4. *The Ontario Symposium*. New York: Psychology Press.
- Operario, Don, and Susan T. Fiske. 2001. "Ethnic Identity Moderates Perceptions of Prejudice: Judgments of Personal Versus Group Discrimination And Subtle Versus Blatant Bias." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 27 (5): 550–561.
- Outten, H. Robert. 2012. "To Engage or Disengage? How Group-based Coping Options Explain the Relationship between Group Identification and Well-being for Disadvantaged Groups." PhD. Department of Psychology, Simon Fraser University.
- Peek, Lori. 2005. "Becoming Muslim: The Development of a Religious Identity." *Sociology of Religion* 66 (3): 215–242.
- Portes, Alejandro, and Rubén G. Rumbaut. 2001. *Legacies. The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation*. Berkley: University of California Press.
- Schlomer, Gabriel L., Sheri Bauman, and Noel A. Card. 2010. "Best Practices for Missing Data Management in Counseling Psychology." *Journal of Counseling Psychology* 57 (1): 1–10.
- Schmitt, Michael T., and Nyla R. Branscombe. 2002. "The Meaning and Consequences of Perceived Discrimination in Disadvantaged and Privileged Social Groups." *European Review of Social Psychology* 12 (1): 167–199.
- Sutter, Alex, Giulia Brogini, and Alma Wiecken. 2018. *Incidents racistes recensés par les centres de conseil*. Bern: CFR & Humanrights.ch.
- Tajfel, Henri, and John C. Turner. 1986. "The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior." In *Psychology of Intergroup Relations*, edited by S. Worchel and W. Austin, 33–48. Chicago: Nelson-Hall.
- Valfort, Marie-Anne. 2017. "Has France a Problem with Muslims? Evidence from a Field Experiment in the Labour Market." IZA/CREST/OECD Workshop: Recent Advances in the Economics of Discrimination, Paris, OECD Conference Center, July 6–7.
- Weber, Max. 1978. *Economy and Society. An Outline of Interpretative Sociology*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Weichselbaumer, Doris. 2016. Discussion paper series, Bonn.
- Widner, Daniel, and Stephen Chicoine. 2011. "It's All in the Name: Employment Discrimination Against Arab Americans." *Sociological Forum* 26 (4): 806–823.
- Williams, David R., Harold W. Neighbors, and James S. Jackson. 2008. "Racial/Ethnic Discrimination and Health: Findings From Community Studies." *American Journal of Public Health* 98 (9 Suppl): S29–S37.
- Yazdiha, Hajar. 2019. "Exclusion Through Acculturation? Comparing First- and Second-generation European Muslims' Perceptions of Discrimination Across Four National Contexts." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 42 (5): 782–800.
- Zainiddinov, Hakim. 2016. "Racial and Ethnic Differences in Perceptions of Discrimination among Muslim Americans." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 39 (15): 2701–2721.

4 Discrimination against veiled Muslim women in Switzerland: Insights from field experts

Published article


Lindemann, A. (2021). Discrimination against veiled Muslim women in Switzerland: insights from field experts. *Religions*, 12, 1-16.

DOI : 10.3390/rel12070500

Version retrieved from the journal's website with its permission

Article

Discrimination against Veiled Muslim Women in Switzerland: Insights from Field Experts

Anaïd Lindemann 

Institute for Social Sciences of Religions, University of Lausanne, 1015 Lausanne, Switzerland; anaïd.lindemann@unil.ch

Abstract: Although the *hijab* has recently attracted much attention from social scientists, the discrimination experienced by *hijabis* has been insufficiently investigated. Data are difficult to obtain, partly because surveys usually do not have items on this practice and victims are difficult to reach. However, field experts, namely active agents in governmental racism-prevention institutions and in Muslim associations, can provide rich insights into processes of discrimination. Based on an analysis of semi-structured interviews, I answer the following question: how do governmental and non-governmental experts describe discrimination against *hijabis* in Switzerland? The results reveal that, according to the experts interviewed, the *hijab* is the most important marker leading to processes of discrimination; this discrimination takes a variety of forms and affects a wide range of life domains and profiles of *hijabis*; such discrimination leads to a segregation of the social space of *hijabis*; many women are unwilling to report discrimination to governmental services for different reasons.

Keywords: headscarf; *hijab*; islamophobia; Muslims; gender; expert interviews; discrimination; racism; stigma; religious minority



Citation: Lindemann, Anaïd. 2021. Discrimination against Veiled Muslim Women in Switzerland: Insights from Field Experts. *Religions* 12: 500. <https://doi.org/10.3390/rel12070500>

Academic Editor: Halim Rane

Received: 1 June 2021

Accepted: 29 June 2021

Published: 5 July 2021

Publisher's Note: MDPI stays neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.



Copyright: © 2021 by the author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>).

1. Introduction and Research Questions

The *hijab*¹ is currently at the center of countless political and theological debates. Social scientists have investigated the practice of wearing the *hijab* from two main perspectives: the individual meaning that Muslim women attach to the *hijab*, and what it symbolizes for the majority society. However, far less attention has been given to the concrete consequences of wearing the *hijab* in Western societies. Data on the discrimination experienced by women who wear the *hijab* (*hijabis*) are particularly difficult to obtain, as official surveys usually do not ask questions on this practice, and accessing victims of discrimination is often challenging for researchers (Allen 2020, p. 42).

One other way of obtaining such data is to investigate the knowledge that field experts have gained on the ground from activities aimed at addressing discrimination. Such field experts can be part either of state-funded services or of Muslim associations. In Switzerland, there are centers funded by the state to support victims of racism and to record the racist incidents that are reported to trained staff (governmental experts), and there are also Muslim associations (non-governmental experts) that provide support to their members if they experience discrimination. Insights from both types of experts are valuable and complement each other.

This paper asks the following question: how do governmental and non-governmental experts describe and explain the discrimination experienced by *hijabis* in Switzerland, and how do they differ in their knowledge? More specifically, this study seeks to (1) determine the importance and role that field experts discern in processes of discrimination of this “marker of Muslimness” (Chakraborti and Zempi 2012, p. 271); (2) identify the forms that discrimination takes, and the life domains and socio-demographic profiles affected; (3) understand the particular way that this discrimination configures the social space that *hijabis* navigate; and (4) reveal how governmental and non-governmental experts differ in their knowledge.

To answer these questions, I draw on 23 semi-structured interviews with governmental and non-governmental experts across Switzerland. It is important to draw on both types of expert for two main reasons. First, governmental experts hear a diversity of victims of racism. Second, non-governmental experts are in contact with *hijabis* who are perhaps unwilling to testify to governmental experts. Interviewing the latter partly addresses the issue of under-reporting, i.e., the fact that victims of discrimination may not be willing to testify to government-funded centers or may not be aware that such centers exist.

2. The *hijab* in the West

An important body of qualitative research, which can be called “herméneutique du voile” (Pelletier 2005), investigates the significance and agency that women who wear the *hijab* ascribe to the garment. Studies using focus groups or interviews in Great Britain and North America reveal that the *hijab* works as a means to achieve empowerment, respectability or modesty; to perform and confirm identity; to represent a political strand such as anti-colonialism; or even to negotiate spaces (Haddad 2007; Hopkins and Greenwood 2013; Ruby 2006; Siraj 2011; Tarlo 2007). Other authors have tried to create typologies of the *hijab* according to what motivates women to wear it (Gaspard and Khosrokhavar 1995). A consensus has emerged from this literature: namely, the polysemy of the *hijab* across all national contexts.

Another category of research shifts the perspective and examines the perceptions and attitudes of the majority society with regard to the *hijab*, with these perceptions and attitudes being either expressed on the individual level or translated into national policies and media representations. Social psychologists have demonstrated that different individual and collective variables predict anti-*hijab* attitudes (Fasel et al. 2013; Saroglou et al. 2009). More generally, Helbling (2014) has demonstrated that majority attitudes are more negative towards *hijabis* than towards Muslims in general. Other scholars have argued that hostility towards veiled women is the gendered aspect of Islamophobia, and that it can be explained by stereotypes linked to the post-9/11 context (Amirault 2007; Chakraborti and Zempi 2012) or to a particular conception of laicity in which the *hijab* is constructed as a threat to the latter and to republican values such as gender equality (Benelli et al. 2006).

Finally, relatively recent studies have started to look specifically at the practical consequences of wearing the *hijab* in such socio-political contexts. This has been done mainly by investigating the economic impact of wearing the *hijab*, which could be called the “*hijab* penalty” just like authors reveal the existence of the “Muslim penalty” in other studies (Khattab and Modood 2015): studies have shown through statistical analyses or field experiments that veiled women are significantly less likely to be employed than non-veiled women and non-Muslims (Unkelbach et al. 2010), and have a significantly lower chance of being offered a job than similar applicants without the *hijab* (Ghumman and Ryan 2013; Weichselbaumer 2020). Very few studies have examined other life domains, however. Zempi and Chakraborti (2015) show that hostility towards veiled women has negative consequences in individual, community, and societal terms. Drawing on the testimonies of victims of discrimination in the United Kingdom, Carr (2016) and Allen (2020) offer detailed investigations of the experience of discrimination for Muslim women who wear the *hijab*, especially in the form of street-level attacks and minor incidents. As for the American context, a qualitative study has shown how the *hijab* plays a prominent role in processes of racialization in Dallas and Chicago (Selod 2015), while a quantitative study has found that the *hijab* is the most important predictor of perceived discrimination among Muslim women (Dana et al. 2019).

These studies make important contributions to understanding the impact of wearing the *hijab* in Western countries in specific life domains. However, they focus on street-level incidents, and usually limit their analysis to one life domain or one area. Drawing on different types of field experts who have heard and collected numerous testimonies allows us to widen the analysis to include a variety of life domains at a national scale.

3. The Swiss Context

Switzerland has a sizeable Muslim minority, amounting to 5.3% of the resident population; of these, approximately one-third have Swiss citizenship, and most have a migration background.²

Due to the system of direct democracy in Switzerland, referendums have introduced structural discrimination in the country: the interdiction with regard to the building of minarets that is inscribed in the Constitution, and the banning of face coverings in the public space by two cantons (Eskandari and Banfi 2017) that has just been inscribed in the Constitution after a referendum in 2021. Discrimination on a more local level has also been documented (Hainmueller and Hangartner 2013; Incidents Racistes Recensés par les Centres de Conseil. Janvier—Décembre 2019 2020).

Rates of perceived discrimination on the part of Muslims in Switzerland are also comparable to the rates in other European countries and the US, with approximately one-third of the Muslim resident population perceiving discrimination (*Enquête sur la Langue, la Religion et la Culture 2019 2020*; Lindemann and Stolz 2020). A survey has documented important levels of stereotypes of Muslims expressed by the majority population and hostility towards them (*Enquête sur le Vivre Ensemble en Suisse (VeS): Résultats 2018 2019*). Research has also shown that Switzerland has a Muslim employment gap that is quite similar to the gap in other European countries (Lindemann and Stolz 2018).

Moreover, the headscarf controversy has animated public and political debate since 1997, when the federal court banned a schoolteacher from wearing the *hijab*, a decision supported by the ECHR (Dahlab vs. Switzerland case). Conversely, attempts to ban schoolgirls from wearing the *hijab* have often been discussed by the media, but have never succeeded legally (Angst et al. 2006, p. 8). These debates take varying forms and intensity, depending on the regulation of religion and the extent to which laicity is or is not applied in each canton, Switzerland being a federal State (Ossipow 2003). Scholars have also demonstrated how the “veil” is used in Swiss media as a symbol of radical Islamism, oppression of women (echoing a process of attribution of extraordinary sexism to the Other described by Roux et al. 2007), or incompatibility with democratic values (Parini et al. 2012).

Finally, after adhering to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in 1971, Switzerland adopted a legal provision against racial discrimination, commonly known as the “anti-racism law”, including discrimination based on religion, in 1995 (Art. 261bis of Criminal Code): anyone who publicly discriminates or incites hatred against individuals because of their racial, ethnic or religious affiliation or sexual orientation shall be punished by up to three years of incarceration or by a fine.³ Victims of discrimination can file a complaint that will automatically launch legal proceedings.

This enactment gave birth to a network of government-funded centers supporting victims of discrimination. It is partly individuals who work in these centers that I have interviewed for this paper. Since 1995, out of 935 procedures filed as part of the “anti-racism law” and compiled by the Federal Commission against Racism,⁴ 52 involved Muslims. Out of these 52 cases, only 2 concern direct discrimination against women wearing the *hijab*, both in 2010 (one was insulted and the other got her *hijab* torn off, both in the street), and 2 others were linked to communications inciting hatred and violence against women wearing the *hijab*. The small number of legal cases involving direct victims might suggest that *hijabis* very rarely report experiences of discrimination, which will be discussed in the analysis.

To sum up, Switzerland is quite similar to other European countries, although the level of structural discrimination is somewhat higher due to its system of direct democracy.

4. Theoretical Framework

There is an extensive theoretical literature that attempts to conceptualize and explain discrimination, and I only select three points here that will help me interpret my subsequent findings.

4.1. Terminology

In the literature, the terms *veil*, *hijab* and *headscarf* are often used to refer to the same garment, namely a scarf covering the hair, neck, and shoulders. In this study, I chose to use the terms *hijab* and *hijabis* for two main reasons. First, it constitutes a neutral alternative to the various emic terms that I came across during the expert interviews. Depending on the linguistic region, the respondents spontaneously referred to the “veil” in the French and Italian-speaking parts of Switzerland (*il velo/le voile*), and sometimes to the headscarf in the French part (*le foulard*), and exclusively to the “headscarf” in the German part (*das Kopftuch*). Any discussion on other types of garments in the interviews is not analyzed in the present study. Second, *hijab* is the most precise term, as it allows differentiating from other types of garments worn both in specific Islamic traditions and other religions (Almila 2017). In this study, the term “veiled women” is rarely used but, if so, it refers to *hijabis* and not to women wearing full-face coverings such as the *niqab* or the *burqa*.

4.2. Racism, Islamophobia, and Intersectionality

Discrimination can be defined as behaviors that create unequal treatment based on presumed individual or group characteristics, resulting in disadvantages and negative outcomes of the targeted individual or group of individuals. These behaviors are usually, but not necessarily (Merton 1949), motivated by prejudices, defined as negative and generalized beliefs towards an outgroup (Allport 1954; Quillian 2006).

When we talk about discrimination against women who wear the *hijab*, which can take the form of social exclusion, violence, or stigmatization, the question that automatically arises relates to the type of prejudices on which this discrimination is based. Is it Islamophobia, racism, or gender-based discrimination? The answer to this question depends on the definition of these concepts. Of course, adherence to a religion is not a “race”. However, the process of targeting individuals based on their (supposed) adherence to a religion can be considered a process of racialization (Carr 2016; Meer and Modood 2009, p. 344), in the sense that it seeks to undermine and “other” these individuals based on their belonging. From this perspective, Islamophobia may be defined as a specific form of racism that motivates discriminatory behaviors targeting individuals based on their (supposed) adherence to a specific religion, namely Islam. Indeed, Islamophobia functions identically to racism: namely, through ideologies based on a set of prejudices, opinions, and attitudes that are manifested through exclusionary discourses and practices (Allen 2020).

To complicate matters, it is difficult to disentangle the motives based on gender, ethnicity, race, skin color, and religion. Authors refer to “intersectionality” (Crenshaw 1993) or “multiple-discrimination” (Ruwanpura 2008) to describe processes of discrimination where the accumulation of different social positions and attributes (race, gender, religion, migratory status, etc.) creates specific experiences of discrimination. In this regard, a growing number of studies focusing on the discrimination of Muslims women resort to this theoretical framework (Eijberts and Roggeban 2016; Weichselbaumer 2020).

4.3. Social Stigma and Markers of Muslimness

Studies on discrimination frequently cite the work by Erving Goffman on Stigma. Goffman’s concept is very useful for the interpretation of my results, because, in Western societies, the *hijab* fits his notion of social stigma, especially in terms of how its visibility or “evidentness” (Goffman 1963, p. 48) works. Goffman posits that society produces the means to categorize individuals into groups based on attributes thought to be ordinary or natural for their members. Some of these attributes become stigmas when they differ from normative expectations and when they discredit the individual who possesses them.

However, an attribute is never creditable or discreditable in itself; rather, it is the special relationship between stereotypes and the attribute that makes it a stigma. According to Goffman, there are two types of social stigma: the discreditable, which is invisible or not yet known, and the discredited, which is visible (“evident”) or already known (Goffman 1963, pp. 41–42). In this regard, the *hijab* falls under the second category of stigma, as it is visible and functions as a marker of Muslimness or otherness.

4.4. Social Stigma and the Configuration of Social Spaces

Another important insight provided by Goffman (1963, pp. 81–82) is that the stigmatization of certain individuals tends to configure their space into three types: the out-of-bounds places, where stigmatized persons are forbidden and where exposure leads to expulsion; the civil places, where they are tolerated, but in fact disqualified; and the back places, where they can freely navigate their world without any social costs. This idea seems to be very useful when it comes to making sense of how the field experts interviewed describe the effects of discrimination for *hijabis* in Swiss society.

5. Methodology

5.1. Expert Knowledge

The concept, validity, and reliability of expert knowledge have been much debated (Collins and Evans 2002). Following Meuser and Nagel (2009), I conceive of experts as individuals who are active agents in a specific field and who, through their social positioning and experience, have acquired practical knowledge on particular issues. More specifically, I identify individuals as experts when they are active agents in the field of anti-racism in general or of anti-Islamophobia in particular. In Switzerland, this includes both governmental agents who assist victims of discrimination and gather data on racist incidents, and non-governmental actors who receive testimonies from and give informal support to victims who are unwilling to contact state-funded centers or are unaware that such centers exist. These experts are points of crystallization for multiple testimonies of victims.

The combination of these two types of expert permits us to widen our understanding of discrimination against *hijabis* in Switzerland for three main reasons. First, it allows us partly to address the issue highlighted by scholars of under-reporting (Carr 2016, pp. 137–39; Fanning et al. 2011), since victims are often reluctant to testify to state services or are simply not aware that they exist. Active agents in Muslim associations therefore have access to the testimonies of women who are unknown to governmental experts, and have particularly strong ties to the population of *hijabis*, since data suggest that veiled Muslim women are much more likely to be members of an ethno-religious association.⁵ Second, some incidents could be considered not serious enough to be reported to state services, but are still discussed in the Muslim associations. Third, and conversely, *hijabis* who do not belong to Muslim associations might not report their experiences to non-governmental experts but might contact state services instead. While this methodology aims at being as inclusive as possible, a selection bias still remains: namely, the lack of knowledge with regard to the experience of women who are both unwilling to testify to state experts and absent from Muslim associations.

Finally, not drawing on the direct experience of *hijabis* and privileging field expert insights is a methodological choice. Although this choice involves resorting to respondents who “speak for” these women, it has important benefits: it provides a more general overview of the issue, since these respondents are in contact with many individuals from very diverse horizons and who have experienced discrimination in a wide range of domains. To reach such an overview with interviews of *hijabis* would have required conducting far more interviews and convincing people to confide on sensitive experiences. Focusing on the limited viewpoint of victims would have necessarily limited the scope of the inferences. Finally, some of the non-government female experts wore the *hijab* and they sometimes shared their experiences during the interviews. To avoid dealing with data from a different

nature (expert knowledge vs. personal experiences), I excluded personal experiences from the analysis.

5.2. Data Collection

A total of 23 semi-structured, face-to-face interviews were conducted with experts in the three linguistic regions of Switzerland between August 2019 and May 2020. We conducted the interviews in the language spoken in the canton where the expert lived, and used topic guides avoiding closed questions (Meuser and Nagel 2009), these topic guides being structured around three main axes: how the entity to which the expert is affiliated defines and deals with discrimination; the nature of the discrimination identified by the expert (frequency, life domains, types of discrimination); the profile of the victims who contacted the expert (where we avoided mention of *hijabis* so as not to give the answers a particular orientation); and mechanisms of discrimination and coping strategies that the expert identifies in the testimonies.

The non-governmental experts (14, named N01 to N14) were mostly drawn from Muslim organizations, i.e., representatives from both local and umbrella organizations. As for the governmental experts (9, named G01 to G09), these are persons in charge of counselling in government-funded centers for victims of racism. These centers are either part of the cantonal administration, usually belonging to the “Offices for the integration of foreigners”, or are hosted by civil organizations but still funded by the canton. Overall, 48% of the experts interviewed were women.

I used a hybrid approach to build the sample: I listed all the organizations and government-funded centers in Banfi’s exhaustive cartography (Banfi 2013), as well as the public reports of the centers (Incidents Racistes Recensés par les Centres de Conseil. Janvier—Décembre 2019 2020), and then added all other actors that might be of interest; I then used a snowball procedure to confirm and/or expand the list. Overall, I contacted 47 experts, and achieved a response rate of 49%. The interviews lasted between 30 and 150 min, with an average duration of 63 min. The interviews were audiotaped and transcribed.

5.3. Analyses

I used a hybrid approach of thematic content analysis consisting of an iterative process between inductive and deductive coding similar to the methodology of Fereday and Muir-Cochrane (2006). I first coded a selection of interviews inductively to identify key themes and patterns using MAXQDA12 software. I rearranged the list of codes before adding codes that I thought would be useful for the rest of the corpus, based on the research questions, the literature, and my field experience. Finally, I reran the analysis on the selection using this fixed list accompanied by rules of coding (available on request by the author) and then applied it to the rest of the corpus. The main codes analyzed in this paper are those attached to victims of discrimination discussed by the experts: markers of Muslimness/otherness (*hijab*, origin, name, other religious signs); life domains (private sector, public sector, public life, private life); forms of discrimination (exclusionary practices, verbal abuse, physical violence); types of ideology underlying the discrimination (xenophobia, Islamophobia, sexism, etc.); socio-demographic profile (migratory status, level of education); and strategy (testify, not testify).

Using this coding scheme allows me to identify (1) how the experts evaluate the importance and role of the *hijab* in processes of discrimination; (2) the life domains in which discrimination occurs, as well as the forms that such discrimination takes and the socio-demographic group to which discriminated women belong; (3) how the experts describe the configuration of the social space for *hijabis*; and (4) how the two types of experts differ, especially in their understanding of individual reasons for not reporting incidents.

6. Results

6.1. The hijab as the Most Important Marker of Muslimness

Drawing on the multitude of testimonies given by individuals who had experienced discrimination, both the governmental and the non-governmental experts discussed the importance of this garment and the role that it plays in processes of discrimination. Analyzing the interviews reveals that the *hijab* is seen as the most important marker of Muslimness, which makes *hijabis* especially vulnerable to discrimination.

For example, one non-governmental expert claims:

“But the only negative point in this system are not Muslims; it is the Muslim woman. Muslims, I don’t know, there are prejudices sometimes in the workplace or hiring process. There are some stories linked to eating halal, etc. But the discrimination that is clear is against Muslim women, especially the veiled woman. This is really, this is the thing that sticks out the most”.

(N03)

Similarly, some of the other experts indicate that *hijabis* are the most vulnerable Muslims when it comes to discrimination. They mention that cases of discrimination reported to them “concern all veiled women” (N06), that they are “more affected” (G09), and that “women with the headscarf have the most difficulty, I think, without a doubt” (G07). Both the governmental and the non-governmental experts share this perception.

In this regard, it is interesting to note that the *hijab* is a very salient topic when the experts discuss different markers of Muslimness. As Figure 1 shows, the experts mention the *hijab* spontaneously more often than other markers (left axis), as they bring up the issue themselves in 21 of the 23 interviews (91%). In contrast, they spontaneously mention other markers of Muslimness (right axis), such as name, origin, or signs seen as religiously motivated (Ramadan, beard, special diet), in only 12 (52%), 13 (57%), and 14 (61%) interviews.




Figure 1. Spontaneity with which the experts raise an issue (left), and average proportion of the interview that they give to markers of Muslimness (right).

Figure 1 also indicates that, in terms of the extent to which each marker is discussed, the *hijab* is given more attention than other markers. On average, the *hijab* takes up 17% of an interview, with a maximum of 40% and a minimum of 2%. Comparing these results to other markers (7% for origin, for example) shows clearly the prominence of the *hijab* in the expert interviews.

Additionally, the *hijab* appears at a very early stage in the interview, with the issue cropping up after less than 13 min on average; it sometimes crops up in the first three minutes of the interview, and almost always within the first 20 min. However, the governmental experts were slower to mention the issue (17.4 versus 9.8 min on average).

6.2. Why *hijabis* Are Targeted: Visibility, Gender, and Racialization

In line with Goffman's theory of "discredited stigma" (visible marker of otherness) and intersectional approaches, most of the experts explain that the vulnerability of *hijabis* is due to three main mechanisms: (a) the *hijab* makes their belonging to Islam directly visible; (b) gender and religious belonging intersect in the experiences of discrimination; (c) *hijabis* are racialized as they are often (wrongly) perceived as foreigners. These mechanisms are highlighted by both types of expert.

(a) According to the experts and in line with previous studies, the *hijab* "makes things a lot worse, because it is very visible" (N01, G09). As an illustration, one expert explains the difference between men and women as follows:

"With women it is more difficult; in most cases it is obvious that they are Muslims. For men, a beard is not sufficient anymore, unless you really wear religious clothes, but no one wears such clothes for a job interview. So, with men, other things cause problems like surname or first name. Or in a job interview when you say something. Or at work, you're bullied by your colleagues, you hear certain stories or those bad jokes about Islam, about Muslims, but often also the countries of origin [are involved] like Turkey, Kosovo . . . With women it's different, especially when they wear headscarves it's obvious. She doesn't have to say anything, she's just . . . Her clothes speak".

(N09)

(b) Additionally, the experts highlight how gender and religious belonging intersect in processes of discrimination. Apart from the obvious fact that the *hijab* is only worn by women, those women who do wear the *hijab* can be exposed to sexist comments in the public space. Examples were given of women who had been asked in public about why they hid their hair despite being "so beautiful", and about their supposed difficulty in dating men (N07), as well as of sexist insults thrown at *hijabis* by strangers in the street and by neighbors.

The experts gave other examples of *hijabis* facing verbal attacks with regard to their maternal role, such as being told that what they are "doing with the veil is unacceptable, your child will suffer all his life because of your choice. Are you thinking about your child? Are you thinking about the suffering you're causing him?" (N05). Other experts explain that, "when *hijabis* take a walk, some women even talk to the kids, telling them, 'your mother with her headscarf . . .'" (N07); that *hijabis* are intentionally kicked on the bus when they are looking for something in the stroller (N05), or physically assaulted by a man trying to pull the *hijab* off (N09).

All these examples reveal how the injunctions made to women in different gender roles attributed to them by society are added to the prejudices and stereotypes linked to the wearing of the *hijab*.

(c) Finally, the experts highlighted how *hijabis* are racialized through xenophobic comments, as women wearing the *hijab* are often wrongly perceived as foreigners and attacked for this reason. They report situations where the victim is reduced to her (supposed) "foreign" identity. This can take different forms, such as direct insults or attributions of "otherness", for example "go back home" (N02, N06, N07, N10, G02) or "dirty Arab" (N07); the implication that the world is divided between "us" and "you", such as "in our country you can't do this" (N07); and more subtle insinuations, such as being surprised that the woman speaks the local language, when she is asked, "Do you understand French?" (N04, N07, N14). The experts often highlighted the fact that these incidents had occurred with regard to Swiss citizens or second-generation individuals born in the country.

This process can be called “double-othering” (Allen 2020), as women wearing the *hijab* are attacked because they are Muslims *and* because they are conceived as being “other” or as not belonging to the country.

To sum up these results, the experts explain that *hijabis* are especially targeted by pointing to the fact that they are more visible as Muslims, and that *hijabis* experience multiple discrimination where gender, belonging to Islam and (supposed) foreign origins intersect.

6.3. Pervasive and Multifaceted Discrimination

In addition to their specific vulnerability, another important dimension of discrimination against *hijabis* highlighted by experts is its pervasiveness: it (a) occurs in a variety of life domains, (b) takes different forms, and (c) affects a wide range of socio-demographic profiles.

(a) First, the experts interviewed identify different life domains where such discrimination occurs, especially the labor market, public spaces, and state schools.

As for the labor market, there seems to be a double glass ceiling for women wearing the *hijab*, as they find it almost impossible to access the labor market (G09) despite a good, and sometimes very good, level of education. The experts often highlight the fact that “there are veiled women who are hyper qualified, women who have a PhD in medicine, but who are housewives. With a master’s degree, a PhD, in educational sciences, journalists, teachers, there are a lot” (N03).

For example, they explain that students are unable to find internships in law or pharmacy (N02, N06, N11, N04), that women are fired as soon as they decide to wear the *hijab* at work (N03, G04), or are faced with the choice of either removing the *hijab* or quitting their job (N06, N07, G07), and that they have been refused a position explicitly or implicitly because of the *hijab* (N05, N07, N09, G08). Especially affected are the medical sector, teaching, jobs involving direct contact with customers, work in cantonal administrative offices, and universities.

As for public spaces, the experts talk about discrimination in different public situations, such as insults or physical assaults in the street (N02, G03, N04, N06, G07, N10, G09), in supermarkets (N07, N10), at the airport (N01, N04) where women are forced to remove the *hijab* in front of other passengers, at the post office or bank (N02, N04), on public transport (G02, N05, N08, N09), and in car parks (N07):

“Otherwise, most of the problems that arise are in car parks. Or at the till in shops. Or on the street. Sometimes it means looks, insults. Insults saying “go home”, things like that. That’s the majority of it, it’s in the street. Someone who says something quickly and leaves”.

(N07)

As well as the labor market and public spaces, schools, although mentioned less often, are no exception to the rule. Situations range from harassment by other children to degrading treatment by teachers. For example, one of the experts relates the testimony of a mother whose daughter had put her *hijab* back on after school and then bumped into her teacher on the street. Expressing her negative view of this practice, the teacher then completely changed her attitude towards the girl in class for the worse (N07).

Other examples are that girls who wore the *hijab* at school ended up taking it off (although legislation does not prohibit pupils from wearing it in Switzerland), or asked to change colleges because of harassment: “There was no way to talk to the teachers, it was always like closed doors. They (the schoolgirls) felt demeaned. They were losing their self-esteem” (N04).

(b) The variety of forms taken by discrimination is also important. Indeed, the incidents can range from verbal to physical attacks, be implicit or explicit discrimination, or take the form of practices of exclusion. The experts most often report practices of exclusion such as bullying or withholding a service (61.9%) and verbal abuse (31.0%), but physical

assaults (7.1%) are not exceptional, with examples of women being spat at (N04), jostled and hit (N05, N09, N07), and having their *hijab* torn off (N06).

(c) Finally, the examples described by the experts show that the experience of discrimination affects all socio-demographic profiles, be they Swiss citizens or asylum seekers, born in Switzerland or abroad, with a high level of education or from poorer socio-economic backgrounds. One of the experts explains, for example, that no matter the status, exclusion from the labor market is commonplace: “Can you imagine, 200 rejections! . . . Just for an initial internship. They don’t succeed. It’s not easy, even though they were born here, they are Swiss, they are naturalised. But, in spite of that, they are marginalised, they are excluded from the system. They feel like second-class citizens” (N03). The analysis of discrimination in schools or kindergartens also points to the fact that the women affected by discrimination are of widely different ages.

In other words, the experts describe the discrimination faced by *hijabis* as pervasive, since it affects a wide range of life domains; multifaceted, since it takes a variety of forms; and it affects a wide range of socio-demographic profiles.

6.4. A Segregated Social Space

Analyzing the expert interviews also allows us to identify three kinds of space for *hijabis* that are similar to the “out-of-bounds, civil and back places” coined by Goffman (1963).

First, the labor market is a quasi “out-of-bounds place”, as it appears to be almost forbidden for women wearing the *hijab* in Switzerland, in a variety of sectors. Several of the experts explain that “it is almost inaccessible for a woman who introduces herself veiled in a job interview”, be it in industry, in more social-oriented jobs (G09), or in local administration (N13, N05). The exclusion of *hijabis* can be formulated either explicitly or implicitly: the experts signal that many companies explicitly state that they “do not want to hire women who wear the *hijab*” (N11), and make a condition of employment the removal of the garment (N02, N03, N05, N10), or develop written guidelines to prohibit the wearing of “headgear” in the workplace (N02, N03, N11). The usual argument highlighted by the experts is that, if confronted with someone wearing the *hijab*, customers or patients could be “shocked” or “disturbed” (N02, N03, G07, N10). In some implicit situations, *hijabis* point to different clues as evidence of their lack of success in the process of applying for a job, such as repeated rejections, a sense of discomfort during the interview, and a sudden change of tone. To some of the experts, the only solution seems to be to remove the *hijab*, which some government workers at regional employment offices seem to encourage (N04, N09):

“And yes, there are many of them. To tell you the truth, there are quite a few who actually take off the veil. Because they were unemployed for years, devalued... And it’s true that at some point—for a matter of survival, too, for socio-economic reasons, they had to take the step, and I think that’s the case for many women”.

(N05)

Second, public space and state education could be described as “civil places”, where stigmatized individuals are treated as though they were not officially disqualified when in fact they are. Indeed, although Swiss legislation does not prohibit women from wearing the *hijab* in public spaces, or pupils wearing the *hijab* at school, the experts claim that practices of exclusion and stigmatization do in fact target women wearing the *hijab* in such places. In public spaces, this can range from verbal and physical aggression, to unfriendly looks that are sometimes difficult to decipher: “maybe you can say that’s not discrimination or that’s just a look. . . . when you stare at people, that would probably bother others as well” (N10). The frequency of such incidents depends on what is currently happening in the international context, as the incidents appear to increase immediately after a terrorist attack (N02, G03).

Examples at school also highlight how certain spaces are officially inclusive but are nonetheless sites where stigmatization is still at work: a teacher repeatedly calling a schoolgirl “scarf” instead of her name; a school head criticizing the parents for allowing

a pupil to wear the *hijab* after returning from the holidays; girls forced to take off the *hijab* when photographed for their pupil ID card. Some schools, especially in cantons where laicity has become the subject of heated political debates, are known to be more problematic:

“And this school, unfortunately, is not the only one. I can easily think of a dozen girls who went to that school and really suffered. Girls who were veiled and ended up removing their veil, so much pressure”.

(N04)

Indeed, this could be explained by political contexts at the cantonal level. The federal nature of Switzerland implies important variations in the way laicity is (not) applied. For example, the new *Law on the laicity of the State (A 2 75)* came into force in 2019 in the canton of Geneva, prohibiting the wearing of “ostentatious religious signs” for state employees, which is symptomatic of an especially tense context surrounding the “veil”. “The proximity of Geneva to France entails similarities in its political debates and understanding of laicity, namely in terms of invisibility of religious belonging and practices in the public sphere. As Amiraux points out, the *hijab* is situated between the private and public spheres, and is often presented in public debates as a threat to laicity (Amiraux 2007). Several experts, government as well as non-government ones, highlight a particularly hostile context towards *hijabis* in Geneva (N03, N05, G07) and explain it by two main factors: a conception of laicity that is exclusive, contrary to Neuchâtel where it is inclusive (N02, N05, N08), and its proximity to France (N02, N04, N05, G02).

Finally, social exclusion, be it explicit or implicit, official or unofficial, leads *hijabis* to invest in “back spaces”, where they can navigate without experiencing discrimination or having to conceal their “social stigma”, with different experts often mentioning such spaces as being the household, low-skilled jobs, and voluntary work in Muslim organizations. For example, highly qualified women such as lawyers, legal experts, doctors, who unwillingly end up doing cleaning work (N02, N07), being full-time mothers (N03), or doing voluntary work (N05).

The interviews suggest that discrimination shapes the social world in three kinds of places for *hijabis*, although the boundaries between the places are not as clear-cut as Goffman’s theory might suggest: except for some low-skilled jobs and for businesses owned by Muslims, the labor market can be seen as an “out-of-bounds place” for women when they expose their religious affiliation through the *hijab*; public space and education can be seen as “civil places”, since officially they are inclusive, but unofficially exclusive in day-to-day experience; and voluntary work in Muslim organizations, low-skilled positions, and being a housewife are close to “back places”, where these women, by force of circumstance, can navigate these spaces without having to conceal their social stigma.

6.5. To Report or Not to Report?

With one exception, the governmental and the non-governmental experts provide broadly similar insights into the prevalence, nature and effects of discrimination against *hijabis*: namely, the non-governmental experts have a better understanding of the phenomenon whereby *hijabis* under-report to state services. The governmental experts are usually aware that just a minority of victims of discrimination report to their services and provide explanations (albeit at a general level) as to why that might be the case. For example, one of the experts enumerates possible reasons why victims of discrimination do not report to them: unawareness, fear and shame:

“So sometimes people don’t even know we exist; I think about people with a precarious status, people who have just arrived in Switzerland. Another reason is the fact that they are afraid to report because they fear possible repercussions for their illegal or precarious status in the country. Sometimes they are ashamed to talk about certain episodes with someone they don’t know well and there is also the fear of not being perceived as integrated. For people who have been here

for a long time, recognizing that they are victims of discrimination represents a personal defeat”.

(G09)

In contrast, the non-governmental experts provide specific explanations as to why *hijabis* in particular do not report to state services, these explanations falling into three main categories: a sense of fatalism, the fear of being blamed, and the complexity of legal procedures.

As to the first category, the non-governmental experts explain that, if many *hijabis* do not report their experiences, it is because “some of them think that there is no point in talking. Even if she speaks, she won’t get anything. That’s a very strong reason” (N06). Others point to the attitude of resignation among *hijabis* with regard to discriminatory practices in the labor market, where women “know that they did not obtain a position because of the headscarf; they know and say, ‘alright, I accept it, I move on’” (N09).

As to the fear of being blamed, the non-governmental experts suggest that reporting discrimination that is linked to the *hijab* may involve a double stigmatization, with the person to whom the incident is reported judging the victim negatively for wearing the *hijab*. For example, one of the experts says that victims fear reporting discrimination because this might backfire on her (N04), and another says:

“I understand these women who don’t go because they are immediately told, ‘yes, you know, in our country, you shouldn’t wear . . . ’ We make them feel guilty. Not only do we judge them; we also make them feel guilty, ‘it’s your fault, you’re dressed like that, well that’s what happens’”.

(N07)

These past experiences or concerns would explain why *hijabis* are sometimes reluctant to contact state services and would rather turn to Muslim associations comprised of Muslim peers who would better understand them. As one of the experts suggests: “So I come back to the reason why they come to us, because we don’t judge them, maybe we understand them because we have also experienced it”.

Finally, the non-governmental experts mention the fact that the complaint mechanisms and legal procedures are complicated. Indeed, if a victim of racism wants to defend his or her rights within the legal framework of provisions against racial discrimination, a framework that includes discrimination based on religion (Art. 261bis of the Swiss Criminal Code), then different criteria must be met, one of which is that there are witnesses to the racist incident and that the incident took place publicly. Both the governmental and the non-governmental experts highlight the difficulty here when talking about racist discrimination in general (G02, G05, G06, N09, N11): “most of the time, the case is closed. Word against word, lack of conclusive evidence, no witnesses, that’s it, the perpetrator can tell barefaced lies and that’s the end of it. And it’s a double punishment for the victims, so it’s a pretty traumatic process” (G02).

This means that *hijabis* tend to be reluctant when it comes to contacting a state-funded center for help in criminal procedures; they regard a positive outcome as being unlikely. This could certainly explain the very low number of legal cases involving *hijabis* recorded in the database presented in Section 3: two cases of direct discrimination against *hijabis*, concentrated in the year 2010, out of a total of 52 cases where the victims are Muslims since 1995. For example, one non-governmental expert describes the situation in these terms:

“After years of working in this company without any problems, she decided to wear a headscarf, and then this became a reason for her dismissal. Often it is clearly said, but not recorded, and that is not racial discrimination, according to criminal law, because this is a private relationship and there is no evidence, or no witnesses. Then maybe they can sue for defamation, but that will cost money”.

(N09)

Some of the experts also report that the police sometimes constitute another obstacle for *hijabis* when they wish to file a complaint, because the police either do not take the case seriously (N10), or immediately claim that there were no witnesses (N09).

In short, while the governmental experts have a general idea of why many victims of discrimination do not report to official centers, the non-governmental experts provide more detailed and specific reasons why that is the case, the three reasons that they mention being a fatalist attitude towards the situation, the fear of being blamed instead of supported, and the obstacles to initiating legal procedures.

7. Conclusions

In this paper, I set out to answer the question: how do governmental and non-governmental experts describe the discrimination experienced by *hijabis* in Switzerland? More specifically, I sought to (1) determine the importance and role of this “marker of Muslimness” that field experts discern in processes of discrimination; (2) identify the forms that discrimination takes, and the life domains and socio-demographic profiles affected; (3) understand the particular way that this discrimination configures the social space that *hijabis* navigate; and (4) reveal how governmental and non-governmental experts differ in their knowledge.

We can provide four answers to these questions. First, both the governmental and the non-governmental experts state that the *hijab* is the most important marker of Muslimness in processes of discrimination, which makes *hijabis* especially vulnerable to discrimination. The experts explain the specific vulnerability of *hijabis* by pointing to the fact that their affiliation to Islam is visible (like the discredited stigma described by Goffman); to the way that gender and religious belonging intersect in the experiences of discrimination; and to the processes of racialization and othering based on the (often false) perception as foreigners.

Second, the experts describe this discrimination as being widespread and multifaceted, since it occurs in a variety of life domains, takes various forms, and affects a wide range of socio-demographic profiles.

Third, the expert interviews suggest that the social world is configured around three kinds of places for *hijabis* (also highlighted by Goffman): the out-of-bounds places, such as the labor market, where the *hijab* is very rarely tolerated; the civil places, which are officially inclusive but actually marked by exclusion in day-to-day experiences, such as schools and public spaces; and, finally, back-places, which *hijabis* can navigate freely, mostly through voluntary work in Muslim organizations, in low-skilled positions, and in the household.

Fourth, the governmental and non-governmental experts converge with regard to the prevalence, nature, and effects of discrimination against *hijabis*. However, the non-governmental experts show a better understanding of the phenomenon of under-reporting, explaining the reluctance of *hijabis* to report their experiences to state services by pointing to their sense of fatalism, their fear of being blamed rather than supported, and the complexity of criminal procedures.

These results have several implications with regard to the current state of research and to recent events. For one thing, many studies that measure discrimination against Muslims show no significant difference between Muslim men and women. For example, they face unemployment in the same extent (Connor and Koenig 2015; Heath and Martin 2013; Lindemann and Stolz 2018) and do not significantly differ in their perception of discriminations (Lindemann and Stolz 2020). However, my results point to the specific difficulties faced by Muslim women who wear the *hijab*. These difficulties do not appear in statistical analyses, either because such women constitute a minority of the Muslim population, or because they are under-represented in surveys. My study also suggests that existing field studies that rely on controlled situations and focus on specific life domains have not yet captured the pervasiveness and importance of discrimination against veiled women, welcoming further qualitative studies or new surveys that include items on veiling practices.

For another, passionate debates have broken out in the public and academic spheres regarding scientific research on minorities, debates that have culminated in the accusation of Islam-leftism levelled at social scientists working in these fields, especially in the French context (Fassin 2021). At the same time, laws are being passed that ban different veiling practices in the public space in Europe, the latest being the banning of full-face veils in Switzerland, which was voted for in March 2021. During the campaign, it was not unusual to notice a quick slip from the niqab (full-face veil) to the *hijab* in TV and radio debates. In such a context, there is still a clear need for dispassionate and serious empirical research to document and understand social injustices scientifically.

Funding: This research received no external funding.

Institutional Review Board Statement: Not applicable.

Informed Consent Statement: Informed consent was obtained from all subjects involved in the study.

Data Availability Statement: The anonymized interviews and the codebook can be provided on direct request by the author.

Acknowledgments: I thank Jörg Stolz for his regular and insightful comments during the writing of the paper; David West for his attentive proofreading; and my student assistants for their precious help in collecting the data.

Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest.

Notes

- ¹ The *hijab* refers to a simple head covering worn by Muslim women.
- ² Source: Federal Statistical Office: <https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/fr/home/statistiques/population/langues-religions/religions.html> (accessed on 24 June 2020).
- ³ <https://www.admin.ch/opc/fr/classified-compilation/19370083/index.html#a261bis> (accessed on 24 June 2020).
- ⁴ These numbers and descriptions come from a thorough reading of all cases involving Muslim victims in the database of procedures filed in Switzerland as part of art. 261bis of the Penal Code, compiled by the Federal Commission against Racism: <https://www.ekr.admin.ch/prestations/f518.html>. (accessed on 18 August 2020).
- ⁵ The data gathered for the study “Between Demands for Recognition and Politics of Accommodation: The Cultural, Social, and Political Orientations of Muslims in Switzerland” indicate that 42% of Muslim women involved in an ethno-religious association wear the hijab, while only 18% of those not involved in such association do so. However, the sample is representative of Muslim foreigners and does not include Swiss Muslims. Information on this study is available at <https://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:73809>. (accessed on 15 May 2021).

References

- Allen, Chris. 2020. *Reconfiguring Islamophobia. A Radical Rethinking of a Contested Concept*. Cham: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Allport, Gordon. 1954. *The Nature of Prejudice*. Cambridge: Addison-Wesley.
- Almila, Anna-Mari. 2017. Introduction. In *The Routledge International Handbook to Veils and Veiling Practices*. Edited by Anna-Mari Almila and David Inglis. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 1–52.
- Amiriaux, Valérie. 2007. The Headscarf Question: What is Really the Issue? In *European Islam. Challenges for Public Policy and Society*. Edited by Samir Amghar, Amel Boubakeur and Michael Emerson. Bruxelles: Centre for European Policy Studies, pp. 124–43.
- Angst, Doris, Sabine Kreienbühl, and Tarek Naguib. 2006. Les Relations Avec la Minorité Musulmane en Suisse. Prise de Position de la CFR sur L'évolution Actuelle. Available online: https://www.ekr.admin.ch/pdf/Les_relations_avec_la_minorite_musulmane_en_Suisse_Resume.pdf (accessed on 17 August 2020).
- Banfi, Elisa. 2013. *Snowboarding on Swiss Islam*. Neuchâtel: Alphil-Presses Universitaires Suisses.
- Benelli, Natalie, Ellen Hertz, Christine Delphy, Christelle Hamel, Patricia Roux, and Jules Falquet. 2006. De l'affaire du voile à l'imbrication du sexisme et du racisme. *Nouvelles Questions Féministes* 25: 4–11. [CrossRef]
- Carr, James. 2016. *Experiences of Islamophobia: Living with Racism in the Neoliberal Era*. London: Routledge.
- Chakraborti, Neil, and Irene Zempi. 2012. The veil under attack: Gendered dimensions of Islamophobic victimization. *International Review of Victimology* 18: 269–84. [CrossRef]
- Collins, Harry, and Robert Evans. 2002. The Third Wave of Science Studies: Studies of Expertise and Experience. *Social Studies of Science* 32: 235–96. [CrossRef]

- Connor, Phillip, and Matthias Koenig. 2015. Explaining the Muslim employment gap in Western Europe: Individual-level effects and ethno-religious penalties. *Social Science Research* 49: 191–201. [CrossRef]
- Crenshaw, Kimberlé. 1993. Mapping the Margins—Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color. *Stanford Law Review* 43: 1241–99. [CrossRef]
- Dana, Karam, Nazita Lajevardi, Kassra Oskooii, and Hanna Walker. 2019. Veiled Politics: Experiences with Discrimination among Muslim Americans. *Politics and Religion* 12: 629–77. [CrossRef]
- Eijberts, Mélanie, and Conny Roggeban. 2016. Stuck with the stigma? How Muslim migrant women in the Netherlands deal—Individually and collectively—With negative stereotypes. *Ethnicities* 16: 130–53. [CrossRef]
- Enquête sur la Langue, la Religion et la Culture 2019. 2020. Bern: Federal Statistics Office, Available online: <https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/fr/home/statistiques/population.assetdetail.14856800.html> (accessed on 15 May 2021).
- Enquête sur le Vivre Ensemble en Suisse (VeS): Résultats 2018. 2019. Neuchâtel: Federal Statistics Office, Available online: <https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/fr/home/statistiques/catalogues-banques-donnees/publications.assetdetail.7466705.html> (accessed on 25 June 2021).
- Eskandari, Vista, and Elisa Banfi. 2017. Institutionalising Islamophobia in Switzerland: The Burqa and Minaret Bans. *Islamophobia Studies Journal* 4: 53–71. [CrossRef]
- Fanning, Bryan, Brian Killoran, Saorlaith Ní Bhroin, and Geoff McEvoy. 2011. *Taking Racism Seriously: Migrant's Experiences of Violence, Harassment and Anti-Social Behaviour in the Dublin Area*. Dublin: Immigrant Council of Ireland. Retrieved from Dublin, Available online: <https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/librarydoc/taking-racism-seriously-migrants-experiences-of-violence-harassment-and-anti-social-behaviour-in-the-dublin-area> (accessed on 15 May 2021).
- Fasel, Nicole, Eva Green, and Oriane Sarrasin. 2013. Unveiling Naturalization. A Multilevel Study on Minority Proportion, Conservative Ideologies, and Attitudes Toward the Muslim Veil. *Zeitschrift für Psychologie* 221: 242–51. [CrossRef]
- Fassin, Didier. 2021. Are 'woke' academics a threat to the French republic? Ask Macron's ministers. *The Guardian*. Available online: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/mar/12/academics-french-republic-macron-islamo-leftism?fbclid=IwAR3IDG2RtIo-2KGRzudx59ZfEuQOUspoSVNBaoPz-5hPtsuEo6BQxjvdhmv> (accessed on 13 March 2021).
- Fereday, Jennifer, and Elimear Muir-Cochrane. 2006. Demonstrating Rigor Using Thematic Analysis: A Hybrid Approach of Inductive and Deductive Coding and Theme Development. *International Journal of Qualitative Methods* 5: 80–92. [CrossRef]
- Gaspard, Françoise, and Farhad Khosrokhavar. 1995. *Le Foulard et la République*. Paris: La Découverte.
- Ghumman, Sonia, and Ann Marie Ryan. 2013. Not welcome here: Discrimination towards women who wear the Muslim headscarf. *Human Relations* 66: 671–98. [CrossRef]
- Goffman, Erving. 1963. *Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
- Haddad, Yvonne Yazbeck. 2007. The Post-9/11 "Hijab" as Icon. *Sociology of Religion* 68: 253–67. [CrossRef]
- Hainmueller, Jens, and Dominik Hangartner. 2013. Who gets a Swiss passport? A Natural Experiment in Immigrant Discrimination. *American Political Science Review* 107: 159–87. [CrossRef]
- Heath, Anthony, and Jean Martin. 2013. Can religious affiliation explain 'ethnic' inequalities in the labour market? *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 36: 1005–27. [CrossRef]
- Helbling, Marc. 2014. Opposing Muslims and the Muslim Headscarf in Western Europe. *European Sociological Review* 30: 242–57. [CrossRef]
- Hopkins, Nick, and Ronni Michelle Greenwood. 2013. Hijab, visibility and the performance of identity. *European Journal of Social Psychology* 43: 438–47. [CrossRef]
- Incidents Racistes Recensés par les Centres de Conseil. Janvier—Décembre 2019. 2020. Available online: http://network-racism.ch/cms/upload/200421_Rassismusbericht_19_D.pdf (accessed on 15 May 2020).
- Khattab, Nabil, and Tariq Modood. 2015. Both Ethnic and Religious: Explaining Employment Penalties across 14 Ethno-Religious Groups in the United Kingdom. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 54: 501–22. [CrossRef]
- Lindemann, Anaïd, and Jörg Stolz. 2018. The Muslim Employment Gap, Human Capital, and Ethno-Religious Penalties: Evidence from Switzerland. *Social Inclusion* 6: 151–61. [CrossRef]
- Lindemann, Anaïd, and Jörg Stolz. 2020. Perceived discrimination among Muslims and its correlates. A comparative analysis. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 44: 173–94. [CrossRef]
- Meer, Nasar, and Tariq Modood. 2009. Refutations of racism in the 'Muslim question'. *Patterns of Prejudice* 43: 335–54. [CrossRef]
- Merton, Robert King. 1949. Discrimination and the American creed. In *Discrimination and the National Welfare*. Edited by R. M. MacIver. New York: Harper and Row, pp. 99–126.
- Meuser, Michael, and Ulrike Nagel. 2009. The Expert Interview and Changes in Knowledge Production. In *Interviewing Experts*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 17–42.
- Ossipow, William. 2003. La double logique des relations Église/État en Suisse. Une perspective de théorie politique. *Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions* 121: 41–56. [CrossRef]
- Parini, Lorena, Matteo Gianni, and Gaëtan Clavien. 2012. La transversalité du genre: L'islam et les musulmans dans la presse suisse francophone. *Cahiers du Genre* 52: 197–218. [CrossRef]
- Pelletier, Denis. 2005. L'école, l'Europe, les corps: La laïcité et le voile. *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'Histoire* 87: 159–76. [CrossRef]
- Quillian, Lincoln. 2006. New Approaches to Understand Racial Prejudice and Discrimination. *Annual Review of Sociology* 32: 299–328. [CrossRef]

- Roux, Patricia, Lavinia Gianettoni, and Céline Perrin. 2007. L'instrumentalisation du genre: Une nouvelle forme de racisme et de sexisme. *Nouvelles Questions Féministes* 26: 92–108. [\[CrossRef\]](#)
- Ruby, Tabassum. 2006. Listening to the voices of hijab. *Women's Studies International Forum* 29: 54–66. [\[CrossRef\]](#)
- Ruwanpura, Kanchana. 2008. Multiple identities, multiple-discrimination: A critical review. *Feminist Economics* 14: 77–105. [\[CrossRef\]](#)
- Saroglou, Vassilis, Bahija Lamkaddem, Matthieu Van Pachterbeke, and Coralie Buxant. 2009. Host society's dislike of the Islamic veil: The role of subtle prejudice, values, and religion. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 33: 419–28. [\[CrossRef\]](#)
- Selod, Saher. 2015. Citizenship Denied: The Racialization of Muslim American Men and Women post-9/11. *Critical Sociology* 41: 77–95. [\[CrossRef\]](#)
- Siraj, Asifa. 2011. Meanings of modesty and the hijab amongst Muslim women in Glasgow, Scotland. *Gender, Place & Culture* 18: 716–31.
- Tarlo, Emma. 2007. Hijab in London: Metamorphosis, Resonance and Effects. *Journal of Material Culture* 12: 131–56. [\[CrossRef\]](#)
- Unkelbach, Christian, Hella Schneider, Kai Gode, and Miriam Senft. 2010. A Turban Effect, Too: Selection Biases against Women Wearing Muslim Headscarves. *Social Psychological and Personality Science* 1: 378–83. [\[CrossRef\]](#)
- Weichselbaumer, Doris. 2020. Multiple Discrimination against Female Immigrants Wearing Headscarves. *ILR Review* 73: 600–27. [\[CrossRef\]](#) [\[PubMed\]](#)
- Zempi, Iree, and Neil Chakraborti. 2015. 'They Make Us Feel Like We're a Virus': The Multiple Impacts of Islamophobic Hostility towards Veiled Muslim Women. *Crime Justice Journal* 4: 44–56. [\[CrossRef\]](#)

5 To speak out or not to speak out? Exploring the reporting of discrimination among Muslims and Jews in Switzerland

Published article

Lindemann, A. & Stolz, J. (2022). To speak out or not to speak out? Exploring the reporting of discrimination among Muslims and Jews in Switzerland. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*.

DOI : 10.1080/1369183X.2022.2130199

Version retrieved from the journal's website with its permission



To speak out or not to speak out? Exploring the reporting of discrimination among Muslims and Jews in Switzerland

Anaïd Lindemann  and Jörg Stolz 

Institut de sciences sociales des religions, University of Lausanne, Lausanne, Switzerland

ABSTRACT

Muslims and Jews are among the minorities in Switzerland who are most disliked and discriminated against, but the frequency with which the two groups report racist incidents to official bodies and initiate court proceedings differs greatly. The goal of this paper is to establish the extent of these differences and to explore the reasons for them. We use data from a representative survey, official datasets of reported cases of discrimination and legal proceedings, as well as 27 semi-structured interviews with representatives from Muslim and Jewish organisations, and from government centres that record incidents. We show that Muslims and Jews perceive discrimination at similar levels, but that the latter report discrimination and initiate court proceedings much more frequently than Muslims. We find that these differences can be explained by a divergence between the two groups in terms of perceived costs, in-group norms, structural factors, and organisational opportunities. In comparison to Jews, Muslims typically (1) are less confident that reporting discrimination will have a positive outcome; (2) are more concerned about being seen as 'victims'; (3) are less well-informed about the possibilities available to them to report discrimination; and (4) come from communities that have lower organisational capacities in this regard.

ARTICLE HISTORY

Received 8 February 2022
Accepted 23 September 2022

KEYWORDS

Discrimination; Jews; Muslims; racism; underreporting

1. Introduction

Western democracies subscribe to strict anti-discrimination laws and employ legal sanctions when these laws are violated. Yet, research shows significant levels of both actual and perceived discrimination among members of minority groups in these democracies (Fox 2020).¹ Moreover, individuals who feel discriminated against rarely report these incidents to official bodies, and initiate court proceedings even more rarely – a phenomenon often called 'underreporting'.

The literature on this phenomenon has mainly focused on the psychological mechanisms that might encourage or discourage a person from reporting discrimination. Drawing on the *homo-œconomicus* model, this literature has often claimed that individuals weigh the pros and cons of reporting a discriminatory incident – and then decide rationally whether to report the incident (Feagin and Sikes 1994; Garcia

CONTACT Anaïd Lindemann  anaid.lindemann@unil.ch

© 2022 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group

et al. 2005; Kaiser and Miller 2001). On the other hand, sociological and sociolegal studies have highlighted meso-level factors that discourage individuals from reporting discrimination, such as cultural and structural barriers (Akarçay and Polat 2021; Kim 2011).

To explore the importance of cultural and institutional aspects of reporting incidents of discrimination, we undertake a specific comparison both of perceived discrimination among Muslims and Jews in Switzerland, and the extent to which they report discrimination and initiate court proceedings.

We chose these two groups for two reasons. First, because they are among the religious minorities most discriminated against in Switzerland (Baier 2020; Federal Statistical Office 2019, 2020; Lindemann and Stolz 2018, 2021), the situation in Switzerland largely mirroring the situation in other Western countries (Connor and Koenig 2015).² Second, because we became increasingly aware during our ongoing qualitative analysis that the two groups differ markedly when it comes to reporting discrimination and initiating court proceedings, with the Jewish community seemingly reporting discrimination more often than the Muslim community. If that is really the case, then what reasons might there be for the difference?

This paper therefore addresses the following two questions:

- (1) How common is perceived discrimination among Muslims and Jews, and how likely are they to report discriminatory incidents and take the matter to court?
- (2) What cultural, structural, and organisational reasons might there be to explain possible differences between Muslims and Jews when it comes to reporting discriminatory incidents and initiating court proceedings?

We answer these questions with a comparative case study (Maxwell 2005, 90; Yin 2002). We combine an analysis of a representative survey and two databases of reported incidents of discrimination and court decisions with an in-depth analysis of 27 interviews with representatives from ethno-religious organisations and from official centres that record incidents of discrimination and support victims.

2. Theoretical framework

It is useful to begin by defining our central concepts of *discriminatory action*, *perceived discrimination*, and *reporting discrimination*. *Discriminatory actions* can be defined as actions based on the assumption of individual or group characteristics, correctly or incorrectly attributed, that result in some form of exclusion of the individual or group of individuals targeted (Lindemann and Stolz 2021). *Perception of discrimination* describes when an individual feels that she or he has been the target of a discriminatory action, whether or not that is in fact the case. *Reporting discrimination* refers to the fact that an individual, after perceiving discrimination, either contact a body that supports victims of discrimination to report what has happened or files a complaint. *Not reporting* refers to the fact that an individual, despite perceiving discrimination, refrains from reporting the incident to such bodies. Finally, *underreporting* can be defined as the discrepancy between the level of perceived discrimination among a population and the actual incidents that have been reported.

One important theory explaining whether individuals report discrimination is based on the *homo-æconomicus* model (Kaiser and Miller 2001; Kowalski 1996), which states that perceiving discrimination makes an individual feel dissatisfied, a feeling that she or he will then seek to mitigate by choosing to complain if the benefits of doing so seem to outweigh the costs. Numerous empirical studies have tested this theory (Feagin and Sikes 1994; Garcia et al. 2005; Kaiser and Miller 2001).

While the *homo-æconomicus* model can be useful when modelling individual choices, its very strong and individualistic assumptions (complete information, stable preferences and perfect rationality) tend to obscure the cultural and structural factors that can be part of the equation when accounting for (non)reporting. Various theoretical attempts have been made to integrate (boundedly) rational choice with meso-/macro-level factors such as norms and structural factors (Lindenberg 1990). In other words, individuals may have 'good reasons' when deciding to report or not, but they do so in specific opportunity structures, or 'choice environments' (Thaler, Sunstein, and Balz 2013), that influence how likely they are to report.

Such choice environments that positively or negatively influence how minorities can defend their rights to equal treatment consist of different factors: cultural factors; structural factors linked to sociodemographic characteristics; and organisational opportunities and resources.

Cultural factors that impact individual choice consist of in-group rationales that can be mobilised in the face of specific situations, based on certain rules, goals, and possible actions (Wimmer 1996). To report an incident of discrimination, individuals must know how to spot discrimination and distinguish it from other modes of behaviour; they must be able to mobilise a justification for reporting in the light of group norms; and they must know what possible actions need to be taken. In other words, there may be group knowledge (sometimes referred to in resource mobilisation theory as 'cultural resource') and group norms encouraging or discouraging individuals from reporting discrimination. For example, if a social group sees complaining in terms of 'showing weakness' and therefore as undesirable behaviour, then persons who experience discrimination will be unlikely to report it.

Structural factors are linked to sociodemographic characteristics that make individuals more or less likely to engage in specific actions. In the face of discrimination, a minority's sociodemographic composition (i.e. average level of education or migration background) influences how likely its members are to be able to access information on bodies to which they can report discrimination and on the legal framework in general. Also, it influences the degree of trust that people may have with regard to such bodies: precarious statuses and corrupt authorities in the country of origin can therefore be significant obstacles to making their case known to governmental bodies.

Finally, the *organisational factors* shaping individual choices are the opportunities and available resources provided by governmental or non-governmental structures that allow individuals to engage in specific actions. Resource mobilisation theory posits that the type and level of access to resources are important determinants in the achievement of social movement goals. These resources can be human (experience and skills) and moral (legitimacy and solidarity) in nature, among other types (Edwards and McCarthy 2004, 125–128). Applied to perceived discrimination, one important element is the set of opportunities and resources provided by the organisations to which a person may report

discrimination, with the trustworthiness and efficiency of these organisations being highly significant (Lalonde and Cameron 1994).

3. Discriminatory actions, and how people perceive and report them

Various studies have documented *discriminatory actions* against Muslims and Jews in the West.

Globally, the level of religious discrimination perpetrated by governments against Muslims has almost doubled since the 1990s, while remaining relatively stable and less pronounced for Jewish minorities. Switzerland is typical of this Western trend since it has voted to ban minarets and face-covering – this ban is now part of its Constitution. The index proposed by Fox (2020, 132–146) of religious discrimination at a governmental level rose from 5 to 12 between 1994 and 2009 with regard to Muslim minorities, while remaining at 4 for Jews. Scholars generally agree that this increase in institutionalised discrimination against Muslims is the result of the perception of Muslims as posing a threat to Western norms and security, especially in the aftermath of terrorist attacks (Cesari 2013, 83–106; Fox and Akbaba 2015).

Objective discrimination against Muslims has also been documented in various life domains, especially in the labour market and courtesy situations in European countries (Connor and Koenig 2015; Di Stasio et al. 2021; Helly 2004; Valfort 2017a; Widner and Chicoine 2011). Similar findings have been reported in Switzerland (Aidenberger and Doehne 2021; Berger and Berger 2019; Lindemann and Stolz 2018). As for objective discrimination against Jews, research points to discriminatory treatment in the labour market, at least in France, but the level of discrimination is lower in this regard than it is for Muslims (Valfort 2017b).

Also, the Swiss population have the same level of stereotypes with regard to Muslims and Jews (Federal Statistical Office 2019, 8; Pew Research Center, 2018, 71, 74), but they express more hostility to Muslims than Jews: while 17% of Swiss citizens would not accept a Jewish person as a family member, and 8% would not accept a Jewish person as a neighbour, these figures rise to 31% and 13%, respectively, when it comes to a Muslim family member or a Muslim neighbour. Switzerland is close to the European medians in this respect (Pew Research Center, 2018, 64–65).

As for how, and the extent to which, discrimination is *perceived* and *reported* among Muslims and Jews, the latest report of the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights reveals that 25% of Muslims in the EU felt that they had been subject to discrimination in the year preceding the survey, with 12% reporting the incident.³ As for Jews, 11% said that they had experienced discrimination in the previous 12 months, with 23% reporting the incident.⁴ These findings on the number of incidents reported match those obtained by Fox in his societal discrimination index, which shows that the level of reporting among Jews is higher than it is among Muslims in Western countries as a whole, and in Switzerland in particular (Fox 2020, 137, 143). In Switzerland more specifically, population surveys show that approximately three out of ten Muslims (Federal Statistical Office 2020, 28; Golder, Mousson, and Tschöpe 2018, 4) and three out of ten Jews (Baier 2020, 38) had perceived discrimination in the previous year as a result of their religious belonging. These surveys did not include an item to measure reporting behaviour, however.

To sum up, Muslims and Jews in both Europe and Switzerland seem to be subjected to a significant level of objective discrimination, with Muslims usually being more discriminated against and perceiving discrimination more, but with Jews reporting discrimination significantly more often.

4. The Swiss context: sociodemographics and monitoring tools

The Muslim and Jewish minorities in Switzerland are quite different regarding their sociostructural profile. Muslims made up 5.5% of the resident population in 2019,⁵ with approximately one-third of these having Swiss citizenship, and the majority (97.7%) having a migration background (more than half of whom belong to the first generation).⁶ The average socioeconomic status of Muslims is lower than the Swiss average, with 15.4% having completed tertiary education in contrast to a national average of 32%, and 7.3% being unemployed in contrast to a national average of 3.2% (on the Muslim employment gap, see Lindemann and Stolz 2018). Jews, on the other hand, make up fewer than 1% of the resident population, 70.6% of these having Swiss citizenship and roughly 65.5% having a migration background (fewer than a third of whom belong to the first generation). The average educational attainment of Jews is higher than the Swiss average, since half have completed the tertiary level of education. Both groups are very diverse ethnically and denominationally.

Switzerland adopted the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) in 1994, and passed a law against racial discrimination, art.261bis of the Criminal Code (commonly known as the ‘anti-racism law’), in 1995. Under this law, a person who publicly discriminates against individuals because of their race, ethnicity, or religious affiliation, as well as sexual orientation, can be sentenced to up to three years in prison.⁷ Any complaint filed or report submitted to the police or to the public prosecutor compels the authorities to investigate the facts and to initiate legal proceedings.

Adopting the ICERD compels Switzerland to pursue an active policy to combat discrimination. This has led to the creation of the Federal Commission against Racism (FCR), which supports and implements measures to combat discrimination and provides diverse audiences with information on discrimination. Among other things, the FCR has created an online database that registers the legal complaints filed within the framework of the anti-racism law,⁸ this database providing information on the profile of the victim (Jew, Muslim, black, etc.), and how the court case ended (defendant found guilty, not guilty, etc.). It has also created a national network of centres that support victims of racism. The first opened in 2005; by 2020, the number had grown to 21. Legally framing religious discrimination in terms of ‘racial discrimination’ explains why the different data that we use in this study view incidents of discrimination involving Muslims or Jews to be *racist* incidents (for a discussion on the different concepts of Islamophobia, racism, and anti-Muslimism, see Allen 2020; Cheng 2015).

These centres can function in different ways: they are all funded by the government and are either attached to cantonal services (Cantonal Offices for the Integration of Foreigners) or have their office in civil associations (hereafter referred to as ‘government centres’). Help – in the form of mediation, advice on how to take the offender to court, or simply listening, etc. – can be elicited from a counsellor (who usually works part-time)

via telephone or email, or in person. A centralised database, DoSyRa (Dokumentations-system Rassismus), records each case reported to a centre, and uses different variables such as type of racism (anti-Muslim, anti-Semitism, xenophobia, anti-black, etc.), form of discrimination (insults, violence, placards, etc.), and life domain in which the act of discrimination occurred (public transport, neighbourhood, school, etc.). The FCR publishes an annual report based on this database that provides statistics for cases that the counsellor assesses as being acts of racial discrimination and as being sufficiently substantiated.⁹

The Jewish community is the only religious community in Switzerland that also has its own body to which people can go in order to report discrimination. There are two such bodies, one based in Geneva (CICAD) and the other in Zurich (FSCI). More precisely, they are federations of Jewish communities with staff that both deal with reports of anti-Semitism from their members or non-members, and help individuals to cope with discrimination (mediation, advice on how to take the offender to court, or simply listening, etc.). Staff first verify each case that reaches one of these bodies (it must correspond to the IHRA definition of anti-Semitism and there must be good evidence that discrimination actually took place), and then make a record of the case in the database. Staff also monitor the media and use the database to record cases of discrimination in the media. These two databases contain variables such as the form that the incident took, and whether the incident came either from monitoring the media or from the victims themselves. The CICAD and the FSCI use their database to publish annual reports on anti-Semitism.

No other religious minority has its own monitoring system, although a federation of Muslim communities launched an app together with an online form in 2018 for people to report Islamophobic incidents; but it has not yet published a report or made any information available.

There are therefore three different monitoring tools that are used to estimate the number of reported cases of racial discrimination in Switzerland: (1) the government-run online database registering the legal complaints filed within the framework of art.261bis; (2) the government-run database of incidents reported to government-funded centres supporting victims of racism (DoSyRa); and (3) the databases recording incidents of anti-Semitism reported to two Jewish organisations (CICAD and FSCI).

5. Methodology

5.1. Data and variables

We use four different sources of data.

- (1) A *representative survey*, the ‘Etude sur les langues, religions, et cultures’ (ELRC),¹⁰ which the Federal Office for Statistics (FSO) carried out in 2019 and which contains items on self-assigned religious affiliation and perceived discrimination. *N* is 13,417; the sample contains 521 Muslims and 50 Jews. The response rate is 42%. We use weighted data (weights are provided by the FSO and described in its methodological document ‘Pondération_ELRC2019’). We use the dependent variable ‘experienced discrimination in at least one life domain’ (11 items collapsed into one variable)

and the independent variable ‘religious affiliation’.¹¹ Missing values for these two variables meant that we excluded individuals from the sample who did not answer the question on religious affiliation and individuals who answered *none* of the 11 items on discrimination. We have imputed values for control variables (gender and education) when these are missing (no imputations for gender, and five for education).

- (2) An *integrated database of racist incidents* reported in Switzerland to (a) state-funded centres in the DoSyRa database (incidents from 2010 to 2019, $N = 2500$), retrieved from the annual reports,¹² and (b) Jewish organisations (incidents from 2010 to 2019, $N = 593$), retrieved from their annual reports and first-hand information from the person responsible for analysing the data.¹³ We only include cases reported by individuals to the Jewish organisations and exclude incidents gleaned from their own media. We assume that these databases are comparable since the incidents are checked by a specialist in both cases and only contain incidents reported by individuals in civil society.
- (3) A *database* initiated in Switzerland by Muslim and Jewish victims as part of the anti-racism law, and compiled by the Federal Commission against Racism (CFR), *of court proceedings with decisions* (incidents from 1995 to 2019, $N = 709$). Our variables of interest are the profile of the victim (Muslim or Jew for our subsample), the year that the incident took place, and whether the incident resulted in the offender being sentenced.

We used SPSS 27 and Excel 16 for our quantitative analysis of these data (the syntax files are available on request).

- (4) *Twenty-seven semi-structured, face-to-face expert interviews* with nine employees from state-funded centres (governmental experts); 13 from Muslim groups; four from Jewish organisations; and one from a civil organisation active in anti-racism. The interviews were conducted on the basis of topic guides with open questions (available on request from the authors), in the language of the expert and in the place of their choosing (usually their office); these interviews lasted between 30 and 150 min, and were audiotaped and transcribed. We used exhaustive lists of Muslim organisations (compiled in Banfi 2013), Jewish organisations, and state-funded centres (listed in [humanrights.ch & Federal Commission against Racism 2020](https://www.humanrights.ch/_Federal_Commission_against_Racism)) to contact 52 experts, the response rate being 51%. The interviews were conducted in the three linguistic regions of Switzerland between August 2019 and November 2021.

We chose to interview field experts instead of individuals who themselves had experienced discrimination, since the former have contact with a very large number of individuals who, having experienced discrimination, either reported or did not report it. Such experts are therefore in an ideal position to give information on the meso-level that interests us here, i.e. in-group rationales and institutional opportunities for (non)reporting. We define field experts as active agents in a specific field who have acquired practical knowledge of particular issues through their social positioning, practice, and experience (Meuser and Nagel 2009). The interviews were recorded and transcribed. They were

coded with the help of MAXQDA 12 following a hybrid approach of thematic content analysis consisting of an iterative process between inductive and deductive coding similar to the methodology used by Fereday and Muir-Cochrane (2006). The codebook was fixed and detailed, with definitions accompanied by rules of coding (available on request). Governmental experts are labelled with the letter ‘G’, and non-governmental experts, with ‘N’.

5.2. Analytical strategy

We use a comparative case study as our analytical strategy (Maxwell 2005, 90; Yin 2002). As is common for case studies, we triangulate different datatypes, both quantitative and qualitative, to make sense of our cases. Our case study is comparative in that we compare Muslims and Jews with respect to various dimensions of our dependent and independent variables. Our methodology is explorative and inductive in that both the explanandum (reporting discrimination) and the reasons for the differences between Muslims and Jews emerged during our analysis. Our methodology is also close to a realist mixed-methods approach in the sense that we believe that the triangulation of both qualitative and quantitative datatypes permits a more valid description of a social reality than would be possible with only one datatype (Kelle 2007).

To measure the extent to which Muslims and Jews report discrimination, we calculate the ratio of reported discriminatory incidents or court proceedings by dividing the number of reported incidents (retrieved from annual reports issued by governmental and Jewish centres) or court proceedings (retrieved from the CFR database) by the number of individuals who perceived discrimination in that year (obtained from the ELRC). We used the population estimates provided by the FSO in its *relevé structurel* to obtain absolute numbers of individuals who perceived discrimination, multiplying the percentage of individuals who perceived discrimination by the estimated number of individuals in each group. We calculate this ratio for 2019, when we have all three variables (Table 1) and present longitudinal data where these are available.

We should highlight some points in these calculations. We acknowledge that the sample size for Jews in the ELRC is rather small ($N = 50$), which creates a relatively large confidence interval for the estimated level of perceived discrimination among

Table 1. Ratios of reporting discrimination and court decisions among Muslims and Jews in Switzerland in 2019.

	Muslims		Jews		P
	N	%	N	%	
Population (15+)	391,703 ^a	100.0	17,307 ^a	100.0	
Perceived discrimination	135,920 ^c	34.7 ^b	5192 ^c	30.0 ^b	n.s.
Reported discrimination	55 ^d	0.040^e	57 ^d	1.098^e	.000
Court decisions	4 ^f	0.003^g	12 ^f	0.231^g	.000

Note: Sources of data (see ‘Data availability statement’ section) and calculations.

^aEstimates from the Relevé structurel (RS) from the FSO.

^bPercentages from ELRC 2019.

^cAbsolute number obtained by multiplying (a) by (b).

^dNumber of cases reported in DoSyRa database + FSCI database + CICAD database.

^eRatio obtained by dividing (d) by (c).

^fNumber of court decisions retrieved from the CFR database.

^gRatio obtained by dividing (f) by (c).

Jews. This might create a validity problem for our results if discrimination against Jews was in reality much higher than against Muslims, which in turn would invalidate our claim that Jews and Muslims have relatively similar levels of perceived discrimination, but that Jews are much more likely to report discrimination. However, a study by Baier (2020), which relies on a higher sample of Jews ($N = 487$), reports a similar proportion of Jews who feel discriminated against to the proportion that we report (see below). Another point to be mentioned is that our way of calculating may give the impression that it is necessary *individuals* who first perceive discrimination and then either report it or not. In reality, however, it may very well be that several individuals or an organisation pursue one legal case together (even if one person is named as the plaintiff). However, this in our view does not invalidate the idea that a certain level of perceived discrimination in a group leads to a certain level of reporting.¹⁴

6. Results

6.1. A quantitative look at the extent to which Muslims and Jews reporting discrimination

Figure 1 shows that, when compared to Catholics, Protestants, Evangelicals, Other Christians, and Nones, Muslims and Jews (together with members of ‘other religions’) had relatively high levels of perceived discrimination in 2019, with 34.7% of Muslims and 30.0% of Jews saying that they had felt discriminated against in at least one life domain in the past year. While we can falsify the ‘Alternative hypothesis’ that there is a significant difference between Muslims and Jews,¹⁵ we cannot prove the ‘Null-hypothesis’ that there is no significant difference between the two groups, because of the low power of this test (8.4%). As already noted in the methodology section, the confidence interval around the found mean of Jews is relatively large (because of the small sample




Figure 1. Perception of discrimination in at least one life domain, among religious groups in 2019 (data and nomenclature: OFS, ELRC 2019).

size of Jews). Should one worry about the relatively large confidence interval for Jews, it is notable that our estimate of perceived discrimination among Jews is close to the results obtained by Baier (2020, 38), who, drawing on a larger N (487), finds that 26.4% of Jews felt that they had been discriminated against because of their religion in 2019.

Table 1 compares the level of perceived discrimination for each population group, and the ratios of reported discrimination and court cases, in Switzerland in 2019. We see that 35% of Muslims (which represents 135,920 individuals) perceived some kind of discrimination; for these 135,920, there were 55 discriminatory incidents reported to an official body, with three cases going to court, which represents a ratio of 0.04% and 0.002%, respectively. The extremely high level of underreporting is clear here: for every 2471 Muslims who perceive discrimination, only one reports it. A similar percentage of Jews (30%, i.e. 5192 individuals) perceived discrimination in 2019, with 1.098% (57) reporting the incident and 0.193% (ten) going to court. Again, there is a significant degree of underreporting, but this is much lower than it is for Muslims: the ratio of reported cases to perceived discrimination is 27 times higher among Jews than it is among Muslims, while the ratio of court proceedings to perceived discrimination is 77 times higher. Statistically, these differences are highly significant ($p < .000$).¹⁶ Due to uncertainties linked to population estimates, we cannot apply a Chi-Square test directly to test the significance, and we therefore calculated the p -values through simulations ($N = 5000$) in R.¹⁷ Even when taking into account the uncertainties linked to population estimates, the differences remain highly significant ($p < .000$). A robustness test shows that the differences in reporting and court action between Muslims and Jews remain highly significant ($p < .000$), even if we suppose that perceived discrimination among Jews is in reality much higher (we set it at 35%, 40%, and 45%).

It was not just in 2019 that Jews reported discrimination and initiated court proceedings much more often than Muslims, but in every year observed. Figure 2(left) shows the




Figure 2. Left: Reported cases to all bodies supporting victims of discrimination (state-funded centres and Jewish organisations). Right: court proceedings between 2010 and 2019, where the victims were Muslims or Jews.

absolute number of reported cases for Muslims and Jews from 2010 to 2019. With the exception of 2015, every year sees higher absolute numbers of reported cases for Jews than for Muslims. Figure 2(right) shows the same information for court proceedings, with Jews initiating such proceedings much more often than Muslims in each year. Since there were roughly 20 times more Muslims than Jews living in Switzerland during this period, the proportion of the latter both reporting discrimination and initiating court proceedings was clearly much greater.

It should be noted that these figures show an increase over time in the number of anti-Muslim incidents reported and of court proceedings initiated by Muslims, but this cannot be interpreted as suggesting that there was an actual increase in the number of incidents. While this could be the case, the increase in the number of incidents reported can be explained by other factors, such as the expansion of state-funded centres in Switzerland. Also, most of the cases of anti-Semitism were reported to one of the two Jewish organisations, while state-funded centres only registered between three and 12 cases each year in their database, pointing to the importance of organisational capacities in dealing with discrimination in communities. This point will be treated in more detail with the qualitative material.

6.2. Perceived likelihood of success

Analysing the interviews with field experts reveals four main reasons why Muslims report discrimination less often than Jews. Together, these four reasons show that what may be called the ‘choice environment’ for reporting or not reporting discrimination differs greatly for Muslims and Jews in Switzerland.

The first reason given by experts for why Muslims do not report discrimination is fatalism, i.e. individuals who perceive discrimination do not think that reporting it would lead to a ‘successful’ or ‘useful’ outcome. Many believe that, no matter what, they will not be taken seriously or will not be able to go to court for various reasons (e.g. lack of evidence or financial resources). One expert stated: ‘Some believe that it is no use to talk. Even if they talk, they will obtain nothing’ (N06); another expert said: ‘They don’t believe that they will obtain anything, so automatically they don’t proceed, they let it go’ (N13). Other experts raised the issue of discouragement faced by Muslims because the police are unwilling to act (N01, N09).

This perception that reporting discrimination is unlikely to be successful or useful is related to the costs in terms of time, energy, and money that are involved in reporting or taking the matter to court. This mechanism can be attributed to a cost–benefit calculation as stated by the *homo-oeconomicus* model. One expert explains with regard to one case, for example:

Muslims went to court and in the end they got nothing. Maybe Muslims didn’t know how to defend themselves, but in the end, when that was the outcome, what was the point? (N06)

Also, money can be a hindrance when victims cannot provide evidence of racial discrimination within the framework of art. 261bis (which is often the case), this forcing them to sue for defamation, which turns an inexpensive criminal trial into an expensive and time-consuming civil trial. Indeed, according to experts, ‘that’s also a difficulty of the anti-racism law ... if it happens in a closed room, it’s not recognised as racial discrimination.

And then you can maybe sue for defamation, but that costs' (N09), and people do not want to 'risk money in court for a lawsuit where the statistics tell you there's a good chance that you will simply lose money' (N12). In the face of all this, some experts suggest that Muslims who experience discrimination simply find it less costly to 'accept' their fate (N01, N09).

In contrast, experts describe the shared perception among Jews very differently. They see a realistic chance of success and have a much more positive view of the cost–benefit relationship than Muslims. For example, one expert from a Jewish organisation believes that victims of anti-Semitism come to them because Jews know that the organisation is efficient:

Because they know our scope of action and, I hope, our efficiency. [...] People say to themselves, 'we know this institution; we know their work and then we see the result of their actions'. (N15)

This expert also gave an example of a father who asked the organisation to contact the management of a school that had refused to answer his request for a meeting: 'Our organisation contacted the school and we received an answer from the director within 24 h, saying, "I will meet whenever you want"' (N15).

Although there is no significant difference between Jews and Muslims when it comes to their chances of winning a case in court within the framework of art. 261bis (see Figure A1 in the Appendix), it is true that there are more examples of success (i.e. in absolute numbers) among Jews than among Muslims: 201 court cases involving a Jewish victim have resulted in a sentence for the perpetrator since 1995, while that figure is only 36 for cases involving a Muslim victim.

6.3. Cultural factors: normative in-group rationales

A second reason why Muslims do not report discrimination is their desire to avoid being seen as a 'victim' and as someone who 'complains'. This is in line with the previous research on other minority groups (Kaiser and Miller 2001; Kowalski 1996; Swim and Hyers 1999). Experts describe shared frames of interpretation and norms of how Muslims should behave and see themselves when faced with discrimination. One idea is that individuals who speak out about discrimination frame themselves as 'victims', thus placing themselves in a weak position.

Focusing on *hijab*-wearing Muslim women who experience discrimination on the labour market, one expert explains:

They don't want to be in a victim position. What they are looking for is not a salary, but social legitimacy. (N03)

While describing this reluctance, experts from Muslim organisations also endorse it, one expressing, for example, the scepticism felt towards a system of reporting discrimination through a mobile app created by a Muslim umbrella association:

In fact, I was personally never really in favour of this. [...] From a political point of view, [it is useful] because it helps us to be taken seriously. But at the same time it victimizes us; it's very tricky. When I was first told about this app, I said, 'no, we shouldn't do this, let's put our efforts, money and resources elsewhere, we have other things to do'

[...] What is a shame is that we have to victimize ourselves to make things change. (N01)

Asked whether his or her association deals with discrimination in one way or the other, another expert says:

So actually no, and I'll explain why. I'm simply convinced of this: in the end, there is discrimination, there is a lot of Islamophobia. [...] If you take all the anti-Muslim material that exists and try to respond to it, to counter this stuff that shouldn't even matter, you consume your resources, your time. [...] Or you can simply ignore it, act as if nothing is happening, go on your way and try to do something good. So our working mentality has been, 'let's not victimize ourselves' [...] We have really kind of taken the stance of not being a complainer. (N12)

This reluctance is sometimes backed by cultural arguments that imply that speaking out about discrimination does not fit 'Muslim culture':

We do not have a culture of filing complaints or writing and publishing reports. Muslims do not write, so we have this difficulty. We have talked a lot with the Jewish community, which faces the same problems [of discrimination], except that they do write, they have this culture. They write, they have lawyers, their cases reach the authorities, and they achieve results. But we, Muslims, do not have this culture. (N06)

These results echo what Quinn calls the 'paradox of complaining', namely that acknowledging and naming discrimination can have a disempowering effect on victims since it reveals their subordinate social position: it becomes problematic 'to talk of the incidences as if by speaking of their victimisation they perpetuated it' (Quinn 2000, 1173).

A very different picture emerged when speaking with Jewish experts, who neither talked about the reluctance to appear as 'victims' among individuals experiencing discrimination, nor themselves tried to avoid victimisation. When listing all the reasons why Jews do not report discrimination, experts from Jewish organisations never once mentioned the problematisation of the status of 'victim'. Quite the contrary: speaking out about and combating discrimination are seen positively and are officially inscribed in the mission statements of some Jewish organisations. Experts from Jewish organisations told us, for example:

There is a kind of 30-year tradition now, where people come naturally to our organization for all questions to do with anti-Semitism. (N15)

People come more often to us because we specialize in questions to do with anti-Semitism. (N17)

One expert suggests that how Jews denounce anti-Semitism has 'a historical component': they have 'learned' the need to be organised and to make themselves heard 'from the Holocaust' (N08).

6.4. Structural factors: access to information and trust

A third reason that experts cite for why Muslims do not report discrimination is that they are ill-informed with regard to the government centres that exist, and that, if they are familiar with such centres, then they have little trust in them.

Experts believe that some Muslims do not report discrimination simply because they do not know their rights or because they are unaware that official centres exist, this being

especially predominant among the first generation, which makes up more than half the Muslim population. According to various non-governmental experts, the first generations of Muslim immigrants either adopted an attitude of the low profile due to their experiences of dictatorship and war in their countries of origin (N02) or did not know their rights (G07, N09). In contrast, second and third generations perceive discrimination as an injustice since they were born in Switzerland and have a better understanding of their rights and the system in general (G07, N02).

Governmental experts also highlight this fact, saying that the majority of people who come to them were born in Switzerland, are usually highly educated (G02), and know where to go, while people who have just arrived do not have such knowledge because there is structural discrimination with regard to how people access information (G09).

Not only we find this, but also other counselling centres, that the hurdle preventing people from seeking counselling is relatively high. [...] On the one hand, this certainly has to do with the fact that many people do not know that there are any counselling services. This is also shown by the fact that the person who comes to us tends to be rather well integrated, if you want to define it that way. (G07)

Moreover, having a precarious legal status is also reported to be an additional hindrance when it comes to reaching out to state-funded centres: 'Another reason is the fact that they are afraid to approach a service, even one provided by an NGO, because they fear possible repercussions on their illegal status for example or on their precarious permit' (G09), and 'some are afraid because they are in a relationship of dependence and do not want to expose themselves' (G07).

We again find a very different picture when it comes to Jews, since experts state that Jews are well-informed about the existence of the two specialised bodies and know their rights better. One reason for this might be linked to sociodemographic differences between the two groups. Indeed, while the majority of Muslims have a migratory background, with more than half being from first generation, and a significantly lower average socioeconomic status (Schneuwly Purdie 2009), Jews in Switzerland are mostly Swiss natives and highly educated (Baumann and Stolz 2009).

These differences in the sociodemographic characteristics between Muslims and Jews, with the former being in a more disadvantaged social position than the latter, surely impact the likelihood that individuals will report experiences of discrimination or pursue the matter in court: individuals with better knowledge of the Swiss legal system, and with a more secure status, will be more likely to reach out to a specialised body and speak out.

6.5. Organisational capacities: (non)existence of community alternatives

A last reason discussed by experts to explain the low level of reporting among Muslims is distrust in state-funded centres and (in contrast to the situation among the Jewish population) the absence of community-led centres. This major difference in the opportunities available to Jews and Muslims to report discrimination points to the importance of organisational capacities: namely, the ability of minorities to organise their efforts to monitor and address the discrimination that their members experience.

Among other reasons for distrust in state-funded centres, experts from Muslim associations cite the fact that Muslims deem such centres to be unhelpful because they are

financed by the state (N09), because they do not specialise in anti-Muslim discrimination (N02), or simply because they are not willing to help Muslims for political reasons or due to conflicts of interest (N09, N02). One expert from a Muslim association said:

These [state] services are useless because, besides patting you on the back and telling you that you might want to go to court, they can do very little. (N12)

Another said:

Because the network of counselling centres is financed by the federal Service for Combating Racism and by the cantons, they have to make sure that they don't cause any political waves. That's just the reality, that's why many cases reported to the network haven't made it into the statistics. (N09)

This distrust is also perceived by government experts:

The fact that we are funded by the department can cause a person to make the connection. [...] We know it's not ideal, also because there can be conflicts of interest and we try to avoid these, and we are completely independent from the operational point of view but, of course, we are in this department. (G09)

Jews also express distrust in these state-funded services, mainly citing their inefficiency and lack of specialisation regarding anti-Semitism (N15, N17). However, since they run their own system of reporting discrimination, individuals who experience it can turn to more trusted bodies. Indeed, Jews seem to have a high level of trust in the two community-based bodies to which they can report discrimination. This trust is reflected in [Figure 2](#) (left), which shows that the vast majority of anti-Semitic incidents are reported to the Jewish bodies rather than to the state-funded centres. One expert explains the importance of having a relationship of trust, and why state-funded centres have little value:

There are Ashkenazi Jews, Sephardic Jews, Jews from old Swiss traditions who have been here for centuries, and they manage to get together and say: 'Okay, we have a centre where there is a relationship of trust and we are convinced of its ability to deal with this kind of problem'. [...] People will not go to you if they don't know you, this doesn't happen! (N15)

Two experts feel that specialising in issues to do with anti-Semitism makes them more 'attractive' than centres that deal with racism in general (N15, N17). This points to a professionalisation of such bodies, as one expert explains:

Of course, we can see that if the figures show an increase, the more *name of organization* is established and institutionalized, the more the number of cases is important, a very natural phenomenon. But this means that over the years we have been able to really have a methodology that was, for one thing, more adapted and for another, more effective, under the form of guidance, mediation, psychological support, legal support, and all this done at our expense. (N15)

Finally, many Jews seem to be aware of the existence of these community-based systems of reporting. One reason for this might be that the organisations monitoring discrimination pursue a strategy of communicating their activities through the 'Reports on anti-Semitism'. One expert told us, for example, that the members of his association 'are obviously aware of the system of reporting discrimination because they all receive the report' (N16).

To sum up, Jews have their own alternatives to state-funded centres, and they turn to these much more often. These alternatives involve organisational capacities in the sense that Jewish communities have specialised in dealing with claims of discrimination in terms of legal knowledge and intervention, support, and communication.

Interestingly, experts from Muslim associations often and spontaneously compared themselves to Jewish communities, and especially to the way that the latter are organised to deal with discrimination, one saying:

We see for example the CICAD in Geneva that defends people a lot in the Jewish community, they are very well organized. And I say to myself, here we are, we also have to work. In our community, we have a lot of gaps, but at some point we have to get to work. That's all. (N02)

Another said:

For example, the Jewish community, we are now trying to do what the Jewish community does, they are more organized. They have their own statistics. (N09)

That Jewish communities are somewhat more effective and should be taken as an example is a feeling shared by Muslim representatives (N02, N06, N09 and N01).

7. Conclusion

This paper has set out to establish the extent to which Muslims and Jews perceive discrimination, report incidents of discrimination, and initiate court proceedings. We have also sought to identify the cultural and institutional reasons for the possible differences between the two groups.

We find that, while Muslims and Jews are similar when it comes to the level of discrimination perceived, the ratio of reported racist incidents and court decisions for the two groups differs greatly, with anti-Semitic cases being reported and taken to court far more often than cases of anti-Muslim racism.

The reasons for these differences are that Muslims typically (1) have less confidence that reporting will have a positive outcome (cost-benefit considerations); (2) are more worried about being seen as 'victims' and 'people who complain' (in-group normative rationales); (3) are less well-informed about organisational bodies to which complaints can be made and, if they are, do not trust the government bodies (structural factors); and (4) have no community-based alternatives to turn to (organisational capacities). In comparison, Jews are better informed and have more trust in centres that are run by their own community. This is due to the fact that the two populations have unequal opportunities to organise and are differently composed in socioeconomic terms.

Our paper makes two contributions. First, we have provided the first sketch of (under)reporting with regard to the discrimination perceived by Muslims and Jews in Switzerland and have explored the specific reasons for these differences in the Swiss case. Second, we have shown more generally that in-group rationales, structural inequalities, and organisational capacities play a very important role in accounting for such differences. These factors help us to understand better why it is that Jews report discrimination and initiate court proceedings more often than Muslims in Switzerland.

There are of course certain limitations to this paper. One is linked to the method used. Since we use a comparative case study that compares two cases, we cannot make strong

causal claims. We have explored the reasons for the strong differences in reporting and initiating court proceedings between Muslims and Jews, but we cannot say anything about the possible strength or importance of these reasons. Addressing these questions would require carrying out studies with different research designs and using many cases. A second issue is the fact that most of the cases reported in the Jewish case were reported to Jewish bodies, while all those cases reported in the Muslim case were reported to government bodies. This might lead us to suspect that the selection criteria used by these bodies vary, and that the difference in reporting behaviour might express not so much differing individual behaviour as divergent activity on the part of the organisational body. However, a close analysis of the selection criteria to establish a ‘case of discrimination’ shows that Jewish centres were at least as strict, if not stricter, than government centres. Additionally, we find that the strong differences between Muslims and Jews are also apparent in their behaviour with regard to initiating court proceedings, i.e. facing the same Swiss judicial system. Third, we may wonder whether relying on individuals rather than experts when searching for the reasons why Muslims and Jews show different reporting behaviour would have yielded different results. While we do not think that this is the case, we do acknowledge the need to complete our findings with further studies that draw on qualitative interviews with Muslims and Jews.

Our findings have implications for anti-racism policies at the state and association levels. To combat anti-Muslim racism better and support victims of discrimination more effectively, the state might seek to work with communities more, thereby fostering the transfer of information and the building of trust. Also, statistics of reported cases and court proceedings should be interpreted carefully, since such statistics do not inform us directly about the level of actual discrimination against a minority, but might be an expression of the minority’s ability or willingness to report discrimination or take legal action. Muslim associations might want to consider relinquishing their reluctance to appear as ‘victims’, and either working more closely with government bodies or forming their own bodies to support Muslims who wish to report discrimination. Indeed, our results allow us to make the following hypothesis: if Muslims had, like Jews, a community-led system of reporting, then the number of anti-Muslim cases reported would increase, with the majority of such cases being reported to community-based bodies and a minority to government centres. The future will show whether Muslims in Switzerland will take this path.

Notes

1. See also: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2017a).
2. See also: European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2017b, 2018).
3. See European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2017b).
4. See European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (2018).
5. See ‘Data availability statement’ section. An item asking respondents to designate their religion is used to build the categories ‘Muslims’ and ‘Jews’.
6. The category ‘with a migration background’ defined by the FSO includes: individuals with foreign citizenship, naturalized individuals (except those born in Switzerland to two parents born in Switzerland), and Swiss-born individuals who have two parents born in a different country. See <https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/en/home/statistics/population/migration-integration/by-migration-status.html> Accessed 27 January 2022.

7. https://www.fedlex.admin.ch/eli/cc/54/757_781_799/fr#a261bis.
8. <https://www.ekr.admin.ch/prestations/f518.html>.
9. For example, in 2019, 55 cases out of 73 (75%) were considered substantiated acts of racial discrimination.
10. See 'Data availability statement' section.
11. The question for the dependent variable is, 'Have you been discriminated against because of your religious affiliation in one or more concrete situations in Switzerland in the last 12 months?', followed by a list of 11 life domains. The question on religious affiliation is, 'Would you say that you have a religion and, if so, which one?'. Translations are ours.
12. See 'Data availability statement' section.
13. See 'Data availability statement' section.
14. An additional point is that it takes time from feeling discriminated against to reporting, initiating legal action, and then reaching a court decision. Accordingly, when we measure the percentage of perceived discrimination and that of court decisions, it is highly likely that we do not capture the same individuals who experience discrimination and who report or receive a court decision. Again, one should interpret the results as the general percentages of feeling discriminated against and of reporting emerging from the respective groups.
15. This result remains when controlling for gender and level of education.
16. The syntax for these calculations is available from the authors.
17. The R syntax for these calculations and the robustness tests is available from the authors.

Acknowledgments

The authors thank Jean-Philippe Antonietti for his precious help with the simulations and David West for his attentive proofreading.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Data availability statement

The qualitative data (anonymised interview transcripts and codebook) supporting the findings of this study are available on request from the corresponding author (AL). The quantitative data from the ELRC and RS were generated by the Federal Office for Statistics (FSO) and can be requested at <https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/fr/home/statistiques/population/enquetes/esrk.html> and accessed at <https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/fr/home/statistiques/catalogues-banques-donnees/tableaux.assetdetail.15384750.html>. Population estimates in 2019 with confidence intervals are available at <https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/fr/home/statistiques/catalogues-banques-donnees/tableaux.assetdetail.15384750.html>. Data on reported incidents regarding Muslims are available at <https://network-racism.ch/fr/rapports-sur-le-racisme/index.html>, and those regarding Jews are available at <https://www.swissjews.ch/fr/antisemitisme/rapports/archives/> and <https://cicad.ch/fr/antisemitisme/rapports>. Data on court proceedings are openly available at <https://www.ekr.admin.ch/prestations/f518.html>. Derived data supporting the findings of this study are available on request from the corresponding author [AL].

ORCID

Anaïd Lindemann  <http://orcid.org/0000-0002-2200-1528>

Jörg Stolz  <http://orcid.org/0000-0002-3849-7812>

References

- Aidenberger, A., and M. Doehne. 2021. "Unveiling Everyday Discrimination." *Two Field Experiments on Discrimination Against Religious Minorities in day-to-day Interactions*. *British Journal of Social Psychology* 72: 328–346.
- Akarçay, A., and S. Polat. 2021. "Reluctance to Report Criminal Incidents: Social Exclusion and Limited Access to Justice." Paper presented at the The Seventh International Conference on Economics, Ankara (Turkey).
- Allen, C. 2020. *Reconfiguring Islamophobia. A Radical Rethinking of a Contested Concept*. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Baier, D. 2020. *Erfahrungen und Wahrnehmungen von Antisemitismus unter Jüdin-nen und Juden in der Schweiz*. Zurich. <https://www.zhaw.ch/storage/hochschule/medien/news/2020/200702-zhaw-antisemitismus-studie.pdf>.
- Banfi, E. 2013. *Snowboarding on Swiss Islam*. Neuchâtel: Alphil-Presses Universitaires Suisses.
- Baumann, M., and J. Stolz. 2009. "La diversité religieuse en Suisse: chiffres, faits et tendances." In *La nouvelle Suisse religieuse. Risques et chances de sa diversité*, edited by M. Baumann and J. Stolz, 44–71. Genève: Labor et Fides.
- Berger, R., and J. Berger. 2019. "Islamophobia or Threat to Secularization? Lost Letter Experiments on the Discrimination Against Muslims in an Urban Area in Switzerland." *Swiss Journal of Sociology* 45 (1): 83–105.
- Cesari, J. 2013. *Why the West Fears Islam: An Exploration of Muslims in Liberal Democracies*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Cheng, J. E. 2015. "Islamophobia, Muslimophobia or Racism? Parliamentary Discourses on Islam and Muslims in Debates on the Minaret ban in Switzerland." *Discourse & Society* 26 (5): 562–586.
- Connor, P., and M. Koenig. 2015. "Explaining the Muslim Employment Gap in Western Europe: Individual-Level Effects and Ethno-Religious Penalties." *Social Science Research* 49: 191–201.
- Di Stasio, V., B. Lancee, S. Veit, and R. Yemane. 2021. "Muslim by Default or Religious Discrimination? Results from a Cross-National Field Experiment on Hiring Discrimination." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 47 (6): 1305–1326.
- Edwards, B., and J. D. McCarthy. 2004. "Resources and Social Movement Mobilization." In *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, edited by D. A. Snow, S. Soule, and H. Kriesi, 116–152. Malden: Blackwell Publishing.
- European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. 2017a. *Second European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey. Main Results*. Luxembourg. <https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2017/second-european-union-minorities-and-discrimination-survey-main-results>.
- European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. 2017b. *Second European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey. Muslims – Selected findings*. Luxembourg. <https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2017/second-european-union-minorities-and-discrimination-survey-eu-midis-ii-muslims>.
- European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. 2018. *Experiences and Perceptions of Antisemitism – Second Survey on Discrimination and Hate Crime against Jews in the EU*. Luxembourg. https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/fra-2018-experiences-and-perceptions-of-antisemitism-survey_en.pdf.
- Feagin, J. R., and M. P. Sikes. 1994. *Living with Racism: The Black Middle-Class Experience*. Boston MA: Beacon Press.
- Federal Statistical Office. 2019. *Enquête sur le vivre ensemble en Suisse (VeS): Résultats 2018*. Neuchâtel. <https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/fr/home/actualites/quoi-de-neuf.assetdetail.7466705.html>.
- Federal Statistical Office. 2020. *Pratiques et croyances religieuses et spirituelles en Suisse*. Neuchâtel. <https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/fr/home/statistiques/population/enquetes/esrk.assetdetail.15023004.html>.
- Fereday, J., and E. Muir-Cochrane. 2006. "Demonstrating Rigor Using Thematic Analysis: A Hybrid Approach of Inductive and Deductive Coding and Theme Development." *International Journal of Qualitative Methods*, 5: 80–92.

- Fox, J. 2020. *Thou Shalt Have No Other Gods Before Me. Why Governments Discriminate Against Religious Minorities*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Fox, J., and Y. Akbaba. 2015. "Securitization of Islam and Religious Discrimination: Religious Minorities in Western Democracies, 1990–2008." *Comparative European Politics* 13 (2): 175–197.
- Garcia, D. M., A. H. Reser, R. B. Amo, S. Redersdorff, and N. R. Branscombe. 2005. "Perceivers' Responses to In-Group and Out-Group Members Who Blame a Negative Outcome on Discrimination." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 31 (6): 769–780.
- Golder, L., M. Mousson, and S. Tschöpe. 2018. *Hinweise auf erlebte, aber kaum registrierte Hasskriminalität. Schlussbericht*. Bern: <https://docplayer.org/71623518-Hinweise-auf-erlebte-aber-kaum-registrierte-hasskriminalitaet.html>.
- Helly, D. 2004. "Are Muslims Discriminated Against in Canada Since September 2001?" *Canadian Ethnic Studies* 36 (1): 24–47.
- humanrights.ch_& Federal_Commission_against_Racism. 2020. *Incidents racistes recensés par les centres de conseil. Janvier – décembre 2019*. Bern. <https://www.ekr.admin.ch/publikationen/f602/1348.html>.
- Kaiser, C. R., and C. T. Miller. 2001. "Stop Complaining! The Social Costs of Making Attributions to Discrimination." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 27 (2): 254–263.
- Kelle, U. 2007. *Die Integration qualitativer und quantitativer Methoden in der empirischen Sozialforschung. Theoretische Grundlagen und methodologische Konzepte*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften.
- Kim, A. T.-H. 2011. "Culture Matters: Cultural Differences in the Reporting of Employment Discrimination Claims." *William & Mary Bill Rights Journal* 20 (2): 405–455.
- Kowalski, R. M. 1996. "Complaints and Complaining: Functions, Antecedents, and Consequences." *Psychological Bulletin* 119 (2): 179–196.
- Lalonde, R. N., and J. E. Cameron. 1994. "Behavioral Responses to Discrimination: A Focus on Action." In Vol. 7 of *The Psychology of Prejudice: The Ontario Symposium*, edited by M. P. Zanna and J. M. Olson, 257–288. Hillsdale: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
- Lindemann, A., and J. Stolz. 2018. "The Muslim Employment Gap, Human Capital, and Ethno-Religious Penalties: Evidence from Switzerland." *Social Inclusion* 6 (2): 151–161.
- Lindemann, A., and J. Stolz. 2021. "Perceived Discrimination among Muslims and Its Correlates. A Comparative Analysis." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 44 (2): 173–194.
- Lindenberg, S. 1990. "Homo Socio-Oeconomicus: The Emergence of a General Model of Man in the Social Sciences." *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics* 146 (4): 727–748.
- Maxwell, J. A. 2005. *Qualitative Research Design. An Interactive Approach. Second Edition. Applied Social Research Methods Series. Volume 41*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Meuser, M., and U. Nagel. 2009. "The Expert Interview and Changes in Knowledge Production." In *Interviewing Experts*, edited by A. Bogner B. Littig and W. Menz, 17–42. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Pew Research Center. 2018. *Being Christian in Western Europe*. Washington: <https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/2018/05/29/being-christian-in-western-europe/>
- Quinn, B. A. 2000. "The Paradox of Complaining: Law, Humor, and Harassment in the Everyday Work World." *Law & Social Inquiry* 25 (4): 1151–1185.
- Schneuwly Purdie, M. 2009. "Sociographie de l'islam en Suisse." In *Musulmans d'aujourd'hui. Identités plurielles en Suisse*, edited by M. Schneuwly Purdie, M. Gianni, and M. Jenny, 23–36. Genève: Labor et Fides.
- Swim, J. K., and L. L. Hyers. 1999. "Excuse Me – What Did You Just Say?!: Women's Public and Private Responses to Sexist Remarks." *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology* 35 (1): 68–88.
- Thaler, R. H., C. R. Sunstein, and J. P. Balz. 2013. "Choice Architecture." In *The Behavioral Foundations of Public Policy*, edited by E. Shafir, 428–439. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

- Valfort, M.-A. 2017a. "Has France a Problem with Muslims? Evidence from a Field Experiment in the Labour Market." Paper presented at the IZA/CREST/OECD Workshop: Recent Advances in the Economics of Discrimination, Paris.
- Valfort, M.-A. 2017b. "La religion, facteur de discrimination à l'embauche en France?" *Revue économique* 68 (5): 895–907.
- Widner, D., and S. Chicoine. 2011. "It's All in the Name: Employment Discrimination Against Arab Americans." *Sociological Forum* 26 (4): 806–823.
- Wimmer, A. 1996. "Kultur. Zur Reformulierung eines sozialanthropologischen Grundbegriffs." *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 48 (3): 401–425.
- Yin, R. K. 2002. *Case Study Research. Design and Methods*. 3rd ed. Newbury Park: Sage Publications.

Appendix




Figure A1. Likelihood that an offender will be found guilty within the framework of the anti-racism law 261.bis when the victim is Muslim ($n = 56$) or Jewish ($n = 265$), 1995–2019.

6 Conclusion and discussion

The aim of this thesis has been to carry out an empirical investigation of how Muslims in Switzerland *experience* and *respond* to discrimination. To do so, we investigated four specific aspects of discrimination in four articles: the perception of discrimination among Muslims compared to other groups; the impact of discrimination on their access to employment relative to other groups; discrimination against veiled Muslim women; and the individual responses of Muslims to discrimination compared to Jews, as well as the aggregated consequences of these responses. We drew on various types of data and methods, depending on data opportunities and research questions: namely, data from population surveys, expert interviews, and records of reported cases of discrimination and of legal cases.

Here, we will first present the main results of each article in a synthetic way and make generalizations (6.1), before then highlighting how the results contribute to the international literature empirically, theoretically, and methodologically (6.2). Finally, we will discuss the possible limitations of these results, and outline the future prospects both in the academic field and in terms of anti-racism policies (6.3).

6.1 Main results

The first article, “The Muslim Employment Gap, Human Capital, and Ethno-Religious Penalties: Evidence from Switzerland” (Lindemann & Stolz, 2018), addresses the issue of whether there is a Muslim employment gap in Switzerland, how great the gap is, and whether it can be attributed to discrimination. The results provide empirical evidence that Muslims are in fact disadvantaged on the Swiss labour market, and that this can only be partly explained by differences in socio-demographic characteristics, human capital, and migratory backgrounds. Thus, it seems reasonable to attribute the remaining unexplained variance to ethno-religious discrimination. What is surprising is that a university degree actually increases the likelihood of unemployment for Muslims, which is the very opposite for the non-Muslim population.

The second article, “Perceived discrimination among Muslims in Switzerland and its correlates: A comparative analysis” (Lindemann & Stolz, 2021), investigates the extent to

which Muslims perceive discrimination in different life domains compared to other groups, and the correlates of this perceived discrimination. The article shows that the levels of perceived discrimination are higher among Muslims in all the life domains investigated (work, administration, health, culture) than among any other group (majority Christians, minority Christians, Nones), with the level of perceived discrimination in the workplace being particularly high. In contrast to the other groups as well as to possible expectations, a higher socio-economic status does not reduce the likelihood that Muslims will experience discrimination. Finally, perceived discrimination is strongly associated with in-group identification and with engagement in associations, for Muslims in particular.

The third article, “Discrimination against veiled Muslim women in Switzerland: Insights from field experts” (Lindemann, 2021), seeks to discover how field experts describe and explain discrimination against Muslim women who wear the *hijab*. Our results indicate that field experts see the *hijab* as the most important marker in discrimination against Muslims, and that these women are especially targeted because their gender, religious affiliation, and racialization intersect. The discrimination experienced by Muslim women who shared their testimonies with these experts seems to be both pervasive and multifaceted: it occurs in various life domains, takes different forms, and impacts a wide range of different types of victims. This discrimination results in the segregation of the social space for women who wear the *hijab*. Finally, the victims are very unlikely to report their experience or to take the perpetrators to court, and this for reasons that non-governmental experts are mostly familiar with: namely, a fatalist attitude towards the situation, the fear of being blamed, and the complexities of the legal process.

Finally, the fourth article, “To speak out or not to speak out? Exploring the reporting of discrimination among Muslims and Jews in Switzerland” (Lindemann & Stolz, 2022), assesses whether Muslims and Jews are just as likely to report discrimination and take the matter to court, and what reasons there might be for any differences between the two groups. The article suggests that the level of perceived discrimination among Muslims and Jews is similar, but that the latter are much more likely to report discrimination or to take the perpetrators of discrimination to court. We identify four main reasons for this: Muslims are less confident that reporting discrimination or taking legal action will have a positive outcome (cost-benefit considerations); they problematize the status of “victim” more (cultural factors); they are less

informed about, and have less trust in, the bodies to which they could report discrimination since they are predominantly of migrant origin (structural factors); and, importantly, unlike the Jewish community, they do not have their own systems of reporting discrimination as an alternative to state-funded centres (organizational resources).

6.2 Contributions to the field

More generally, this thesis contributes significantly to the existing literature on discrimination against what is now a well-established religious minority in the West, and it does so empirically, theoretically, and methodologically. First, it provides empirical evidence of widespread discrimination against Muslims in a country that is nevertheless known for its cultural diversity. Second, it challenges some classical theories on integration and gives food for thought with regard to more recent theories in the field. Third, it makes the case for a methodology that combines various types of data and micro-meso levels of analysis.

Empirical contributions

We might not expect a country of just over 40,000 km² with no fewer than four national languages and five neighbouring countries to be marked by ethno-religious exclusion. However, this thesis provides empirical evidence that its numerically most important religious minority, i.e. Muslims, who make up more than 5% of its resident population, experience discrimination. So far, it has been mainly majority attitudes that have been investigated, this research indeed pointing towards the existence of symbolic boundaries (Lamont & Molnár, 2002) between the majority population and minorities along ethno-religious lines: for example, there is a higher level of hostility towards the Muslim minority in cantons where the state favours the historical churches (Helbling & Traunmüller, 2016). These symbolic boundaries may translate into social boundaries, i.e. the actual social exclusion of minority members (Koenig, 2017; Lamont & Molnár, 2002). Hence, our investigation of the Swiss case provides evidence of the consequences resulting from bright (socially salient) religious symbolic boundaries (Alba, 2005).

These results allow us to draw four overarching conclusions. First, *there is a significant level of discrimination against Muslims in Switzerland, and this discrimination is widespread in different regards*: perceived discrimination and actual discrimination are usually stronger

among Muslims than they are among other groups, and are generalized to all life domains and socio-economic status. In other words, evidence points to the fact that there is a wide range of situations in which Muslims perceive and experience discrimination, with this discrimination having different forms, intensities, and consequences. It also points to the fact that Muslims are especially likely to experience discrimination, and that this is irrespective of social situation and social status.

Second, there are different reasons why *discrimination against Muslims is particularly difficult to combat*. One reason is the difficulty of disentangling the motives behind discrimination – whether discrimination is based on a person’s presumed ethnic origins (xenophobia), gender (for women who are visibly Muslim), or religious affiliation (Islamophobia). Another reason is that raising the human capital and socio-economic status of Muslims neither protects them from socio-economic disadvantages nor decreases the likelihood that they will perceive discrimination. For example, highly educated Muslims are actually more likely to be unemployed; Muslims who are Swiss nationals and second-generation Muslims report similar levels of discrimination as foreigners; and Swiss Muslim women who wear the *hijab* are treated like foreigners. A third reason is the apparently ineffective system of reporting and the legal system itself, since Muslims in particular rarely report their experience of discrimination and even more rarely engage in court proceedings under art.261bis (CP).

Third, and relatedly, *being a Muslim seems to function as a Master status*. This notion of “Master status” was developed by Hughes to describe a trait that “tends to overpower, in most crucial situations, any other characteristics which might run counter to it”: for example, the Master status of black Americans is precisely “being black”, which on the labour market overrides any professional qualifications that they might have (Hughes, 1945, p. 357). It does indeed seem to be the case that the Master status of being a Muslim prevails over other dimensions of identity such as being highly qualified, being Swiss or of European descent, being a parent, etc. Muslims are categorized primarily through their affiliation to Islam, and discriminated against according to general stereotypes that are attached to this affiliation. This echoes what Behloul (2009) has described as a tendency to define immigrants from Muslim majority countries according primarily to their supposed affiliation to Islam. This is particularly evident in correspondence tests, which show that fictional Muslim candidates are

disadvantaged when it comes to applying for a job: they have identical qualifications and only differ in their religious affiliation (Adida et al., 2010; Valfort, 2018).

Finally, *despite historical and socio-demographic differences, the Swiss case mirrors in various ways the situation of Muslims in Europe as a whole*. This thesis contributes to a now robust literature that documents the existence of a consistent Muslim penalty in different life domains in European countries,⁸² with Switzerland being no exception to the rule: Muslims in Switzerland experience discrimination to a similar extent and in similar forms to Muslims in other European countries. The studies most similar to ours that have investigated discrimination in other European countries have yielded relatively similar results. Even after controlling for socio-demographic characteristics and human capital, Muslims remain significantly penalized in their access to the Swiss labour market, similarly to other European countries⁸³ and on the aggregate level (Connor & Koenig, 2015), a phenomenon that is known as the “Muslim penalty”. The perception of discrimination is widespread among the Muslim population in Switzerland, with European countries displaying comparable levels of perceived discrimination (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2009, p. 5; 2017b, p. 11). Moreover, although Muslim women do not differ significantly from Muslim men in Switzerland with regard to their perception of ethno-religious discrimination, visible Muslim women do seem to be particularly vulnerable to multiple discrimination, just like their counterparts in other European countries (Allen, 2015; Allen & Nielsen, 2002; Chakraborti & Zempi, 2012; European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2017b; Simon, 2021; Weichselbaumer, 2020). The “hijab effect” that has been documented by some authors in courtesy situations and labour market (Choi et al., 2021; Fernández-Reino et al., 2022; Weichselbaumer, 2020) is also confirmed by the insights of field experts in Switzerland. Finally, studies also point to the significant underreporting of discrimination among Muslims in Europe in general (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2009, pp. 8-9; 2017b), and in specific countries (Carr, 2016; Poynting & Noble, 2004; Shammass, 2015), with some

⁸² For a review of this body of research, see sub-section entitled “The Muslim penalty in the West” in section 1.2.

⁸³ For the UK, Germany, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and France, see: (Adida et al., 2010; Di Stasio et al., 2021; Heath & Martin, 2013; Khattab & Modood, 2015; Pierné, 2013; Valfort, 2018).

reasons being identified as the costs (in time and energy) involved in reporting, and the fact that people are unaware of the services to which they can turn.

Against the background of highly emotional debates around racism/anti-racism, and about whether “race” and religious affiliation should be erased from public and academic discussions (Fassin, 2021), these studies suggest that social categorizations still impinge significantly on the lives of those individuals categorized as “Muslim”. It is therefore important to continue to carry out realistic⁸⁴ and dispassionate studies on discrimination against minorities.

Theoretical contributions

It is worth discussing in more depth some results of this thesis in the light of previous research and of more recent theories: namely, that a higher level of education is associated with a higher risk of unemployment among Muslims in Switzerland (a); that, in contrast to other groups, being engaged in an association makes Muslims more likely to perceive ethno-religious discrimination (b); and that, despite evidence of gender-specific discrimination, Muslim women are not more likely to perceive discrimination than their male counterparts (c).

(a) As the first article has demonstrated, Muslims with university degrees are in fact more likely to be unemployed than less educated Muslims, which is the very opposite for non-Muslims. It also contradicts the theory of human capital, which posits that the more human capital (education, language proficiency, social ties) a person has, the better her chances are with regard to socio-economic outcomes (Becker, 1994). However, the results of our research suggest that the role of education is rather a moderator of this relationship, with more education leading to poorer chances on the labour market. To be more precise, this is the case when Muslims go from having a non-compulsory schooling or professional training (apprenticeship) to having a university degree; but it is not the case when they go from having a compulsory schooling to a non-compulsory schooling or professional training, which does indeed (as expected) decrease the likelihood of unemployment. This finding echoes similar

⁸⁴ For a definition and discussion of realism in the social sciences, see sub-section entitled “Epistemological stance” in section 1.4.

findings from research on black Americans in the US (Wilson, Tienda, & Wu, 1995), and calls for a more fine-grained theorization of the role that human capital plays in the socio-economic positions that minority members attain. For example, a correspondence test reveals that education reduces the likelihood that German, but not Kosovar, candidates are discriminated against (Zschirnt & Fibbi, 2019) in Switzerland.

What, then, happens to Muslims on the Swiss labour market when they have a university degree? Different hypotheses can be suggested. For one thing, they could be more exposed to discrimination because they have more contact and compete more with members of the majority population. As Wilson and colleagues (1995) suggest in their research on black Americans, this situation may increase the significance of minority status (or, in his words, “race”) in the allocation of scarce positions on the labour market. In other words, belonging to a minority may be a distinct disadvantage when it comes to applying for a highly coveted job.

For another, the non-Swiss degree might be the reason why employers do not employ otherwise highly qualified Muslim candidates. This hypothesis could be investigated by controlling for foreign qualifications (although population surveys such as the LRCS do not have this information), or by analyzing second- and first-generation Muslims separately: “If the explanation for the differential returns to education is the foreign qualifications of the first generation, then we would not expect to find differential returns in the second generation” (Heath & Cheung, 2007, p. 26). In Switzerland, authors have identified signs of anticipation of discrimination among immigrants in their analysis of the extent of resume whitening, i.e. engaging in a strategy to modify a resume to conceal immigrant status or signal membership in the majority group: their results reveal that adding diploma equivalences is the most common resume whitening technique, which suggests that this population is aware of the issue (Ruedin & Van Belle, 2022). Hence, further investigations are required to measure the effect that foreign qualifications have on the access that Muslims have to the Swiss labour market.

Finally, Muslims with a university degree might face a disproportionately high level of unemployment due to supply-side mechanisms:⁸⁵ namely, they might use inefficient strategies when applying for highly qualified positions. Two main hypotheses can be drawn from the literature. First, it might be that, despite their high level of education, Muslims refrain from applying for highly qualified positions precisely because they anticipate discrimination, and therefore remain unemployed (the chill factor). The study from Ruedin and Van Belle (2022) points to such anticipation of discrimination, with some immigrants engaging in resume whitening to avoid it. Second, scholars suggest that, since Muslims might tend to have mostly intra-group relations (bonding capital), but not enough relations with the majority population (bridging capital), they are cut off from “a resource-rich network” of those “in control of the labour market” (Lancee, 2012, p. 66). In short, as Koopmans (2016) argues, attributing the disadvantages that Muslims have on the labour market simply to discrimination on the part of employers is “premature”, since there might be socio-cultural factors at play on the Muslim side.⁸⁶

While such mechanisms might explain the phenomenon in part, and might account for the Muslim employment gap in general, we argue that they are unlikely to provide a full explanation. In fact, the studies in this thesis provide consistent evidence that people categorized as Muslims are discriminated against, and that the effect of religious affiliation is consistent and significant, this being seen from different perspectives and with different data. Also, we argue that it is difficult to determine the direction that such mechanisms might work in: do Muslims tend to engage in intra-group relations more, meaning that they have less useful social capital with regard to their access to employment? Or do they invest more in intra-group relations in response to their experience of discrimination on the part of the majority population? Our studies do not allow us to test these hypotheses, which would require investigating (probably qualitatively) the strategies used to look for a job, and/or including items grasping social ties in statistical models.

The fact that highly qualified Muslims fare less well than their counterparts who have a lower level of education could, however, help solve the puzzling paradox of integration, which is

⁸⁵ For an explanation of what scholars refer to when speaking of supply-side mechanisms in ethnic penalties, see note 48.

⁸⁶ See note 49 for remarks on the data used by Koopmans.

that structurally integrated migrants (who are educated and master the language of the receiving country) perceive more discrimination and/or become less emotionally committed to the host society (Verkuyten, 2016).⁸⁷ Migrants or their children may feel resentment towards the host society if they are unable to find an (adequate) job despite their education, and even more so if they feel that this is due to ethno-religious discrimination. This can also be applied to individuals who display other important signs of structural integration, such as language proficiency and even citizenship: we have indeed shown that having Swiss citizenship does not have any significant effect on the likelihood that a person will be unemployed. Before anything, however, it is vital first to verify through further inquiries whether this paradox exists in Switzerland, something that has not yet been done.

(b) Another surprising finding is that, especially for Muslims, being active in an association significantly increases the likelihood of experiencing discrimination, and even more so if the association is of an ethno-religious nature. This finding can be understood within the more general framework of rejection-identification theory,⁸⁸ which argues that individuals who experience social discrimination based on their ethno-religious affiliation will compensate for the socio-psychological impact of such discrimination by identifying more strongly with their group (Branscombe et al., 1999; Portes & Rumbaut, 2001). On the other hand, this finding could also confirm the bonding vs. bridging argument in social capital theory, with those individuals who engage in a high level of closure within their ethnic group (bonding) experiencing more exclusion than those who engage in contact with the majority population (bridging) (Lancee, 2012).

However, we believe that these interpretations should be treated with caution for two main reasons. First, our research design cannot test the direction of the relationship empirically, which means that we do not know whether individuals are discriminated against and then turn to ethno-religious associations, or whether members who are already active in such associations are more visible and hence more prone to being the target of discrimination. Second, other indicators of bonding and bridging strategies among Muslims should be investigated to assess whether either bonding or bridging lessens or eradicates the feeling

⁸⁷ For a more detailed discussion of the “paradox of integration”, see the sub-section “Effects of and responses to discrimination: ethnic penalties, perception, and coping” in section 1.1., and especially note 28.

⁸⁸ For a synthetic description of this theory, see page 16.

that Muslims have that they are discriminated against. For example, it would be wise to test whether different types of social ties are associated with more or less perceived discrimination: is volunteering in an ethno-religious association linked to more perceived discrimination than volunteering in a non-ethnic/non-religious association? Does having friends from the majority population decrease the likelihood that the person will perceive discrimination? It has already been evidenced that stronger social ties with co-ethnics, both on a local and transnational level, lessen the detrimental effects of perception of discrimination among Muslims (Arat & Bilgili, 2021).

(c) Finally, Muslim women are not more likely to perceive discrimination than Muslim men, which might appear to contradict our other finding that veiled Muslim women are especially subject to discrimination. These apparently contradictory results are consistent with the mixed results in the empirical literature on the gender aspect of Islamophobia.⁸⁹

Such variations could be explained by different factors. First, since population surveys usually do not include items on the wearing of the *hijab*, they cannot grasp the *hijab* effect. This means that, if Muslim women who wear the *hijab* are the most discriminated against but make up a small minority of the female Muslim population in a country, then no gender gap will show up in the results. This might indeed be the case in Switzerland, where Muslim women who wear the *hijab* do indeed constitute a minority.⁹⁰ Second, different life domains may expose men and women to different degrees of stigmatization: Muslim men might report discrimination that happens in life domains that are particularly subject to discrimination *and* that concern men to a greater extent, such as the labour market. Third, men and women might differ in their tendency to attribute negative experiences to discrimination. Fourth, our study on perceived discrimination only takes into account ethno-religious discrimination, i.e. discrimination that is based on a person's ethnicity or religious affiliation. Had our analysis

⁸⁹ For a brief review of this body of research, see sub-section entitled "The gendered side of Islamophobia" in section 1.2.

⁹⁰ There are no official estimates published of the proportion of Muslim women who wear the *hijab*, but the data gathered for the study "Between Demands for Recognition and Politics of Accommodation: The Cultural, Social, and Political Orientations of Muslims in Switzerland" indicate that 20.3% of non-Swiss Muslim women from Turkey, the former Yugoslavia, and the Maghreb say that they wear the *hijab*. However, the sample is representative of non-Swiss Muslims who have names that do not sound Swiss (onomastic sampling), and it does not include Swiss Muslims. Information on this study is available at <https://archive-ouverte.unige.ch/unige:73809> (accessed on 15 May 2021). In short, we can reasonably assume that fewer than 20% of Muslim women wear the *hijab* in Switzerland.

included gender discrimination (discrimination attributed to a person's gender), we would probably have observed a gap, with women reporting more discrimination than men.

In other words, the failure to find a gender gap in perceptions of discrimination does not mean that discrimination against visible Muslim women is not widespread in Switzerland: either the methodology does not grasp all the grounds for discrimination, or such women simply make up a minority of Muslims in Switzerland. This is precisely the advantage of using qualitative data when investigating discrimination against Muslim women as doing so enables us to unmask multiple aspects of discrimination specific to certain profiles of women.

Methodological contributions

This last point demonstrates the methodological relevance of drawing on various types of data and methods to produce a better understanding of complex and multi-faceted social phenomena such as discrimination. While this study does not adopt a mixed methods design *per se* (Maxwell & Loomis, 2003; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2003), it does employ a multi-method approach in that it draws on different types of data and adopts both quantitative and qualitative research methods. Such an approach has proven useful since it has allowed us to answer research questions of different scope (micro-/meso-level questions); to obtain a more complete picture of a complex phenomenon (holism); and to understand an otherwise unintelligible state of affairs (complementarity) (Muskat, Blackman, & Muskat, 2012).

Thus, by using different types of data, this thesis has been able to answer research questions at different levels of analysis and with different scope: the first two studies use population survey data to investigate individual-level variables of discrimination, this allowing us to gain representative results on both its objective and subjective reality at a national scale; for their part, qualitative data from expert interviews allowed us to achieve meso-level insights into specific aspects of discrimination, such as the cultural and organizational environment that influences the reporting of discrimination.

Also, complementing statistical data with qualitative material that tapped into aspects absent from the data allowed us to gain a more complete picture of certain profiles of Muslims who experience discrimination: while population surveys allowed us to control only broadly for gender, qualitative interviews with field experts gave us some insights into what happens

when it comes to visible Muslim women. Had we not used qualitative interviews, then we would not have been made aware of the specific vulnerability of such women.

Finally, triangulating between different types of data permitted us to tackle important sociological puzzles: while population surveys reveal similar levels of perceived discrimination among Muslims and Jews, it is only through the analysis of legal records and of records of self-reported cases of discrimination that we could show that the two groups behave very differently when it comes to reporting. What is more, complementing these analyses with expert interviews sheds light on the reasons behind this difference.

In short, had we used only observational data, or only interviews, or only legal records, then we would not have been able to understand important aspects of discrimination against Muslims in Switzerland. But, by drawing on different methods and types of data, we could compensate for the weaknesses of one methodology with the strengths of the other, and therefore acquire a multi-level, more complete, and finer understanding of this phenomenon (Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004).

6.3 Limitations and future prospects: research and policy leads

While this study contributes to our understanding of anti-Muslim discrimination, it also contains limitations that future research should address.

The first limitation is to do with the comparative approach that three of the four articles take, an approach that limits itself either to broad group categories (“non-Muslims” and “minority/majority Christians”), or to only one specific group (Jews). For one thing, the choice of the categories makes some phenomena more or less visible: for example, we focused on the comparison between Muslims, Christians and Nones in our article on perceived discrimination (article 2) and did not include Jews in the comparison⁹¹, while we did precisely this in our article on reporting (article 4) that shows similar levels of perceived discrimination. For another, the Muslim employment gap that is measured depends of course on the group with which we compared Muslims: namely, non-Muslims. Had we compared the rate of

⁹¹ We did not include the category of Jews in our analyses at the time, because of a sample size problem for Jews in the LRCS. Only after the publication of our paper, Baier (2020) published his research on perceived discrimination among Jews that could have helped us address this difficulty, which we did in article 4.

unemployment among Muslims with the rate among Protestants, then the gap would probably have been wider; conversely, had we compared Muslims with minority Christians, then the gap would probably have been narrower. The category of “non-Muslim” is largely irrelevant sociologically since it includes a wide variety of groups. Nonetheless, it serves as a good starting-point for assessing ethno-religious barriers on the labour market. Future research could refine its analyses by including comparisons with specific groups, and by examining whether human capital and migratory background function as mediators, moderators, or as factors that have no effect when it comes to accounting for each gap. Attempts to explain these differences would also help us understand better the differential returns on human capital investments as per ethno-religious belonging.

As for perceived discrimination, we would also encourage other studies to compare the Muslim case with that of other non-Christian minorities. The main statistical difficulty here are sample sizes: while population surveys provide workable samples for Muslims, other minority groups are simply too small for that to be the case. As for the reporting of discrimination and the initiation of legal proceedings, these could be widened to include other groups than Muslims and Jews, such as blacks or Yenish people (an ethnic minority in Switzerland), since the CFR datasets and centre reports provide data about them, too. The challenge will be to justify such a comparison, since neither Yenish people nor blacks are a religious minority.

A second limitation lies in the difficulty of making causal interpretations with regard to some results. For example, while article 1 suggests that religiosity has a significant and positive link to the likelihood of unemployment for the population as a whole, article 2 indicates that there are strong positive correlations between ethno-religious in-group identification/community involvement on the one hand, and perceived discrimination among Muslims on the other.⁹² What these correlations mean is unclear, and could support three different theoretical hypotheses. First, it may be that Muslims who identify strongly with their in-group and who are more active in an ethno-religious association are simply more visible and hence more exposed to discrimination, resulting in the fact that they report discrimination more often.

⁹² This result applies to Muslims and non-Muslims combined, but religiosity barely explains the employment gap. The same results are found in Connor and Koenig’s study (2015).

Second, the causality could work in the opposite direction: namely, Muslims who are discriminated against might identify more strongly with their in-group as a means of dealing with experiences of discrimination. This interpretation would give support to the rejection-identification model (Branscombe, Schmitt & Harvey, 1999), and to reactive ethnicity theory (Portes & Rumbaut, 2001), which claim that members of disadvantaged groups cope with the pain or threat to self-esteem (Eccleston & Major, 2006; Ghaffari & Çiftçi, 2010; Jean S. Phinney, 1991) that perceived discrimination entails by identifying more strongly with their in-group. A final possibility is that, when a person identifies strongly with her in-group and engages in the activities of her association, then she shares experiences of discrimination and gains awareness of inequalities, this making her more “vigilant” and more primed with regard to spotting (or over-estimating) situations of discrimination. There could also be a combination of these mechanisms, with each reinforcing the other. This reveals the need for further research to determine the nature and the direction of this relationship, such research needing perhaps to draw on qualitative methodologies such as focus groups or biographical interviews, or on natural experiments.

Another example of the difficulty of making sense of mechanisms at work in statistical models is apparent in the results regarding education and socio-economic status. Highly educated Muslims are more likely to be unemployed, and a higher socio-economic status does not protect Muslims in general from perceiving discrimination. After at least controlling for foreign degrees, we could explain these counterintuitive situations in three different ways. First, as the theory of exposure hypothesizes, more education and upward mobility mean that people participate in spheres that involve more contact with members of the majority population (van Doorn, Scheepers, & Dagevos, 2013, pp. 384-385). Since decisions whereby individuals are given access to scarce positions on the labour market increase the importance of out-group belonging, this results in greater exposure to discrimination and an increased likelihood of having to compete against privileged majority members. Another explanation lies in the theory of awareness: possessing a higher level of education helps people reflect on processes of inequality in society (Steinmann, 2019, pp. 1381-1382). Finally, it could be that members from stigmatized minorities anticipate discrimination and therefore refrain from applying for certain jobs, or from acting in ways that might trigger discriminatory behaviour, like self-fulfilling prophecies (Pager & Shepherd, 2008, p. 199). In short, *why* highly educated

Muslims face more unemployment, and *why* a high socio-economic status does not protect them from perceiving discrimination, are open questions that still need investigating.

A third limitation to this thesis relates to its inevitable inexhaustiveness, since we had to make choices regarding life domains and specific points in processes of discrimination. For example, measuring and explaining the Muslim employment gap can only investigate one outcome (namely, having or not having a job), while ignoring other outcomes on the labour market (being given a promotion, a pay rise, a qualified position, etc.), as well as the moment at which the discrimination occurs (when the application is read, at the job interview, etc.). What would be very interesting in this regard would be field experiments such as those carried out by Fibbi and colleagues (Fibbi, Lerch, & Wanner, 2006; Zschirnt & Fibbi, 2019), but designed in such a way that they test the factor of religious belonging. Our field of study would also benefit from research examining other life domains such as housing, the credit market, decisions on naturalization, again with a focus on religious belonging, and other coping strategies with regard to discrimination (not only reporting discrimination, but, for example, seeking in-group support, or disengaging strategies).

To conclude, the results of this thesis are important not only empirically and methodologically, but also because they allow us to reflect on anti-discrimination policies in an informed manner. It is now clear that it may not be enough just to raise the level of human capital of the second generation: irrespective of education, the amount of time spent in the country, citizenship, language proficiency, involvement in associations, etc., Muslims are and feel discriminated against to a significant extent and in various life domains in Switzerland, as they are in other European countries. This does not mean adopting a fatalist attitude and reducing Muslims to the status of victims, however. On the contrary, racial discrimination in Switzerland can be combatted in several concrete ways.

For example, it will not be sufficient to foster social inclusion to focus only on structural integration for migrants and their children, i.e. on their acquisition of language, education, or even citizenship, unless complementary policies are pursued to combat prejudice in the majority population. Following its accession to the ICERD, Switzerland has obviously taken an important step by including in its criminal code the prohibition of racial discrimination and by creating a network of centres to support victims, but this does not prevent a large proportion

of its most important religious minority from feeling discriminated against and experiencing difficulties in finding employment. What must also be kept in mind here are the “limits of rights in unmaking stigma” as Koenig puts it: “Indeed, the remarkable expansion of individual and/or collective rights does not necessarily and certainly not immediately alter widely shared definitions of cultural membership. Discursive spaces of defining the nation continue to reproduce symbolic boundaries based on racial or ethnic, religious or linguistic categories” (Koenig, 2017, p. 1268).

In the field of employment more specifically, understanding why employers are reluctant to employ Muslims appears crucial if we want to adopt efficient prevention strategies and programmes of equality. If, for example, wearing the *hijab* or observing other religious practices (Ramadan, prayers, food restrictions) is deemed problematic in different fields, then this attitude should not only be identified, but also shown to be unjustified *or* justified, with pragmatic solutions being proposed if the latter is the case. Different types of employment procedures and incentives should be tested and promoted (Schönenberger & Fibbi, 2011), which would not only decrease discrimination against minorities, but also avoid wasting human resources and costly education.

Finally, our results point to the need for different collaborations. For one thing, the state would benefit from collaborating more closely with ethno-religious communities, so that they could exchange information with one another, thereby raising awareness among minorities of the state’s anti-racism strategies and legal provisions, and uncovering the discrimination that might not be picked up by the state. It is, for example, insufficient to use systems of reporting to assess the extent to which Muslims (or any other minority) experience discrimination day-to-day. Although political awareness can be raised by numbers, with such reports being important (Simon, 2005), we should also highlight the tip-of-the-iceberg phenomenon here by referring to complementary data such as population surveys and the insights of non-state field experts. For another, collaboration between religious minorities would also benefit knowledge transfer, and allow such minorities to share experiences when it comes to dealing with racist incidents. The literature often looks at micro-level factors, but when meso-level aspects such as the way that a group has access to or makes use of resources are investigated, then it appears that fighting racism is not just an individual issue, but a collective one.

7 References

(Bibliography for 1. Introduction and 6. Conclusion, otherwise in articles)

- Ademović-Omerčić, N. (2018). Islamophobia in Switzerland. National report 2017. In F. Hafez & E. Bayrakli (Eds.), *European Islamophobia Report 2018* (pp. 647-670). Istanbul: SETA.
- Adida, C. L., Laitin, D. D., & Valfort, M.-A. (2010). Identifying barriers to Muslim integration in France. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, *107*(52), 22384-22390.
- Adorno, T., Frenkel-Brenswik, E., Levinson, D. J., & Sanford, N. R. (1950). *The Authoritarian Personality*. New York: Harper.
- Ahmed, A. M. (2010). Muslim Discrimination: Evidence From Two Lost-Letter Experiments. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, *40*(4), 888-898.
- Aidenberger, A., & Doehne, M. (2021). Unveiling everyday discrimination. Two field experiments on discrimination against religious minorities in day-to-day interactions. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, *72*, 328-346.
- Alba, R. (2005). Bright vs. blurred boundaries: Second-generation assimilation and exclusion in France, Germany, and the United States. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, *28*(1), 20-49.
- Allen, C. (2010). *Islamophobia*. London: Routledge.
- Allen, C. (2015). 'People hate you because of the way you dress': Understanding the invisible experiences of veiled British Muslim women victims of Islamophobia. *International Review of Victimology*, *21*(3), 287-301.
- Allen, C. (2020). *Reconfiguring Islamophobia. A Radical Rethinking of a Contested Concept*. Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Allen, C., & Nielsen, J. S. (2002). *Summary report on Islamophobia in the EU after 11 September 2001*. European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC). Retrieved from Vienna: https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/199-Synthesis-report_en.pdf
- Allport, G. (1954). *The Nature of Prejudice*. Cambridge: Addison Wesley Publishing Company.
- Allport, G., & Ross, M. J. (1967). Personal religious orientation and prejudice. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *5*(4), 432-443.
- Amiriaux, V. (2004). Pourquoi parler de discrimination religieuse ? Réflexion à partir de la situation des musulmans en France. *Confluences Méditerranée*, *48*(1), 61-70.
- Amiriaux, V. (2007). The Headscarf Question: What is Really the Issue? In S. Amghar, A. Boubakeur, & M. Emerson (Eds.), *European Islam. Challenges for Public Policy and Society* (pp. 124-143). Bruxelles: Centre for European Policy Studies.
- Anderson, L. R., Fryer, R. G., & Holt, C. A. (2006). Discrimination: Experimental Evidence from Psychology and Economics. In W. M. Rodgers III (Ed.), *Handbook on the Economics of Discrimination* (pp. 97-117). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
- Arat, E., & Bilgili, Ö. (2021). Transnational and Local Co-ethnic Social Ties as Coping Mechanisms Against Perceived Discrimination - A Study on the Life Satisfaction of Turkish and Moroccan Minorities in the Netherlands. *Frontiers in Sociology*, *28*(6), 671897.
- Auer, D., Lacroix, J., Ruedin, D., & Zschirnt, E. (2019). *Ethnische Diskriminierung auf dem Schweizer Wohnungsmarkt*. Bundesamt für Wohnungswesen BWO. Retrieved from Grenchen: <https://www.bwo.admin.ch/bwo/de/home/Wohnungsmarkt/studien-und-publikationen/diskriminierung-auf-der-schweizer-wohnungsmarkt.html>

- Baier, D. (2020). *Erfahrungen und Wahrnehmungen von Antisemitismus unter Jüdin-nen und Juden in der Schweiz*. Institut für Delinquenz und Kriminalprävention. Retrieved from Zurich: <https://www.zhaw.ch/storage/hochschule/medien/news/2020/200702-zhaw-antisemitismus-studie.pdf>
- Banfi, E. (2013). *Snowboarding on Swiss Islam*. Neuchâtel: Alphil-Presses universitaires suisses.
- Baumann, M., & Stolz, J. (2009). *La nouvelle Suisse religieuse. Risques et chances de sa diversité*. Genève: Labor et Fides.
- Becker, G. (1994). Human Capital Revisited. In G. Becker (Ed.), *Human Capital: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis with Special Reference to Education (Third ed., pp. 15-28)*. Chicago: National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Behloul, S. M. (2009). Discours total! Le débat sur l'islam en Suisse et le positionnement de l'islam comme religion publique. In M. Schneuwly Purdie, M. Gianni, & M. Jenny (Eds.), *Musulmans d'aujourd'hui. Identités plurielles en Suisse* (pp. 53-71). Genève: Labor et Fides.
- Berger, R., & Berger, J. (2019). Islamophobia or Threat to Secularization? Lost Letter experiments on the Discrimination Against Muslims in an Urban Area in Switzerland. *Swiss Journal of Sociology, 45*(1), 83-105.
- Berry, S. E. (2011). Bringing Muslim Minorities within the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination - Square Peg in a Round Hole? *Human Rights Law Review, 11*(3), 423-450.
- Berthoud, R., & Blekesaune, M. (2007) Persistent employment disadvantage, Research Report No. 416. In. London: Institute for Social and Economic Research, University of Essex, on behalf of the Department of Work and Pensions.
- Blackwood, L., Hopkins, N., & Reicher, S. D. (2013). I know who I am, but who do they think I am? Muslim perspectives on encounters with airport authorities. *Ethnic and Racial Studies, 36*(6), 1090-1110.
- Blackwood, L., Hopkins, N., & Reicher, S. D. (2015). 'Flying While Muslim': Citizenship and Misrecognition in the Airport. *Journal of Social and Political Psychology of Women Quarterly, 3*(2), 148-170.
- Bleich, E. (2011). What Is Islamophobia and How Much Is There? Theorizing and Measuring an Emerging Comparative Concept. *American Behavioral Scientist, 55*(12), 1581-1600.
- Boulila, S. C. (2019). Race and racial denial in Switzerland. *Ethnic and Racial Studies, 42*(9), 1401-1418.
- Bourguignon, D., Seron, E., Yzerbyt, V., & Herman, G. (2006). Perceived group and personal discrimination: Differential effects on personal self-esteem. *European Journal of Social Psychology, 36*, 773-789.
- Branscombe, N. R., Schmitt, M. T., & Harvey, R. D. (1999). Perceiving pervasive discrimination among African Americans: Implications for group identification and well-being. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77*(1), 135-149.
- Brante, T. (2001). Consequences of Realism for Sociological Theory-Building. *Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour, 31*(2), 167-195.
- Brubaker, R. (2009). Ethnicity, Race, and Nationalism. *Annual Review of Sociology, 35*(1), 21-42
- Brubaker, R. (2015). *Grounds for Difference*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

- Carol, S., Helbling, M., & Michalowski, I. (2015). A Struggle over Religious Rights? How Muslim Immigrants and Christian Natives View the Accommodation of Religion in Six European Countries. *Social Forces*, 94(2), 647–671.
- Carr, J. (2016). *Experiences of Islamophobia: Living with Racism in the Neoliberal Era*. London: Routledge.
- Chakraborti, N., & Zempi, I. (2012). The veil under attack: Gendered dimensions of Islamophobic victimization. *International Review of Victimology*, 18(3), 269-284.
- Chen, P. G., & Palmer, C. L. (2018). The Prejudiced Personality? Using the Big Five to Predict Susceptibility to Stereotyping Behavior. *American Politics Research*, 46(2), 276-307.
- Choi, D. D., Poertner, M., & Sambanis, N. (2021). The Hijab Penalty: Feminist Backlash to Muslim Immigrants. *American Journal of Political Science*.
- Colen, C. G., Ramey, D. M., Cooksey, E. C., & Williams, D. R. (2018). Racial disparities in health among nonpoor African Americans and Hispanics: The role of acute and chronic discrimination. *Social Science & Medicine*, 199, 167-180.
- Commission Nationale Consultative des Droits de l'Homme. (2021). *Rapport sur la lutte contre le racisme, l'antisémitisme et la xénophobie*. Paris: https://www.cncdh.fr/sites/default/files/rapport_racisme2020_basse_def.pdf
- Connor, P. (2010). Contexts of immigrant receptivity and immigrant religious outcomes: the case of Muslims in Western Europe. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 33(3), 376-403.
- Connor, P., & Koenig, M. (2015). Explaining the Muslim employment gap in Western Europe: Individual-level effects and ethno-religious penalties. *Social Science Research*, 49, 191-201.
- Couttenier, M., Hatte, S., Thoenig, M., & Vlachos, S. (2021). Anti-Muslim Voting and Media Coverage of Immigrant Crimes. *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 1-33.
- Crenshaw, K. (1989). Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics. *University of Chicago Legal Forum*, 1989(1), 139-167.
- Crocker, J., Major, B., & Steele, C. M. (1998). Social stigma. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), *Handbook of social psychology* (Fourth ed., Vol. 2, pp. 504–553). Boston: McGraw-Hill.
- Cronin, T. J., Levin, S., Branscombe, N. R., van Laar, C., & Tropp, L. R. (2012). Ethnic identification in response to perceived discrimination protects well-being and promotes activism: A longitudinal study of Latino college students. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 15(3), 393–407.
- Dahinden, U., Koch, C., Wyss, V., & Keel, G. (2011). Representation of Islam and Christianity in the Swiss Media. *Journal of Empirical Theology*, 24(2), 197-208.
- Dana, K., Lajevardi, N., Oskooii, K. A. R., & Walker, H. L. (2019). Veiled Politics: Experiences with Discrimination among Muslim Americans. *Politics and Religion*, 12(4), 629-677.
- Dargent, C. (2009). L'État et la difficile saisie statistique de la religion : l'exemple des protestants dans les recensements en France au XIXe siècle. *Population*, 64(1), 215-232.
- Devine, P. G. (2001). Implicit Prejudice and Stereotyping: How Automatic Are They? Introduction to the Special Section. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 81(5), 757–759.
- Di Stasio, V., Lancee, B., Veit, S., & Yemane, R. (2021). Muslim by default or religious discrimination? Results from a cross-national field experiment on hiring discrimination. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 47(6), 1305-1326.

- Diehl, C., & Liebau, E. (2017). *Perceptions of Discrimination: What Do They Measure and Why Do They Matter?* SOEPPaper No. 945. Retrieved from SSRN: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3098793
- Diehl, C., Liebau, E., & Mühlau, P. (2021). How Often Have You Felt Disadvantaged? Explaining Perceived Discrimination. *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, 73, 1-24.
- Direnberger, L., Banfi, E., & Eskandari, V. (2022). Locating the threat, rebordering the nation: Gender and Islamophobia in the Swiss Parliament, 2001–2015. *European Journal of Women's Studies*, 29(3), 384–401.
- Dolezal, M., Helbling, M., & Hutter, S. (2010). Debating Islam in Austria, Germany and Switzerland: Ethnic Citizenship, Church-State Relations and Right-Wing Populism. *West European Politics*, 33(2), 171-190.
- Dovidio, J. F., Glick, P., & Rudman, L. A. (Eds.). (2005). *On the nature of prejudice: Fifty years after Allport*. Malden: Blackwell Publishing.
- Dovidio, J. F., Hewstone, M., Glick, P., & Esses, V. M. (2010). Prejudice, Stereotyping and Discrimination: Theoretical and Empirical Overview. In J. F. Dovidio, M. Hewstone, P. Glick, & V. M. Esses (Eds.), *The SAGE Handbook of Prejudice, Stereotyping and Discrimination* (pp. 3-28). London: SAGE Publications.
- Droogsma, R. A. (2007). Redefining Hijab: American Muslim Women's Standpoints on Veiling. *Journal of Applied Communication Research*, 35(3), 294-319.
- Duckitt, J. (2015). Authoritarian Personality. In J. D. Wright (Ed.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences* (Vol. 2, pp. 255-261). Oxford: Pergamon.
- Eccleston, C. P., & Major, B. N. (2006). Attributions to discrimination and self-esteem: The role of group identification and appraisals. *Group Processes & Intergroup Relations*, 9(2), 147-162.
- Echebarria-Echabe, A., & Fernández Guede, E. (2007). A New Measure of Anti-Arab Prejudice: Reliability and Validity Evidence. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 37(5), 1077-1091.
- Edwards, B., & McCarthy, J. D. (2004). Resources and Social Movement Mobilization. In D. A. Snow, S. Soule, & H. Kriesi (Eds.), *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements* (pp. 116–152). Malden: Blackwell Publishing.
- Eskandari, V., & Banfi, E. (2017). Institutionalising Islamophobia in Switzerland: The Burqa and Minaret Bans. *Islamophobia Studies Journal*, 4(1), 53-71.
- Ettinger, P. (2008). *The problematisation of Muslims in public communication in Switzerland. fög discussion paper 2008-0004*. fög – Forschungsbereich Öffentlichkeit und Gesellschaft. Retrieved from Zürich: https://www.foeg.uzh.ch/analyse/publikationen/Problematisierung_Muslime.pdf
- Ettinger, P., & Imhof, K. (2009). Religions, médias et espace public. In M. Baumann & J. Stolz (Eds.), *La nouvelle Suisse religieuse. Risques et chances de sa diversité* (pp. 295-310). Genève: Labor et Fides.
- Ettinger, P., & Imhof, K. (2011). *Ethnisierung des Politischen und Problematisierung religiöser Differenz. Schlussbericht*. Nationales Forschungsprogramm. Retrieved from Bern: www.nfp58.ch/files/news/116_NFP58_Schlussbericht_Imhof.pdf
- Ettinger, P., & Udriș, L. (2009). Islam as a threat? Problematisation of Muslims in the mass media and effects on the political system. In L. Marsden & H. Savigny (Eds.), *Media, Religion and Conflict* (pp. 59-80). London & New York: Routledge.

- European Commission. (2017). *A comparative analysis of non-discrimination law in Europe*. Retrieved from Brussels: <https://op.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-/publication/36c9bb78-db01-11e7-a506-01aa75ed71a1>
- European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia. (2006). *Muslims in the European Union - Discrimination and Islamophobia*. Retrieved from Vienna: <https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2012/muslims-european-union-discrimination-and-islamophobia>
- European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. (2009). *Data in Focus Report: Muslims*. Retrieved from Vienna: https://fra.europa.eu/sites/default/files/fra_uploads/448-EU-MIDIS_MUSLIMS_EN.pdf
- European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. (2017a). *Second European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey. Main results*. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA). Retrieved from Luxembourg: <https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2017/second-european-union-minorities-and-discrimination-survey-main-results>
- European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. (2017b). *Second European Union Minorities and Discrimination Survey. Muslims – Selected findings*. Retrieved from Luxembourg: <https://fra.europa.eu/en/publication/2017/second-european-union-minorities-and-discrimination-survey-eu-midis-ii-muslims>
- Fasel, N., Green, E. G. T., & Sarrasin, O. (2013). Unveiling Naturalization. A Multilevel Study on Minority Proportion, Conservative Ideologies, and Attitudes Toward the Muslim Veil. *Zeitschrift für Psychologie*, 221(4), 242–251.
- Fassin, D. (2021). Are 'woke' academics a threat to the French republic? Ask Macron's ministers. *The Guardian*. Retrieved from: <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/mar/12/academics-french-republic-macron-islamo-leftism?fbclid=IwAR3IDG2Rtlo-2KGRzudx59zfEuQOUSpoSVNBaoPz-5hPtsuEo6BQxjvdhmw>
- Feagin, J. R., & Sikes, M. P. (1994). *Living with Racism: The Black Middle-Class Experience*. Boston MA: Beacon Press.
- Federal Commission against Racism. (2017). *Muslimfeindlichkeit: Gesellschaft, Medien und Politik*. TANGRAM, 40. Retrieved from Bern: https://www.ekr.admin.ch/pdf/Tangram_40.pdf
- Federal Statistical Office. (2016). *Pratiques et croyances religieuses et spirituelles en Suisse*. Retrieved from Neuchâtel: <https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/fr/home/statistiques/population/enquetes/esrk.assetdetail.350458.html>
- Federal Statistical Office. (2019). *Enquête sur le vivre ensemble en Suisse (VeS): Résultats 2018*. Retrieved from Neuchâtel: <https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/fr/home/actualites/quoi-de-neuf.assetdetail.7466705.html>
- Federal Statistical Office. (2020). *Pratiques et croyances religieuses et spirituelles en Suisse*. Retrieved from Neuchâtel: <https://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/fr/home/statistiques/population/enquetes/esrk.assetdetail.15023004.html>

- Fernández-Reino, M., Di Stasio, V., & Veit, S. (2022). Discrimination Unveiled: A Field Experiment on the Barriers Faced by Muslim Women in Germany, the Netherlands, and Spain. *European Sociological Review*, 1-19.
- Fibbi, R., Kaya, B., & Piguët, E. (2003). *Nomen est omen: quand s'appeler Pierre, Afrim ou Mehmet fait la différence*. FNS. Retrieved from Bern/Aarau: https://libra.unine.ch/Publications/Rosita_Fibbi/16377
- Fibbi, R., Lerch, M., & Wanner, P. (2006). Unemployment and Discrimination against Youth of Immigration Origin in Switzerland. *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, 7(3), 351-366.
- Fibbi, R., Midtbøen, A. H., & Simon, P. (2021). Concepts of Discrimination. In *Migration and Discrimination* (pp. 13-20). Cham: Springer.
- Fiske, S. T. (1989). Examining the Role of Intent: Toward Understanding Its Role in Stereotyping and Prejudice. In J. S. Uleman & J. A. Bargh (Eds.), *Unintended thought* (pp. 253–283): The Guilford Press.
- Frega, R., & Carreira da Silva, F. (2011). Pragmatism and the Social Sciences. A Century of Influences and Interactions. *European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy*, 1, III-2.
- Gaertner, S. L., & Dovidio, J. F. (1986). The aversive form of racism. In J. F. Dovidio & S. L. Gaertner (Eds.), *Prejudice, discrimination, and racism* (pp. 61-89). San Diego: Academic Press.
- Gerring, J. (2012). *Social Science Methodology: A Criterial Framework*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Ghaffari, A., & Çiftçi, A. (2010). Religiosity and Self-Esteem of Muslim Immigrants to the United States: The Moderating Role of Perceived Discrimination. *International Journal for the Psychology of Religion*, 20(1), 14-25.
- Gianni, M., Giugni, M., & Michel, N. m. (2015). *Les musulmans de Suisse. Profils et intégration*. Lausanne: Presses polytechniques et universitaires romandes.
- Gianni, M., Schneuwly Purdie, M., Jenny, M., & Lathion, S. (2010). *Vie musulmane en Suisse. Profils identitaires, demandes et perceptions des musulmans en Suisse*. Commission fédérale pour les questions de migration CFM. Retrieved from Bern: https://www.ekm.admin.ch/dam/ekm/fr/data/dokumentation/materialien/mat_mu_slime_f.pdf
- Goffman, E. (1963). *Stigma : notes on the management of spoiled identity*. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall.
- Golder, L., Mousson, M., & Tschöpe, S. (2018). *Hinweise auf erlebte, aber kaum registrierte Hasskriminalität. Schlussbericht*. gfs.bern. Retrieved from Bern: <https://docplayer.org/71623518-Hinweise-auf-erlebte-aber-kaum-registrierte-hasskriminalitaet.html>
- Green, E. G. T., Fasel, N., & Sarrasin, O. (2010). The More the Merrier? The Effects of Type of Cultural Diversity on Exclusionary Immigration Attitudes in Switzerland. *International Journal of Conflict and Violence*, 4(2), 177 – 190.
- Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji's, M. R. (1995). Implicit social cognition: attitudes, self-esteem, and stereotypes. *Psychological review*, 102(1), 4–27.
- Haddad , Y. Y. (2007). The Post-9/11 "Hijab" as Icon. *Sociology of Religion*, 68(3), 253-267.
- Hainmueller, J., & Hangartner, D. (2013). Who gets a Swiss passport? A Natural Experiment in Immigrant Discrimination. *American Political Science Review*, 107(1), 159-187.
- Halliday, F. (1999). 'Islamophobia' reconsidered. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 22(5), 892-902.

- Halrynjo, S., & Jonker, M. (2015). Naming and Framing of Intersectionality in Hijab Cases — Does It Matter? An Analysis of Discrimination Cases in Scandinavia and the Netherlands. *Gender, Work & Organization*, 23(3), 278-295.
- Harms, L. (2021). Claiming Religious Freedom at the European Court of Human Rights: Socio-Legal Field Effects on Legal Mobilization. *Law & Social Inquiry*, 46(4), 1206-1235.
- Heath, A. F., & Cheung, S. Y. (2007). The Comparative Study of Ethnic Minority Disadvantage. In A. F. Heath & S. Y. Cheung (Eds.), *Unequal Chances: Ethnic Minorities in Western Labour Markets* (pp. 1-44). Oxford: Oxford University Press/British Academy.
- Heath, A. F., & Martin, J. (2013). Can religious affiliation explain 'ethnic' inequalities in the labour market? *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 36(6), 1005-1027.
- Heath, A. F., Rethon, C., & Kilpi, E. (2008). The Second Generation in Western Europe: Education, Unemployment, and Occupational Attainment. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 34, 211-235.
- Helbling, M. (2008a). *Islamophobia in Switzerland : A new phenomenon or a new name for xenophobia?* Paper presented at the Annual conference of the Midwest Political Science Association (MPSA) in Chicago. Retrieved from: https://www.unil.ch/files/live/sites/issr/files/shared/8_Telechargement/Colloque_d_e_Recherche/Helbling_2010_Islamophobia.pdf
- Helbling, M. (2008b). *Practising Citizenship and Heterogeneous Nationhood. Naturalisations in Swiss Municipalities*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Helbling, M. (2010a). Naturalisation politics in Switzerland: explaining rejection rates at the local level. In T. Caponio & M. Borkert (Eds.), *The Local Dimension of Migration Policymaking* (pp. 33-56). Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Helbling, M. (2010b). Switzerland: Contentious Citizenship Attribution in a Federal State. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 36(5), 793-809.
- Helbling, M. (2014). Opposing Muslims and the Muslim Headscarf in Western Europe. *European Sociological Review*, 30(2), 242-257.
- Helbling, M. (2017). Islamophobia in the West. An introduction. In M. Helbling (Ed.), *Islamophobia in the West: Measuring and explaining individual attitudes* (pp. 1-18). London and New York: Routledge.
- Helbling, M. (Ed.) (2012). *Islamophobia in the West. Measuring and Explaining Individual Attitudes* (First ed.). London: Routledge.
- Helbling, M., & Traunmüller, R. (2016). How State Support of Religion Shapes Attitudes Toward Muslim Immigrants: New Evidence From a Sub-National Comparison. *Comparative Political Studies*, 49(3), 391-424.
- Helly, D. (2004). Are Muslims Discriminated Against in Canada Since September 2001? *Canadian Ethnic Studies*, 36(1), 24-47.
- Hirschman, A. (1970). *Exit, Voice, and Loyalty*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Hopkins, N., & Blackwood, L. (2011). Everyday citizenship: Identity and recognition. *Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology*, 21(3), 215-227.
- Hopkins, N., & Greenwood, R. M. (2013). Hijab, visibility and the performance of identity. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 43(5), 438-447
- Hopkins, P. (2004). Young muslim men in Scotland: inclusions and exclusions. *Children's Geographies*, 2(2), 257-272.
- Hopkins, P. (2016). Gendering Islamophobia, racism and White supremacy: Gendered violence against those who look Muslim. *Dialogues in Human Geography*, 6(2), 186-189.

- Hughes, E. C. (1945). Dilemmas and Contradictions of Status. *American Journal of Sociology*, 50(5), 353-359.
- humanrights.ch & Federal Commission against Racism. (2020). *Incidents racistes recensés par les centres de conseil. Janvier – décembre 2019*. Retrieved from Bern: <https://www.ekr.admin.ch/publikationen/f602/1348.html>
- humanrights.ch & Federal Commission against Racism. (2022). *Incidents racistes recensés par les centres de conseil. Janvier – décembre 2021*. Retrieved from Bern: <https://www.ekr.admin.ch/publications/f602/1368.html>
- Huntington, S. P. (1996). *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Jackson, L. M. (2020). *The psychology of prejudice : from attitudes to social action* (Second ed.). Washington, District of Columbia: American Psychological Association.
- Jasperse, M., Ward, C., & Jose, P. E. (2012). Identity, Perceived Religious Discrimination, and Psychological Well-Being in Muslim Immigrant Women. *Applied Psychology*, 61(2), 250-271.
- Johnson, M. K., Rowatt, W. C., & LaBouff, J. P. (2012). Religiosity and prejudice revisited: In-group favoritism, out-group derogation, or both? *American Psychological Association*, 4(2), 154 –168.
- Johnson, R. B., & Onwuegbuzie, A. J. (2004). Mixed Methods Research: A Research Paradigm Whose Time Has Come. *Educational Researcher*, 33(7), 14–26.
- Kaiser, C. R., & Miller, C. T. (2001). Stop Complaining! The Social Costs of Making Attributions to Discrimination. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 27(2), 254-263.
- Kanas, A., & Müller, K. (2021). Immigrant Women’s Economic Outcomes in Europe: The Importance of Religion and Traditional Gender Roles. *International Migrant Review*, 55(4), 1231–1264.
- Kelley, H. H. (1973). The processes of causal attribution. *American Psychologist*, 28(2), 107–128.
- Khattab, N. (2009). Ethno-religious as a Determinant of Educational and Occupational Attainment in Britain. *Sociology* 43(2), 304-322.
- Khattab, N., & Modood, T. (2015). Both Ethnic and Religious: Explaining Employment Penalties Across 14 Ethno-Religious Groups in the United Kingdom. *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, 54(3), 501–522.
- Kishi, K. (2017). *Assaults against Muslims in U.S. surpass 2001 level*. Pew Research Center. Retrieved from <http://pewrsr.ch/2zMfEGA>
- Koenig, M. (2017). Exploring the micro-politics of recognition. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 40(8), 1261-1270.
- Koopmans, R. (2016). Does assimilation work? Sociocultural determinants of labour market participation of European Muslims. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 42(2), 197-216.
- Kowalski, R. M. (1996). Complaints and complaining: Functions, antecedents, and consequences. *Psychological Bulletin*, 119(2), 179-196.
- Krieger, N. (1999). Embodying inequality: a review of concepts, measures, and methods for studying health consequences of discrimination. *International Journal of Health Service*, 29, 295–352.
- Lamont, M., & Molnár, V. (2002). The Study of Boundaries in the Social Sciences. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 28, 167-195.

- Lamont, M., Welburn, J. S., & Fleming, C. M. (2016). Responses to Discrimination and Social Resilience Under Neoliberalism. In A. Maurer (Ed.), *New Perspectives on Resilience in Socio-Economic Spheres* (pp. 129-157). Wiesbaden: Springer.
- Lancee, B. (2012). *Immigrant Performance in the Labour Market. Bonding and Bridging Social Capital*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Lazarus, R. S., & Folkman, S. (1984). *Stress, Appraisal, and Coping*. New York: Springer.
- Lee, S. A., Gibbons, J. A., Thompson, J. M., & Timani, H. S. (2009). The Islamophobia Scale: Instrument Development and Initial Validation. *The International Journal for the Psychology of Religion*, 19(2), 92-105.
- Leimgruber, V. (2021). *La norme pénale antiraciste dans la pratique judiciaire. Analyse de la jurisprudence relative à l'art. 261 bis CP de 1995 à 2019*. Commission fédérale contre le racisme (CFR). Retrieved from Bern: https://www.ekr.admin.ch/pdf/Studie_Rechtsprechung_F_Web.pdf
- Lindemann, A. (2021). Discrimination against veiled Muslim women in Switzerland: insights from field experts. *Religions*, 12, 1-16.
- Lindemann, A., & Stolz, J. (2014). Use of Islam in the definition of foreign otherness in Switzerland. A comparative analysis of media discourses between 1970 and 2004. *Islamophobia Studies Journal*, 2(1), 44-58.
- Lindemann, A., & Stolz, J. (2018). The Muslim Employment Gap, Human Capital, and Ethno-Religious Penalties: Evidence from Switzerland. *Social Inclusion*, 6(2), 151–161.
- Lindemann, A., & Stolz, J. (2021). Perceived discrimination among Muslims and its correlates. A comparative analysis. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 44(2), 173-194.
- Lindemann, A., & Stolz, J. (2022). To speak out or not to speak out? Exploring the reporting of discrimination among Muslims and Jews in Switzerland. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*.
- Lindenberg, S. (1990). Homo Socio-oeconomicus: The Emergence of a General Model of Man in the Social Sciences. *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, 146(4), 727-748.
- Lindley, J. (2002). Race or religion? The impact of religion on the employment and earnings of Britain's ethnic communities. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 28(3), 427-442.
- Link, B. G., & Phelan, J. C. (2001). Conceptualizing Stigma. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 27, 363-385.
- Livengood, J. S., & Stodolska, M. (2004). The Effects of Discrimination and Constraints Negotiation on Leisure Behavior of American Muslims in the Post-September 11 America. *Journal of Leisure Research*, 36(2), 183-208.
- Maliepaard, M., Gijsberts, M., & Phalet, K. (2015). Islamic gatherings: experiences of discrimination and religious affirmation across established and new immigrant communities. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 38(15), 2635-2651.
- Maxwell, J. A., & Loomis, D. M. (2003). Mixed Methods design: An Alternative Approach. In A. Tashakkorie & C. Teddlie (Eds.), *Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social & Behavioral Research* (pp. 241-271). Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.
- Merton, R. K. (1948). Discrimination and the American creed. In R. M. Maclver (Ed.), *Discrimination and the National Welfare* (pp. 99-126). New York: Harper & Brothers.
- Meuser, M., & Nagel, U. (2009). The Expert Interview and Changes in Knowledge Production. In A. Bogner, B. Littig, & W. Menz (Eds.), *Interviewing experts* (pp. 17-42). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Miles, R., & Brown, M. (2003). *Racism* (Second ed.). London: Routledge.

- Miller, C. T., & Kaiser, C. R. (2001). A Theoretical Perspective on Coping With Stigma. *Journal of Social Issues, 57*(1), 73-92.
- Modood, T. (2015). 'Difference', cultural racism and anti-racism. In P. Werbner & T. Modood (Eds.), *Debating Cultural Hybridity: Multicultural Identities and the Politics of Anti-Racism* (Second ed., pp. 154 - 172). London: Bloomsbury Publishing.
- Mohiuddin, A. (2017). Muslims in Europe: Citizenship, Multiculturalism and Integration. *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 37*(4), 393-412.
- Monnot, C., & stolz, J. (2014). The Diversity of Religious Diversity. Using Census and NCS Methodology in Order to Map and Assess the Religious Diversity of a Whole Country. In G. Giordan & E. Pace (Eds.), *Religious Pluralism. Framing Religious Diversity in the Contemporary World* (pp. 73-91). Cham: Springer.
- Morgan, P. L. (2007). Paradigms Lost and Pragmatism Regained: Methodological Implications of Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Methods. *Journal of Mixed Methods Research, 1*(1), 48-76.
- Morse, J. M. (2003). Principles of Mixed Methods and Multimethod Research Design. In A. Tashakkorie & C. Teddlie (Eds.), *Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social & Behavioral Research* (pp. 189-208). Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.
- Muskat, M., Blackman, D., & Muskat, B. (2012). Mixed Methods: Combining Expert Interviews, Cross-Impact Analysis and Scenario Development. *Electronic Journal of Business Research Methods, 10*(1), 9-21.
- Najib, K., & Hopkins, P. (2019). Veiled Muslim women's strategies in response to Islamophobia in Paris. *Political Geography, 73*, 103-111.
- National Research Council. (2004). *Measuring Racial Discrimination*. Retrieved from Washington, DC: <https://nap.nationalacademies.org/catalog/10887/measuring-racial-discrimination>
- Olson, J. M., Herman, C. P., & Zanna, M. P. (1986). *Relative Deprivation and Social Comparison* (Vol. 4). New York: Psychology Press.
- Padela, A. I., & Heisler, M. (2010). The Association of Perceived Abuse and Discrimination After September 11, 2001, With Psychological Distress, Level of Happiness, and Health Status Among Arab Americans. *American Journal of Public Health, 100*, 284-291.
- Pager, D., & Shepherd, H. (2008). The Sociology of Discrimination: Racial Discrimination in Employment, Housing, Credit, and Consumer Markets. *Annual Review of Sociology, 34*, 181-209.
- Pahud de Mortanges, R. (2018). Entre pluralisation religieuse et sécularisation : l'évolution récente de la reconnaissance étatique des communautés religieuses en Suisse. In I. Becci, C. Monnot, & O. Voirol (Eds.), *Pluralisme et reconnaissance. Face à la diversité religieuse* (pp. 121-131). Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes.
- Paradies, Y., Ben, J., Denson, N., Elias, A., Priest, N., Pieterse, A., Gupta, A., Kelaher, M., Gee, G. (2015). Racism as a Determinant of Health: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis. *PLoS one, 10*(9), e0138511.
- Peek, L. (2005). Becoming Muslim: The Development of a Religious Identity. *Sociology of Religion, 66*(3), 215-242.
- Pettigrew, T. F. (2015). Prejudice and Discrimination. In J. D. Wright (Ed.), *International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences* (Second ed., Vol. 18, pp. 828-833). Oxford: Pergamon.

- Pettigrew, T. F., & Taylor, D. M. (2015). Racial Discrimination. In J. D. Wright (Ed.), *International Encyclopedia for the Social and Behavioral Sciences* (Second ed., Vol. 6, pp. 542-545). Oxford: Pergamon.
- Pew Research Center. (2009). *Mapping the global Muslim population*. Retrieved from Washington: <https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2009/10/Muslimpopulation-1.pdf>
- Pew Research Center. (2017). *Europe's Growing Muslim Population*. Retrieved from Washington: <https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2017/11/FULL-REPORT-FOR-WEB-POSTING.pdf>
- Pew Research Center. (2018). *Being Christian in Western Europe*. Retrieved from Washington: <https://www.pewresearch.org/religion/wp-content/uploads/sites/7/2018/05/Being-Christian-in-Western-Europe-FOR-WEB1.pdf>
- Pew Research Center. (2019). *European Public Opinion Three Decades After the Fall of Communism*. Retrieved from Washington: <https://www.pewresearch.org/global/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/2019/10/Pew-Research-Center-Value-of-Europe-report-FINAL-UPDATED.pdf>
- Phalet, K., Maliepaard, M., Fleischmann, F., & Güngör, D. (2013). The Making and Unmaking of Religious Boundaries. Comparing Turkish and Moroccan Muslim minorities in European Cities. *Comparative Migration Studies*, 1(1), 123–145.
- Phelps, E. S. (1972). The Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism. *The American Economic Review*, 62(4), 659-661.
- Phinney, J. S. (1991). Ethnic Identity and Self-Esteem: A Review and Integration. *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences*, 13(2), 193–208.
- Phinney, J. S., Madden, T., & Santos, L. J. (1998). Psychological Variables as Predictors of Perceived Ethnic Discrimination Among Minority and Immigrant Adolescents. *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, 28(11), 937-953.
- Pierné, G. (2013). Hiring discrimination based on national origin and religious closeness: results from a field experiment in the Paris area. *IZA Journal of Labor Economics*, 2(4).
- Portes, A., & Rumbaut, R. G. (2001). *Legacies. The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Poynting, S., & Noble, G. (2004). *Living with Racism: The experience and reporting by Arab and Muslim Australians of discrimination, abuse and violence since 11 September 2001. Report to The Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission*. Centre for Cultural Research, University of Western Sydney. Retrieved from Sydney: <https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.511.2683&rep=rep1&type=pdf>
- Quillian, L. (2006). New Approaches to Understand Racial Prejudice and Discrimination. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 32, 299-328.
- Riach, P. A., & Rich, J. (2002). Field Experiments of Discrimination in the Market Place. *The Economic Journal*, 112(483), F480-F518.
- Rippy, A. E., & Newman, E. (2006). Perceived Religious Discrimination and its Relationship to Anxiety and Paranoia Among Muslim Americans. *Journal of Muslim Mental Health*, 1(1), 5-20.

- Roth, T. (2020). The role of religion, religiousness and religious participation in the school-to-work transition in Germany. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 46(17), 3580-3602.
- Ruedin, D., & Van Belle, E. (2022). The Extent of Résumé Whitening. *Sociological Research Online*.
- Said, E. W. (1978). *Orientalism*. New York: Pantheon Books.
- Said, E. W. (1981). *Covering Islam: How the Media and the Experts Determine How We See the Rest of the World*. New York: Pantheon.
- Saleem, M., Dubow, E., Lee, F., & Huesmann, R. (2018). Perceived Discrimination and Intergroup Behaviors: The Role of Muslim and American Identity Integration. *Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology*, 49(4), 602-617.
- Sarrasin, O., & Green, E. G. T. (2015). Gender differences in the acceptance of the Muslim headscarf. In K. Faniko, F. Lorenzi-Cioldi, O. Sarrasin, & E. Mayor (Eds.), *Gender and social status: Perspectives from social psychology* (pp. 159–174). New York: Routledge.
- Schiffer, S., & Wagner, C. (2011). Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia – new enemies, old patterns. *Race & Class*, 2(3), 77–84.
- Schmitt, M. T., Branscombe, N. R., Postmes, T., & Garcia, A. (2014). The Consequences of Perceived Discrimination for Psychological Well-Being: A Meta-Analytic Review. *Psychological Bulletin*, 140(4), 921-948.
- Schneuwly Purdie, M., & Lathion, S. (2003). Panorama de l'Islam en Suisse. *Boèce, Revue romande des sciences humaines*, 6, 7-20.
- Schneuwly Purdie, M. (2009). Sociographie de l'Islam en Suisse. In M. Schneuwly Purdie, M. Gianni, & M. Jenny (Eds.), *Musulmans d'aujourd'hui. Identités plurielles en Suisse* (pp. 23-36). Genève: Labor et Fides.
- Schneuwly Purdie, M. (2010). De la diversité à la réduction. Réflexions sur 'l'être musulman' en Suisse. *TANGRAM*, 25, 52-57. Retrieved from Bern: https://www.ekr.admin.ch/pdf/Tangram_25.pdf
- Schönenberger, S., & Fibbi, R. (2011). *Lutte contre les discriminations à l'embauche. Les mesures volontaires mises en oeuvre par les employeurs en Suisse*. Forum suisse pour l'étude des migrations et de la population, Université de Neuchâtel. Retrieved from Neuchâtel: https://www.edi.admin.ch/dam/edi/fr/dokumente/FRB/Broschueren/Arbeitswelt/diskriminierungsbekehrungbeiderpersonalrekrutierungkurzfassung.pdf.download.pdf/lutte_contre_lesdiscriminationsalembaucheresume.pdf
- Schütz, H., & Six, B. (1996). How strong is the relationship between prejudice and discrimination? A meta-analytic answer. *International Journal of Intercultural Relations*, 20(3-4), 441-462.
- Semati, M. (2010). Islamophobia, Culture and Race in the Age of Empire. *Cultural Studies*, 24(2), 256-275.
- Shammas, D. (2015). Underreporting Discrimination Among Arab American and Muslim American Community College Students: Using Focus Groups to Unravel the Ambiguities Within the Survey Data. *Journal of Mixed Methods Research*, 1–25.
- Sheridan, L. P. (2006). Islamophobia Pre- and Post-September 11th, 2001. *Journal of Interpersonal Violence*, 21(3), 317-336.
- Sibley, C. G., & Duckitt, J. (2008). Personality and Prejudice: A Meta-Analysis and Theoretical Review. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 12(3), 248-279.

- Simon, P. (2005). The measurement of racial discrimination: the policy use of statistics. *International Social Sciences Journal*, 57(183), 9-25.
- Simon, P. (2021). Le genre de l'islamophobie : les musulman.es face aux discriminations en France. In E. Lépinard, O. Sarrasin, & L. Gianettoni (Eds.), *Genre et islamophobie. Discriminations, préjugés et représentations en Europe* (pp. 143-156). Lyon: ENS Éditions.
- Simon, P., & Tiberj, V. (2013). *Sécularisation ou regain religieux: la religiosité des immigrés et de leurs descendants*. Document de travail 196. Institut national d'études démographiques. Retrieved from Aubervilliers: <https://www.ined.fr/fr/publications/editions/document-travail/secularisation-regain-religieux/#tabs-2>
- Smith, H. J., Pettigrew, T. F., Pippin, G. M., & Bialosiewicz, S. (2012). Relative deprivation: a theoretical and meta-analytic review. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 16(3), 203-232.
- Steele, C. M. (1997). A threat in the air: How stereotypes shape intellectual identity and performance. *American Psychologist*, 52(6), 613-629.
- Steele, C. M., & Aronson, J. (1995). Stereotype Threat and the Intellectual Test Performance of African Americans. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 69(5), pp. 797-811.
- Steinmann, J.-P. (2019). The paradox of integration: why do higher educated new immigrants perceive more discrimination in Germany? *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 45(9), 1377-1400.
- Stolz, J. (2005). Explaining Islamophobia. A Test of Four Theories Based on the Case of a Swiss City. *Swiss Journal of Sociology*, 31, 547-566.
- Stolz, J., Amiotte-Suchet, L., & Fortin, D. (2009). *Recensement des appartenances religieuses en Suisse. Nomenclature des religions et questions concernant l'appartenance religieuse dans le cadre du relevé structurel 2010. Rapport final*. Observatoire des religions en Suisse. Retrieved from Lausanne: https://www.unil.ch/files/live/sites/issr/files/shared/3_Recherches/Sociologie/Mandat_OFS_2009/20090630_MandatOFS-RapportFinal.pdf
- Stolz, J., & Senn, J. (2021). Des générations à la foi décroissante : religion et sécularisation en Suisse 1930-2020. *Social Change in Switzerland*, 27.
- Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), *The social psychology of intergroup relations* (pp. 33-37). Monterey: Brooks/Cole.
- Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In S. Worchel & W. Austin (Eds.), *Psychology of intergroup relations* (pp. 33-48). Chicago: Nelson-Hall.
- Tashakkori, A., & Teddlie, C. (1998). *Mixed Methodology: Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches* (Vol. 46). Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.
- Taylor, D. M., Wright, S. C., Moghaddam, F. M., & Lalonde, R. N. (1990). The Personal/Group Discrimination Discrepancy: Perceiving My Group, But Not Myself, to Be a Target for Discrimination. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 16(2), 254-262.
- Teddlie, C., & Tashakkori, A. (2003). Major Issues and Controversies in the Use of Mixed Methods in the Social and Behavioral Sciences. In A. Tashakkorie & C. Teddlie (Eds.), *Handbook of Mixed Methods in Social & Behavioral Research* (pp. 3- 50). Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications.

- Thaler, R. H., Sunstein, C. R., & Balz, J. P. (2013). Choice Architecture. In E. Shafir (Ed.), *The Behavioral Foundations of Public Policy* (pp. 428-439). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Thames, A. D., Hinkin, C. H., Byrd, D. A., Bilder, R. M., Duff, K. J., Mindt, M. R., Arentoft, A., Streiff, V. (2013). Effects of Stereotype Threat, Perceived Discrimination, and Examiner Race on Neuropsychological Performance: Simple as Black and White? *Journal of the International Neuropsychological Society*, 19(5), 583-593.
- The Runnymede Trust. (1997). *Islamophobia : a challenge for us all*. Retrieved from London: <https://mcislamofobia.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/Islamophobia-a-challenge-for-us-all-without-cartoons-1.pdf>
- The Runnymede Trust. (2017). *Islamophobia. Still a challenge for us all*. Retrieved from London: <https://www.runnymedetrust.org/uploads/Islamophobia%20Report%202018%20FINAL.pdf>
- Trittler, S. (2019). Consequences of religious and secular boundaries among the majority population for perceived discrimination among Muslim minorities in Western Europe. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 45(7), 1127-1147.
- Tummala-Narra, P., & Claudius, M. (2013). Perceived Discrimination and Depressive Symptoms Among Immigrant-Origin Adolescents. *Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology*, 19(3), 257-269.
- United Nations - Commission on Human Rights. (1949). *The Main Types and Causes of Discrimination (memorandum submitted by the Secretary-General)*. Retrieved from New York: <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1638125>
- Valfort, M.-A. (2018). *Anti-Muslim Discrimination in France. Evidence from a Field Experiment in the Labour Market*. Discussion Paper Serie, n°11417, IZA Institute of Labor Economics. Retrieved from Paris: <https://docs.iza.org/dp11417.pdf>
- van Doorn, M., Scheepers, P., & Dagevos, J. (2013). Explaining the Integration Paradox Among Small Immigrant Groups in the Netherlands. *Journal of International Migration and Integration*, 14, 381-400.
- Vatter, A., & Danaci, D. (2010). Mehrheitstyrannie durch Volksentscheide? Zum Spannungsverhältnis zwischen direkter Demokratie und Minderheitenschutz. *Polit Vierteljahresschr*, 51, 205-222.
- Verkuyten, M. (2016). The Integration Paradox: Empiric Evidence From the Netherlands. *American Behavioral Scientist*, 60(5-6), 583-596.
- Voas, D., & Fleischmann, F. (2012). Islam Moves West: Religious Change in the First and Second Generations. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 38(1), pp. 525-545.
- Wäckerlig, O. (2020). Islamophobia in Switzerland. National report 2019. In F. Hafez & E. Bayrakli (Eds.), *European Islamophobia Report 2019* (pp. 765-790). Istanbul: SETA.
- Weichselbaumer, D. (2020). Multiple Discrimination against Female Immigrants Wearing Headscarves. *ILR Review*, 73(3), 600-627.
- Widner, D., & Chicoine, S. (2011). It's All in the Name: Employment Discrimination Against Arab Americans. *Sociological Forum*, 26(4), 806-823.
- Williams, D. R., Neighbors, H. W., & Jackson, J. S. (2008). Racial/Ethnic Discrimination and Health: Findings From Community Studies. *American Journal of Public Health*, 93, 200-208.
- Williams, D. R., & Williams-Morris, R. (2000). Racism and mental health: the African American experience. *Ethnicity and Health*, 5(3-4), 243-268.

- Wilson, F. D., Tienda, M., & Wu, L. (1995). Race and Unemployment: Labor Market Experiences of Black and White Men, 1968-1988 *Work and Occupations*, 22(3), 245-270.
- Wimmer, A. (2008). The Making and Unmaking of Ethnic Boundaries: A Multilevel Process Theory. *American Journal of Sociology*, 113(4), 970-1022.
- Wimmer, A. (2013). *Ethnic Boundary Making: Institutions, Power, Networks*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Witte, N. (2018). Responses to stigmatisation and boundary making: destigmatisation strategies of Turks in Germany. *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 44(9), 1425-1443.
- Yazdiha, H. (2019). Exclusion through acculturation? Comparing first- and second-generation European Muslims' perceptions of discrimination across four national contexts. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 42(5), 782-800.
- Yendell, A., & Huber, S. (2020). Negative views of Islam in Switzerland with special regard to religiosity as an explanatory factor. *Zeitschrift für Religion, Gesellschaft und Politik*, 4, 81-103.
- Young, R. J. C. (2012). Edward Said: Opponent of Postcolonial Theory. In T. Doring & M. U. Stein (Eds.), *Edward Said's Translocations Essays in Secular Criticism* (pp. 23-43). New York: Routledge.
- Zainiddinov, H. (2016). Racial and ethnic differences in perceptions of discrimination among Muslim Americans. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 39(15), 2701-2721.
- Zschirnt, E. (2019). Equal Outcomes, but Different Treatment – Subtle Discrimination in Email Responses From a Correspondence Test in Switzerland. *Swiss Journal of Sociology*, 45(2), 143-160.
- Zschirnt, E., & Fibbi, R. (2019). *Do Swiss Citizens of Immigrant Origin Face Hiring Discrimination in the Labour Market?* Working paper n°20. The National Centres of Competence in Research. Retrieved from Bern: <https://nccr-onthemove.ch/publications/do-swiss-citizens-of-immigrant-origin-face-hiring-discrimination-in-the-labour-market/>
- Zwysen, W., Di Stasio, V., & Heath, A. F. (2021). Ethnic Penalties and Hiring Discrimination: Comparing Results from Observational Studies with Field Experiments in the UK. *Sociology*, 55(2), 263-282.

