3. Climate change and security within the United Nations: Insights from the UN Environment Programme and the UN Security Council

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The 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm Conference) took place in Stockholm, Sweden, with the resulting 1972 Declaration of the UN Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm Declaration).[1] The conference drew attention to the capacity of humankind to transform the global environment and to the key role of international organizations to coordinate international environmental cooperation. While advocating environmental protection and economic and social development, the Stockholm Declaration called for 'extensive cooperation' (preamble) 'through multilateral or bilateral arrangements' (principle 24) with international organizations playing 'a coordinated, efficient and dynamic role' (principle 25).[2] It therefore laid the foundations of the global agenda that has guided the international environmental governance system since then.[3]

This chapter explores how the UN has cultivated the mandate inherited from the Stockholm Conference, focusing on climate change and the mounting sense of planetary urgency tied to a rapidly warming world. As concerns over the adverse effects of climate change are growing, climate change is increasingly linked to questions of security, notably within UN arenas. International

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[1] Conca, K., *An Unfinished Foundation: The United Nations and Global Environmental Governance*, 1st edition (Oxford University Press: Oxford, 2015); UN, Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 5–16 June 1972, A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1, 1973; and UN, 'Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment', Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 5–16 June 1972, A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1, 1973.

[2] UN, 'Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment' (note 1).

[3] Conca, K. and Dabelko, G., *Green Planet Blues: Environmental Politics from Stockholm to Johannesburg*, 3rd edition (Westview Press: Boulder, CO, 2004).

relations scholars have analysed the growing interest of inter-national organizations in the interlinkages among the environment, climate change and security in two primary ways. Studies mostly grounded in the liberal institutionalist tradition have explored how climate and security concerns affect the design, mandates and legitimacy of institutional arrangements. A more constructivist scholarship has also formulated critical questions about how climate change is framed as a security issue, and to what effect.[4] This chapter takes stock of this literature and offers a double analytical lens by combining securitization and climatization theories. It draws on both concepts to analyse the integration of climate change into the UN security agenda on the one hand, and of security concerns into the UN environmental and climate mandate on the other hand. To do so, this chapter examines two UN bodies: the UN Environment Programme (UNEP) and the UN Security Council.

UNEP was established in 1972 as a result of the Stockholm Conference. It has been the main UN entity in charge of promoting global environmental governance since the mid 1970s. It has been described as the 'leading global environmental authority' that sets the global environmental agenda, facilitates the adoption of multilateral agreements and coordinates major environmental assessments to bridge the gap between science and policy.[5] While its mandate is mostly oriented towards norm setting instead of operational on-the-ground activities, UNEP has been increasingly involved at the field level since the late 1990s, especially in the context of its post-conflict environmental assessments. Since then the programme has looked into the interlinkages between the environment and conflict.[6] UNEP began to extensively explore the links between climate change and security in 2009 when it conducted a desk study on the Sahel region at the request of the UN secretary-general's special adviser on

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[4] For a summary of both trends see e.g. Dellmuth, L. M. et al., 'Intergovernmental organizations and climate security: Advancing the research agenda', *Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change*, vol. 9, no. 1 (2018); and Krampe, F. and Mobjörk, M., 'Responding to climate-related security risks: Reviewing regional organizations in Asia and Africa', *Current Climate Change Reports*, vol. 4, no. 4 (2018), pp. 330–37.

[5] UNEP, 'Why does UN Environment Programme matter', [n.d.].

[6] Maertens, L., 'Depoliticisation as a securitising move: The case of the United Nations Environment Programme', *European Journal of International Security*, vol. 3, no. 3 (2018), pp. 344–63; and UNEP, 'Climate change and security risks', [n.d.].

conflict.[7] UNEP is now also actively involved in the Climate Security Mechanism (CSM) that it established in 2018, together with the UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs (UNDPPA).

The UN Security Council is the UN organ responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security. It has 15 member states, 5 of which have a permanent seat and veto power (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States). It has broadened its agenda since the end of the cold war to include questions of human security and has expanded the range of actions of peacekeeping operations. In this context the Security Council has been increasingly debating the role of natural resources in specific conflict settings.[8] Climate change has also featured in Security Council deliberations since 2007.

Although the UN system cannot be reduced to these two entities, this chapter offers insights into member states' positions through analysis of the UN Security Council and into UN staff actions through the study of UNEP publications. The analysis covers the time period 2007–20, building on the literature and previous work on both institutions.[9] Empirically, the chapter proposes a qualitative content analysis of different types of documents investigating how climate change and security are associated with each other. For the Security Council, the official records of open debates and online information regarding informal discussions organized under the Security Council umbrella dedicated to climate change are analysed. These include the five official open debates and some Arria-formula

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[7] Maertens, L., 'The United Nations Environment Programme', ed. Trombetta, M. J., *Handbook of Climate Change and International Security* (Edward Elgar Publishing: forthcoming).

[8] Aldinger, P., Bruch, C. and Yazykova, S., 'Revisiting securitization: An empirical analysis of environment and natural resource provisions in United Nations Security Council Resolutions, 1946–2016', eds Swain, A. and Öjendal, J., *Routledge Handbook of Environmental Conflict and Peacebuilding* (Routledge: New York, 2018).

[9] Conca, K., Thwaites, J. and Lee, G., 'Climate change and the UN Security Council: Bully pulpit or bull in a China shop?', *Global Environmental Politics*, vol. 17, no. 2 (2017), pp. 1–20; Hardt, J. and Viehoff, A., 'A climate for change in the UNSC? Member states' approaches to the climate-security nexus', Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy Research Report #005 (2020); Maertens, L., 'Climatizing the UN Security Council', *International Politics* (2021); Scott, S. V. and Ku, C. (eds), *Climate Change and the UN Security Council* (Edward Elgar Publishing: Cheltenham, 2018); Hardt, J. N., *Environmental Security in the Anthropocene: Assessing Theory and Practice* (Routledge: London, 2018); and Maertens (note 6).

meetings dedicated to the security implications of climate change.[10] For UNEP, publications such as policy reports, desk studies and online content that make reference to security and climate change are studied. These official documents are listed on the UNEP web page dedicated to its work on climate change and security risks.[11]

The analysis in this chapter shows a progressive securitization of climate change within UNEP publications and UN Security Council debates, and identifies dominant approaches to the understanding of security in relation to climate change. This chapter then presents the parallel process of climatization, through which climate politics expand and transform UN security practices. It concludes with some remarks and situates the findings in the context of the Anthropocene, as described by earth system sciences.[12]

I. The multiple meanings of security in the context of climate change

Security is a contested concept in international relations. Next to the traditional security concept, tied to states and military conflicts, security studies have offered diverse interpretations, conceptions and analytical tools. Connecting security to the environment and climate change has opened up important debates. A large interest has been to critically examine how and under what circumstances climate change may increase the risks for violent conflict.[13] In addition to analysing different forms of security challenges induced by climate change, scholars have also focused on the possible effects of framing and understanding security in relation to climate change.[14] These approaches share the assumption that security is socially

[10] Arria-formula meetings are informal gatherings where member states can debate controversial issues and explore new items for the Security Council's agenda.

[11] See UNEP (note 6).

[12] Lenton, T. M. et al., 'Climate tipping points—too risky to bet against', *Nature*, vol. 575, no. 28 (2019), pp. 592–95; and Steffen, W. et al., 'Trajectories of the earth system in the Anthropocene', *Proceedings of the Natural Academy of Sciences of the United States of America*, vol. 115, no. 33 (2018), pp. 8252–59.

[13] See e.g. Hardt (note 9); and Sharifi, A., Simangan, D. and Kaneko, S., 'Three decades of research on climate change and peace: A bibliometric analysis', *Sustainability Science* (2020).

[14] McDonald, M., 'Securitization and the construction of security', *European Journal of International Relations*, vol. 14, no. 4 (2008), pp. 563–87; and von Lucke, F., *The Securitization of Climate Change and the Governmentalisation of Security* (Palgrave MacMillan: 2020).

constructed and that security framings ultimately shape the world.[15] Referring to the traditional security concept focused on the state, several scholars have highlighted the risk of militarization and the possible adverse effects of applying a security logic dominated by violence, enemies and antagonism.[16] Other scholars have pushed for a positive understanding of security based on preventing threats to human security and/or to ecological security.[17] These multiple understandings of the links between climate change and security have grown into a rich and diverse body of literature.[18] Like this volume and this chapter, some of the recent concerns in the literature call for revisiting security in the context of the Anthropocene.[19]

To grasp the meanings of security in relation to climate change, we approach the concept as an analytical category, for which we draw in particular on the work of Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap De Wilde.[20] They theorized the process of securitization and thereby offered an important basis for studying the transformations of policy problems into matters of security. In addition, their analytical framework helps detect the meanings of security by unpacking agency and political measures behind the security threats. This present chapter draws on their work and on additional approaches in critical security studies.[21] Building on existing literature on the security framing of the

[15] Aradau, C. et al., *Critical Security Methods: New Frameworks for Analysis* (Routledge: London, 2014); and Peoples, C. and Vaughan-Williams, N., *Critical Security: An Introduction*, 1st edition (Routledge: London, 2010).

[16] Floyd, R., 'The environmental security debate and its significance for climate change', *International Spectator*, vol. 43, no. 3 (2008), pp. 51–65; and Trombetta, M. J., 'Environmental security and climate change: Analysing the discourse', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, vol. 21, no. 4 (2008), pp. 585–602.

[17] Barnett, J. and Adger, N. W., 'Climate change, human security and violent conflict', *Political Geography*, vol. 26, no. 6 (2007), pp. 639–55; Dalby, S., 'Rethinking geopolitics: Climate security in the Anthropocene', *Global Policy*, vol. 5, no. 1 (2014), pp. 1–9; and McDonald, M., 'Climate change and security: Towards ecological security?', *International Theory*, vol. 10, no. 2 (2018), pp. 153–80.

[18] See e.g. Trombetta, M. J., *Handbook of Climate Change and International Security* (Edward Elgar Publishing: forthcoming).

[19] Harrington, C. and Shearing, C., *Security in the Anthropocene: Reflections on Safety and Care* (transcript Verlag: Bielefeld, 2017); Hardt (note 9); and Dalby, S., *Anthropocene Geopolitics: Globalization, Security, Sustainability* (University of Ottawa Press: Ottawa, 2020).

[20] Buzan, B., Wæver, O. and De Wilde, J., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis* (Lynne Rienner Publishers: Boulder, CO, 1998).

[21] We are aware of the limits and criticism addressed at the Copenhagen School. We more broadly draw on critical security studies and international political sociology: Booth, K., *Theory of World Security* (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2007);

environment and of climate change, the chapter empirically assesses the meanings of security in UNEP publications and UN Security Council debates.[22] It first investigates the different logics of securitization of climate change by focusing on agenda-setting strategies and institutionalization attempts. In a second step it addresses the following questions in relation to the empirical material: (*a*) who/what needs to be secured?, (*b*) what are the major threats and related responses? and (*c*) to what extent, and how, is the Anthropocene referenced?

Climate change in the UN Environment Programme and the UN Security Council: Security for whom and how?

By applying an analytical lens building on critical security studies to the UN Security Council debates and UNEP publications, we observe different logics of securitization in both institutions. At the Security Council, several states have consistently pushed for the securitization of climate change by organizing open debates and informal Arria-formula meetings since 2007. Five open debates were organized by the UK (2007), Germany (2011 and 2020), Sweden (2018) and the Dominican Republic (2019). The increasing efforts to securitize climate change have cumulated into a joint initiative by a coalition of 10 member states claiming the necessity to address climate-related security risks within the Security Council.[23] Opponents to the securitization of climate change within the Security Council argue it could lead to further militarization, depoliticization, co-optation of climate politics to reinforce power dynamics, duplication of tasks within the UN, the potential to overrule sovereign decision making, and inadequate and simplified responses to the interlinked climate change–security threats. Another debate concerns the question of whether the Security Council should develop a proactive or reactive

McDonald (note 14), p. 568; and Bigo, D., 'International political sociology', ed. Williams, P., *Security Studies: An Introduction* (Routledge: London, 2010).

[22] McDonald (note 14); McDonald, M., 'Whose security? Ethics and the referent', eds Nyman, J. and Burke, A., *Ethical Security Studies: A New Research Agenda* (Routledge: New York, 2016), pp. 32–45; and von Lucke (note 14).

[23] Permanent Mission of the Federal Republic of Germany to the UN, 'Joint statement by 10 members of the UN Security Council (Belgium, Dominican Republic, Estonia, France, Germany, Niger, Tunisia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, United Kingdom, Vietnam) on their joint initiative to address climate-related security risks, June 22, 2020', 22 June 2020.

agenda on climate-related security risks. That is how, despite the multiple securitizing moves, the only international institution in charge of maintaining international peace and security has not officially recognized climate change as a cross-cutting challenge permanently relevant to its agenda.

UNEP has been actively involved in the securitization of environmental issues since 2001, when it co-established the Environment and Security Initiative (ENVSEC).[24] On climate change more specifically, a 2011 UNEP report on the effects of climate change on livelihood, migration and conflict in the Sahel marked an important landmark in terms of agenda setting.[25] Since then UNEP has increasingly addressed the links between climate change and security. Together with other UN entities, UNEP successfully participated in the securitization process of climate change in the broader UN context, leading to the establishment, in 2018, of the first and only UN institutionalized arrangement fully dedicated to climate security: the CSM.

In terms of security meanings, UNEP and the UN Security Council have adopted similar ways to articulate climate change with security. Exploring the question of *who is secured*, we detect overlapping approaches related to national, international and human security in both institutions.[26] Aside from the determination of these entities as referent objects that are threatened and need protecting, a strong geographical bias on crisis-affected countries and communities and on small island developing states is palpable. This can be seen in 2018 and 2019 Security Council debates and the focus on Lake Chad, small island states and 'fragile countries', which are, according to the UN deputy secretary-general: 'in danger in becoming stuck in a cycle of conflict and climate disaster'.[27] UNEP shows a similar geographical focus with its report on the Sahel, a four-year planned project on

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[24] See Hardt (note 9) for a detailed analysis of ENVSEC and UNEP involvement.

[25] UNEP, *Livelihood Security: Climate Change, Migration and Conflict in the Sahel* (UNEP: Geneva, 2011).

[26] Scott and Ku (note 9); and Droege, S., 'Addressing the risks of climate change. What role for the UN Security Council?', SWP Research Paper 6, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, June 2020.

[27] UN, Security Council, 8307th meeting, S/PV.8307, 11 July 2018.

Nepal and Sudan and activities in other countries and regions of the Global South.[28] The UNEP executive director stated that:

Climate change is now impacting every corner of the globe. In many regions, severe droughts and rising temperatures are leading to food insecurity and loss of livelihoods—threatening to reverse hard-won development gains. In fragile and conflict-affected settings, limited governance, political instability and violence leave communities particularly ill-equipped to cope with a changing climate. This in turn can compound existing tensions and exacerbate the complex emergencies we are witnessing today in the Sahel, the Middle East and Central America.[29]

UNEP and the UN Security Council focus predominantly on the Global South, despite acknowledging the global nature of climate change risks.

This analysis also demonstrates that conflict is the consistent and dominant security threat associated with climate change in both institutions.[30] In the UN Security Council context, the presidential statement in 2011 noted 'possible security implications of climate change' can be 'drivers of conflict'.[31] The impacts of phenomena related to climate change on conflicts appear in several Security Council resolutions and field missions since 2017, although an official recognition of climate change as a threat to international peace and security remains overdue. In addition to conflict, we also find climate change is framed as a security threat via its detrimental effects on resilience, vulnerability and development, as well as in relation to migration. Statelessness as a threat resulting from climate change is described on several occasions. For example, during a 2020 Security Council debate, Coral Pasisi (director of the Sustainable Pacific Consultancy Niue) stated: 'There can be no greater security threat

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[28] UNEP (note 25), p. 72; UNEP (note 6); UNEP, 'Climate change and security: Strengthening resilience to climate-fragility risks', [n.d.]; and UNEP, UN Women, UNDP and UNDPPA/UN Peacebuilding Support Office, *Gender, Climate & Security: Sustaining Inclusive Peace on the Frontlines of Climate Change* (UNEP, UN Women, UNDP and UNDPPA/UN Peacebuilding Support Office: 2020).

[29] UNEP, UN Women, UNDP and UNDPPA/Peacebuilding Support Office (note 28), p. 7.

[30] See Conca, K., 'Is there a role for the UN Security Council on climate change?', *Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development*, vol. 61, no. 1 (2019), pp. 4–15; and Scott and Ku (note 9).

[31] UN, Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, S/PRST/2011/15, 20 July 2011.

than the potential loss of one's entire nation and its jurisdictions established under international law.'[32]

While most solutions to climate-induced security threats are presented as climate policies (see section II), some actors also push for traditional military security responses. For instance, in a 2019 UN Security Council open debate, the representative of Indonesia suggested: 'One concrete step that we can take is to better equip our peacekeepers with the capacity to undertake military operations other than war—to carry out not only peacekeeping operations but also climate peace missions.'[33]

Focusing on references to the Anthropocene, we observe a multi-plication of references to notions of complex interconnectedness within the use of, for example, 'climate-related security risks'.[34] However, the term 'Anthropocene' has been absent in UN debates on the climate and security nexus.[35] Both institutions do not consider the new meanings of (in)security threats described by earth system sciences in the context of the human–nature entangled dynamic world of the Anthropocene.[36]

II. Approaching security through climate framing

The social construction of environmental problems has been subject to ample research and has informed studies on climate politics and governance. The concept of climatization has been developed in this field, and describes the social processes through which a given issue or actor is drawn into the climate domain and made relevant to climate policies.[37] For Stefan Aykut, Jean Foyer and Édouard

[32] UN, Security Council, Statement by the director of the Sustainable Pacific Consultancy Niue, Coral Pasisi, Annex 3, S/2020/751, 30 July 2020.

[33] UN, Security Council, 8451st meeting, S/PV.8451, 25 Jan. 2019.

[34] UN, Security Council (note 27).

[35] The term 'Anthropocene' does not appear in UN Security Council documents and debates and is found on some occasions only on the UNEP website; see UNEP, 'Policy statement by Achim Steiner, UN under-secretary-general and UNEP executive director', 27 June 2014.

[36] Hardt (note 9), p. 164.

[37] Aykut, S. C., Foyer, J. and Morena, E. (eds), *Globalising the Climate: COP21 and the Climatisation of Global Debates* (Routledge: 2017); Aykut, S. C. and Maertens, L., 'The climatization of global politics', *International Politics* (forthcoming); Maertens, L. and Baillat, A., 'The partial climatisation of migrations, security and conflict', eds Aykut, S. C., Foyer, J. and Morena, E., *Globalising the Climate: COP21 and the Climatisation of Global Debates* (Routledge: 2017); Oels, A., 'From "securitization" of climate change

Morena climate change is increasingly becoming the dominant frame through which other issues and forms of global governance are mediated and hierarchized. Such a climatization process rests on the work of numerous actors, which translate issues and concerns using a climate lens.[38] Work on climatization remains rare in critical security studies, which have largely focused on the securitization of climate change. Maria Julia Trombetta approaches similar questions by illustrating how the securitization of environmental issues transforms security practices.[39] Security actors integrate new logics of action inspired by traditional environmental policies such as preventive actions and non-confrontational responses. These conclusions echo Angela Oels's definition of the climatization of security: '"Climatization" of the security field means that existing security practices are applied to the issue of climate change and that new practices from the field of climate policy are introduced into the security field.'[40]

This section builds on this emerging trend in the literature to analyse the way the UN approaches the interlinkages between climate change and security. Climatization is a definitional process that extends the realm of climate politics. Approaching UN action and discourse in terms of climatization means exploring three interrelated developments, which structure the analysis below: (*a*) the way security issues are understood as having climate origins and security actors as having responsibilities in the climate crisis, (*b*) how climate change actors—climate experts, climate activists and so-called climate victims, among others—extend their sphere of influence and jurisdiction and (*c*) how climate-oriented policies and practices are considered relevant to fix a security problem. The concept of climatization therefore sheds light on other mechanisms through which climate change and security can be linked, without implying domination of the security logic. It draws attention to how security issues are framed and understood, who acquires a legitimate voice to express their views on the interlinkages between climate

to "climatization" of the security field: Comparing three theoretical perspectives', eds Scheffran, J. et al., *Climate Change, Human Security and Violent Conflict*, Hexagon Series on Human and Environmental Security and Peace, vol. 8 (Springer: Berlin, 2012), pp. 185–205.

[38] Aykut, Foyer and Morena (note 37).

[39] Trombetta (note 16).

[40] Oels (note 37), p. 197.

change and security, and which answers are suggested to respond to the identified problems.

Climatizing moves at the UN Environment Programme and the UN Security Council

The analysis of UNEP publications and UN Security Council debates reveals an increasing climatization of security within the UN. UNEP has signalled the climate origins of security issues with a focus on the climate causes of human insecurity and of political destabilization in two ways since the late 2000s. First, it has contributed to milestone publications and debates advancing such a framework. For instance, UNEP provided 'technical inputs to the drafting' of the 2009 UN secretary-general's report entitled 'Climate change and its possible security implications', which defines climate change as a 'threat multiplier'.[41] UNEP also brought 'substantive contributions' to the report *A New Climate for Peace* commissioned by the Group of 7 (G7), which identifies fragility risks rooted in climate change.[42] Moreover, the executive director of UNEP spoke during the second Security Council open debate on climate change, which led to the adoption of a presidential statement recognizing that climate change impacts may drive conflicts.[43]

Second, UNEP has (co-)published reports and guidance notes in which the role of climate change as a source of insecurity is emphasized. For instance, in its first desk study on climate change and security, dedicated to the Sahel region, UNEP concludes:

The impacts of changing climatic conditions on the availability of natural resources, coupled with factors such as population growth, weak governance and land tenure challenges, have led to increased competition over scarce natural resources—most notably fertile land and water—and resulted in tensions and conflicts between communities and livelihood groups.[44]

A two-page document presenting UNEP's four-year project supported by the European Union on climate change and security

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[41] UNEP (note 6); and UN, General Assembly, 'Climate change and its possible security implications', Report of the Secretary-General, A/64/350, 11 Sep. 2009.

[42] UNEP (note 6); and Rüttinger, L. et al., *A New Climate for Peace* (Adelphi: Berlin, 2015).

[43] UNEP (note 6); and UN, Security Council (note 31).

[44] UNEP (note 25), p. 7.

(2017–21) asserts: 'Climate change worsens existing social, economic and environmental risks that can fuel unrest and potentially result in conflict.'[45] The CSM, co-sponsored by UNEP, proposes similar views, stressing 'the interaction of climate change with socio-economic, political or demographic factors'.[46] The emphasis on overlapping factors challenges deterministic understandings of the security implications of climate change, which have been heavily criticized.[47] Indeed, as seen in the chosen excerpts mentioned above, UNEP does not single out climate change as the sole source of conflicts but shows how insecurities are rooted in a number of socio-economic causes, including climate change, supporting 'policymakers to integrate a climate lens into peacebuilding/stabilization policies, and a peacebuilding lens into climate adaptation policies'.[48]

Many member states of the UN Security Council have expressed similar concerns on 'climate-related security risks'.[49] While insecurities are presented as having potential climate origins, states present the Security Council as having a responsibility to manage the climate crisis. Member states and other invited speakers have called on the Security Council to take responsibility in the global climate crisis since 2007. The UN under-secretary-general for political and peacebuilding affairs, who opened the 2019 official debate, stated: 'Given the critical role and responsibility of the Security Council, I am encouraged by today's debate. It signals our willingness to establish a shared understanding of the impact of climate-related security risks on international peace and security.' Following her statement, several member states also referred to the Security Council's responsibility and obligations.[50] UNEP discourse and UN Security Council debates show signs of a climatization process in which security issues are designated as having roots in the climate

[45] UNEP, 'Climate change and security: Strengthening resilience to climate-fragility risks' (note 28).

[46] UN, CSM, *Toolbox: Briefing Note* (UN: New York, 2020), p. 1.

[47] Ide, T., 'The dark side of environmental peacebuilding', *World Development*, vol. 127 (2020), pp. 3–4.

[48] UNEP, 'Climate change and security: Strengthening resilience to climate-fragility risks' (note 28). A CSM staff member emphasized their approach to climate risks as 'not a deterministic formula': UN System Staff College webinar, 'Climate security for sustaining peace (Part 1)', 24 Apr. 2020.

[49] UN, Security Council, 'Arria formula: "Preparing for security implications of rising temperatures"', 15 Dec. 2017, p. 2.

[50] UN, Security Council (note 33).

crisis and security actors as having responsibilities in mitigating the crisis beyond security implications.

The process of climatization also unfolds when the UN assigns an increasingly important role to climate-oriented experts, climate activists and (often self-designed) climate victims in discussions over security. Here again, the parallel analysis of UNEP and the UN Security Council shows complementary developments. Experts professing their knowledge on climate change and climate advocacy networks and non-governmental organizations are invited as guest briefers at the Security Council.[51] For example, UNEP and the World Meteorological Organization intervened at the Security Council for the first time in their histories, in 2011 (through its executive director) and in 2019 (through its chief scientist), respectively. In addition, the director of the Climate Action Network was invited to brief the 2013 Arria-formula session, the co-founder and president of the Center for Climate & Security presented during the 2017 Arria-formula meeting and the director of SIPRI intervened during the April 2020 Arria-formula meeting along with the president/chief executive officer of the non-governmental organization International Crisis Group.[52] Climate science, especially the reports of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, is also referred to in member states' interventions during the different debates.

Similarly, experts are active in support of the Group of Friends on climate and security.[53] 'Expertise' is of vital importance in the work of the CSM, an institutionalized recognition of the UN climate security agenda that 'provides the United Nations with a small but dedicated capacity to connect and leverage existing resources and expertise across the system in an attempt to address climate-related security risks more systematically'.[54] The CSM has the goal 'to strengthen the capacity of the UN to address the interlinkages between climate

[51] Extending Boswell's definition of expert knowledge, we approach expertise as the forms of codified knowledge produced by or involving specialists who are recognized to hold skills and experience; in other words, we focus on situated expertise that can be held by many actors professing their own knowledge on climate change and climate change security risks. Boswell, C., 'The role of expert knowledge in international organizations', ed. Littoz-Monnet, A., *The Politics of Expertise in International Organizations: How International Bureaucracies Produce and Mobilize Knowledge* (Routledge: New York, 2017), pp. 19–36.

[52] Permanent mission of France to the UN in New York, 'Event on climate and security risks', Meeting of the UN Security Council in Arria formula, 22 Apr. 2020.

[53] Hardt and Viehoff (note 9), p. 11.

[54] UN, CSM (note 46), footnote 1.

change, peace and security' and to provide a platform for dialogue and exchange on this topic within the UN system.[55] It works in close collaboration with a network of actors at the science–policy interface, consisting mostly of think tanks, research institutes and scientific associations.[56] In other words, the climatization of security attributes relevance to climate-oriented expertise and advocacy in the security field.

The climatization of the UN Security Council also provides a stage for so-called climate change victims, understood as states or communities with a perceived and claimed critical exposure to the adverse effects of climate change. During open debates, states with high vulnerability to climate change, such as Bangladesh or Pacific small island developing countries, requested to participate, sometimes through a spokesperson. For example, in 2018 the representative of the Maldives addressed the Security Council on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island States. The statements of such states emphasized the legitimacy of their voice as the first ones affected by the consequences of climate change: 'We are likely to become the victims of a phenomenon to which we have contributed very little and which we can do very little to halt' (representative of Papua New Guinea, on behalf of the Pacific Islands Forum Small Island Developing States).[57] Moreover, the closer involvement of those actors in the Security Council is expressed in their gaining access to non-permanent seats, as in the case of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. The permanent mission of the Caribbean multi-island state defined its 'unique opinions on the issue of climate change' as the reason why it was elected.[58] Climatization is about giving a voice to actors specifically concerned with climate change.

Finally, climatization of security emerges from suggested responses consisting of a mix of managerial approaches to development, peace-building and climate politics. Indeed, the solutions put forward at the UN Security Council and by UNEP to address the security implications of climate change entail recourse to climate-oriented

[55] UNDP, 'Supporting climate security', [n.d.].

[56] For instance, CSM developed its 2020 briefing note in collaboration with Adelphi and SIPRI; see UN CSM (note 46).

[57] UN, Security Council, 5663rd meeting, S/PV.5663, 17 Apr. 2007.

[58] Permanent Mission of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines to the UN, Facebook profile, accessed 14 Oct. 2019.

policies based on science, preventive risk management, climate proofing and institutional adaptation. Security Council debates and CSM publications have emphasized the need to collect and exchange scientific data and information. During open debates states called for more 'comprehensive information from the field' (representative of Poland, 2018) and 'aggregating data' (representative of the USA, 2019), while advocating for 'further informative exchanges with representatives and experts, including the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, on the security implications of climate change, as well as more integrated sharing of data and expertise' (representative of Viet Nam, 2019).[59] The 'latest data' on 'climate and security risks' was also the focus of the April 2020 Arria-formula meeting.[60]

These calls and recommendations reinforce the role of climate experts as relevant partners for the Security Council, and they also encourage the application of tools used in climate science such as 'Climate data collections, climate scenarios and early-warning systems' (representative of Switzerland) to address climate and security risks.[61] These tools suggest a risk-management approach that aims to enhance 'a preventive assessment strategy' and 'anticipate the consequences' (representative of France).[62] The CSM produced a toolbox including a briefing note, a conceptual approach, data sources and a conflict analysis checklist to make it 'climate-informed'.[63] Other recommendations focus on climate proofing, adapting security institutions and improving assessments of conflict dynamics in relation to climate hotspots. For example, the French permanent mission expressed the objective 'to ensure that the work of the UN in countries vulnerable to the effects of climate change is climate-proofed'.[64] To do so, member states recommended the appointment of a special representative on climate and security within the UN secretariat. States also encouraged the establishment of the CSM and the enhancement of 'climate-sensitive peacebuilding

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[59] UN, Security Council (note 27); and UN, Security Council (note 33).

[60] Permanent mission of France to the UN in New York (note 52).

[61] UN, Security Council (note 33).

[62] The representative of France expressed this view during the meeting of the UN Security Council in Arria formula; see Permanent mission of France to the UN in New York (note 52).

[63] UN, CSM, *Toolbox: Checklist* (UN: New York, 2020), p. 1.

[64] Permanent mission of France to the UN in New York (note 52).

initiatives'.[65] In summary, climatization unfolds through the adoption of an adaptation strategy for UN peace and security institutions faced with the adverse effects of climate change.

Climate change currently dominates UN debates on the inter-linkages between security and the environment. Further research should explore how climatization may overshadow the complex socioecological entanglements of the Anthropocene.

III. Concluding remarks

This chapter has investigated how the UN has approached the interlinkages between climate change and security since the late 2000s, based on analysis of UNEP publications and UN Secur-ity Council debates. First, it stressed that dominant approaches to security in relation to climate change carry a geographical bias and focus located mostly in the developing world within conflict regions. Security is also commonly understood in relation to conflicts and to a national and human security approach. Second it showed how, through the process of climatization, climate change is becoming a dominant framework that complements the security logic implied in securitization. Climatization helps climate actors to take a more assertive role in the security field and in the development of political responses following a climate-oriented approach based on science, preventive risk management, climate proofing and institutional adaptation. By drawing on critical security studies and work on climatization, the chapter has provided a broader understanding of the shared mechanisms through which the UNEP and UN Security Council approach and frame the interlinkages between climate change and security. Put differently, this chapter considers both the attraction of the security framing and the impact of the climate framing. While acknowledging the interdependence between the two processes, this chapter urges scholars to look at climatization as another way to analyse how the interlinkages between climate change and security are understood.

While the political effects of securitization and climatization can be assessed in their specific context only, persistent criti-cisms challenge securitizing and climatizing moves. Addressing

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[65] UN, 'Addressing the impact of climate change on peace and security', [n.d.].

practitioners and scholars alike, we would like to briefly point to some shortcomings, to open up new avenues for reflection and research. On the one hand, member states have shown resistance to 'the quick fix of securitization of climate change' (representative of India), seeing climate change 'as a tool to drive discussions on specific country cases away from addressing evident and well-established causes of their instability' (representative of Russia).[66] On the other hand, criticism has emerged in relation to the risk of depoliticization: 'cleavages, power relations and socio-economic structures become invisible when environmental peacebuilding emphasises the low politics, neutral and positive sum character of shared environmental problems.'[67] In other words, the emphasis on climate causes of insecurities can act as an excuse for governments to conceal their role in conflict dynamics or insecurities.

Adding to these, we draw attention to the often-overlooked complex entanglements of threats and socioecological processes in the Anthropocene. Further academic and policy research should address the role of the Anthropocene as an alternative lens and as a living context through which contemporary (in)securities could be understood, thus challenging the current dominating discourse on climate change. The scientific findings urgently demand institutional, multilateral and scientifically informed changes in which questions such as 'security for whom, and how?' should remain central to further discussions in the context of the Anthropocene. Improving dialogue among different scientific communities and various stakeholders is a key prerequisite for addressing these shortcomings and new challenges. This volume is a much-welcomed step in that direction.

[66] UN, Security Council (note 33); the representative of Russia expressed this view during the 2020 Arria-formula meeting, see Permanent mission of the Russian Federation to the UN, 'Statement by Dmitry Chumakov, deputy permanent representative of Russia to the UN, at the Arria formula VTC of UNSC member-states on climate and security risks', 22 Apr. 2020.

[67] Ide (note 47), p. 3.