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The invention of strategy at the turn of the 18th to 19th centuries

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Funding: No specific funding was received for this work.

Potential competing interests: No potential competing interests to declare.

Abstract

In the 1770s, two translations of a military treatise from Byzantine times introduced the concept of strategy into modern military terminology. This article examines the reasons why the concept first spread among German-speaking military writers and the conditions for its semantic evolution in the early 19th century

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Keywords: strategy, tactics, logistics, military theory, terminology.

Introduction

On a day when he was probably not in the best of moods, Napoleon made the following observation to his fellow exiles on St Helena: 'The fact is that, without a doubt, I beat the enemy without so much intellect and without Greek words'. As Lawrence Freedman notes, the Greek word in question appeared in the title of Archduke Charles' treatise, translated into French in 1818, which the former emperor had just consulted: *Principes de la stratégie*.¹ Napoleon could not have anticipated the outstanding success that the concept of strategy would have in the centuries to come, and far beyond the military domain. At the time when he spoke, the word was still in marginal use in France, whereas it was much more

widely used in German-speaking countries.

Beatrice Heuser, Freedman, and probably others have already highlighted the conditions in which the word strategy entered the military lexicon, namely the almost simultaneous publication, in the 1770s, of the translations into French and German of a military treatise whose authorship is attributed to Leo VI, otherwise called the Wise: the *Taktika*.² Starting from this observation, this essay raises and attempts to answer the following questions: Why did the notion of strategy initially take root in German-speaking countries and not in France, even though the French translation of the Byzantine treatise preceded the German translation? How did the concept evolve and take on a new meaning in the late 18th century and finally become established in France, and later, in Anglo-Saxon countries? The answers to these questions can be found in Paul-Gédéon Joly de Maizeroy' and Johann von Bourscheid's translations, respectively, in the military discussions of the period and in the changes that occurred in the art of war in the late 18th century.

Etymology

As is well known, the term strategy is derived from the Greek word *stratēgós* (στρατηγός) meaning 'the general' or 'the art of the general'. However, its exact etymology is difficult to ascertain. Beyond the reasons related to the gaps in the text corpus mentioned by Heuser, it is also necessary to take into account the evolution of the semantic field of the lexicon that took place over an extended period of time – between the classical and the Byzantine periods – and in the multiple words that composed it.

In this context, trying to identify a single etymon is risky and it is more reasonable to consider a network of closely related terms. In their Byzantine uses and according to Bourscheid's translation *stratēgiké* (στρατηγική) or *stratēgiká* (στρατηγικά) – a neuter plural used substantively to denote a field of knowledge or expertise, i.e. generalship³ – might be a good candidate for etymon status, but the fact is that *stratēgiká* was originally a synonym for *stratēgēmá* (στρατηγήμα). The difference that we now make between strategy and stratagem did not initially exist in a military vocabulary that focused on the skills of the person who implemented the procedures. While it is true, as Everett Wheeler has shown, that the semantic field of *stratēgēmá* evolved and increasingly included connotations of cunning and trickery, it nonetheless retained the meaning of 'manoeuvring the army';⁴ moreover, it should not be imagined that these connotations were absent from the other terms in the lexicon relating to generalship. A late author such as Polyænus uses *stratēgía* (στρατηγία) – generalship according to the *Suda*⁵ – to characterise the trick Apollodorus of Cassandria played on the judges before whom he had been brought.⁶

Stratēgiké, *stratēgiká*, *stratēgēmá*, *stratēgía* or *stratēgiáō* (στρατηγιάω) – the wish to be a general or go to war – all conveyed the same idea, namely the value of the one commanding an army, and connoted more or less strongly, the skill involved in his procedures. The skill involved in, or the practice of military command did not correspond to a single word; both, skill and practice covered the lexical field of generalship as a whole.

One should refrain from projecting onto the military lexicon of the Greeks and the Byzantine our current understanding of the distinction between tactics and strategy. The exact meaning of these two notions – *taktiké* (τακτική) and *stratēgiké*

(στρατηγική) – in Byzantine period is a complex problem that is a matter for specialists.⁷ Suffice it to say here that this distinction does not correspond to our contemporary understanding of the relationship between tactics and strategy:

Strategy, strategia, associated with or derived from stratos, army, and strategos, leader of an army, 'general', means 'the art of generalship'. In contrast to the modern sense of the word – the art and technique of deploying all available resources to gain the objects of war, a meaning which developed only from the nineteenth century – strategy for East Roman and Byzantine generals was not always easily distinguished from tactics, so that the medieval military treatises which provide us with so much of our information on military matters treat the two as part of a continuum [...].⁸

The relationship between tactics and strategy was gradually developed at the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries in a context where the intellection of the art of war has evolved into a more conceptual form.

Translations of the *Taktika*

The first edition of *Institutions militaires de l'empereur Léon le Philosophe* was published in two volumes in Paris in 1771. By then, Maizeroy was already a well-known military writer who had published *Essais militaires* in 1762, *Cours de tactique théorique* in 1766 and *Traité de tactique* in 1767. He was also a distinguished Hellenist, his translation of the *Taktika* certainly contributing to his election to the Académie Royale des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres in July 1775 as an associate member. Based on meticulous cross-referencing, this translation drew on the edition by Johannes Meursius of one of the Greek manuscripts of the *Taktika* (although it was probably the 1745 reprint of Meursius' work revised by Giovanni Lami), as well as on a translation into Italian by Filippo Pigafetta, and on two of the Greek manuscripts of the *Taktika* kept in the Royal Library.⁹

Maizeroy's translation of the text of the *Taktika* has the particularity of never using the word *stratégie*, neither in Emperor Leo's prologue – which includes four associations of *taktiké* and *stratēgiké* – nor in the initial definitions provided by the treatise.¹⁰ If the first term, *taktiké*, is indeed rendered as 'tactics' in the translation, the second is rendered as 'the general's duty', 'the art of command' and 'the one who commands'. *Stratégie* does appear in the translator's commentary on the first article of the treatise, but only in the context of a quotation. Taken from a treatise attributed to Emperor Maurice, the quotation reads: 'strategy makes use of times and places, surprises, withdrawals, and simulated disengagements to outwit the enemy, even without general fighting'. The original text mentions *stratēgía* which could just as easily be translated as generalship.¹¹ The term thus has a meaning very close to that of *stratēgiké* in the *Taktika*, but Maizeroy chose not to use *stratégie* in the translation of the text of this latter treatise. Even more surprisingly, the author chooses not to use it in his commentary, but to create a neologism: the *stratégique*. This is a noun and not what will later become the adjectivation of the word strategy in the French language. The author's choice of terminology raises two questions: why did Maizeroy not use the words *stratégie* or *stratégique* in the translation of the *Taktika* text? Why, in his commentary on the first article in *Taktika*, did he choose *stratégique* over *stratégie*?

The answer to the first question seems to me to lie in the translator's scruples about using a neologism in the translation of the original text, and therefore chose a more literal meaning and reserved the use of the neologism for his own commentary.

The answer to the second question requires development. Clearly, Maizeroy conceived of a slight difference between *stratēgía* and *stratēgikḗ* and considered that Leo's definition was more relevant than that of Maurice. Phonetically closer to *stratēgikḗ*, *stratégique* offered an alternative that allowed the author to develop his own ideas, which he had sought to thematize for a decade. As Alexandre David has pointed out, Maizeroy had sought to devise a term to denote the art of command as early as the publication of his *Essais* in 1762.¹² He then chose the notion of *dialectique*, which he defined as 'the science of marching and waging war'.¹³ This definition is clarified in the *Cours de tactique* of 1767, in which a chapter is devoted to the *dialectique militaire*, which comprises two components: the art of forming plans for a campaign and that of directing the operations of this campaign.¹⁴ This conceptual endeavour and the resulting terminological choices are nevertheless under-emphasized in his works and drowned out by other considerations; in comparison, his commentary on the first article of the *Taktika* reveals more explicitly his views on the subject.

In his first commentary on the *Taktika*, however, the translator abandons (temporarily, as we shall see) the term *dialectique* and only keeps the term *stratégique*: 'The art of commanding, of employing in a timely and skilful manner all the means which the general has in his hand, of moving all the parts which are subordinate to him and of arranging them for success'. On the one hand, Maizeroy defines the *stratégique* as a science – and not an art – which 'embraces all the other' sciences of war, but, on the other hand, he appears to conceive it as both an art and a science. Indeed, the previous definition explicitly mentions the art of command, and one understands that the 'science of the general' – apparently synonymous with the 'science of war' – is both a science and an art.¹⁵

In the commentary on the first article of the treatise, Maizeroy mentions logistics as part of the science of the general. In fact, the term *logistikḗs* (λογιστικής) appears only in the conclusion of the *Taktika*, where the translator strongly summarises the author's argument. He translates only one of the seven occurrences of *logistikḗs*, as 'logistics', defined as 'the art of calculation'.¹⁶ The author of the treatise, however, dwelt at greater length on the notion, which is defined as one of the skills (*tékhnē*, τέχνη) of the general, a task (*ergon*, ἔργον) that requires methodical thinking and planning (*méthodos*, μέθοδος). The implementation of the different functions of logistics – which ranged from dividing troops into units to devising the budget for a military expedition to lining up men for battle according to their characteristics and abilities – could only be performed by men well-versed in letters (*grámma*, γράμμα) and numbers (*psēphḗn*, ψηφῶν). Without totally ignoring the value of the notion, Maizeroy only uses it partially. This is not the case with Bourscheid.

The first volume of *Kaisers Leo des Philosophen Strategie und Taktik* was published in Vienna in 1777, followed by four more volumes, with the last one published in 1781. Its translator is a forgotten German military writer about whom little is known. Born in Bonn in 1729, he entered the service of the imperial army in the ranks of which he participated in the Seven Years' War as a lieutenant. Serving as an estafette under Marshal Daun, he was seriously wounded at the battle of Kolin. In the 1760s, Bourscheid was squadron leader in a hussar regiment; his translation of the *Taktika* was apparently his first publication and marked the launch of his career as a military writer.¹⁷

Like Maizeroy, Bourscheid drew from Meursius' work – probably Lami's 1745 reprint – but he did not have the necessary competence to translate the *Taktika* directly from Greek into German. Thus, his translation was apparently based on the sixteenth-century Latin translation by John Cheke, and not on the original Greek text. Indeed, Meursius had also published Cheke's Latin translation of the Greek text. Bourscheid's version of events is that he undertook his work at the same time as Maizeroy undertook his, and that his translation was ready for printing in the early 1770s. However, having had to leave Vienna on business, the printing of the work was postponed. In the meantime, he found out about the French translation published by Maizeroy and decided to suspend the publication of his translation, considering that the French author's thoughts (*Gedanken*) were close to his own; and still, according to Bourscheid, it was only on the advice of friends, that he had his German translation published.¹⁸

The words Bourscheid chose to translate the title of the Byzantine treatise give a first indication of the originality of his approach; indeed, he decided to include the word *Strategie* in his translation of the treatise's title, although it does not appear in the original Greek version. The fact that the translator relied on the Latin translation of the *Taktika* has nothing to do with this, since the title of the treatise in Cheke's version is *De re militari*. Similarly, the Latin text cannot explain the frequency of the term *Strategie* in Bourscheid's translation and commentary; indeed, Cheke translated *stratēgiké asars imperatoria*.¹⁹ Although the military writer based his translation on the Latin text, he drew from the Greek lexicon to construct his own terminology but takes liberties in his interpretation of the texts. The translation of the beginning of the treatise is a good example thereof. Not only does Bourscheid translate *stratēgiké/ars imperatoria* as *Strategie*, but he adds a definition that is found neither in the original text nor in the Latin translation: the art of campaigns (*Kunst der Feldzüge*).²⁰

In fact, Bourscheid reads and translates the *Taktika* according to his own questions – which are also those of his contemporaries – concerning the campaigns of the Seven Years' War. His guiding idea is that Frederick II had revived the art of war of the ancients and created an original system of warfare, which he describes as « *system of the art of battles* » (*System der Kunst der Feldschlachten*). *Starting from the premise that the rules of strategy and tactics have remained unchanged since the time of Alexander and Hannibal, and that only their application – since the invention of gunpowder – has required a new calculating key (Rechnungsschlüssel), the author thus engages in a risky dialogue between the military theory of the Byzantine era and the tactical debate of the 18th century. His approach is a strange mixture of more or less fanciful approximations and brilliant intuitions.*

Among those approximations is the claim that all Greek youth were taught in public schools the basic rules of strategy, which was presented as a system. Bourscheid is not referring here to the practical military training that was delivered in the gymnasiums nor to the art of the general taught by the Sophists and referred to by Plato in his *Euthydemus*,²¹ but rather to a theoretical training in a discipline that simply did not exist as such, but which he himself had just created. The argument nonetheless serves its purpose insofar as it explains the difficulty of recruiting competent officers, and therefore of fighting the most skilful generals, at a time – his own – when the teaching of strategy had been totally neglected: 'Nowadays there are no teachers of strategy, so there are no public examinations of their theory'.²²

This same creative imagination is at the root of the terminological masterstroke that consists in closely associating the

concepts of tactics, logistics and strategy. The first two are explicit in the *Taktika*, but weakly connected: one constitutes the central notion of the treatise, which gives it its title, while the other only comes into play very late in the text's developments. The third is a genuine creation by Bourscheid, in which he places strategy at the heart of his thinking. While the frequency of use of these concepts in the author's comments is high, their meaning and logical relationship are not always clear in a fairly wordy text. While strategy is conceived as the art of campaigns, logistics is envisaged as a calculation of time, terrain and circumstances. As for tactics, it consists of the art of manoeuvring an army in its marches and battles.²³ In such a conception, the sphere of tactics is subordinate to those of strategy and logistics insofar as it is the place where what has been conceived in the other two spheres is implemented. The result is a valorisation of logistics which, though not elevated to the same level as strategy, is judged to be a decisive component of the art of war: without the light shed by logistics, strategy and tactics 'grope in the dark' (*im Finstern tappend*).²⁴

This conceptual triad was also an opportunity to assert the superiority of German military thought over French military thought, and more particularly its figurehead, which at that time was the *Essai général de tactique* by Guibert. According to Bourscheid, the French military writer had too narrow a conception of the art of war, his ignorance of strategy and logistics giving him an incomplete vision.

The reception of the neologism

Maizeroy's translation was better received than Bourscheid's translation and his later publications.

A highly laudatory review of Emperor Leo's *Institutions militaires* published in the *Encyclopédie militaire* in early 1771 described Maizeroy's two volumes as 'one of the best works we have on the tactics of the ancients and a very excellent guide to the tactics of the moderns'. The author notes, without dwelling on it, the neologism proposed by Maizeroy, and that defines the science of the general, but introduces a slight confusion since he talks of *stratagétique* instead of *stratégique*.²⁵ Maizeroy himself hesitated about the right choice of terminology. As Adam Parr noted, the French military writer used the word *stratégie* to characterise the science of war when reading a memorandum to the *Académie* on 14 July 1775.²⁶ However, this is an isolated occurrence, as Maizeroy mostly opts, in his publications, for the neologism 'the *stratégique*', coined in the commentaries of the *Taktika*; in his *Mémoire sur les opinions que partagent les militaires* of 1773 and especially in his last work published in 1777 (*Théorie de la guerre*), Maizeroy had reverted back to using the terms *stratégique* – which appears in the subtitle of the book – and *dialectique*, which he opted for in his introduction and in the third part devoted to the 'most sublime' part of the science of war. Are the *stratégique* and the *dialectique* two distinct concepts or synonyms? David opts for the first interpretation, considering that the notion of *dialectique* denotes an 'art of reasoning' rather than the application of strategy in action.²⁷ There are, however, several passages in Maizeroy's works that indicate that the author understands them as synonyms.

At first, military writers publishing in French exclusively used the term 'stratégique'. In addition to the authors mentioned by Jeremy Black, one can mention Turpin de Crissé in his *Commentaires sur les institutions militaires de Végèce* (1779), the Baron de Bohan in his *Examen critique du militaire françois* (1781) and the anonymous author of *Lettres militaires*

(1779).²⁸ The temporary interest in the neologism *stratégique* does not imply that the authors who used it shared a common definition and embraced Maizeroy's views.

Turpin de Crissé understood it simply in its etymological sense of 'science of the general', a meaning that Maizeroy wanted to clarify and develop in his commentary on the *Taktika* by differentiating between the *stratégie* and the *stratégique*. The Marquis de Bohan was in the same frame of mind as Turpin de Crissé but thought it wise to add that the *stratégique* rested on no other principles than the genius of the general. Closer to Maizeroy's views, the Marquis de Silva considered that the *stratégique* teaches how to form plans for operations and how 'to properly employ and combine all the means provided by the different branches of tactics'. Michaud d'Arçon uses the term without defining it. In fact, he only refers to it as a basis to criticize Guibert, who, in his view, repeatedly confuses *stratégique* with *tactique*. As for Guibert, he mentions the term once, without paying any further attention to it, and identifies it with the 'tactics of armies'.²⁹

In fact, none of these authors, including the Marquis de Silva, were in tune with Maizeroy's theoretical ambition, even if some of them could see the value of conceptualising the most 'sublime' part of the science of war. The author of *Théorie de la guerre* himself was not the best advocate for his own ideas. In his works, his innovations in terminology are poorly highlighted and the development of his ideas is hesitant, the relationship between *stratégie*, *stratégique* and *dialectique* being difficult to grasp. Maizeroy finally abandoned the term *stratégique* at the very moment when his neologism started attracting interest. In his more recent, posthumous edition of *Cours de tactique* (1781), he regards *dialectique* – a concept he does not want to abandon – as equivalent with *stratégie*, but no longer with the *stratégique*. Does this final trial-and-error adjustment mean that the two terms were synonymous in his mind? Although most scholars assume that the *stratégique* and the *stratégie* are synonyms, the comments in the *Taktika* suggest the opposite. Maizeroy's problem was actually to find the best neologism to impose his initial idea of *dialectique* on his readers.

The failure was complete. The term *dialectique* did not catch on. The term *stratégique* quickly fell into disuse. As for the term *stratégie*, it aroused even less immediate interest in France than the neologism previously coined by Maizeroy. Not only did the occurrence of the word *stratégie* in the 1781 edition of the *Cours de tactique* fail to attract any attention or interest, but neither did its use in French publications, which echoed the great success that the term *Strategie* was having simultaneously in Germany and Austria.

The memoirs of François Louis de Wimpfen (1788) informed French readers that strategy and logistics were subjects taught at the military school in Kassel, a fact also reported in the *Esprit des journaux*.³⁰ Similarly, the French translation of the curriculum of the *Hohe Karlsschule* in Stuttgart provided information on the teaching of strategy at this academy as part of the training of public servants.³¹ The publication in 1783 of a work by Friedrich Nockern von Schorn did not arouse more interest despite the ambition of its subject matter.

Schorn was of German origin and served Holland as a colonel in a regiment before retiring to Bayreuth; Azar Gat presented him as being 'amazingly pretentious'.³² This is too harsh a judgement, but Schorn did probably decide to publish his treatise initially in French, which was not his mother tongue (the German version was not published until two years later) because he wanted to rise to the level of, and even to outperform the 'dogmatic scholars' who had written on

the art of war.³³ He did not claim that his work – which was addressed to young officers – was a military treatise, but a systematic and innovative method for assimilating the science of war. According to Schorn, this science consists of six parts, the most important of which is *stratégie* defined as ‘the art of commanding and directing the operations of war’. Although he mentions the etymology of the term, the author does not specify his source of inspiration, which could be either Maizeroy or Bourscheid, both of whom are cited in the book. This is all the more difficult to determine as Schorn develops a personal conception of strategy that is significantly different from that of the other two authors. Contrary to what its definition suggests, this conception is less oriented towards the operational aspect than it is in the approaches proposed by Maizeroy or Bourscheid. In fact, Schorn’s understanding of the notion is far weaker than he would have us believe. In some parts of the text, strategy seems to be equated to the science of war, sometimes it seems to correspond to the command capabilities and knowledge of the general; it is in this second sense that one must understand the assertion according to which strategy reached a ‘high point of perfection’ in the 18th century, or the recommendation to read the Memoirs of Montecuculi to learn about *grande stratégie*. Precisely, this distinction between *grande stratégie* and *petite stratégie* further blurs the perspective; while the former is logically related to the commander-in-chief, the latter is, less logically, equated with ‘petty war’.

A final example of the French disinterest in the concept of strategy in the 1780s is the translation of a work by Bourscheid on the first campaign of the War of the Bavarian Succession. While the title of the German version explicitly mentioned that the campaign was approached from the point of view of strategy (*im Gesichtspunkte der Strategie*), the mention of strategy disappears from the title’s French translation, as well as from the first paragraph in which Bourscheid specified that the campaign was a masterpiece (*Meisterstück*) of strategy.³⁴

The first part of the book containing Bourscheid’s translation offers a first element of explanation for the lack of interest, on the part of French military thinkers, in the notion of strategy. This text was about Frederick II’s *grande tactique*, a concept coined by Guibert and used as a reference by French-speaking military writers interested in major military operations. Jomini used the term *grande tactique* at the beginning of the 19th century in the title of his first treatise, before switching to the word *strategy*. The second explanation does not lie in any Gallocentrism on the part of French-speaking military writers (indeed, the French had a real fascination for the Prussian military model) but in their linguistic inability to grasp the dynamism of the military debate in Germany and Austria. Even a German-speaking author such as Schorn is criticised in a review in the *Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek*, which claims that Schorn is not sufficiently knowledgeable in German military literature for his *Idées raisonnées* to be fully in tune with the state of the art.³⁵

In German-speaking countries, the notion of strategy took root earlier than in France, but there is no certainty that Bourscheid’s translation of the *Taktika* was the sole or even the main cause. The reception of his translation was contrasted. Ignored in France, it was favourably received in Great Britain in a review published in the *Critical Review* in which is probably found the first occurrence of the term strategy in Anglo-Saxon literature.³⁶ In Austria and Germany, the reception ranged from the most positive to the most negative. A glowing review in the Vienna *Realzeitung* called the book an important work and its author the first German military writer to write so clearly and illuminatingly about the art of war, outperforming even Guibert or Maizeroy.³⁷ The author of the review published in the *Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek* of

Berlin and Stettin was not of that opinion and recommended referring to Maizeroy's translation instead, disputed Bourscheid's knowledge of military history and considered that he was trying to blind the reader by writing in a pompous, empty style mixed with Greek words that made linguists shrug their shoulders.³⁸ The explanation for this polarisation between the critics does not merely lie in their country of origin; indeed, the author of a review published in the *Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen* received the translation of *Taktika* positively, applauded its thorough analyses and, above all, stressed the value of the comparative study of past and present wars from a strategic point of view; the author of this review thus believed that the translation of the *Taktika* and Bourscheid's commentaries would benefit the systematic teaching of strategy (*systematische Unterricht in der Strategie*).³⁹

Bourscheid's other works published in the 1770s and 1780s – his study of the first campaign of the War of the Bavarian Succession and a *Kurs der Taktik und Logistik in allen dem Dienste der Strategien* 1782 – also elicited contrasting reactions. Carl von Seidl's was negative. The latter also wrote a study on the War of the Bavarian Succession, in which, he introduces readers to Bourscheid's lexicon (*bourscheidisches Wörterbuch*), and in so doing points out, with biting irony, Bourscheid's extravagance (*Kriegsphantasie*) in his approach to war study.⁴⁰ In his otherwise excellent study, Anders Palmgren was misled by the frequent use of the word *Strategie* at the beginning of Seidl's book; in fact, Seidl was merely explaining Bourscheid's ideas without endorsing them.⁴¹ It was another German military writer, also mentioned by Palmgren, who made the concept widely known in the early 1780s.

Ferdinand Friedrich von Nicolai was a Württemberg officer who, as early as the 1760s, became interested in the question of military education. His *Versuch eines Grundrisses zur Bildung des Officiers* (Essay on a Plan for the Education of Officers), published in 1775, was one of the most widely read military works in the German-speaking world at the end of the 18th century.⁴² It deals very marginally with strategy, defined as the science of generals, and always in the context of the art of war in ancient Greece. In the 1770s, as Daniel Hohrath has observed, Nicolai did not conceive of an explicit distinction between tactics and strategy in his plans for the military education of the officers of his time, and only took into consideration the notion of tactics.⁴³ Everything changed with the publication in 1781 of *Die Anordnung einer gemeinsamen Kriegsschule für alle Waffen* (The ordinance of a common war school for all arms). From the very first pages, a distinction is made between tactics and strategy, the latter referring to a *higher* component of the art of war. Nicolai thus made the term his own, as its frequent occurrences in the book also demonstrate. Did this change of perspective result from his reading Bourscheid? Nicolai only half-admits this in a footnote at the end of the volume in which he looks forward to the forthcoming publication of Bourscheid's *Kurs der Taktik und Logistik*; he seems to consider that a manual of this type can be useful for the training of officers, and the fact that it is written by the commentator of the *Taktika* seems to him to be a good omen.⁴⁴ This footnote also shows that Nicolai had a less negative opinion than the author of the review published in the *Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek* of which he was editor.

The idea of integrating strategy into the military education of officers quickly gained ground. As we have seen, this discipline was included in the curricula of the *Hohe Karlsschule* in Stuttgart and the Kassel Military School as early as 1783. In the latter case, on the initiative of the school's director, Johann Christoph Wittenius, who convinced Jakob Mauvillon to design an introductory course in which the art of war was divided into a mechanical section (*das Mechanische*) – tactics – and a scientific one (*das Wissenschaftliche*) – strategy.⁴⁵ The institutionalisation of strategy in

education in German-speaking countries is a determining factor in the establishment of a renewed military terminology. This choice was made by a generation of seasoned officers – Wittenius was 60 years old in 1783 – and was to have an impact on the younger generations trained in military schools, in which they were familiarised with this terminology. A second factor was the dynamism of the military debate in Germany and Austria, where a plethora of periodicals specialized in military issues existed, while the more general press also devoted a good deal of space to reviews of works dealing with these issues.⁴⁶ As Max Jähns has pointed out, although France set the tone in the eighteenth century with the publication of numerous military treatises, it was Germany that took precedence (*Vortritt*) in the military press at the end of the century.⁴⁷

However, the institutionalisation of strategy and dynamism of the debate did not result in a definitive and consensual definition of the concept. As Black has suggested, the notion of strategy was characterised by semantic flexibility and volatility in the late 18th to early 19th centuries.⁴⁸ It was only gradually and through trial and error that the meaning of the concept developed.

Trial and error

By creating the neologism (of meaning) of *Strategie*, Bourscheid opened up the semantic field of the concept to the sphere of politics as well. He defined it not only in relation to tactics, but also in relation to war as a whole. The duty (*Pflicht*) of strategy is in fact to make plans for the war (which is why it is related (*Verwandtschaft*) to politics) and then to develop a plan for each campaign according to the offensive or defensive nature of the operations. In this last respect, strategy has its own sphere of action; it follows its own rules, which makes it possible to determine the configuration of the campaign and the most appropriate initiatives to be implemented in order to defeat the enemy.⁴⁹ The approach was not without merit, but Bourscheid made it unnecessarily complex by drowning it in Greek-inspired terminology, and not always to good effect, to the point of making it difficult to understand.

Nicolai accepted some of Bourscheid's ideas but chose to focus more on the relationship between strategy and tactics. Nicolai conceives the science of war as a chain (*Kette*) of actions that must be planned according to the forces available and be directed towards objectives (*Zwecke*) that can be achieved as advantageously as possible. The first links (*Gelenke*) in this chain are elementary tactics and higher tactics (*höhere Taktik*). As for strategy, it seeks to make good use of the two forms of tactics, i.e., to link operations together and through methodical and regular arrangement (*regelmäßige Anordnung*) to direct the course of the war towards the desired result.⁵⁰

Mauvillon's approach is more didactic and enumerative. Tactics included: the composition of an army, encampments, foraging, marches, convoys, attacks on enemy foragers and convoys, and defence. Strategy involved: knowledge of the country, plans of operations, the formation of the army, the art of positioning and moving an army, the crossing of rivers and passes and their defence, combat, cantonments and winter quarters. However, the logic underlying Mauvillon's classification of actions into one category or the other is not clear (why was combat not a tactical matter?); similarly, it is unclear how Mauvillon's typological approach could be coherent with Nicolai's views. Thus, one easily sees that the

lessons in strategy received by young German-speaking officers did not result in their clear understanding of the concept, and that their understanding of the concept did not match the meaning it would subsequently acquire.

The relationship between tactics and strategy was far from obvious. Georg Heinrich von Berenhorst had a fairly clear idea of what tactics is – everything that belongs to combat proper (*was zum eigentlichen Kampf gehört*) – and considered its relationship to the higher sciences of war (*höheren Kriegswissenschaften*), without however explicitly identifying these sciences with strategy. His concern to clarify the definition of tactics, a notion that was used in a fluctuating manner both in its narrow and its broad sense (*man brauche es gewöhnlicherweise, bald im weiten, bald im engern Sinn, schwankend*), did not extend to strategy, which he seems to consider as the art of command (*Anführerkünste*). Does this art of command belong to the higher sciences of war? Apparently not, since Berenhorst uses another term to define the army leadership skills, *Heerführerkünste*, without explicitly linking it to strategy.⁵¹

With the wars of the French Revolution and the Empire, the issue of defining strategy ceased to be purely theoretical and became more immediately practical. To paraphrase Napoleon, the French armies did not need Greek words to inflict defeats on their opponents, even though the latter were trained in strategy. In his work, published in 1799, and which was to have a great impact, Heinrich von Bülow proposed to distinguish between tactics and strategy on the basis of a simple criterion: any movement conducted within the enemy's visual field – and therefore within the range of his cannon – is tactical; any movement conducted outside his visual field – and therefore outside the range of his cannon – is strategic.⁵² The translation of the work in 1801 by Léger Tranchant de Lavern finally aroused French interest in the notion, or at least that of the author – probably Joseph Servan – of the article dedicated to Bülow's work and published in the fourth volume of the *Encyclopédie méthodique* on the military arts. The interest was obviously not only in the concept of strategy but also in the notions of lines of operation and bases of operation discussed at length in the article. But although strategy was not the subject of a specific entry in the volume, the term was used as the heading of the 17th section of the analytical table of the volume. This section included words relating to 'the art of forming war plans, of fitting them into the means of the state, of putting them to use with intelligence and economy, of executing the projected designs, of arranging marches, campaign plans, encampments, forage, convoys, supplies for places, river crossings, subsistence, etc.'⁵³

Recently rehabilitated by Arthur Kuhle, Bülow is an author whose importance should not be overlooked. In addition to the paradigm of a theory of social dynamics (*das Paradigma einer Theorie sozialer Dynamik*), Bülow also developed an original approach to the relationship between tactics and strategy.⁵⁴ What is not explicit in his dual definition of strategy and tactics is the conception of the latter as the 'ultimatum' to strategy (*sie ist das Ultimatum der Strategie*). Here, ultimatum should be understood as the last proposal: tactics complete what the strategy has prepared (*sie vollendet, was diese vorbereitet*), it 'pours', in a way, into strategy (*gleichsam ergießt*).⁵⁵

Bülow's definition in the 1799 edition of his work is frequently used in military history literature. It is important to remember, however, that the author negated it (*widerrufen*) in his remarks added to the new edition of 1805. Henceforth, Bülow considers that tactics correspond to any movement that has the enemy as the objective (*den Feind zum Gegenstand*), whereas strategy has the enemy as its aim and not its objective (*zum Zweck und nicht zum Gegenstand*).⁵⁶ This definition was more sophisticated, but also much more abstract; in any case, this new definition was still compatible

with the conception of tactics as the 'ultimatum' to strategy. In the meantime, other German-speaking military writers had formulated their own definitions of strategy, while their French-speaking counterparts remained generally silent on the subject, with the exception of Tranchant de Laverne's take on Bülow's definition (that of 1799).⁵⁷

In a text that is both abundant and makes for tedious reading, Georg Venturini considers strategy from several perspectives. First of all, he defines it as a science that aims to achieve the purpose of war (*Kriegszweck*) by using the armed forces, which the general must implement effectively according to the different configurations of the confrontation with the enemy.⁵⁸ Venturini also defines it as the general's own science by introducing a distinction between two main components of strategy: strategy per se (*Strategie an sich*) and the dialectics of war (*Kriegesdialektik*). Strategy per se is the application of the art of war to achieve the aim prescribed by the general plan of war. As for the dialectics of war, it is defined by a cryptic formulation: the application of the application of the art of war (*die Anwendung von der Anwendung der Kriegeskunst*). This notion of dialectics of war (which has nothing to do with Maizeroy's conception of dialectics) is probably to be understood as the application of strategy, which itself is the implementation or application of the plan of war.⁵⁹ Finally, Venturini proposes to distinguish strategy from tactics using specific definitions. Strategy is thus the application of the art of movement and combat to defend (*zur Deckung*) the country. As for tactics, there are two definitions. The first appears in the book from which the previous definition of strategy is drawn: tactics is the science of ordering troops in order to prevent an unfavourable combat in every military situation.⁶⁰ The second is given in another book that does not offer a definition of strategy: applied tactics is the science of using the military advantages of the terrain for the security of troops and the country.⁶¹

Gerhard Scharnhorst explicitly attributes the renewal of military terminology to three authors: Maizeroy, Bourscheid and Nicolai. The 1790 edition of his *Handbuch für Officiere* shows that, in the 1790s, the relationship between the new concepts forged by these three authors was not yet clearly established. Indeed, Scharnhorst presents logistics and strategy as components of tactics.⁶² In an analysis of the Battle of Marengo published in 1802, Scharnhorst's approach evolved. He was not concerned with formulating definitions, but rather sought to use the concepts in his analysis; thus, the reader understands the meaning he gives them from the manner in which he uses the terms rather than through formal definitions. He established a new hierarchy between strategy and tactics by focusing on the conditions under which a military engagement can be victorious. He laid the foundations for what was to become Clausewitz's – his student and disciple – understanding of the relationship between strategy and tactics. Scharnhorst begins by stating that the analysis of a battle must be carried out from the dual perspective of the strategic conditions under which it was fought, on the one hand, and the tactical disorders (*taktischen Unordnungen*) that occurred there, on the other. This double perspective implies a difference in scale between the two spheres of action and a subordination of the latter to the former, as the author makes clear when he states that a small change in the strategic conditions of the moment – in this case a crossing of the Po by the Austrian army – could have altered the favourable situation in which the French found themselves. By manoeuvring skillfully at the strategic level, one can place the enemy at a tactical disadvantage. Without going into the analysis of the battle, let us take note of the strategic principle that Scharnhorst identified: Never stand (*stehen*) concentrated, but always fight in a concentrated manner.⁶³

Bonaparte's campaigns acted as a real stimulus to German military thinking. As Clausewitz wrote in his *Life and*

Character of Scharnhorst, 'War itself, so to speak, stood at the lectern and every day offered practical instruction to its students'.⁶⁴ He himself formulated a twofold definition in 1804: *tactics* teaches the *use* of armed *forces* in the *engagement* (*Gefecht*); *strategy*, the *use* of *engagements* for the object (*Zweck*) of the *war*.⁶⁵ *What is remarkable is that this definition is identical – with one small formulation difference– to that given in Vom Kriege. Clausewitz's conception did not change between 1804 and the late 1820s (the twofold definition can be found in chapter 1 of Book II), notwithstanding the continued reflection on the definition of strategy among German-speaking military writers.*

The *Grundzüge der reinen Strategie* (Principles of pure strategy) was published in 1809 by August Wagner, a Prussian then in Austrian service. According to him, tactics correspond to the movement that an army, or a fraction thereof, makes with the immediate aim of engaging in combat. As for strategy, he considers that it corresponds to movements conducted by an army in preparation for tactical movements; these preparatory movements, which he referred to as *Märsche*, will subsequently be called strategic movements. Wagner establishes a clear hierarchy between the two areas of action, since it is strategy that dictates the actions of tactics; strategy is the *legislator* (*Gesetzgeberin*) in that it imposes tactics' movements. However, the author also envisages a correspondence between tactics and strategy: one does on a small scale what the other does on a large scale; tactics determine the rules for arranging troops for combat, while strategy determines the rules that operations must apply throughout the campaign.⁶⁶

In the first part of an article published in 1809, Otto August Rühle von Lilienstern provides an overview of the difference between tactics and strategy and their mutual relationship. While he criticised Venturini's approach, he acknowledged Bülow's ability to modify his views and emphasised the value of Wagner's work, despite its shortcomings. However, Rühle von Lilienstern does not attempt to formulate his own definitions of strategy and tactics. Considering that the real question should be the nature of war, and that subjective definitions of strategy and tactics should be avoided, he devotes the second part of his article to discussing the notions of bases and lines of operation.⁶⁷

Constantin von Lossau shares a perspective that is not fundamentally different from Lilienstern's. He was wary of the excesses of theory and considered that war must initially be understood in its concept (*Begriff*), which reveals what war is, what the soldier should expect from it and how he can learn it. Lossau is considered to be a military writer with the same vision as Clausewitz and whose 1815 work – *Der Krieg* – prefigures *Vom Kriege*. Jean-Jacques Langendorf has, however, highlighted an important difference between the two authors, which, precisely, concerns strategy.⁶⁸ Lossau's conception of tactics – the art of positioning and moving troops – is not incompatible with that of Clausewitz. Lossau, on the other hand, does not conceive of strategy in terms of manoeuvres or higher-scale engagements, but in terms of the personal qualities of the general. This astonishing return to the etymological meaning of the term can be explained by the reasoning according to which the higher parts of the art of war cannot be rigorously theorised and therefore taught. The leadership of an army requires above all talent and genius, which can be acquired neither by study nor by means of theory, 'all art lies in the artist' (*die ganze Kunst in der Künstler liegt*). Lossau concludes that it is therefore 'quite correct to understand strategy as the personal qualities that a general-in-chief must possess'.⁶⁹

Beyond their divergences, these authors have in common the fact that they focus the question of the definition of strategy on the conceptual pair strategy/tactics, leaving aside the notion of logistics that Bourscheid had put forward. There was a

good reason for this, which Seidl identified: what Bourscheid meant by logistics seemed to belong to the sphere of strategy. The reintroduction of the term logistics into the definition of the higher parts of the art of war was to give a new scope to the concept. This reintroduction is due to a French-speaking military writer – and not to Clausewitz who, as is well known, disregards the notion of logistics in *Vom Kriege*.

Although he published, in 1808, an article in Rühle von Lilienstern's journal, *Pallas*, Jomini stayed away from the debate between his German-speaking counterparts. In his first publications, he was even hesitant about the meaning and scope of the notion of strategy, which he used only very marginally. The *Pallas* article illustrates this. In a first occurrence, he refers to a movement that is carried out *par la stratégie* (by strategy) without defining the term. A second occurrence concerns les *mouvements préparatoires de stratégie*, which are also left undefined. The third occurrence likens the term strategy to what Jomini defines as the second 'combination' of the science of war, i.e., 'the art of transferring our masses with the greatest possible expedition to the decisive point of either the primitive or accidental line of operation [of the enemy]'. This approach calls for two remarks. Firstly, Jomini did not, at the time, consider strategy as the highest component of the art of war, i.e., the 'first combination', which is 'the art of adjusting the lines of operation in the most advantageous manner'. Secondly, Jomini doubly debases the concept by asserting, on the one hand, that strategy 'is *only the means* of carrying out this second combination of the art of war', and, on the other, that this second combination corresponds to what is 'vulgarly' called strategy.⁷⁰

The 1818 translation into French of the *Grundsätze der Strategie* by Archduke Charles, supervised by Jomini, enabled him to clarify his views. Although he did not agree with the Archduke's definition of strategy – the science of war (*Kriegswissenschaft*) or the particular science of the general-in-chief (*die eigenthümliche Wissenschaft des obersten Feldherrn*) as opposed to tactics, which is defined as the art of war (*Kriegskunst*) – Jomini states in his memoirs that the *Grundsätze der Strategie* 'enlightened' him on the inadequacies of his first treatise.⁷¹ The Archduke's argument was more 'methodical'; in other words, it was better organised around the concepts of the *principles* of the art of war and *strategy*, the latter concept providing a structuring element to the theory of war. Jomini accepted the concept but reformulated the Archduke's definition: strategy is the art of directing masses on the decisive point, tactics the art of engaging them there.⁷²

From the 1820s onwards, his *Histoire des guerres de la révolution* contained significant formulations, which had been absent from his earlier publications: 'principles of strategy' or 'rules of strategy'. Jomini's terminology was recast shortly after the publication of his *Histoire*, in the *Tableau analytique des principales combinaisons de la guerre* then in the *Précis de l'art de la guerre*. In the 1830s, the Swiss military writer had laid a definitive foundation for his conceptual system and strategy had acquired a new definition.

In fact, the *Précis* contains three different definitions of strategy. The first bears the hallmark of Jomini as a staff officer: 'the art of making war on the map'. The second has a more operational connotation: 'the art of properly directing masses upon the theatre of war'. The last one takes the form of a triple definition characterising the main components of the art of war: '*strategy decides where to act; logistics brings the troops to this point; tactics decides the manner of execution and the employment of the troops*'.⁷³ *The formulation personifies the concept – it is the strategy that acts and not the strategist – but is interesting in two respects. On the one hand, it asserts the primacy of strategy over the other two components of*

the art of war. On the other hand, it reincorporates the notion of logistics into the main components of this art. As article 41 of the *Précis* shows, Jomini included in logistics some staff tasks, which are today classified in other spheres of military action. But he also included material aspects that correspond to contemporary conceptions of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces.

Did – as Freedman suggests – this definition of strategy, as well as Clausewitz's, contribute to inhibiting discussion on the concept in the nineteenth century, by approaching the battle as the object of action? This is possible insofar as the political dimension of war was not explicitly referred to in the definition, although it was very much present in the theory of both authors. What Jomini and Clausewitz called strategy is what we call today the operational level of war; whereas what we now call strategy or grand strategy was the *politique de la guerre* and the *politique militaire* for Jomini (the translation by Mendell and Craighill does not make this important distinction). But another aspect, also highlighted by Freedman, is equally important. The true issue is the dynamic interaction between the concepts, not the concepts themselves or their definition. Mono-dimensional definitions of strategy, which only see it as the art of command, were replaced by approaches more oriented towards the functions of the main components of the art of war in the perspective of the engagement of the forces. The idea of action directed towards an objective and of mobilising resources to achieve it was the principle that underpinned the approaches of Maizeroy, Bourscheid, Nicolai, Bülow, Venturini, Wagner, Scharnhorst, Clausewitz, Charles or Jomini – notwithstanding their divergences; and it is the idea that still prevails in contemporary understandings of the notion, whatever the fields of action considered (military or non-military).

Between Maizeroy's time and Jomini's, however, a gradual shift in perspective occurred, both because the exchange and confrontation of ideas on the issue helped to refine the concepts, and because the impact of Bonaparte's campaigns stimulated reflection and led to new ways of approaching these concepts. In the first phase, German-speaking military writers put more emphasis on the relationship between strategy and tactics than Maizeroy did. In a second phase, following Bonaparte's first campaigns, the focus turned to the conditions for a successful engagement, both at the strategic and tactical levels. In a third phase, the focus shifted to the role of engagement in achieving the aim of the war. Finally, logistics was reintroduced into the formula.

Conclusion

In one moment on 12 December 1818, Napoleon – by then exiled in Saint Helena – condensed, with his comments and reaction, the circumstances from which the concept of strategy emerged. He, who had greatly stimulated reflection among German-speaking military writers at the beginning of the century, had just read a French translation of the treatise of Archduke Charles proposed by Jomini; The latter would soon bring to a close the intellectual process that had been fuelled by the debate on the concept of strategy.

So, who invented the concept of strategy? All those who contributed to the progressive development of the notion. Maizeroy, despite his hesitations, Bourscheid, despite his approximations, a group of German-speaking authors who adopted the term while confronting their ideas about it, Clausewitz whose definition has passed into posterity, Jomini who

completed the work by turning a conceptual pair into a conceptual triad; and of course, the man who remained sceptical about terminology, but whose action prompted the emergence of new ways of thinking about warfare and major military operations. Referring to the definitions of Charles and Jomini, Napoleon formulated his own definition of strategy versus tactics: 'strategy is the art of plans of campaign and tactics the art of battles'. However, a few months later, Napoleon conceded that he did 'not even understand the word strategy very well'. He seemed to agree with Jomini's definition (that of 1818) and considered that strategy corresponded to what used to be called grand tactics.⁷⁴

The many definitions that existed in the late 18th and early 19th centuries did not fix the concept of strategy, which was constantly questioned and reinterpreted in the military field, at first, and subsequently in other fields. The dynamic of reflection did not differ from one era to another: it consists of conceiving new ways of thinking about changing phenomena.

Footnotes

¹ Lawrence Freedman, 'Meaning of Strategy', *Texas National Security Review* 1 (2017), 105.

² Beatrice Heuser, *The Evolution of Strategy* (Cambridge: CUP 2010), 5.

³ Murray K. Dahm, *The Career and Writings of Sextus Julius Frontinus*, (Master's Thesis: University of Auckland 1997), https://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Roman/Texts/Frontinus/MKDahm**/body.html

⁴ Everett Wheeler, *Stratagem and the Vocabulary of Military Trickery* (Leiden: Brill, 1988), 9-10. See also the definition in the *Suda*: <http://www.cs.uky.edu/%7Eraphael/sol/sol-entries/sigma/1167>.

⁵ <http://www.cs.uky.edu/%7Eraphael/sol/sol-entries/sigma/1168>.

⁶ Polyanus, *Στρατηγήματα* (Chicago: Ares, 1994), 570.

⁷ The first version of this essay was too confusing on this issue, as Hew Strachan rightly observed. I will try to clarify my approach in another essay, specifically devoted to the *taktiké/stratēgiké* relationship in Byzantine military treatises.

⁸ John Haldon, *Warfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World, 565-1204* (Abingdon: Routledge 1999), 33-34.

⁹ *Institutions militaires de l'empereur Léon le Philosophe* (Paris: Jombert 1771), I, XXXIII-XXXVII.

¹⁰ The prologue of the *Taktika* repeatedly distinguishes between *taktiké* (τακτική) and *stratēgiké* (στρατηγική) by referring to their status (*katástasis*, κατάσταση), their method (*méthodos*, μέθοδος), their exercises (*meletáō*, μελετώ) and their maxims (*gnōmai*, γνώμαι). As for the definition of *stratēgiké*, it is formulated as follows: this 'is how good commanders put their military training into practice, their drilling with stratagems, and putting together ways of defeating [the enemy]'. George Dennis, *The Taktika of Leo VI* (Washington: Dumbarton Oaks 2010), 4-10.

¹¹ *Das Strategikon des Maurikios* (Wien: Verlag der österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften 1981), 228.

- ¹² Alexandre David, "L'interprète des plus grands maîtres" Paul-Gédéon Joly de Maizeroy l'inventeur de la stratégie', *Stratégique* 99/1 (2010), 79.
- ¹³ *Essais militaires* (Amsterdam: Gosses 1762), 130.
- ¹⁴ *Traité de tactique* (Paris: Merlin 1767), II, 35.
- ¹⁵ *Institutions militaires*, I, 6-7.
- ¹⁶ *Institutions militaires*, II, 263.
- ¹⁷ *Denkwürdiger und nützlicher rheinischer Antiquarius* (Koblenz: Hergt 1858), V, 395.
- ¹⁸ *Churbaierisches Intelligenzblatt*, 21 Oct. 1775.
- ¹⁹ *Ioannis Mevrsi Opervm, volvmen sextum ex recensione Ioannis Lami* (Florentiæ: Regiis magni Etrvriae dveis typis, apvd Tartinivm, et Franchivm 1745), 542.
- ²⁰ *Kaisers Leo des Philosophen Strategie und Taktik* (Wien: *Trattnern* 1777), I, 98.
- ²¹ Plato, *Euthyd.* 273c.
- ²² *Kaisers Leo des Philosophen Strategie und Taktik*, I, 36.
- ²³ *Kaisers Leo des Philosophen Strategie und Taktik*, V, 219.
- ²⁴ *Kaisers Leo des Philosophen Strategie und Taktik*, I, 174.
- ²⁵ *Encyclopédie militaire*, Jan. 1771, 80 ; Feb. 1771, 99.
- ²⁶ Adam Parr, *The Mandate of Heaven: Strategy, Revolution, and the First European Translation of Sunzi's Art of War* (Leiden: Brill 2019), 218.
- ²⁷ Alexandre David, *Joly de Maizeroy* (Paris: Editions de l'Ecole de guerre 2018), 272.
- ²⁸ Jeremy Black, *Plotting Power. Strategy in the Eighteenth Century* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press 2017), 130-136.
- ²⁹ *Défense du système de guerre moderne* (Neuchâtel: s.n. 1779), II, 1.
- ³⁰ *Mémoires du général baron de Wimpffen* (Paris: Didot 1788), I, 154. *L'Esprit des journaux françois et étrangers*, Oct. 1784, 409.
- ³¹ *Description de l'Académie-Caroline de Stouitgard* (Stouitgard: Imprimerie de l'Académie-Caroline 1784), 104 and 316.
- ³² Azar Gat, *A History of Military Thought* (Oxford: OUP 2001), 65.

³³ Idées raisonnées sur un système général et suivi de toutes les connaissances militaires et sur une méthode lumineuse pour étudier la science de la guerre (Nuremberg: Monath 1783), XVI.

³⁴ Grande tactique et Manœuvres de guerre suivant les principes de sa majesté prussienne [...] suivies d'un Précis de la campagne de 1778 entre les armées autrichiennes et prussiennes, traduit de l'allemand (Paris: Jombert 1781). Johann von Bourscheid, Der erste Feldzug im vierten preußischen Kriege im Gesichtspunkte der Strategie (Wien: Trattner 1778), 3.

³⁵ Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek, IV-V (1783), 285.

³⁶ The Critical Review or Annals of Literature, XLVIII (1779), 310.

³⁷ Realzeitung, oder *Beyträge* und Anzeigen von Gelehrten und Kunstsachen, 28 March 1780, 201-202.

³⁸ Allgemeine deutsche Bibliothek, 44 (1781), 258-270. Anhang zum dem [...] Band der Allgemeinen deutschen Bibliothek, 3 (1785), 1621-1627.

³⁹ Göttingische Anzeigen von gelehrten Sachen, I (1779), 93 and 95.

⁴⁰ Versuch einen militärischen Geschichte des bayrischen Erbfolgekriege im Jahr 1778, im Gesichtspunkt der Wahrheit (Königsberg: 1781), I, 36.

⁴¹ Anders Palmgren, *Visions of Strategy. Following Clausewitz Train of Thought*(Helsinki: National Defense University 2014), 85.

⁴² Jean-Jacques Langendorf, *La Pensée militaire prussienne* (Paris: Economica 2012), 61.

⁴³ Daniel Hohrath, 'Ferdinand Friedrich von Nicolai: Betrachtungen über die vorzüglichsten Gegenstände einer zur Bildung angehender Officiers anzuordnen den Kriegsschule (1770), *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen*, 51 (1992), 111.

⁴⁴ Die Anordnung einer gemeinsamen Kriegsschule für alle Waffen (Stuttgart: Mezler 1781), 2 and 548-549.

⁴⁵ Einleitung in die sämtlichen militärischen Wissenschaften für junge Leute (Braunschweig: Waisenhaus-Buchhandlung 1783).

⁴⁶ Langendorf, *La pensée militaire prussienne*, 67-75.

⁴⁷ Max Jähns, *Geschichte der Wissenschaften in Deutschland*(München: Oldenbourg 1891), XXI, 1812.

⁴⁸ Black, *Plotting Power. Strategy in the Eighteenth Century*, 136.

⁴⁹ Der erste Feldzug im vierten prussischen Kriege, IV, 31.

⁵⁰ Die Anordnung einer gemeinsamen Kriegsschule für alle Waffen, 1-2.

⁵¹ Betrachtungen über die Kriegskunst über ihre Fortschritte, ihre Widersprüche und ihre Zuverlässigkeit (Leipzig: s.n.

1797), 14-16 and 66.

⁵² *Geist des neuern Kriegssystems* (Hamburg: Hofmann 1799), 83-84.

⁵³ *Encyclopédie méthodique. Arts militaires*, (Paris: Agasse), 4, 890-896.

⁵⁴ Arthur Kuhle, *Die preußische Kriegstheorie um 1800 und ihre Suchenach dynamischen Gleichgewichten*, (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot 2018), 137 and 123.

⁵⁵ *Geist des neuern Kriegssystems*, 89.

⁵⁶ *Geist des neuern Kriegssystems* (Hamburg: Hofmann 1805), 110.

⁵⁷ *Histoire du feld-maréchal Souvarof* (Paris: Egron 1809), 354-355.

⁵⁸ *Lehrbuch angewandten Taktik* (Schleswig: Röhß 1800), 1, V.

⁵⁹ *Lehrbuch der Strategie*, (Schleswig: Röhß, 1800), I, XVIII-XIX.

⁶⁰ *Mathematisches System der angewandten Taktik* (Schleswig: Röhß 1800), 8 and 85.

⁶¹ *Kritische Betrachtungen des letzten und wichtigsten Feldzugs im achtzehnten Jahrhundert und der dem Oesterreichischen Staate angemessensten Kriegführung...*, (Braunschweig: Reichard 1802), 16.

⁶² *Handbuch für Officiere* (Hannover: Helwingschen Hofcuchandlung 1790), I-II.

⁶³ Scharnhorst, 'Über die Schlacht bei Marengo', *Denkwürdigkeiten der militärischen Gesellschaft*, 1 (1802), 52-59.

⁶⁴ *Historical and Political Writings* (Princeton: Princeton University Press 2014), 103.

⁶⁵ *Strategie*, aus dem Jahr 1804 mit Zusätzen von 1808 und 1809 (Hamburg: Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt 1937), 62.

⁶⁶ *Grundzüge der reinen Strategie* (Amsterdam: Kunst und Industrie Comptoir 1809), 1, 4 and 6.

⁶⁷ Rühle von Lilienstern, 'Grundzüge der reinen Strategie', *Pallas*, 2 (1808), 133-178.

⁶⁸ Langendorf, 'Clausewitz avant Clausewitz: Johann Friedrich Konstantin von Lossau', *Stratégique*, 5 (2009), 149-173.

⁶⁹ *Der Krieg. Für wahre Krieger* (Leipzig: Engelman, 1815), 2, 111, 156-157, 243 and 287.

⁷⁰ Jomini, 'L'art de la guerre', *Pallas*, 1 (1808), 34 and 37.

⁷¹ *Recueil de souvenirs pour mes enfants* (Château de Morges [Switzerland], CMM: bibliothèque L13; CHPM TAP 0196), II, 485.

⁷² *Principes de la stratégie* (Paris: Magimel, Anselin et Pochard 1818), I, 2.

⁷³ *Précis de l'art de la guerre* (Paris: Tanera 1855), 36 and 155-156.

⁷⁴ Bruno Colson, *Napoleon: on War* (Oxford: OUP 2015), 84-85.

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