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Mīmāṃsā versus Vaiśeṣika

Pārthasārathi and Kumārila on the creation and dissolution of the world*
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In a recent publication Peri Sarveswara Sharma (1994: 60) draws attention to a passage in Pārthasārathi Miśra's commentary Nyāyaratnākara on Kumārila Bhaṭṭa's Ślokavārttika, where the former, so he claims, summarises the views of Praśastapāda, author of the Padārthadharmasaṅgraha, better known as Praśastapādabhāṣya. Pārthasārathi's passage occurs under verse 66 of the chapter called Sambandhākṣepaparihāra, and reads as follows:¹

*vaiśeṣikās tv āhuḥ: anādir ayaṃ sṛṣṭipralayapravāhaḥ, brāhmanānena
 varṣasātānte bhagavato maheśvarasya samastajagatsaṃhārecchā bhavati,
 tadicchāvadiśvarātmasaṃyogāt paramāṇuṣu vibhāgakarmāṇy utpadyante, taiś ca
 sarveṣu mitho vibhakteṣu yāvad dvyaṇukaṃ sarvāvayavināśād paramāṇava eva
 kevalāḥ pāṛthivāpyataijasavāyaviyā vyomakāladigātmamanāṃsi cāvatiṣṭhante,
dharmādharmās ca tāvantaṃ kalam īsvarecchāpratibaddhāḥ phalam
aprayacchantas teṣu teṣv ātmasv avatiṣṭhante, punas tāvati kāle gate tasyaiva
 bhagavataḥ karmopabhogaśūnyān ātmano dṛṣṭvā anukampāparaśasya sisṛkṣā
 bhavati, tataḥ sisṛkṣāvadiśvarātmasaṃyogāt paramāṇuṣu karmotpattes tadvaśān
 mithaḥ saṃyuktais tair dvyaṇukādikrameṇa pṛthivyādaya ārabhyante, tatas
tadicchāvaśād evāpagatapatibandhair abhivyaktasāmarthyair vividhaiḥ
karmabhir vividhānekanarapaśvādibhedabhinnaṃ bhūtajātam ārabhyate, tataḥ sa
 eva maheśvaro dharmādharmapratipādanāya vedān sṛjati/ tad evaṃ pratisargam
 anye 'nye ca vedāḥ, pravāhataḥ tu vedāḥ sṛṣṭipralayāś cānādayaḥ, kartā ca
 maheśvaro 'nādir eva, iha ca paramāṇūnām upādānatvān nānupādānatvaṃ sṛṣṭer
 iti/*

* I thank Gerdi Gerschheimer for help and advice.

¹ NyR 5.15.66, p. 465-66.

Pārthasārathi does not say that he here summarises the views of Praśastapāda. It is however true that the Padārthadharmasaṅgraha contains a passage which in its contents is close to the above one. The relevant parts of it read:²

*ihedānīm caturṇām mahābhūtānām sṛṣṭisamhāraavidhir ucyate/ brāhmeṇa mānena
varṣaśatānte ... maheśvarasya samjihirṣāsamakālam
śarīrendriyamahābhūtopanibandhakānām sarvātmagatānām adṛṣṭānām
vṛttnirodhe sati maheśvarecchātmāṇusamyogajakarmabhyaḥ
śarīrendriyakāraṇāṇuvibhāgebhyaḥ tatsamyoganivṛttau teṣām āparamāṇvanto
vināśaḥ/ tathā pṛthivyudakajvalanapavanānām api mahābhūtānām anenaiva
krameṇottarasminn uttarasmin sati pūrvasya pūrvasya vināśaḥ/ tataḥ
pravibhaktāḥ paramāṇavo 'vatiṣṭhante dharmādharmasaṃskārānuviddhāś
cātmānas tāvantam eva kālam/ tataḥ punaḥ prāṇinām bhogabhūtaye
maheśvarasiṣṭkṣānantaram sarvātmagatavṛtilabdhdṛṣṭāpekṣebhyaḥ
tatsamyogebhyaḥ pavanaparamāṇuṣu karmotpattau teṣām
parasparasamyogebhyo dvyaṇukādīprakrameṇa mahān vāyuḥ samutpann[ah]
etc.*

There can be no doubt that Pārthasārathi's account contains much that is also found in the Padārthadharmasaṅgraha. It even looks as if Pārthasārathi misinterpreted a compound used by Praśastapāda. The latter's passage contains the ambiguous expression *maheśvarecchātmāṇusamyogajakarmabhyaḥ*. The part *maheśvarecchātmāṇusamyoga* means, according to the commentators: "the desire of God and contact (or: the contacts) between the souls and the atoms".³ The whole expression *maheśvarecchātmāṇusamyogajakarma-* must therefore mean: "movements arisen from the desire of God and contact between the souls and the atoms".

Pārthasārathi's passage, on the other hand, has the phrase *tadicchāvadīśvarātmāmasamyogāt paramāṇuṣu vibhāgakarmāṇy utpadyante*: "movements of separation arise in the atoms as a result of contact between God characterised by that desire on the one hand and the souls on the other". It is hard to imagine that such a position was ever held by a Vaiśeṣika. But it is conceivable that this position was ascribed to the Vaiśeṣikas as a result of a careless reading of the ambiguous expression *maheśvarecchātmāṇusamyoga*. Grammatically this could mean "contact between the

² WI p. 9-10 §§ 57-58.

³ Vy I p. 98 l. 3-4: *maheśvarecchā nimittakāraṇam, ātmanām aṇubhiḥ samyogaś ca asamavāyikāraṇam*; Ki p. 62 l. 8: *maheśvarecchayā sahita ye ātmāṇusamyogāḥ*; Ny p. 136 l. 9: *maheśvarasyecchā cātmāṇusamyogāś ceti vighrahaḥ*.

desire of God, the souls, and the atoms". As stated above, such an interpretation does not easily fit into Vaiśeṣika doctrine.

Do we have to conclude from all this that Pārthasārathi here summarises, i.e. reformulates in his own words, the passage from the Padārthadharmasaṅgraha? Or did he have another source, which he perhaps quotes verbatim? It is to be observed that, in spite of the similarities, there are also some important differences between Pārthasārathi's passage and the Padārthadharmasaṅgraha. It is known that the Vedāntin Śāṅkara was acquainted with a Vaiśeṣika account of the creation of the world different from that in the Padārthadharmasaṅgraha, and which most probably belonged to the earlier, but now lost, Kaṇḍī of Rāvaṇa.⁴ Is it possible that Pārthasārathi, too, used that text?

This possibility can be discarded. Rāvaṇa's Kaṇḍī did, to be sure, contain an account of the creation of the world (and probably one of its destruction), but one in which there was no place for a creator God. Indeed, Śāṅkara criticises it for this very reason. Praśastapāda may have been the first Vaiśeṣika author to introduce the notion of a creator (and destroyer) God.

What about Praśastapāda's Ṭīkā on the Kaṇḍī, which has not been preserved either? Is it possible that Pārthasārathi used a Vaiśeṣika account of the creation and destruction of the world which he found in that text? Are the elements recorded by Pārthasārathi that have no parallels in the Padārthadharmasaṅgraha to be explained as borrowings from Praśastapāda's Ṭīkā?

We will see that this too is highly improbable. Pārthasārathi attributes to the Vaiśeṣikas an idea which they are unlikely to have held. It is the idea that God interrupts the workings of karmic retribution at the time of cosmic dissolution, and ends this interruption at the time of renewed creation. We will discuss this point below.

First we consider the following. Pārthasārathi's presentation of the alleged Vaiśeṣika position introduces a passage in the Ślokavārttika in which the notion of a creator God is criticised. It is therefore conceivable that it — or at least the parts that talk about God interrupting karmic retribution — has been composed to fit the verses of Kumārila's text. Soon after this account Pārthasārathi introduces a verse of the Ślokavārttika with the words: "Concerning what has been said to the extent that deeds do not bear fruit because they are interrupted by the desire of God, [Kumārila] says".⁵ And after that same verse he resumes: "But there is no proof that all deeds, without giving result, have been interrupted by the mere desire of God."⁶ May we conclude that

⁴ Bronkhorst, 1996. For information about the Kaṇḍī, see Bronkhorst, 1993.

⁵ NyR p. 466 l. 21: *yat tūktam īśvarecchāpratibaddhatvāt karmāṇi na phalantīti, tatrāha.*

⁶ NyR p. 466 l. 24-25: *sarvakarmaṇām tu phalam adadatām īśvarecchāmātreṇa pratibaddhānām avasthānam apramāṇakam iti.*

already Kumāriḷa ascribed to the Vaiśeṣikas the idea that God's mere desire interrupts the working of karma?

This is far from obvious. Kumāriḷa does not mention God's desire, nor indeed anyone else's, in the context of the destruction of the world (which he does not accept). Quite on the contrary, he speaks of a deed (*karman*) of Prajāpati. The verses concerned read as follows:⁷

*pralaye 'pi pramāṇaṃ naḥ sarvocchedātmake na hi/
na ca prayojanaṃ tena syāt prajāpatikarmaṇā //68//
na ca karmavatāṃ yuktā sthitis tadbhogavarjitā/
karmāntaraniruddhaṃ hi phalaṃ na syāt kriyāntarāt //69//
sarveṣāṃ tu phalāpetāṃ na sthānam upapadyate/
na cāpy anupabhogo 'sau kasyacit karmaṇaḥ phalam //70//
aśeṣakarmanāśe vā punaḥ sṛṣṭir na yujyate/*

This means:

68. For we have no proof for a dissolution in the form of universal destruction.

And that activity (*karman*) on the part of Prajāpati would serve no purpose.

69. Moreover, it is not possible that beings that have engaged in activity (*karmavat*) would stop without experiencing [the results of] those [activities]; for the fruit deriving from one action cannot be stopped by another activity (*karman*).

70. The coming to a stop of all [beings] without [experiencing] the fruits [of their activities] is not possible. And nor is that absence of experience itself the fruit of any activity (*karman*).

71ab. Alternatively, in case all activities (*karman*) have been destroyed, no new creation is possible.

This passage repeatedly uses the word *karman*, a notoriously difficult term to translate. It means primarily activity, but can also refer to the mechanism that brings about karmic retribution. In the case of Vaiśeṣika this means that *dharma* and *adharma*, or *adr̥ṣṭa*, might conceivably be referred to by this term. It certainly never refers to the desire of God, especially not if, as Pārthasārathi maintains, God's desire interferes with the process of karmic retribution. Kumāriḷa's text speaks about cosmic dissolution as an

⁷ ŚIV 5.15.68-71ab.

activity, most probably an activity of Prajāpati, and there is no reason whatsoever to assume that God's desire played a special role in this event.

This impression is confirmed by the fact that God's desire does enter the picture in Kumāriḷa's then following account of renewed creation. God's desire is here presented, hypothetically, as the cause of karmic retribution, and is indeed contrasted with activity. The verses concerned read:⁸

karmaṇāṃ vāpy abhivyaḷtau kiṃ nimittaṃ tadā bhavet //71//

īsvarecchā yadīṣyate saiva syāl lokakāraṇam/

īsvarecchāvaśīṭve hi niṣphalā karmakalpanā //72//

na cānimittayā yuktam utpattuṃ hīsvarecchayā/

yad vā tasyā nimittaṃ yat tad bhūtānāṃ bhaviṣyati //73//

71cd. Or if [you maintain that] activities manifest themselves [anew at the occasion of a new creation], what would cause this?

72. If you propose God's desire, then let that be the cause of the world. For it would be pointless to imagine [the efficacy of] actions (*karman*) if [the creation of the world] is controlled by God's desire.

73. Moreover, God's desire cannot come into existence without having itself a cause; or rather, the cause of that [desire] will be the cause [of the creation of] living beings.

God's desire, then, is introduced in the discussion of the creation of the world, but plays no role in its dissolution. Kumāriḷa's opponents rather looked upon the destruction of the world as due to the activity of Prajāpati. There is nothing typically Vaiśeṣika in this part of the discussion.

Pārthasārathi, on the other hand, uses this passage as a pretext to ascribe a certain position to the Vaiśeṣikas. To understand what is at stake, some general reflections are called for.

The notion of a creator God had been introduced into Vaiśeṣika (perhaps by Praśastapāda) for a special reason. It solved a problem which had occupied the thinkers of that school. It answered the question how deeds of living beings can bring about situations that punish or reward them. In other words, it helped to understand the mechanism of karmic retribution. Earlier Vaiśeṣikas had tried to solve this problem differently. They had claimed that deeds and their retributions are linked through the intermediary of two qualities of the soul, *dharma* and *adharmā*. The soul of each living creature being omnipresent and eternal, these qualities could be thought of as acting at a

⁸ ŚIV 5.15.71cd-73.

distance, and at a moment of time far removed from the deed that had caused them. However, foresight and conscious design could not be attributed to these qualities. These were rather linked to other qualities of the soul — such as *buddhi* ‘knowledge’ — that are not involved in the mechanism of karmic retribution. How then can these unconscious qualities act as if guided by foresight and conscious design?

The answer proposed by Praśastapāda is simple. They **are** guided by foresight and conscious design. There is an all-powerful creator God who arranges things in such a way that *dharma* and *adharma* bring about the desired results. The following passage from the Padārthadharmasaṅgraha shows this:⁹

When in this way the four composite elements have come into existence, a great egg (*mahad aṇḍam*) is formed, caused solely by God's (*maheśvara*) meditation / volition (*abhidhyāna*), out of atoms of fire with an admixture of atoms of earth.¹⁰ In it [God] creates Brahmā, with four faces like so many lotuses, the grandfather of all worlds (*sarvalokapitāmahaṃ brahmānam*), and all worlds; he then enjoins him with the duty of creating living things. That Brahmā, thus enjoined by God, and endowed with abundant knowledge, complete absence of passion and absolute power, **knows the effects of the deeds of living beings**; he creates the Prajāpatis, his mind-created (*mānasa*) sons, with knowledge, experience and span of life **in accordance with their [past] deeds**; [he also creates] the Manus, Devas, Ṛṣis and groups of Pitṛs (*pitṛgaṇa*), the four *varṇas* out of his mouth, arms, thighs and feet (*mukhabāhūrupādataḥ*) [respectively], and the other living beings, high and low (*uccāvacāni bhūtāni*); he then connects them with Dharma, knowledge, absence of passion and power **in accordance with their residue of past deeds**.

Other authors of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools confirm the importance of this side of God's activity. They came to admit that they could not make sense of karmic retribution without assuming an omnipotent God supervising the process.¹¹

⁹ WI p. 11, § 59: *evam samutpanneṣu caturṣu mahābhūteṣu maheśvarasyābhidhānamātrāt taijasebhyo 'ṇubhyaḥ pārvivāpamāṇusahitebhyo* (variants: *pārvivādīparamāṇusahitebhyo*, *pārvivāṇusahitebhyo*) *mahad aṇḍam ārabhyate* (some editions read *utpadyate*)/ *tasmiṃś caturvadanakamalaṃ sarvalokapitāmahaṃ* (variant: *caturvadanakamalasakalalokapitāmahaṃ*) *brahmānam sakalabhuvanasahitam utpādya prajāsarṅge viniyunkte* (variant: *niyunkte*)/ *sa ca maheśvareṇa viniyukto* (variant: *niyukto*) *brahmā 'tīśayajñānavairāgyaiśvāryasampannaḥ prāninām* (variant: *sarvaprāninām*) *karmavipākam viditvā karmānurūpajñānabhogāyusaḥ sutān prajāpatīn mānasān manudevarṣipitṛgaṇān* (variant: *manūn deva*) *mukhabāhūrupādataś caturō varṇān anyāni coccāvacāni bhūtāni* (variants: *bhūtāni ca; anyāni coccāvacāni ca sṛṣṭvā*) *sṛṣṭvā, āśayānurūpair dharmajñānavairāgyaiśvāryaiḥ saṃyojayatīti*//

¹⁰ Atoms of fire with an admixture of atoms of earth constitute, in Vaiśeṣika, gold.

¹¹ See my forthcoming article "Consciousness and teleology in the Indian philosophical tradition".

Unfortunately for the Mīmāṃsakas this solution was not open to them. They were indissolubly linked to the idea that the Veda is without beginning (not uttered by God, as the Vaiśeṣikas had it), having been continuously handed down in a world which, too, is without beginning, and without periodic destructions and recreations. They did however accept the principle of karmic retribution. But unlike the Vaiśeṣikas they had to maintain that karmic retribution can work, and can be understood, without assuming that it is guided by foresight and conscious design.

We now understand why Pārthasārathi, instead of presenting the notion of God as a means to explain karmic retribution, depicts it as interfering with it. The period of dissolution of the world, in particular, is described as one in which "*dharmā* and *adharmā*, not producing an effect because interrupted by the desire of God, remain in their respective souls" (*dharmādharmāś ca ... īśvarecchāpratibaddhāḥ phalam aprayacchantas teṣu teṣv ātmasv avatiṣṭhante*). And the subsequent renewed creation of living beings is made possible by the removal of those restraints: "Then many different living beings, such as humans, animals, etc., are produced by the various deeds (*karman*) whose potencies have become manifest once the interruptions have disappeared due to the power of [God's] desire [to create]" (*tatas tadicchāvaśād evāpagatapatibandhair abhivyaktasāmarthyair vividhaiḥ karmabhir vividhānekanarapaśvādibhedabhinnam bhūtajātam ārabhyate*). In other words, if only God did not interfere, karmic retribution would pursue its normal course, and there would be no destruction and new creation of the world. This position is attributed to the Vaiśeṣikas. The Mīmāṃsā position is closely related to this: There is no creator God who interferes, and karmic retribution does pursue its course, not interrupted by destructions and renewed creations of the world.

Do we have to conclude that Pārthasārathi made up the position he ascribes to the Vaiśeṣikas? The answer must be negative. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's Nyāyamañjarī (ca. 900 C.E.)¹² contains some passages that are of interest. First there is a passage that presents a view that is rejected by the critic of the idea of a creator God, and which may therefore represent Jayanta's own position:¹³

*atha brāhmeṇa mānena saṃvatsaraśataniṣṭhām adhiṣṭhāti parameṣṭhīni
maheśvarasya saṃjihīrṣā jāyate/ tayā tirohitasvaphalārambhaśaktīni karmāṇi
saṃbhavantīti saṃpadyate sakalabhuvanapralayaḥ/ punaś ca tāvaty eva
rātriṣṭhāye kāle vyatīte siṣṭkṣā bhavati bhagavataḥ/ tayā 'bhivyaktaśaktīni
karmāṇi kāryam ārabhante iti.*

¹² On the date of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa see Hacker, 1951: 162 (112).

¹³ NM p. 490/177.

Then, when Brahman supervises the conclusion of hundred Brahman-years, a desire to destroy arises in the Supreme Lord. On account of that [desire] the activities (*karman*) lose the power to bring about their results, and so the dissolution of all worlds comes about. And again, when the same amount of time, which is like the night, has passed, a desire to create arises in the Lord. On account of that [desire to create] the power of the activities manifests itself, and the activities bring about their effect.

Later in the same discussion about God, the Nyāyamañjarī refers back to this passage and states:¹⁴

*nanu ca yugapad eva sakalajagatpralayakaraṇam anupapannam, avināśinām
karmaṇām phalopabhogapratibandhāsaṃbhavād iti coditam/ na yuktaṃ etat/
īśvarecchāpratibaddhānām karmaṇām stimitaśaktīnām avasthānāt/
tadicchāpreritāni karmāṇi phalam ādadhati/ tadicchāpratibaddhāni ca
tatrodāsate/ kasmād evam iti cet/ acetanānām cetanānadhiṣṭhitānām
svakāryakaraṇānupalabdheḥ/*

It has been objected that the simultaneous dissolution of the entire universe is not possible, because it is not possible to obstruct the experiences of their results of the activities (*karman*) which are undestructable. This is not correct. Because the activities are obstructed by God's desire, and their power [to bring about results] is paralysed. Activities that are impelled by His desire bring about results, and those that are obstructed by His desire remain inactive. If [you ask] why it is like this, [the answer is:] because it has never been observed that unconscious things, not supervised by someone conscious, bring about their effects.

The final argument — unconscious things, not supervised by someone conscious, cannot bring about their effects — is not new, as we have seen. To bring about their effects, activities have to be guided by a conscious being; in other words, they have to be impelled by His desire. This idea may be behind the very introduction of God in the Vaiśeṣika system. The present passage expands the idea by adding that God's desire can also obstruct activities; this explains the simultaneous destruction of the entire universe. But this passage does not say that God only obstructs activities, and that without God's interference they would bring about their results just as well. The final remark "it has never been observed that unconscious things, not supervised by someone conscious,

¹⁴ NM p. 510/186.

bring about their effects" proves the opposite. It had to be a Mīmāṃsaka, viz. Pārthasārathi, who turned the argument on its head. For him God interferes with the working of karma, and nothing else.

Not all Vaiśeṣikas looked upon God's role as that of interrupting the process of karmic retribution. Praśastapāda, as we have seen, states the opposite. And Udayana's Kiraṇāvalī, while commenting Praśastapāda's phrase "when the *adr̥ṣṭas* have stopped their activity" (*adr̥ṣṭānāṃ vṛttinirodhe sati*), explains:¹⁵ *pralayahetunādr̥ṣṭena pratibandhe sati* "when there is interruption [of the *adr̥ṣṭas*] on account of the *adr̥ṣṭa* which is the cause of the destruction [of the world]". *Adr̥ṣṭa*, singular or plural, is synonymous with *dharma* and *adharma*, the two qualities that are responsible for karmic retribution. The destruction of the world itself, according to Udayana, is due to *dharma* and *adharma*, and not to the interruption of their activity caused by the desire of God.

But even Pārthasārathi himself describes, in his Śāstradīpikā, the Vaiśeṣika position in a way which does not differ so blatantly from the texts of that school. (It may here be recalled that the Śāstradīpikā was composed before the Nyāyaratnākara.)¹⁶ We read here (p. 115):

na hi pralaye paramāṇūnāṃ pralayo 'smākam (i.e., vaiśeṣikānām) asti sām̐khyādivat/ kāryadravyāṇi tu dvyaṇukādīni sarvāṇy eveśvarecchayā viśliṣṭāvayavāni pralīyante, paramāṇavas tu mitho 'saṃyuktās tiṣṭhanti vyomādayaś ca kṣetrajñāś cātmīyadharmādharmayuktā evāvatiṣṭhante/ sargakāle punar īśvarecchām kṣetrajñādr̥ṣṭam ca nimittam āsādya paramāṇuṣu karmāṇy utpadyante tadvaśac ca mithaḥ saṃyuktās catuṣṭaye 'pi paramāṇavo dvyaṇukādikrameṇa yathāsvam pṛthivyādikaṃ bhūtacatuṣṭayam ārabhante/ nimittabhūtakṣetrajñādr̥ṣṭavaicitryāc ca jarāyujāṇḍajodbhijjasvedajabhinnam śarīrabhedam īśvarecchākāritasaṃyogaviśeṣāt paramāṇava ārabhante/

For according to us Vaiśeṣikas, unlike the Sām̐khyas, atoms do not dissolve in the dissolution [of the world]. Composite substances (*kāryadravya*), on the other hand, that is to say all dyads and [larger objects], dissolve, their parts having been separated by God's desire; but the atoms, without mutual connection, remain, and so do [the omnipresent substances] such as ether, and the souls, the latter accompanied each by their own *dharma* and *adharma*. At the time of a new creation movements arise in the atoms, the cause of which is God's desire as

¹⁵ Ki p. 62 l. 6-7.

¹⁶ See Ramaswami Sastri, 1937.

well as the *dharma* and *adharma* (*adr̥ṣṭa*) of the souls; the four kinds of atoms, which by virtue of these [movements] are [now] joined together, form the four elements earth etc., each their own, in the sequence which begins with the dyad. And on account of the variety of *dharma* and *adharma* in the souls, which cause [the process], the atoms, because of the special connections brought about by God's desire, form a variety of bodies, viz. born from the womb, born from an egg, sprouting, and born from perspiration.

* * *

We can conclude that Pārthasārathi in his Nyāyaratnākara (but not yet in his Śāstradīpikā) brings to light a fundamental difference in attitude between Mīmāṃsā and Vaiśeṣika with regard to the mechanism of karmic retribution. The Vaiśeṣikas had come to admit that this mechanism is hard to explain in non-teleological terms, and without assuming a conscious agent in the process. They introduced the notion of a creator God in order to avoid this difficulty. The Mīmāṃsā thinkers were basically confronted with the same problem, but could not accept the Vaiśeṣika solution without fundamentally changing their system. All they could do was ignore the problem, and criticise the notion of a creator God on other grounds. This is what Kumārila does. His commentator Pārthasārathi goes one step further. He depicts the Vaiśeṣika system as not really needing the idea of a creator God. We have seen that in so doing he painted an incorrect picture of that system.

References:

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Abbreviations:

ABORI	Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Poona
GOS	Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Baroda
IHQ	Indian Historical Quarterly, Calcutta
JIP	Journal of Indian Philosophy, Dordrecht
Ki	Praśastapādabhāṣya with the commentary Kiranāvalī of Udayana, ed. Jitendra S. Jetly, Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1971 (GOS, 154)
KISchr	Kleine Schriften (in the series of the Glasenapp-Stiftung), Wiesbaden, Stuttgart
KSS	Kāshi Sanskrit Series, Benares
NM	Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta Bhaṭṭa: 1) ed. K.S. Varadacharya, Mysore: Oriental Research Institute, 1969 (Oriental Research Institute Series, 116); 2) ed. Surya Nārāyana Śukla, Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1971 (KSS 106)
Ny	Nyāyakandalī of Śrīdhara, ed. J.S. Jetly and Vasant G. Parikh, Vadodara: Oriental Institute, 1991 (GOS, 174)
NyR	Nyāyaratnākara of Pārthasārathi Miśra (for the edition see ŚIV)
ŚIV	Ślokavārttika of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa, with the commentary Nyāyaratnākara of Pārthasārathi Miśra, ed. Dvārikādāsa Śāstrī, Varanasi: Ratna Publications, 1978 (Ratnabharati Series, 3)
Vy	Vyomavatī of Vyomaśiva, ed. Gaurinath Sastri, Varanasi: Sampurnanand Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya, 1983-84 (M.M. Śivakumāraśāstri-granthamālā, 6)
WI	Word Index to the Praśastapādabhāṣya, by Johannes Bronkhorst and Yves Ramseier, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1994