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**Basic Indicators for Better
Governance in International
Sport (BIBGIS): An assessment
tool for international sport
governing bodies**

IDHEAP Working Paper
1/2013

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FOR INTERNATIONAL SPORT GOVERNING BODIES**

IDHEAP Working paper 1/2013

Chair of Public Management

January 2013

This Working Paper can be downloaded from www.idheap.ch >Publications >Working Papers

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The authors wish to thank all those who contributed comments to previous versions of this working paper including Jens Sejer Andersen (Play The Game), Dawn Aquilina (IDHEAP), Ingrid Beutler (SportAccord), Rowland Jack (Itrustsport), Simona Kustec-Lipicer (University of Ljubljana), Sarah Lacarrière (SportAccord), Francisco Lima (FEI), Christian Milz (EAA), Roger Pielke (University of Colorado), Alex Phillips (UEFA), Hans-Jörg Wirz (EAA), and Sabrina Zeender (FEI). The errors and omissions remain ours.

1. Introduction

Since the beginning of the 21st century, high profile cases of corruption, doping, and match fixing in sport, as well as mismanagement and lack of efficiency within sport governing bodies (SGB) have resulted in calls for good governance. The concept grew rapidly in different parts of the world, tinted with different cultures (e.g. Henry & Lee, 2004), framed with different theoretical influences (such as corporate governance or democratic governance), and with a variety of different titles such as “best practices”, “principles of conduct” or simply “governance”. Since the European Union Council’s Nice Declaration on Sport in December 2000 and the first International Conference on Governance in Sport in February 2001 in Brussels, many governmental organisations, sport organisations and scholars have tried to define sets of principles of good governance specific to sport and its various local, national and international SGBs. We have identified more than 35 such sets of principles, guidelines or recommendations (see appendix 1). In the spring of 2013, the European Commission should add to this collection by publishing another set of principles of good governance in sport from its Expert Group on Good Governance created in 2011.

Being highly extensible and flexible, principles of good governance can encompass a wide range of sporting organisations and activity. However, less developed in the literature is the discussion about the extent to which these principles meet reality. If we consider transparency – which is found in almost all sets of principles – what kind of information are we asking for? Which channels are to be used? When is the information disseminated? In other words, how can a SGB evaluate whether transparency is effectively implemented in its own policies, procedures and structures? Only a handful of studies have tried to deconstruct good governance into potential measurement indicators (see for instance Burger & Goslin, 2005; de Zwart & Gilligan, 2009), and mostly on a national basis. Moreover, the governance structures of sport organisations are rarely identical (Hums, MacLean, & Zintz, 2011, p. 24). The organisational culture and resources of International sport governing bodies (ISGBs) are similarly diverse. For example, the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA) which governs football worldwide, is a Swiss non-profit association of currently 209 national associations, a meta-organisation (Arhne & Brunsson 2005) like most so-called “international sport federations” (IFs). The International Olympic Committee (IOC) is also a Swiss association but of natural persons (a maximum of 115). By contrast, the World Anti-Doping Agency is a Swiss foundation which does not have members, although it is governed by a board of 38 natural persons and works on a daily basis with many national and regional anti-doping agencies around the world which are public or sometime private organisations. The International Paralympic Committee is an association under German Association Law composed of IFs, National Paralympic Committees, International organisations of sport for the disabled and Regional organisations.

Recognising these differences, we therefore assume that “good governance” is too context sensitive to be applied universally across all sport organisations, locally, nationally or internationally. What is needed is a way to evaluate the governance of a given sport organisation so that it can improve over the years. In that sense, in line with Chappelet (2011), we call for “better” sport governance. The aim of this working paper is to present a pragmatic tool for assessing the state of governance of ISGBs.

This working paper is organised as follows. We start by presenting different definitions of governance and some examples of principles of good governance in sport and critique them. We then introduce

our approach which is based on a limited number of indicators divided among seven dimensions and apply it to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and the Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). Although our approach can also be used to benchmark the governance of different sport organisations, we demonstrate that it faces limitations. We conclude with suggested next steps for future BIBGIS developments.

2. Examples of existing principles

We highlight in chronological order one example from each of the three following sources of principles of governance: Scholars (Henry & Lee), intergovernmental organisations (Council of Europe) and ISGBs (International Olympic Committee). We do not analyse examples at the national level as we are focusing on international sport, including European sport.

2.1 Scholars' principles of sport governance

Among the first scholars to define the concept of good governance in sport, Henry & Lee (2004) present three interrelated approaches to help the understanding of sport governance: systemic governance, political (or democratic) governance, corporate (or organisational) governance. The first is concerned with the competition, cooperation, and mutual adjustment between organisations in business and/or policy systems. The second approach is concerned with how governments or governing bodies in sport steer, rather than directly control, the behaviour of organisations. The last one is concerned with normative, ethically-informed standards of managerial behaviour (Henry & Lee, 2004, p. 25). It is inspired by corporate governance and provides means for resolving unethical or socially unexpected behaviours such as racism, discrimination or conservatism. The authors propose 7 principles (Henry & Lee, 2004, p. 31):

1. *Transparency: clarity in procedures and decision-making, particularly in resource allocation. Organisations charged with care of a public good such as sport have a particular obligation not simply to act in a fair and consistent manner but also to be seen to do so. Thus their inner workings should as far as possible be open to public scrutiny.*
2. *Accountability: sporting organisations are not only responsible to financial investors through financial reporting procedures, but also to those who invest other resources in the organisation – athletes, coaches, parents, supporters, sponsors and so on, even where that investment is largely emotional rather than material.*
3. *Democracy: access to representation in decision-making should be available to those who make up the organisation's "internal constituencies" – with for example representation on boards of such organisations for constituencies such as players, supporters, and managers as well as owners.*
4. *Responsibility: for the sustainable development of the organisation and its sport, and stewardship of their resources and those of the community served.*
5. *Equity: in treatment of constituencies – for example gender equity in treatment of sports participants and in terms of positions within the organisation; and equity in treatment of sports participants (and employees) with disabilities.*

6. *Effectiveness: the establishing and monitoring of measures of effectiveness with measurable and attainable targets.*
7. *Efficiency: the achievement of such goals with the most efficient use of resources.*

2.2 Council of Europe's Principles of Good Governance in Sport

The Council of Europe is the largest institutional governmental construct at the European level. Its 47 member states comprise more or less those represented in European sport governing bodies¹. As such the Council of Europe's membership better reflects the European sporting reality than the European Union's 27 member states. Its driving values are Democracy, Human Rights and Rule of Law. In line with these values and being aware of the risks of corruption and unethical behaviours in sport, the Council of Europe sees in good governance a means to resolve and prevent any breaches to the integrity of sport. After a first attempt in 2004 (see appendix 1), it recommends that non-governmental sport organisations respect 4 important principles (Council of Europe, 2005):

1. *Democratic structures based on clear and regular electoral procedures open to the whole membership;*
2. *Organisation and management of a professional standard, with an appropriate code of ethics and procedures for dealing with conflicts of interest;*
3. *Accountability and transparency in decision-making and financial operations, including the open publication of yearly financial accounts duly audited;*
4. *Fairness in dealing with membership, including gender equality and solidarity.*

2.3 IOC's Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic and Sports Movement

The high profile Meca-Medina and Majcen case in 2006 challenged the autonomy of sports organisations in the production of rules. By declaring that: "if the sporting activity in question falls within the scope of the Treaty [of the EU], the conditions for engaging in it are then subject to all the obligations which result from the various provisions of the Treaty", the Court of Justice of the European Union rejects a "sports exception" tailored for sports organisations and reinforces the legal uncertainty of the environment in which they operate. Aware of these issues, the IOC organised two seminars on the autonomy of the Olympic and Sport movement in 2006 and in 2008, which aimed at analysing the situation regarding autonomy. The second seminar discussed principles of good governance and adopted the Basic Universal Principles (BUPs) of Good Governance of the Olympic and Sports Movement (2008). The BUPs are organized around 7 themes, 34 criteria (see table 1) and comprise a total of close to 110 items (Romon, 2011).

¹ In 2012, UEFA (Union of European Football Associations) has 53 members (national football associations); European Athletics (European Athletics Association) has 50 members; UEG (European Union of Gymnastics) has 48 members, etc.

Table 1: Dimensions and sub-dimensions of the Basic universal principles of good governance of the Olympic and Sports Movement (source: IOC 2008)

1. <i>Vision, mission and strategy</i>	1.1. <i>Vision</i> 1.2. <i>Mission</i> 1.3. <i>Strategy</i>
2. <i>Structures, regulations and democratic process</i>	2.1. <i>Structures</i> 2.2. <i>Clear regulations</i> 2.3. <i>Governing bodies</i> 2.4. <i>Representative governing bodies</i> 2.5. <i>Democratic processes</i> 2.6. <i>Attribution of the respective bodies</i> 2.7. <i>Decision-making</i> 2.8. <i>Conflicts of interests</i> 2.9. <i>Duration of the terms of office</i> 2.10. <i>Decisions and appeals</i>
3. <i>Highest level of competence, integrity and ethical standards</i>	3.1. <i>Competence of the members of the executive body</i> 3.2. <i>Power of signature</i> 3.3. <i>Internal management, communication and coordination</i> 3.4. <i>Risk management</i> 3.5. <i>Appointment of the members of the management</i> 3.6. <i>Code of Ethics and ethical issues</i>
4. <i>Accountability, transparency and control</i>	4.1. <i>Accountability</i> 4.2. <i>Processes and mechanisms</i> 4.3. <i>Transparency and communication</i> 4.4. <i>Financial matters – applicable laws, rules, procedures and standards</i> 4.5. <i>Internal control system</i> 4.6. <i>Education and training</i>
5. <i>Solidarity and development</i>	5.1. <i>Distribution of resources</i> 5.2. <i>Equity</i> 5.3. <i>Development</i>
6. <i>Athletes' involvement, participation and care</i>	6.1. <i>Right to participate and involvement of the athletes in the Olympic and Sports Movement and governing bodies</i> 6.2. <i>Protection of athletes</i> 6.3. <i>Health</i> 6.4. <i>Fight against doping</i> 6.5. <i>Insurance</i> 6.6. <i>Fairness and Fair play</i> 6.7. <i>Athletes' education and career management</i>
7. <i>Harmonious relations with governments while preserving autonomy</i>	7.1. <i>Cooperation, coordination and consultation</i> 7.2. <i>Complementary missions</i> 7.3. <i>Maintain and preserve the autonomy of sport</i>

The BUPs were adopted at the Olympic Congress in 2009 (International Olympic Committee, 2009) and made compulsory by the IOC Ethics Code in 2010, “in particular transparency, responsibility & accountability” (International Olympic Committee, 2010). And finally a fifth Fundamental Principle was added by the IOC to the Olympic Charter in 2011: “Sports organisations within the Olympic

Movement shall have the rights and obligations of autonomy, which include [...] the responsibility for ensuring that principles of good governance be applied.” (International Olympic Committee, 2011).

When considering all the governance principles published since 2000 (see appendix 1), it is clear that they are often interdependent, overlapping, not easily actionable and often too numerous to be of real use to measure the level of governance of ISGBs and to help them improve (Chappelet, 2012a). For example, the principle of *integrity* lacks a precise definition. The principle of *equity* in the BUPs is applied in several contexts such as the distribution of resources, the organisation of competitions, the bidding process for hosting events, and the participation of athletes in competitions (Romon, 2011). The principles of *transparency* and *accountability* overlap or are difficult to separate (e.g. Hood, 2010). These principles also often confuse governance and management (for instance, *efficiency* and *effectiveness*), and few are sport specific (except the principles of *solidarity* and *integrity* if they are mentioned). In addition, most of them are not easy to measure (for instance, *democracy*). It is also noticeable that many of the principles are expressed as recommendations (“should...”) without explaining under what circumstances recommendations become firm obligations. In this vein, Romon (2011) shows that there is a lack of emphasis on the prioritisation of the principles, but also on a clear targeting of their recipients.

3 Basic Indicators for Better Governance in International Sport (BIBGIS)

3.1 Rationale

ISGBs are hybrid organisations. These are mostly non-profit associations, but at the same time they behave like corporations due to their increasing commercialisation (Andreff, 2006; Foster, 2003; Parrish, 2001). They therefore tend to be under the scope of both prescriptive approaches, democratic governance and corporate governance (Pieth, 2011; Chappelet, 2013). Measuring the state or quality of democratic governance is rooted in comparative and development studies. In his seminal work on the concept of “polyarchy”, Dahl aims at measuring the level of democratic process in different countries. He was followed by numerous scholars, intergovernmental institutions and NGOs which generated a plethora of approaches and indicators measuring the quality of democratic governance (Norris, 2011). The United Nations Development Program has identified about 50 of these studies (United Nations Development Program, 2007). The corporate sector has also contributed several frameworks for measuring and regulating the quality of governance of corporations, through the development of binding codes of good practices such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United States or the Combined Code in the UK.

After thorough analysis, we decided to concentrate on 7 broad dimensions of governance which can be found in all the sets of existing principles mentioned above, sometimes under different names. We do not attempt to give a precise and extensive definition of each of these dimensions but instead provide for a limited and equal number of indicators for each dimension. The extent to which an organisation fulfils each indicator should be measured by external or internal experts applying their own qualitative assessment, for example starting with information on the international sport organisation’s website or any other accessible source of data (such as the SportAccord Factsheet on women in leadership positions or the Sydney Scoreboard for gender representation in sport organisations’ boards: www.sydney scoreboard.com) and completing the scoring with one’s

knowledge of the organisation. Since a certain degree of internal and/or external expertise is required this evaluation is therefore an “elite evaluation” according to Norris (2011).

We concentrate on information available publicly as it is this kind of information which can further the (social) accountability of sport organisation to their external stakeholders such as athletes, partners (media and sponsors), hosting communities and fans. Other information might (and should) be available internally to managers or (board) members of the international sport governing body and can contribute to its organisational (corporate) governance, but we are more interested in what is externally available because pure self-governance, i.e. governance exercised only by internal stakeholders, can create unacceptable situations as we have seen in the past with the IOC or FIFA.

This idea stems from the Open Government Initiative launched by President Obama in 2009 for the US public sector and followed by several governments in Europe (www.opengovernmentdata.org). The initiative makes easily available through websites information produced by a national government. In a similar fashion (ISGBs) should make available all the necessary data and information to measure the BIBGIS indicators in a spirit of “Open Sport”.

We concentrate on ISGBs as some of the proposed indicators would be difficult to fulfil or be applied to local or national sport organisations.

The BIBGIS indicators for ISGBs are organised along 7 broad dimensions:

- Organisational transparency
- Reporting transparency
- Stakeholders’ representation
- Democratic process
- Control mechanisms
- Sport integrity
- Solidarity.

Each of these 7 dimensions is measured by an equal number of indicators (9, see below) to attribute equal importance to each dimension. The scoring is based on a Lickert-type scale ranging from 0 to 4 (cf. table 2)

Table 2 – The scoring system

Score	
0	Indicator not fulfilled at all
1	Indicator partially fulfilled
2	Indicator fulfilled
3	Indicator well-fulfilled
4	Indicator totally fulfilled in a state-of-the art way

Each score should be justified by a qualitative comment and/or based on a quantitative predefined scale. By adding all the grades – eventually weighted – the scorecard of an ISGB can be obtained.

With such a scorecard a given ISGB can see how it performs over several years in a spirit of better (rather than good) governance (Chappelet, 2011). For each dimension the indicator scores can be added and the ISGB's spiders drawn and compared over the years as shown in figure 1 where we can see that the ISGB being studied improved in the sport integrity dimension but regressed in the organisational transparency dimension from 2010 to 2012.




Figure 1 – BIBGIS spider comparing the same ISGB in 2010 and 2012.

3.2 The indicators

Before listing the BIBGIS indicators it is necessary to provide a glossary of terms which will be used in the description of the indicators. The following phrases and acronyms will be used:

LB: Legislative Body of the ISGB (general assembly, general meeting, congress, etc.) – Has supreme and ultimate power over the ISGB.

EB: Executive Body of the ISGB (executive board, executive committee, council, management board, etc.) – Has executive power over the ISGB and takes decisions according to the powers given by the LB which it advises. Some ISGB have two EBs.

SB: Standing bodies of the ISGB (standing / statutory committees, finance commission, ethics committee, disciplinary commission, judicial bodies, sport tribunal, etc.) – Have a membership and role described in the statutes of the ISGB.

OB: Other bodies of the ISGB (thematic or study commissions, advisory boards, working groups, forums etc.) – Permanent or temporary, not mentioned in the statutes and created by the president, EB or LB.

Organs: LB and EB.

ISGB Bodies: LB, EB, SB and OB.

Senior managers: CEO (Chief Executive Officer), COO (Chief Operation Officer), Director General, General Secretary, Executive Director, often participating in the EB but with no voting rights.

3.2.1 Organisational transparency

The indicators for this dimension assess to what extent the main documents and official information of the ISGB are published on its website.

Indicator number	Indicator description
1.1	<i>ISGB publishes on its website its statutes and bye-laws</i>
1.2	<i>ISGB publishes on its website its sports rules</i>
1.3	<i>ISGB publishes on its website its LB members' basic information (name, address, date of creation for organisations, date of birth, nationality, gender for natural persons)</i>
1.4	<i>ISGB publishes on its website its EB members' and senior managers' biographical and contact information</i>
1.5	<i>ISGB publishes on its website its organisation chart</i>
1.6	<i>ISGB publishes on its website its vision/mission/values and strategic objectives</i>
1.7	<i>ISGB publishes on its website the agenda of its LB meetings</i>
1.8	<i>ISGB publishes on its website newsletters and/or press releases</i>
1.9	<i>ISGB publishes on its website an annual activity report</i>

3.2.2 Reporting transparency

The indicators for this dimension assess to what extent the main annual reports and financial information of the ISGB are published on its website or in traditional form (reports).

Indicator number	Indicator description
2.1	<i>ISGB publishes or makes available reports on its main events (championships, cups, etc.)</i>
2.2	<i>ISGB opens its Legislative Body meetings to media or publishes their minutes</i>
2.3	<i>ISGB annually publishes its Standing Bodies reports</i>
2.4	<i>ISGB annually publishes an externally audited financial report according to recognised international standards (IFRS² or similar)</i>

² IFRS = International Financial Reporting Standards

2.5	<i>ISGB annually publishes compensation benefits and/or salary of its president</i>
2.6	<i>ISGB annually publishes financial allowances of its voluntary EB members</i>
2.7	<i>ISGB annually publishes salaries and benefits of its senior managers</i>
2.8	<i>ISGB annually publishes amount of income tax paid and to whom</i>
2.9	<i>ISGB has an archival policy to give access to its archives for scholars and media</i>

3.2.3 Stakeholders' representation

The indicators for this dimension assess to what extent the main stakeholders of the ISGB are represented in the different ISGB's bodies. The grades are attributed as follows:

0 = stakeholder not represented in any body of the ISGB

1 = stakeholder represented in 1 category of body of the ISGB

2 = stakeholder represented in 2 categories of body of the ISGB

3 = stakeholder represented in 3 categories of body of the ISGB

4 = stakeholder represented in 4 categories of body of the ISGB.

Indicator number	Indicator description
3.1	<i>Athletes are represented in the ISGB bodies</i>
3.2	<i>The athletes' entourage (coaches, agents, medical staff, etc.) are represented in the ISGB bodies</i>
3.3	<i>Judges / referees are represented in the ISGB bodies</i>
3.4	<i>Clubs are represented in the ISGB bodies</i>
3.5	<i>Leagues are represented in the ISGB bodies</i>
3.6	<i>Event organising committees are represented in the ISGB bodies</i>
3.7	<i>Media partners are represented in the ISGB bodies</i>
3.8	<i>Commercial partners (sponsors, suppliers...) are represented in the ISGB bodies</i>
3.9	<i>Sport fans, supporters, volunteers, grass root participants are represented in the ISGB bodies</i>

3.2.4 Democratic process

The indicators for this dimension assess the extent to which democratic processes are in place in the ISGB.

Indicator number	Indicator description
4.1	<i>ISGB organs meet regularly (annually for LB and several times a year for EB)</i>
4.2	<i>ISGB organs' members are elected on the basis of secret ballots and procedures detailed in its statutes</i>
4.3	<i>ISGB has detailed regulation for the candidatures to its presidency</i>
4.4	<i>ISGB organs' major decisions are taken by secret ballots and members with a conflict of interest are excluded from the vote</i>
4.5	<i>ISGB organs' major decisions are taken on the basis of written reports supported by criteria</i>
4.6	<i>ISGB EB's members have a term limit</i>
4.7	<i>ISGB EB's members have an age limit</i>
4.8	<i>ISGB EB's members and senior managers reflect the sport gender balance</i>
4.9	<i>ISGB EB's members and senior managers reflect an appropriate geographical balance</i>

3.2.5 Control mechanisms

The indicators for this dimension aim at assessing whether the ISGB has established controls and appropriate procedures in its activities and decisions.

Indicator number	Indicator description
5.1	<i>ISGB has adopted a code or principles of governance</i>
5.2	<i>ISGB has an internal integrated control and risk management system (COSO³ or similar)</i>
5.3	<i>ISGB has an audit and remuneration committee or similar, distinct from the finance committee</i>
5.4	<i>An elected independent member sits on the ISGB's Executive Body to safeguard proper decision making on behalf of the members</i>
5.5	<i>ISGB has a committee to perform due diligence on the members of its bodies and senior managers based on FIT⁴ or similar</i>
5.6	<i>ISGB separates regulatory and commercial functions</i>
5.7	<i>ISGB observes open tenders for its major marketing and procurement contracts</i>
5.8	<i>ISGB's decisions can be contested through well-defined internal channels specified in its statutes and bye-laws</i>

³ COSO = Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (Common internal control model).

⁴ FIT = The Fit and Proper test for Approved Persons by the UK FSA (Financial Services Authority).

5.9	<i>ISGB recognises the Court of Arbitration for sport (or similar) as an external channel of complaint and dispute resolution</i>
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3.2.6 Sport integrity

The indicators for this dimension aim at assessing measures that the ISGB has put in place for guaranteeing the integrity of its sport and main stakeholders.

Indicator number	Indicator description
6.1	<i>ISGB has or recognises an Ethics/Integrity Code for its organs' members and staff including guidelines for receiving/giving gifts from/to individuals or organisations</i>
6.2	<i>ISGB has state-of-the-art conflict of interest regulations</i>
6.3	<i>ISGB has rules concerning betting on its sports or recognises the SportAccord code of conduct and model rules on sports integrity in relation to sports betting</i>
6.4	<i>ISGB has an independent body (e.g. Ethics Commission) to monitor the application of the rules presented in 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3, to initiate investigation proactively and to propose sanctions</i>
6.5	<i>ISGB has a confidential reporting mechanism to manage comments and allegations by whistle blowers</i>
6.6	<i>ISGB recognises and complies with the World Anti-Doping Code</i>
6.7	<i>ISGB's major events respect the principles of sustainable development and adopt an environmental management system(ISO⁵ 14000 or similar)</i>
6.8	<i>ISGB has integrity awareness / education programmes for its main stakeholders</i>
6.9	<i>ISGB collaborates with governmental and non-governmental agencies on integrity issues</i>

3.2.7 Solidarity

The indicators for this dimension assess to what extent the ISGB supports its main stakeholders, notably through ad hoc programmes and revenue redistribution.

Indicator number	Indicator description
7.1	<i>ISGB invests an adequate part of its surplus in its declared non-profit objectives</i>
7.2	<i>ISGB has a financial redistribution policy and programmes for its main stakeholders</i>
7.3	<i>ISGB audits the use of funds given to its main stakeholders</i>

⁵ ISO = International Standard Organisation

7.4	<i>ISGB has programmes for the development of its sport at elite and grassroots levels</i>
7.5	<i>ISGB has an environmental and social responsibility policy and programmes in place</i>
7.6	<i>ISGB has career and education programmes to assist its athletes during the transition to their post-athletic careers</i>
7.7	<i>ISGB has programmes or resources to assist the communities which host its events in their legacy planning</i>
7.8	<i>ISGB audits the use of funds given to its social responsibility programmes</i>
7.9	<i>ISGB collaborates with governmental and non-governmental agencies on social responsibility issues</i>

4 Applying BIBGIS to some ISGBs

We tested the BIBGIS with the International Olympic Committee (IOC), the Fédération internationale de Football Association (FIFA), the Fédération Equestre Internationale (FEI), the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) and European Athletics (EAA). We thank these ISGBs for their cooperation and present some results of these tests to the first two organisations.

4.1 Applying BIBGIS to the IOC before and after its 1999 reform

In 1998-1999, the IOC suffered its worst governance scandal since its creation more than one century before (in 1894) due to unethical practices by more than twenty of its members (Mallon, 2000). Consequently, it had to reform its governance and in particular amend the Olympic Charter and the procedure to select Olympic host cities. This section looks at the BIBGIS indicators as they could have been measured in 1998 (prior to the 1999 reform which took place during the IOC presidency of Juan Antonio Samaranch) and in 2012 (after more than twelve years of application and improvement under the IOC presidency of Jacques Rogge). The grades are given on the basis of the authors' intimate knowledge of IOC governance (Chappelet & Kübler-Mabbott, 2008; Chappelet, 2011; Chappelet 2012b).

The glossary of terms for the IOC is as follows:

LB: IOC Session, the general assembly of the IOC members (natural persons)

EB: IOC Executive Board (15 IOC members elected by IOC session)

SB: IOC Commissions such as the Finance, Athletes, Ethics, Nominations Commissions

OB: Other IOC thematic commissions and working groups made up of IOC members and experts

Organs: IOC Session and Executive Board

Senior managers: Executive management (IOC President, President's chief of staff, Director General and Executive Director of the Olympic Games), Department Directors.

4.1.1 Organisational transparency

#	Indicators	1998 Score	2012 Score	Comments
1.1	ISGB publishes on its website its statutes and bye-laws	2	4	Past versions of the Olympic Charter are available on the Olympic Study Centre web pages
1.2	ISGB publishes on its website its sports rules	2	4	The Olympic Charter and other documents contain the rules for the organisation of the Olympic Games. The candidature procedure was clarified in more detail after 1999
1.3	ISGB publishes on its website its LB members' basic information	3	4	Website was not well developed in 1998 but IOC members' biographies were published in book form, now available on website
1.4	ISGB publishes on its website its EB members' and senior managers biographical and contact information	3	3	Contact information is published in the Olympic Directory but not on website
1.5	ISGB publishes on its website its organisation chart	0	0	Still not published although included in Administration Guidebook (not publicly available) and scholarly publications
1.6	ISGB publishes on its website its vision/mission/values and strategic objectives	0	3	Published in the IOC intermediary Report 2009-2010 (page 43). An IOC Corporate Development Plan 2009-2012 has existed since 2008 but is not available
1.7	ISGB publishes on its website the agenda of its LB meetings	0	0	Session minutes are available after a long embargo period. Session agenda were printed in the Olympic Review in the past but did not reflect all the matters discussed
1.8	ISGB publishes on its website newsletters and/or press releases	2	4	Press release, weekly highlights and the Olympic Review are available over several years
1.9	ISGB publishes on its website an annual activity report	0	3	Every two years (called Intermediary and Final Reports for the Olympiad)
	TOTAL	12/36	25/36	
	Mean	1.33	2.77	

4.1.2 Reporting transparency

#	Indicators	1998 Score	2012 Score	Comments
2.1	ISGB publishes or makes available reports on its main events (championships, cups, etc.)	4	3	Final Reports of the Olympic Games are published by the Organising Committees of the Olympic Games but with less data than in the past
2.2	ISGB opens its LB meetings to media or publishes their minutes	0	3	Through video feed since 1999 for the session, but not the questions raised by IOC members
2.3	ISGB annually publishes its SB reports	0	0	Minutes are available after a long embargo period

2.4	ISGB annually publishes an externally audited financial report according to recognised international standards (IFRS ⁶ or similar)	0	3	Every two years with IOC Intermediary or Final Reports
2.5	ISGB annually publishes compensation benefits and/or salary of its president	0	4	The IOC President receives no salary but residence costs are detailed in a note in the financial report
2.6	ISGB annually publishes financial allowances of its voluntary EB members	0	3	Some information is provided in a note in the financial report
2.7	ISGB annually publishes salaries and benefits of its senior managers	0	4	The information is available in the financial report (for the president and executive officers) and in the following website: www.guidestar.org (non-profit reports)
2.8	ISGB annually publishes amount of income tax paid and to whom	4	4	The IOC is exempt from revenue taxes in Switzerland and Olympic host countries
2.9	ISGB has an archival policy to give access to its archives for scholars and media	3	2	Yes, since 2002 but with a very long embargo period which was not so strict before 1999
	TOTAL	11/36	26/36	
	Mean	1.22	2.88	

4.1.3 Stakeholders' representation

#	Indicators	1998 Score	2012 Score	Comments
3.1	Athletes are represented in the ISGB bodies	2	4	Athletes Commission Chair is an EB member
3.2	The athletes' entourage (coaches, agents, medical staff, etc.) are represented in the ISGB bodies	0	1	An IOC Entourage Commission was created in 2009
3.3	Judges / referees are represented in the ISGB bodies	0	0	No commission for judges/referees
3.4	Clubs are represented in the ISGB bodies	2	3	15 NOCs (equivalent to clubs for IFs) formally represented since 1999
3.5	Leagues are represented in the ISGB bodies	1	3	15 IFs (equivalent to leagues for IFs) represented since 1999
In 3.6	Event organising committees are represented in the ISGB bodies	1	1	Only in IOC Press and Environment commissions
3.7	Media partners are represented in the ISGB bodies	1	1	Only in IOC Press and Radio-Television commissions
3.8	Commercial partners (sponsors, suppliers...) are represented in the ISGB bodies	1	1	Only in IOC Marketing commission
3.9	Sport fans, supporters, volunteers, grass root participants are represented in the ISGB bodies	0	2	World Olympian Association is represented in Athletes commission; a Sport for all Commission exists
	TOTAL	8/36	16/36	
	Mean	0.88	1.77	

⁶ IFRS = International Financial Reporting Standards

4.1.4 Democratic process

#	Indicators	1998 Score	2012 Score	Comments
4.1	ISGB organs meet regularly (annually for LB and several times a year for EB)	4	4	IOC Session meets every year; IOC Executive Board meets 4 to 5 times a year
4.2	ISGB organs' members are elected on the basis of secret ballots and procedures detailed in its statutes	2	4	True for Executive Board members and now for members (prior to the 1999 reform, votes for IOC membership were very rare)
4.3	ISGB has detailed regulation for the candidatures to its presidency	2	4	For the first time for 2001 and reinforced for 2013
4.4	ISGB organs' major decisions are taken by secret ballots and members with a conflict of interest are excluded from the vote	1	3	True for Olympic city and IOC membership elections (members from same country do not vote)
4.5	ISGB organs' major decisions are taken on the basis of written reports supported by criteria	1	3	Candidature Evaluation reports are published
4.6	ISGB EB's members have a term limit	2	4	President has a maximum 8+4-year term, EB members have a maximum 4+4-year term and can only be re-elected after a 2-year sabbatical, members are elected for 8-year terms but are always re-elected (no non-re-election since this term limit was introduced in 1999)
4.7	ISGB EB's members have an age limit	1	4	Now 70 years old, 80 years before 1999 for all LB and thus EB members
4.8	ISGB EB's members and senior managers reflect the sport gender balance	1	2	About 20% of membership of Session and EB is female, only one female director out of 13
4.9	ISGB EB's members and senior managers reflect an appropriate geographical balance	1	2	Europe still over represented in the Session and EB, and among senior managers, EB better balanced <i>de facto</i> but not <i>de jure</i>
	TOTAL	15/36	30/36	
	Mean	1.66	3.33	

4.1.5 Control mechanisms

#	Indicators	1998 Score	2012 Score	Comments
5.1	ISGB has adopted a code or principles of governance	0	4	BUPs were adopted in 2009

5.2	ISGB has an internal integrated control and risk management system (COSO ⁷ or similar)	1	3	Not publicly available, internal auditor recruited in 2007
5.3	ISGB has an audit and remuneration committee or similar, distinct from the finance committee	0	4	Since 2006; from 2002 to 2005 there was a remuneration working group
5.4	An elected independent member sits on the ISGB's Executive Body to safeguard proper decision making on behalf of the members	0	0	All EB members are IOC members
5.5	ISGB has a committee to perform due diligence on the members of its bodies and senior managers based on FIT ⁸ or similar	0	3	Role taken by Nominations Commission
5.6	ISGB separates regulatory and commercial functions	0	3	IOC Television and Marketing Services is a limited company whose Board is chaired by an IOC member
5.7	ISGB observes open tenders for its major marketing and procurement contracts	1	3	Tenders progressively introduced under Rogge presidency, but not available for the public
5.8	ISGB's decisions can be contested through well-defined internal channels specified in its statutes and bye-laws	1	2	Members cannot appeal IOC's decision (Olympic Charter Rule 16.1.3); others can only go to CAS or other external channels
5.9	ISGB recognises the Court of Arbitration for sport (or similar) as an external channel of complaint and dispute resolution	3	3	For "some [unspecified] decisions" (Olympic Charter Rule 15.4) since its creation in 1984
	TOTAL	6/36	25/36	
	Mean	0.66	2.77	

4.1.6 Sport integrity

#	Indicators	1998 Score	2012 Score	Comments
6.1	ISGB has or recognises an Ethics/Integrity Code for its organs' members and staff including guidelines for receiving/giving gifts from/to individuals or organisations	0	4	Since 1999

⁷ COSO = Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (Common internal control model).

⁸ FIT = The Fit and Proper test for Approved Persons by the UK FSA (Financial Services Authority).

6.2	ISGB has state-of-the-art conflict of interest regulations	0	4	Since 2002
6.3	ISGB has rules concerning betting on its sports or recognises the SportAccord code of conduct and model rules on sports integrity in relation to sports betting	0	4	Integrated in the IOC Ethics Code and ad hoc rules for each edition of the Games
6.4	ISGB has an independent body (e.g. Ethics Commission) to monitor the application of the rules presented in 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3, to initiate investigation proactively and to propose sanctions	0	2	IOC Ethics Commission since 1999 but not fully independent
6.5	ISGB has a confidential reporting mechanism to manage comments and allegations by whistle blowers	0	1	Ethics Commission and IOC receive reports which are referred to IOC President who decides whether the Commission should investigate
6.6	ISGB recognises and complies with the World Anti-Doping Code	0	4	The Anti-doping Code has existed since 2003
6.7	ISGB's major events respect the principles of sustainable development and adopt an environmental management system(ISO ⁹ 14000 or similar)	2	3	Environment was declared a pillar of Olympism in 1994 and Olympic Games Organising Committees have since adopted EMS on IOC's request
6.8	ISGB has integrity awareness / education programmes for its main stakeholders	1	3	Seminars are organised for NOCs, IFs, OCOGs and bid cities
6.9	ISGB collaborates with governmental and non-governmental agencies on integrity issues	0	4	UNEP, UNODC, Interpol, Council of Europe
	TOTAL	3/36	29/36	
	Mean	0.33	3.22	

4.1.7 Solidarity

#	Indicators	1998 Score	2012 Score	Comments
7.1	ISGB invests an adequate part of its surplus in its declared non-profit objectives	4	4	In particular through Olympic Solidarity and the IOC International Cooperation Department

⁹ ISO = International Standard Organisation

7.2	ISGB has a financial redistribution policy and programmes for its main stakeholders	3	4	Reported in the IOC financial reports
7.3	ISGB audits the use of funds given to its main stakeholders	1	2	Little done in this area despite mandate given by IOC Ethics Code
7.4	ISGB has programmes for the development of its sport at elite and grassroots levels	3	3	Sport for all Commission and 2-yearly congresses
7.5	ISGB has an environmental and social responsibility policy and programmes in place	1	3	Adoption in 1999 of an Agenda 21 for the Olympic Movement and sustainability through sport report in 2010
7.6	ISGB has career and education programmes to assist its athletes during the transition to their post-athletic careers	0	2	Special programme sponsored by Adecco for Olympians' post-career transition
7.7	ISGB has programmes or resources to assist the communities which host its events in their legacy planning	0	3	Legacy Manual published in 2012
7.8	ISGB audits the use of funds given to its social responsibility programmes	0	2	Special efforts on the IOC Sports for Hope Centres in Zambia and Haiti
7.9	ISGB collaborates with governmental and non-governmental agencies on social responsibility issues	2	3	UNEP, Right to Play (formerly Olympic Aid), CICR, WHO, UNHCR, etc.
	TOTAL	14/36	26/36	
	Mean	1.77	2.88	

After adding all the scores of the BIBGIS indicators applied to the IOC the spider diagram shown in figure 2 can be drawn.




Figure 2 – BIBGIS spiders comparing the IOC in 1998 and in 2012

According to figure 2, the IOC has considerably improved its governance in all seven BIBGIS dimensions. Improvements are still possible in terms of stakeholders' representation and solidarity, as well as to a lesser extent in organisational transparency.

4.2 Trial application of BIBGIS for benchmarking the IOC and FIFA in 2012

The BIBGIS could also be used to compare two ISGBs of similar size and reach. We test this possibility with the IOC and FIFA, arguably the two best known and largest ISGBs.

Since the selection of the 2018 and 2022 FIFA World Cup hosts (respectively Russia and Qatar) in 2010 and the re-election of its President in 2011 amid various scandals and allegations, FIFA has been under intense scrutiny. In summer 2011, it nominated an Independent Governance Committee (IGC) to propose governance reforms. This Committee, chaired by Mark Pieth, issued a concept paper (Pieth 2011) and made several recommendations to improve FIFA's governance. Table 3 provides a quick comparison between the 2012 IOC and FIFA's governance structure, i.e. after the first round of reform at FIFA in 2012.

Table 3 – Comparing the IOC and FIFA in 2012

IOC	FIFA
Association of natural persons (maximum 115 IOC members)	Association of associations (209 national football associations)
Founded in 1894 in Paris	Founded in 1904 in Paris
Under Swiss law since 1915, headquarters in Lausanne	Under Swiss law since 1927, headquarters in Zurich

President = CEO since 1980 (Samaranch) No salary (but residence expenses)	President = CEO since 1998 (Blatter) With a salary (not public)
Director General Salaried COO	Secretary General Salaried COO
Controls 2 foundations and 3 limited companies (SA)	Controls 10 limited companies (AG and GmbH)
Assets US\$ 2.3 billion (2010) (latest published figure)	Assets US\$ 2.1 billion (2010)
Financial report published every two years (since 1999)	Financial report published every year (since 2004)
Audited by PWC	Audited by KPMG
EB= Executive Board (15 members including 3 female members)	EB= Executive Committee (25 members including 1 female member)
EL= Session (maximum 115 votes); one member = one vote	EL= Congress (208 votes); One NA = one vote
EB and EL chaired by President=CEO	EB and EL chaired by President=CEO
Members are elected by the Session upon recommendation of EB after due diligence by Nomination Commission	NAs are recognised by Congress upon request by EC, EC members are appointed by the 5 confederations
Ethics Commission named by President, confirmed by EB	Ethics Commission appointed by EC / independent co-chairs
IOC Ethics Code (1999)	FIFA Ethics Code (2004/2011)
BUPs of good governance	IGC recommendations
Only President can refer cases to Ethics Commission	EC members, and NAs / Confederations can file complaint
CAS recognised for "some [unspecified] cases" (article 15.4 Olympic Charter)	CAS recognised for recourse after all internal channels have been exhausted
265 arbitrators (general list)	35 arbitrators (football list)

The BIBGIS indicators of FIFA and the IOC were scored by the authors on the basis of their knowledge of these two ISGBs and available governing documents. The detailed scores can be found in Appendix 2.

After adding all the scores of the BIBGIS indicators applied to the IOC and FIFA the spider diagram shown in figure 4 can be drawn.




Figure 3 – BIBGIS spiders comparing the IOC and FIFA in 2012

According to figure 3, the IOC is doing better than FIFA in all dimensions except transparency. It ties with FIFA for sport integrity and control mechanisms. However this benchmarking approach suffers several limitations. It requires an intimate knowledge of the two organisations being compared which is not easily achieved by the same persons. These organisations should be of a similar size and reach and, if possible, of comparable structure (which is not totally the case of FIFA and IOC as shown in table 4). For each indicator, there is a tendency not to give an absolute score but a relative one to the score of the other benchmarked ISGB. We therefore do not advise using the BIBGIS as a benchmarking or ranking tool until further research is carried out.

5 Conclusions

In this working paper we do not start with proposing a conceptual definition of sport governance as we know that many such definitions already exist (see for instance Houlihan & Groeneveld, 2011; Hoye & Cuskelly, 2007; Sawyer, Bodey, & Judge, 2008; Ferkins, Shilbury, & McDonald, 2005; Henry & Lee, 2004; Thoma & Chalip, 1996). For the same reasons, nor do we propose principles of good governance in sport (see Appendix 1 for the long collection of such principles). We rather start from the reality of ISGBs by focusing on a clear and concise set of indicators of measurement for better governance on the basis of seven dimensions of governance inspired by the literature and discussions with stakeholders. Our focus is evidence based governance and our 63 indicators practically define what can be considered as the governance of ISGBs.

In this respect, we aim at highlighting the complexity, uncertainty and evolving nature of the environment in which an ISGB operates. Governance can only be better in a given context, under specific circumstances, for one given ISGB. A longitudinal approach seems therefore more appropriate than a benchmarking approach aiming at comparing inevitably very different ISGBs.

However we are also aware of the limitations of our approach. The scores should be given by a larger panel of experts rather than two authors as we did for the IOC. Other dimensions/indicators could be taken into consideration. It would also be interesting to see if a subset of the BIBGIS could be applied at the national level.

We hope that the BIBGIS will evolve and be tested by as many ISGBs as possible. An improved version could then be the basis for delivering a label of governance to ISGBs.

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Appendix 1: list of published principles of good governance in sport

This appendix was established by the authors at the start of the Action for Good Governance in International Sport (AGGIS), a project financed by the European Commission (2012-2013).

1.1 Chronological overview by type of organisations

International governmental organisations	
Council of Europe	
2004	<i>Resolution I on The Principles of Good Governance in Sport</i>
2005	<i>Recommendation Rec(2005)8 on the principles of good governance in sport</i>
European Union	
2000	<i>Nice Declaration on the specific characteristics of sport and its social function in Europe</i>
2007	<i>White Paper on sport</i>
2011	<i>Communication to the European Parliament : developing the European Dimension of sport</i>

International and European sport associations	
European Olympic Committees & Fédération Internationale de l'Automobile	
2001	<i>Statement of Good governance principles</i>
Union Cycliste Internationale	
2004	<i>Rules of Good governance</i>
Commonwealth Games Federation	
2006	<i>Principles of conduct</i>
International Olympic Committee	
2008*	<i>Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic and Sports Movement (* 2 modifications in 2012 related to Structures, regulations and democratic process)</i>
European Team Sports Association	
2008	<i>Good governance by sports federations</i>
Union of European Football Associations	
2009	<i>Good governance and autonomy</i>
2011*	<i>Good governance Menu card for UEFA Member Associations 2012-2016 (*to be approved)</i>

National sports associations and agencies	
Sport and Recreation South Africa	
2004	<i>Best practice principles of good governance in sport</i>
UK Sport	
2004	<i>Good Governance: A Guide for National Governing Bodies of Sport</i>
NOC*NSF	
2005	<i>Good Sport Governance Code</i>
United States Olympic Committee	
2005	<i>USOC Preliminary NGB Governance Guidelines</i>
Sport and Recreation New Zealand (Sport New Zealand)	
2006	<i>Nine steps to effective governance : building high performing organisations</i>

Wales Sports Council	
2006*	<i>Sound governance and good management characteristics (* circa ; year of publication not disclosed but reference to the document appears in the 2006-2007 annual report)</i>
Sport and Recreation Alliance (UK)	
2011	<i>Voluntary Code of Good Governance for the Sport and Recreation Sector</i>
Sport England	
2011	<i>Good governance guidance</i>
Australian Sport Commission	
2012	<i>Governance Principles: A good practice guide for sporting organisations</i>

Scholars	
Katwala	
2000	<i>Democratising global sport</i>
Chaker	
2004	<i>Principles of good governance in sport</i>
Henry & Lee	
2004	<i>Good organisational governance</i>
Burger & Goslin	
2005	<i>Best Practice Governance Systems</i>
McNamee & Flemming	
2005	<i>Conceptual model for the corporate governance of sport</i>
Chappelet & Kübler-Mabbott	
2008	<i>Principles for the governance of world sport</i>
Taylor & O'Sullivan	
2009	<i>Board structures of sporting governing bodies</i>
De Zwart & Gilligan	
2009	<i>Key governance indicators in sport organisations</i>
Mowbray	
2012	<i>Contingent and Standards Governance Framework</i>

International non-governmental organisations	
Transparency International	
2011	<i>Safe Hands: building integrity and transparency at FIFA</i>
2011	<i>ICC Governance review</i>
Play The Game	
2011	<i>Cologne Consensus: towards a global code for governance in sport</i>
One World Trust	
2007	<i>2007 Global Accountability Report : FIFA Accountability Profile</i>
2008	<i>2008 Global Accountability Report : IOC Accountability Profile</i>

Transnational organisations	
Pricewaterhouse Coopers	
2012	<i>An independent governance review of the International Cricket Council</i>

1.2 Principles by organization or author

Council of Europe		
2004	2005	2012
<i>Resolution I on the principles of good governance in sport</i>	<i>Recommendation Rec (2005) 8 on the principles of good governance in sport</i>	<i>Resolution 1875 (2012) Good governance and ethics in sport</i>
<i>Adopted at the 10th Conference of European Ministers responsible for sport in Budapest</i>	<i>Adopted by the Committee of Ministers</i>	<i>Adopted by the Parliamentary Assembly</i>
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?Ref=CM(2004)213&Language=lanEnglish&Site=CM	https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=850189&Site=CM	http://www.assembly.coe.int/ASP/Doc/XrefViewPDF.asp?FileID=18258&Language=EN
Democratic structures based on clear electoral procedures open to the membership	Democratic structures for non-governmental sports organisations based on clear and regular electoral procedures open to the whole membership	Federations, associations, professional leagues and other sports organisations should include in their codes of sports ethics the provisions needed to prevent criminal associations from infiltrating the management bodies of sports companies or authorities. The purchase of sports clubs using capital of unknown origin should be prevented by making it compulsory for clubs to seek information about potential owners
Professional organisation and management, with an appropriate code of ethics and procedures for dealing with conflicts of interest	Organisation and management of a professional standard, with an appropriate code of ethics and procedures for dealing with conflicts of interest	The Basic Universal Principles of Good Governance of the Olympic and Sports Movement, drawn up by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in 2008, should be complied with by all sports organisations
Accountability and transparency in decision making and financial operations	Accountability and transparency in decision-making and financial operations, including the open publication of yearly financial accounts duly audited	Within sports federations, it is necessary to introduce supervisory mechanisms achieving a new balance in the powers of their presidents and ensuring that presidents are accountable to members' assemblies
Fairness in dealing with the membership and solidarity	Fairness in dealing with membership, including gender	In this context, the term of office for which presidents of federations

	equality and solidarity	are elected should be limited (for example a four-year term, renewable only once). In addition, within sports federations, multiple candidates should be encouraged to stand for election as president, as should female candidates at every level
A basis for setting an equitable partnership between the public authorities and the sports movement		The statutes of sports federations should prevent any form of conflict of interest by prohibiting individuals from holding senior offices within those federations if, at the same time, they hold senior posts in a club
		The governance mechanisms of sports federations should be such as to involve athletes in the major decisions relating to the regulation of their sport. In this respect, encouragement could be given to the representation of players' and athletes' trade unions and to the presence of former athletes of acknowledged integrity on federation committees
		It is necessary to improve, within all sports federations, the provisions concerning the committees responsible for examining candidatures for the hosting of major international sports events. Strict rules on eligibility and on these committees' election and operating arrangements should be drawn up in order to prevent and punish any conflicts of interest or acts of self-interest among members, and strict checks should be provided for in order to avoid any attempted bribery or the exercise of improper influence on voting members' final decision. The possibility of including outside observers on such committees without the right

to vote should be considered
Sports associations and federations at every level (regional, national, continental and international) should publish annually (on their websites and in their activity reports) details of their income and expenditure and the remuneration of their senior executives and elected managers

European Union		
2000	2007	2011
<i>Nice Declaration on the specific characteristics of sport and its social function in Europe</i>	<i>White paper on sport</i>	<i>Communication to the European Parliament : developing the European dimension of sport</i>
<i>Adopted by the European Council in Nice</i>	<i>Presented by the European Commission</i>	<i>Adopted by the European Commission</i>
http://ec.europa.eu/sport/documents/doc244_en.pdf	http://ec.europa.eu/sport/documents/wp_on_sport_en.pdf	http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0012:FIN:EN:PDF
Transparency	Transparency	Transparency
Democracy	Democracy	Democracy
Solidarity	Accountability	Accountability
Ethics	Representation of stakeholders	Representation of stakeholders

Transparency International	
2010	2011
<i>Safe hands: building integrity and transparency at FIFA</i>	<i>ICC governance review</i>
<i>Published by Transparency International</i>	<i>Published by Transparency International</i>
http://www.transparency.ch/de/PDF_files/Divers/110_816_FIFA_SafeHands.pdf	http://blog.transparency.org/2012/01/31/defining-the-boundaries-a-blue-print-for-enhancing-cricket-administration/
Putting the past behind	<u>International</u>
New procedures of good governance and	Widen its focus from corruption among players to

<p>transparency (more detailed reporting, rotation; roles and responsibilities; remuneration, benefits, payments, grants)</p>	<p>encompass other forms of corruption that threaten the integrity of the game such as trading of influence and cronyism</p>
<p>The way forward through the application of Anti - bribery codes developed in other sectors</p>	<p>Conduct an independent risk assessment of the corruption risks facing cricket at the national and international levels, and what impacts these risks may have on the integrity and reputation of the game</p>
<p>Putting anti-corruption policies into practice (review of the code of ethics; review of the organisational structures: key management personnel, high risk areas, strengthening existing transparency measures, investigations and sanctions; implementation strategy: communication policy and training, monitoring and reporting)</p>	<p>Commission a review of anti-corruption best practice in other sectors and benchmark itself against other international organisations, both in sport and other spheres</p>
	<p>Based on the above risk assessment and benchmarking, the ICC should introduce best-practice policies and procedures in all areas that are appropriate to mitigate the risks to integrity</p>
	<p>Acknowledge its role in the global governance of cricket and take responsibility for setting out governance standards for member countries and significant matches, competitions or leagues played under the auspices of private promoters</p>
	<p>Create a mechanism that allows individual supporters of the game throughout the world to convey their views and opinions to their respective national boards or Federations, and thence to the ICC, as appropriate, who could take these into account when making significant decisions</p>
	<p>Review its internal procedures for dealing with corruption cases, including the desirability of establishing an independent anti-corruption tribunal, to ensure that it follows international best practice</p>
	<p>Review the arrangement whereby corruption and security have been combined into a single unit within the council. Adequate resources for anti-corruption investigation and enforcement should be made available. National boards or Federations should also have more resources for investigation and enforcement</p>
	<p>Review its whistleblowing procedures to ensure that they are confidential, provide appropriate protection, are available to all the game's stakeholders, and are</p>

widely publicised
Be more transparent about the type, quality and response to the anti-corruption training it offers to players and officials
Greatly increase the information available on its website about its approach to governance and corruption, and the progress it is making. All policies and procedures should be available for review unless there is a legitimate reason for confidentiality
Introduce greater accountability into its governance structures, and in particular in its board and key committees
The ICC and national boards should review their anti-corruption training and mentoring procedures to ensure that they are state of the art and aligned with best practice
<u>Domestic</u>
Require national boards or Federations to have in place codes of conduct, policies and procedures that reflect ICC's own global best practice approach. The ICC should also have capacity building programmes to assist bodies who need support to improve their standards within agreed time-frames
There should be greater transparency of national boards, and greater accountability to stakeholder groups including amateur and professional players and supporters, for example through greater disclosure of information, including policies and decisions, by national boards
Member countries should consider creating anti-corruption tribunals at domestic levels to hold individuals and organisations to account, if existing anti-corruption mechanisms are inadequate
Effective mechanisms to review whether domestic boards are adhering to anti-corruption codes and procedures, and should have strong sanctions, including financial sanctions or suspensions, available to it if member countries' boards or federations are judged to have infringed the rules
<u>Private organisations</u>

Ensure that there is proper scrutiny, and due diligence undertaken, of private promoters and their associates
Appropriate measures should be put into place with regard to the ownership structures, financial arrangements and tournament design of high-profile private competitions or leagues to safeguard the integrity and reputation of the game
Private promoters and associated competitions must be subject to oversight of the relevant national board so that all tournaments fall under the purview of ICC, which can if necessary delegate some supervisory authority to the national board of the host nation

Play The Game
2011
<i>Cologne consensus: towards a global code for governance in sport</i>
<i>Adopted by the participants at the 2011 Play The Game Conference in Cologne</i>
<i>http://www.playthegame.org/fileadmin/documents/Cologne_Consensus.pdf</i>
Governance documents and practices, and democratic procedures
Representation principles, including age, gender, ethnicity, tenure and stakeholder issues
Principles of autonomy and cooperation with governments
Transparency and accountability, both operational and financial
Monitoring, compliance and enforcement, including the feasibility of an independent agency to this end
Development of grass-root sport
Education, sharing of information and best practices
Equity, inclusiveness, non-discrimination and minority protection

One World Trust	
2007	2008
<i>2007 Global Accountability Report</i>	<i>2008 Global Accountability Report</i>
<i>FIFA accountability profile</i>	<i>IOC accountability profile</i>
<i>http://oneworldtrust.org/publications/doc_view/169-2007-global-accountability-report?tmpl=component&format=raw</i>	<i>http://oneworldtrust.org/publications/doc_view/225-2008-global-accountability-report-black-and-white?tmpl=component&format=raw</i>

Transparency	Transparency
Participation	Participation (internal member control / external stakeholder engagement)
Evaluation	Evaluation
Complaints and response	Complaints and response (internal / external)

Pricewaterhouse Coopers
2012
<i>An independent governance review of the International Cricket Council</i>
http://static.icc-cricket.yahoo.net/ugc/documents/DOC_6E43A6280C922ABC51A9C6AB55AA58E1_1328155148580_481.pdf
Board
Ethics
Membership, Board structure and Committees
Funding

Katwala
2000
<i>Democratising global sport</i>
Katwala, S. (2000). <i>Democratising Global Sport</i> . London: The Foreign Policy Centre.
Accountability and transparency (term limits for those in charge ; financial transparency ; business and commercial relationships within sports based on fair and open competition and disclosure of key information ; transparent and professional funding ; credible ethics code and independent investigation of abuses ; professional governance and communications)
Giving sport's stakeholders a say (athletes ; fans ; sponsors)
Institutional cooperation and public interest
Fight against doping
Hosting major tournaments
Match fixing and corruption
TV rights and the communications revolution

Chaker
2004
<i>Principles of good governance in sport</i>
Chaker, A.-N. (2004). <i>Good governance in sport: A European Survey</i> . Strasbourg: Council of Europe.
Freedom of association
Freedom of speech
Freedom of operation
Transparency (audit)
Independence (control; conflicts of interest)
Democracy (consultation)

Henry & Lee
2004
<i>Good organisational governance</i>
Henry, I. & Lee, P. C. (2004). "Governance and ethics in sport", in <i>The Business of Sport Management</i> (Beech, J. & Chadwick, S.), Harlow: Prentice Hall, pp. 25-42.
Transparency (clarity in procedures and decision-making, particularly in resource allocation)
Accountability (to financial investors and other emotional investors)
Democracy (access to representation in decision-making should be available to those who make up the organisation's internal constituencies)
Responsibility (for the sustainable development of the organisation and its sport, and stewardship of their resources and those of the community served)
Equity (in treatment of constituencies – for example gender equity and participants/employees with disabilities)
Effectiveness (establishing and monitoring of measures of effectiveness with measurable and attainable targets)
Efficiency (the achievement of such goals with the most efficient use of resources)

Burger & al.
2005
<i>Best Practice Governance Systems</i>

Burger, S. & al. (2005). "Compliance with Best Practice Governance Systems by National Sports Federations in South Africa", in <i>Aspects of Sport Governance</i> (Kluka, D. & al., Eds.), Oxford: Meyer & Meyer Sport, pp. 125-152.
Accountability
Responsibility
Transparency
Social Responsibility
Independence
Fairness
Discipline

McNamee & Flemming
2005
<i>Conceptual model for the corporate governance of sport</i>
McNamee, M. & Flemming, S. (2005). "The ethics of corporate governance in sport: Theory, method, and operationalization, in <i>Aspects of Sport Governance</i> (Kluka, D. & al., Eds.), Oxford: Meyer & Meyer Sport, pp. 153-167.
Respect (Beneficence, Civility, Confidentiality, Honesty, Loyalty, Non-abuse, Non-discrimination, Non-exploitation, Non-harassment, Privacy)
Equity (Diversity, Fairness, Recognition, Tolerance, Transparency)
Responsibility (Accountability, Effectiveness, Efficiency, Trustworthiness)

Chappelet & Kübler-Mabbott
2008
<i>Principles for the governance of world sport</i>
Chappelet, J.-L. & Kübler-Mabbott, B. (2008). <i>The International Olympic Committee and the Olympic System: The governance of world sport</i> , London: Routledge.
Transparency
Democracy
Accountability
Autonomy

Social responsibility

Taylor & O'Sullivan
2009
<i>Board structures of sporting governing bodies</i>
Taylor, M. & O'Sullivan, N. (2009). "How Should National Governing Bodies of Sport Be Governed in the UK? An Exploratory Study of Board Structure", <i>Corporate Governance: An International Review</i> , 17, pp. 681–693.
Nonprofit boards should contain a reasonable balance between members possessing appropriate business expertise and members representing the membership of the organisation
Nonprofit boards should be limited to between 5 and 12 members, thereby facilitating debate while also optimizing decision making
Nonprofit boards should separate the roles of chairman and CEO. This separation should make the board more objective and independent while also enabling the board to effectively pursue multiple and often conflicting objectives
Nonprofit boards should contain sufficient non-executive representation so as to ensure the independence of decision making
NED's should bring onto boards of nonprofits specific business insights or experience that the board does not already possess

De Zwart & Gilligan
2009
<i>Key governance indicators in sport organisations</i>
Zwart, F. de & Gilligan, G. (2009). "Sustainable Governance in Sporting Organisations", in <i>Social Responsibility and Sustainability in Sports</i> (Rodriguez, P. & al., Eds), Oviedo, Universidad de Oviedo, pp. 165-227.
Identification, consultation and participation of stakeholders
Access to and timely disclosure of information
Fair and ethical decision-making, corporate social responsibility and codes of conduct
Principal board responsibilities
Competency/experience and skills of directors
Board and management roles to be distinguished and specified

Mowbray

2012
<i>Contingent and standards governance framework</i>
Mowbray, D. (2012). "The contingent and standard governance framework for national governing bodies", in <i>Handbook of Sport Management</i> (Robinson, L. & al., Eds), London: Routledge, pp. 26-41.
Structural standards (framework, induction, purposeful structure, process-based, purposes, board size, tenure, chairman selection, policy)
Partnership and communication standards (partnership, relationships, communication, advocacy)
Planning standards (strategy, annual plan, meeting plans, resources, performance, financial results, learning, meeting attendance, risk minimisation)
Transparency standards (board committees, compliance with integrity, conflict of interest, culture of inquiry, transparency, board members, equal opportunity, independence)

European Olympic Committees & Fédération Internationale de l'Automobile
2001
<i>Statement of good governance principles</i>
<i>"The rules of the Game" First international governance in sport conference, Brussels</i>
http://www.fia.com/public/fia_structure/resources/governance_sport.pdf
The role of the governing body
Structures, responsibilities and accountability
Membership and size of the governing body
Democracy, elections and appointments
Transparency and communication
Decisions and appeals
Conflicts of interest
Solidarity
Recognition of other interests

Union Cycliste Internationale
2004
<i>UCI Rules of good governance</i>
http://www.uci.ch/Modules/BUILTIN/getObject.asp?MenuId=&ObjTypeCode=

<i>FILE&type=FILE&id=MzQxMDk&LangId=1</i>
Identity
Objectives
Representation
Decision-making process
Transparency
Communication
Sports Management
Rules
Commercial activities
Finances
Solidarity

Commonwealth Games Federation
2006
<i>Principles of conduct</i>
<i>Code of conduct</i>
http://www.thecgf.com/about/constitution.pdf
Selflessness
Integrity
Objectivity
Accountability
Openness
Honesty
Non discrimination

International Olympic Committee
2008
<i>Basic universal principles of good governance of the Olympic and sports movement</i>
<i>Seminar on autonomy of the Olympic and sports movement</i>

http://www.olympic.org/Documents/Conferences_Forums_and_Events/2008_seminar_autonomy/Basic_Universal_Principles_of_Good_Governance.pdf
Vision, mission and strategy
Structures, regulations and democratic process
Highest level of competence, integrity and ethical standards
Accountability, transparency and control
Solidarity and development
Athletes' involvement, participation and care
Harmonious relations with governments while preserving autonomy

European Team Sports Association
2008
<i>Good governance by sports federations</i>
<i>Safeguarding the heritage and future of team sport Conference</i>
http://www.uefa.com/MultimediaFiles/Download/uefa/KeyTopics/74/35/95/743595_DOWNLOAD.pdf
Appropriate involvement of stakeholders in the decision making process
Operating in a democratic and transparent way
Fight against racism and corruption
Promotion of the principle of fair play
Work with public authorities on societal issues: violence; corruption; money laundering; trafficking/smuggling of minors; stadia and security; illegal betting; xenophobia, racism and other forms of discrimination; match fixing and doping

Union of European Football Associations	
2009	2012
<i>Good governance and autonomy</i>	<i>Good governance menu card for UEFA member associations 2012-2016</i>
<i>4th Value of UEFA Eleven key values</i>	
http://www.uefa.com/uefa/elevenvalues/index.html	MESGO Master thesis by Alex Phillips
Openness	Strategy
Democracy	Democracy & Inclusiveness
Transparency	Transparency

Responsibility	Accountability
	Solidarity
	Integrity
	Effectiveness & efficiency
	Legal stability

Sport and Recreation South Africa
2004
<i>Best practice principles of good governance in sport</i>
<i>King II Report on corporate governance</i>
Accountability
Responsibility
Transparency
Social responsibility
Independence
Fairness
Discipline

UK Sport
2004
<i>Good governance: a guide for national governing bodies of sport</i>
Governance vs. management
Role, responsibilities and liabilities of Board members (selflessness, Integrity, objectivity, accountability to stakeholders, openness, honesty, leadership)
Specific role of the Chair
Board Members training
Board performance and evaluation
Conflicts of interest
Evaluating the CEO
Role of the CEO

Overview of the importance of international controls
The governing document
Effective meetings and information needs
Sub committees
Supporting the Board
Organisational reporting lines
Strategic planning
Risk management
Policies and procedures
Internal audit
Monitoring, evaluating and KPI
Importance of participation and accountability
Open organisational culture
General Assembly
Consultation
Electronic communication
Annual reports
Volunteer management
Regulatory compliance
Financial reporting
Audit
Labour law
Child protection and working with vulnerable groups

Dutch NOC*NSF
2005
<i>13 points of advice</i>
<i>Good sport governance code</i>

http://www.nocnsf.nl/cms/showpage.aspx?id=1857
Unity within the organisation
Existence and definition of statutes/policy
Good administration and healthy financial policy
Organisational structure
Members
Code of conduct for the board approved by the General Assembly
Liability of the board
Communication
Step down of a member of the board
Annual meeting of the board
Statutory for directors and managers
Responsibility of the board (regulate) for the general assembly to be sell able to do its monitoring job
The board should well-define the regulations of the following subjects: disciplinary regulation, sexual harassment, discrimination, racism and handing complaints

United States Olympic Committee
2005
<i>USOC preliminary NGB governance guidelines</i>
https://custom.cvent.com/EE7D9F1FF632436E9BD5A04565F24F99/files/1fe9e6f85e2c4675bda34c8e01b6137b.pdf
NGBs should be governed by a board which shall have sole responsibility for governance
NGB boards should generally be between 7 and 12 in membership
NGB boards should have at least 20% independent directors as well as at least 20% athlete directors
NGB boards should have staggered term limits
NGBs must have at least the following 3 standing committees: Audit (which shall also have responsibility for ethics matters unless ethics issues are addressed by another committee), Compensation, and Nominating & Governance
NGB committees should be of the minimum number and size possible to permit both conduct of the sport and appropriate board governance
The role of management and the role of governance should be defined clearly, with each NGB being staff

managed and board governed
NGBs must be financially and operationally transparent and accountable to its members and the USOC
NGBs must adopt best practices for not for profit organizations
NGBs must comply with all of the requirements for membership as defined in the Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act, USOC Bylaws, and any USOC Board policies

Sport and Recreation New Zealand (Sport New Zealand)
2006
<i>Nine steps to effective governance: building high performing organisations</i>
http://www.sportnz.org.nz/Documents/Sector%20Capability/effective_govt_2nd.pdf
Prepare the job description
Develop the work plan
Review the structure and content of the standard board meeting
Recast the strategic plan
The chief executive – recruitment, performance measures and evaluation
Enhance the board’s monitoring effectiveness
Regularly review the board’s performance
Ensure active succession planning

Wales Sports Council
Circa 2006
<i>Sound governance and good management characteristics</i>
http://www.scw.sequence.co.uk/performance-and-excellence/governing-bodies/governance
Strong accountability to all members, funders and stakeholders
Modern and efficient arrangements for governance
Appropriate legal structures
Appropriate business planning
Clear leadership which commands the respect of players
A sport run with energy, enthusiasm and passion
Explicit roles and expectations to ensure the optimum contribution from board members, paid staff,

volunteers and players
Transparent and compliant systems for managing and administering the sport
Commitment to ethical standards and fair play
Diverse sources of revenue without over-dependence on any one funder
Partnerships working to deliver national opportunities for sport

Sport and Recreation Alliance (UK)
2011
<i>Voluntary code of good governance for the sport and recreation sector</i>
http://www.sportandrecreation.org.uk/smart-sport/voluntary-code
Integrity: Acting as guardians of the sport, recreation, activity or area
Defining and evaluating the role of the board
Delivery of vision, mission and purpose
Objectivity: Balanced, inclusive and skilled board
Standards, systems and controls
Accountability and transparency
Understanding and engaging with the sporting landscape

Sport England
2011
<i>Good governance guidance</i>
http://www.sportengland.org/funding/small_grants/want_to_apply-1.aspx
Board leadership
The Board in control
The high performance Board
Board Review and renewal
Board delegation
Board and trustee integrity
The open Board

Australian Sports Commission

2012
<i>Sports Governance principles: a good practice guide for sporting organisations</i>
http://www.ausport.gov.au/__data/assets/file/0010/485857/ASC_Governance_Principles.pdf
Board composition, roles and powers
Board processes
Governance systems
Board reporting and performance
Stakeholder relationship and reporting
Ethical and responsible decision making

Appendix 2 – Benchmarking FIFA and the IOC in 2012

See section 4.3.

Organisational transparency Indicators in 2012	<i>FIFA Score</i>	<i>IOC Score</i>	<i>Comments</i>
ISGB publishes on its website its statutes and by-laws	4	4	Including past FIFA Statutes or Olympic Charters
ISGB publishes on its website its sports rules	4	4	
ISGB publishes on its website its Legislative Body members' basic information	4	4	National football associations are presented as well as IOC members
ISGB publishes on its website its Executive Body members' and senior managers biographical and contact information	3	3	contact information is not published on the respective websites (fifa.com and Olympic.org)
ISGB publishes on its website its organisation chart	3	0	Unlike the IOC, a simplified FIFA organisation chart is published on its website
ISGB publishes on its website its vision/mission/values and strategic objectives	3	3	
ISGB publishes on its website the agenda of its Legislative Body meetings	0	0	
ISGB regularly publishes on its website newsletters and/or press releases which are retrievable	4	4	Press release, weekly highlights and the Olympic Review are available over several years
ISGB publishes on its website an annual activity report	4	3	Every year for FIFA, every two years for the IOC
Total	29/36	25/36	
Mean	3.22	2.77	

Reporting transparency Indicators in 2012	<i>FIFA Score</i>	<i>IOC Score</i>	<i>Comments</i>
ISGB publishes or makes available reports on its main events (championships, cups, etc.)	3	3	Final Reports of the Olympic Games and the World Cup are published by the Organising Committees
ISGB opens its Legislative Body meetings to media or publishes their minutes	3	3	Through video feed since 1999 for the session, but not the questions raised by IOC members
ISGB annually publishes its Standing Bodies	0	0	Minutes are available after a long

reports			embargo period.
ISGB annually publishes an externally audited financial report according to recognised international standards (IFRS* or similar)	3	3	Prepared by KPMG (for FIFA) and PWC (for IOC)
ISGB annually publishes compensation benefits and/or salary of its president	0	4	The information is not available for FIFA
ISGB annually publishes financial allowances of its voluntary Executive Body members	3	3	Some information is provided in a note to the financial report
ISGB annually publishes salaries and benefits of its senior managers	0	4	The information is not available for FIFA
ISGB annually publishes amount of income tax paid and to whom	4	4	The IOC is exempt of the revenue tax in Switzerland and Olympic host countries; FIFA pays taxes in the Canton of Zurich
ISGB has an archival policy to give access to its archives for scholars and media	3	2	FIFA has a slightly more open policy for access to its archives
Total	19/36	26/36	
Mean	2.11	2.88	

<i>Stakeholders' representation Indicators for IOC</i>	<i>FIFA Score</i>	<i>IOC Score</i>	<i>Comments</i>
Athletes are represented in the ISGB bodies	2	4	FIFA has a Players' Status Commission
The athletes' entourage (coaches, agents, medical staff, etc.) are represented in the ISGB bodies	0	1	An IOC Entourage Commission was created in 2009
Judges / Referees are represented in the ISGB bodies	1	0	FIFA has a referees' Commission
Clubs are represented in the ISGB bodies	1	3	NOCs are better represented than football clubs
Leagues are represented in the ISGB bodies	1	3	IFs are better represented than football leagues
Event organising committees are represented in the ISGB bodies	1	1	Only in some commissions
Media partners are represented in the ISGB bodies	1	1	Only in some commissions
Commercial partners (sponsors, suppliers...) are represented in the ISGB bodies	1	1	Only in IOC / FIFA Marketing commission

Sport fans, supporters, volunteers, grass root participants are represented in the ISGB bodies	1	2	
Total	9/36	16/36	
Mean	1.0	1.77	

<i>Democratic process Indicators in 2012</i>	<i>FIFA Score</i>	<i>IOC Score</i>	<i>Comments</i>
ISGB organs' meet regularly (annually for LB and several times a year for EB)	4	4	
ISGB organs' members are elected on the basis of secret ballots and procedures detailed in its statutes	2	4	FIFA Executive Committee members are not elected by Congress (in 2012) but nominated by their confederations
ISGB has detailed regulation for the candidatures to its presidency	2	4	
ISGB organs' major decisions are taken by secret ballots and implicated members are excluded from the vote	1	3	FIFA Executive Committee members can vote for their own country's candidature for the World Cup
ISGB organs' major decisions are taken on the basis of written reports supported by criteria	3	3	Candidature Evaluation reports are published
ISGB EB's members have a term limit	0	4	No term limit at FIFA in 2012
ISGB EB's members have an age limit	0	4	No age limit at FIFA in 2012
ISGB EB's members and senior managers reflect the sport gender balance	1	2	FIFA is more male dominated than the IOC, although both organisations are imbalanced
ISGB EB's members and senior managers reflect the members' geographical balance	2	2	Europe still over represented in the EBs and among senior managers
Total	15/36	30/36	
Mean	1.66	3.33	

<i>Control mechanisms Indicators in 2012</i>	<i>FIFA Score</i>	<i>IOC Score</i>	<i>Comments</i>
ISGB has adopted a code or principles of governance	3	4	BUPs adopted in 2009, FIFA refers to IGC reports
ISGB has an internal integrated control and risk management system (COSO or similar)	3	3	Not publicly available
ISGB has an audit and remuneration committee	4	4	Since 2006 for the IOC; since 2012 for

or similar, distinct from the finance committee			FIFA
An elected independent member seats on the ISGB's Executive Body to safeguard proper decision making on behalf of the members	4	0	Proposal by FIFA IGC for decision of the FIFA Executive Committee in May 2013
ISGB has a committee to perform due diligence on the members of its bodies and senior managers based on FIT or similar	3	3	Role taken by Nominations Commission at the IOC and Audit and Compliance Committee at FIFA
ISGB separates regulatory and commercial functions	0	3	TV and Marketing are two FIFA Departments under the FIFA Secretary General
ISGB observes open tenders for its major marketing and procurement contracts	1	3	FIFA rarely uses tenders unlike the IOC
ISGB's decisions can be contested through well-defined internal channels specified in its statutes and bye-laws	2	2	
ISGB recognises the Court of Arbitration for sport (or similar) as an external channel of complaint and dispute resolution	3	3	FIFA recognised CAS in 2002 with a separate football arbitrators' list
Total	23/36	25/36	
Mean	2.55	2.77	

<i>Sport integrity Indicators in 2012</i>	<i>FIFA Score</i>	<i>IOC Score</i>	<i>Comments</i>
ISGB has or recognises an Ethics/Integrity Code for its organs' members and staff including guidelines for receiving/giving gifts from/to individuals or organisations	4	4	Since 1999 for the IOC; since 2006 for FIFA, revamped in 2011
ISGB has state-of-the-art conflict of interest regulations	4	4	
ISGB has rules concerning betting on its sports or recognises the SportAccord code of conduct and model rules on sports integrity in relation to sports betting	4	4	Both organisations have rules and monitoring systems to fight against match fixing
ISGB has an independent body (e.g. Ethics Commission) to monitor the application of all these codes and rules, to initiate investigation on its own and propose sanctions	4	2	FIFA Ethics Commission is more independent than IOC Ethics Commission
ISGB has a confidential reporting mechanism in order to manage comments and allegations by	3	1	FIFA has launched a whistle-blower

whistle blowers			website in 2013
ISGB recognises and complies to the World Anti-Doping Code	4	4	
ISGB's major events respect the principles of sustainable development and adopt an environmental management system (ISO* 14000 or similar)	2	3	
ISGB has integrity awareness / education programmes for its main stakeholders	2	3	
ISGB collaborates with governmental and non-governmental agencies on integrity issues	3	4	IOC has more cooperation in place
Total	30/36	29/36	
Mean	3.33	3.22	

<i>Solidarity Indicators in 2012</i>	<i>FIFA Score</i>	<i>IOC Score</i>	<i>Comments</i>
ISGB is a not-for-profit organisation (it invests a part of its surplus in its ideal objectives)	4	4	
ISGB has a transparent financial redistribution policy and programmes towards its main stakeholders	3	4	
ISGB audits the use of funds given to its main stakeholders	2	2	
ISGB has programmes for the development of its sport at elite and grass root levels	3	3	
ISGB has an environmental and social responsibility policy and programmes in place	4	3	Adoption in 1999 of an Agenda 21 for the Olympic Movement and sustainability through sport report in 2010
ISGB has career and education programmes to assist its athletes during the transition to their post-athletic careers	1	2	
ISGB has programmes or resources to assist the communities which host its events in their legacy planning	1	3	
ISGB audits the use of funds given to its social responsibility programmes	1	2	Little is done, especially by FIFA

ISGB collaborates with governmental and non-governmental agencies on social responsibility issues	2	3	
Total	21/36	26/36	
Mean	2.33	2.88	

Abstract

This working paper presents the Basic Indicators for Better Governance in International Sport (BIBGIS) as a tool to assess and measure the state of governance of international sport governing bodies. The working paper is organised as follows. We start by presenting different definitions of governance and some examples of principles of good governance in sport and critique them. We then introduce our approach which is based on a limited number of indicators divided among seven dimensions and apply it to the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and other international sport governing bodies. Although our approach can also be used to benchmark the governance of different sport organisations, we demonstrate that it faces limitations. We conclude with suggested next steps for future BIBGIS developments.

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