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Nirukta, Uṇādi Sūtra, and Aṣṭādhyaśayī: a review article*

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1. This new volume of the veteran Nirukta scholar contains eleven numbered notes (X - XX) and one article which carries no number.¹ All of them had been, or were about to be, published elsewhere. Together they contain interesting new points of view on quite a number of the problems connected with the Nirukta. I shall briefly describe them, with comments where necessary.

Note X ('Anūpa') argues convincingly that Yāska knew the derivation of *prācīna* (< *pra-c-īna* < *pra-ac-īna*; in the Nirukta parallel to *anūpa* < *anu-p-a* < *anu-āp*) also found in Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhyaśayī. (Cf. § 4, below.)

Note XI ('Ardhanāman') shows that *ardhanāman* (Nir. 1.7) does not mean "synonym of 'half'" (Sarup) but is rather a technical grammatical term which was used by 'some', apparently not for long, to designate the few words² which share with *nāmans* the property of declension, but not of accentuation.

Note XII ('Vibhakti') attempts to clarify the hitherto obscure sentence *yathārtham vibhaktīḥ saṃnamayet* (Nir. 2.1). The solution lies in the word *vibhakti* which must not here mean 'case termination' but 'division'. The sentence now comes to say that "They [i.e., the divisions of a word into syllables or letters] (*vibhaktīḥ*) ... should be interpreted [?] (*saṃnamayet*) according to the sense (*yathārtham*) of the words to be derived".

Note XIII ('Brahman') deals with the meaning of *brahman* in Nir. 4.6: *tatra brahmetihāsamīśram*³ *ṛjimiśram gāthāmiśram bhavati*. The Aitareya Brāhmaṇa (33.6) contains a similar sentence at the end of the Śunahśepa story: *tad etat pararkśatagātham śaunahśepam ākhyānam*. Mehendale concludes that here *brahman* = *ākhyāna*. He does not seem to be aware that the same two episodes had been compared by Oldenberg (1883: 79-80 (466-67)) in an article dedicated to 'das altindische Ākhyāna', who did not however go

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¹ It does in the 'Contents', no doubt by mistake.

² *tva* and *sama*.

³ Mehendale dissolves the sandhi: *brahma itihāsamīśram*, thus excluding the possibility that there is here question of one compound; see below, n. 5.

to the extent of saying that *brahman* and *ākhyāna* are synonymous here.⁴ Geldner's (1889: 285 n. 2; cf. Thieme, 1952: 119 (128)) suggestion to take *brahman* = *brāhmaṇa*, seems more acceptable than Mehendale's proposal. Another recent interpretation of the Nirukta sentence has been given by Horsch (1966: 314): "Dieser Hymnus ist vermischt mit Gebet (*brahman*) und Erzählung (*itihāsa*),⁵ er besteht (nämlich) aus Rk- und Liedstrophe."

[2]

Note XIV ('Jāmi and ajāmi in the Nirukta 4.20') gives a plausible new interpretation of the line *jāmy atirekanāma bāliśasya vāsamānajātiyasya vopajanah* (Nir. 4.20).

Note XV ('Aikapadika in the Nirukta 1.14') tries to find the meaning of *aikapadika* in *santy alpaprayogāḥ krto 'py aikapadikā yathā vratafir*⁶ *damūnā jātya āṭnāro jāgarūko darvihomīti* (Nir. 1.14). Mehendale argues that of all the words here enumerated "either the *prakṛti* or the *pratyaya* turns out to be of unique occurrence". These words therefore "are *aikapadika* in this sense". This proposal, I think, is not acceptable because it confronts us with insuperable difficulties. The most serious one is no doubt that the word *aikapadika*—which occurs twice in the Nirukta (1.14 and 4.1) and further nowhere in Sanskrit literature, it seems—cannot in Mehendale's interpretation both times be given the same, or similar, meanings. Also the related word *ekapada* is given two meanings in two of its contexts by Mehendale (p. 29 n. 20). Another difficulty is that Mehendale cannot substantiate his claim that either the *prakṛti* or the *pratyaya* of the enumerated words are of unique occurrence. Since Yāska presents these words as being of known derivation, we are entitled to look for them in Pāṇini's Aṣṭādhayāyī and in the Unādi Sūtra, where we find several of them.

Damūnas is indeed derived (Un 4.234)⁷ with a *pratyaya* (*ūnasI*) which is not used anywhere else. The same may be true of *homin*⁸ which seems to get the unique *pratyaya min* in Un 3.84.⁹ But *jāgarūka* shares the ending *ūka* with *yāyajūka*, *jañjapūka* and *dandaśūka* according to P. 3.2.165-66,¹⁰ and with *marūka*, *kāṇūka*, *valūka*, *ulūka*, *sālūka*, *maṇḍūka* and other words according to Un 4.40-43. *Darvi*¹¹ shares the ending *viN* with *varvi* according to

⁴ Surprisingly, Mehendale (1979) compares the two episodes again in an article which supports Oldenberg's *ākhyāna* theory.

⁵ *brahmetihāsamīśram* is here obviously taken as a compound.

⁶ Mehendale (p. 26 n. 8) observes that "Durga does not explain the formation of *vratati*." This is not correct, as Dr. Kahrs pointed out to me. Durga explains: *vratafir vrīṇātēḥ*.

⁷ Strictly speaking Un 4.234 derives *damunas*; *damūnas* is derived in the Daśapādī (9.95), the other, later, version of the Unādi Sūtra edited by Yudhishthira Mimansaka.

⁸ I follow here Mehendale in taking *darvihomī* to be two words, *darvi* and *homin*. Note that *darvihomin* occurs JB 3.123-24 and in the lost Śātyāyani Brāhmaṇa (Ghosh, 1935: 27) in the sense "die (nur) am Darvi-opfer Anteil hatten" (Caland, 1919: 255).

⁹ Un 3.84 is a *nipātana sūtra*, so that the suffix is not made explicit.

¹⁰ Mehendale's remark that only in *jāgarūka* the ending *ūka* comes after an unreduplicated stem (in the opinion of the ancient grammarians) is irrelevant.

¹¹ See note 8 above.

Uṇ 4.53. We must conclude that another interpretation of *aikapadika* is called for. See § 2, below.

In Note XVI ('Sattvanāman and karmanāman') an attempt is made to show that *sattvanāman* and *karmanāman* are two sub-classes of *nāman*. Examples of *sattvanāman* are *vrajyā* ('a going') and *pakti* ('a cooking'); examples of *karmanāman* are said to be *puruṣa*, *aśva* and *trṇa*. I must confess that I am not convinced by Mehendale's argument. The two passages which must support his contentions can be more satisfactorily explained without the assumption that *sattvanāman* and *karmanāman* are technical terms. What is meant by *sattva*, Yāska informs us, includes cows, horses, people and elephants (*gaur aśvah puruṣo hastī*): these words are therefore certainly *sattvanāman*.¹² The word *karmanāman*, Mehendale admits, does not by itself occur as a grammatical term in the Nirukta. Its derivative *kārmanāmika* occurs once (Nir. 1.13). But this passage, and the word *kārmanāmika* in it, does not deal with the words *puruṣa*, *aśva*, *trṇa*, etc., as Mehendale thinks; it rather is about the artificial words **puriṣaya*, **astr*, **tardana*, etc., which should be used instead of *puruṣa* etc. These artificial words are nouns expressive of the action inherent in the objects denoted, and therefore the word *kārmanāmika* [3] could be used here. The point is not that *karmanāman* is a grammatical term, but that in the passage under consideration an opinion is represented according to which nominal words (*nāman*), if they were indeed derived from verbs, would be more clearly recognizable as such. I translate: "[People] would use [words] of which the formation is regular, *giving rise to nominal words which express the action* [concerned], in such a way that the meaning is understood; they would use *puriṣaya* instead of *puruṣa*, *astr* instead of *aśva*, *tardana* instead of *trṇa*." (... *ya eṣāṁ nyāyavān kārmanāmikāḥ saṃskāro yathā cāpi pratītarthāni syus tathaināny ācakṣīran/puruṣam puriṣaya ity ācakṣīran/ aṣṭety aśvam/ tardanam iti trṇam/*)

Note XVII ('Some technical terms used by Yāska in the Nirukta II 1 and 2') studies the important section which describes the methods of 'etymological explanation'. (Cf. § 4 below.)

Note XVIII ('Āditya : āditeya') proposes a slight transposition of sentences in Nir. 2.13 whereby the discussion about the 'etymological explanation' of *āditya* makes more sense. (Cf. n. 23, below.)

In Note XIX ('Yāska's definition of the karmopasaṅgraha nipāta') Mehendale proposes two interpretations of the obscure sentence (Nir. 1.4) *atha yasyāgamād artha prthaktvam aha vijñāyate na tv auddeśikam iva vigrahenā prthaktvāt sa*

¹² The complete passage leaves no room for doubt (Nir. 1.1): *tatraitan nāmākhyātayor laksāṇam pradiśanti/ bhāvapradhānam ākhyātam/ sattvapradhānāni nāmāni/ tad yatrobhe bhāvapradhāne bhavataḥ pūrvāparībhūtam bhāvam ākhyātenācaṣṭe/ vrajati pacatīti/ upakramaprabhrty apavargaparyantam mūrttam sattvabhbūtam sattvanāmabhīh/ vrajyā paktir iti/ ada iti sattvānām upadeśāḥ/ gaur aśvah puruṣo hastī/ bhavatīti bhāvasya/ āste śete vrajati tiṣṭhatīti/*

karmopasaingrahah.¹³ The difficulty of this sentence is compounded by the fact that a number of particles is enumerated after it which have all kinds of meanings. Mehendale therefore suggests as first interpretation: "karmo[pasaingraha] *nipāta* is that *nipāta* by the use of which separateness of meaning (i.e. a separate meaning for the different particles comprising this groups and not the same meaning for all of them) is indeed understood, but not as if it were directly stated, because the separate meaning is understood on account of the special or distinct comprehension (*vigraha*) of that *nipāta*." In short: these particles have all kinds of meanings which must be understood. Clearly this interpretation is not convincing. Mehendale's second interpretation runs: "a karmo[pasaingraha] *nipāta* is that *nipāta* by the use of which separateness of objects, ideas etc. is no doubt understood, but not as in the case of a simple enumeration of the objects by which also separateness of the objects enumerated is understood." But Mehendale himself must admit that this interpretation "will be applicable mainly to the particle *ca*", i.e. not to the other particles following this heading. In other words: this interpretation too is not satisfactory.

I have elsewhere (1979) argued that a number of features of Yāska's discussion appear to indicate that particles were meant to fall into four groups, not three as always maintained. The particles listed after the obscure sentence under consideration fall in two groups: one in which 'separateness of items' (*arthaprthaktvam*) is clearly recognizable, and indeed emphasized in the Nirukta itself; and one where this is not the case.¹⁴ I would have simply referred the reader to this article, were [4] it not that recently Falk (1982) has attacked my least important argument on rather flimsy grounds¹⁵ and concluded that "Bronkhorst's ingenious solution loses credibility and we have to start again to search for the clue." Falk's proposed interpretation of the sentence under consideration is: "Now, (that particle) for which by tradition a separateness of meaning is known, but not one connected with the (usual) explanation (but one derived) from the separateness (resulting) from (contextual) analysis, that is an 'adoption of meaning'-(particle)." Unfortunately for Falk, this interpretation forces him to say that the first particle enumerated after this sentence, viz. *ca*, "is not *karmopasamgraha*"! Other particles which, though listed as *karmopasaingrahā* (one would think), are not *karmopasaingrahā*, are *aha*, *ha*, *śasvat*. And of the remaining particles some may be *anekakarman* or "we may have thought of its use in

¹³ This sentence and the related problem of Yāska's classification of *nipātas* have been repeatedly discussed. To the publications referred to in Bronkhorst, 1979, must be added Prasad, 1975; Falk, 1982; Thieme, 1935: *24* (531) n. 1.

¹⁴ This distinction into two groups had already been noted by the commentators Durga and Skanda-Maheśvara; see Mehendale, pp. 55-56.

¹⁵ Falk notes that "api can be found in the Brāhmaṇa-language preceding all parts of an enumeration but the first (1 ... api 2 ... api 3), but in classical Sanskrit we expect an *api* with the first item also (api 1 ... api 2 ... api 3)." Since the Nirukta follows the second practice at one place, Falk thinks it cannot follow the first one somewhere else. We may compare Yāska's double negative in Nir. 2.3 (*naikapadāni nirbrūyat/ nāvaiyākaranāya/ ...;*; see § 2, below); are we to draw far-reaching consequences from this too?

Sanskrit only, forgetting that in the Veda it is used differently"; to both categories, Falk admits, the title of 'functiontaking' (*karmopasaṅgraha*) does strictly speaking not apply. We must conclude that also Falk's interpretation cannot be accepted.

Note XX ('Yāska's second rule of derivation') explains the sentence *athānanvite 'rthe prādeśike vikāre 'rthanityah parīkṣeta kenacid vṛttisāmānyena* (Nir. 2.1) as follows: "in cases of difficult words — i.e. words, the accent and the grammatical formation of which are not regular (*anavite arthe*)¹⁶ or in cases of words where the word to be derived is not indicative of any action (*aprādeśike vikāre*), e.g. a word like *indra*, — in such cases one should first take a root similar in (sound and) meaning (*arthanityah*) with the word to be derived and derive it from that root on the basis of the commonness of behaviour in undergoing a phonetic change, that is he should try to see if the phonetic change implied in such a derivation has any similarity with a phonetic change accepted by the grammarians for the explanation of some other forms in the grammar." In view of the preceding sentence *tad yesu padesu svarasamskārau samarthau prādeśikena vikārenānvitau syātām tathā tāni nirbrūyāt* (translated below, § 2) it seems better to translate *anavite 'rthe* "when the meaning is not accompanied [by the right accent and formation]" and *aprādeśike vikāre* "when the modification is not such as fits the [grammatical] derivation".¹⁷ Mehendale's interpretation of *vṛttisāmānya* ('commonness of behaviour in undergoing a phonetic change', i.e. 'similarity with a phonetic change accepted by the grammarians for the explanation of some other forms in the grammar') may be correct, because the Nirukta continues: "When not even such a *sāmānya* is present, one should explain on the basis of similarity in a syllable or in a single sound" (*avidyamāne sāmānye 'py akṣaravarṇasāmānyān nirbrūyāt*). It is in this connection that the remark is made "one should not heed the grammatical formation" (*na samskāram ādriyeta*); that is, one should not heed grammar where the meaning to be expressed does not tally with the grammatical derivation.

[5]

A short discussion of the final article 'The science of etymology (*niruktasāstra*)' will be given in § 5, below.

2. A solution of the *aikapadika* problem (Note XV) may become possible if we recall the objection which Yāska tries to answer. A critic charges that if all nominal words (*nāman*) were derived from verbs, they should have a form from which the sense and the

¹⁶ A footnote reads: "Or, when the meaning of the word does not agree with the meaning of the root apparent in it, e.g. the meaning of the root *has* 'smile' does not agree with the meaning of the word *hasta* 'hand'."

¹⁷ For the translation of *pradeśa* 'derivation' and *prādeśika* 'derivational' see Scharfe, 1977: 121-22.

action would be understood:¹⁸ *puruṣa* should be *puriṣaya*, *aśva* should be *aṣṭr*, *tṛṇa* should be *tardana*. That is to say, these words should have taken the regular *kṛt* endings which their senses demand. Yāska admits the irregularity, but points out that the reverse irregularity exists as well: there are words with regular *kṛt* endings which do not have the meanings demanded by those endings and the roots to which they are attached. *Kṛt* endings normally express one of the *kārakas* with respect to the activity represented by the verbal root, or that activity itself.¹⁹ In the words enumerated by Yāska they do nothing like it. The meaning of *damūnas* ('devoted to the house') has little to do with the root *dam* (*upaśame*; DhP IV.94) from which it is derived;²⁰ *jāgarūka* means 'wakeful', not 'who wakes up' or 'who awakens' as one might expect on the basis of the root *jāgr* (*nindrākṣaye*; DhP II.63); *darvi* should mean something like 'what tears asunder' (cf. *dṝ vidāraṇe*; DhP IX.23), but actually means 'ladle'. (The remaining words cannot be taken into account here, partly because we do not know the intended derivation, partly because we are not sure if Yāska wanted *homī* or *homin* in his list.)

If we now understand Yāska correctly, his sentence *santy alpaprayogāḥ kṛto 'py aikapadikā[h]* must convey the meaning that there are words, of rare occurrence, which, though ending in *kṛt* suffixes,²¹ must be treated as grammatically unanalyzed words. Recall that Yāska's business is to find the meanings of words (Bronkhorst, 1981a: 9-12). Normally grammatical analysis (including the analysis of the Unādi sūtras) helps him in his endeavour; in the case of the words *damūnas* etc. it does not. These words are *aikapadika* 'belonging to the unanalyzed words (*ekapada*)'.

This interpretation well fits Yāska's own procedure. Of the enumerated *aikapadika* words, he discusses *damūnas* in Nir. 4.4: *damūnā damamanā vā/ dānamanā vā/ dāntamanā vā/ api vā dama iti grhanāma/ tanmanāḥ²² syāt/*. Yāska here goes about as if he does not know the derivation of *damūnas* from the root *dam*. Also *vratati* is discussed (Nir. 6.28: *vratatir varanāc ca/ sayanāc ca/ tatanāc ca/*); we do not know how this word is derived as a *kṛt* formation, but we can be sure that the etymology of this word given in the Nirukta deviates from that derivation.

Also the sense which we now ascribe to the word *ekapada* ('unanalyzed word', i.e., a word where grammar does not help to reach at the meaning) is in agreement with Yāska's use of this term elsewhere. In Nir. 2.1 we hear: "Words in which [6] accent and formation

¹⁸ See above, § 1, on Note XVI.

¹⁹ Unādi suffixes in particular are said to be expressive of *kārakas* other than *sampradāna* and *apādāna* in P. 3.4.75: *tābhyaṁ anyatropādayah*.

²⁰ In Nir. 2.2 Yāska tells us that the Vedic word *damūnas* is a *kṛt* derivative from a *bhāṣā* root. This fits the derivation from *dam*.

²¹ Yāska, like sometimes Patañjali, uses the word *kṛt* for *kṛdanta* (Abhyankar and Shukla, 1977: 126, s.v. *kṛt*).

²² Sarup reads *tanmanā*; Roth *tanmanāḥ*.

agree with the meaning [to be expressed] and have been modified in a way which fits the derivation,²³ [such words] should be explained thus (i.e., in agreement with their regular derivation)." (*tad yeṣu padeṣu svarasamskārau samarthau prādeśikena vikāreṇānvitau syātāṁ tathā tāni nirbrūyāt.*) The text then turns to words which do not have such a regular derivation, gives a number of hints how such words must be ‘explained’, and concludes (Nir. 2.2): "In this way the unanalyzed words (*ekapada*) should be explained" (*evam ekapadāni nirbrūyāt*). The Nirukta (2.2-3) subsequently explains that *taddhita* formations and compounds must first be split up into their (grammatical) parts before ‘etymological explanation’ can be applied. In short, we see that grammatical analysis must precede ‘etymological explanation’. Where and when no grammatical analysis is possible, Yāska speaks of *ekapada* ‘unanalyzed words’.

We turn to Yāska's use of *aikapadika* in Nir. 4.1. Its citation in context supports our interpretation: "Now we shall turn to the words which have several meanings but only one word form; and to Vedic words of which *the grammatical formation is not known*. They call this [the section] *dealing with unanalyzed words (aikapadika)*." (*atha yāny anekārthāny ekaśabdāni tāny ato 'nukramiṣyāmaḥ/ anavagatasamskārāmś ca nigamān/ tad aikapadikam ācakṣate/*) I am not quite sure what the first sentence means. Probably we must think of words which have one or more meanings besides the meaning which agrees with their grammatical formation.²⁴ Certain is that Yāska is going to discuss words where grammatical formation does not or not always help to get at their meaning. The name *aikapadika* for this section emphasizes this lack of help from grammar.

It goes without saying that it is in the field of *ekapadas* that Yāska's method goes beyond grammar.²⁵ It cannot therefore surprise us that the explanation of *ekapadas* is only understandable to someone who has already studied grammar. "One should not explain *ekapadas* neither to a non-grammarian, nor to a non-resident pupil, or to someone who is not conversant with it; for the scorn of the ignorant for knowledge is eternal." (*naikapadāni nirbrūyāt/ nāvaiyākaraṇāya/ nānupasannāya/ anidaṇvide vā/ nityam hy avijñātur vijñāne 'sūyā/*)(Nir. 2.3)

Because then ‘etymological explanation’ follows grammar as long as possible and does not come into action until grammar has played its role, it is a *complement of grammar*

²³ See note 17 above.

²⁴ Examples may be *śaryā* (Ngh. 4.2.23) which means ‘finger’ (*āṅguli*) besides regular ‘arrow’ (*isu*; Nir. 5.4); *arka* (Ngh. 4.2.24) which is derived from *arc* (so Un 3.40) and thus given three meanings, and which in addition is given the sense ‘tree’ (*vṛkṣa*). We may also think of the ‘etymological explanations’ given of *āditya* (Nir. 2.13) as understood by Mehendale (Note XVIII): the grammatical derivation *aditeḥ putrah* is assigned a secondary role because it does not well fit the sense ‘sun’.

²⁵ Elsewhere ‘etymological explanation’ follows grammatical analysis: "Where accent and formation agree with the meaning [to be expressed] and have been modified in a way which fits the derivation, so that everything fits the derivation, there there is no disagreement [with those who think that only such words should be ‘etymologically explained’]" (*yatra svarasamskārau samarthau prādeśikena vikāreṇānvitau syātāṁ sarvam prādeśikam ity evam saty anupālambha esa bhavati*; Nir. 1.14).

(*vyākaraṇasya kārtṣnyam*; Nir. 1.15), not its substitute or alternative. ‘Etymological explanation’ discards grammar only in exceptional cases, as in the case of words which “though *kṛt* formations, belong to the unanalyzed words, such as *vratati*, *damūnas*, *jātya*, *āṭṇāra*, *jāgarūka*, *darvi* and *homi(n?)*” (*kṛto 'py aikapadikā yathā vratatir damūnā jātya āṭṇāro jāgarūko darvihom[?]ti*).²⁶

3. In the preceding section I have done as if Yāska certainly knew the Aṣṭādhyaśyī and the Unādi Sūtra. This is an assumption which cannot of course be taken for [7] granted. But if we cannot at this point be certain that Yāska knew the Aṣṭādhyaśyī and the Unādi Sūtra, we must accept that he knew grammatical works which accounted for the derivation of numerous words. In the preceding section we saw that Yāska explicitly designates *vratati*, *damūnas*, *jātya*, *āṭṇāra*, *jāgarūka*, *darvi* and *homi(n?)* as *kṛt* formations. One of these (*jāgarūka*) is derived in Pāṇini’s grammar, three (*damūnas*, *darvi* and *homin*) are dealt with in the Unādi Sūtra. This means that the remaining three (*vratati*, *jātya* and *āṭṇāra*) were analyzed in works which no longer survive, works moreover which were most likely of the kind of the surviving Unādi Sūtra. This suggests that, if Yāska knew the historical predecessor of the present Unādi Sūtra, this work contained in certain respects *more* than at present. The fact that Yāska mentions *darvi* and *homin* (?) side by side, like in the present Unādi Sūtra (3.84), makes it plausible that our Unādi Sūtra preserves at least some traces of the work(s) known to Yāska.

We can go one step further by again paying attention to the objection which Yāska tries to answer. This objection is that if nominal words were derived from verbs, they would have a regular grammatical formation and their senses would be understood therefrom; *puruṣa* would be *puriṣaya*, *aśva* *aṣṭr*, *trṇa* *tardana*. The fact that Yāska replies that reversely some nominal words with a regular derivation, such as *vratati*, *damūnas*, etc., have irregular meanings, shows that in Yāska’s opinion the words *puruṣa*, *aśva* and *trṇa* are *no* regular *kṛt* formations. But these three words are derived in the present Unādi Sūtra (4.74; 1.151; 5.8 resp.)! We must conclude that at least these sūtras, and most probably many others with them, were not known to Yāska.

More positive evidence regarding the Unādi Sūtra-like work(s) known to Yāska can be gathered from Nir. 2.1-2, where the methods of ‘etymological explanation’ are justified with the help of accepted grammatical derivations. These derivations are taken to be known, so that again we cannot avoid the conclusion that they had been laid down in grammatical works. Some of these are of the kind we are accustomed to find in the Unādi Sūtra. In four there is modification of the initial sound: *jyotis*, *ghana*, *bindu*, *vātya*; there is

²⁶ It is in cases like these that “one should not heed the grammatical formation”. See above, § 1, on Note XX.

inversion of the initial and final sounds in *stoka*, *raju*, *sikata* and *tarku*; substitution²⁷ of the final sound has taken place in *ogha*, *megha*, *nādhas*, *gādha*, *vadhū*, *madhu*; a sound has been added in *dvār*, *bharūjā*; Samprasāraṇa has taken place in *ūti*, *mṛdu*, *pr̥thu*, *pr̥sata*, *kunāru*; Vedic words derived from classical (*bhāṣika*) roots are *damūnas*, *kṣetrasādhas*; *uṣṇa* and *ghṛta* are classical words derived from Vedic roots; *śava* is derived from *śavati*, *dātra* from *dāti*.

A fair number of these words is derived in the present Uṇādi Sūtra precisely in the way indicated in the Nirukta. *Jyotis* is derived from *dyut*,²⁸ with substitution of *j* for *d* (Uṇ 2.111); *tarku* is derived from *kṛt* with inversion of initial and final sounds (Uṇ 1.17: *krter ādyantaviparyayaś ca*); *vadhū* is derived from *vah*, with [8] substitution of *dh* for final *h* (Uṇ 1.85); *madhu* is in a similar fashion derived from *man* (Uṇ 1.19); *mṛdu* and *pr̥thu* are derived from *mrad* and *prath* respectively, with Samprasāraṇa (Uṇ 1.29); *pr̥sata* is derived from the root *pr̥s* which has the present tense *parsati*, so that here too we can speak of Samprasāraṇa — the sūtra (Uṇ 3.111) indicates this by specifying that the suffix is *kit*; *damūnas* is derived from *dam*, as we know; *uṣṇa* from *uṣ* (Uṇ 3.2); *ghṛta* from *ghr* (Uṇ 3.89); *dātra* from *dā* (Uṇ 4.169).²⁹ In these cases the agreement between the work(s) presupposed by Yāska and the present Uṇādi Sūtra is perfect.

It appears that Kātyāyana and Patañjali derived *bharūjā* from *bhrj* with an Uṇādi suffix, adding an infix *ūM* (Mbh on vt. 3 on P. 1.1.47).

There is no agreement in two cases. The Uṇādi Sūtra (1.16) derives *raju* from *sr̥j*, so that there is here no inversion of initial and final sounds;³⁰ *śava* is derived from the root *śvi* (Uṇ 4.192), not *śav*. Another major point of difference is of course that more than half of the words enumerated by Yāska are not dealt with at all in the present Uṇādi Sūtra.

All this seems to support the conclusion that Yāska may have known some of the present Uṇādi sūtras, or earlier versions of them. A number of those known to us were certainly not known to him, but it appears that he knew others which have not survived. He looked upon all of them, and upon the derivations enjoined by them, as belonging to grammar (*vyākaraṇa*), not to ‘etymological explanation’ (*nirukta*).

²⁷ Mehendale (p. 41-43) tries to find the difference between *vyāpatti* (‘substitution’) and *viparyaya* (‘modification, inversion’) with no convincing results. Bhate (1975) points this out and proposes to follow Skanda-Maheśvara in reading *ādīvyāpatti* for *ādīviparyaya* in Nir. 2.1. *Viparyaya* can thus keep the sense ‘metathesis’, and only *vyāpatti* means ‘transformation of a phoneme into another phoneme’.

²⁸ Mehendale (p. 39-40) rightly points at the existence of a root *jyut* from which *jyotis* might have been derived. The fact that both Yāska and Uṇādi Sūtra prefer the root *dyut*, strengthens our suspicion that Yāska knew some of our Uṇādi sūtras or their precursors.

²⁹ *Dātra* can also be derived from the same root by P. 3.2.182.

³⁰ The derivation is: *sr̥j* > *r̥j* > *r-as-j* > *rajj-u*. Mehendale (p. 40-41) proposes another derivation from *sr̥j*: *sarj* > *rasj* > *rajj-u*, and observes in a footnote (n. 16): “This example will ... show that *anta* does not necessarily mean the final letter of the root, but the one occurring in the final syllable.”

4. It was relatively easy to find out in how far Yāska was acquainted with the present Unādi Sūtra. After all, the derivations given in the Unādi sūtras are not always self-evident and may even be far-fetched. If therefore Yāska knew the same derivations, he is likely to have known the same, or historically related Unādi sūtras. Ordinary grammar, on the other hand, often deals with obvious derivations which any grammar would contain. In order to find out if Yāska knew Pāṇini's grammar we need therefore more information than, say, from which root a certain word was considered to be derived.

Some such information is discussed by Mehendale in Note X: the grammatical derivation of *prācīna* known to Yāska was in an essential way identical with its derivation in Pāṇini's grammar; both have elision of *a* in *a(ñ)c* and lengthening of *a* in *pra*, where another derivation would have been conceivable. This suggests that Yāska knew the Aṣṭādhhyāyī.

Further evidence of this kind is found in Nir. 2.1-2, where in explaining the methods of 'etymological explanation' examples are given of peculiarities in grammatical derivations. These grammatical derivations and their peculiarities are taken to be known and therefore presuppose some grammatical system, and most probably one or more grammatical works. This passage has been discussed [9] by Mehendale (Note XVII), while Thieme (1935: *23*-24* (530-31)) has studied the question if the derivations here presupposed agree with Pāṇini's grammar. They do to a remarkable degree, so that Thieme — on the basis of this and some other evidence — accepts the posteriority of Yāska with respect to Pāṇini as a likely working hypothesis ('Arbeitshypothese').

There is one more piece of evidence which has not until now been made use of in this connection. Mehendale (1965: 8-16 = Nirukta Note II 'The use of *I* in the speech of Yāska') has convincingly argued that Yāska used the sound *I*, both in his own speech and in the R̥gveda. This sound, which is late, must have made its appearance in Vedic and classical Sanskrit after Pāṇini (Bronkhorst, 1981b: 90). There is only one possible objection against the corollary that Yāska came a considerable time after Pāṇini. It is conceivable that *I* entered into the text of the Nirukta long after its composition, as a result of a process of 'śākalization', a process which also left its mark on the R̥gveda-Prātiśākhya (Bronkhorst, 1982b: § 4) and the R̥gveda Padapāṭha (Bronkhorst, 1982a: 186). But this seems unlikely, because the Nirukta has no particularly close relationship with the R̥gveda Samhitā, as do the R̥gveda-Prātiśākhya and Padapāṭha, as well as the R̥gveda Brāhmaṇas, which also have *I*.

If then it is true that Yāska knew and used the Aṣṭādhhyāyī — which now seems likely —, we can no longer assume that he found all the grammatical derivations to which he refers in some other grammar which also derived words like *vratati*, *damūnas*, etc. We

rather have to assume that Yāska knew, besides a grammar (Pāṇini's grammar), something like our Unādi sūtras.

5. We are now in a position to come to grips with some of the questions discussed in Mehendale's final article 'The science of etymology (niruktaśāstra)'. I do not wish to comment on the useful summary of etymologies in the Saṃhitās, Brāhmaṇas, and Upaniṣads. Nor do I wish to criticize the comparison of ancient Indian *niruktaśāstra* and modern historical linguistics, which I have elsewhere (1981a) shown to be mistaken.³¹ I shall rather focus on the relation between grammar (*vyākaraṇa*) and 'etymological explanation' (*nirukta*).

Mehendale depicts grammar and 'etymological explanation' as sharing the same aim: "Their principal aim is to analyze the 'words' (*padas*) of the language into stem and suffix (*prakṛti* and *pratyaya*)."³² Yet there is a difference: "In the Indian tradition, *nirukta* considers itself to be complementary to grammar (*vyākaraṇasya kārtsnyam*; Nirukta 1.15). The reason is this. Nirukta teaches us the principles of analysing the words, considered by the grammar as unanalysable, from the roots."

One would expect that this last sentence implies that *nirukta* is to some extent opposed to grammar, rather than complementary to it. Mehendale confirms this (p. 71): "Most of the words dealt with by [Yāska] are those which the [10] grammarians have set aside as *avyutpanna*." Also the Unādi sūtras are said to be concerned with words which are underivable according to grammar, so that (p. 71) "the subject of study of both the Nairuktas and the Unādisūtras is the same. Both look upon the *avyutpanna* words as derivable from verbs."

We now know that all this is not correct. 'Etymological explanation' does not look upon itself as a better kind of grammar which supposedly corrects the mistaken view of the grammarians that not all nominal words can be derived from verbs. Rather, grammar is taken to be correct, not built on false assumptions, and not incomplete in any essential way.³³ 'Etymological explanation' is something besides grammar, a way to find the meanings of words where grammar is of no avail. The Unādi sūtras, be it noted, appear to belong in Yāska's opinion squarely in the field of grammar, not of 'etymological explanation'.³⁴ They, like grammar, analyze words into stems and suffixes. The Nirukta

³¹ Cf. also Kahrs, 1980; 1983; 1987. Note that historical linguistics did not fail to be influenced by the ancient Indian 'etymologists'; see Gonda, 1971: 199.

³² It is true of course that some grammarians think that all nominal words are derived from verbs, whereas others don't; see Nir. 1.12.

³³ [Added:] That later authors did not all share this position is shown by that fact that the astronomer Bhāskara I, in his commentary on Āryabhatīya 2.6ab (ed. K. S. Shukla, New Delhi 1976, p. 55 l. 13-15), proposes an Unādi derivation for the word *bhujā* in a sense different from the one given ("hand") in P. 7.3.61: *atra gaṇite bhujāśabdah auṇādikah pratipattavyah, anyathā hi "bhujānyubjau pāṇyupatāpayoh"* (P.

does not usually do so.³⁴ Note that Nir. 4.1 announces that ‘etymological explanation’ will be given of words ‘of which the grammatical formation is not known’ (*anavagatasamskāra*); this confirms that ‘etymological explanation’ is different from ‘grammatical formation’.

6. It may be useful to recall what is known about the relation of Pāṇini, Kātyāyana and Patañjali to the Unādi sūtras.

Pāṇini refers on two occasions (P. 3.3.1; 3.4.75) to Unādi suffixes. What is more, P. 6.4.55, 97 and 7.2.9 mention suffixes which have nowhere been taught in the Aṣṭādhyaśyāyī, but occur in the Unādi Sūtra (Renou, 1956: 158-159; Sarma, 1941: 399). Pāṇini must therefore have known some Unādi suffixes, and probably also some Unādi sūtras. It is at the same time clear that he did not know all the present Unādi sūtras. An indication to this effect may be that a number of words are derived both in the Aṣṭādhyaśyāyī and in the Unādi Sūtra (Renou, 1956: 164). A clearer indication is that many late words are derived in the Unādi Sūtra (Renou, 1956: 165). Moreover, P. 3.4.75 teaches that the Unādi suffixes come in senses other than those of the dative and ablative. These last two senses are expressed by *dāśa* and *goghna*, and *bhīma* etc. (P. 3.4.73-74). Apparently these words were in Pāṇini’s opinion not formed with Unādi suffixes. But several of them are in the surviving Unādi Sūtra. We must conclude that the Unādi sūtras which prescribe the formation of these words were not known to Pāṇini (cf. Sarma, 1941: 398-399). Pāṇini’s work does not allow us to find out if perhaps he knew Unādi sūtras which no longer exist.

Kātyāyana too refers to Unādi sūtras (or merely suffixes?) in some vārttikas (vt. 3 on P. 7.1.2; vt. 2 on P. 7.3.50; vt. 2 on P. 8.2.78). It seems that Kātyāyana used Unādi suffixes to derive *bharūjā* from *bhrj*, *marīcī* from *marc* (vt. 3 on P. 1.1.47; cf. Renou, 1957: 113 n. 518). These derivations are not found in the Unādi Sūtra. Kātyāyana may therefore have known Unādi sūtras which no longer [11] exist. It has been shown that at least one Unādi sūtra (2.58) is later than, and draws upon, a vārttika (vt. 2 on P. 3.2.178) of Kātyāyana (Sarma, 1941: 400).

Patañjali often refers to Unādi sūtras.³⁵ Many of the words which he gives as being derived with their help are also derived by surviving Unādi sūtras; some however are not: *śālā*, *malla* (Mbh on vt. 3 on P. 3.4.77; cf. Pade, 1951: xv-xvi), *vāṇtha*, *śāṇtha* (Mbh on vt. 2 on P. 7.3.50; cf. Pade, 1951: xvi). We must conclude that Patañjali, like Kātyāyana and Yāska, knew at least some Unādi sūtras which no longer exist. (Note that Kaiyata still may

7.3.61) *iti bhujāśabdasya pāṇāv arthe nipātitatvāt kṣetrapārśve na labhyate*. Be it noted that P. 7.3.61 normally reads: *bhujānyubjau pānyupatāpayoḥ*.

³⁴ It is dubious if the *nāmakaraṇas* which Yāska gives on six occasions (enumerated by Mehendale, p. 78-79) and the *upabandhas* (Nir. 1.7; 6.16; cf. Bhate, 1968: 121) were meant to be the same as *pratyayas* in grammar.

³⁵ See Tatacharya, 1972: 22 f.

have known an Unādi sūtra needed for the derivation of *sālā* and *malla*, as well as *mālā*.) Some of the now existing Unādi sūtras, on the other hand, were not known to Patañjali (Sarma, 1941: 400-401). The fact that Patañjali appears to have known an Unādi sūtra (*jīve radānuk*; Mbh I, p. 28, l. 9) which only survives in the Daśapādī version (1.163) — which is later than the more usual Pañcapādī version (Mimansaka, 1943: 28-29; Cardona, 1976: 170-171) — supports the view that individual Unādi sūtras could live a life more or less on their own, which would end by their being incorporated into one of the surviving collections, or by their simply being forgotten.

A noteworthy feature of Patañjali's remarks about the Unādis is that he often labels them 'underived words' (*avyutpannāni prātipadikāni*). It is true that at other occasions he appears to represent the opposite opinion (Tatacharya, 1972: 26-27), but the former one — which predominates — is of more interest to us. By considering Unādis underived words, he takes a position opposed to Yāska's. For Yāska these words were as much derived by grammar as words with more transparent derivations; for Patañjali they usually were not.

7. We return in conclusion to the question: What is the exact difference between grammar (*vyākaraṇa*) and 'etymological explanation' (*nirukta*)? We noticed already that 'etymological explanation' makes a serious start where grammar leaves off, where no grammatical derivations are available, or where they are of no help for finding the meaning. But if the Unādi sūtras were part of grammar, as Yāska thought, one might think that the introduction of enough new Unādi sūtras would make 'etymological explanation' virtually superfluous, would force it to yield all of its terrain to grammar. Śākaṭayana, the grammarian to whom the Unādi sūtras are often ascribed by tradition, shared with the *nairuktas* the view that all nominal words are derived from ('born from') verbs (Nir. 1.12); there is therefore not even in this respect theoretical opposition between grammar (at any rate this grammarian) and 'etymological explanation'. What then is the difference?

The difference appears to be one of emphasis rather than principle. Grammar was too much concentrated on *form* to be always of help for finding the *meaning*, at least in the eyes of Yāska.³⁶ The 'etymologists' opined that the restrictions imposed by grammar excluded much that might be used for finding the meaning [12] of a word. *Damūnas*, for example, is grammatically derived from the root *dam*, but this does not give us much insight into its meaning; Yāska therefore proposes other 'etymologies' which are more enlightening in this respect (above, § 2). And *anna* 'food' is obviously connected with the

³⁶ Cf. already Thieme, 1930: 1035: "Das Nirukta will im wesentlichen die unbekannte oder ungewöhnliche Bedeutung vedischer Worte durch etymologische Spekulation feststellen oder sichern und erklären. Die Unādisūtras wollen dunkle Wortbildungen ohne Rücksicht auf die Bedeutung analysieren, und zwar in grammatisch korrekter Weise."

root *ad* ‘eat’ and may even be grammatically derived from it,³⁷ yet the connection with *ā-nam* shed further light on its meaning (Bronkhorst, 1981a: 7). Grammar therefore is fine as far as it goes. Where the study of meaning is concerned it does not always go far enough. This is done by ‘etymological explanation’.

[14]

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³⁷ Note that Uṇ 3.10 derives it from *an*.

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